Khost Province – Governor – Deputy Governor – Hezb-E-Islami – Jalaluddin Haqani – Security Situation

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Khost Province – Governor – Deputy Governor – Hezb-E-Islami – Jalaluddin Haqani – Security Situation Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: AFG23736 Country: Afghanistan Date: 29 November 2005 Keywords: Afghanistan – Khost Province – Governor – Deputy Governor – Hezb-e-Islami – Jalaluddin Haqani – Security situation This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Questions 1. What are the political party affiliations of the governor and deputy governor of Khost province? 2. Is there any evidence that the governor or deputy governor of Khost Province are particularly opposed to Hezb-e-Islami? 3. Are they causing problems for supporters of this group? 4. Are members of the group headed by Jalaluddin Haqani active in Khost province? 5. Are they part of the provincial government? 6. Are they causing any problems in the area? 7. Please provide information about the general security situation in Khost province. RESPONSE 1. What are the political party affiliations of the governor and deputy governor of Khost province? The RRT Country Research Provincial Governors of Afghanistan 2004-2005 package indicates that Mera Juddin Pathan has been the governor of Khost province since April 2004 (RRT Country Research 2005, Provincial Governors of Afghanistan 2004-2005, 22 September – Attachment 1). The package refers to articles that provide background information on Pathan, including an article dated 8 December 2004 that indicates that “Merajuddin Patan, the governor of Khost province,” had “fought the Soviet Union’s occupation of the country in the 1980s, became a taekwondo instructor in Arlington and returned to his native land after the fall of the Taliban.” The article also notes that Patan considered the inauguration of Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan’s first elected president as “the birth of our nation” (Lancaster, John 2004, ‘At Inauguration, Karzai Vows Action on Tough Issues’, Washington Post, 8 December http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42132-2004Dec7.html – Accessed 15 September 2005 – Attachment 2). A search of the sources consulted found no information regarding the political party affiliations of the governor of Khost province or details regarding the current deputy governor of the province. 2. Is there any evidence that the governor or deputy governor of Khost Province are particularly opposed to Hezb-e-Islami? 3. Are they causing problems for supporters of this group? A search of the sources consulted found no specific reference to information regarding whether the governor or deputy governor of Khost Province are particularly opposed to Hezb-e-Islami or whether they are causing problems for supporters of this group. An article in the Pakistan newspaper Daily Times dated 29 April 2005 refers to comments by “Merajudeen Patan, Khost Governor” regarding the surrender of seventeen members of the Hekmatyar-led Hezb-e-Islami to Afghan authorities. Patan told reporters that “Seventeen commanders of Hezb-e-Islami from different districts of Paktia and Khost provinces returned from Pakistan and joined the political process” (‘17 Hezb-e-Islami militants surrender in Afghanistan’ 2005, Daily Times, 29 April http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_29-4-2005_pg7_51 - Accessed 4 November 2005 – Attachment 3). In relation to the Taliban, an article dated 28 April 2005 indicates that “Merajuddin Pathan, governor of Khost province,” had said that in relation to President Karzai’s amnesty for lower and middle level Taliban, “We will deal with the Afghan Taliban through dialogue. And we will handle the Pakistani Taliban with bullets” (Baldauf, Scott 2005, ‘Taliban coming in from cold’, AOP: Today’s Afghan News, source: The Christian Science Monitor, 28 April – Attachment 4). 4. Are members of the group headed by Jalaluddin Haqani active in Khost province? 5. Are they causing any problems in the area? A RFE/RFL Newsline article dated 30 September 2005 indicates that Jalaluddin Haqani was “believed to be the mastermind behind a recent upsurge of neo-Taliban terrorist activities.” According to the article, “Haqani was a celebrated mujahedin commander during the anti- Soviet resistance before joining the Taliban regime in a ministerial capacity. Since the demise of the Taliban regime, Haqani has been regarded as one of the top leaders of the neo-Taliban and as a key coordinator of activities between the Afghan militants and Al-Qaeda members” (‘Pakistani forces arrest wanted neo-Taliban leader’ 2005, RFE/RFL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 185, Part III, 30 September – Attachment 5). An article dated 31 August 2005 reports that “Khost intelligence head Sadeq Tarakhel” had said that “a large quantity of weapons and ammunitions had been recovered from the house of commander Zahidullah, a loyalist of former Taliban minister Jalaluddin Haqqani.” The commander was not captured in the raid (‘Rocket attack damages checkpoint in Khost City’ 2005, Pajhwok Afghan News, 31 August - Attachment 6). An article dated 29 August 2005 refers to the comments of a senior military officer “that apart from al-Qaeda and Taliban, the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani were launching regular attacks on US and Afghan forces.” Haqqani was “part of a fundamentalist web that is connected to controversial madrassas - religious schools - and training camps in Pakistan.” The officer said that “The Haqqani and Hekmatyar groups are operating around Khost [a border province]” (McGeough, Paul 2005, ‘Into the Afghan danger zone’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 August – Attachment 7). An article dated 9 July 2005 indicates that two Taliban leaders in Khost, “allied with former minister Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, Saturday renounced militancy and pledged allegiance to the government.” The two leaders “vowed support to the government through Mualim Jan, then Jalaluddin Haqqani’s close confidant, who had surrendered to provincial authorities on April 1” (‘Two more Taliban activists switch sides in Khost’ 2005, Pajhwok Afghan News, 9 July – Attachment 8). According to an article dated 19 May 2005, reliable sources had said that the Taliban had “appointed Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, as its chief in Paktia, Paktika and Khost” (‘Al-Qaeda and Taleban appoint new regional chiefs’ 2005, AOP: Today’s Afghan News, source: Arman-e-Milli, 19 May – Attachment 9). An article dated 15 May 2005 indicates that Taliban insurgents commanded by Jalaluddin Haqqani were carrying out assaults “along the Pakistan border, near Khost”. It is stated in the article that: “Further north along the Pakistan border, near Khost, the war hasbecome [sic] a hot one – human waves of Taliban fighters launch night assaults against the fortified bases of an Afghan mercenary force recruited by the CIA. Those insurgents are under the command of an old warlord with links to Saudi Arabia – Jalaluddin Haqqani – whose Pakistan-based operations seem to have received a new infusion of Gulf money” (‘In Afghanistan, the Taliban rises again for fighting season’ 2005, AOP: Today’s Afghan News, source: The Independent (UK), 15 May – Attachment 10). An article dated 31 March 2005 refers to an attack on the Batai area in Ali Sher district of Khost province during the previous week and the “capture of the town by fighters loyal to another wanted Taleban leader, Commander Jalaloddin Haqqani”. It is stated in the article that: The attack on Batai area in Ali Sher district of Khost last week and capture of the town by fighters loyal to another wanted Taleban leader, Commander Jalaloddin Haqqani, required heavy bombing by the US planes to dislodge the attackers. The attackers, led by Maulavi Muntazir, suffered as many as 13 casualties in the bombing, but they also claimed to have killed and injured at least 10 Afghan soldiers. No independent confirmation about the casualties is available. "We have the force and will to capture areas close to Kabul, but cannot protect ourselves against heavy bombing," a source close to Maulavi Muntazir claimed. According to the source, as many as 409 fighters took part in the offensive on Batai area, with 150 fighters pounding the area with heavy and light weapons from the surrounding hill tops, another 150 making the ground advance, 100 deputed to take care of the local informers helping the US and Afghan authorities while nine persons were assigned the task to act as informers for the attackers. Pakistani forces have increased raids and search operations in the border areas in a bid to plug entry-exit points and also smash their hideouts on the Pakistani side of the border (‘Pakistan daily reports less unrest in Waziristan, more clashes in Afghanistan’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: The News website, Islamabad, 31 March – Attachment 11). An article dated 16 February 2005 indicates that a spokesman for Jalalodin Haqani had denied reports that talks were going on “between close friends of Mawlawi Jalodin Haqani and the government”. The article refers to comments by Khost’s governor, Merajodin Patan, that “Jalalodin Haqani’s close friends” had contacted them and sent representatives. Patan said that they wanted “to join the government” (‘Governor of south Afghan province confirms talks with Taleban’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Afghan Islamic Press news agency, Peshawar, 16 February – Attachment 12). According
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