THE FRONTLOADING OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES FROM THE STATES' PERSPECTIVE by JOSHUA T. PUTNAM (Under the Direction of Paul-Henri Gurian) ABSTRACT In the years since the McGovern-Fraser reforms fundamentally reshaped the presidential nomination process, a trend toward the early scheduling of presidential primaries and caucuses emerged. This frontloading phenomenon has led to nominations being decided earlier and earlier as states moved to have an influence over the process. While the motivation for this movement has been established in the extant literature, nothing has attempted to explain why some states are better able to shift the dates on which their delegate selection event. This research will seek to explain not only what separates states in this regard but also show, using a series of time series cross-sectional logistic regression models; that political and structural factors have a larger impact on obstructing some states from moving their primaries and caucuses than states simply being motivated to move. INDEX WORDS: presidential primaries, caucuses, frontloading, presidential nominations, concurrent primaries, divided government THE FRONTLOADING OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES FROM THE STATES' PERSPECTIVE by JOSHUA T. PUTNAM B.A., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1999 M.A., The University of Georgia, 2004 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ATHENS, GEORGIA 2010 © 2010 Joshua T. Putnam All Rights Reserved THE FRONTLOADING OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES FROM THE STATES' PERSPECTIVE by JOSHUA T. PUTNAM Major Professor: Paul-Henri Gurian Committee: Damon Cann Audrey Haynes Arnold Fleischmann M.V. Hood III Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2010 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This research would not have been possible except for the two children who most motivated me to finish this tremendous endeavor. Thank you Aden and Harper. A huge debt of gratitude is also owed to my parents, Hugh and Eva Putnam, and my sister, Vandy, who have been with me from the beginning. Thank you all for the support you have given me not only throughout this process, but in life as well. I am nothing without my family. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my political science family. Thank you Paul and Audrey for all the guidance you have provided me during my tenure at UGA. Finally, thank you to everyone else who touched my life during and had an impact on this process. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................................iv CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: FRONTLOADING FROM THE STATE’S PERSPECTIVE…..1 2 THE STORY BEHIND THE FRONTLOADING PHENOMENON………………..8 3 A THEORY OF FRONTLOADING………………………………………………..36 4 STATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE FRONTLOADING DECSION……………64 5 A FULL MODEL OF FRONTLOADING DECISION MAKING………………....97 6 THE FUTURE OF FRONTLOADING AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM………………………………………………………..122 REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………....131 APPENDICES A PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY CALENDARS, 1976-2012………………………..134 B VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATIONS………………………………………...144 v Chapter 1. Introduction: Frontloading from the States' Perspective Should we move up? Should we stay put? Those are two of the questions that have faced states since the McGovern-Fraser reforms fundamentally restructured the methods by which the two major parties' presidential nominees are chosen during the final presidential election cycle of the 1960s. Part of the outcome of that process has been an irregular lurch forward over time as states began shifting their delegate selection contests as a means of influencing the nominations. Though there has been some ebb and flow to the movement from state to state in the cycles since, the product has been a compressed calendar of delegate selection events with a majority of primaries and caucuses at the very beginning of the presidential election year. That collective movement over time and the byproducts are together what has come to be known as frontloading All states, however, are not created equal in terms of frontloading. In fact, in the presidential nomination process, those states scheduled at the front end of the calendar are better able to have a noticeable impact on the outcome of the nomination race. Though the motivation to hold a contest early may be present across states, the desire and/or ability to reschedule those primaries or caucuses on a more advantageous date is not uniformly distributed across the fifty states. Why is it, then, that some states have shifted to earlier dates over the last four decades of presidential election cycles and others have either not moved at all or have moved temporarily only to move back to the original [later] date in a subsequent cycle? That is the question this research intends to explain. To this point, the literature regarding frontloading has established the motivation states have to move to earlier dates from a national perspective (Mayer and Busch 2004). Yet, that fails to explain the action from the level at which it is occurring, the state level. This research not only continues the shift in focus toward the state-level decision makers charged with scheduling 1 a state’s primary or caucus, but also broadens the scope of factors affecting that decision. Most importantly, while the extant literature establishes the pattern of motivation, it misses the deterrents that separate the states that can and do move from those that either cannot or do not shift the dates on which their delegate selection events are held. That more dynamic explanation of the frontloading process places particular import on the relationship between the state-level frontloading decision makers and the national parties in terms of the rules governing delegate selection. Given the Florida and Michigan situation that confronted the Democratic Party during the 2008 election cycle, establishing the extent of that relationship could have far-reaching implications in not only future cycles, but in future research. This dynamic theory of the frontloading decision-making process hinges on the notion of rationally-acting state actors weighing the costs and benefits of making a change to the date on which the state’s primary or caucus is held. If the incentives are sufficiently high, a state will be more likely to move. However, if the deterrents (structural and political) outweigh those benefits, a state will be more likely to stand pat and not change the existing law. The interplay of the costs and benefits are best typified by the decisions made in Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina during the post-reform era. Despite being a limited sample of the full array of issues attendant to the frontloading decision, these three states serve as a microcosm of the basic types of movement witnessed throughout this period and provide an example of the impetus behind some of the frontloading decisions made over the last ten cycles. North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia all share a border, yet have dealt with the timing of their presidential delegate selection events in very different ways. All three faced some motivation, if not pressure, to align the dates on which their contests were held given the push across the South during the late 1970s and into the 1980s to establish a southern regional 2 primary. Yet, all three states pursued different strategies for complying with national Democratic Party rules and ultimately determining the dates on which their delegate selection events would be held. Outside of those regional forces, it was the set of obstacles – not motivating factors – that helped or hindered each of those states from freely moving its delegate selection event. During the 1976 cycle, North Carolina scheduled its primary in late March – an early date within the first four weeks of the process after New Hampshire. Despite the primary having kept Ronald Reagan in the race for the Republican nomination against Gerald Ford in 1976, the Old North State – or its Democratic-controlled state legislature – moved its primary for 1980 to May, coupled with the state's primaries for state and local offices. Establishing that bond between the presidential contest and those for state and local offices would prove prohibitive to primary movement in future cycles. The effect that had was to force on the decision makers in the North Carolina in every cycle in which the two primary types were held concurrently to make a handful of decisions regarding frontloading. First, would the state move its primary to an earlier date? If not, there was no change, but if the decision to move was made, there was an additional layer to consider. The first option is to sever the bond between the presidential primary and the primaries for state and local offices and move the newly created presidential primary to an earlier position. State actors in North Carolina also could have moved the concurrent set of primaries to an earlier date. The catch there is that both options come with costs. The former requires the funding of a new election, while the latter could hurt the fortunes of candidates in down-ballot races in terms of tradition and turnout. The story during the same period in Georgia and South Carolina was altogether different. Both states held presidential contests that were separate from their nomination structures for state and local offices and continued to do so throughout the post-reform era. Simply because North 3 Carolina established that bond between the two levels of nominating contests, the state faced a barrier that Georgia and South Carolina never encountered. Namely, if the decision makers in the Tarheel State desired a change in the date on which its presidential primary was to be held, they faced the reality of having to fund an entirely new and separate election.