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Styles of Sociological Thought: Sociologies, Epistemologies, and the Mexican and U.S. Quests for Truth* GABRIEL ABEND Northwestern University Both U.S. and Mexican sociologies allege that they are in the business of making true scientific knowledge claims about the social world. Conventional conceptions of science notwithstanding, I demonstrate that their claims to truth and scientificity are based on alternative epistemological grounds. Drawing a random sample of nonquantitative articles from four leading journals, I show that, first, they assign a different role to theories, and indeed they have dissimilar understandings of what a theory should consist of. Second, whereas U.S. sociology actively struggles against subjectivity, Mexican sociology maximizes the potentials of subjective viewpoints. Third, U.S. sociologists tend to regard highly and Mexican sociologists to eagerly disregard the principle of ethical neutrality. These consistent and systematic differences raise two theoretical issues. First, I argue that Mexican and U.S. sociologies are epistemologically, semantically, and perceptually incommensurable. I contend that this problem is crucial for sociology’s interest in the social conditioning of scientific knowledge’s content. Second, I suggest four lines of thought that can help us explain the epistemological differences I find. Finally, I argue that sociologists would greatly profit from studying epistemologies in the same fashion they have studied other kinds of scientific and nonscientific beliefs. The phrase ‘‘Uruguayan physics’’ might refer to physics departments located in Montevideo or to physicists who possess Uruguayan citizenship. But insofar as it refers to theories and laws, the traditional conception of science would consider ‘‘Uruguayan physics’’ to be an oxymoronic phrase. Maxwell’s equations are not Scottish, nor is Lavoisier’s refutation of the phlogiston theory of combustion French. In fact, the oxymoron can be made even starker: ‘‘Scottish attitude toward value judgments’’ and ‘‘French conception of objectivity’’ seem to be, from the point of view of science, unintelligible expressions. Unlike mores, political cultures, and aesthetic judgments, science, this argument goes, is universal. In Mannheim’s ([1929] 1966:265) words, ‘‘the sociology of knowledge has set itself the task of solving the problem of the social conditioning of knowledge.’’ Taking *Address correspondence to: Gabriel Abend, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 1810 Chicago Ave., Evanston, IL 60208. E-mail: [email protected]. My research in Mexico was supported by the Center for International and Comparative Studies at Northwestern University and a Fulbright Alumni Initiative Award. I gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of the Centro de Estudios Sociolo´gicos at El Colegio de Me´xico, the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales at UNAM, and the Centro de Investigacioń y Docencia Econo´micas. I have benefited from comments and suggestions from Sarah Babb, Charles Camic, Paula England, Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, Andreas Glaeser, Rebeca de Gortari, Natividad Gutie´rrez, Carol Heimer, Jerry Jacobs, Miche` le Lamont, Jeff Manza, Ann Orloff, Juan Manuel Ortega, Devah Pager, Olivier Roueff, Michael Sauder, Ben Ross Schneider, George Steinmetz, Jessica Thurk, Francisco Zapata, several anonymous referees, and the editors of Sociological Theory. I owe special thanks to Bruce Carruthers, Elif Kale-Lostuvali, and Arthur Stinchcombe, who read more drafts of this paper than I care to remember. Sociological Theory 24:1 March 2006 # American Sociological Association. 1307 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005-4701 2 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY science as a special case of knowledge, one would readily acknowledge that the fact that two communities of sociologists might be interested in different topics or privilege different methods can be accounted for by ‘‘the existential basis of mental productions’’ (Merton [1949] 1968:514). This argument is consistent with ‘‘the image of science by which we are [generally] possessed’’ (Kuhn [1962] 1970:1), according to which science is objective, rational, and universal. For it can be argued that the selection of a research interest or a methodological tool is just a matter of taste unrelated to the context of justification. By contrast, it would not be consistent with the traditional conception of science if two communities of sociologists differed in something more fundamental: the criteria through which they discriminate between true and false claims, their definition of what constitutes knowledge, their under- standing of what an acceptable theory should look like—that is, their epistemological assumptions. While there are theoretical and empirical grounds to expect variation in, for example, foci of attention and rates of advance, it may be an unexpected and unsettling empirical finding that sociology’s very foundations are in some way ‘‘socially constructed’’ (on these scare quotes, see Hacking 1999). This is precisely the question that this article addresses—its main argument is that the discourses of Mexican and U.S. sociologies are consistently underlain by signifi- cantly different epistemological assumptions. In fact, these two Denkgemeinschaften (Fleck [1935] 1979) are notably dissimilar in at least four clusters of variables (see, e.g., Andrade Carrenõ 1998; Brachet-Marquez 1997; Leal y Fernańdez et al. 1995; Girola and Olvera 1994; Davis 1992; Girola and Zabludovsky 1991; Paoli Bolio 1990; Garza Toledo 1989; Sefchovich 1989; Benı´tez Zenteno 1987): their thematic, theoretical, and methodological preferences; their historical development and intellectual influences; the society, culture, and institutions in which they are embedded; and the language they normally use. It is reasonable to expect that if variation in epistemological assumptions can be found at all, it would be more likely when there is variation in these clusters of variables as well. Then, the comparison of Mexican and U.S. sociologies is a promising one to tackle the issue of that ‘‘more fundamental’’ difference. Both U.S. and Mexican sociologies allege that they are in the business of making true scientific knowledge claims about the social world. Conventional conceptions of science notwithstanding, I show that their claims to truth and scientificity are based on alternative epistemological grounds. My argument is organized as follows. After expounding my data and methods, I present my findings in three substantive sections, each of which addresses a different epistemological dimension. The first of them explores the nature and role of theories and the dialogue between theory and evidence. The second looks at whether and how epistemic objectivity is sought after. Finally, the third substantive section examines to what extent the ideal of a value-free science is pursued and realized. In turn, my empirical findings raise two theoretical problems, which I discuss in the conclusion. The first is how to explain the difference I describe. The development of a theory that could explain the exceptionally complex process through which U.S. and Mexican sociologies have come to hold their distinctive epistemological commitments would require a profound historical study, which is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, I shall suggest four lines of thought from which this theory might profit. The second theoretical problem is in what sense variation in epistemologies can be said to be more fundamental than variation in, for example, methods or topics. This will lead us to the subject of commensurability or translatability, that is, whether the translation between theoretical claims rendered in these languages is at all possible (or whether there is a meta-language into which both could be translated). I shall argue STYLES OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 3 that this problem is crucial for the sociology of knowledge in general, and for what I call the ‘‘sociology of epistemologies’’ in particular. Obvious as it by now may seem, I would like nevertheless to underscore that this is not an epistemological treatise but an exercise in the sociology of knowledge. Hence, in accordance with Bloor’s ([1976] 1991:7) tenets of impartiality and symmetry, I do not grant any epistemic privilege to the Mexican or U.S. ways of going about studying the social world. I do not know nor do I care about how true and false beliefs are distributed.1 My approach is not theoretical, normative, or philosophical—it is empirical and sociological. As I argue in the conclusion, sociologists would greatly profit from studying epistemologies in the same fashion they have studied other kinds of scientific and nonscientific beliefs. DATA AND METHODS My inquiry into the epistemological presuppositions that underlie the discourse of U.S. and Mexican sociologies is based on a content analysis of a sample of journal articles. The sample is drawn from two Mexican and two U.S. journals of sociology: American Journal of Sociology (AJS), American Sociological Review (ASR), Estudios Sociolo´gicos (ES), and Revista Mexicana de Sociologıá (RMS). These journals are the most cited and most prestigious ones in each of the communities.2 The following volumes are considered: AJS Volumes 101–106 (1995–2001), ASR Volumes 61–66 (1996–2001), ES Volumes XIV–XVIII (1996–2000), and RMS Volumes LVIII–LXII (1996–2000). Throughout these periods, three different editors served on AJS, two editors and one editorial team on ASR, three directores on ES, and two directores

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