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An Oral History with Maria Benevidez on the Somoza Government Conducted By: Corbin Ayers

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An Oral History with Maria Benevidez on the Somoza Government Conducted By: Corbin Ayers An Oral History with Maria Benevidez on the Somoza Government Conducted by: Corbin Ayers Interviewer: Corbin T. Ayers Interviewee: Maria Benevidez Instructor: Michael Chapper Date: February 17, 2009 Table of Contents Statement of Purpose 3 Biography 4 Historical Contextualization: A Background on Nicaragua and Somoza's Rise to Power 5 Interview Transcription 13 Time Indexing Recording Log 42 Interview Analysis 43 Works Consulted 47 Statement of Purpose This project serves to provide a first hand experience on life under the Somoza family reign in Nicaragua. This task will be accomplished through an interview with Maria Benevidez who was a student at the time, on her father's role in the Somoza government and also life under both the Somoza government and the Sandinista. This unique perspective will provide people with more insight and knowledge than they could ever get from reading a textbook. Biography Maria Benavidez was born on May 29, 1961 in Managua, Nicaragua. She went to the Catholic High School in Managua and went to college at the University of Managua Rendarie Unan. Since her father was part of the Somoza regime she was born into a very wealthy family with many luxuries. However, when the Sandinistas overthrew the Somoza Governemnt, she and her family were left with nothing. The Sandinistas forced their way into her house, killed her father right in front of her eyes, and then proceeded to take anything of value in the house. Many years later she moved to the United States, partly because she was offered aid by her aunt, and also because she wanted to get away from her now ex-husband after he became a part of the Sandinista Government. Her daughter and mother however still live mainly in Nicaragua, however they move quite frequently. When she moved to the United States she could not speak English. But she took classes at the Sans School and learned to speak English. She later also went to NOVA to get her teaching degree. She now teaches at Churchill High School. Historical Contextualization Nicaragua: The Somoza Government Nicaragua is the largest nation in Central America both because of its size (49,579 sq. mi.) and because of its population (more than 4 million). It is a beautiful country the size of Michigan and has an agro-economy. However, Nicaragua’s history is rattled with violence and war, and varying political extremes. Including the dictatorship of the Somoza family from 1936/7 to 1978. Many say that Somoza was a cruel ruthless dictator, but some say the exact opposite. To understand the Somoza Government one must examine Nicaragua’s background, the Somoza regime, and author’s views as well as gain the perspective of someone who was there. Nicaragua would not see independence from Spain until 1821. At the time Central Americans were moving to separate themselves from Spain because of the establishment of an independent empire in Mexico. Nicaraguans were divided as to whether or not to side with advocates of union with Mexico, or advocates for independence from Mexico. Conflict over this ensued from 1839- 1855. There was a lot of foreign interest in Nicaragua, especially from Great Britain and the United States. The British were interested in Nicaragua for attempts to control Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast region. At first the main reason that the United States wanted it was not much more than just to oppose Great Britain. But then they realized how useful Nicaragua could be after the construction of canals to help speed up trade. Because of the potential transit routes that Nicaragua possessed Great Britain forced sovereignty over Nicaragua. Following a battle in 1849 Nicaragua was forced to sign a treaty that did not allow Nicaragua to interfere with the British controlled government of Mosquito King and it’s control of Greytown. When the administration of President James K. Polk heard about the extension of British influence he immediately acted to negotiate with Great Britain and Nicaragua. In 1849 The United States and Nicaragua reached the agreement that The US was allowed to fortify and utilize the transit route across Nicaragua, and in return The US would protect Nicaragua from Great Britain. This lead to many conflicts between the United States and Great Britain. Starting in 1857 Nicaragua entered a time of relative peace under conservative rule. The Conservatives did everything in their power to keep Liberals out of the government. No individual dominated, moderate individuals, most of whom were civilians took turns occupying the presidency. The peace came to an end in 1891 when Roberto Sacasa was elected. Even though Sacasa was conservative, he was from Leon, not Granada. So his election produced a split within the ruling party. The Liberals (led by General Jose Santos Zelaya) took advantage of the situation. In April 1893 a revolt cast out Sacasa and installed another Conservative. Attempts to share the power with Liberals were made, but proved impossible. In July 1893 Zelaya supporters resigned from the government and led a successful revolt. After this a new constitution was quickly made, and Zelaya was officially confirmed president, which he retained until 1909. Nicaraguan Conservatives denounced Zelaya’s reign as unbridled corrupt tyranny. However Central American Liberals and American scholars said that Zelaya was relatively progressive and nationalistic. Impressively, he helped to end the dispute with Britain over the Atlantic Coast; and the formal reincorporation of that region into Nicaragua. On July 1, 1927 Augusto Cesar Sandino issued his first political manifesto, he said that Moncada (the current leader) was a traitor, he vowed to drive the Americans out of Nicaragua and called for joint Latin American construction of a Nicaraguan Canal. Sandino led many revolts against American forces in Nicaragua but all failed. But Sandino would regroup and began a guerilla campaign. Then came the elections of 1932. Moncada had tried to restrict the political activities of the people running against him, and tried to alter the constitution to allow him to stay in power for longer than he was legally allowed to. But the United States stepped in to help regulate the elections, making them into a fairly honest election. In the end Sacasa, mainly due to the Conservative’s lack of funds, won the election. Later Sacasa decided to elect Anastasio Somoza to command the National Guard. Sacasa’s popularity began to decrease after accusations of fraud and poor leadership. Because of increasing military confrontation headed by a man known as Somoza, Sacasa was forced to resign. Somoza then proceeded to resign as chief director of the National Guard, as to comply with the constitutional requirements for eligibility to run for president. With support from the US he won the presidential election of 1836 combining the roles of President and chief director of the Military. Especially at the beginning of his reign Anastasio Somoza Garcia was not the most honest man. “He made conflicting promises to his officers, the president, and the U.S. ambassador; he cajoled, wheedled, and lied”(Booth 52). He also took ownership of textile companies, sugar mills, rum distilleries, the merchant marine lines, the national Nicaraguan Airlines, and La Salud dairy, the countries only pasteurized milk factory, to build upon his own personal wealth while the rest of the country went hungry. The Somoza family not only controlled the military and Presidential office but also controlled the PLN (the Liberal Party), which in turn meant that they had control of the Legislature and the Judicial System, Somoza had control over every single aspect of Nicaraguan politics. To ensure that the National Guard stay loyal to him he keeping direct command in the family and isolated the guardsmen from citizens. The Guard become a sort of Mafia. They directly ran forms of gambling, prostitution and smuggling. Also bribing guardsmen was necessary if someone wanted to engage in any sort of business activity. The power of the National Guard grew and grew until they controlled national radio and telegraph networks, postal and immigration services, health services, the internal revenue service, health services, and the national railroads. Even though it was against the law Somoza punished people who tried to protest him or show any sort of dislike towards him. A little less than 2 years after he had been elected president Somoza declared that he intended to stay in office way beyond his presidential term allowed. Then in 1938 Somoza organized an assembly that gave the president extreme power, reelected Somoza for another eight-year term, allowed the president to make laws regarding the National Guard without consulting Congress, and ensured that Somoza would have complete and total control over the state and Military. This set the stage for a permanent dictatorship. As most would assume Somoza made many political enemies and was thus exteamly defensive at all times: “Gen. Anastasio Somoza, Nicaragua’s Minister of War, declared today that Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Venezuela were convening to overthrown the Nicaraguan Government. General Somoza issued a statement to newspapers saying that he wished “an evil plot” against the peace of Central America. He said that the plot also included El Salvador and Honduras.”(Somoza Sees Plot Against Nicaragua) Coups against him were attempted every once in a while but never succeeded. For his protection he constructed a secure compound and kept bodyguards, separate from the National Guard, with him at all times. Even with all of his security on September 21, 1956 Anastasio Somoza Garcia was wounded while attending a PLN party and died eight days later. Immediately following his father’s death, Luis Somoza Debayle assumed the position of interim president and his brother “Tachito” Somoza took over the National Guard.
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