The National Intelligence Council: Issues and Options for Congress
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September 12, 2006 the Honorable John Warner, Chairman The
GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, USA (RET.) GENERAL JOSEPH HOAR, USMC (RET.) ADMIRAL GREGORY G. JOHNSON, USN (RET.) ADMIRAL JAY L. JOHNSON, USN (RET.) GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, USA (RET.) GENERAL MERRILL A. MCPEAK, USAF (RET.) ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN (RET.) GENERAL WILLIAM G. T. TUTTLE JR., USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL W. CHRISTMAN, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL E. FUNK, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT G. GARD JR., USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAY M. GARNER, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL LEE F. GUNN, USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARLEN D. JAMESON, USAF (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAUDIA J. KENNEDY, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONALD L. KERRICK, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL ALBERT H. KONETZNI JR., USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES OTSTOTT, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL JACK SHANAHAN, USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY E. SOYSTER, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL K. VAN RIPER, USMC (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL JOHN BATISTE, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL EUGENE FOX, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL JOHN L. FUGH, USA (RET.) REAR ADMIRAL DON GUTER, USN (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL FRED E. HAYNES, USMC (RET.) REAR ADMIRAL JOHN D. HUTSON, USN (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL MELVYN MONTANO, ANG (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL GERALD T. SAJER, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL J. SCOTTI JR., USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID M. BRAHMS, USMC (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES P. CULLEN, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL EVELYN P. FOOTE, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID R. IRVINE, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN H. JOHNS, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL RICHARD O’MEARA, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL MURRAY G. SAGSVEEN, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN K. SCHMITT, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL ANTHONY VERRENGIA, USAF (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL STEPHEN N. -
Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. -
New Frontiers of Intelligence Analysis
A Publication of the Global Futures Partnership of the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis Link Campus University of Malta Gino Germani Center for Comparative Studies of Modernization and Development NEW FRONTIERS OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS Papers presented at the conference on “New Frontiers of Intelligence Analysis: Shared Threats, Diverse Perspectives, New Communities” Rome, Italy, 31 March-2 April 2004 1 All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in these collected papers are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the official positions or views of the Global Futures Part- nership of the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, of the Link Campus University of Malta, or of the Gino Germani Center for the Comparative Study of Modernization and Develop- ment. The papers in this publication have been published with the consent of the authors. This volume has been edited by the New Frontiers conference co-directors. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to New Frontiers conference co-di- rector Dr. L. S. Germani : [email protected] All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval sys- tem, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers and the authors of the papers. 2 CONTENTS PREFACE 5 Vincenzo Scotti INTRODUCTION 9 Carol Dumaine and L. Sergio Germani Part I - INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO THE CONFERENCE 1 - INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 15 Gianfranco Fini 2 - INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 17 Nicolò Pollari Part II – PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE 3 - LOOKING OVER THE HORIZON: STRATEGIC CHOICES, INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES 23 Robert L. -
The Train in Spain Fell Mainly Off the Rail (With Apologies to "My Fair Lady")
The Train in Spain Fell Mainly off the Rail (with apologies to "My Fair Lady") March 13, 2004 By Robbie Friedmann The horrendous terror atrocity that murdered about 200 and injured some 1600 on Madrid trains has already become Spain's 9-11, acquiring its own symbol of 3-11, and is seen by some as a "reminder" that the war on terrorism has not ended ("Spain's 3/11: A horrifying reminder that the war on terror is not over," Editorial, Wall Street Journal, 12 March 2004). As if reminders are needed. Initial reports from Spain blamed the multiple blasts on the Basque separatist group ETA and reports suggest that the Spanish foreign minister instructed all Spanish ambassadors to push this notion no matter what other evidence comes up (while keeping all investigation avenues "open"). This is partly because in Spain an act by ETA will be perceived as a unifying factor, while terrorism by Islamist groups may tilt the sentiment against the Spanish involvement in the war on terror. Given the elections slated for next week, the stakes are indeed very high. Even the U.N. Security Council rushed to condemn ETA even as it had no proof ETA was involved (see U.N. Resolution 1530). Nevertheless, initial non-Spanish reports suspected al-Qaeda involvement and shortly thereafter ETA denied any responsibility and al-Qaeda indeed quickly declared it ("Al-Qaeda Took Responsibility for Thursday's Madrid Bombings: 190 people killed, 1,400 injured in Madrid train bombings. Stolen car with detonators and tapes in Arabic found near Madrid," Ma'ariv Online, 11 March 2004), and respected Israeli analysts tended to accept it at face value. -
CIA Director Documentary: 'The Attacks Will Be Spectacular'
Case 1:15-cv-01954-CM Document 53-4 Filed 12/01/15 Page 1 of 7 Exhibit 54 November 2015 Panetta Statement CIA Director Documentary: Case‘The Attacks 1:15-cv-01954-CM Will Be Spectacular’ - POLITICO Document Magazine 53-4 Filed 12/01/15 Page 2 of 7 11/30/15, 8:17 PM THE FRIDAY COVER ‘The Attacks Will Be Spectacular’ An exclusive look at how the Bush administration ignored this warning from the CIA months before 9/11, along with others that were far more detailed than previously revealed. By CHRIS WHIPPLE | November 12, 2015 Getty in Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” The CIA’s famous Presidential Daily Brief, presented to George W. Bush on August 6, 2001, has always been Exhibit A in the “B case that his administration shrugged off warnings of an Al Qaeda attack. But months earlier, starting in the spring of 2001, the CIA repeatedly and urgently began to warn the White House that an attack was coming. By May of 2001, says Cofer Black, then chief of the CIA’s counterterrorism center, “it was very http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/cia-directors-documentary-911-bush-213353 Page 1 of 6 CIA Director Documentary: Case‘The Attacks 1:15-cv-01954-CM Will Be Spectacular’ - POLITICO Document Magazine 53-4 Filed 12/01/15 Page 3 of 7 11/30/15, 8:17 PM evident that we were going to be struck, we were gonna be struck hard and lots of Americans were going to die.” “There were real plots being manifested,” Cofer’s former boss, George Tenet, told me in his first interview in eight years. -
Interview with Jonathan Dayton (Jock) Stoddart
Library of Congress Interview with Jonathan Dayton (Jock) Stoddart The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project JONATHAN (JOCK) DAYTON STODDART Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: January 19, 2000 Copyright 2002 ADST Q: This is an interview with Jonathan Dayton Stoddart which is being done on behave of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Jock let's start with when and where were you born? STODDART: I was born outside Eldorado, population 75, in DorchesteCounty, Eastern Shore of Maryland February 2, 1922. Q: Could you tell me a little about your family and theibackgrounds? STODDART: Both of my parents were from Philadelphia. My mother came from a relatively affluent family. She was born, as was my father, in 1896. She was a very bright, gregarious, and attractive young woman. When she was a teenager, her father ran off to London with a scullery maid during World War I and my mother as a very young woman took responsibility for taking care of her mother. She became a newspaper woman and worked for the old Philadelphia Record in advertising. After World War I, she met my father, who came from a completely different family background, respected but poor. He was orphaned by the time he was five years old and was brought up by a wonderful woman, his grandmother, who worked at the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia until her early 80s. He spent ages six through ten in an orphanage outside of Philadelphia. He graduated Interview with Jonathan Dayton (Jock) Stoddart http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001134 Library of Congress on an accelerated curriculum at the age of 16 from Central High School in Philadelphia, which was considered a very elite, good school. -
Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence Tom Grassey
Naval War College Review Volume 59 Article 16 Number 4 Autumn 2006 Burn before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence Tom Grassey Stansfield urT ner Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Grassey, Tom and Turner, Stansfield (2006) "Burn before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence," Naval War College Review: Vol. 59 : No. 4 , Article 16. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/16 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen 142Grassey NAVAL and WAR Turner: COLLEGE Burn REVIEWbefore Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intel find a single plan laid out in such com- expected to produce an atomic bomb is plete detail. mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953.” RICHMOND M. LLOYD William B. Ruger Chair of Turner recounts subsequent intelligence National Security Economics failures, but because the manuscript was Naval War College submitted to the CIA for security review, few readers should be surprised by this history. While most facts are familiar, Turner’s Turner, Stansfield. Burn before Reading: Presidents, thesis is that the director of Central In- CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence. New York: telligence serves the president in two ca- Hyperion, 2005. 319pp. $23.95 pacities: leading the CIA in providing Presumably Stansfield Turner did not unbiased intelligence; and heading the devise the nonsensical title of this history intelligence community, “fifteen federal of the DCI’s (Director, Central Intelli- agencies, offices, and bureaus within the gence) relationship with the president of executive branch.” Turner evaluates the the United States. -
Swire. “The Declining Half-Life of Secrets”
CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE New America Cybersecurity Fellows Paper Series - Number 1 THE DECLINING HALF -LIFE OF SECRETS And the Future of Signals Intelligence By Peter Swire July 2015 © 2015 NEW AMERICA This report carries a Creative Commons license, which permits non-commercial re-use of New America content when proper attribution is provided. This means you are free to copy, display and distribute New America’s work, or in- clude our content in derivative works, under the following conditions: ATTRIBUTION. NONCOMMERCIAL. SHARE ALIKE. You must clearly attribute the work You may not use this work for If you alter, transform, or build to New America, and provide a link commercial purposes without upon this work, you may distribute back to www.newamerica.org. explicit prior permission from the resulting work only under a New America. license identical to this one. For the full legal code of this Creative Commons license, please visit creativecommons.org. If you have any questions about citing or reusing New America content, please contact us. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Peter Swire, Nancy J. and Lawrence P. Huang Professor of Law and Ethics, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology; Senior Counsel, Alston & Bird LLP; and New America Cybersecurity Fellow ABOUT THE CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Internet has connected us. Yet the policies and debates that sur- Many thanks to Ross Anderson, Ashkan round the security of our networks are too often disconnected, disjoint- Soltani and Lee Tien for assistance with ed, and stuck in an unsuccessful status quo. This is what New Ameri- this draft, and to the fellow members ca’s Cybersecurity Initiative is designed to address. -
N Ieman Reports
NIEMAN REPORTS Nieman Reports One Francis Avenue Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Nieman Reports THE NIEMAN FOUNDATION FOR JOURNALISM AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY VOL. 62 NO. 1 SPRING 2008 VOL. 62 NO. 1 SPRING 2008 21 ST CENTURY MUCKRAKERS THE NIEMAN FOUNDATION HARVARDAT UNIVERSITY 21st Century Muckrakers Who Are They? How Do They Do Their Work? Words & Reflections: Secrets, Sources and Silencing Watchdogs Journalism 2.0 End Note went to the Carnegie Endowment in New York but of the Oakland Tribune, and Maynard was throw- found times to return to Cambridge—like many, ing out questions fast and furiously about my civil I had “withdrawal symptoms” after my Harvard rights coverage. I realized my interview was lasting ‘to promote and elevate the year—and would meet with Tenney. She came to longer than most, and I wondered, “Is he trying to my wedding in Toronto in 1984, and we tried to knock me out of competition?” Then I happened to keep in touch regularly. Several of our class, Peggy glance over at Tenney and got the only smile from standards of journalism’ Simpson, Peggy Engel, Kat Harting, and Nancy the group—and a warm, welcoming one it was. I Day visited Tenney in her assisted living facility felt calmer. Finally, when the interview ended, I in Cambridge some years ago, during a Nieman am happy to say, Maynard leaped out of his chair reunion. She cared little about her own problems and hugged me. Agnes Wahl Nieman and was always interested in others. Curator Jim Tenney was a unique woman, and I thoroughly Thomson was the public and intellectual face of enjoyed her friendship. -
Sherman Kent, Scientific Hubris, and the CIA's Office of National Estimates
Inman Award Essay Beacon and Warning: Sherman Kent, Scientific Hubris, and the CIA’s Office of National Estimates J. Peter Scoblic Beacon and Warning: Sherman Kent, Scientific Hubris, and the CIA’s Office of National Estimates Would-be forecasters have increasingly extolled the predictive potential of Big Data and artificial intelligence. This essay reviews the career of Sherman Kent, the Yale historian who directed the CIA’s Office of National Estimates from 1952 to 1967, with an eye toward evaluating this enthusiasm. Charged with anticipating threats to U.S. national security, Kent believed, as did much of the postwar academy, that contemporary developments in the social sciences enabled scholars to forecast human behavior with far greater accuracy than before. The predictive record of the Office of National Estimates was, however, decidedly mixed. Kent’s methodological rigor enabled him to professionalize U.S. intelligence analysis, making him a model in today’s “post- truth” climate, but his failures offer a cautionary tale for those who insist that technology will soon reveal the future. I believe it is fair to say that, as a on European civilization.2 Kent had no military, group, [19th-century historians] thought diplomatic, or intelligence background — in fact, their knowledge of the past gave them a no government experience of any kind. This would prophetic vision of what was to come.1 seem to make him an odd candidate to serve –Sherman Kent William “Wild Bill” Donovan, a man of intimidating martial accomplishment, whom President Franklin t is no small irony that the man who did D. -
CLASSROOM | 9-12 Lessons
CLASSROOM | 9-12 Lessons : JIMMY CARTER AND THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS President Carter announces sanctions against Iran in the White House Press Room. Jimmy Carter Library Jimmy Carter would say later, “No matter who was with me, we watched the big grandfather clock by the door.” Time was running out, for it was Tuesday, January 20, 1981. The scene was the Oval Office. In just hours this president would leave it for good, and a new leader, Ronald Reagan, would move in. As the clock ticked the time away, Carter tried to resolve a crisis that had almost destroyed his presidency. He was close, very close, and as he said, “At stake were the lives of 52 precious human beings who had been imprisoned in Iran for 444 days–and almost 12 billion dollars of Iranian assets.” 1 Prelude The beginnings of this crisis preceded Jimmy Carter’s term by almost thirty years. For that long, the United States had provided political support and, more recently, massive military assistance to the government of the shah of Iran. Iran was important because it provided oil to the industrial West and separated the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf and the oil states. The United States had an enormous stake in keeping it stable and independent. By 1979, however, when Carter had been in office three years, the shah was in trouble, reaping the harvest of years of brutal and unpopular policies, including the use of secret police that controlled dissent with arbitrary arrests and torture.2 It was clear that the shah had lost the (next page) White House Historical Association | http://www.whha.org | Pg. -
SHERMAN KENT at YALE 62 the Making of an Intelligence Analyst Antonia Woodford
THE YALE HISTORICAL REVIEW AN UNDERGRADUATE PUBLICATION SPRING 2014 THE YALE HISTORICAL REVIEW AN UNDERGRADUATE PUBLICATION The Yale Historical Review provides undergraduates an opportunity to have their exceptional work highlighted and SPRING 2014 encourages the diffusion of original historical ideas on campus by VOLUME III providing a forum for outstanding undergraduate history papers ISSUE II covering any historical topic. The Yale Historical Review Editorial Board For past issues and information regarding gratefully acknowledges the support of the submissions, advertisements, subscriptions, following donors: contributions, and our Editorial Board, please visit our website: FOUNDING PATRONS Matthew and Laura Dominski WWW.YALE.EDU/ In Memory of David J. Magoon YALEHISTORICALREVIEW Sareet Majumdar Brenda and David Oestreich Stauer Or visit our Facebook page: Derek Wang Yale Club of the Treasure Coast WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/ Zixiang Zhao YALEHISTORICALREVIEW FOUNDING CONTRIBUTORS With further questions or to provide Council on Latin American and Iberian feedback, please e-mail us at: Studies at Yale Department of History, Yale University [email protected] Peter Dominksi J.S. Renkert Joe and Marlene Toot Or write to us at: Yale Center for British Art Yale Club of Hartford THE YALE HISTORICAL REVIEW Yale Council on Middle East Studies P.O. BOX #204762 NEW HAVEN, CT 06520 CONTRIBUTORS Annie Yi The Yale Historical Review is published by Greg Weiss Yale students. Yale University is not Department of the History of Art, Yale responsible for its contents. University ON THE COVER: U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Special Publication No. 7: Atlas of the Philippine Islands (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), Biodiversity Heritage Li- brary, http://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/106585#page/43/mode/1up.