ORGANIZATIONAL and PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS of TERRORISM NATO Science for Peace and Security Series

ORGANIZATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TERRORISM NATO Science for Peace and Security Series

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 43 ISSN 1874-6276 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series

This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS).

Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience.

Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action.

The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 43 ISSN 1874-6276 Proceedings on NATO Advanced Training Course on the Organizational and Psychological Profile of Terrorism Skopje, Macedonia 22–26 October 2007

ISBN 978-1-58603-892-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008932760

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This page intentionally left blank Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism vii Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Preface

The book Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism collects the lectures delivered at an Advanced Training Course (ATC) in Skopje, Macedonia, between 22 and 26 October 2007. The course was organized by the Ankara-based Centre of Excellence–Defence Against Terrorism (COE–DAT), and it was funded and supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme. COE–DAT was opened in 2005 with the purpose of supporting NATO on defence issues related to terrorism. Turkey is the framework nation, and at present six other nations also contribute with staff and funds, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Romania, the Netherlands and Germany. Each year, COE–DAT organizes numerous workshops and courses, bringing academic rigour and institutional expertise in terrorism to interested parties in NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, Non-triple Nations, and others. The course was taught by twelve lecturers, nine of whom have contributed to this book. They are both academics and practitioners, selected for their expertise in military, police and security affairs. The lecturers were able to share their experiences with those who attended the course, many of whom were from the Macedonian ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, and from the National Intelligence Agency, Crisis Management Unit, and Civil Aviation Agency. In terms of structure, the course handled terrorism in its broad outlines first, and then proceeded to highlight such aspects as the organizational structure of terrorist groups, their psychology and group dynamics, financing, and recruitment. Along with each topic, the question of how to counter terrorist activities is addressed. The first speaker was COE–DAT Concept Specialist Miss Zeynep Sütalan, who introduced “The Causes of Terrorism” (see the first chapter below). This paper reviews the ‘structural causes’ cited by those who see terrorism as the result of the international system, or political, cultural, social and economic realities. While deprivation is one factor leading to terrorism, Sütalan draws attention to Martha Crenshaw’s observation that “[n]ot all those who are discriminated against turn to terrorism”, and that perceptions of injustice play an important role. This paper also introduces the psychological aspects of this kind of violence, referring to approaches which seek to find explanations in individual experience and in the influence of group identity. Zeynep Sütalan’s second paper discusses “Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism”. Already in her first paper’s section on the psychological causes of terrorist violence she spoke of the “high priority” given to ideology by organizations’ leaders as they seek to develop a group identity. In this article Sütalan develops the argument that “the ideology is not what motivates people to turn to terrorism … it is used as a legitimizing tool”. The example of the PKK illustrates the kind of ideological shift which organizations make as they try to adapt to the changing circumstances of the modern world. The paper also gives an overview of the main ideologies to which attempts to justify terrorism have appealed, and these are divided into four types: left-wing, right-wing, separatist, and religious. There are many insights into contemporary trends in the article, which notes that changing balances in the international system, societies in transition, economic pressures, etc., have all viii contributed to the rise of religious terrorism. However, in an individualized world, we will see the mushrooming of extremist ideas, but no single ideology will be able to capture an entire generation as Marxism did: “[I]t is not likely that Islamist extremism or any other type of religious extremism will become … a dominant global counter- ideology opposing the liberal paradigm.” A perspective on terrorism in the future is also provided by Major Julian Charvat (see the chapter “Terrorism Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects (Conventional, Bio, WMD, Cyber, etc.)”). Drawing on his practical experience as a soldier, the speaker shares his knowledge of the modus operandi and weaponry of terror. The most visible change here has been the adoption of the new methods, tactics and approaches for the attacks, and the way all terrorist networks have embraced technology. Almost every country must now be concerned about terrorist attacks using CBRN weapons of mass destruction. The police in Turkey have been looking closely at the problem of recruitment to terrorist groups in that country. The approach they have developed is explained in the first part of a paper by Police Chief Yavuz Özdemir, written in collaboration with Supt. Necati Alkan (see “Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations”). He shows how the violent organizations put candidates through a rigorous screening, and gradual ‘process of construction’. As a survey by Özönder has shown, individuals have been drawn into the PKK through social networks. These are classified into relationships with friends, relatives, and fellow-countrymen. The role of social activities and appeals to ethnic identities and religious values is also significant. In the second part of this chapter, on ‘Psychological Methods’ of recruitment, Özdemir and Alkan examine the stages through which the recruits’ perceptions are changed, giving them a militant personality. The authors analyse the attractions of the group according to Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ theory, which ranges from physiological needs to the needs associated with self-actualization. They show how hierarchical organizations, working as cells, make effective use of group dynamics to attract and then intimidate recruits. In a final passage of “Conclusions and Suggestions”, the authors point out that one can combat terrorism politically, but unless one addresses the human issues organizations will continue to be able to recruit: “…particularly the youth must be well informed about the activities of terrorist organizations, and they must be taught methods and ways to avoid catching the ‘terrorism disease’.” The Course Director, Police Chief Seyit Ahmet Eren, considered the “Psychology of Terrorists and Profile of Suicide Bombers”. The paper begins by evoking the thought world of the terrorist, dominated by notions heroism and evil, and the author emphasises the importance of the leader and the ideology. Focusing on suicide bombers, he provides ‘in broad terms’ the profile of an attacker. The motivations of the suicide are listed, as are the demands placed on him/her by the terrorist group. Eren also answers the question why such a high percentage of suicide attackers are women. He notes that “not only the security forces but all other institutions and civil society must get involved in coping with suicide terrorism”. Lt.-Col. U÷ur Ersen provides an “Overview of Crisis Management Related to Terrorist Attacks”. This chapter is of practical use to project managers, and all involved in preparation against attacks. In crisis management, the policy and strategy is developed by the ministry and government, but there are supervisory roles also for the Crisis Management Centre (CMC), on-scene leaders, and response team leaders. The tools include logistics, health and safety, information management, public order, and legal support. The CMC, providing centralized control, may be composed of police, ix army, fire fighters, health workers, municipality, and other experts. The paper then analyses the phases of crisis management, from the planning and preparation, including exercises, to the execution. In Major Julian Charvat’s lecture on “Possibilities of Cooperation and Coordination”, the state’s responses to terrorism are divided according to the criminal justice and war models. Of these, “[f]or international cooperation the War Model is far more controversial … when the War Model is applied some states may baulk at full cooperation”. The author briefly considers areas of international cooperation, and notes in particular the international agreements on preventing maritime terrorism. There is a need, not only for combined efforts on an international level, but for better cooperation between the various agencies within states. In a course presenting organizational aspects of terrorism, attention must be given to the issue of terrorist financing. The detailed account by Assistant Prof. Michael Freeman in “Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations” shows that money will determine whether and how terrorist groups survive. He divides the sources of terrorist funding into five categories: state support, illegal activity, legal activity, popular support, and involuntary support. In each of these different sources there are advantages and disadvantages for terrorist groups, as well as opportunities for the state to implement countermeasures and exploit vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, targeting terrorist financing is a difficult task because the amounts terrorists need tend to be readily available, and because terrorist organizations adapt easily in the face of government pressure. Assistant Prof. Michael Freeman touches on “Terrorism and Organized Crime” in his second lecture. He notes that the nexus of organized crime and terrorism is complex and an increasingly important issue for policy-makers. Frequently, terrorist groups and organized crime look much alike structurally and engage in similar activities, yet there are also some crucial differences in their acceptance of risk, their motivating ideology, and in the way they use violence, etc. Furthermore, terrorist and criminal groups often work together and these alliances have a force multiplying effect in terms of the dangers they might pose to the state. Police Chief Seyit Ahmet Eren presented the “Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism” when he next took the podium. This chapter in the book reviews the types of terrorist organization in Turkey, in particular outlining the characteristics of the PKK. After discussing incentives for suicide attacks in general, there is a useful summary of suicide attacks in the country, and two case studies are provided. As a conclusion, practical advice is offered on how security personnel can identify suicide bombers. “Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks” is the theme of Assoc. Prof. Müfit Selim Saruhan, from the University of Ankara’s Faculty of Divinity. This lecture provides arguments for a clear distinction between religion and the role religious references may play in the psychology of terrorism. Religions in general, and Islam in particular, have as their aim living together in peace: “We should judge religions by their most authentic examples rather than by their worst corruptions.” Terror is the result of influences brought to bear on human nature, and cannot be attributed to a religion, just as it cannot be attributed to a nation. Terrorists of all religions may attribute their violence to their beliefs, while in fact they operate for other, human reasons. The central point of his thesis is that, in order to overcome terrorism, people have to put forward a true and accurate understanding of religion. The paper adds that the Faculty of Divinity educates its students in the ways of peace, providing in turn a model for other Muslim countries. x

Col. Osman Aytaç’s paper on “Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter- Terrorism and Crises” discusses this vital organizational tool in preventing terrorism. Very often ROE apply in situations where military concerns are subordinate to political demands. Managing this tension through clearly delineated boundaries is the key to successful operations. ROE for counter-terrorism are different to wartime ROE in terms of the applicable law and political framework. The author notes the importance of avoiding provocation in order to minimize the possibility of political clashes and/or an escalation in the violence. Another aspect of organizing the response to terrorism is summarized by Lt.-Col. U÷ur Ersen in his paper on the “Role of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union in Countering Terrorism”. Of these organizations, the United Nations is the most significant, and the lecture gives details of the legal basis for the UN’s counter-terrorism role, quoting both the UN Charter and relevant resolutions. In particular, the UN has led a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force since 2005, in coordination with numerous international bodies. 2006 saw the adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The EU has taken an active role with its Action Plan to Fight Terrorism of 21 September 2001. In 2005 the EU committed itself to a CT Strategy, covering four strands of work: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. The third organization examined is NATO, which endorsed a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism at the 2002 Prague Summit. The NATO Response Force, with over 20,000 troops, is a recent development. Police Supt. Süleyman Özeren summarizes the organizations behind the terrorist threat in Turkey. In his paper on “Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience”, Dr. Özeren lists the ministries and agencies involved. The authorities have carried out successful operations through diplomacy and working to address the root causes of terrorism. Nevertheless, Özeren argues that Turkey has not always received the attention it deserves from the international community, and this country could make a much greater contribution to international counter-terrorism efforts, for example by training other law enforcement agencies. The Advanced Training Course in Skopje was conducted in the framework of international co-operation, and this in itself is important. Terrorism has gained a global dimension, and it is impossible to imagine successful counter-terrorism unless true and open international cooperation is realized. The ATC was one example of sharing expertise and lessons learned.

Police Chief Seyit Ahmet Eren ATC Director xi

Contents

Preface vii Seyit Ahmet Eren

The Causes of Terrorism 1 Zeynep Sütalan Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism 13 Zeynep Sütalan Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects (Conventional, Bio, WMD, Cyber, etc.) 23 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations 37 Necati Alkan and Yavuz Özdemir Psychology of Terrorists and Profile of Suicide Bombers 51 Seyit Ahmet Eren Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack 59 Ugur Ersen Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation 73 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations 81 Michael Freeman Terrorism and Organized Crime 95 Michael Freeman Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism 109 Seyit Ahmet Eren Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks 119 Müfit Selim Saruhan Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter-Terrorism and Crises 131 Osman Aytaç Role of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union in Countering Terrorism 139 Ugur Ersen The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience 155 Suleyman Özeren

Author Index 165 This page intentionally left blank Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 1 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-1 The Causes of Terrorism

Zeynep SÜTALAN Concept Specialist, COE-DAT, Ankara

Abstract. Terrorism breeds in any environment it can. Thus, it is hard to identify one specific cause or few that result in terrorism. Different types of terrorism in different cases can derive from different causes. Despite the difficulty in identifying causes of terrorism, a comprehensive approach towards the political, social and economic environment where terrorism is likely to flourish may result in fruitful outcomes for combating terrorism. Within this context, this article aims to provide a general framework for understanding the causes of terrorism rather than proposing methods to cope with them.

Keywords. Terrorism, causes of terrorism.

1. Introduction

Terrorism has been on the world scene for ages. Terrorism is not a new or unaccustomed phenomenon. However, undeniably, it has become the greatest security challenge of the 21st century. Fuelled by the impact of globalization, terrorism has transcended borders, targeting any society, nation, culture or civilization and has no doubt increased in its deadliness. Unfortunately today, anything about terrorism, except the great extent of the terrorist threat, is a matter of dispute. The disagreement among nations, decision-makers or scholars, about terrorism starts at the very beginning: how to define terrorism and whom to call a terrorist. A study done by the United States (US) Army in 1988 found 109 different definitions of terrorism, a number which is expected to have increased over the decades. However, time has not favored the efforts to develop a generally accepted definition of terrorism.1 Despite the lack of such a definition, as stated by Walter Laquer, ‘violence’ and the ‘threat of violence’ are at least the common characteristics of the several definitions made about terrorism.2 While defining terrorism as ‘the indiscriminate use of violence in order to spread fear and panic among the individuals and societies to shake their confidence in the governments and thus coerce governments and societies to achieve their political objectives’, this article is devoted to providing a general framework to understand the causes of terrorism.

1 See in Ben Golder and George Williams, “What is ‘Terrorism’? Problems of Legal Definition”, UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 27 (2), pp. 270-295. 2 See in Walter Laquer, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 2 Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism

Before the analysis of the causes of terrorism, the reason why the causes of terrorism need to be understood should be underlined. In fact, terrorism is evil by nature and it is a tremendous threat, the target of which can be anybody. Thus, coping with this threat needs immediate denying actions. However, national experiences and the so-called ‘global’ experience in fighting against terrorism have proved that just crushing terrorism is not enough. It is vital to understand and address the causes of terrorism in order to win any war against terrorism. Without knowing what provides terrorism with a fertile ground to grow or what facilitates it and how, one will always stand on the brink of producing more terrorism while trying to crush it.3 On the other hand, this is not to say that “if we understand and efficiently address the causes of terrorism, we will be able to eradicate it and wipe away terrorism from the earth.” We may find out some causes which we will not be able address.

2. Causes of Terrorism

Terrorism occurs everywhere; in rich or poor countries, in developed or less developed countries, in countries that experienced colonialism or countries that have never been colonized. We see terrorism both in established democracies and anti-democratic states and societies. 4 We find terrorists among less educated people as well as among educated ones, among psychopaths and mentally normal and healthy people. We come across terrorists among men and women of all ages. It is possible to enlarge this descriptive list. This is just to show that it is not easy to make any generalization in terms of the conditions under which terrorism flourishes and prevails. This diversity of conditions not only makes it considerably more difficult to make generalizations about terrorism, but also shows us its dynamic nature which also makes it hard to predict future of terrorism. Within this framework, it is fair to say that terrorism does not originate from one specific cause. Since there is not one terrorism, but terrorisms, the causes of terrorism vary. This aspect of the nature of terrorism reflects itself in analyzing as well. The analysis of the causes of terrorism is very much dependent on the level of analysis, the time period and the definition of the terrorism and terrorist. From the individual to the social level, from the social to the international systemic level, one may discuss different causes of terrorism. Despite the existence of different types of classifications, in this article, a classification of the causes of terrorism based on level of analysis is proposed as follows:5 1. structural causes 2. facilitating (accelerating) causes 3. motivational causes 4. triggering causes

3 Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p.1. 4 Lia Brynjar, Skjolberg Katja, “Why Terrorism Occurs – A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism”, FFI Rapport, 02769, (Norway: Forsvarets Forsninginstitutt, Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2000). 5 This classification is borrowed from Bjorgo, “Introduction”, Root Causes of Terrorism, pp. 3-4, but the classification may include different contents and opinions from Bjorgo’s. Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism 3

2.1. Structural Causes of Terrorism:

Structural causes of terrorism refer to the macro level approaches, explanations and discussions. According to this explanation, the causes of terrorism can be found it in the environment, be it the characteristics of the international system, or the political, cultural, social and economic structures of the states and societies.

2.1.1. Globalization: Today even those who are “for” globalization accept the fact that globalization increases inequality and it creates a winner-takes-all society.6 Despite the discussion on the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer, globalization accelerates inequality especially in terms of distribution of the benefits. Growing global inequality means fertile ground for new motivations for people to turn to terrorism such as micro- nationalism (ethnic nationalism), separatism and religious extremism. Globalization, like most other such processes, creates its opposite as well. In parallel with the discussions about the world’s becoming a global village where the importance of the national borders is eroding, we are confronting redefined or newly emerged nationalisms, mostly micro-nationalisms. Globalization, while it starts promoting a global culture with shared values among the world population, apparently causes the fragmentation of identities with the growing awareness it brings. In addition, globalization creates a great amount of confusion for the individual in terms of identity. In order to seek a clear identity, people with certain frustrations may be drawn to extremist movements, including those that promote violence.

2.1.2. Rapid Modernization: There is a traditional argument that the modernization process7 has agonizing effects on the societies which may weaken the legitimacy of the state and promote conflict, the use of political violence, and even terrorism. On the other hand, the liberal theory claims that modernization leads to prosperity and political development. In short, free trade and free market economy will bring in economic development. A prosperous economy will pave the way for democracy and democracy will promote domestic peace. This is also what is seen as a recipe for countering the root causes of terrorism. However, there remains the challenge posed by the transition phase.8

2.1.3. Relative Deprivation: According to the relative deprivation theory, individual mobilization of aggression and political violence stems from frustration due to the social, economic and political circumstances.9 It is claimed that individuals are more prone to aggression when they find themselves in a state of disequilibrium economically, socially or politically. When

6 John Mickelthwaith and Adrian Wooldridge, “The Hidden Promise: Liberty Renewed”, Frank J. Lechner and John Boli (eds), The Globalization Reader, Second Edition, (Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 11. 7 In broadest terms, modernization means the transformation of societies via economic development, political stability and social and cultural change. 8 For further discussion, see in Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No.3, (August 1993), pp. 320-322. 9 See in Brynjar and Katja, “Why Terrorism Occurs”, pp. 11-12. 4 Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism there is a gap between the expectations and their satisfaction, there appears a high probability for conflict. Crenshaw asserts that “Not all those who are discriminated against turn to terrorism nor does terrorism always reflect objective social or economic deprivation.”10 According to her, it is the perceptions that play an important role in giving rise to terrorism. When deprivation is believed to derive from injustice, it increases the anger and frustration and thus gives the terrorists the necessary tools to blame the government or the political authority for the misfortune of the public. Accusing the political authority of depriving the people, terrorists get the chance to appear with an alternative discourse. 2.1.3.1. Poverty: Researches have shown that there is not a correlation between poverty and terrorism. Analyses of terrorist activities in the last two decades consistently reveal that individuals who support and commit terrorist acts are likely to be more highly educated and have higher incomes than others in their society. Ehrlich and Liu claim: “Although some terrorists (especially leaders such as Osama bin Laden) were members of a disaffected elite, relatively well-educated and well-off, the socioeconomic and political conditions in their nations provided a good basis for both their moral indignation and grassroots support among the disadvantaged.”11 In this context, neither poverty, nor lack of education turn out to be sufficient explanations for people becoming terrorists, but it is obvious that the misfortune of the poor is used as one of the justifications for terrorism. Besides that, poverty, unemployment and lack of education do not only provide a discourse and tool for the terrorists to justify violence, but also appear as vulnerability points, which could be easily exploited for terrorist recruitment. 2.1.3.2. Democracy, Political Representation, Rights and Freedoms: There is a tendency to connect democracy with a lower possibility for conflict or political violence. Due to democratic values such as freedom, openness and political participation, democracies are regarded as regimes with much more legitimacy among the population. It is claimed that even in cases where there is dissatisfaction, frustrations do not reach the level of a threat to the regime. “In addition, democratic systems have various alternative channels for expressions and influence through which potential frustration and dissatisfaction can be directed.” 12 This brings in the expectation that terrorism is very rare in democracies if not non-existent. However, when the access to power and political participation is denied for certain groups, the increasing political grievances may result in terrorism. 13 In addition to that, racist, extreme right and ethnic terrorism are usually given as examples supporting the thesis that less proportional democracies are more prone to experience terrorism than open proportional systems.14 On the other hand, the relationship between democracy and peace appears to be more complex and at the same time ambiguous. According to Ross, “Oppositional

10 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics, Vol.13, No.4, (July 1981), p. 383. 11 Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, “Socioeconomic and Demographic Roots of Terrorism”, Forest, James J. F. (ed.), The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, Volume Three, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 168. 12 Brynjar and Katja, “Why Terrorism Occurs”, p. 19. 13 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, pp. 383-384. 14 Brynjar and Katja, “Why Terrorism Occurs”, p. 19. Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism 5 terrorism flourishes primarily in prosperous democracies. […] In general, the lion’s share of terrorism takes place in democracies due to the strengths and limitations of this type of political system.”15 He puts forward several reasons for proving his assertion: “[T]he legacy of a colonial or semicolonial past that has not been adequately resolved (e.g. Great Britain in Northern Ireland); nationalist, separatist and ethnic conflicts that cannot be easily resolved (e.g. Basques in Spain); accessibility of victims by foreign terrorism (e.g. Al Fatah attacks in France); guarantees of fundamental civil liberties promoting freedom of movement, access to media and the free expression of unrest and dissent thereby accommodating diverse political values and demands as well as encouraging the proliferation of narrow-based social issues; and the existence of political forces which are generally law-abiding.”16 The open nature of democratic societies may also function as a condition for the mobilization of political frustration and violence. The human rights and freedoms may unintentionally lead to the uncontrolled mobilization of populations and the organization of dissatisfaction, if any, among the masses. Furthermore, since democracy by nature means the rule by the majority, it may easily result in the majority’s dictatorship in practice. In this respect, the principle of majority voting can easily be perceived as an assault on minorities.17 As a consequence, although democracy is proposed as a panacea for terrorism in many platforms and studies, this ambiguous relationship between democracy and peace should never be forgotten. No one can guarantee that terrorism will not occur in democracies since the causes that motivate people in choosing terrorism are not only the dissatisfaction resulting from the lack of enjoying political rights and freedoms.

3. Facilitating Causes of Terrorism

These are in fact not the primary causes of terrorism, but they make terrorism possible, help terrorism to attract attention, and enable terrorism to become widespread. The increase in the speed of the means of transportation and communication, together with their relatively low costs, the modern news media, developments in the weapons technology, states sponsoring, weak state control of territory, and weak governance of rich minerals like petroleum, gold, and diamonds can be counted within this type of cause.

3.1. Developments in the Means of Transportation and Communication:

The opportunities presented by globalization in terms of means of communication and transportation have facilitated the interaction and cooperation of different groups across the globe. Just as states and civil societies have become more interlinked, so have the terrorist groups. Globalization has increased the ability of invisible groups to use violence and gain international attention. Improvements in the means of communications, particularly the widespread use of internet, have allowed terrorist groups to link up very easily. As such, terrorists transfer funds to finance their

15 Ross, “Structural Causes”, p. 321. 16 Ross, “Structural Causes”, pp. 321-322. 17 Brynjar and Katja, “Why Terrorism Occurs”, p. 19. 6 Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism associates in another part of the world within days, if not hours. As a matter of fact, the globalized international system has led to the globalization of terrorism.

3.2. News Media:

Terrorism intends to influence the local and international political processes. Therefore, influencing public opinion is a vital means for terrorists. ‘Propaganda by deed’ has been the best expression in explaining the importance for terrorists of actions to attract the attention of the masses. Terrorism requires publicity in order to bring their ideological motives to a national, or indeed international, audience. This publicity can maintain support for their cause, assist recruitment and fundraising, and assist in spreading fear and intimidating the targeted population with their illegal activities.18 The most efficient means to gain publicity and influence the political processes is through the mass media.19 There is a symbiotic relationship between media and terrorism. “Media coverage and terrorism are virtually inseparable soul mates. They feed off each other. They together create a dance of death—the one for political or ideological motives, the other for commercial success.”20 This ironic reality has brought about a lot of discussion concerning the responsibility of the media. The media are committed to protecting the right of people to know. However, unconsciously, by the dramatic representation of events, they serve the goals of the terrorists to publicize themselves, to be seen, to gain sympathy for their causes and to destabilize their target governments by creating social unrest. For this dilemma to be solved policies are needed on the one hand, but it is a great challenge to find policies concerning media coverage of terrorists and their actions in open, democratic states and societies with a tradition of free media and press, on the other.

3.3. State Sponsorship:

State sponsorship has been exposed as one of the primary causes of the international terrorism since the 1960s. Especially within the ‘new terrorism’ discussions, it is claimed that state sponsored terrorism has been dead since the emergence of global terrorism. Terrorism has become more complex with different actors and networks. However, today there are still states that are either actively or passively supporting terrorism, either so-called ‘domestic terrorism’ or ‘global terrorism’. States sponsor terrorism by providing safe havens or physical basing for terrorist organizations. States can also sponsor terrorism by providing false documentation for personal identification like passports, weapons and financial assets. Training facilities and expertise can be another means of support. The list of types of support can be widened to extending diplomatic protections, immunity from extradition, use of embassies and other protected grounds for hiding terrorists, transporting weapons and explosives.

18 For more information about “Terrorist goals regarding the media”, in comparison with media and government goals see Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty First Century, Fourth Edition, (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), pp. 165-167. 19 See in David J. Wittaker,, Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 91-100. 20 Cited in Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq, (New York: Jeremy P. Tacher/Penguin, 2003), p. 136. Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism 7

The relationship between the state and the terrorists may vary from tight to loose. The state sponsoring a terrorist organization may know about the actions of the terrorist organization in advance and can be directly responsible for the actions of the terrorist organization. On the other hand, the sponsor state may not know the action of the terrorist organization in advance, but it can be counted responsible in moral sense. In fact, identifying the degree, dimension and the content of this relationship is of crucial importance in countering state sponsorship of terrorism.21

3.4. Weak States:

Weak states22 are states that have a central government that lacks control of its territory or where there is no central government at all. Weak states generally contain ethnic, religious or other kinds of tension which have the potential to turn into or have already become open conflicts. These conflicts limit or impede the government’s functioning. Despite their regime type, politically unstable regimes are more conducive to providing ground for terrorist developments due to the lack of, or underdeveloped establishment of, domestic institutions that can prevent terrorism. In addition, deficiencies like the lack of legitimacy and accountability of the political authority, insufficient monitoring systems, weak security organizations and the lack of law enforcement result in an inability to combat terrorism.23 Weak states intentionally or unintentionally turn out to provide safe heavens for terrorists, for training or routes for organized crime, drug trafficking, human smuggling, which activities may also serve for terrorist purposes. As an example, for building training camps, recruiting new members, and financing its operations via illicit trade in gemstones including diamonds, Al-Qaeda profited from the weakness of the state in Afghanistan.24

4. Motivational Causes of Terrorism

These are found to be the causes that motivate people to act due to the grievances that they have at the individual or societal level. Psychological causes, ideological causes and feelings of revenge can be counted among these causes.

4.1. Psychological Causes:

As stated before, it is not possible to talk about one terrorism since there are various types of terrorisms indicating different characteristics even within the same type. The same approach is applicable to the motivation of the terrorists, their decision-making and psychology. Terrorism is a collective rational strategic choice based on will for the

21 Louise Richardson, “State Sponsorship: A Root Cause of Terrorism?” Tore Bjorgo, (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 195-197. 22 Defining the weakness of a state is a matter of discussion as well as the strength of a state. There may be different definitions for weak states or there may even be different types identified. For detailed discussion, see in Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” Washington Quarterly, 29:2, (Spring 2006), pp. 27-53. 23 Erica Chenoweth, “Instability and Opportunity: The Origins of Terrorism in Weak and Failed States”, Forest, James J. F. (ed.), The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, Volume Three, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 17-20. 24 Patrick, “Weak States”, p. 34. 8 Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism purpose of realizing aims and protecting interests in the political arena. Despite the fact that the terrorists’ interpretation of cost may differ from ours, their cost and benefit calculation is based on strategic rational choice. This turns out to nullify the conventional beliefs about terrorists’ being abnormal and irrational.25

4.1.1. Individual-Level Explanations The idea that all terrorists share a particular psychological profile is subject to dispute. Several researchers have tried to figure out terrorist psychological profiles according to the data they managed to collect. Although this was not an easy task, since the 1970s the trends in terrorism have been changing, and the data collected has also changed from nationalist, left-wing terrorism to religiously-based terrorism currently. The results of these researches in general indicate that with exceptions, of course, most of the terrorists from different ideological motivations were not depressed or mentally disordered or had ever suffered from childhood trauma. Speaking in psychological terms, if non-violent behavior is accepted as ‘normal’, then all the people engaged in terrorist activities are to be considered as ‘abnormal’. However, looking at the results of the researches conducted so far, this normative approach is proved to be null and void.

4.1.2. Group-Level Explanations: Since it is not possible to separate the individual from the environment in which he/she lives, the influence of the environment on the individual comes into play in the case of terrorism. “In a number of social and political contexts, political violence is a familiar social phenomenon for some people.” 26 When this process is combined with “the pronounced need to belong to a group”,27 individuals can in the end define their social status by group acceptance. On the other hand, Crenshaw argues that terrorists do not always have to be seeking for ‘belonging’ to a certain group.28 However, once they become a member of a terrorist organization, they need group identity. This group identity is based on trust both among the terrorists and in the organization as a whole. The commitment of the terrorists to their cause combined with this trust isolate them from the society. Hence, terrorists form a closed community that it is not possible to leave once involved except at great cost and at the risk of losing one’s life. The group thinking of a terrorist organization is another important element that cements its members. It is based upon the ‘terrorist psycho-logic’, a term which is proposed by Post and explained as: “Terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit.”29

25 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice”, Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 7-24. See also in Jerold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces”, Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 25-42. 26 Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, (Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 96. 27 Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic”, p. 28. 28 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, p. 393. 29 Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic”, p. 25. Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism 9

4.2. Ideological Causes:

Once, for whatever reason, an individual is involved in a group, then group dynamics come into play. This means that the behavior of an individual may differ depending upon his/her connections to a certain group. The individual begins to think and behave according to the ‘group-think’. This group-think is developed in order to provide cohesiveness within the group and it is given high priority by the members of the group. In the case of terrorism, ideology turns out to be one of the most important elements that bind the terrorist group members and mobilize them as well. In addition, ideology also serves as a great tool or disguise for justifying terrorist ends. Throughout history, terrorism has appeared in many ideological disguises like religious fanaticism, anarchism, fascism, neo-fascism, separatism, nationalism, micro-nationalism and racism.

4.3. Feelings of “Revenge”:

Feelings of revenge are one of the most important motivational causes of terrorism. Unsolved conflicts among certain groups within a society or among certain different societies are fuelled by these feelings of revenge, which have their roots in history and are transferred down the generations like a genetic code. They are a pivotal point for fuelling terrorism and appear as a deadlock in efforts to end terrorism. This is very apparent in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to the unsolved conflicts, wrong or wrongly implemented right counter-terrorism policies involve the risk of creating feelings of revenge, too.

5. Triggering Causes:

Triggering causes are the immediate circumstances or events that provoke people to resort to engaging in terrorism. Normally, these events or circumstances may do lead to terrorism. However, given the already existing conflicts and tensions, these events play a triggering role and set off terrorist actions. Triggering causes may be a war, the rise of a leader or revenge for a killing can move a culture towards terrorism. These kinds of causes are very much inherent in the Palestinian-Israeli context. Ariel Sharon’s visit in 2000 to the al-Aqsa Mosque, known to Muslims as al-Haram al-Sharif, on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, which started the Second Intifada, can be given as an example to the triggering causes. In addition, the invasion of Iraq can be regarded as a triggering cause fuelling terrorism in Iraq in particular and the Middle East in general.

6. Conclusion

We have looked at answers to the questions of why a person becomes a terrorist, and why he/she chooses to join a terrorist group and stay there. However, then the question of why a terrorist organization exists in the first place should be asked. If one looks at the picture in a much broader framework, then one comes across the reality that terrorism is a network where there is a terrorist organization, where there are facilitators logistically or financially backing terrorism, where there are states 10 Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism sponsoring terrorism, where there are states providing safe havens, intentionally or unintentionally, and where there are populations ideologically supporting the terrorist. If one adopts a sort of systemic approach to terrorism, a lot of reasons appear for the system’s existing and enduring, deriving from the symbiotic relationship between the components of the terrorist system. Hence the struggle against terrorism should be initiated not only against the terrorist, but all the components of the terrorist network. Otherwise it is impossible to win this struggle.

References

Abadie, Alberto, “Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism”, KSG Working Paper, (Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), October 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=617542. Bjorgo, Tore (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). Brynjar, Lia and Skjolberg Katja, “Why Terrorism Occurs – A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism”, FFI Rapport, 02769, (Norway: Forsvarets Forsninginstitutt, Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2000). Chenoweth, Erica, “Instability and Opportunity: The Origins of Terrorism in Weak and Failed States”, Forest, James J. F. (ed.), The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, Volume Three, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 17-31. Combs, Cindy, Terrorism in the Twenty First Century, Fourth Edition, (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006). Crenshaw, Martha, “The Causes of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics, Vol.13, No.4, (July 1981), pp. 379-399. Crenshaw, Martha, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice”, Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 7-24. Ehrlich, Paul R. and Jianguo Liu, “Socioeconomic and Demographic Roots of Terrorism”, Forest, James J. F. (ed.), The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, Volume Three, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 160-171. Forest, James J. F. (ed.), The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, Volume Three, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006). Golder, Ben and George Williams, “What is ‘Terrorism’? Problems of Legal Definition”, UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 27 (2), pp. 270-295. Hudson, Rex A., “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes A Terrorist and Why?”, Report, (Washington D.C.:Federal Reseach Division, Library of Congress, September 1999), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf. Laquer, Walter, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York: Oxford University Pres, 1999). Mickelthwaith,, John and Adrian Wooldridge, “The Hidden Promise: Liberty Renewed”, Frank J. Lechner and John Boli (ed.s), in The Globalization Reader, Second Edition, (Blackwell Publishing, 2004). Martin, Gus, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, (Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). Patrick, Stewart, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” Washington Quarterly, 29:2, (Spring 2006), pp. 27-53. Post, Jerold M. “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces”, Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998). Rampton, Sheldon and John Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq, (New York: Jeremy P. Tacher/Penguin, 2003). Reich, Walter (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998). Richardson, Louise, “State Sponsorhip: A Root Cause of Terrorism?”, Tore Bjorgo, (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 189- 197. Ross, Jeffrey Ian, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No.3, (August 1993), pp. 317-329. Z. Sütalan / The Causes of Terrorism 11

Wittaker, David J., Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). Victoroff, Jeff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.49, Issue.1, (February 2005), pp. 3-42. This page intentionally left blank Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 13 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-13 Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism

Zeynep SÜTALAN Concept Specialist, COE–DAT, Ankara

Abstract. Ideology has been regarded as one of the motivational causes of terrorism. In fact, the ideology is not what motivates people to turn to terrorism as a means to achieve political ends, but it is used as a legitimizing tool for the terrorist acts in the eyes of the public. This article aims to display the relationship between the ideologies and the terrorism, and precisely how ideologies are used for terrorist purposes. Within the scope of this article, types of terrorism, classified in terms of ideological motivations, namely left-wing, right-wing, separatist and religious terrorism, are explored. The changing profile of terrorism is also touched upon with reference to ideological shifts, and how these reflect on the terrorist organizations and their acts.

Keywords. Terrorism, terrorist ideologies, left-wing terrorism, right-wing terrorism, separatist terrorism, religious terrorism, ideological change.

1. Introduction

Elaborating ideology within the scope of terrorism, it would be a considerable mistake to consider ideology to be identical to terrorism. When the requirements of ideology cannot be realized through normal means or when ideology cannot find its place in political participation, proponents of ideologies may turn to terrorism in order to realize their aims. Thus, the use of any kind of violence, or, be precise, terrorism, turns out to be a ‘weapon of choice’ for ideological extremists. In fact, ideological approaches present current problems as systemic failures and they aim to establish the understanding that systems should be changed by using violence. In its broadest terms, an ideology is a set of beliefs on which a political or economic system is based, or which strongly influences the way people behave. It offers a course of action to people on how to live, what the ideal life and society should be and what the right and wrong are. The focus of an ideology could either be the re- allocation of political power or the re-distribution of economic resources. In most generic terms, ideology intends to clarify the reasons people live for and to determine their goals and roles. It helps the society in settling down on specific grounds by regulating the life styles and relations among the people. In this way, it prevents chaos within society and gives a certain direction to the society. Ideologies are composed of two main parts, one is the goal of how societies should be arranged and the other is the methodology, precisely the most appropriate ways to achieve the ideal arrangement. In 14 Z. Sütalan / Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism this respect, generally ideology and methodology are mixed under ‘extremism’, which is the radical interpretation of an ideology. Terrorism exploits social contradictions and dissatisfactions. It presents people the goals to be reached as hopes. Hence, this gathering together of hopes and ideals establishes an ideology and system. Terrorism has a holy cause within its understanding. In order to achieve the success of this cause, terrorism strives to eradicate all the obstacles on its way to success. Therefore, ideology has a pivotal role in terrorism. Ideology not only cements the terrorists within the terrorist organization, but also serves for legitimizing the meaning of ‘propaganda by deed’ in the eyes of the public.

2. Ideological Types of Terrorism

The types of terrorist organization according to their ideological motivations can be explained under four main headings:1 1. left-wing terrorism 2. right-wing terrorism 3. separatist terrorism 4. religious terrorism All these types of terrorism have enjoyed periods of relative prominence in the modern era. Left-wing terrorism is interlinked with the communist movement whereas right-wing terrorism draws out its inspiration from fascism. Separatist terrorism accompanied the wave of decolonization in the post Second World War years. Religious terrorism has a current prominence. Although all of these groups continue to exist today, the left and right wing terrorist groups were numerous in earlier decades. It has to be admitted, these categories are not perfect and it is difficult to draw clear-cut lines between ideologies motivating terrorist groups. This is because some terrorist groups present a mix of ideologies, such as ethno-nationalism combined with religious characteristics.2

2.1. Left-Wing Terrorism:

Leftist terrorism in its modern context originated after the 1848 revolutions in Europe. Anarchism and Marxism provided the philosophical basis for revolutionary violence and many who adopted these ideologies engaged in acts of terrorism. Throughout the twentieth century and into the present, variations of anarchism and Marxism have repeatedly been adapted according to unique sociopolitical conditions.3 Understanding the reasons for the emergence of left-wing terrorism, the comparison between Europe and Latin America is important. Social-revolutionary terrorism has been prevalent both in Europe and Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Europe was developed and highly prosperous, whereas Latin America was an underdeveloped region overwhelmed by the disparities and socio-economic gaps between the rich and poor. In addition, when Europe was enjoying democracies at least

1 See in John Baylis, Steve Smith, Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to World Politics, Second Edition, (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 480. 2 Baylis and Smith, Globalization of World Politics, p. 480. 3 Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, (Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 235. Z. Sütalan / Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism 15 with freely elected political leaders, Latin American countries like Argentina and Brazil were governed by military dictatorships. These controversial realities not only display the difficulty of understanding left-wing terrorism in particular, but also appear as a challenge to attempts to identify roots causes of terrorism, like trying to find a correlation between terrorism and regime type, or terrorism and socio-economic well- being.4 Within this context, it is important to bear in mind the contagious effect of violence.5 In the late 1960s and 1970s, most of the left-wing terrorist groups arose at the same time both in Latin America and Europe. Terrorism can transcend countries and even continents when it has once appeared. Although left-wing terrorist groups share similar values and are often rooted in Marxist theory, they arise out of unique political environments that are peculiar to their respective countries. In Latin America and Asia, these movements have fought on behalf of identifiable domestic constituencies against identifiable domestic adversaries. In Europe, regional nationalist movements advocated similar identifiable constituencies against identifiable adversaries.

2.2. Right-Wing Terrorism:

Terrorism on the right in the modern era is an outgrowth of fascist, National Socialist (Nazi), Falangist, and other reactionary movements that existed in Europe between the First and the Second World Wars. The interwar period was the heyday of the extreme right. It was the period when rightist nationalism in Europe was very strong and popular among large segments of the population. Fascists, Nazists, Falangists and others were certainly dictatorial, but they succeeded in mobilizing the nationalistic spirit of millions of Europeans. These were, no doubt, mass movements that waged a concerted struggle against communism and the Western style of democracy.6 In fact, the interwar period has been recaptured in the ideologies and activism of the modern right in the post second world war era and even in the emergence of ‘neo’ versions of the rightist ideologies like neo-fascism. Modern activist and extremists have chosen specific facets of certain right-wing movements for their causes. For example, right-wing ideologies in Latin America have historically promoted fascist and Falangist style militarism, anticommunism, traditional values and authoritarian rule. Less prominent now than in the 1980s, German extremists use neo-Nazi slogans, symbols, and doctrines, as do some racial supremacists in the United States. Italian activists, like the Ordine Nuovo, have looked to their between-war past and adopted fascist traditions and values. 7 There were also anti-communist terrorist groups like NAR (Nuclei Armoti Revoluzionari) in Italy. In fact, the situation has become complicated and controversial with the involvement of the political actors.8 Right-wing terrorist groups have risen as a reaction to perceived domestic ideological and ethnic enemies. In this respect, Right-wing terrorism is carried out by

4 Peter Waldmann, “Social-Revolutionary Terrorism in Latin America and Europe”, Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 155. 5 Waldmann, “Social-Revolutionary Terrorism”, pp. 155-156. 6 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, p. 245. 7 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, p. 246. 8 Heitmayer, “Right-wing Terrorism”, Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 145. 16 Z. Sütalan / Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism the representatives of the majority against the minority.9 Although they share basic characteristics, their values and ideologies are rooted in their domestic political contexts. They do not share an overarching ideology similar to the Marxist theory on the left. In essence, right-wing terrorists develop characteristics that arise out of unique political environments that are peculiar to their respective countries. When the right- wing terrorism in Europe is compared with the one in Latin America, it is seen that in Europe there has been small groups, street-level toughs or clandestine terrorist cells, directing acts generally against foreigners and the democratic system. In Latin America, right-wing terrorist groups have tended to be paramilitaries that engage in terrorist campaigns arising out of destabilized domestic environments 10 with the aim of establishing dictatorships to restore stability.11

2.3. Separatist Terrorism:

Separatist terrorism is generally equated with nationalist separatism and ethnic- nationalist separatism. However, as identified by Reinares, “There is no direct causal nor unavoidable connection between separatist nationalism as expression of political discontent, socioeconomic grievances or identity claims and terrorist violence. […] nationalist separatism does not in itself explain nationalist separatism terrorism.” 12 Nationalist separatism may be an ideological motivation for terrorists, but careful scrutinizing shows that, on the continuum from ideology to mobilization of masses with this ideology for using violence as a means to achieve strategic political ends, there may be other internal dynamics or external constraints that result in separatist terrorism. 13 Nationalist separatism can be defined as having the objective of an independent sovereign state based on a nation. Trying to achieve this objective via collective violence may turn it to separatist terrorism. If collective violence is used in order to intimidate and spread fear, and convey messages and threats to the whole population by harming people and property in an unpredictable but systematic way, it is then separatist terrorism.14 Separatist terrorism differs from terrorism carried out in the name of ideology, religion or economic gain. Some separatist terrorist groups can also advocate an ideology in addition to their separatist ends. The PKK can be given as an example. The PKK emerged as a Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary terrorist organization with ethnic separatist aims. In general, separatist terrorists intend to form a national identity and aim to mobilize a community by appealing to the nationalistic background of a particular ethnic group.15 The fear created by violence and terror polarizes cultural differences within a society and weakens the will to stay together. Separatist terrorism was an effective instrument to use in ‘war by proxy strategy’ between rival states especially during the

9 Wilhem Heitmayer, “Right-Wing Terrorism”, p. 145. 10 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, p. 256 11 Heitmayer, “Right-wing Terrorism”, p. 145. 12 Fernando Reinares, “Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism in Comparative Perspective”, Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p.119. 13 Reinares, “Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism”, p. 119. 14 Reinares, “Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism”, p. 120. 15 Mustafa Kibaro÷lu, “War by Proxy: A Political Explanation of Separatist Terrorism”, in the course on The Effects of Separatist Movements on Terrorism organized by COE-DAT, (Ankara/Turkey, 17-21 April 2006). Z. Sütalan / Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism 17

Cold War era. However, in some cases, it is still used as a foreign policy tool especially by sponsoring states. Then there comes the need to deal with the states that support terrorism in order to achieve success in preventing separatist terrorism.16 During the late 1960s there were terrorist organizations with nationalist or ethno- nationalist separatist aims in Europe. These terrorist groups like the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army) in the United Kingdom and ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) in Spain emerged in industrial and highly urbanized societies. The social and economic structures of these societies, especially in terms of complex networks of transportation and communication, together with the open nature of the democratic societies, enabled the mobilization of at first small groups which came together to act as a terrorist organizations. On the other hand, separatist terrorism was not unique to highly urbanized developed societies as in the case of Western Europe. It is also seen in developing or less-developed countries especially beginning in the 1980s. The PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) terrorist organization in the 1980s appeared with a terrorist campaign especially in the southeast part of Turkey which had the aim of establishing an independent state of Kurdistan on the territories in the southeast part of Turkey and across the borders in other countries like Iraq.17

2.4. Religious Terrorism:

Religious extremism has become the central attribute of the so-called ‘new terrorism’, a term which shows that terrorism had changed by the beginning of the twenty-first century. Terrorism in the name of God, very much due to the case of Al-Qaeda and Jihadism, has become the most discussed model of terrorism. Without question, religious terrorism is not the only model even today since nationalism, especially micro-nationalism, separatism and ideologies still remain as a potent catalyst for terrorism. It is apparent that the old ideologies of class conflict, anti-colonial liberation and secular nationalism are challenged by religious terrorism. Modern religious terrorism came to the fore around the 1980s and “modern religious terrorism very effectively married the ideology to religion”.18 In addition, starting in the 1980s, many countries began to experience great social transformations, plus the international system also went through significant changes. Changing balances in the international system and also in societies in transition, together with social and economic pressures, frustrated political aspirations and bitter personal experiences and grievances, all contributed to the rise of religious extremism in the world arena. Currently, religiously motivated terrorism seems to supersede other forms of terrorism. Although to date religious terrorism is often attributed to the Islamist groups, there are other religious terrorist groups with different references such as the Army of God, the Phineas Priesthood in United States, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and Sikh militants in India. There were/are terrorist organizations that use religious references despite being racist like the Ku Klux Klan in the United States.

16 Kibaro÷lu, “War by Proxy”. 17 Reinares, “Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism”, pp.121-122. 18 Fang Jinying, “Religious Terrorism Threatens the World Peace: From its Idiosyncratic Perspective”, paper presented in the Terrorism Discussion Platform-I organized by the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE–DAT), (Ankara/Turkey, 11-13 May 2005). 18 Z. Sütalan / Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism

3. The Changing Profile of Terrorism

Terrorism has become the primary security challenge of the twenty-first century. This is due to the increase in the number of terrorist incidents and also the increase in the deadliness of the terrorist attacks. Between 1968 and 1989, the number of recorded acts of international and domestic terrorism was 35,150. With a rough calculation, it corresponds to 1,673 attacks per year. Between the years 1990-96, there were in fact 30,725 attacks recorded with 4,389 attacks per year. This means that there is a 162 percent increase in the number of the terrorist attacks recorded after the end of the Cold War.19 In addition to the increasing number of the terrorist acts, today it is certain that the profile of terrorism is changing. This changing profile is not confined to ideology. The tactics, the structures and the instruments that the terrorist organizations employ are also changing very much with the opportunities presented by globalization. And the threat of mass casualties because of terrorist acts is more imminent than ever. There is also another term coined, namely ‘ad hoc’ or ‘amateur’ terrorism, which appears as one of the new characteristics of the current terrorism. This refers to the loose structures and connections between the terrorists belonging to a terrorist group. There is not a well-defined command and control relationship between and among the members of the terrorist group. There is no process of education and training in terrorist tactics. By using the modern means of communication, like-minded people can find each other and appear as a group. This group does not come into being physically, but rather via digital or virtual integration. 20 The bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma city is regarded as an incident of ‘amateur’ terrorism. The act was planned and conducted by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, resulting 168 casualties and more than 500 wounded people. Although acts of ‘amateur’ terrorism are conducted by ‘part-time’ terrorists, the impact of their attacks is not less than a professional attack.21 On the other hand, not as an example of amateur terrorism, but of the ‘networked structure’ of current terrorism, it is important to note that Al-Qaeda is operating as a network with a center and satellite cells. It is estimated that Al-Qaeda has cells in at least 50 countries throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe, US and Canada to which it is connected by command and control lines.22

Ideological Shift

Throughout the recent decades, we have witnessed significant ideological changes, some of which started before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The era of dominant ideologies and a clear-cut left-right axis in politics have been gradually overtaken by the rise of new political movements that defy traditional categorization.23

19 Peter Chalk, “The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No.2, 1999, p. 152. 20 Chalk, “The Evolving Dynamic”, pp. 156-157. 21 Chalk, “The Evolving Dynamic”, p. 158. 22 David J. Wittaker, Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 39. 23 Brynjar Lia, Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions, (New York: Routledge), pp. 159-169. Z. Sütalan / Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism 19

In the future, fluidity and rapid changes will characterize the landscape of extremist ideologies. However, no single ideology will be able to capture an entire generation like Marxism. Instead, we will be seeing the mushrooming of extremist ideas. Despite the rise of Al-Qaeda as a global threat, inhabitants of Western societies no longer have a common external threat after the fall of the Soviet Union. What we have witnessed in the post-Cold War era is, in fact, the individualization of the society. The atomization of Western societies has taken a further step as even the common- enemy image disappeared. In this hyper-individualized postmodern world, everybody has their own enemy, indeed, but no longer the same unifying external enemy.24 Al- Qaeda is shown as a common enemy of Western liberal democracies. However, in contrast to the Marxist ideologies, it is not likely that Islamist extremism or any other type of religious extremism will become hegemonic ideologies and a dominant global counter-ideology opposing the liberal paradigm.

Figure 1. Terrorist incidents and ideologies, 1968-2004 adopted from data from the RAND MIPT terrorism incident base, see http://db.mipt.org/mipt_rand.cfm

With the demise of communism as an ideology due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most of the terrorist organizations motivated by left-wing ideologies are robbed of these ideologies. Thus, some of these terrorist organizations faded away, a small number of them survived and some experienced an ideological shift. This ideological shift can be easily seen in the context of separatist terrorism, which needs ideological references in addition to its separatist aims. The case of the PKK terrorist organization

24 Lia, Globalisation, pp. 159-169. 20 Z. Sütalan / Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism is a relevant example to see the ideological shift within a terrorist organization. Starting as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ethnic separatist organization, the PKK has become a terrorist organization with solely ethnic separatist purposes. This ideological shift proves that through time ideologies may become less influential or wither away. The terrorist organizations can find different ideological references to justify their acts especially in the eyes of the public. The importance of perceptions reveals itself in the changing profile of terrorism as well. There is a tendency to claim that religious fanaticism is the dominant ideological extremism that shapes contemporary terrorism. However, the reality is far from that. Statistics about terrorist incidents and ideologies between the years 1968 and 2004 display that the most powerful ideology behind terrorist violence is nationalist separatism. It is successively followed by communist-socialist, leftist-anarchist and lastly religious terrorism as the largest share owners. These statistics prove that when the international agenda is occupied with the “new terrorism” discussions, what is regarded as “traditional terrorism” has not yet ended. There are still nations who are suffering from ethno-national or separatist terrorism which is not motivated by any religious ideology. The separatist terrorist organizations are making use of the opportunities posed by globalization and enjoying state sponsorship at the very same time. A report concerned with terrorism in the European Union (EU) revealed that in the year 2006 only one out of 500 terrorist attacks was committed by Islamists25 whereas the rest were done by separatist groups targeting France or Spain, and these resulted in material damage. A small number of attacks were carried out in Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain by left-wing and anarchist terror groups.26

4. Conclusion

Terrorism has appeared in many disguises throughout history. Terrorist organizations named themselves social revolutionary or Marxist-Leninist on the left, and fascist, Nazist, or Falangist on the right. Ideologies are used for the terrorist desires and interests as a means for legitimizing the ends and acquiring public support. Terrorists use ideology to define their dislike of the ‘other’, of the existing political or religious system. The ideological shifts observed within the same terrorist organization, the disappearance of some terrorist organizations due to the demise of the ideology they supported, or the efforts to revitalize less influential ideologies according to terrorist interests, display both the importance of ideology for the terrorists and the evolving and easily adaptable nature of terrorism. With the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the left- wing terrorism is withering away despite the few exceptions. However, in some regions like South America, left-wing terrorism is still a serious problem, as in the case of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia. In fact, more or the less all of the types of ideological terrorism exist today. However, one is gaining prominence whereas the others are losing prominence. Today, compared to left-wing and right-wing terrorism, which are not totally dead, religious terrorism seems to have

25 It was the foiled suitcase bomb plot in Germany. 26 “500 Terror Attacks in EU in 2006, But Only 1 by Islamists”, EU Terrorism Report, Spiegel Online International, at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,476599,00.html. Z. Sütalan / Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism 21 gained prominence. In addition to that, due to the emergence of several conflict zones following the end of Cold war, terrorism using ethno-national references is also significant. Terrorism breeds everywhere in any society. The factors that are thought to be motivating terrorism like inequality, discrimination and alienation will continue to exist on earth, too. However, these cannot be used for explaining the reason for terrorism to exist since no consideration, political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious, can be used to defend terrorist acts. No end can be considered as legitimate if it is using terrorism as a means. In this regard, it important to keep in mind an esteemed legal maxim that says that “rights do not arise from wrongs”.

References

Baylis, John and Steve Smith, Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to World Politics, Second Edition, (Oxford University Press, 2004). Bjorgo, Tore (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). Chalk, Peter, “The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No.2, 1999, pp. 151-167. Heitmayer, Wilhem, “Right-wing Terrorism”, p.145.Wilhem Heitmayer, “Right-Wing Terrorism”, Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 141-153. Kibaro÷lu, Mustafa, “War by Proxy: A Political Explanation of Separatist Terrorism”, in the course on The Effects of Separatist Movements on Terrorism organized by COE-DAT, (Ankara/Turkey, 17-21 April 2006). Lia, Brynjar, Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions, (New York: Routledge). Martin, Gus, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, (Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). Reinares, Fernando, “Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism in Comparative Perspective”, Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp.119-130. Spencer, Alexander, “Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism’”, Peace Conflict and Development, Issue 8, (January 2006). Waldmann, Peter , “Social-Revolutionary Terrorism in Latin America and Europe”, Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and the Way Forward, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 154-163. Wittaker, David J., Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). “500 Terror Attacks in EU in 2006, But Only 1 by Islamists”, EU Terrorism Report, Spiegel Online International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,476599,00.html. This page intentionally left blank Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 23 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-23 Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects (Conventional, Bio, WMD, Cyber, etc.)

Maj. J. P. I. A. G. CHARVAT Course Director, COE–DAT, Ankara

Abstract. This paper examines the causes of modern terrorism and the motivation behind contemporary terrorist groups. It looks at terrorist recruitment to study the type of people who become terrorists. It looks at future battlefields of terrorism and the type of weaponry and attack that may be used by the terrorists in the future.

Keywords. Terrorism, motivations. cyber terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, future developments.

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to examine the modern threats of terrorism, their methodology and motivation. It will also discuss possible developments to this threat and assess the possibilities of new types of attack, specifically from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cyber terrorism. In the modern world the greatest perceived threat to security, both domestic and international, is from terrorism. The threat comes from many different sources, and varies in terms of motivation and modus operandi. Some regions face a local threat from separatist or single-issue terrorist organizations, while international threats usually come from groups motivated by religion or politics who seek to force their views through the application of violence. In today’s society terrorism can hit anywhere at any time and is ever evolving in cause and nature. As the reason and location of terrorist attacks is changing and developing so are the methods of attack. There is a greater array of weaponry available to these groups and the proliferation of WMD is an ever-increasing possibility. There are also new spheres of modern life that the terrorist can use or attack. With an increasing reliance on the Internet by business and government organizations the risk of cyber attack grows too. There is much debate about what constitutes cyber terrorism and this will be discussed in this paper. 24 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects

Modern Types of Terrorism

Terrorism is far from a new phenomenon. It has been in existence for centuries and as long as there have been regional and political disputes among men acts of terrorism have existed. The Sicarii or ‘dagger men’ were an early example of terrorists in their campaign against the Romans in AD 66-70.1 Ever since there have been groups that have turned to terrorism in order to fight or influence a regime or occupation. Today terrorism is a worldwide issue with groups conducting terrorist campaigns for many different reasons. The cause that the terrorists espouse and their organization as a group will determine both their modus operandi and the methodology required to defeat them. It is only through a thorough understanding of why a group has resorted to terrorism and why individuals risk their life or liberty in support that the security forces and politicians can combat the problem. There is no internationally recognized definition of terrorism.2 This fact does cause problems for those fighting terror as international cooperation and the legal status of terrorists may vary from case to case and from nation to nation. There will always be some international disagreement as to who is a terrorist and who is justifiably using armed irregular intervention against an oppressor. There are literally hundreds of examples in the modern world where the actions of a group are regarded as terrorism by some state actors while supported by others. NATO is one of the few international organizations to reach a definition but only members of the alliance have agreed on it. NATO defines terrorism as “The unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.”3 This definition tends to define terrorism as an act rather than terrorists as a group. However, armed with this definition, we can decide that those who use violence for such ends are terrorists. Having decided what terrorism actually is, the reasons that it is conducted must be considered. There are a great number of causes and justifications for acts of terrorism by organizations ranging from very small and localized groups or individuals to major global networks of untold numbers of people.

Types of Terrorist Organization

Single-issue terrorist groups are concerned about a specific problem and have resorted to violence in order to attract attention to it and to force a change in governmental or international policy. Generally such groups will use lawful protest and minor illegal actions such as trespass and criminal damage to gain headlines and to try and educate the public. They do, however, on occasion, transgress into terrorism. Animal Rights groups have been known to bomb or threaten those involved in vivisection, even resorting to grave desecration to bring attention to the plight of animals and to deter practitioners from continuing their work.4 Anti-abortionists in the USA have conducted

1 Wilkinson, Paul, St Andrews University, Pre-Modern Unsuccessful Terrorist Groups. 2 Kash, Douglas A., in Kushner (ed.), p.164. 3 MC472 and APP-6 (ACT FCRT/TC-7110 draft). 4 Gladys Hammond was involved in the breeding of guinea pigs for research. In 2005 animal rights protesters in the UK stole her body from the grave and held it until her family stopped breeding the animals for this purpose. J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects 25 similar attacks and killed doctors who practice abortion as part of their pro-life campaign. The campaigners’ impact is generally limited as they only tend to target those directly involved with the issue in question and do not seek to cause casualties in the general public. Ideological terrorists have existed in many guises and acted in support of many political ideas. They usually seek to change most if not all of the social, political and economic fabric of their country. Generally these groups have belonged to the far right or far left and have often been allied to, cooperated with, or assisted other organizations of the same point of view. During the cold war there were many active left-wing terrorist groups, including the Italian Red Brigade and the Greek 17th November organization. There has been a downward trend in the activities of such groups since towards the end of the twentieth century but some, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), remain active in the twenty-first century. Such groups may also be heavily involved in other illegal activities such as drug trafficking and kidnapping. Their impact tends to be regional as they are trying to change a specific regime. They will generally target high profile figures and will accept collateral damage, including some casualties from the public, to further their cause. Nationalist terrorists continue to be an active threat in many areas across the world. They generally seek the separation of a territory from a state to form either and independent entity with self-determination or to accede to another state with which they identify on ethnic or religious grounds. The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Basque separatist ETA in Spain are two such groups active in the present day. Such organizations may have international support from countries which sympathize with their claims for independence and they have frequently been used by the victim state’s enemies to conduct a sustained campaign of attacks through state sponsorship of terrorism. Libya was a key funder and supplier for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the 1980s, using the terrorists to attack its enemy, the UK. These groups tend to target high profile infrastructure or events. They do seek some casualties from the general public although mass casualties tend to be avoided, as this would have too much negative impact on the public. They are by nature regional in their activities, although support both direct and indirect can come from all over the world. The type of terrorism that is probably the most dangerous in the world today is the threat from certain religio-political terrorists. They generally claim to act on behalf of a deity and not for secular human issues and therefore will accept greater casualties for their cause. Often they will regard those who are not with them as being against God and therefore expendable and worthless.5 This type of terrorism is not limited to any particular faith and may involve most major religions and many small cults. Religio- Political terrorist groups can be regional in their campaigns and have a classic vertical structure as an organization, such as Hamas or Hezbullah. There are some organizations that have become truly global in their area of operations and have come to have a horizontal command structured network. Al-Qaeda is the best known of these, and after the September 11 attacks in 2001 it has certainly been the most destructive. Its members operate active and sleeper cells across the world and it is estimated that there are al-Qaeda cells in over 100 countries worldwide.6 By the nature of the

5 In this case the word God is used for any deity or cult leader that has terrorists acting in its name and not in the classical religious sense. 6 Figure from GlobalSecurity.org 26 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects organization it is sometimes difficult to determine their exact demands and the aims of their campaign. State sponsored terrorism is a form of attack used by states on other states by supporting or creating a non-state actor to conduct a campaign. This will allow one state indirectly or covertly to attack another to forward its political goals without resorting to conventional armed conflict. The Libyan support of the PIRA is an example of this; it was not in a position to take on the United Kingdom in a conventional war but instead supplied and assisted the PIRA to attack the UK. This tactic has been used by many states to fight war by proxy on many occasions throughout history.

The Lethal Nature of the Terrorist Threat

Terrorism occurs for many different reasons but the effects of these terrorist acts have a common outcome, death and destruction. Terrorism has a different psychological effect on people than the effect of a natural disaster. It is a deliberate act designed to further a political cause by the use of unlawful violence and has an impact on the whole community beyond those actually involved in the event itself. The terrorist will conduct an attack based on the effect they want to achieve and their motivation will be a factor in this. It is therefore vital to understand the terrorists’ modus operandi in order to predict the selection of likely targets and the likely methods and limitation of attack. The terrorist group will be cognizant of the fact that public opinion needs to change for their cause to succeed. If their actions are too severe, or not severe enough, they will lose sympathy or fail to cause the change through fear. Traditional terrorist groups such as separatist movements will seek to achieve certain goals through their actions. As Bruce Hoffman observed: “These more familiar terrorist groups [IRA, ETA, etc.] engaged in highly selective and mostly discriminate acts of violence.”7 They tried to achieve a balance between their acts and a political path, usually through a front organization. Their aims would mean, if achieved, that they would enter a state of peace with the population they were targeting. While these groups would conduct attacks that would kill or maim innocent civilians, they preferred to target military, political and economic targets in order to promote their cause. They would often refer to these as legitimate targets in their ‘war’ against the state. They generally shied away from purposeful mass casualties and would often issue warnings to the authorities. This could give maximum political impact without generating the adverse feeling that mass casualty attacks produce. Groups motivated by religion often have a different approach to their attacks. This is because religious terrorists believe – or claim to believe – that they are acting in God’s name and against those who they believe are the enemies of God. They also believe that they are not accountable to man for their actions and therefore religious terrorism is often more lethal than other types of terrorism.8 These terrorists are generally happy to cause mass casualties and will plan attacks with the maximum loss of life. Generally their supporters will see it as a victory if hundreds or even thousands of lives are lost because they believe the population is the enemy and not just the political system. This sad phenomenon spans most major religions as well as some

7 Bruce Hoffman Terrorism Trends and Prospects, Countering the new terrorism, RAND Corporation. 8 CSTPV University of St Andrew’s Certificate in Terrorism Studies Terrorist Ideologies Module Lesson 2. J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects 27 cults that have risen in the last decades. Aum Shinrikyo in Japan is an example of such a cult which tried to cause mass casualties with the release of sarin in a Tokyo subway in 1995. Al-Qaeda has carried out the most destructive terrorist attacks and has clearly had total disregard for the target population. As Marc Sageman observed: “It [al- Qaeda] needs to “inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the West”. These victories will inspire the Muslim masses to achieve its goal.”9 The choice of target and of likely weapons is affected by the motivation of the group in question.

Factors in Turning to Terrorism

While there are many motivations for terrorist organizations, the reasons individuals themselves become terrorists are equally varied. There will always be a spectrum of different views on terrorism among members of the community, ranging from complete rejection to active participation. Figure 1 illustrates how the population will have increasing levels of support for the terrorist up to an individual joining the terrorist organization as an activist.

Reject violence (General population)

Neutral

Sympathisers

Supporters

Recruitmen A Activists

10 Figure 1. Levels of support for terrorist organizations.

9 Statement of Marc Sageman to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 9, 2003. 10 While only activists and supporters will use or condone violence, sympathisers will dislike it but accept it. Those who accept the terrorist cause will understand the use of violence but condemn it as they follow a peaceful path to the same goal as the terrorist, and the remainder of the population fully reject all aspects of the terrorist campaign. The size of each concentric circle will vary as those in the centre may number only a few with many millions in the outer. 28 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects

It is the factors that cause individuals to move towards the centre of these circles that drive terrorist recruitment and support. A major mistake by those fighting terrorism may push people from one category to the next. There are many risks and dangers associated with being a terrorist, whatever the motivation and role. It is worth examining why people become foot soldiers in terror to understand how to prevent or intercept them before they do. There has been much debate about the mental state of a terrorist. What would drive a person deliberately to kill or maim their fellow man in great numbers? There had been arguments that they must be psychopathic or mentally feeble and have been exploited and encouraged into terrorism by those who want to keep their hands clean. Research is limited as terrorists are difficult to find for psychoanalysis, however study has shown that the “outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality”.11 There may be many factors that drive an otherwise normal individual to such abnormal extremes. A terrorist group may be appealing to certain types of people who share the same views but seek something in their lives that membership of such an organization can provide. It may fulfill a sense of belonging to a group or personal worth. In some societies the terrorist activists are given high social regard and this will encourage certain types of people to terrorist membership. As Martha Crenshaw observed: “The incentives for joining a terrorist organization, especially one that is already established and of known character, include a variety of individual needs: to belong to a group, to acquire social status and reputation, to find comradeship or excitement, or gain material benefits. The popular image of the terrorist as an individual motivated exclusively by a deep and intransigent political commitment obscures a more complex reality.”12 The personality of an individual is obviously a factor in them becoming a terrorist activist. They must also share the beliefs or agree with the propaganda of the terrorist organizations. Social, political and economic factors will likewise be important in profiling potential terrorist activists. While sympathy for the motivation of a terrorist organization and certain personality traits may make one person more likely to become a terrorist activist than another, there is usually a final factor that will push them to the innermost circle of Figure 1 above. Poverty is often thought to be a major factor in driving people into terrorism. While undoubtedly some terrorists come from poverty it is not in itself the sole factor in someone resorting to terrorism. Indeed, Paul Wilkinson has argued that poverty or deprivation do not automatically result in aggression and violence. He proposes that the poorest masses of the Third World are not prepared for revolutionary struggles or even political participation because they are completely engrossed in the struggle to stay alive.13 In fact Alberto Abadie believes that terrorists are more likely to spring from developing societies rather than rich or poor ones.14 Educational opportunities have likewise been examined as a possible cause for people engaging in terrorism. The question of whether terrorists were more likely to be ill-educated and act out of ignorance or simplicity was considered. This was found not to hold water as many terrorists were judged to be educated to a reasonable standard. Generally the

11 Crenshaw, M., The Cause of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol 13, No 4 (Jul 1981) p. 390. 12 Rapoport (ed.), Martha Crenshaw, Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches, p. 19. 13 Paul Wilkinson in Terrorism: Theory and Practice, p. 58. 14 Alberto Abadie in Root Causes of Terrorism. J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects 29 leaders of a terrorist group will be well educated and the longevity of the group may be dependent on its leader’s intelligence and education level.15 So, if the social and educational backgrounds do not generally promote a tendency to terrorism, what does draw someone to take the lives of others in this way? Obviously a strong belief in the aims and motivational reasons behind the terrorist group is key. If an individual does not firmly believe in the “Cause” they are not going to sacrifice or risk losing their life or liberty in its furtherance. Social inequality and humiliation are two of the major reasons cited by terrorists in explaining why they commit acts of terrorism. The poorest societies in the world work hard for survival and generally accept their circumstances. However societies where there is considerable economic or social inequality often have a greater problem. This is because there are disaffected people who feel unfairly treated. While the vast majority of people will address this by working to change their opportunities or circumstances, through hard work or legitimate political protest, there are some who will be more likely to be attracted to terror. Yigal Cameron noted this at the 2005 Madrid Summit: “Economic change creates conditions that are conducive to instability, the emergence of militant movements and extremist ideologies. In the Islamic world, for example, the more traditional segments of the population are disorientated by sweeping socio-economic change, and are therefore especially susceptible to movements that strengthen threatened identities, provide explanations, and give believers a sense of empowerment.”16 Humiliation is another factor in driving an individual to membership and activity in a terrorist organization. In most societies the history and achievements of the civilization, tribe or nation are fundamental in the psyche of the people. As world circumstances change a particular group may feel that their way of life, history or land has been violated or downtrodden by another. Terrorism is usually rooted in history with a perceived grievance being peddled by the terrorist group as propaganda. This humiliation will make those who have a personality that lends itself to terrorist activity feel obliged to carry out attacks. Often they would regard the risk of death or long term imprisonment a better choice than living under the circumstances of their perceived humiliation. As Jessica Stern notes: “I’ve been interviewing terrorists around the world for these past 5 years [written in 2003]. Those I interviewed cite many reasons for choosing a life of holy war … the variable that comes up the most frequently is not poverty or human-rights abuses, but perceived humiliation.”17 Humiliation can be historical or contemporary in this context. While it may be a longstanding issue from history, it may also come from, or be inflamed by, the tactics of the security forces or government concerned. In the early 1970s the British Army adopted a policy of Stop and Search to try and halt the movement of terrorist weapons and identify terrorist suspects. This involved large numbers of Northern Irish Catholics regularly being stopped and often over zealously searched by the Army. There was resentment and a feeling of humiliation caused by this tactic and it became a great recruiting sergeant for the Provisional Irish Republican Army:

15 Rex Hudson, Who becomes a terrorist and why, pp 94–95. 16 Yigal Cameron at the 2005 International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid, March 8–11. 17 Jessica Stern in Terrorism’s new Mecca. 30 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects

“I think probably the way we conducted our operations in those days [1970-2] would in fact strengthen the support that the [Provisional] IRA got in the local communities, certainly … I don’t think we differentiated nearly enough between those who were true terrorists and those who were normal members of the population, and I think that we paid very little regard to the impact that our operations would have on the majority of the population.”18 The perception by the Catholic Nationalist population in Northern Ireland that the British troops were oppressing them and the sense of humiliation was one factor which pushed them towards the more central of the circles of support depicted at figure 1 above.

Types of Terrorist Attack

Having briefly looked at why terrorism occurs, the motivations for terrorist groups, and why some people are likely to take action and become terrorists, one should consider how this could manifest itself in an attack. The worldwide phenomenon of terrorism comes in many different ways. The lethality and method of delivery will be different depending on the aim of the attack and the motivation of the group. A single-issue animal rights groups is unlikely to employ suicide tactics to cause mass casualties. A separatist group will be limited by the fact that they will need popular support to win their cause, while some religious groups see killing as the aim of their campaign and will accept, or, in the more extreme examples, seek the maximum loss of life from the non-believers. The types of attack employed by terrorist organizations vary from group to group and will depend on the desired outcome. Conventional terrorist attacks involving some form of kinetic weapon are still the favoured form of attack by most groups. These will catch the headlines and get the political notoriety that the terrorist seeks. The breakdown of modern terrorist attacks shows that ‘conventional’ terrorism, that is to say, terrorism with conventional kinetic weaponry, is the mainstay for contemporary terrorism. Indeed, as Horgan reminds us: “For most terrorist groups around the globe, the gun and the bomb serve symbolically to epitomize their struggle for freedom from the perceived oppressors.”19 Table 1 below demonstrates the type of attack carried out by terrorist organizations around the world in the six week period from 1 Sep 2007. Clearly the traditional terrorist attacks are the norm in contemporary terrorism. While the 9/11 attacks demonstrated a lateral thinking by some terrorist groups in their use of weapons, in that case a hijacked plane being the bomb itself, the basis was nothing new. Increasingly terrorists are going to seek new methods of attack, both in terms of weaponry and targets.

18 A former British Special Forces operative quoted on Taylor; Brits p. 76. 19 Horgan p. 2. J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects 31

20 Table 1. Types of terror attack in the six week period from 1 September 2007.

EVENT TYPE Event Count KIA WIA AIA Abduction 41 1 0 177 Armed Attack 457 1094 301 20 Arson 10 0 2 0 Assassination 50 54 117 0 Clash 163 344 313 1 Execution 2 4 0 0 Hijack 2 0 1 0 Hoax 2 0 0 0 Hostage Kill 17 24 0 1 IDF 79 63 380 0 IED 237 248 854 0 Infrastructure Attack 15 0 0 0 NA 2 3 0 0 Suicide Attack 59 356 731 0 VBIED 54 242 815 0 VOIED 51 58 122 0 Grand Total 1241 2491 3636 199

Possible Developments in Future Terrorism

Terrorism is an evolving problem and it will seek new means of attack if traditional routes are denied to the terrorist. This is not to say the terrorist organizations have the time or expertise to develop new weaponry but that they look to utilize existing technology, often something that is not used as a weapon, and to use it as a tool for terror. The innovative use of the aeroplanes in the USA by Al Qaeda showed the lengths to which terrorists may go to utilize everyday things as a weapon. They are also constantly looking for new spheres of terrorist attack, and, as the modern world evolves, new battlespaces such as the cyber world become areas that they might choose for their campaigns of terror. There are three major areas in which terrorism may become a scourge in the future, but where today’s terrorists are seldom active, namely new forms of conventional attacks, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and cyber terrorism. This list is by no means exhaustive but it provides areas worth considering in the fight against terrorism. These are areas of potential development and preemptive action, as planning for and detecting these possible forms of terror may be prudent in the mitigation or removal of the threat.

20 Terrorist attacks by type Sept and first half Oct 2007 collated by COE–DAT Information Collation Management Section. 32 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects

Potential Conventional Developments

The nature of a ‘conventional’ attack is that the terrorists use existing conventional weaponry or improvise an attack using normal materials as a weapon. The 7/7 bombings in London used commercially available peroxide as the main ingredient of the bombs. Agricultural fertilizer was a main weapon of the Provisional IRA in their campaign. Such use shows that the terrorist organizations often have advanced Research and Development (R&D) cells as part of their logistical chain. These are fairly simple chemicals, readily available for legitimate use, that have been turned into weapons for mass killing. There are areas of concern where materials essential for daily life can be used as a weapon. The possibilities and therefore the possible indicators should be examined. Maritime terrorism is one area in which such concerns exist. While undoubtedly there have been many examples of maritime terrorism, events such as the MV Limburg attack show that targeting ships is a serious consideration for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.21 While most attacks use well-known technology, for example a suicide boat laden with explosives, there are new possibilities in maritime terrorism which are of concern in the fight against terrorism. Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) is a widely used fuel, which is frequently transported in large quantities by sea. LNG is a cheaper replacement fuel for many oil-based energy sources. There are over 40 LNG plants worldwide and the tanker trade passes all major trade routes and many major ports and hubs. It is estimated that LNG will meet 10% of the USA’s energy needs by 2010.22 There is a concern among many maritime terrorist experts that a terrorist group could use a hijacked LNG tanker as a floating bomb. The amount of LNG held in a large tanker could generate an explosion of a similar size to a small nuclear bomb.23 For ports such as Boston, Massachusetts, this is a major concern as the route into the port takes shipping within 100 metres of downtown Boston and Logan International airport. The potential hijack and detonation of such a tanker is an example of the potential use of conventional transport as a weapon. Although the ‘floating bomb’ is not widely regarded as a likely or imminent threat, the maritime industry has taken many measures to ensure this possibility is denied to the terrorists as far as possible. The use of maritime twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) containers is another possible source of terrorist attack. These containers are used in their millions to transport cargo around the world. It would be a possible delivery method for a timer or other type of bomb and has the potential to be delivered worldwide. The mega-port of Singapore, for instance, handles in excess of 2 million TEUs per month.24 To check and confirm the contents of each container would be impossible and therefore they are a potential target for terrorism. Many ports and international agencies have cooperated and introduced safeguards in container security, but the potential should not be underestimated.

21 The MV Limburg, a French oil tanker, was carrying Arab heavy oil and was targeted with a bomb attack from a speed boat packed with explosives near the Yemeni oil port of Mina al-Dabah in October 2002. 22 Daly, Liquid Gas article. 23 Ibid. 24 www.mpa.gov.sg J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects 33

Cyber Terrorism

Cyberspace is potentially the new battlespace. Increasingly modern life relies on the World Wide Web and Information Technology for finance, business and communication. The Net is poorly policed and has many vulnerable points that could allow a terrorist organization to exploit it. There is no agreed definition of Cyber Terrorism and a distinction should be made between two elements, terrorist cyber attacks and terrorist use of the Internet. The former is a direct attack on an IT system and the latter is using the modern technology of the Internet for more familiar purposes like propaganda, recruitment, training, communication and information gathering. While terrorism does not have a definition in itself, it is generally accepted that a terrorist attack will break things or kill people (BTKP). This is something difficult to quantify in the cyber world, where it is the electronic make-up of a computer that is affected. However a cyber attack could take various forms. Defacement of a web page is a simple and possibly high profile type of attack. A major organization could have its official web page hacked into and altered to display a message from a terrorist organization. This could range from the obvious, where the site is clearly altered and the message is that the terrorists have the capability to break the victim organization’s IT security, to the extremely subtle, where a message originally sent by the victim organization is altered to give the political message the terrorists want but in a way that would only be noticed by the victim when the page is re-read. The text could go some time undetected and have a message that gains sympathy for the terrorist and damages the victim organization politically. An attack of this nature could cause a great deal of embarrassment for the victim and be an easy attack for the terrorist but the overall effect would be fairly low level. It is most likely to come from fringe sympathizers rather than the terrorist organization itself. A potentially more damaging threat would be a denial of service. This would be a terrorist action to bring down a network or to slow it up so much that it would make it unworkable. This could be achieved by a number of methods and have far more serious consequences for the victim. Although not believed to be terrorist in nature, the Estonian IT network suffered such an attack in the Spring of 2007, when their entire Internet service was targeted.25 The potential effects of targeting a specific system or the whole net could be very significant for business and the military. In the modern world the amount of business made over the Internet means that should these services be denied the cost would potentially have the magnitude of a bomb such as the Baltic Exchange in London.26 A targeted attack on the information held by an organization could have similarly disastrous consequences. National records, military administration or financial transactions could be taken over or wiped clean. The potential is almost endless. Cyber response and cyber defence measures are in place to combat this potential. The extent to which terrorists are currently pursuing this method of attack is unknown but it could provide them with the rewards of a bomb without the risk of planting it. It also does not cause direct loss of life so may be more attractive to a terrorist group which does not wish collateral damage or untargeted victims.

25 The Estonian network was targeted with a denial of service through a mass e mail attack flooding their bandwidth and stopping the system for a short while. 26 On 10 April 1992the PIRA exploded a large bomb in the City of London which caused GBP 750 million in damage and lost trade as it closed the Baltic Exchange financial institution. 34 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects

The Nightmare Scenario – Weapons of Mass Destruction

There is a threat that some terrorist groups may pursue Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD). Given the great potential for mass casualties in almost unprecedented numbers it is an option that would only appeal to those terrorist groups who seek or accept huge amounts of collateral damage and is therefore limited to certain motivations, primarily those motivated by religion. The potential reward for the terrorist is immeasurable and the destruction caused to the victim would be enormous. Weapons of Mass Destruction can be Nuclear, Biological, Chemical or Radiological (CBRN) in nature and have a different availability and delivery according to their type. Perhaps the easiest type of CBRN weapon to obtain and deliver would be a radiological weapon. Radiological material is more readily accessible than the other types of CRBN materials and could be delivered by conventional transportation. It does not need an explosion to have its effect. However the effects of a radiological attack are considerably less than the other forms of CBRN and the detection of such material is relatively simple. Chemical weaponry is generally securely held and difficult to home manufacture using commercial products. There has been one example of a terrorist organization attempting an attack with chemical weaponry, when the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo released sarin nerve agent on the Tokyo subway.27 The effect of a chemical attack can be shown by the Halabja massacre carried out by the Saddam Hussein regime on Iraqi Kurds in 1988. The estimated casualties of this attack range from hundreds to over 5,000 in a town of 80,000 inhabitants.28 Although not truly a terrorist attack, Halabja demonstrates the potential these weapons have if employed by terrorists. The casualties would be much higher due to population density in a major city such as Istanbul. Delivery is perhaps the most difficult problem for a chemical attack. Armies generally shell deliver them, an option that is very difficult for a terrorist to achieve. Biological terrorism would be an extremely dangerous issue should a terrorist organization obtain the wrong biological material and have the motivation to use it. Generally bio weapons are natural or enhanced diseases which are air or contact borne. There are stocks of such weapons and spores in various parts of the world but these are generally very secure. It is the simplicity of this type of attack that is of great concern, coupled with the potentially lengthy process of detecting and reacting to an attack. A slow incubation biological agent could lie dormant for some considerable time after the initial release and cause mass casualties as it spreads. Of all the threats from WMD, nuclear arrack would cause the most psychological and physical damage to the victim state. Although nuclear material, especially weapons grade material is strictly accounted for and subject to stringent non-proliferation agreements, there is genuine concern that some material, or indeed scientists who have the capability to manufacture it, may ‘go rogue’. It is estimated that the Soviet Union had over 40,000 nuclear weapons29 at its breakup and the concern that there is insufficient infrastructure to stop this falling into terrorist hands, either through malevolence or for financial reasons, cannot be ruled out. These types of weapons

27 In 1995 the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo messianic cult released sarin in a crowded Japanese subway. This religiously motivated group sought the maximum casualties possible in its attacks. They produced the sarin in a complicated chemical laboratory in their compound. 28 www.en.wikipidea.org/wiki/Halabja_poison_gas_attack. 29 Baker-Cutler report in Alexander & Hoenig p. 163. J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects 35 would only interest the terrorists most intent on maximum loss of life, but there are those who would probably use them. The delivery and detonation of this material would be a severe problem for the terrorists and the probability for detection would be high. A WMD attack would be difficult for a terrorist organization to achieve but not impossible. The ability to detect and intercept such threats must be carefully considered. The consequence management of an attack must be planned and exercised. An attack of this nature would have the most severe consequences, and, despite its challenges, it is an area that security agencies must not overlook.

Conclusions

People will resort to terrorism for a variety of reasons, and terrorist organizations will continue to seek to justify themselves citing a wide range of motivations. Those fighting terrorism must understand this. The war on terror is not quantifiable as a conventional war may be, there are few strategic targets and the killing of the ‘enemy’ may not necessarily result in fewer terrorists if the event draws more people to terror. This is vital as, if the supply of terrorists can be cut by persuading people away from terror, by nature terrorism has only a limited life. However the reason behind the motivation may be difficult to understand and may be something that cannot be defeated by persuasion alone. Understanding the terrorist will allow an understanding of the types of attack they may employ and the potential targets for the terrorist. It may also lend clues to their potential for the future and the sort of attack they may look at executing if they have the means. Methods such as eco-terrorism may also be a potential for the future. It is an understanding of why the terrorists act, and the limitations to their capabilities, that may help us unlock the best methods to defeat them.

References

Alexander, Y & Hoenig, M: Super Terrorism, New York, Transnational Publishers, 2001. Alexander, Y, Carlton, D and Wilkinson P (eds): Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Westview, Colorado 1979. Bjorgo, Tore (ed.): Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and the Way Forward, New York, Routledge, 2005. Crenshaw, Martha: The Cause of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol 13, No 4 (Jul 1981). Daly, Dr J.C.K, Liquid gas: The next terrorist target, Jane’s Terrorism & Security monitor, June 2004. Gurr, N & Cole, B: The New Face of Terrorism, New York, Tauris, 2000. Harman, Christopher C: Terrorism Today, Abingdon, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. Horgan, John: The psychology of Terrorism, Abingdon, Routledge, 2005. Howard, Russell D and Forrest James J F (ed.): Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, McGraw Hill Contemporary Learning Series, USA, undated. Hudson, Rex A: Who becomes a terrorist and why, Guildford Connecticut, the Lyon Press, undated. Krueger and Maleckova: Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a casual connection? (Journal of Economic Perspectives, Autumn 2003). Kushner, Harvey W (ed.): The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 1998. Lesser, Ian O, Hoffman, Bruce and others: Countering the new terrorism, RAND Corp, RAND, 1999. Rapoport, D (ed.): Inside Terrorist Organizations, London, Frank Cass, 2001. Simonsen, Clifford E, and Spindlove, Jeremy R: Terrorism Today – The Past, The Players, The Future, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Pearson Prentice Hall 2004. 36 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects

Snowden, Lynne L. and Whistle Bradley C (ed.): Terrorism Research, Readings, and Realities, Upper Saddle River, Pearson Prentice Hill, 2005. Stern, Jessica: Terrorism’s new Mecca, Reprinted from The Globe and Mail at www.kgs.harvard.edu, 28 Nov 2003. Taylor, Peter: Brits; the war against the IRA, London, Bloomsbury, 2002. Wilkinson, Paul: Pre-Modern Unsuccessful Terrorist Groups, University of St Andrews Certificate in Terrorism Studies, Key Issues in International Terrorism.

Websites http://english.safe-democracy.org/causes http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-sageman.htm http://www.kgs.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/stern_mecca_gm112803.htm Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 37 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-37 Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations

Supt. Necati ALKAN and Chief Supt. Yavuz ÖZDEMøR Turkish National Police, Anti-Terrorism Department, Ankara

Abstract. Terrorist organizations draw individuals into a group dynamics in which the scenery, decor and players have already been adjusted, by using friend relationships, relative relationships, nepotism, local associations, social and cultural activities, ethnic roots, and religious values. While doing so, needs which have not been able to be satisfied are misused as propaganda tools. The terrorist organizations active in Turkey take advantage, not only of social methods, but also psychological methods, in recruiting new members. They use the promise of meeting the target individuals’ physiological and psychological needs, using friends, relatives, fellow-countrymen, social and cultural activities, and religious values. Through the organization’s ideology, the terrorists change the attitude of the targeted persons, they penetrate into their perception of the world, form a new subconscious, and in these ways the terrorists give them a militant identity and personality. This paper analyses the group dynamics which shape the life of members of terrorist organizations.

Keywords. Terrorism, counter-terrorism, terrorist recruitment methods, terrorist psychology.

Introduction

When we look at the literature on international terrorism, we see that there is a common understanding that the militants, who are active members of terrorist organizations, have joined the terrorist groups by their own free will. However, terrorist groups are hidden organizations. Even if an individual wants to join a terrorist organization, he/she cannot readily become a member of that organization, due to its secrecy. When an individual has found a terrorist organization through its legal structures, due to the suspicions that he/she might be a police agent, or intelligence service agent, the organizations do not accept such individuals into their ranks easily. They will go through a lot of tests before becoming a full member of the terrorist organization. In this context, it can be said that most individuals who are active in the terrorist organizations did not join by their own choice, but they were recruited through the propaganda methods of the organizations. As a matter of fact, Özönder’s survey, which was conducted on the basis of data from 1003 arrested PKK members, authenticates 38 N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations this observation. According to the survey, 71% percent of the PKK members had been found by the other members of the terror organization.1 In a word, being a terrorist is not an inherited trait, but it is a “process of construction”. In order to understand this process it is necessary to dwell upon how a person is taken through a brainwashing process. The terrorist organizations recruit new members by using “social” and “psychological” methods. In this paper, “social” and “psychological” methods will be explained within the framework of the following figure.

Figure 1. Alkan’s Model of the Militant Raising Process2

1. Social Methods

The terrorist organizations draw the individuals into a group dynamics in which the scenery, decor and players have already been adjusted, by using friend relationships, relative relations, nepotism, local associations, social and cultural activities, ethnic roots, and religious values. While doing so, needs which have not been able to be satisfied are misused as propaganda tools.

1.1. Friend Relationships

Individuals satisfy their social and psychological needs within groups, such as belonging to a group, loving/being loved, being treated as an adult, and establishing him/herself. Especially peers have a very great influence on their fellows, and this

1 C. Özönder, Socio-cultural aspects of terrorism. Security and Peace in Eastern Anatolia Symposium. Elazı÷: Fırat Universty Publications, 1998, p. 295. 2 N. Alkan, Before the Word Ends, Preventive Strategies in Struggling with Terrorism, USAK Publications, Ankara, 2007. N. Alkan, M. C. Çıtak, Youth and Terrorism, NATO, Security Science Series, Vol.19, 2007, p. 285-304. N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations 39 sometimes causes some unexpected negative results.3 During this period, young people, who completely trust their friends, may become drug addicts, or unconsciously find themselves in a terrorist organization through the influence of their friends. 4 The terrorist organizations mostly take the advantage of high school, university, workplace, and neighborhood friendships.

1.2. Relative Relationships

The term relative is defined as “people related to each other with blood or marriage”. In other words, kinship is a relation between people formed through birth, marriage or adoption.5 With kinship ties people establish social relationships and mark distinctions among themselves.6 In recent years, kinship has lost some of its functions and ceased to play such a dominant role in a certain regions due to various reasons like the migration of family members. Whereas the relatives were living in a certain place in solidarity with the past, nowadays traditional families have been separated as a result of industrialization, and the nuclear family has gained importance. As a result of this, the wide social institution called the kinship network has been separated into small pieces in towns and slowly been lost.7 Family ties in Turkey, from the west to the east and from the towns to the villages, are strong. Besides this, kinship is also strong in shanty towns in the big cities. Terrorist organizations take advantage of kinship ties to their best advantage. It is possible to observe this fact in the publications of the terrorist organizations and in the testimonies of militants.

1.3. Local and Regional Associations

A person from the same part of country, province, village, etc., is called a fellow countryman /fellow townsman.8 In Turkey, relations based on civic associations are as common as kinship relations. People who come from Anatolia to Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir to immigrate or stay briefly, derive benefits from local associations. Especially the families that immigrate into metropolises prefer to settle down in places inhabited by their fellow countryman. The terrorist organizations take maximum advantage of the relationships developed through local associations. They approach the individual who feels lonely, in the universities or in the shanty towns, on the pretext of being a fellow countryman.

1.4. Social and Cultural Activities

Another method that the terrorist organizations use to recruit members is to arrange conditions to meet people by organizing social and cultural activities. The terrorist organizations prearrange some innocent activities like picnics, sporting activities, tea

3 I. S. Kon, Society and Youth. (Translated by S. Keleú), Istanbul: Ar-Tu Press; 1977, p. 62. 4 Z. Erdogmus, Reasons of terrorist acts in Turkey. International Terrorism and Youth. Ankara: MEB; 1987, p. 19. 5 Y. Erjem, Açıklamalı Sosyoloji Sözlü÷ü, Izmir: Saray Kitabevleri, 1996, p. 15. 6 Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia, Pearson Education, New Jersey, 2002, p. 140. 7 Y. Erjem, Ibid., p. 15. 8 Meydan Larousse, Büyük Lügat ve Ansiklopedi, Istanbul: Meydan Yayınları, 1973, p. 773. It has been hard to find words which convey the exact meaning of the Turkish words “Hemúehri” or “Hemúehricilik” in English. 40 N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations parties, concerts, meetings of friends, cultural activities, movie shows, youth camps, etc.. In these activities there is often the use of bookstores, foundations, associations, cultural centres, and political party premises belonging to organizations, all of which are functioning legally.

1.5. Using Religious Values

Historical and sociological research reveals that the sense of religion rose throughout the history of humanity. In all places where human beings exist, there has always existed, right or wrong, a belief or way of worship.9 Religion is defined as “a set of beliefs which systematizes the supernatural powers, various existences defined as sacred, and believing in God or worship”.10 On the other hand, religion, according to Islamic scholars, is “a system of divine laws, which conveys the people of wisdom to the most beautiful and the best through their own will”.11 There are at present approximately 3,000 religions, 6,000 sects, and 12,000 religious orders in the world. Religions are classified by researchers under two categories: ‘celestial religions’, brought by prophets through revelation, and ‘human religions’, which are the product of human observations. According to these principles, Judaism, Christianity and Islam can be exemplified as celestial religions, whereas Totemism, Brahmanism, Buddhism are human religions. The concept of religion serves an indispensable function for individuals and societies, which need to believe in a higher order. Meeting this need by worshipping the sun, moon, stone, soil, fire, etc., which were identified as supernatural, the human being started to meet this need more systematically through human religions. The phenomenon of religion also brings with it certain differences in beliefs within the same religion, due to differences between human beings’ lifestyles, interpretation and perception. In this respect, we find in Turkey various radical understandings and movements that perceive and interpret Islam differently. Some of these groups carry out their activities on the basis of thought alone, and some actually convert their thoughts into actions. Some terrorist organizations active in Turkey have been using the Turkish people’s religious feelings as an instrument to recruit new members into their groups.

1.6. Using Ethnic Roots

An ethnic group is defined as a common cultural tradition and consciousness of identity in a society.12 The members of an ethnic group are seen to be different from the other members of a society in terms of their cultural features. This group may have its own religion and language as well as having a different tradition. The terrorist PKK organization was established with a Marxist-Leninist ideology and it transformed into an ethnicity-based terrorist organization after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. 13 It started with spreading the propaganda that Kurds are a different ethnic group.

9 A. Gurtas, Atatürk and Religious Education. Ankara: Diyanet øsleri Baskanligi Publications; 2000, p. 3. 10 Turkish National Police, Counter Terrorism and Operation Department (TEMUH), Religion, secularism and exploitation. Polis Dergisi 17, 1998, p. 69, 70. 11 L. Senturk, S.Yazici, Catechism of Islam. Ankara: Diyanet øsler Baskanligi Publications; 2001, p. 11. 12 Y. Erjem, Ibid., p. 190. 13 A. Cevik, The psychology of ethnic terrorism. Ankara: Basbakanlık Publications; 1993, p. 3. N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations 41

2. Psychological Methods

The social methods which have been explained above are facilitating factors in that they use relationships to convince the person targeted. Under this subtopic we will discuss the psychological methods. The terrorist organizations active in Turkey take advantage, not only of social methods, but also psychological methods, in recruiting new members. In this context, the terrorist organizations try to attract individuals into their circles with the promise of meeting the target individuals’ physiological and psychological needs, using friends, relatives, fellow-countrymen, social and cultural activities, and religious values. Through the organization’s ideology, the terrorists change the attitude of the targeted persons, they penetrate into their perception of the world, form a new subconscious, and in these ways the terrorists give them a militant identity and personality. It may be said that sociological methods are complementary to psychological methods. Terrorist organizations put their militants into armed actions after the recruits have been put through a psychological formation. In this respect, the psychological processes used by the organizations to attract new members are listed below.

2.1. Motivation

The terrorist organizations collect as much as detailed information about the people they want to recruit from schools, workplaces, streets, syndicates, unions, political parties, villages, etc. 14 Such information on the person to be recruited is collected especially about his/her family structure, weaknesses, the friends he/she communicates with, economic level, religious, ethnic and cultural roots, and his/her physiological, psychological and social needs. In a publication of the organization,15 the reason why such information is collected is given as follows:16 “Above all, is the person worthy enough of attention? Could he be a police agent trying to appear well-intentioned? Could he be a weak person who would speak to the police? Is he capable of being a revolutionary? What is his way of thinking, what kind of personality does he have, what kind of surroundings does he come from? Such questions about the person have to be clarified.” After collecting the necessary information about the persons they plan to approach, terrorist organizations communicate with them. To do so, they also exploit the physiological, psychological and social needs of the targeted persons. In order to understand this issue better, the concept of motivation should be understood. So, what is an instinct? Instinct in psychology is a general concept compromising motives. The physiological instincts, like hunger, thirst, and sexuality, are called incentives. The higher incentives, like the wish to achieve success, are called the requirements (needs). Instincts motivate the organism and direct his/her behaviour to a

14 Sempatizan Kazanma ve Kadro Yetiútirme 1, Seçme Yazılar, Istanbul: Yaúam Yayıncılık, 2000, p. 189. 15 Other expressions on this issue are found in the same publication: “It is the duty of all to supervise the people to become sympathizers in a l l stages of their lives, including the schools, workplaces, districts, unions, political parties, villages, etc., and to determine the ones capable of resistance. One must communicate with them, gaining their confidence and respect, guiding them to revolutionary ideas without scaring them.” 16 Sempatizan Kazanma ve Kadro Yetiútirme 1, Ibid., p.189. 42 N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations certain aim. When these two features are seen in the organism’s attitude, it can be said that the organism has been motivated.17 In this context, the concept of motive can be defined as the source that pushes the organism to take action. For example, when we look for water when we are thirsty, or we look for a job when we need money and status, or a friend when we need to talk to someone. In short, we take action in line with the motives we have. Through the impact of some of our instincts, we may compete with others for something, and when we are blocked in our attempt to meet our needs, we may become aggressive. When the people around us affirm us, saying “you give him a good piece of advice”, for example, we may enter into new altercations in order to gain social acceptance. Several theories have been asserted on how to classify the motives that push humans to behave. One very well known theory belongs to Maslow. He collected the instincts under five categories and called them as “needs hierarchy”.18

19 Figure 2. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory.

As is seen in the figure above, and according to the theory, there are physiological needs at the first stage. It is not possible for someone who cannot satisfy the physiological needs to move the next stage. Then come safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem needs, and aesthetic and cognitive needs. The ones who satisfy the needs in the first four stages reach the stage of self actualization. The terrorist organizations address the physiological, psychological and social needs of the people with whom they plan to communicate. In this respect, they can provide students who have the problems of finance with dormitory accommodation, money and scholarships, and jobs for the unemployed.

17 D. Cuceloglu, Human and His Behaviour. Istanbul: Remzi Bookstore; 1991, p. 229, 230. 18 U.Dokmen, øletiúim Çatıúmaları ve Empati, Istanbul: Sistem Yayıncılık, 1994, p. 97. 19 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Maslow%27s_hierarchy_of_needs.svg, 10.12.2007. N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations 43

Also, tea, cinema, theatre, concert and picnic invitations can be the first steps of the dialogue to be established. An organization addresses this issue in one of its publications:20 “Giving a book (should not be thick) or a cassette, watching a video cassette or a program together, going to a movie, a play or a concert, taking into consideration the person’s interests and preferences, visiting a museum, taking him to a picnic or sporting activities all develop friendship and communication. The first thing that comes to mind to accustom the person to the organization, and allow the communication with him to progress, is to invite him to the cultural centres, magazines, union and syndicate. We should not forget that there are various possibilities.” In this respect, just as Maslow defines in his pyramid of needs, the terrorist organizations provide the best conditions to meet the physiological, safety, belongingness and love, esteem and self-actualization of needs of the young person they have recruited. Berrin Bıçkılar explains the reasons behind her joining the DHKP/C terrorist organization in her own words as: “The interest, confidence and value the organization showed me, and the contradiction between these approaches and my way of searching, form the basis of the reasons for my joining the revolution …”21

2.2. Group Dynamics

The terrorist organizations try to draw the individuals into a group dynamics in which the scenery, actors, and decor have been set up in advance, with the excuse of helping meet physiological and psychological needs. The reason is that, in order to make a terrorist organization or an extremist tendency successful, it must have the power to establish a covert (closed) network right from the start and dissolve and integrate all of its supporters in this network so that they become an indispensable part of the organization.22 In this regard, the organizations use group dynamics as a means in brainwashing and changing the militants’ attitudes in line with the ideologies of the organization, and removing his or her personal identity. The concepts of group and group dynamics have to be defined in order to explain how the terrorist organizations take advantage of the group dynamics to change the attitude and behaviour of the individuals they attract.

2.2.1. Definition of Group and Group Dynamics Human beings have lived within groups everywhere, and at every stage of their history, and created new groups. In order to survive, people need to have cooperation, collaboration and social relations. In this context, a group can be described as mainly a social unit in which an individual lives.23

20 Sempatizan Kazanma ve Kadro Yetiútirme 1, Ibid., p. 189-191. 21 Our women, Yaúadı÷ımız Vatan Dergisi 82, 2001, p. 14. 22 E. Hoffer, The True Believer (Translated by E. Gunur). Istanbul: Yüksel Press; 1980, p. 63. English original 1951 (reprint New York, Perenial Library, 2002). 23 M. Tan, Toplum Bilimine Giriú, Ankara University, Faculty of Education Sciences Publishment, Ankara, 1981, p. 73. 44 N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations

The term group used in daily speaking determines a plurality. There have been many definitions of the concept of the group, and it is the subject of sociology and social psychology. According to these definitions, it is necessary, for a crowd to be a group, that common aims exist, and common norms, and feelings of being a group. In Ka÷ıtçıbaúı’s term, a group is more than one human who have come together with a common aim, and who interact with each other.24 In the light of the information above, for a community to be a group, it is necessary to have the features listed below: x Consisting of more than one member, x Existence of relationships based on a common aims and benefits/interests, x Continuity of relations, x Feeling of group identity among the members. All these features are the basic criteria which differentiate the group from the ordinary masses. In this context, the people, who watch a football match in a stadium, the people who travel in a train, and parents who wait for their children and pick them up from school, are not a group since they came together cursorily and temporarily. Thus, masses do not have interaction and group consciousness.25 Group dynamics denote causal connections which exist in a group, and functioning as and consisting of a group.26

2.2.2. Group Dynamics and Their Importance for Terrorist Organizations The terrorist organizations attract the targeted people into an illegal group, where the activities are carried out secretly, by using some legal organizations such as publishing houses, foundations, associations, etc.. They change the targeted person’s ideas, senses and attitudes through the direction of their own ideologies, and they make use of group dynamics by giving organizational training. In the light of the group and group dynamics the structure and the functioning of the terrorist organization may be shortly explained as follows. Terrorist organizations are covert organizations/networks, operating with a ‘cell system’. They build a wall between the members and the outer world by means of group dynamics. So, nobody is accepted into the terrorist groups at whatever time he/she wants, because, since the organizations operate secretly, they approach any willing individual suspiciously. However, they trust those recruited through their existing members. A recruited individual cannot leave the organization as he wishes. When he wants to leave, the group never lets him go. Therefore, apart from physical torture he/she is subjected to psychological torture as well. At this point, organizations use two major emotions of the human being; hope and fear. Until they recruit an individual they manipulate his/her hopes, but then, once the person has become a member, they manipulate the person’s fears in order to keep him/her in the network.27 Additionally,

24 Ç. Ka÷ıtçıbaúı, ønsan ve ønsanlar, Istanbul:Cem ofset Matbaacılık, 1980, p. 200. 25 F. Ulu÷, Group Processes in Education, Ankara, TODAøE Publications, 1999, p. 74-75. 26 Ç. Ka÷ıtçıbaúı, , ønsan ve ønsanlar, Istanbul: Cem ofset Matbaacılık, 1980, p. 203. 27 The memories of a university sudent who stayed in the terrorist PKK organization for 400 days support our idea. Once a person joins the organization it becomes very difficult to leave. For this reason, the condition of a person who starts to recognize the ugliness and contradictions in the organization can be tragic. See: O.Uneú, 400 Days of a University Student with the PKK. Erzurum, Bakanlar Media, 1999, p. 32-33. N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations 45 the organization marks those who want to leave it with humiliating adjectives such as ‘fake’ or ‘traitor’.28 Each group in an organization has norms and a system of values. Although these norms and values are not generally in written form, there are also written accounts. An organized group of this kind has its own organizational functioning, stereotyped values, purposes and order of relationships. In that respect, the group has a solidarity, unison, and a labour division in it, and separate expectations of its members. An organizational group has a collective mind, attitude and pattern of behaviour.29 Therefore, since the decision mechanism is controlled by the collective mind, Individuals in a terrorist network can not act in the way they wish, can not read a book they like, can not meet with people they choose, and can not marry people they want.30 This is because the mechanism that directs the lives of the individuals, that thinks, and makes decisions on behalf of them, is the collective mind, stance and behaviour of the network. There is no place for individualism in an organizational group. Individualism is constantly humiliated, while collective organization is praised/blessed. Rather than the ‘I’, ‘we’ is used. The organization is everything. Therefore, individuals can always be sacrificed for the higher good of the organization.31 Organizational groups have a very strict hierarchical structure. This structure is built on a cell type group structure and each militant of the organization can only know the militants in his/her group. The instructions of the organization’s leader are conveyed to the subordinates through the group coordinators. The information sent to the seniors by the subordinates is again transferred in the form of a report through the group leaders.32 The organizations are managed under the control of their leaders through the hierarchic structure. A leader is everything for the organization. The leader is the mother, father, brother, God ...33 For this reason, the leaders have immunity. They cannot be criticized, and have the absolute dominance over the organization.34 These conditions, which exist in most of the organizations, cause the loss of the members’ personalities and identities. 35 Using group psychology to their

28 The propaganda the terrorist organization DHKP/C used in its publication about its members who gave up their hunger strike is one of the most significant examples. “Know them! They betrayed their comrades!” Yaúadı÷ımız Vatan, 103, 2001. 29 The following expressions are found in the same issue: “The organization will create its own individual. It assimilates by collectivizing. It shapes the individual to make him a part of the whole. There is an organic tie between the organization with its collective power bond and the individual. It is both an instrument and an aim in the development of the individiual. Because an individual without an organization is nothing. He is powerless and hopeless without an organization.” Also (p. 28): “To be organized means to be collective. To be organized and collectivism are two interconnected realities. Being organized would manifest itself at the militants’ level, and is achieving the union of decision and will through the common aim,” p. 30. 30 V. Acarsoy, Station, Ankara: Yeni Forum Publications, 1987, p. 25-26. 31 The following passage is found in this book (p. 25-26): “The revolutionaries are the public’s property. They do not have a private life. They do not get married and cannot fall in love. Our aim is to realize the revolutions that the Turkish public desires.” 32 M.Sincar, On education and organization. Istanbul: Mem Publications; 2001, p. 54. 33 C. Deniz, The anatomy of my revolutionism and APO - our God Ankara: Aksu Printing; 1996, p. 53. 34 Can Deniz, who was active in the PKK for long years, says on this issue: “The terrorist organization leader Abdullah Ocalan could not be criticized because he was like God. The general approach among the militants was like this. Some were scared, some really believed this, some thought like this due to their feudal prejudices. This approach has been defined as the devotion to the leader psychology” (p. 53). 35 E. R. Hilgard, R. L. Atkinson, Introduction to Psychology, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1979, p. 747. 46 N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations advantage, the terrorist organizations change the individuals’ attitudes, system of perceptions and identities through their own ideologies. These individuals, whose brains have been washed and whose minds have been conditioned, are no different from robots after they enter these networks. After adopting a ‘robotic sub-culture’, the newly-recruited person can easily kill others or themselves.

2.3. Change of Attitudes within a Group

The terrorist organizations change the attitudes of the individuals whom they attract and, based upon their respective potential, may use them to perform various tasks ranging from hanging posters on walls, distributing bulletins, and participating in demonstrations, to hunger strikes, arranging suicide attacks, and killing people, etc.. As is stated by many researchers, our attitudes are the invisible world of our behaviour, and they have power to direct the senses and behaviour.36 According to this pattern, the organizations begin to attract individuals first by giving a book, magazine or newspaper, since these publications are the most effective instruments for brainwashing. The print and visual media play a very important role in the formation of the expectations, values, beliefs, feelings and ideas. 37 Books, newspapers, and magazines are the three main tools in the formation of attitudes. In this context, the process of brainwashing is initiated by giving the targeted person books and newspapers and feeding them the thought which is the primary element of the attitude. There are also discussions within the group while the newly recruited militant reads the book.38 As a matter of fact, while these discussions are carried out in a controlled manner by the organization members, pre-determined issues and questions are also raised, and pre-planned answers are provided. The person is asked about what he has read. He is taken to seminars and meetings that have been organized by the organization, and is given new propaganda material to read. Meanwhile, the individual is only allowed to read the books, newspapers and magazines provided by the organization and told to believe in the facts, opinions and ideologies provided in these materials. 39 The aim of this is to impose upon the individual a single way of thinking. In other words, the individual will acquire a black and white perspective. This black and white way of thinking imbues the individual with a strong sense of the difference between ‘the ones that are sympathetic to the organization’s cause’ and the ‘ones that are not’, or, in other words, a strong sense of differentiation between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. The newly-recruited individual, who has been fed through organizational publications, is also fed through the organizational propaganda, including slogans, music, videocassettes and CDs.

36 S. A. Arkonaç, Social Psychology, Istanbul: Alfa Publications, 1998, p. 163. 37 Ö. Köknel, Understanding Human, Istanbul, Altın Kitaplar Publications, 1986, p. 434. 38 The statements in an organization’s publication supports our view: “It would not be proper to set a standard timetable for making the individual a sympathizer. Some people can be convinced in a longer and some at a shorter time. At this stage, people may be given some of our magazines and publications. These publications must be discussed with these people. When a book is given, a date should be set and that book should be discussed after that date. The activities must be evaluated immediately” (Gaining Sympathizers and Training up the Cadre, Istanbul, Yaúam Publications, 2000). 39 S. Taúçı, Freedom of Book Selection Which Has Been Trampled by the Hegemony of the Terrorist Organizations. In From Craziness to Commonsense: Confidents Tell Their Stories, Ankara, Yeni Forum Publications, 1987, p. 59-65. N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations 47

The individual is also charged with duties like hanging posters on the walls, distributing notices and participating in the public meetings.40 Even if the young person dragged into an illegal group thinks that its activities are wrong, he will know that he cannot object. This is because, as we mentioned in our list of the features of the group, there are common values, norms, attitudes and behaviour, and it can be said that by this point this psychological process has started to have a greater effect up the individual. The terrorist organizations use a warm and sincere approach to change the attitudes of the individuals toward their ideologies. It has, however, been observed that once these people become members of the organization, those who later resist or question the group ideology or actions are met with physical and psychological torture.

2.4. Influence on the Perception of the World

The terrorist organizations not only change young people’s attitude and behaviour through their ideologies, but also they penetrate into their perception of the world, and make them not think of anything other than the organization’s own targets and ideals. Perception, as is known, is what we call the process of the organizing, interpreting, and explaining of the data which reach at brain from the sense organs. The data which arrive from the sense organs do not make very much sense without perception. It is necessary for sensory data to be perceived, namely to be given meaning. Only through perception can we decide how we will react to the data which come to us.41 Perception is not only the function of sensations. It comes as a result of the interaction of two groups of factors. In a general discussion of advertising and propaganda, these have been defined as follows: “The first group of factors come from the environment. For example, the colours used in an advertisement may affect the perception. The differences (discrepancies) between the object and the others increase its recognizability. Large size is another feature. Bigger objects are more attractive than small ones. The factors mentioned above are often used by advertisers and propagandists. They are one of the most important instruments that are used by a terrorist organization’s propaganda. Thus, the terrorist organizations use environmental factors to their advantage while making propaganda. In addition, culture is one of the most important environmental factors effecting perception. The terrorist organizations, which form a sub-culture, require strict adherence to their values from their members. The second group factors are individual factors. The needs of the individual, standards of judgment, beliefs, motives, experiences, attitudes, personality and expectations all affect perception. The thesis has already been presented in this paper that terrorist recruiters are trained to judge and meet, on an individual level, the needs of the youth, and this ability earns them a position of trust. Later they use this position of trust is to mould the youth’s perceptions and ideologies.”42

40 Gaining Sympathizers and Training Up the Cadre, p. 197. 41 Ü. Dökmen, Communication Conflicts and Empathy, Istanbul, Sistem Publications, 1994, p. 84. 42 Y. Odabaúı, Consumer Behaviour, Anatolia University Publications, Eskiúehir, 1986, p. 60. 48 N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations

In this context, the terrorist organizations build a wall between the members and the outer world through constructing a new world. They create individuals who have a single set way of thinking, and who perceive events in a unique way. In those individuals who have gone through ideological training there is the tendency to perceive all thoughts, ideas, ideologies, organizations, and structures as the enemy, except for their own ones, since their perception of the world has been formed by the organizations they belong to. Also, in those individuals who have acquired an ideological way of thinking, there is a tendency to perceive and interpret all the events around them within the framework of that ideology.

2.5. Acquiring the Militant Identity and Personality

The next step, after brainwashing and the inculcation of the group ideology, is to invoke the militant identity in the adolescent. The most important aim at this stage is to make the young person a part of the collective organizational identity and personality.43 In other words, it is to make him into a spoke in the organizational wheel. In order to make the militants ready to kill and die, the terrorist organizations turn them into true believers in the cause and ideology of the organization by first destroying their individual personality and then replacing it with the group identity. Identification with the group identity results in the acquisition of deviant militant beliefs whereby life loses its sanctity and the indoctrinated militant is ready to kill or be killed in the name of ideology. Tufan Türenç, ‘Hürriyet’ daily’s writer and managing editor, stated the following in one of his articles:44 “A woman (!) activist wildly attacking the tulips, whose only guilt was in showing off their beauty, is the only thing that remained from 1 May 1996. A young girl, wearing blue jeans, a jeans waistcoat, and the scarf of the organization around her neck, is hitting the tulips with the stick in her hands. The tulips, which had been grown with great care, are scattered all over the place, with only the stems left behind. And the other tulips are waiting for their death sentence. Maybe the young girl will cut all of their heads. I am sure that young girl had also cultivated, watered and talked to flowers like a mother [before she became a part of the organization]. But terrorism makes people wild. The organizations turn their militants into robots. That young girl would hit a person in the same way. She is programmed like that. She is only a merciless robot, not a human being.” Organizational personality, in other words militant personality and identity, provides legitimacy for the crimes which are to be committed. An ordinary person feels some remorse, even when he/she has killed someone by mistake. Some commit suicide due to the anxiety arising from awareness of guilt. However, when a terrorist organization has completed the brainwashing process on a militant, that person does not have guilty conscience. One could even say that there is no difference between the individuals whose brains are washed and conditioned in the way seen in terrorist organizations and robots.

43 Özgür Halk, Vol. 119, 2001. 44 T. Türenç, The Young Girl Destroying The Tulips, Hürriyet, 05.04.1996. N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations 49

Training of Militants

The terrorist organizations subject the people they have attracted firstly to ideological training. According to the organization’s particular features, certain publications are given to the recruits as basic training books. The militants are sent to training camps for practical activities, and are first ideologically and theoretically trained. This theoretical training continues even after the practical training.45 The members of a terrorist organization who are ideologically well-trained are then subjected to basic training necessary for armed strife. Other than the use of any kind of weapon that the organization would provide, and the way to plan an action like an assassination, the militants are also trained in the tactics of organizing a bomb attack.46

Conclusion and Suggestions

As mentioned before, there are certain elements that keep the terrorist organizations alive. These are ideology, domestic and foreign support, funding and members. The terrorist organizations may have an ideology, foreign support and even funding, but, despite all these, without human resources it is not possible for that terrorist organization to continue to exist. When the 30 years of Turkey’s combat against the terrorist organizations is analysed, one observes that there is the misunderstanding which suggests that the problem can be solved only by operational activities. In such operations, the militants of the terrorist group who have been through the phases explained above are either arrested and sent to prisons or killed in armed conflict. But has this prevented the entire scope of the organization’s activities? In our view, it has not. The reason is that the terrorist organizations can recruit a new militant to fill the empty place left behind by every militant lost in armed conflict. This is why their activities still continue today. To have absolute control over terrorist networks, and terminate their activities, social projects focusing on the human should be developed and implemented. In other words, just like the practice in ‘preventive medicine’ in the healthcare services, the sections of the society which terrorist networks use as a resource for recruiting new members, particularly the youth, must be well informed about the activities of the terrorist organizations, and they must be taught the methods and ways to avoid catching the “terrorism disease”.

References

Acansoy, V., Station. Ankara: Yeni Forum Publications; 1987. Alkan, N., Before the Word Ends, Preventive Strategies in Struggling with Terror, (Söz Bitmeden, Terörle Mücadelede Önleme Stratejileri), USAK Publications, Ankara, 2007. Alkan, N., Çıtak, M. C., Youth and Terrorism, NATO, Security Science Series, E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 19, IOS Press, 2007. Arkonac, S. A., Social Psychology. Istanbul: Alfa Publications, 1998. Atkinson, R. C., Hilgard, E. R., Introduction to Psychology (translated by K. Atakay and others), Istanbul: Social Publishing, 1995.

45 N. Alkan, M. C. Çıtak, Youth and Terrorism, NATO, Security Science Series, Vol. 19, 2007, p. 302 (quoted from S.Dilmaç, The Terrorism Problem and Turkey, Ankara TNP Publications, 1997). 46 Ibid, p. 303. 50 N. Alkan and Y. Özdemir / Recruitment Methods of Terrorist Organizations

Bozkurt, T., Yıldırım, O., Fading lives in Terrorism. Zaman Daily, 01.17.2001. Bulut, F., Farac, M., Code Name Hezbollah. Istanbul: Ozan Publications, 1999. Cerrah, ø., Socio-Economic and Cultural Reasons of PKK Terror, I International Symposium on Security and Peace in Eastern Anatolia. Elazı÷: Fırat University Publications, 2000. Cemal, H., Kimse Kızmasın Kendimi Yazdım, Istanbul, Do÷an Kitapçılık. Cicek, H., Which Hizbullah? Istanbul: Kaynak Publications; 2000. Cuceloglu, D., The Human and His Behaviour. Istanbul: Remzi Bookstore, 1991. Çevik, A., The psychology of ethnic terrorism. Ankara: Basbakanlık Publications, 1993. Demirel, E., Hizbullah. Kultur Sanat Publications, 2001. Demirkıran, S., Trembling Confessions. Istanbul: Turan Publication, 1996. Deniz, C., The Anatomy of My Revolutionism and APO – Our God, Ankara: Aksu Printing, 1996. Dilmaç, S., The Terrorism Problem and Turkey, TNP Publications, Ankara, 1997. Do÷an, I., Sociology, Concepts and Problems. Istanbul: Sistem Publications, 2000. Dökmen, Ü., Communication Conflicts and Empathy, Istanbul, Sistem Publications, 1994. Eickelman, Dale F., The Middle East and Central Asia, An Anthropological Approach, Pearson Education, New Jersey, 2002. Erdogmus, Z., Reasons of terrorist acts in Turkey. International terrorism and youth. Ankara: MEB, 1987. Erjem, Y, Annotated Sociology Dictionary. Izmir: Saray Bookstore, 1996. Gurtas, A., Atatürk and Religious Education. Ankara: Diyanet øsler Baskanligi Publications, 2000. Hilgard, E. R., Atkinson, R., Introduction to Psychology, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1979. Hoffer, E., The True Believers. (Translated by E. Gunur). Istanbul: Yüksel Press, 1980. Hottacsu, N., In-group and inter-group processes. Ankara: Image Bookstore, 1998. Inceoglu, M., Attitude-perception relationship. Ankara: ømaj Publications, 2000. Ka÷ıtçıbaúı, Ç., Human and Humans (ønsan ve ønsanlar), Istanbul: Cem Ofset, 1980. “Know these well! They betrayed their comrades!” Yaúadı÷ımız Vatan Magazine 103, 2001. Kon, I. S., Society and Youth. (Translated by S. Keleú), Istanbul: Ar-Tu Press, 1977. Köknel, O., Republican youth and their problems, Istanbul: Cem Publications, 1979. Meydan Larousse, Istanbul, Meydan Publications, 1973. Morgan, C. T., Introduction to Psychology. Ankara: Hacettepe University Psychology Department Publications, 1989. Odabaúı, Y., Consumer Behaviour, Anatolia University Publications , Eskiúehir, 1986. Özönder, C., Socio-cultural aspects of terrorism. Security and Peace in Eastern Anatolia Symposium. Elazı÷: Fırat Üniversitesi Publications, 1998. Schein, E. H., Organizational Psychology. (Translated by M. Tosun) Ankara: TODAIE Publications: 1978. Sempatizan Kazanma ve Kadro Yetiútirme I, Seçme Yazılar I, (Gaining Sympathizers and Training up the Cadre), Istanbul, Yaúam Publications, 2000. Sincar, M., On Education and Organization. Istanbul: Mem Publications, 2001. “Some Emphasis on Personality Transformation” III. Özgür Halk Dergisi 119, 2001. ùenturk, L. , Yazici, S., Catechism of Islam. Ankara: Diyanet øsler Baskanligi Publications, 2001. Tan, M. Introduction to Sociology, Ankara University, Dep. Of Education Publications, 1981. Taúçı, S., Freedom of book selection which has been trampled by the hegemony of the terrorist organization. From Craziness to Common Sense: Confidents Tell Their Story. Ankara: Yeni Forum Publications, 1987. Temüh, Din ve Laiklik østismarı, (Religion, Secularism and Exploitation), Police Magazine, Vol. 17, 1998. Türenç, T., The Young Girl Destroying the Tulips. Hürriyet Daily, 05.04.1996. Ulug, F., Group processes in education. Ankara: TODAIE Publications, 1999. Üneú, O., 400 days of a university student with the PKK. Erzurum: Bakanlar Media, 1999. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Maslow%27s_hierarchy_of_needs.svg, 10.12.2007. Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 51 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-51 Psychology of Terrorists and Profile of Suicide Bombers

Police Chief Seyit Ahmet EREN Anti-Terrorism Dept., and COE–DAT Instructor, Ankara

Abstract. The lecture begins by evoking the thought world of the terrorist, dominated by notions heroism and evil. The importance of the ideology is emphasized. Focusing on suicide bombers, the lecture provides ‘in broad terms’ the profile of an attacker. The motivations of the suicide are listed, as are the demands placed on him/her by the terrorist group. This chapter also answers the question why women are preferred as suicide attackers. In conclusion, it notes that “not only the security forces but all other institutions and civil society must get involved in coping with suicide terrorism”.

Keywords. Suicide attacks, psychology of terrorists, profile of suicide bombers, motivation for suicide terrorism, women suicide bombers.

1. Psychology of Terrorists

The psychology of joining a terrorist group or being a suicide attacker differs depending on the typology of the group. Motivational elements vary from country to country, from region to region and even from organization to organization. Terrorists have many different reasons or motives for their acts. Many politically motivated terrorists, whether they are of the left or right, want to bring down an existing government or regime. Many religious terrorists want to attack those they see as attacking their religion. Others want publicity for their cause. Suicide attackers have usually had at least one relative or close friend who has been killed, maimed, or abused by their enemies. They regard themselves as unknown warriors and self-sacrificing people of the community. According to them people in the community are unaware of their rights and unconscious. Therefore, they cannot distinguish good from bad. This is why the public does not join the organizations. They also believe that as time goes on the people will become conscious and take part in activities. Until then, as the conscious group of the community, the struggle must be implemented on behalf of the public.1 Ideology is very important for the terrorist organizations. They regard their ideologies as a unique guide that produces solutions to every kind of problem in the universe, and it is therefore not necessary for a member in the organization to think for

1 Necati Alkan, “Genclik ve Terorizm” (Youth and Terrorism), Publication of Anti-Terrorism Department, Turkish National Police, No:9, Catalog No: 323, Ankara, 2002, p.144-156. 52 S.A. Eren / Psychology of Terrorists and Proﬁle of Suicide Bombers himself or herself. A member within the organization is expected to be obedient to whatever the leader or his commanders say. The leaders in the religious terrorist organizations have a great influence on the obedient cadre of the organizations. Because of strict hierarchy and high discipline in these groups, the leaders keep full control over the political and military issues. It is as if the leaders made themselves a God and regard their militants as their servants. They direct their staff towards the attacks by invoking religion and by finding a basis in the Scriptures. In order to achieve their aims, terrorist organizations using religious motives can kill anybody, even Muslim leaders, or scholars who are believed to constitute an obstacle to their making progress. Having been accepted into the organization, the individual is taken for training both ideological and practical. Ideological training comes first. Ideology is of vital importance in terms of changing the mentality. The organization makes the necessary changes in the attitude of the person by penetrating his perception of the world, and forms a new subconscious. Thus, the new member earns a militant identity and personality. Each member considers himself as a revolutionary and, in order to be able to change the whole world, a revolutionary has to change himself first in the direction of his organization’s ideology.2 How can it be achieved? Ideological thoughts turn into a belief system in the world of the militants thanks to ideological publications, which are read continuously during the organizational training. As a result of the training, the militants become extremists of their ideologies. Especially the ones who were starved for affection may have tendency to be fanatical. While they were nothing in their own minds, and in the environment they lived in, until they joined the organization, after joining they regard themselves as heroes that can rebuild the world. These feelings give them energy, strength, and enthusiasm. This is why they are so ruthless and merciless while killing people, even babies. A while after joining the organization, the militants start to regard everything as ‘black’ or ‘white’. In other words, they divide the people into two groups; those who are from us, and those who are not from us. Most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing wrong when they kill and injure people, or damage property. Many terrorists have a simplistic thinking in which “I am good and right, you are bad and wrong.” This belief makes it easier to kill people who are believed to have a connection with their enemies. They do not feel other people’s pain. However, they do not appear to be unstable or mentally ill. This is also not a lack of intelligence, as many terrorists are of above average intelligence. Besides these, the leaders construct glorious dreams and make their staff believe these dreams. As the time goes on, the leaders, too, start to believe the things they concoct. The terrorists feel that they carry out a magnificent and holy duty. It can be said that this feeling is one of the main pillars of legitimacy to kill or to die. Ideological publications and the subjects in these publications increase the incentives to imitate the terrorist group’s former militants, especially the martyrs.

2 N. Alkan, p. 144-156. S.A. Eren / Psychology of Terrorists and Proﬁle of Suicide Bombers 53

2. Profile and Mindset of Suicide Bombers

Having mentioned these points, we turn our attention to the phenomenon of suicide bombers. Although the motivations are not too different from other types of terrorism, suicide attacks are the last stage of dedication, which entails not only killing but also dying. Terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, grows in an environment in which the conditions are abnormal. Some blame military occupations or heartbreaking economic and social conditions for causing the existence of abnormal conditions. Under the abnormal conditions, some people in the region think of suicide attacks as a necessity and the last remedy in situations where the weapons are not equal. Additionally, as is the case in the Middle East, suicide bombers expect to be admired and envied by those left behind. Teenage groups praise martyrs in their songs.3 Research done in the USA showed that suicide terrorism is employed “to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the suicide bombers consider to be their homeland”. Chicago University political scientist Robert A. Pape mentions in his book “Dying to Win; The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”, that catalogues every suicide terrorist attack between 1980 and 2003 using an original database, mentions that 301 of the 315 recorded attacks were components of large, coherent struggles against foreign occupation. Suicide terrorism, he argues, is employed as a strategy of last resort designed to cause more damage than conventional forms of resistance. He also adds that the description of these catastrophes as products of Islamic fundamentalism and other false presumptions threaten America and harm Muslims around the world.4

2.1. Profiling of Suicide Bombers

Researchers agree that there is no single profile of a suicide bomber. A wide range of people can feel themselves compelled to such extremes. Nevertheless, in broad terms, the attackers are: x generally single, x between 17-55 years old (these are the figures that were found in Turkey), x usually from poor and multi-children families, x both educated and uneducated, x both male and female, x not necessarily motivated by religious fanaticism, as they are often from groups like left-wing organizations, x eager to avenge themselves on security officers/enemy, x mostly psychologically normal, although x suffering in some cases from psychological/health problems, x no longer useful to the organization, x unskilled, especially in the field.

3 Debra D. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers, Research, June 2004, p. 9. 4 Robert A. Pape, “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”, 2005. 54 S.A. Eren / Psychology of Terrorists and Proﬁle of Suicide Bombers

2.2. Mental Characteristics of Suicide Attackers

Again, if one is focusing on the mental characteristics of suicide attackers, there are no certain criteria. This category of terrorist can be said to be usually drawn from those who are, or feel themselves to be, unsuccessful. Often introverts, they combine a withdrawal from society, often combined with physical poverty, with a deep sense of offence. Strongly emotional people, they are easily indoctrinated, and immerse themselves in the mythology of the organization. They may not be people who often engage in open aggression, but their strong drive for vengeance leads them to rash actions. This is not the case in the Middle East. Palestinian and Iranian organizations recruit thousands of young people who are voluntarily registered for suicide attacks allegedly for the sake of the GOD. Hamas, Lebanese Hezbullah, and groups in Iran and Iraq, openly encourage a culture of suicide attacks. Those allegedly willing to die often participate in public parades, covering their faces, and sometimes wearing suicide jackets. As a result, the attacker may go through the stages of preparation in groups, and this method of attack will imply less individual choice.

3. Mindset of Suicide Bombers

3.1. Motivational Elements

The motivations of suicide bombers, in most aspects, are not different from other types of terrorism. These can be listed as: x The wish to influence an audience, x to be remembered, and x to gain other militants’ praise, x the longing for religious purity, x the wish for the eternal rewards of “martyrdom”, x the sense of desperation, having “nothing to live for”, x humiliation and impotence as an individual and as a group, x the belief that the attackers are useful to their cause. It is clear that this list can be analysed into broader categories. The first of the motivations listed above that fame and notoriety are important attractions, in contrast to the secrecy surrounding the attack’s preparation stages. In the case of religiously-inspired terrorists, there is a longing for purity/absolution, and, always, the organization’s promises of eternal reward. Central to the motivational aspect of these suicides is the element of a person’s grim identification with a cause, and the sense that both the attacker and his/her cause are victimized and humiliated. Whereas a personal sense of failure may be blamed on the person’s immediate circumstances, when a group is seen as being oppressed by another there is a strong likelihood of a dangerous politicization of victimhood. This is discussed by Roy Baumeister in his penetrating study of violence: “When people believe that their rights and their group pride have been injured by someone from another group, they are all too often ready to respond in a violent S.A. Eren / Psychology of Terrorists and Proﬁle of Suicide Bombers 55 fashion … Groups are a vital part of human social life and are necessary for survival, but they also reflect a built-in predisposition toward a certain pattern of antagonism.”5 Suicide bombing is the expression of a society where the focus is upon grievances, often perceived as reaching back far into history. There is a sense of being trapped in an inevitable historical struggle. No trust is placed in responsible and constructive efforts to recognize and redress genuine distress. Terrorists may develop a pathological mentality, whereby they feel that whatever they do is justified. Here there is a pleasure in, and glorifying of, violence. The 9/11 attackers are said to have celebrated together before their attacks, and even boasted of their plans. In a case which I have mentioned before, particularly cruel was the behaviour of Nezar Hindawi, a freelance Jordanian terrorist. In an April 1986 plan that was foiled by airport security, Hindawi sent his pregnant Irish girlfriend to Israel by airplane, saying he would meet and marry her there. She apparently was not aware that Hindawi had hidden a bomb provided by the Abu Nidal organization in her luggage.6

3.2. Group Mindset: What the Group Expects from the Terrorist

It has been established above that there is an important shift in the mindset when the distinctions between the individual and the group are blurred. The group has a catalytic quality in the individual’s move to violent response in a political context. What pressures, therefore, is the group bringing to bear? Firstly, every group will expect complete obedience. Typically there is a strong hierarchy. This also applies in groups which rely more on the ‘inspirational’ leadership style to which al-Qaeda has resorted since 9/11: Although the ultimate authorities may be distant, the attackers come from groups in which there are dominant leadership characters. Because of the absolute authority of the leadership, individuals are compelled against their wishes. Once they are ordered to commit an attack they have no option, because: x non-acceptance is punished with death, x there is no chance to choose to live or to die, and x the only choice may be the type of death. The suicide attack reinforces the group. Every case is a message, not only to the relevant people, institutions, or states, but also to the members of the organization.

4. Why Are Women Preferred?

In the case of a number of terror organizations there is a tendency to prefer females as suicide bombers. There are some operational reasons for this: x Traditionally there is a hesitancy to inspect the woman body (especially in Muslim cultures). x Easiness to camouflage (e.g. as a pregnant woman). x They may have greater accessibility to targets. There are other, more socially specific, reasons for the number of women bombers: x Deadly attack as a way to cope with social rejection.

5 Roy F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Violence, New York: W. H. Freeman, 1997, p. 26–27. 6 Maxwell Taylor, Ryan, Helen, “Fanaticism, Political Suicide, and Terrorism”, no. 2, p.91-111, 1998. 56 S.A. Eren / Psychology of Terrorists and Proﬁle of Suicide Bombers

x Mentality to prove to be useful. x Emotional state and lack of schooling means that they are more easily persuaded to commit suicide attacks. x The psychological effect on the population of a woman attacker. The message may be conveyed that the organization’s cause must be particularly strong if it is able to give women this unaccustomed, militant function. The determination of the group is reflected by this partial reversal of the woman’s traditional role. She remains a guardian of social honour, but now through violence, rather than nurturing at home.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Counter-terrorism will not be able to profile and identify terrorists in a way which will eliminate the danger. Because the method is used so frequently, suicide attacks have become a goal in a society rather than a means. The culture subject to it degenerates after a while. Then that society does not need to expend great efforts in finding suicide attackers since the environment is convenient for raising up such people. The people in that society feel themselves to be very strong when they take death lightly in the struggle against the enemy. As a result, suicide action gives them a feeling of unlimited power despite their weakness. By the same token, a mature society will be able to identify and redress genuine grievances. If conditions are restored to a civilized normality, people are confronted with the truth, and then communities and people have the chance to relinquish these considerations and thought patterns. Policies and relationships within the countries/groups must be reviewed and new approaches must be adopted based on mutual understanding. Peaceful resolutions must be implemented instead of mutual retaliation. Inevitably, more attention has to be paid to historical, economic, social, cultural, political, psychological and religious factors. For this, not only the security forces but also other institutions and civil society must get involved in coping with suicide terrorism. In order to prevent false teachings and the misuse of the religions, governments should provide education on religious subjects. Religious scholars have great responsibilities in illuminating individuals who have been trapped into the mentalities discussed in this lecture. Religions should not be politicized, and, to prevent this, the divine messages in the holy books must not be misinterpreted. In terms of the international perception of Islam, considering every Muslim as a potential terrorist should be avoided. This perception deeply hurts Muslims across the world and increases the polarization. Neither terrorism nor suicide attacks are approved in religion. Special efforts must be made by the media, researchers and politicians in distinguishing the real tenets of Islam and the approaches of members of a religious terrorist organization which exploits the religion. Would it not be much better if we could term the situation ‘terrorism with religious motives’, or ‘terror organizations exploiting religions’ instead of ‘Islamic terrorism’? When combating this kind of terrorism, every effort should be made to show that it is the violence, and the false and S.A. Eren / Psychology of Terrorists and Proﬁle of Suicide Bombers 57 violent interpretation, which is of concern to the security forces, and not the religion itself.

References

ALKAN, Necati, (2002), “Genclik ve Terorizm” (Youth and Terrorism), Publication of Anti-Terrorism Department, Turkish National Police, No:9, Catalog No: 323, Ankara. BAUMEISTER, Roy F., Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Violence, New York: W. H. Freeman, 1997. ÇEVøK, Abdülkadir, and CEYHUN, Birsen (1995), “Psikolojik yönden kimlik geliúimi ve Etnik Terörizm”, (Identity Improvement in Terms of Psychology and Ethnic Terrorism”, Ankara, Political Psychology Centre. GÖKA, Erol (2002), “Siyasi Vahúet Gruplarının ve øntihar Eylemcisinin Psikolojisi”, (The Psychology of Politically Brutal Groups and Suicide Attackers”, compiled by Erol GÖKA and Iúık KUùÇU, Ankara, a publication of Euro-Asia Strategic Studies Centre (ASAM). “Haftalık Magazine” (2005), “Bir Canlı Bomba Psikolojisini Anlatıyor”, (A Suicide Bomber Explains His Psychology”, Vol. 118. Holy Koran; 4/90, 5/32, 60/8. CCMR, Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism, 19-30 Jun 2006, Peace Support Operations Department Training Center, Bosnia-Herzegovina. PAPE, Robert A. (2005), “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. TAYLOR, Maxwell, RYAN, Helen, (1998), “Fanaticism, Political Suicide, and Terrorism”, No: 2. ZEDALIS, Debra D., (2004), “Female Suicide Bombers”, Research. This page intentionally left blank Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 59 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-59 Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack

Lt.-Col. Ugur ERSEN Instructor, COE–DAT, Ankara

Abstract. This paper aims to present an overview of crisis management activities and terrorism relationship. In order to be able to provide a concise and comprehensive overview, the main structure of crisis management activities and the key points will be emphasized along with a few lessons learned selected from previous major terrorist events. The policy and strategy is developed by the ministry and government, but there are supervisory roles also for the Crisis Management Center (CMC), on-scene leaders, and response team leaders. The tools for crisis management include logistics, health and safety, information management, public order, and legal support. The CMC, providing centralized control, may be composed of police, army, firefighters, health workers, municipality, and other experts. This chapter then analyses the phases of crisis management, from the planning and preparation, including exercises, to the execution. The execution of responding to a crisis is also divided into phases, from the initial response, to recovery and lessons learned. Detailed planning is vital for preventing or managing a crisis.

Keywords. Counter-terrorism, crisis management.

1. Introduction

A crisis can be defined as a “national or international situation where there is a threat to priority values, interests or goals”. From this definition, we can infer that a crisis starts with the emergence of a threat. Therefore, crisis management activities have to be initiated at this point with the aim of preparedness and managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. Crises may differ in causes and consequences, and last several days. They are not considered as routine or normal and it negatively impacts on the Security Forces and the community with consequences such as loss of life, injury, or severe property damage. As a consequence, most of the time the crisis requires intervention on a regional or national level, extraordinary means to resolve it, extraordinary measures to achieve recovery and extensive cooperation among organizations. In the same way, impacts and consequences of recent global terrorist events clearly highlight that the demand for detailed and comprehensive crisis management efforts has become a global fact. A detailed planning, preparation and response is vital to prevent a crisis or to manage if it occurs. Within this context, crisis management can be defined as “Measures to identify, acquire and plan the use of resources needed to 60 U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism”. The overview will be detailed in the light of this definition.

2. Crisis Management Supervision, Integration and Tools a. Supervision

Crisis management supervision should be initiated and performed from the top to the bottom with feedback in reverse order. While the government/ministry in charge retains authority to make the policy and strategic crisis management decisions at all times, operational and tactical decisions are taken to the greatest extent possible by lower echelons under the guidance of higher authorities. The Crisis Management Center receives guidance from the government/ministry or the governor depending on the size of the incident and maintains the overall control over the on-scene leader and the response teams.

Figure 1. Crisis Management supervision.

Proper and timely coordination among the levels is essential for the successful management of the crisis. Another key point is the necessity for the unity of effort from the strategic to the tactical level. b. Integration

Crisis management efficiency is closely related to the integration from the government to the public through the internal organizations and units. Additionally, enhanced civil- military cooperation in consequence management and preparedness can lead to a more effective response. A confident population will support the activities and contribute to U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack 61 overcoming the difficult situation. Depending on the size of the crisis, international cooperation and external support may be required. For this purpose, mutual understanding and diplomatic relations should be maintained at all times. c. Tools

Crisis management efforts dictate the effective use of available means and resources. In the same way, the central coordination authority, the Crisis Management Center, should focus on the proper and timely assignment of different functions and tools to overcome the crisis. As terrorist threats and methods change day by day, the priorities and tools required will change. Depending on the attack and the consequences, some of the tools might be needed more, but the others will have essential roles as well. Some of the most important tools are listed below: 1. Resource Management, 2. Intelligence and counter-intelligence (CI), 3. Logistics, 4. Security, 5. Operations, 6. Morale and welfare, 7. Public information, 8. Law enforcement, 9. Legal support, 10. Public order, 11. CBRN defense, 12. Transportation, 13. Information management, 14. Communications, 15. Health and Safety.

3. The Crisis Management Center

The Crisis Management Center plays an important role in ensuring coordination of crisis management and consequence management actions. The Crisis Management Center monitors the response in order to advise on decisions that may have implications for consequence management, and to provide liaison among the levels. a. Crisis Management Center Composition

The Crisis Management Center is composed of different functional organizations’ and units’ representatives in order to maintain an effective control over the situation. 62 U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack

Crisis Management Center CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER COMPOSITION Composition

Military Municipality Police

Fire Comms

Health Transport Leader

Key Utilities SAR

Logistics CBRN

Intelligence Others

Figure 2. Crisis Management Center composition.

In addition to the functions listed below, other functions can be integrated to the center depending on the situation and requirements. 1. Military 2. Police 3. Communications 4. Transportation 5. SAR 6. CBRN 7. Intelligence 8. Municipality 9. Firefighting 10. Health and Safety 11. Key Utilities 12. Logistics 13. Other b. Responsibilities of the Crisis Management Center

As the center provides overall command and control of the crisis situation, it also develops the strategic/operational response to the incident. The Crisis Management Center coordinates tactical response actions with the on-scene leader and the other response team leaders as required and provide assessment and advice to higher levels. It delegates authority to on-scene actors when conditions dictate the requirement. The Crisis Management Center establishment is closely related to threat conditions. As the threat level moves towards high, the center manning should be increased in order to cope with the conditions. U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack 63

4. Crisis Management Phases

In order to achieve a more professional approach to crisis management, crisis management activities should be planned, prepared, and executed by assessing the risk and evaluating the consequence of a terrorist event occurring. The preparation, response, and recovery elements of the Crisis Management Model are interrelated and, therefore, have a crucial relationship.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT PHASES

Policy

Planning Preparation Execution (Consequence management) Assessment Training Response Capabilities Exercise Recovery Resources Prevention Analysis Legal Process Public Information Strategic Level Operational Level Tactical Level

Figure 3. The phases of crisis management.

If an incident that produces major consequences occurs without warning and appears to be caused by an act of terrorism, consequence management and crisis management actions should be implemented concurrently. The whole process must be supported by a legal process and a public information strategy. The process starts with the policy from the higher authorities and proceeds at the operational and tactical level through the bodies responsible for taking action. Planning is the first step for proper crisis management. This phase should be completed with all details considering the threat assessment and the lessons identified. The second step is preparation. This phase is also crucial for a successful execution phase and readiness. Proper planning and preparation will contribute to the response and recovery. It will also ease and minimize the activities required during execution phase. Crisis Management has three main phases. However, they should never be considered apart from each other. A well-planned preparation phase will contribute to response and accordingly a robust response will ease and minimize the activities required during recovery phase. a. Preparation Phase

Authorities should focus on the following points for this phase: Assessment, capabilities, prevention, plans and procedures, training and exercises, legal 64 U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack arrangements and media campaign. In this phase, effective planning and implementation maintain preparedness. Preparedness is defined as the readiness to reduce the impact of major terrorist incidents, and where possible predict and even prevent attacks occurring. Effective preparations help identify the shortages and facilitate incident management. At this point, it is helpful to discuss the difference between being reactive and proactive. Reactive organizations respond to an incident after it has happened. Proactive organizations prepare for crises and possible incidents from the very beginning. This is a very important difference. Proactive ones who prepare well definitely respond to an incident properly and recover in a short time. However, reactive ones have difficulty adapting to the situation. This phase is best achieved in the light of Lessons Learned gained from the previous crises. Organizations generally identify the lessons, keep them on paper, but rarely learn and comply with the requirements of it. However, previous experiences are vital for preparation phase. A key point for preparation phase: Organizations need to prepare for and cope with the worst-case scenario. (1) Assessment: To begin with; we need to identify, evaluate and prioritize the assets and their criticality. Next, we need to assess the current threat. Effective intelligence is the touchstone for a realistic threat assessment. This contributes to providing a common understanding of the terrorist threats, their capabilities and intentions. Following threat assessment, vulnerability assessment needs to be conducted. This process will help identification of weaknesses in security systems of assets and infrastructure. Then, risk assessment is conducted. It combines the assessment of assets, threat and vulnerability in order to provide a complete picture of the risk. This evaluation is best conducted through various “what if” scenarios and realistic security inspections. However, in order to have objective results, inspections should be conducted externally by independent evaluators. In the light of risk assessment, we will be able to identify the requirements to mitigate the risk. Assessment constitutes the basis for planning for eventual crises. Military/security forces, critical infrastructure, valuable assets and other strategic installations are main targets for terrorist attacks. In addition, business and financial centers, industrial areas and population are considered as soft targets for terrorists. (2) Capabilities: Another step for the preparation phase is capabilities assessment. Capabilities assessment, along with risk assessment, helps us discover our deficiencies and requirements for additional measures. It will also help us find out our current abilities for protection and response to terrorist attacks. Work to meet the requirements identified with assessment and building capacity and stocks for sustained response capability have to be completed during this phase. These preparations will contribute to prevention and maintain readiness. Depending on the crisis and the consequences, external support may be required. International cooperation and protocols will increase confidence. (3) Prevention: As the effects of crime and terrorism continues to increase, the need for better strategies for protecting assets increase as well. Counterterrorism establishes policy to reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism, deter and respond to terrorism, and strengthen capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of a terrorist attack. Counter-terrorism policy has a direct effect on crisis management efforts. The purpose of the counter measures is deterrence, prevention, U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack 65 delay, detection, and response from defensive to aggressive. The level of measures is arranged in accordance with the value of assets and risks. (4) Protective Measures: Following the identification of requirements, additional protective and preventive measures should be planned for implementation during the preparation phase. Communities and individuals have always used physical security methods to protect their valuables. However, as the tools and devices available to criminal and terrorist elements become more sophisticated, security personnel need to have a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the threats, risks, and security principles necessary to protect the personnel, assets and infrastructure. As the amount of crime and terrorism continues to increase, the need for better strategies for protecting assets increase as well. Some of the basic protective measures are listed below: 1. Physical security measures, 2. Entry control measures, 3. CCTV/alarm systems, 4. Liaison with security forces, 5. Public Awareness, 6. Good housekeeping, 7. Avoid routine, 8. Alert state measures, 9. Other deterrent measures. The alert state system is one of the measures taken in accordance with the threat level. As the threat level increases, measures taken should be enhanced. In high alert state levels, terrorist attack is considered to be imminent; therefore, strict measures are taken in addition to the available ones. However, it is a fact that we cannot always be in a state of alert because it increases tension within the society, and it may cause people to become indifferent. The most critical warnings might come to be perceived as routine. Here, the key point is to maintain a sufficient level of alert in accordance with the threat conditions and have the society integrate the protective measures into a new way of life. (5) Plans and Procedures: Standardized plans and procedures ensure that responders share a common focus and are able to place full emphasis on the crisis at hand. This ensures that everyone responding to an emergency event uses the same management approach and standard terminology to resolve the incident as quickly and efficiently as possible. Plans and procedures also help control centers and leaders follow and control the response and recovery actions. All plans and procedures should be prepared considering the coordination and integration of response teams. Proper preparation of plans and procedures will support exercise and training activities. They can be used as testing and evaluation material. All crisis plans must be reviewed at least annually to update and revalidate procedures, and adjust/improve response methods. This practice is only as good as the willingness to follow through and make adjustments when necessary. The plans and procedures listed below are essential for a proper preparation. In accordance with the requirements that might arise, additional plans and procedures may be needed. 1. Crisis Management Plan, 2. Physical Security Plan, 3. Emergency Evacuation Plan, 4. CBRN Defense Plan, 5. Security Risk Management Plan, 66 U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack

6. Incident Response Plan, 7. Medical Response Plan, 8. Firefighting Plan, 9. Communication Plan, 10. Logistics Plan, 11. Transportation Plan, 12. Mail handling procedures, 13. Bomb threat response procedures, 14. Crisis Management Center procedures. (6) Training and Exercises: Crisis management requires extensive preparation for terrorist acts. An important part of these activities involves the training of key personnel and others. Plans and procedures must emphasize the application of best practices through reducing the risk of asset loss while encouraging the most effective response techniques. They should also encourage personnel to seek examples and applications of the successful security practices in the community. All plans and procedures must be tested and validated during the preparation phase. To achieve this, training and exercise scenarios should be as realistic as possible. Simulators and films can also be used for training purposes. In scenario-based field exercises, responders’ skills, coordination and main/alternative communication methods, emergency assistance and evacuation should be tested and validated. Training and exercises will also improve the integration of response units if applied realistically. However, theory alone is not sufficient. The learning process can only be considered complete after practicing. (7) Other points: Other points to cover during this phase are the legal arrangements and media campaign. We need the support of legal tools and media for effective management. These arrangements will supplement the other preparations and help give a robust response. In general, a detailed preparation will help uncover the discrepancies in planning, identify the shortages and guide for timely corrections before any crisis. It will also support the execution phase. b. Response Phase

The second phase for crisis management is response. Before going into details, one point should be highlighted. Each incident has its own characteristics and may require different response techniques. Here, basic actions will be detailed. Response phase consists of several steps. It begins with initial response and ends with restoration of basic services. The most important and challenging aspect is immediate crisis response to protect life and property following the attack. Such a response may span from a few hours to a few days, depending on the incident. Crisis response consists of multiple steps such as: Damage assessment, response needs assessment, response prioritization, and plan implementation which includes coordination and mobilization of rescue operations, resource and logistic planning, evacuation planning, situation monitoring, and timely information dissemination to the public, media, agencies, and hospitals. “Consequence management” refers to measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. Consequence U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack 67 management is generally a multifunctional response coordinated by emergency management. Depending on the situation, it may require the coordination of international, national, regional, and local assets to deal with the effects of an attack. (1) Key Factors: Before going into details of the response phase, focusing on the key factors to consider will provide us a better understanding for the crisis management. Effective command and control, coordination and communications prevent loss of control. Priorities help focusing on the most important problem areas and correct effort intensification during the crisis response. Sophisticated techniques for logistics and resource management and planning will maintain sustainment for prolonged execution phase. Flexibility and accordingly creativity are essential for effective crisis management. They will maintain easy and early adaptation to changing conditions. Information management will provide leaders to make sound and timely decisions while unreliable and imprecise information impedes decision-making process. The other key factor, public order and confidence also have direct effect on crisis management considering the disorder will cause confusion, rumors and endanger safety and security. The number of calls the casualty bureau received on the first day of London Bombings highlight the importance of timely dissemination of information: 43000 attempted calls an hour. The most fundamental component of crisis management is fast, effective communication and it is almost always a big problem. The void in communication creates fear, stress, and outright panic. If the authorities remain silent, the responders will fill in the blanks with their own answer. Communication has direct effect to coordination and C2. There is a clear requirement for multiple means against failures. Multiple communication systems has to cover development of means without power sources such as hand signals, signs, voice etc. Communication means should be uninterrupted, fast, flexible and secure. These systems should also be practiced with realistic scenarios. (2) Priorities: Priorities are one of the key points to consider for response and recovery. Following a disaster, immediate response operations to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs have priority for recovery and mitigation. Defense against CBRN agents and prevention of subsequent attacks are also vital as they will affect a large number of people. Restoration of law and order will facilitate the response and recovery while the reverse will complicate it. Mitigation opportunities should be actively considered throughout the execution phase. Decisions made during response and recovery operations can either enhance or hinder subsequent mitigation activities. Considering the priorities listed below will provide mitigation of the incident while ignorance will complicate the situation. (3) Initial Responders: Most crises and emergencies are handled by local and national responders. The Crisis Management Center coordinates the situation with the on-scene leader to assist in the rapid execution of plans and tasking of additional/specialized response units. The various emergency response teams listed below constitute the initial response units: 1. Law enforcement, 2. Firefighting, 3. EOD, 4. Medical services, 5. Search and rescue, 6. Utilities management, 68 U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack

7. Damage control units. (4) Specialized Response Units: Depending on the requirements of the ongoing execution phase, specialized teams may be tasked to respond to specific areas for recovery. The specialized response teams given below are usually tasked according to the information, assessment and requirements received from the initial responders. 1. Specialized crowd control units, 2. CBRN defense units, 3. Enhanced medical capabilities, 4. Tactical counter-terrorism units, 5. Specialized engineering units, 6. Specialized rescue teams, 7. Public information office. The problems and difficulties likely to arise during the crisis might be follow-on explosions and fires, CBRN material/agent exposure, hostage-taking, collapsed structures, public disorder, casualties and dealing with their families. A lessons identified for experts and responders: Some experts in a particular field think that they are also expert in another field, and most of the time it brings disastrous results. We need to know what we know and what we do not know. This confusion can be best avoided by clear job descriptions and training in accordance with them. (5) Initial Response Actions: Initial actions will start with first responders’ intervention. The incident location will be cordoned off and cleared. Then, evacuation procedures will be initiated under strict safety measures. Every effort should be made to maintain security and prevent disorder. The order of the actions given below may change depending on the requirements. 1. Deploy first responders, 2. Cordon off/clear the crisis location, 3. Evacuate the location, 4. Take safety measures (cut off gas, electricity), 5. Maintain public relations, 6. Prevent disorder. Reminder: We should not be afraid to make mistakes on the side of safety. In other words, we should take the side of safety. The lessons learned below emphasize the importance of evacuation of the designated area and the priorities, particularly caution for subsequent attacks and/or explosions. It was selected from Staff Statement 13 prepared by National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, which was established following the 9/11 attacks, and released in 2004: x At 8:49 am Deputy Fire Chiefs agreed to wait for the FDNY to arrive before determining whether to evacuate the South Tower. x Mr Clark: I heard a familiar voice say: “Your attention, please, ladies and gentlemen. Building 2 is secure. There is no need to evacuate the building. You may use the re-entry doors and the elevators to return to your office. x Stanley Praimnath: As we were about to exit the building, the security guard looks at me and says: “Where are you going?” I said: “Well, I’m going home.” “Why?” “I saw fireballs coming down.” “No, your building is safe and secure. Go back to your office.” x Shortly before 9:00 am, impressed by the magnitude of the catastrophe, Fire Chiefs had decided to clear the whole complex. At 9:02 am, an announcement advised civilians to begin an orderly evacuation. U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack 69

x One minute later, at 9:03 am, the hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 hit the South Tower. At 9:59, the South Tower collapsed in ten seconds. Because the SOP did not cover evacuation of other facilities in the event of a major incident in one building at the World Trade Center, officials hesitated to give the evacuation decision. In fact, security personnel returned people who were evacuating the building and told them go back to their offices. When the Fire Chiefs decided to evacuate the facility, it was too late (6) Follow-on Response Actions: After initial response actions, follow-on actions should be initiated. These actions must be implemented in the light of the assessment and requirements. 1. Task specialized response teams (as required), 2. Request additional support (if required), 3. Deploy/task damage repair teams, 4. Initiate the recovery/reconstruction process, 5. Provide public reassurance and business continuity, 6. Search for the terrorists and initiate investigation While response actions continue, the recovery and reconstruction process may be initiated. In addition to responders, volunteers can provide extensive support during recovery actions. A thorough search should be conducted in and around the location to seize the terrorists and prevent any follow-on attacks. Effectiveness of response depends on its timeliness and urgency. For example, a delay of several hours in initiating response actions can result in catastrophe in terms of human life, damage to property, and a general state of confusion that would impede critical emergency response operations.

Figure 4. Response time vs. casualties

The Lessons Learned from the report of London Regional Resilience Forum prepared after the London Bombings emphasizes this point. The report highlights that 70 U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack more could have been done to support the victims during initial response. In a section on ‘Timely Response’, the report also stresses the importance of early action: x In particular, there is a clear message that more could have been done to support all those who were caught up in the attacks—in our preparation and response on the day and in the days and weeks that followed. x And a crucial lesson we have drawn is that the quality of help received in the first few hours and days can determine for years to come people’s reaction to a terrible event of this sort. x Speed, flexibility and openness are of the essence in the provision of effective support. That means faster response in establishing centres of help and assistance, and getting basic information out to people more quickly. (7) Responsibilities of the On-Scene Leader: Crisis leadership principles should be promoted as a key aspect of crisis management. A major crisis demands a rapid centralized response and this, in turn, requires a very clear line of command and the ability to coordinate the activities. Accordingly, the on-scene leader will have essential tasks to perform such as deploying and supervising the response teams, coordinating with crisis management center and following priorities. Additionally, the on-scene leader must have experience and possess leadership traits to overcome the difficulties. Maintaining the public’s confidence is also critical during crises and times of stress. The following are the main tasks of the on-scene leader: 1. Supervise initial and follow-on response efforts, 2. Deploy required response teams timely, 3. Provide coordination among responders, 4. Coordinate with Crisis Management Center, 5. Request additional support (if required), 6. Maintain public confidence, 7. Keep calm and decisive. Reminder: In case of simultaneous attacks and multiple locations, experienced senior leaders should be distributed to each location to avoid loss of command and control. c. Recovery

In the latter part of the crisis management cycle, efforts should be concentrated on recovery and reconstruction. The recovery phase is considered a long-term process, and, depending on the consequences of the incident, it might be quite painful. Recovery encompasses both the human and technological aspects. Reconstructing the destroyed infrastructure is not so difficult if we have sufficient funding and internal/external cooperation. The much more difficult and challenging part is building up the invisible damage on the society. A series of mental and psychological recovery programs should be conducted in the process of restoration of normality. Investigation is another essential part of recovery phase, although it is initiated in the response phase in some cases. For effective investigation, the evidence found is vital. The London Bombings investigation figures provided by Antiterrorist Branch Commander Mr McDowell in the COE–DAT Symposium in 2006 highlights the efforts spent on investigation: 50,000 exhibits, 90,000 tapes, 45,000 documents, 17,000 statements, 20,000 investigative actions, 500 interviews. U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack 71

As the situation returns to normalcy, a complete review and analysis should be conducted. The guiding questions should be: What went well and what went poorly? What are the key lessons identified? What changes do we need to make to our organization and procedures? Lessons identified will definitely provide better preparation for future.

5. Conclusion

To conclude, crisis management focuses on preparedness, response, recovery, using the language of command and control, coordination, communication and intelligence.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Preparation

Command&Control Coordination (C2) Resource Management

Planning Flexibility SUCCESS Public Order Execution

Timely Decisions Communications Priorities

Analysis

Figure 5. Crisis management.

Today it is a fact that short-term intervention to end physical consequences is important but not enough to satisfy the needs of the society. The most important indicator for this is an understanding of long-term activities, such as recovery and reconstruction. In addition to reconstructing infrastructure, re-building confidence and mental health arise as key aspects for future preparation. 72 U. Ersen / Overview of the Crisis Management Related to a Terrorist Attack

References

Brochure on Efficient Crisis Management to Mitigate the Effects of Terrorist Activities Course, COE-DAT, Dec 2006. Consequence Management, Scott R. Taylor, Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1999. Crisis Management Planning, Geary W. Sikich, Logical Management Systems, Corp. The 10 Steps of Crisis Communications, Jonathan Bernstein. Federal Response Plan, FBI Counter Terrorism Section. Crisis Management Recovery, CASLIN 2003, State Technical Library, Prague. Lessons Learned Report for the London Bombings, London Regional Resilience Forum. Staff Statements and Lessons Learned, National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 73 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-73 Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation

Maj. J. P. I. A. G. CHARVAT Course Director, COE–DAT, Ankara

Abstract. This paper discusses the responses to terrorism in the Criminal Justice and the War Models. It briefly considers areas of international cooperation, specifically the legal and maritime international agreements to prevent terrorism. It discusses domestic and intelligence issues.

Keywords. Terrorism, International Cooperation, UN Conventions, Maritime, Intelligence.

1. Introduction

Since the onset of the ‘War on Terror’ in 2001 the international community has been focused on the fight against this international problem. Terrorism has no borders and will, with the exception of a few localized problems, have multinational effects and require international cooperation. In all parts of the battle against terror the international community has areas where it must work together in order to achieve mutual protection from the terrorist threat. This can be at the United Nations, or at the level of bilateral cooperation between states where the problem is more localized or over a specific issue. This cooperation can come in many forms. Military assistance among nations is one aspect, but cooperation in intelligence sharing, legal procedures, financial regulation and simply recognizing certain groups as terrorists are important in the global effort. Cooperation is essential, as is the coordination of efforts both internationally and domestically. This paper will look at existing and potential areas of cooperation in the international field and at the coordination of efforts in the domestic as well as the international fight against terror. The fight against terrorism is a very complex one and by its very nature it has problems regarding cooperation and the coordination of agencies and institutions involved in it. There is no international agreement on the definition of terrorism1 and therefore there is no international agreement on dealing with it. This can impact on the cooperation and coordination among international institutions. There will always be national issues. The government of a country may be sympathetic, because of ideological or ethnic ties, with a particular group of terrorists. While this will not necessarily mean they will not cooperate against terrorism, it may mean that there are

1 The UN set up a committee in the 1970s to define terrorism. After 7 years of debate the committee failed to agree a definition. 74 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation caveats on the level of support they will give. The relationship with the victim country may also indicate the level of cooperation. The severity of the situation will also be a factor in the level of cooperation and coordination amongst nations. The level of effect and violence shown in the terrorist campaign will determine its effects overseas. It is possible that a localised terrorist action may mean that an unfriendly state is uncooperative in the disruption of terrorism. An example of this was in the 1990s when Abdullah Ocalan2 and his PKK terrorists were allowed to live and train in Syria, which at that time was less than friendly to Turkey. However if the level of terrorism escalates to a truly international scale, or the level of violence in the target country becomes unacceptable, even for its enemies, then the chances of international cooperation increase accordingly. The type of terrorism will also affect international cooperation. If the motivations and methodology are in some part understood or sympathised with by some countries they may not cooperate in the fight against it. Non-cooperation is different to support; allowing the use of land for a haven and passage may be neutral acts that some states may give to certain terrorists, short of active support but contrary to international cooperation. Likewise the public perception is important. This is most likely in separatist terrorism where a country may be of the same ethnicity as those engaging in the terrorist acts. However, whatever the cause of the terrorism, there are likely to be elements of the population who are favourable to or supportive of the cause. This may prevent a government committing to full cooperation in the fight against the terrorists. The desired outcome of the campaign, either by the terrorists or by the target country, may affect the cooperation given by others. While most states will condemn the use of terrorist violence, there may be some which are sympathetic to the terrorists’ desired endstate. The Republic of Ireland supported the notion of Northern Ireland uniting with the south; indeed it was initially a constitutional clause for them.3 They did not support the PIRA terrorism but were not against the idea of a united Republic of all 32 counties of Ireland.

Responses to Terrorism

There are two commonly agreed methods of fighting terrorism and the state of the efforts against the terrorists will dictate which model is the most appropriate. The Criminal Justice Model is usually the appropriate model when the terrorist activities are such that the civil authorities can deal with them and protect the public. Democratic governments believe that the basic philosophy of democracy is to ensure human rights and the rule of law. Therefore in many democratic states, terrorists are regarded as criminals and should stand trial in a court of law in order to be convicted. The Criminal Justice Model can be employed to counter terrorism and convict terrorists in accordance with constitutional procedures.

2 Abdullah Ocalan was leader of the PKK. He is currently serving life imprisonment in Turkey. 3 Prior to 1999 the constitution of the Republic of Ireland, in Articles 2 and 3, made the claim that the whole island of Ireland formed one national territory. Post 1999 this was amended to grant the right of all those born in Ireland (North and South) to be ‘part of the Irish Nation’ and that unification must be achieved by peaceful means only with the consent of a majority of the people. J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation 75

The Criminal Justice Model

The Criminal Justice Model is a framework used by liberal democratic countries to confront domestic terrorist activities, but can be applied to most international terrorist acts. In this model the police are the primary agency for preventing and detecting crimes of terrorism.4 The police are to gather intelligence on potential terrorists and seek to thwart their actions and prosecute whenever possible. The deployment of the military for internal security is rare in this model and would only be used in extremis when they are needed to restore law and order. This, as was the case in Northern Ireland, would usually be done with police retaining primacy.5 The police will need specialists in counter terrorism under this model for many aspects of fighting terrorism, such as bomb disposal, counter intelligence and firearms identification, and this expertise may come from the military but be under police command. However their inherent advantage in evidence gathering and consequence management make the police the best agency for this. The advantages of this model are, firstly, that the police have legitimacy in the eyes of the public. They are also likely to have a greater knowledge of the community in which they operate and therefore be in a position to identify those who have a potential link to terrorism. With regard to international cooperation, the Criminal Justice Model has some advantages. A state cannot be criticised for using its police and trying suspects with due process in a court of law means that the terrorists are also convicted criminals. This means that their imprisonment is just and fair and others cannot level accusations of breaches of human rights or harsh and unsympathetic treatment of un-convicted prisoners.6

The War Model

The War Model, meaning the employment of the military to fight the terrorist, is appropriate in some circumstances. It is usually considered when the level of violence has reached such a level that the police are unable to cope with the situation, or law and order has generally broken down beyond the ability of the police to restore it by any other means. Conflicts that possess features of war can be defined as war. However, terrorists differ from soldiers in that they commit acts of violence that would be termed war crimes if a state of war existed, such as deliberately attacking civilians and non- combatants, hostage taking and wilful killing of them.7 Adopting the War Model as the framework for democratic and international response must be considered carefully as this may provide the armed forces a dominant role in developing and implementing counter-terrorism strategies. All aspects of the War Model must be carefully considered before it is employed. In the War Model, the military is granted the right to plan and implement counter- terrorism strategies. Features associated with the use of the War Model must be considered to judge the suitability of this model in the fight against terrorism.

4 Some nations specifically criminalize terrorism, other prosecute terrorists under normal criminal charges. 5 Operation BANNER ran from 1969 to 2007 with the British Army supporting the Police Service of Northern Ireland. 6 University of St Andrew’s, Centre for Terrorism and Political Violence Studies. 7 Laws of Armed Conflict. 76 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation

Since the military is fighting an asymmetrical war, it is difficult to judge success or failure. Unlike conventional wars, no such metrics as the number of tanks and aircraft that were destroyed or captured can be used. The armed forces are often deployed overseas to deal with an international terrorist threat. Examples include the deployment of the military for the rescue of highjack victims at Entebbe,8 and for toppling the Taliban regime, which had given refuge to the Al Qaeda organization in Afghanistan. Although there are inherent risks when deploying military force, it still has a number of advantages in the struggle against terrorism. Military forces are employed in the war against terrorism for a variety of reasons: 1. Using military force to counter terrorism meets the public and media demand for tough action against the sponsors and perpetrators of terrorism. 2. Further use of terrorism and its sponsorship is discouraged as the military inflicts heavy costs on terrorists and their sponsors. 3. Potential attackers and state sponsors all over the world are alerted against the use or support of terrorism. 4. The war model offers the possibility of providing a psychologically damaging setback to the enemy leadership. This, in turn, might undermine enemy leaders and hasten their removal from power. The advantages of employing military force make it a strong counter-terrorism measure. However, there are some inherent problems associated with the use of the military in carrying out strategic offensive operations and reprisals against terrorist groups abroad and the states that sponsor them. The following are the disadvantages of the war model: 1. Due to the nature of terrorist attacks it is often difficult to get enough confirmed intelligence to identify the perpetrator of the attack beyond doubt. 2. A military solution may lead to a wider scale conflict and undermine the anti- terrorism measures. 3. Military action may cause discontent and reprisal attacks, especially if innocent civilians are killed. 4. If the military action is taken unilaterally this may cause consternation among the international community. 5. The deployment of the military may falsely raise the public expectation of a swift end to the problem. For international cooperation the War Model is far more controversial. While many states will support action against the terrorists, when the War Model is applied some states may baulk at full cooperation with the fight.9

Issues for cooperation

Cooperation itself involves many issues. States may be overtly friendly but not share their capabilities fully. Most states have some ‘national only’ sensitive caveats, such as ‘NO FOREIGN’ or ‘XXX EYES ONLY’. It is a fundamental consideration in international cooperation as to what can be shared and what is nationally sensitive. This

8 On the 3rd and 4th July 1976, Israeli special forces rescued the hostages from Air France Flight 139 held in Entebbe Airport in Uganda. 9 University of St Andrew’s, Centre for Terrorism and Political Violence Studies. J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation 77 can be a major hindrance. Likewise the command of troops and who is the lead may be an issue. Coalitions have an advantage in that some members may be able to achieve things through political measures that would not be accepted from others. This can be a matter in domestic issues too. Agencies may have different priorities and not be willing or able to share fully with others. In a federal system the layers of power may mean considerations regarding jurisdiction in certain circumstances. There are many forums where nations come together and discuss issues. If they can agree on a course of action and appropriate response it will give legitimacy to the measures and greatly increase international cooperation. The credibility of an action backed by a resolution from the United Nations 10 derives from the fact that the international community has agreed on it. Resolutions are specific in their scope and will have a specific level of force and limit of the mandate stated in them. Regional alliances or unions may act in a similar fashion. Although these may be independent of the UN they generally act within the guiding principles of the UN organisation and are more legitimate than unilateral action. The Civil Aviation Authority and the International Maritime Organisation are non- state actors. Nations will support them but their purpose is to regulate their specific area of influence in what are by nature international affairs.

Maritime Cooperation

Maritime travel is one area where international cooperation is essential in reducing the risk of terrorism in the largest area of international trade. Even today the majority of internationally traded goods, at some stage of their journey, will make an international sea voyage. Passenger ships also provide a prime target for terrorists to take hostages or make statements, such as the Achillie Lauro attack in 1985. 11 As this is likely to involve many nations the international community has numerous safeguards and a great level of international cooperation. The Safety of Life At Sea Convention was first introduced in 1914 after the Titanic disaster. It has been amended several times since. Its prime aim is not against terrorism but for general safety and obligations of assistance to vessels in difficulty on the high seas. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was set up in 1982. It is internationally accepted and is the basis of the fight against maritime terrorism. Part VII focuses on maritime security measures. It has the limitation that is has never been updated and therefore new developments can make it redundant. Many regard it as satisfactory, but the increasing emergence of maritime terrorism can fall outside its scope. Some new initiatives have been brought in. The Automated Identification of Shipping allows vessels to identify themselves when approaching port. This will show if they have been off course or otherwise interfered with and also allow the port to check if the ship is expected. This will help alert authorities to possible terrorist shipping and aid international cooperation.

10 Article 53 of the UN Charter allows the use of force ‘authorised by the Security Council’. One of the 4 permitted circumstances for states to use force. 11 The Achillie Lauro was a passenger ship hijacked in the Eastern Mediterranean by Palestinian Terrorists in 1985. Leon Klinghoffer, a disabled American citizen was killed. 78 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation

The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 200212 set up strict measures in the control of shipping and cargo. This has meant that compliant ships and ports can be processed quicker as their legitimacy and integrity was more assured. The US Coast Guard has identified over 8,500 US flagged ships and 3,200 ports to come under these measures. The act does entail international cooperation, as many other ports have sought and been accredited as compliant and therefore have easier trade with the US. Compliance is expensive so ports and shipping in poorer parts of the world still do not comply. Under pressure from the US the Parallel Port Security measures such as the International Shipping and Port Security Code were introduced by the UN’s IMO. This set out strict security measures for shipping and ports to reduce the possibility of maritime terrorism. As it is a UN measure the international community is obliged to comply and some nations have threatened not to allow non-compliant shipping into their ports as a security measure for its own territory.

International Legal Cooperation

International law is a major area for international cooperation. It dictates what is acceptable as a reaction to terrorism and obliges nations to meet certain standards. As the UN is unable to agree a definition of terrorism it has been unable to agree any international law on this matter. It has therefore tackled the problem by bringing in conventions on certain acts which are indisputably crimes and therefore obligated the international community to act in a common fashion. These have usually been introduced after a series of terrorist acts and include such areas as hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats and terrorist financing. The convention on nuclear non- proliferation is the main pre-emptive one and has helped in preventing terrorists gaining access to nuclear material. By defining a specific action the international community has been able to agree on a legal definition without the more contentious issue of terrorist motivation being a stumbling block. Long-standing international legal agreements such as the Geneva Convention and LOAC have limited applicability in dealing with terrorism. While they may be applicable in some circumstances terrorists do not generally fall within the categories they set out. This does make it difficult, especially in the use of the War Model, in determining a fully lawful response. This is an area where international cooperation is a little weak. The European Arrest Warrant is a good example of cooperation against terrorism. Signatories agree that they will action an arrest warrant issued by a court in another signatory country and hand over the suspect for due process. The Italians did execute such a warrant for the UK, when one of the suspected 21/7 bombers was found in Italy, arrested by the Italian authorities and extradited under the warrant for trial in the UK. He was convicted found guilty of conspiracy to murder.

12 The act is the US equivalent to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) to reduce the vulnerability of US shipping and ports. J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation 79

Domestic Cooperation

Cooperation and coordination may be as problematic in a domestic setting as they are on the international arena. In this area the problems and issues will vary from state to state depending on its customs, constitution, size and geography. It is therefore impossible to cover an exhaustive list of issues for domestic cooperation, so a generic consideration must be given and applied as necessary. It is necessary for the domestic scene to pay close attention to the threat of any terrorist activity, as well as working to prevent it and reacting to any incidents. This will need to include relations with the public as well as among governmental departments and NGOs. NATOs ‘four pillars’ of operating against terrorists 13 are as valid for domestic terrorism, and therefore domestic cooperation and coordination, as they are internationally. The principles are very similar with cultural and interoperability issues among agencies and just as stark within one’s own national services as within an international alliance. This is an area where pre-event planning and exercising is absolutely essential. Domestic intelligence must have a forum for intra-visibility among all relevant agencies and be disseminated in a timely fashion to the appropriate level. This is the area where cooperation may be the most difficult. Agencies tend to be slow in releasing intelligence to others for security reasons. This can mean that either some are blind to the situation or multiple agencies have an insignificant piece of information that if collated could make good intelligence. A joint approach among all major intelligence agencies with universal sight and clearance is a beneficial forum, and the UK’s Joint Terrorism Advisory Centre is an example of this.14 Depending on the national breakdown of responsibilities this may be harder to achieve. In a federal system there are jurisdictional issues which may have legal or other problems regarding sharing the information. Within an alliance system, such as the European Union, there may be different laws on intelligence gathering and storage, which may preclude certain agencies from full cooperation. Coordination is essential should the terrorist successfully strike. The pillar in the NATO concept15 ‘consequence management’ will mean different things to different agencies. By nature, the different organizations that have a vital role to play at the scene will each regard their priorities as more important than the others. It is only through vigorous and regular exercising that these issues can be identified and rectified.

Conclusions

In today’s world terrorism is truly an international problem. It affects many countries across the globe for many different reasons. It is often a trans-national issue, which will make it a problem that needs cooperation and coordination among nations. However, due to politics, geography, ethnicity or religion, some nations may be less cooperative than others, or even wholly uncooperative to the extent of supporting the terrorist.

13 NATO MC 472 is NATO’s Military Concept on Terrorism. 14 JATC was established in 2003 as part of the UK’s development of co-ordinated arrangements for handling and disseminating intelligence in response to the threat of terrorism. 15 MC 472. 80 J.P.I.A.G. Charvat / Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation

International cooperation is greatly hampered by a lack of definition as to what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist. The lack of definition has strained international relations when one country does not support another to the level they expect. This could be for legal or other reasons, and not a wanton hindrance of that nation’s effort. This is an area which will require some attention to ease misunderstandings or perceived inaction in the fight against terrorism. Initiatives such as the European Arrest Warrant have proven a useful tool in securing the convictions of terrorists in the European Union. The UN and various other international organizations have attempted to reach agreement on specific actions or security measures without the contentious label of terrorism. This has proved a successful, albeit tardy and reactionary, approach to gaining international agreement. Terrorism is by nature a political entity, and therefore, like anything political, will lead to differences of opinion and support. While there is debate on what terrorism is, regardless of the motivation behind an act, the acts themselves kill people and ruin lives. Nations and domestic agencies must make every effort to cooperate in all aspects of stopping terror, otherwise this elusive problem will slip through the gaps left in the security system.

References

Bennet, A. LeRoy and Oliver, James K: International Organizations, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2002. Bretherton, Charlotte and Vodler, John: The European Union as a Global Actor, London, Routledge, 1999. Dannreuther, Roland (ed): European Union Foreign and Security Policy, Abingdon, Routledge, 2005. Goldstein, Joshua S and Pevehouse, Jon C: International Relations 2006 – 2007 Edition, Pearson Longman, 2007. Grindele, Merilee S: Challenging the State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Hough, Peter: Understanding Global Security, Abingdon, Routledge, 2004. Pogden, Anthony (ed): The Idea of Europe, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002. Rieker, Pernelle: Europeanization of National Security Policy, Abingdon, Routledge, 2006. Whitman, Jim: The limits of global governance, Abingdon, Routledge, 2005. Ziring, Lawrence, Riggs, Robert S. and Planom, Jack C: The United Nations, Belmont, Thompson, 2005. Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 81 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-81 Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations

Assistant Prof. Michael FREEMAN Dept. of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

Abstract. Terrorist groups must acquire funds to conduct attacks and operate their organizations. The sources of terrorist funding are divided into five categories: state support, illegal activity, legal activity, popular support, and involuntary support. For each of these different sources, there are advantages and disadvantages for terrorist groups and different opportunities for the state to utilize countermeasures to exploit different vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, targeting terrorist financing is a difficult task because the amounts raised tend to be low and easily raised and because terrorist organizations are adaptive in the face of government pressure.

Keywords. Terrorist financing, state sponsors, charities, drugs, extortion, smuggling, kidnap and ransom, “revolutionary taxes”, counter-terrorism.

1. Costs of Terrorism

Terrorism costs money. As others have stated, “money is the lifeblood of terrorist organizations.” Without it, they would not be able to conduct their operations or exist as organizations.

1.1. Expenses

What, though, do terrorists spend their funds on? Like any organization, they have a whole list of expenses. For example, they need to devote resources to recruiting new members. They also need to build training camps if they are operating in failed or sympathetic states. Often, the members of terrorist organizations leave normal society and rely on the terrorist group to provide them with housing and food. Terrorist groups also need to buy the equipment necessary for conducting acts of violence—this includes guns, explosives, triggers, training simulators, as well as fake passports or drivers licenses, or other travel or identification documents. As an organization, they must also buy devices like phones and computers to be able to communicate with each other. Also, they may need funds to bribe officials to get them to turn a blind eye to terrorist activity. Finally, many groups pay their “retired” veterans a stipend and also pay the families of dead terrorists or suicide bombers. 82 M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations

1.2. Costs of Attacks

Frequently, scholars of terrorist financing like to point out how the costs of particular operations are actually relatively low, or inexpensive. For example, the 1993 World Trade Center attack was estimated to have cost about $19,000. The Bali bombings in 2002 are thought to have cost $20,000 and the Madrid attacks in March, 2004 cost somewhere between $10,000 and $50,000. At the high end, the 9-11 attacks cost between $350,000 and $500,000 but these operations involved at least nineteen hijackers operating abroad and several of them had to undergo expensive flight simulation training.

1.3. Organizational Costs

While it is true that specific operations are relatively cheap, the larger budgets of terrorist organizations are much larger. Because of all the associated expenses described above, the budgets of terrorist groups frequently come to tens if not hundred of millions of dollars per year. For every group, the following numbers are just estimates, but are indicative of the overall phenomenon. Some examples: al-Qaeda’s annual budget is estimated to be $30 million per year; the Provisional IRA had a budget of up to $15 million per year until the 1990s; Hezbollah’s budget is between $100 million and $200 million. At its peak in the 1990s, the PKK was thought to have an annual budget of $86 million. 1 As final examples, the FARC in Colombia has an annual budget of around $100 million, while all the different insurgent groups in Iraq collectively raise between $70 million and $200 million per year.2 So, as we can see, terrorist attacks may be relatively cheap, but terrorist organizations are much more expensive to operate.

2. The Sources of Terrorist Financing

Where, or how, do terrorist groups acquire their funding? In general, the sources of terrorist finances can be broken into five categories: state sponsors, illegal activity, legal activity, popular support, and involuntary support. Each of these categories will be explained and described below with examples given to illustrate how they are actually used by terrorists. In addition, for each source of funding, the advantages and disadvantages will be discussed. Furthermore, each source of funding has vulnerabilities that the state can exploit to make it harder on the terrorists. A few important points need to be mentioned here as well. First, each terrorist group is unique from other groups. As such, no two terrorist groups will have the same profile of funding. One group may rely on state sponsorship and popular support, while another group might engage exclusively in illegal activities. Second, the sources of terrorist financing are diverse. While the five methods are meant to capture all the possible avenues, it may not be an exhaustive list. Ultimately, terrorist groups are

1 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Part (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 October 2007, p. 906. 2 John Burns and Kirk Semple, “U.S. Finds Iraq Insurgency Has Funds to Sustain Itself,” New York Times, November 26, 2006. M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations 83 creative and will find new and different ways of financing their organizations. Third, terrorist groups are extremely adaptive. When the state tries to crack down on one or two different paths of funding, terrorist groups are often successful at shifting their financing operations into less problematic or more lucrative arenas.

3. State Sponsorship

3.1. Examples

One way that terrorists acquire financial resources is through state sponsorship. This is a source of funding that has mostly dried up in recent years, with the notable exceptions of Iran and Hezbollah, and Pakistan and some Kashmiri-based groups, but was much more common during the Cold War years. For example, many Arab states financed the PLO in its early years with at least $100 million per year and possibly upwards of $250 million a year in the 1970s and 1980s.3 Marxist groups around the globe were allegedly given aid by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea.4 Likewise, the U.S. financed its own groups, many of whom could be labeled as terrorists. These would include the Mujahedin in Afghanistan and the Contras in Nicaragua. Libya, in the 1980s, gave aid and financial support to many groups, including Abu Nidal, the Red Brigades, the IRA, the PLO, the ETA, the Japanese Red Army, Baader-Meinhof, and others.5 Today, Iran is perhaps the most active state sponsor of terrorism with estimates that they give Hezbollah around $100 million per year (out of their entire yearly budget of perhaps $200 million). Syria is also an important sponsor of terrorism; they provide weapons, safe havens, and financial support to Hezbollah as well, but also to seven groups on the U.S. State Department’s list who have headquarters in Syria, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Pakistan also continues to use their intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to sponsor groups fighting for Pakistani control of Kashmir like the Lashkar-Taiba, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, and the Hizbul Mujahideen.6

3.2. Advantages

For a terrorist group, there is one really big advantage to receiving funding from a state sponsor: it gives them access to incredibly large amounts of money. This is because the budgets of nation-states dwarf those of terrorist groups, which makes financing a terrorist group an incredibly cheap proposition for a state. Taking the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran as an example, assuming Iran gives Hezbollah around $100 million per year, this is only 1/1000th or 1/10th of 1 percent of Iran’s revenue from oil exports. Consider these figures: Iran exports about 4 million barrels per day, or about 1.5 billion per year. With oil prices running between $50 and $75 per barrel, this computes to about $75-$100 billion per year in oil revenue. The cost of financing

3 James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986). 4 Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981). 5 James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986). 6 MIPT database entry for each group, found at www.tkb.org. 84 M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations

Hezbollah translates into about 7-15 cents for every barrel sold. To put this another way, imagine if international efforts were successful at cutting $15 million out of Hezbollah’s revenue; Iran could compensate for this just by redirecting the profits that would come with a one cent increase in oil prices per barrel.

3.3. Disadvantages

Despite this important advantage, relying exclusively on state sponsorship can also put terrorist groups at a disadvantage for two reasons. First, states can use their financial support as a way of controlling the activity of the terrorist group. In other words, the state might use the terrorist group as a proxy or agent for its own interests. In doing so, the state may try to constrain the terrorist group, or, alternatively, it may force the terrorist group to escalate or change its tactics. Either way, the state might force the terrorist group to engage in activities that it normally or otherwise would not. The second vulnerability for terrorist groups relying on state sponsorship is that states disappear. For many of the Marxist groups, this became a problem when the Soviet Union dissolved in the early 1990s. Additionally, states might continue to exist, but given their own interests and constraints, they may change their policies and stop funding terrorist groups. As an example of this, international pressure on Libya has finally forced it to accept responsibility for terrorist activities and cease its support for further acts of terrorism. Terrorist groups recognize these vulnerabilities and, because of this, diversify their sources of funding to reduce this reliance on state sponsors.

3.4. Counters

How can this source of terrorist financing be stopped or reduced? There are several possible options, although none of them are particularly promising. States can impose economic sanctions or embargos on terrorist sponsoring states; they can use diplomatic pressure to try and convince states to stop sponsoring terrorism; they can try to essentially “bribe” them by rewarding them for changing their behavior; or states can attack and invade other countries that support terrorism. While sometimes international pressure works (like with Libya in recent years), other times sanctions, diplomacy, and military action have had little impact. For example, Iran continues to support Hezbollah; and U.S. attacks on Libya in 1986 and Afghanistan in 1998 also failed to deter their support for terrorism.

4. Illegal Activity

4.1. Examples

Because of the unreliable nature of state sponsorship, terrorist groups have increasingly turned to illegal activities to fund their organizations. Some of the most common fundraising activities include: kidnapping and ransom; theft; smuggling of drugs, weapons, commodities like gold and cigarettes, cash, and people; petty crime, frauds and scams, and pirating goods. Kidnapping and ransom is probably one of the most publicized methods of terrorist financing because of the drama and attention garnered with the kidnapping of powerful M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations 85 officials or wealthy businessmen, but it is also one of the most profitable sources of financing. Some of the more notable groups that are or were heavily engaged in kidnappings include: the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, the FARC in Colombia, the Italian Red Brigade, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, insurgent groups in Iraq, among many others. Often, the ransoms for individuals who have been kidnapped are in the millions of dollars, although the record seems to belong to the Monteneros of Argentina, who received $60 million for the release of Juan and Jorge Born. Sometimes terrorist groups simply steal cash or valuables to finance their operations. Some of the more notable operations include: the PLO/Christian Phalange robbery of the British Bank of the Middle East that netted $100-600 million in 1976; bank robberies by Jemaah Islamiyah that obtained five pounds of gold that helped finance the Bali bombings; the Tupamaros raid on a rifle club from which they took twenty-eight guns in 1963 and jumpstarted their campaign of terrorism; the ongoing theft of oil from pipelines in Iraq by insurgent groups, as well as bank robberies by the Symbianese Liberation Army, the Tamil Tigers and others. Smuggling is a profitable activity for anyone engaged in it, including terrorists. Terrorists smuggle almost anything, from drugs, diamonds, cigarettes, cash, people, and even animals to finance their organizations and operations. The link between drugs, in particular, and terrorism has garnered a lot of attention in recent years and has spawned the term, “narco-terrorists.” Some of the more notable organizations involved in the drug trade include: the FARC in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the PKK in Turkey, and the Shining Path in Peru. While the terrorist groups could potentially be involved in the growing and selling of drugs, they are more commonly involved in the distribution and transit of the drugs through or out of their country. As an example, the PKK is heavily involved in the heroin traffic going from Southwest Asia into Europe, with some estimating that 80% of the drugs in Europe have some connection to the PKK.7 A kilogram of heroin that costs $1,000-$2,000 in Thailand is worth $6,000- $8,000 in Turkey, and has a street value of $200,000 in Germany.8 Clearly, the profits here are tempting for terrorists. Additionally, terrorists often provide protection from security forces to the drug dealers in exchange for a cut of their profit. Terrorist groups also are reportedly heavily involved in commodities. For example, there are some reports that al-Qaeda engaged in the smuggling of diamonds from West Africa and Tanzanite from Tanzania. Likewise, Hezbollah has also been tied to gold and diamond smuggling. For terrorist groups, the appeal of these commodities is that they are small, yet highly valuable, secure in their value, and hard to trace. Additionally, a Hezbollah cell in the U.S. was involved in cigarette smuggling. They bought the cigarettes in North Carolina, where the taxes were low, then drove them to Michigan where taxes where higher, and sold them there at a discount. Others estimate that they raised approximately $7 million dollars over the course of several years and sent at least a portion of it back to Lebanon. Terrorists also engage in human smuggling for profit. For example, the PKK is reportedly heavily involved in the smuggling of people from Iraq and elsewhere in Asia into Europe, usually through Italy. Interpol estimates that the PKK receives around

7 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Part (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 October 2007, p. 908. 8 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Part (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 October 2007, p. 907. 86 M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations

2,000-3,000 Euros per individual. The exact number of people smuggled per year is unknown, but there was a single operation connected to the PKK in which 9,000 Kurds were smuggled into Europe.9 In one of the more odd cases of smuggling, the IRA smuggled pigs between the Northern Ireland and Irish Republic border and raised $2 million in one year. They would openly export them to the British side and collect the 8 pound per pig export subsidy, then smuggle the pigs back into Ireland and repeat the whole operation with the same pigs. As one scholar notes, this produced “a considerable amount of cash and some very tired pigs.”10 Besides cigarettes and pigs, almost any good could be and has been smuggled across borders to take advantage of the differences in taxes or subsidies.11 Petty crime is also an important source of terrorist financing. This can include practically any criminal activity that might aid a terrorist or organization raise funds. For example, Ahmed Ressam, the millennium bomber, spent several years in Montreal and during his interrogation stated that he had stolen from tourists, sold passports for cash, robbed a currency exchange, and engaged in credit card fraud.12 Lastly (although this is far from an exhaustive list), terrorists have been known to deal in pirated and counterfeit goods and currencies. For example, the Tri-Border area between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina is well known as a market for pirated goods, and Hezbollah is believed to be heavily involved in this region. Likewise, the Provisional IRA and Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland are known to deal in counterfeit clothing, CDs, perfume, videos, currency, etc. and have raised around 1 million pounds for both sides combined.13 Also, the PKK is known to be involved in dealing in counterfeit stamps and bank notes.14

4.2. Advantages

Engaging in illegal activities to finance terrorism provides a terrorist organization with many advantages. First of all, while individual illegal activities may yield only small profits, cumulatively they can add to up to more significant funds. For example, a few million dollars from theft, a few million from smuggling, and a few million from fraud, added to donations and membership dues, and a terrorist group can have a significant amount of money. Second, the wide range of illegal activities allows a terrorist group to be independent of state sponsors. It is for this reason that many organizations shifted their

9 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Part (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 October 2007, p. 909. 10 Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 31. 11 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Part (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 October 2007, p. 912 talk about the PKK smuggling blood, for example. 12 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 100. 13 Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part One: Extortion and Blackmail,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21, 1998. 14 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Part (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 October 2007, p. 912. M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations 87 sources of revenue to illegal activities from state sponsorship before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Illegal activities are also fairly easy to accomplish, at least in terms of the levels of skills required. Third, these illegal activities do not require any centralized leadership and therefore an organization can push its fundraising activities into lower levels of the organization. Individual cells can often be self-financing and simply send whatever extra revenue they have, if they have any, up the hierarchical ladder. Fourth, within this category of illegal activity, the possibilities for fund-raising are diverse and seemingly only limited by the imagination of terrorists. This allows them to adapt to whatever scheme seems to offer the greatest profits or operate in an arena where there is the least government scrutiny. Lastly, criminal activities are possible anywhere on the globe. Wherever there are humans, there is commercial activity that can be exploited, or resources that are scarce that can be smuggled, traded, or stolen. As such, terrorists of all kinds engage in some form of illegal activity to raise funds.

4.3. Disadvantages

While engaging in criminal activity has many advantages to terrorist groups, doing so also has its share of disadvantages. To begin with, involvement in profitable criminal activity may expose the organization to corruption. Having access to large amounts of funds may tempt terrorist leaders (or even lower level members) to take some of the profits for themselves. This may be especially likely with illegal activities because often the nature of the activity will be a secret even within the organization and because the funds are not easily tracked or accounted for. For example, Yasser Arafat is believed to have skimmed off between $900 million and $1.3 billion from the PLO’s coffers.15 Second, engaging in criminal activity may distract a terrorist organization from its political objectives. Any group must decide how to allocate its resources between its core mission and its support missions. When groups profitably engage in criminal activity, especially when these functions are performed by peripheral cells, they may become more interested in continuing their profitable ways than in attacking the state. Third, engaging in criminal activity may draw unwanted attention from the state. A small, clandestine organization is more likely to “fly under the radar” if it does as little as possible to challenge the state. Government security forces may actually benefit from terrorist groups engaging in illegal activity because it could provide the state with intelligence that it can use to trace back and reconstruct the entire organization. Fourth, conducting illegal activities may lead the terrorist group to lose some of its popular support. Profiting from drugs or kidnappings may be a public relations disaster for terrorist groups; because of this, many stay away from these types of activities. The Provisional IRA, for example, has refused to get involved in the drug trade in Northern Ireland. Fifth, while cumulatively profitable, individual illegal activities may provide relatively low profits for quite a lot of risk. After all, the state and its police are already looking for and trying to stop these activities, so the risks of incarceration are already high. The reward to risk ratio might also be particularly unfavorable when comparing illegal activities to other avenues for acquiring funds.

15 Wikipedia entry for “Yasser Arafat.” 88 M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations

Lastly, engaging in illegal activities may be disadvantageous for a terrorist group because the central command or leadership may lose control of the periphery of the organization. This would be especially true if financing is done by individual cells and if they are self-sufficient. Under these conditions, if they disagree with the strategy of the organization, they may act independently from the leadership.

4.4. Counters

How can the state counter these sources of terrorist financing? Much of the work that would need to be done would have to be done by the police and domestic intelligence agencies for each state. To begin with, the state could focus more of its resources on prosecuting criminals, especially those that might be tied to terrorist groups. Additionally, the state could increase the punishments for these crimes. For example, if the punishment for smuggling drugs was five years, it could increase to ten years if the person is also affiliated with a terrorist group. Also, devoting more resources to the police should have the effect of lowering crime overall and should lower the rate of terrorist related crime as well. Lastly, there needs to be greater information sharing between police and intelligence agencies. As mentioned earlier, one of the side effects of terrorists engaging in criminal activity is that it opens up their networks to the authorities. Targeting the network is essential, but requires better information-sharing so that authorities can tie disparate pieces of information together that otherwise might not be shared. One important problem with all of these countermeasures is that it is entirely possible that states are already doing everything they can to combat crime. If they had the extra resources to devote to fighting crime, then they probably would have done so already. We all live in a world of scarcity and governments must make hard choices over what they consider their priorities. Spending more of the state’s resources on counter-terrorism would necessarily mean that some other program receives less funding or that taxes will be raised.

5. Legal Activity

5.1. Examples

Terrorist groups do not always only engage in criminal activity; they often operate totally legal businesses for a profit. For example, while al-Qaeda was in the Sudan between 1992 and 1996, they operated many legitimate businesses, including: farms for peanuts and honey, several trading companies, a tannery, a furniture-making company, a bakery, and an investment company.16 Elsewhere, al-Qaeda cells ran a construction and plumbing company, a company that fixed and sold used cars, a fishing business, and a manufacturing company. 17 The Aum Shinrikyo group in Japan, as another example, operated a similarly large host of legitimate businesses. They had a copy shop,

16 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 145. 17 Paul Smith, “Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to the Terrorism Money Trail,” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, James Forest, ed., Vol. 2 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), p. 146. M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations 89 a noodle shop, a computer software company, a real estate business, and other assorted interests.18 The Provisional IRA and Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland are also an interesting example of terrorist groups using legitimate businesses for financing their organizations. Both have operated drinking clubs or pubs as a source of revenue. Although they were originally illegal, they then received the proper licenses and reported their income, although not usually all of it. They also operated gaming machines in the drinking clubs, only some of which were legal. Some scholars contend that these clubs were the single greatest source of income for these groups in the 1980s. 19 Both Loyalists and Republicans also operated taxi services, with the IRA owning two companies, and the Loyalists operating over 90 cabs. 20 Pubs and taxi services were also useful enterprises, because of their cash-based operations, to launder money from other, illegal sources. As a last example, both sides in Northern Ireland also ran security firms that would guarantee the safety of companies and their workers. While nominally legal, these security firms often crossed the line into outright extortion and will be discussed in more detail in the section on involuntary support.

5.2. Advantages

For the terrorist group, engaging in legal activities to raise money has several advantages. First, because the activity is entirely legal, there is little the state can do to target the activity or prosecute those engaged in it. Second, and a result of the first advantage, it is difficult for the state to do anything to stop these legal activities. If the state were to revise its laws to crack down on these activities, it will have to designate activities by broader groups as illegal and so the government may be seen as discriminatory or illegitimate. Third, operating legal businesses gives the terrorists an easy mechanism for laundering funds from other sources. Finally, engaging in legal activities poses little risk for terrorist groups. They can operate openly and legally without fear of prosecution.

5.3. Disadvantages

Operating legal businesses to raise funds also poses some risks and disadvantages for terrorist groups. First of all, it may draw some unwanted attention from the authorities to the movement. This would be particularly problematic if the terrorist group is trying to remain secret or clandestine before it begins its operations. For larger groups, like the IRA or Hamas, however, everyone would know of their existence and so they would not worry about the possibility of getting unwanted attention. Second, as a viable source of income, legal activities require that terrorist groups have good business skills if they are to make a profit, that is by no means guaranteed. In fact, terrorist groups could lose money if their businesses are unprofitable, which was the case with al-Qaeda’s enterprises in the Sudan. Third, using legal businesses may give the authorities greater insight into the terrorist network or organization. A legal business

18 Daniel Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000). 19 Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part One: Extortion and Blackmail,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21, 1998. 20 James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986). 90 M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations may act as a beacon or light that offers the authorities a door into the terrorist group and might allow them to trace back communication or flows of money into the “dark” side of the organization. Legal businesses are also required to keep records and can be audited, both of which provide the state with possible avenues to gather intelligence on the terrorist group. Lastly, a disadvantage of this kind of activity, at least relative to other activities, is that it may yield lower profits. Legal businesses have to compete in the marketplace and doing so drives down profits. Illegal activities, in contrast, may yield higher profits, in part because of the risk premium attached to them.

5.4. Counters

What options do states have to limit the ability of terrorist groups to use legal activities to raise funds? One possible countermeasure is to exploit the already existing requirement that mandates that legitimate businesses keep records. The state can use their power to audit companies to make sure that all processes are followed, that all licenses are held, that all income is reported, and that all taxes are paid. Also, the state could revise its legal system to criminalize what otherwise would be legal activities if they are found to be tied in any way to terrorist organizations. Third, if the state is aware of these ties between legitimate businesses and terrorist groups, it could use information operations to publicize these ties and undermine the customer base of the business. For all these countermeasures, they all assume that the state possesses the information from good intelligence work that there are these ties between the businesses and terrorist groups. Without good intelligence, these businesses will “fly under the radar” because they would look like any other business.

6. Popular Support

6.1. Examples

For many terrorist groups, they rely on the support of a sympathetic population or constituency as a source of funding. For many Islamic groups in particular, charitable donations comprise a large portion of their revenue. Besides charities and donations, terrorists might also tap into sympathetic diaspora communities living overseas, or rely on membership dues to fill their coffers. Many groups receive money sent as a donation to a charity. For Islamic groups, this is a well known and well documented phenomenon. As examples, the Global Relief Foundation and the al-Wafa organization have been associated with al-Qaeda, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and the Quranic Literacy Institute have given money to Hamas, Benevolence International has been tied to Chechen groups, and the Islamic Concern Project and the World and Islam Studies Enterprises have sent funds to Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Much of the funds collected have come from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in the Middle East where there are many wealthy donors sympathetic to these causes. In addition, charitable donations are a religious duty for Muslims. In Iraq as well, the insurgents receive some funds from wealthy donors from the Gulf region. Often the insurgent leaders have an arrangement with the imams in the mosques where the money is collected. Similar to charitable donations, some groups also receive financial support from their diaspora communities. The difference here is that these donations are based on M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations 91 ethnic or racial causes, and less so on religious ones. For examples, consider that NORAID raised 50% of the IRA’s revenue in the 1970s from donations from Irish- Americans. Likewise, many Palestinians living abroad would send 5-7% of their salary back to the PLO. Similarly, the LTTE raises $7-22 million a year from the Tamil diaspora in Canada, while many Lebanese expatriots around the world send money back to Hezbollah.21 As a final category, popular support can also come from membership dues, or donations by members directly to the organization. Osama bin Laden has probably donated much of his personal wealth, for example, to al-Qaeda, although the estimates of the size of his fortune have probably been exaggerated. As another example, members of Aum Shinrikyo would usually give the organization all of their wealth upon joining the group.

6.2. Advantages

For terrorist groups, acquiring funds through popular support can be tremendously advantageous. First of all, it can be a clear signal of their own legitimacy. Ultimately, this—legitimacy—is what they are fighting for, and if they can demonstrate, through their widespread financial support that people support their cause, this will be a tremendous boon to them and a blow to the state. Also, a second advantage is that popular support is relatively easy. Terrorist groups do not have to devote a lot of resources to acquiring funds; instead, they can simply “sit back” and wait for the money to come in. A third advantage is that charities, specifically, give the terrorist group more geographical flexibility. They can solicit donations from anywhere—for example, Hamas collected $13 million from the U.S. through the Holy Land Foundation—but they can also operate anywhere. Charities can go to remote parts of Indonesia, Iran, or Lebanon and provide aid on behalf of opposition movements and gain the trust and support of those populations.

6.3. Disadvantages

Receiving financial resources from donations and charities is generally advantageous, but there are still some disadvantages for the terrorist group. One possible disadvantage is that popular support can affect the terrorists’ behavior, much like state support does. It could lead terrorists to moderate their behavior if they fear that their actions could undermine their popular support. Conversely, it could force them to escalate their behavior if their constituent population is more “hawkish” than they are. Popular support could also cause them to escalate their operations if they are in a competitive environment for funding. For example, Hamas and PIJ rely on more or less the same population base for support; if one of them is seen as less active, they may lose some of their financial revenue. Additionally, popular support may create a competitive environment in which new actors will form to take advantage of the widespread sympathy and support available to organizations that act on behalf of a particular cause. Like in the business world, new companies form and move into areas where there are large profits to be made.

21 Paul Smith, “Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to the Terrorism Money Trail,” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, James Forest, ed., Vol. 2 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), p. 144. 92 M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations

One final possible disadvantage with popular support is that it depends on the overall health of the economy. If people are struggling to meet their own needs, they will be less likely to donate money to a charitable cause.

6.4. Counters

How can the state affect this source of terrorist funding? Dealing with charities is an extremely thorny problem. Charities are rarely simply or entirely devoted to financing terrorist organizations; rather, they may distribute most of their money to other, legal causes. Additionally, even with the money that does go to terrorist groups, much of this money is spent on social welfare programs and not on violent activities. For example, both Hamas and Hezbollah are well known examples of groups that engage in robust social welfare activities. So, what should the state do when 10% of a charity’s money goes to a terrorist group and of that portion, only 10% goes to financing violent actions? Many people argue that money is entirely fungible, so that the money received from charities in fact frees up money to spend on terrorism, so it must all be treated equally. Also, by providing social welfare, terrorist groups undermine the legitimacy of the state and gain supporters for their own cause. Nevertheless, innocent people will suffer if charities are stopped from funding organizations that provide health care or build schools and wells. There are at least three ways that states can undermine the popular support for terrorism. First, they can use information operations to publicize the connections between charities and terrorist groups. Oftentimes, donors are not aware of how their donations are distributed and may be less likely to support a charity if they know the funds go to terrorism. Second, in places like Gaza and southern Lebanon, groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are successful in providing social welfare because the government is incapable or unwilling to do so. If the government provided better governance—and this might require more international aid—this would undermine the support and the demand for terrorist organizations. Lastly, states can, in fact, do a better job at monitoring where and how charities raise money. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the government has recognized the role that charities play in financing terrorism and has responded by creating more oversight and legal constraints on how charities operate within the kingdom.

7. Involuntary Support

7.1. Examples

This category, of involuntary support, is a combination of both illegal activities and popular support. Involuntary support refers to terrorist groups using extortion or imposing taxes on a subject population to raise funds. Terrorist groups often impose what they call “revolutionary” taxes on a population, forcing them to financially support the group. Some notable groups who have used this method include the Shining Path in Peru, the FARC and ELN in Colombia, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the ETA in Spain, and many others. Extortion is often similar to “revolutionary taxes” when it is done in a widespread and indiscriminate manner. Extortion, however, can also be aimed at a particularly vulnerable target. Terrorists threaten a target with violence unless some sum of cash is M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations 93 paid. For example, the PLO extorted $5-10 million a year from airlines in the 1970s and allegedly extorted $100-$220 million from OPEC.22 The Protestant Loyalists in Northern Ireland were also quite adept at extortion. They would simply approach local business owners and offer to protect them from violence for a fee. Of course, they were the ones who would be committing the violence. The business owner could even claim 40% of these expenses as a tax deduction, until the laws changed after Britain realized it was essentially funding the terrorists. Before this happened, this type of fundraising was the primary source for the Loyalist groups.23

7.2. Advantages

For the terrorist group, extortion and taxes offer several advantages. First, they offer a fairly steady supply of funds and a supply that can sometimes be expanded if needed. Second, extortion and taxes work; only 1% of business in Northern Ireland reported the extortion attempt, the rest went along with it. What this means is that the terrorists have achieved at least the passive support of the population. Ideally, the terrorists would want strong, active support, but the existence of extortion activity indicates that the population does not feel loyalty to the state or confidence in the state’s ability to exert control. In other words, extortion shows that the terrorists may not have fully won over the population, but at least they have taken them out of the state’s arc of control. Third, the greater the ability of terrorist to extort or tax the population, the more it undermines the legitimacy of the state because it shows that the state cannot control its own territory. In a world that is “zero-sum” a loss for the state can be seen as a win for the terrorists.

7.3. Disadvantages

Using extortion and collecting taxes also poses some disadvantages for the terrorists. First of all, there are limits on how much they can tax or extort from a population. They are essentially in a parasitic relationship; they want to feed off their host, but they cannot kill it without dying themselves. If they force a business to pay more than they make in profits, that business will have to close down and the terrorists will lose it as a source of income. A second disadvantage is that extorting or taxing a population is at least minimally unpopular. While a population may tolerate it at a certain level or for a certain amount of time, eventually they may become resentful and turn against the terrorist group responsible.

7.4. Counters

The ability of a terrorist group to engage in this kind of activity is totally dependant on their exploitation of the weakness of the state. The way to overcome this is for the state to exert greater control. The business owner that might pay money to the terrorists must fear the reaction of the government if he does pay, more than the reaction of the

22 Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 34. 23 Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part One: Extortion and Blackmail,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21, 1998. 94 M. Freeman / Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations terrorists if he does not. The state must not only increase its presence, but also increase its punishments for helping the terrorists and increase the rewards for not.

8. Conclusions

There are several important points about the financial resources of terrorist organizations that should be highlighted. First, no two terrorist groups have the same portfolio of financial resources. There are an almost unlimited number of ways that they can acquire funds and every terrorist group has a unique portfolio of how it does so. Some may rely more on extortion and state sponsorship, while others may smuggle drugs, and others still might rely more on charitable donations and legal businesses. Second, terrorist groups are tough and smart adversaries. When particular sources dry up or get cut by effective state countermeasures, many groups are successful adapting to find new sources of funds. For example, in Iraq the funding of the insurgents has shifted over time; it originally was financed with funds from regime loyalists, then got the bulk of its money from foreign fighters who smuggled cash into Iraq, and now seems to be self-financing through indigenous sources of crime, extortion, and donations.24 The third conclusion worth highlighting is that different sources of financing have different vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Not only is this a source of optimism for a state trying to cut the financial resources of terrorist groups, it is also a warning that countermeasures must be specifically tailored to not only the particular group being targeted, but the way in which they acquire financial resources. For example, the most likely countermeasures to be successful against the insurgents in Iraq would vary depending on whether they are receiving state sponsorship from Saudi Arabia and Iran or whether they rely on kidnappings and extortion. Finally, it is worth noting that many of the recommendations for how to combat terrorist financing will be difficult, although not impossible to implement. Almost all of the recommendations require a more intensive dedication of resources, but resources are always scarce. Improving intelligence gathering, enhancing the police force, improving governance, or making the state more pervasive in society are all measures that states are already trying to do. Nevertheless, more can be done, especially when it comes to countering terrorist financing. Their money is their life-blood, and if we can attack it in better and smarter ways, we can be more effective at fighting terrorism overall.

24 John Burns and Kirk Semple, “U.S. Finds Iraq Insurgency Has Funds to Sustain Itself,” New York Times, November 26, 2006. Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 95 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-95 Terrorism and Organized Crime

Assistant Prof. Michael FREEMAN Dept. of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

Abstract. The nexus of organized crime and terrorism is complex and an increasingly important issue for policy makers. Frequently, terrorist groups and organized crime look much alike structurally and engage in similar activities, yet there are also some crucial differences in their acceptance of risk, their motivating ideology, and their use of violence, for example. Furthermore, terrorist and criminal groups often work together and these alliances have a force multiplying effect in terms of the dangers they might pose to the state.

Keywords. Terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, ideology, violence.

1. Defining Terrorism and Organized Crime

The relationship of organized crime and terrorism raises many questions. For example: what is the actual difference between the two types of activities; how should we think of terrorism and organized crime conceptually; should countermeasures for one be used against the other; what is the historical record between these two activities or the groups that practice them; what are the future trends; what opportunities or vulnerabilities can the state exploit to defeat both terrorism and organized crime? Overall, all these issues will be addressed by looking at two broad questions. First, what are the similarities and differences between the activities of terrorism and organized crime? Second, what are the historical cases and future trends concerning the overlap of the actors engaged in these activities? Before beginning to answer either of these questions, defining both terms is necessary. Of course, both terrorism and organized crime are notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to define in a way that everyone can agree with, but nevertheless, working definitions are necessary to clarify what is meant by these terms.

1.1. Terrorism

Definitions of terrorism usually converge around a few key concepts. First, terrorism is an act of violence or at least the threat of violence. Without violence, acts of political opposition are not considered terrorism. For example, engaging in the political processes or marching in a peaceful protest would not constitute terrorism. Also, the violence must be intended for it to be labeled terrorism. For example, there was a horrific event in Baghdad in which many people were crushed to death as a result of a 96 M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime rumor that there was a bomb on a bridge. Clearly, the people on the bridge were terrified, but without the intent of someone to commit an act of violence, it was not terrorism. Second, terrorism must have coercive goals. Typically, these goals are to get a state to change its policies. For example, the IRA wanted the British out of Northern Ireland, the ETA wanted Spain out of the Basque region, and al-Qaeda wants the U.S. and Coalition forces out of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It is also possible that terrorists want to maintain the status quo. For example, the Ku Klux Klan in America wanted to maintain white supremacy in race relations. Authoritarian regimes may also terrorize their own populations to maintain their authority and keep the population under control. Because terrorism is coercive, frequently the victims of terrorism are not the intended strategic target or audience. Put simply, terrorists often attack civilians to terrorize the entire citizenry to get them to pressure their government to change its behavior. So, there are at least three “targets”—the victims, the population, and the government. Often, this coercive element of terrorism is what distinguishes it from organized crime, which generally does not seek a change in policy. The third element in the definition of terrorism is that it achieves these coercive effects entirely through the creation of overwhelming terror or fear. Terrorism is unique from other forms of political violence—like conventional warfare or even guerrilla warfare—because of its reliance on the psychological effects of violence to achieve its goals. Other forms of political violence use violence to coerce an enemy, but do so by denying the enemy its objectives or by making it increasingly costly to maintain the status quo. Terrorism, in essence, operates solely against the will of the enemy and makes no effort to diminish the enemy’s capabilities. Of course, all forms of warfare involve targeting the enemy’s will, but with terrorism, it is the only mechanism involved and a mechanism that is specifically utilized and maximized. With these three components of a definition, terrorism can be distinguished from warfare, guerrilla war, crime, politics, and anything else. For any discussion of terrorism, we must recognize that there will never be a universally agreed upon definition. Every country and every agency within a country has its own perspective and its own rationale for defining terrorism in its own way. Despite these irreconcilable issues, by focusing on the three key components of terrorism—the violence, the coercive goals, and the psychological effects, we can begin to compare it to organized crime and see where there are similarities and differences.

1.2. Organized Crime

Defining organized crime is similarly difficult. Like with terrorism, most people know it when they see it, but have trouble defining just what it is they see. For organized crime, groups like the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triad, the Sicilian Mafia, the Italian Camorra, as well as the Russian Mafia and the Albanian Mafia, among many others, are all well-known.1 What defines all these groups as engaged in organized crime is a set of common characteristics. 2 First, they specialize in what are called “market-based crimes.”

1 J. P. Larsson, “Organized Criminal Networks and Terrorism,” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, James Forest, ed., Vol. 2 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), p. 164. 2 This comes from R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 16; Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Part (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study” in M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime 97

Whereas most ordinary crime is concerned with one-time predatory acts of wealth distribution, organized crime acts more like a business in a marketplace by producing and distributing goods or services that happen to be illegal, like drugs, gambling operations, or sex.3 As such, it has a more parasitic than predatory relationship with the economy (as will be discussed below) and has customers more than victims. Also, because it is essentially operating in the illegal, or black, economy, the rates of return on these activities will be higher due to the risk premiums associated with them. Second, organized crime, as the label implies, is organized. It is not a collection of criminals acting completely independent of one another, but a group of criminals that have at least some nominal structure, whether hierarchical or distributed, that aims to coordinate their actions so that they can collectively dominate the market. It is because of this organizational component that we know of these groups by their names like the Mafia; if they were not tied together as a coherent organization, we would instead just talk about the proclivity for Sicilian-American immigrants to engage in criminal activity. Third, organized crime uses violence for coercive purposes, in some ways like terrorism does. While normal criminals use violence in a direct fashion, to force some victim to part with their possessions, organized crime groups use violence to coerce rivals and bolster their position in the market. Additionally, or sometimes alternatively, organized crime can exploit corrupt officials through bribes and blackmail. Again, this is for the overall purpose of dominating the market in which they are involved. Lastly, organized crime also penetrates the legal economy. Frequently, organized crime groups may simply buy or start a legitimate business simply for the profits they expect to receive, just like any other investor. Additionally, though, they may use the legal businesses as front companies to hide or launder the money gained from the illegal operations.

2. Issues of Convergence

With these conceptual definitions in mind, why is the relationship between terrorism and organized crime interesting, problematic, and useful for consideration? There are several issues involved here. First, as discussed above, the definitions of terrorism and organized crime overlap. Not just do the definitions overlap, but our common conceptions of what each phenomenon entails overlap. Sometimes terrorism looks a lot like organized crime and vice versa. For example, when the Sendero Luminoso of Peru began getting involved in the cocaine business, were they Marxist guerrillas, classic terrorists, narco-traffickers, or simply criminals? Of course they were all of these, but understanding how and why they were each is useful if we are to understand and then defeat a group like the Shining Path or any others like them. Second, and related to this first point, gaining a proper understanding of the group in question is vital if we are to develop policies and countermeasures that have the best chance of defeating them. Going back to the Shining Path, or other examples like the

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 October 2007, p. 103; and J. P. Larsson, “Organized Criminal Networks and Terrorism,” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, James Forest, ed., Vol. 2 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), p. 164. 3 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 15. 98 M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime

FARC in Colombia or PKK in Turkey, countermeasures targeting the group as drug traders are vastly different from countermeasures that address the group as Marxist guerrillas. For example, should the government address the drug market by targeting growers and interdicting smugglers or should it address the conditions of poverty and repression that make the Marxist ideology resonate with new recruits. In many cases, both types of countermeasures should be implemented, but sometimes they may work at cross purposes. A third implication of the nexus between organized crime and terrorism is that, not only do their activities look similar in many regards, but that they may actually form alliances in the future to a greater degree or greater depth than they have in the past. For example, imagine the potential danger if al-Qaeda and a right wing criminal group in the United States decided to work together. A terrorist group like al-Qaeda would essentially be able to buy already existing and operating cells in a country that they have, so far, had difficulty operating in. The extreme right and Islamic radicals, in fact, share many ideological elements, especially a hatred of the West and its policies.4 While this specific alliance has not yet materialized, the potential for it or other kinds of relationships between terrorists and criminals is one that deserves attention. Fourth, as will be discussed below, an additional possibility is that terrorists and criminals, instead of working together, will increasingly resemble each other. We may be looking at a future where making distinctions between the two kinds of groups is difficult and what we would have instead is a hybrid organization that has the strengths of each, including the financial wealth and acumen of criminal groups and the ideological commitment and recruitment potentials of terrorist groups. Lastly, the convergence of terrorism and organized crime, despite its dangers, offers opportunities for the state that should utilized. For example, as these two kinds of groups increasingly overlap, the tie to criminal groups may provide avenues for penetration and intelligence collection that would normally be more difficult against a purely terrorist group. Likewise, the state may be better positioned to discredit or delegitimize organized crime groups as they become more associated with terrorist groups. These, of course, are just a few possibilities worth considering.

3. Similarities between Terrorism and Organized Crime

What are the similarities between the activities of terrorism and organized crime? Eight factors will be examined, to include: structure, activities, objectives, targets, risks, corruption, secrecy, and money transfers.

3.1. Structure

Groups engaged in organized crime and terrorism are often structured in similar ways. In general, both types are usually fairly decentralized, but still with some elements of a hierarchy, although both terrorist and crime groups can vary across this dimension. For example, a terrorist group like al-Qaeda started out fairly centralized with a core group of members responsible for the operations in Africa in 1998, the Cole attack, and the 9/11 attacks. Over time, however, al-Qaeda has increasingly become more

4 See George Michael, The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime 99 decentralized, especially under the pressure brought by the West, with more independent groups operating according to the ideology of al-Qaeda but not under their direct command. As a result, affiliated or sympathetic groups in London, Madrid, Bali, Jordan, and Iraq act in al-Qaeda’s name, but not under their guidance. Likewise, organized crime groups are fairly decentralized with just a little centralized leadership. In fact, oftentimes, organized crime groups are just loose affiliations of independent actors who agree to work together to control the market, rather than fight and kill each other in the process.5 Even for organized crime centered around a family patriarch, the level of hierarchy should not be overstated. As R. T. Naylor write, “The Bruno Family of South Philadelphia, for example, had by all appearances a hierarchical structure intended nominally to serve as a vehicle for ‘regulating members’ businesses. In practice, regulation amounted to little more than asking members to respect a code of ethics … [but] the edicts were often ignored frequently and with impunity. Meanwhile, individual members were free to conduct their own businesses.” 6 In sum, generalizations may often be inaccurate, but both terrorists and organized criminals are generally decentralized organizations, or can at least vary in similar ways from loose hierarchies to near total decentralization.

3.2. Activities

Both terrorists and criminals engage in similar activities, namely they both commit crimes to raise money for themselves. Both types of groups rob banks, steal credit cards, kidnap people for ransom, traffic in drugs, smuggle weapons for profit, and create fake documents. It is because of these similarities that studying the nexus between these two groups is so useful. Sometimes, it may not matter what their motives are, if they engage in similar activities, the state can focus on those activities and try to develop effective countermeasures. In other words, the goal might be to stop drug smuggling, for example, regardless of who is doing it or why.

3.3. Internal Objectives

For both groups, they have similar internal objectives. While their external objectives may differ (more on this later), in terms of their own organization, their most fundamental objective is to perpetuate the existence of the organization and, to the extent possible, increase the power of the organization. In this sense, they are both rational actors who are most concerned with their survival and power. Neither group, as an organization, is suicidal.

3.4. Targets and Victims

Often the targets of both groups will be very similar. Both will target civilians for extortion purposes and both may target government officials for coercive reasons. Likewise, as both engage in kidnapping and ransom, both will target wealthy

5 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 6 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 23. 100 M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime individuals. Also, to the extent that both use credit card fraud or identity theft, the victims of these scams will be random, innocent civilians for both types of groups.

3.5. Risks

In many ways, the risks of engaging in organized crime and terrorism are similar. For both, there is the risk of being caught, prosecuted, and imprisoned for their activities. Additionally, for both groups there is also the risk of failure. They both exist as organizations because it serves a purpose. If the criminal group fails to be profitable or the terrorist group fails to terrorize, members will be unlikely to face unnecessary risks for little or no reward.

3.6. Corruption

Both terrorists and criminal groups take advantage of corrupt officials. However, their ultimate goals here differ slightly. While criminal groups exploit corrupt officials for economic purposes, terrorist groups will point to corrupt officials as part of their political campaign to undermine, discredit, or de-legitimize the government. Nevertheless, corruption in the government is a benefit to both groups.

3.7. Secrecy

Both terrorist and criminal groups are both what is called “dark” organizations because both operate illegally and try to keep their activities and their organizations themselves secret from the public and the government as much as possible. However, neither group wants to be completely secret; both benefit from having the public have some knowledge of their existence. For terrorists, complete secrecy would hinder their ability to recruit new members and to coerce the state. For criminals, some information of their existence is useful to create a climate of uncertainty that makes extortion, for example, easier and more lucrative.

3.8. Money Transfers and Money Laundering

Both terrorists and criminals need to move money around and frequently this money needs to cross between the illegal and legal arenas. As a result, both groups are heavily involved in money laundering and other transfer methods. Money laundering always involves three stages: disassociation, obfuscation, and legitimation. Disassociation involves “moving the funds from direct association with the crime,” obfuscation entails “disguising the trail to foil pursuit,” and legitimation is the process of “making the funds again available.”7 All money laundering requires these three stages regardless of who is doing the laundering. There are innumerable methods for actually doing the laundering, in part only limited by the creativity of those involved in it. Some possible methods would include: the use of the formal banking sector; money service businesses like currency exchangers, money order companies, money transmitters, and check cashers; online payments; informal value transfer systems like hawala, Chinese fei chien, and the black market peso exchange; cyber laundering which could use debit

7 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 137. M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime 101 cards, stored value cards, digital cash, and online games; insurance companies; shell companies and trusts; casinos, lotteries and race tracks; bulk cash smuggling; front companies like car washes, restaurants, car dealerships, video rentals, bars; and trading in commodities like gold, cash, and stamps. Again, any organization raising money from illegal means or any organization that must hide or transfer money raised legally will have to resort to these kinds of money transfers and these methods of money laundering.

4. Differences between Organized Crime and Terrorism

Despite these many similarities, terrorism and organized crime are not completely similar. Many of their differences, in fact, are quite significant and consequential in terms of how the state can respond to this kind of threat.

4.1. Ideology and External Objectives

While the internal objectives for terrorists and criminals are similar (survival and power), their motivating ideology and external objectives are often very different. Terrorist groups are motivated by a political ideology, which could be anything from Marxism, Fascism, nationalism, religious extremism, environmentalism, to anarchism. Criminals, on the other hand, lack any kind of political ideology and, instead, engage in their activities for economic motives or, simply put, profit. Sometimes, criminal groups may become involved in the political process, but they do so to affect legislation, disrupt investigations, or receive lucrative contracts, not for ideological or political reasons.

4.2. Acceptance of Risk

Terrorists and criminals face similar risks from conducting acts of violence. Both groups can be captured, prosecuted, and imprisoned, as mentioned above. However, terrorists will be much more acceptant of these risks and even greater risks, like dying, than criminals. Criminals are ultimately selfish actors and will not take any undue risks to themselves. Terrorists, however, have a collective or group identity and so they will be more willing to sacrifice for the group, even risking or giving their own lives to the cause. This is why we see suicide or life-risking terrorist attacks, but why suicidal criminals are incomprehensible. In addition, the risks for terrorists in engaging in certain criminal activities may also be higher than for criminals. This is because terrorists seek the support of the population and so their actions must be seen as legitimate; they care about their public relations. When terrorists turn to drug trafficking or human smuggling, they will face higher risks of getting unwanted attention. Also, despite our common perceptions of most terrorists as being immoral or amoral, in fact, they must reconcile their activities with their own moral code. When these activities include human smuggling for prostitution or drug trafficking, terrorists may see this as immoral and as a “wound” on their soul. These activities go against how they perceive themselves to be or how they want to be seen. 102 M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime

4.3. Other Activities

Although many of the activities of terrorists and organized criminals are similar, there is also at least one important difference. Frequently, terrorist groups are just one wing of much larger political organizations. These larger organizations do much more than commit acts of violence. Often, they provide social services to their constituencies, run for elections, and often act as the de facto government. Hezbollah and Hamas are both excellent examples of this type of terrorist organization. Both do a lot to provide social services and goods to their communities; they build schools, run hospitals, build infrastructure, and pay families of deceased members. Likewise, both have run for political office, with Hamas winning the election in the Palestinian Authority and Hezbollah holding numerous seats in the Lebanese Parliament. These groups are much more complex than simply terrorist or criminal organizations. Focusing too much on the criminal and violent aspects of these organizations, therefore, will tend to overlook other ways in which these organizations maintain and exercise their power.

4.4. Level and Symbolism of Violence

Even though both terrorists and criminals use violence, how much violence they create and what the violence means is different for each. For criminals, violence is used mostly to coerce or extort victims for profit or to eliminate rivals. Generally, levels of violence are low, especially as they tend to intentionally avoid collateral damage. Furthermore, their targets are not symbolic nor is the act of violence itself symbolic. For terrorists, everything about the act of violence is symbolic—from the target to the act. For example, the World Trade Center towers were targeted because they were symbolic of Western economic imperialism. The act itself of terrorism is also symbolic, especially when it is suicide terrorism, because it symbolizes the terrorists group’s willingness and resolve to die for their cause.8

4.5. Means and Ends

Terrorist groups also differ in terms of the purposes of their violent or criminal activity. For criminals, because of their economic motivation, the crime is the end. For terrorists, crime is merely a means to committing acts of terrorism. So, while terrorists, like criminals, are involved in document fraud, and the smuggling of people, guns and drugs, terrorists do so to better enable them to conduct terrorist operations. Put simply, terrorists commit crimes to be able to commit acts of terrorism; criminals commit crimes for profit.

4.6. Secrecy versus Publicity

Criminal groups want to maintain secrecy and avoid publicity as much as possible. When they must commit acts of violence, they would prefer no one finds out (except the victim of course). For terrorists, however, they actively seek publicity for their cause. In fact, many of their operations are designed intentionally to raise awareness of their cause within domestic and international audiences. Terrorists also want publicity

8 See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime 103 to help them mobilize their own sympathizers. In fact, one terrorist strategy is to attack the state in a public way, and force it to respond. The terrorists hope the response is too heavy-handed because that will help them recruit new members and convince others that the state lacks legitimacy and must be fought with violence. Without publicity, in fact, there can be no terrorism. As others have pointed out, terrorists need people watching to be effective.

4.7. Relationship with the State

Terrorists and criminals have different relationships with the state. Generally, terrorists are predatory—they want to destroy the state or government to the extent possible. They see their struggle as zero-sum, meaning that what is good for one side is bad for the other, or vice versa. In some cases, perhaps like Hezbollah, the state and the terrorist may be in a symbiotic relationship, where both the state and terrorists benefit from each other’s existence. In this example, Hezbollah performs social welfare functions that the state cannot do. By doing so, Hezbollah benefits, but so does the state, because it does not need to devote scarce resources to these functions. These symbiotic cases may be most likely when the terrorists’ enemy is not the state itself, but some external entity. Criminal groups, in contrast, actually take advantage of the state and its health. They do not want to destroy the state, but actually benefit from a stronger state. In this regard, they are more like a parasite. The healthier or wealthier the state, the more opportunities there will be for criminal groups to make money. This relationship is parasitic and not symbiotic because the state does not benefit from the existence of the criminal organizations.

5. Ties between Terrorists and Criminals

The previous discussion highlighted the similarities and differences between terrorism and organized crime at a conceptual level. The second main question to be addressed here is how in practice have terrorist and organized crime groups interacted? In general there are three broad types of collaborations. First, there can be weak links or one-off collaborations where groups easily labeled as terrorists and criminals join together for a specific operation. Second, groups can be primarily terrorist or criminal in nature, but overlap in their activities such that terrorists act like criminals and criminals act like terrorists. Third, these two groups can converge into hybrid organizations that cannot be characterized as exclusively or primarily terrorist or criminal. They can be terrorists groups with just a façade of politics, or criminal groups with real political objectives.

6. Weak Links

6.1. Logic of Collaboration

First, terrorists and organized criminals can forge short-lived alliances for specific operations. Both sides benefit from these alliances. From the criminals, terrorists will get fake documents or weapons, for instance. Criminals will benefit because terrorists can help them control a geographic area or assassinate a politician or rival. For example, 104 M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime terrorist groups often provide physical security and protection for drug traders, in exchange for a slice of the profit that the terrorists can use to buy weapons. These kinds of alliances may be on the rise because of the increased decentralization of both terrorist and criminal networks. With individual cells more responsible for their own activities and logistics, alliances with other groups become more lucrative. Also, pressure from the state has forced many terrorist groups to become more independent of other sources of income. So, instead of getting funds from donations or state sponsors, they increasingly turn to criminal activities and alliances with criminal groups. Despite these incentives for cooperation, there are also constraints. For terrorist groups, they are often reluctant to have ties to criminal organizations because these ties can be bad for operational security and they can be bad in terms of their ability to maintain public support and legitimacy. From a criminal’s perspective, alliances with terrorist groups may bring unwanted attention from the state and can also lead to activity that they find distasteful, like killing large numbers of innocent civilians.

6.2. Examples

One of the best examples of this kind of one-time alliance between terrorists and criminals involves one of the largest bank robberies in history. In 1976, an alliance of PLO terrorists, Lebanese Christian Phalange members, and Corsican Mafia blasted their way into the vaults of the British Bank of the Middle East in Beirut. Each of the three groups split the spoils of between $100 million and $600 million.9 Another example of this kind of alliance is the case of Dawood Ibrahim. He is a businessman from Bombay, now living in Pakistan who owns and runs the D Company. He is involved in all the normal organized crime activities, like extortion, drug trafficking, and murder for hire, but has also made deals with terrorist groups. He has allegedly helped al-Qaeda by giving them access to his smuggling routes, has supported terrorists in Pakistan, and was heavily involved in a coordinated attack in Bombay in 1993 that killed 250 and injured 700.10 As another example, there are reports that Pablo Escobar, the noted Colombian drug kingpin, paid the Marxist terrorist group, the ELN, to plant car bombs on his behalf.

7. Dual Activities

Sometimes terrorists and criminals ally with each other, as discussed above; other times, they simply perform for themselves some of the functions of the other type. In other words, sometimes terrorists act like criminals and sometimes criminals act like terrorists.

9 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 59, James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986), p. 118; and http://moneynoobject.typepad.com/mno/blog_index.html. 10 David Kaplan, “Paying for Terror” in U.S. News & World Report November 27, 2005; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Bombay_bombings; Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Crime 6:1 February 2004, p. 132. M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime 105

7.1. Terrorists Acting Like Criminals

Many of the activities in which terrorists engage in to raise money are often very similar to those of organized crime. For instance, terrorists often get involved in drug smuggling, the selling of pirated goods, robberies, and extortion through protection rackets. Many terrorist groups are widely known for their involvement in the drug trade and a list would include the FARC, Shining Path, Taliban, among others. Frequently, however, they are less involved with the actual trade of drugs for profit and more involved in the protection and smuggling of the drugs. Individual cells, however, may be more likely to profit from the drugs. The Madrid bombing cell, for instance, “financed itself almost entirely with money earned from trafficking in hashish and ecstasy.”11 Selling counterfeit or pirated goods is also a common activity for terrorists that is usually more associated with organized crime. For example, the Tri-border Area in South America at the convergence of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil is a largely under-governed area that is notorious for its smuggling, counterfeiting, money- laundering and criminal activities. While most of the people taking advantage of this area’s opportunities are common criminals, there is also a terrorist presence there. Hezbollah has maintained a logistical and support presence there and has allegedly moved $50 million to Hezbollah between 1996 and 2001 from the profits of its illegal activities in the region.12 While regular criminals and organized crime groups use robberies to finance their operations, so too do terrorist groups. For example, the cell responsible for the Bali bombing received some of their financing through jewelry store robberies. Likewise, as mentioned above, the PLO robbed the British Bank of the Middle East to finance their operations. As a final example, the Marxist Tupamaros of Uruguay robbed a delivery truck loaded with food, but distributed it to the poor of Montevideo and gained a Robin Hood like reputation. Organized crime groups are notorious for their protection rackets, where they require businesses to pay for security services and then “fail” to provide them if they refuse to pay. Terrorists, too, have often used this tactic. For example, the Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland relied on this tactic as their primary source of funding. Construction businesses and construction sites were a frequent target of these schemes.13

7.2. Criminals Acting like Terrorists

Even though criminal groups have essentially economic motivations for their activities, they also sometimes become more politically active and start acting more like terrorist groups. They may engage in more terrorist-like behavior because they wish to influence the political process for economic ends. For example, they may want to coerce officials into awarding them contracts, or deter law enforcement agents from

11 David Kaplan, “Paying for Terror” in U.S. News & World Report November 27, 2005. 12 Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28: 3 May-June 2005, p. 246. 13 Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part One: Extortion and Blackmail,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21, 1998. 106 M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime investigating their activities, or punish leaders who act contrary to the group’s goals. For example, the Sicilian Mafia in Italy engaged in what should be labeled terrorism in the 1990s. They used car bombs to attack the Uffizi in Florence and a church in Rome, and planned an attack against the leaning tower of Pisa—all to convince the Italian Parliament to revoke recently passed anti-Mafia legislation.14 As another example, in 2002 Brazilian crime groups “bombed buses, fired shots at government buildings, and targeted police officers.” 15 These attacks by organized criminals were designed as a response to Brazilian effort to restrict the control that criminal leaders in prison had over their organizations. For the most part, the terrorist campaign of the crime groups was successful, with Brazil relaxing many of their restrictions on the imprisoned leaders.

8. Convergence

Beyond ad-hoc alliances and some cross-over activities conducted by both groups, perhaps the most potentially dangerous phenomenon is if there is a complete convergence of these two types of groups into a single, hybrid entity. This may result from criminal groups who acquire political objectives, or terrorist groups who lose their political rationale. For criminal groups who acquire political objectives, they are no longer in a parasitic relationship, but a predatory one in which they seek to harm the state for their own interests. They try to “break or ruin the sense of social and political calm in a country.” 16 Tamara Makarenko writes that the Russian and Albanian mafias are good examples of this phenomenon, in that they try to mobilize the population against the state. The Albanian Mafia, for example, shares membership with the Kosovo Liberation Army and uses its “criminal profits to purchase arms and military equipment for the [KLA].”17 Coming from the other side of the spectrum, terrorist groups may end up as a similar hybrid organization if they lose their political motivations. They may still maintain their rhetoric of revolution, but this is just a façade for their criminal activity. They do not become normal criminals, because their expressed (if not believed) ideology is still important for legitimizing their actions and gaining recruits. As they become more enamored with criminal activity, these groups may become more parasitic and less predatory towards the state. Two examples of this hybrid organization coming from the terrorist side are the Abu Sayyaf Group and the FARC in Colombia. Both still claim to have revolutionary aspirations to establish an independent Muslim state within the Philippines and a Marxist government in Colombia, respectively. However, FARC activities are predominantly focused on cocaine production and export, which garner possibly $500 million in revenue per year. Likewise, ASG spends

14 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Crime 6:1 February 2004, p. 134. 15 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Crime 6:1 February 2004, p. 134. 16 C. Harmon, Terrorism Today (Frank Cass, 2003) quoted in Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Crime 6:1 February 2004, p. 136. 17 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Crime 6:1 February 2004, p. 136. M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime 107 most of its time kidnapping hostages for ransom, which raises around $20 million per year for their coffers.18 Finding the appropriate or most effective countermeasures for these types of hybrid groups can often be very difficult. It is not a matter of understanding them as either terrorists or criminals, but as both simultaneously. For policy-makers, they must appreciate how they have the advantages, aspirations, and even vulnerabilities of both kinds of groups.

9. Countermeasures

What countermeasures can and should the state use to address this relationship between terrorism and organized crime? First, because these two types of activity often look very similar, the initial step must be for the state to properly identify the threat. Is the group under consideration a terrorist organization, an organized group, or some combination of both? For example, if they are a terrorist group, they will probably aspire to have the support of the masses. Knowing this, the state can work to maintain the allegiance of the population by governing legitimately and justly. If the threat is a criminal group, they will not have this vulnerability and so the allegiances of the population are not at stake. Second, alliances between these groups will often provide intelligence benefits to the state if it knows where and how to look for key pieces of information. Specifically, overlapping networks of terrorists and criminals may provide the state with visibility into both groups that it would not have had had they maintained their independence. Third, the relationship between organized crime and terrorism highlights the need for the state to pay attention to logistical cells, not just violent ones. Understandably, government officials and citizens alike will focus on the cells that are planning or executing operations, as they should be. Oftentimes, though, the fundraising cells are just as important to the organization as the violent ones. As a slightly different point, the state should also pay attention to the logistical cells because often these cells can transform into violent ones. For example, the Hezbollah group in North Carolina that was involved in the cigarette smuggling never became violent, but they did train in Lebanon and had the potential to become more violent. Fourth, the ties and convergence between terrorist and criminal groups can be exploited by the state. For terrorist groups, engaging in criminal activity can often be counterproductive. For example, they might lose their popular base of support if they sell drugs to, extort, or kidnap their own population. Additionally, the state can wage an information campaign highlighting the terrorist group’s criminal activity. For many would-be supporters they would see this as the terrorist group compromising its political ideology for financial gain and many might turn away from this kind of group. Lastly, the state can exploit the ties between terrorists and criminals to target criminals. For many people living in areas where organized crime groups have power, they may give them their passive support, especially if the state is weak. However, if the crime group has ties to terrorists and this link is publicized, the population may see this as crossing the line of what is tolerable, especially in our current global fight against terrorism, and work more closely with the state against the criminal group. Also,

18 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Crime 6:1 February 2004, p. 137. 108 M. Freeman / Terrorism and Organized Crime publicizing the link that criminals have with terrorism may literally “shame” them into changing this relationship.

10. Conclusions

To conclude, we need to understand that criminal activity is often a central component of terrorist fund raising. We often appreciate the nexus between drugs and terrorists, but do not go any farther than this. In fact, as articulated above, there are many more possibilities of convergence and alliance between terrorists and criminals. We must also appreciate the dangerous potential of the possible alliance between terrorists and criminals. So far, these alliances have been fleeting, but the potential for much more dangerous consequences is already present. Imagine, for an instance, if al- Qaeda simply offered to pay a local gang in a large city to do their dirty work. Third, there are important similarities between the activities of terrorism and organized crime, yet for each, there are constraints. Terrorists do not always partake in all possible criminal activities, nor do criminals easily adopt the tactics or goals of terrorists. In other words, despite their similarities, there are still many reasons why terrorists and criminals remain as separate entities. Fourth, these groups are adaptive and strategic and can easily transform themselves to take advantage of different circumstances. Terrorist groups can take advantage of economic conditions to make large profits, while criminal groups can easily use the tactics of terrorism if they are faced with unfavorable political conditions. Lastly, we should not be too pessimistic. While the links between terrorists and criminals pose new dangers to the state, they also offer vulnerabilities to exploit. For both groups, an alliance with the other is not a completely natural situation. In fact, both groups often resist any possibility that they might be mistaken for the other. Terrorists do not want to be seen as ordinary criminals and criminals do not want the attention that comes if they are seen as terrorists. The state should take advantage of this situation and use the alliance of these groups as a way to de-legitimize both of them. Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 109 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-109 Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism

Police Chief Seyit Ahmet EREN Anti-Terrorism Dept., and COE–DAT Instructor, Ankara

Abstract. The lecture aims to scrutinize the types of terrorism threat in Turkey, briefly mention the PKK terrorist organization, and touch upon the Turkish experience of suicide terrorism. After discussing incentives for suicide attacks in general, there is a summary of suicide attacks in the country, and two case studies are provided. As a conclusion, practical advice is offered on how security personnel can identify suicide bombers.

Keywords. Terrorism in Turkey, PKK/Kongra-GEL, suicide attacks, suicide case study.

Categories of Terrorism in Turkey

Terrorism, whether based on Marxist-Leninist, separatist or religious ideologies, has marked the lives of Turks for more than thirty years. During this period thousands of people have been killed because of terrorism, including innocent citizens, soldiers, police officers, state officials and the terrorists themselves. Security searches outside shops, in airports, bus stations, and government buildings, have long been a regrettable but necessary part of everyday life. There have been many terrorist organizations in Turkey, many of them small and short-lived. The seeds of the some of these groups were sown during the political turmoil of the 1970s, others more recently, as part of a politicization of religion. The types of organization are categorized under four main titles. These are: x Left-wing terror organizations, x Right-wing terror organizations, x Separatist terror organizations, x Terrorist groups connected to or inspired by al-Qaida. Of these the most significant remains the originally Marxist-Leninist PKK/Kongra- GEL organization, which will be introduced in more detail.

PKK/Kongra-GEL

The PKK-Kongra-GEL terrorists have caused more casualties and injuries in our society than all the other networks mentioned above. As a result of this group’s campaigns of violence it is estimated that about 35,000 people have lost their lives in Turkey. 110 S.A. Eren / Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism

The PKK (Kongra-Gel) terror organization was established in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, a man who had become involved in activism while a politics student at Ankara University. The group’s armed campaign was launched in 1984, and it quickly became evident that Öcalan’s organization had both an unquestioning commitment to its leader, and a willingness to engage in attacks which were unprecedented in their ruthlessness. Having a Marxist-Leninist ideology, it set itself the target of establishing a Kurdish state extending over territories in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. At various times the PKK or its offshoots have changed these stated aims, but it is clear that a separate state remains the main rallying cry. It is notable that in this terrorist organization a growing tendency to use suicide attacks can be observed. This change of tactic, which began in the second half of the 1990s, seems to have been in response to a stronger Turkish Army presence in the south-east of the country and efficient law enforcement efforts to capture terrorists across the country. After the Army operations of 1995, soldiers and locally-recruited ‘village guard’ vigilantes severely restricted the terrorists’ room to manoeuvre. The organization suffered a major setback when in 1999 Abdullah Öcalan was captured and, after trial, sentenced to the death penalty. As part of the accession process to the EU, the Turkish Parliament enacted several reform packages for adopting new laws. Capital punishment was abolished. Therefore, Öcalan’s conviction was later on converted to lifetime imprisonment. After the September 11 attacks, by reason of the fact that it was going to be written on the “Terrorist Organizations List” by the USA and EU countries, the PKK changed its name, firstly to KADEK (Kurdish Liberty and Democracy Congress) in 2002, and later on to KONGRA-GEL (Kurdish People’s Congress) in 2003. At the time leaders who wished to avoid international condemnation were in the ascendancy, but, since the ending of an alleged ceasefire in 2004, power is once again in the hands of hard-liners. The front network of PKK-KONGRA/GEL, that supports the armed organization politically, financially and logistically, is active in about thirty countries, many of them in Europe. Some European and neighbouring countries are responsible for providing support to PKK terrorists. Apart from attacks in cities, and representatives of the state in the south-east, PKK violence included a mid-1990s campaign of arson attacks and vandalism against Turkish interests in Europe, and several fatal bomb attacks in tourist resorts along the south coast. A relatively new factor in PKK-inspired violence that tends to be overlooked is the role of internal migration in the changing nature of the conflict in Turkey. Especially, but by no means only, in the slums and backstreets of Istanbul, there are tensions, which appear to be related to support for the PKK. It is believed that the terrorists have set up organized crime gangs to raise tension, especially in the large cities, in order to weaken the government. They recruited and trained individuals, some of whom were children, to become purse-snatchers and muggers.

Suicide Attacks

Suicide attacks are a typical feature of ‘asymmetrical warfare’. This term describes a conflict in which the resources of the warring parties differ, with the result that the apparently weaker party concentrates its strategy on exploiting the other’s characteristic weaknesses by using unconventional tactics. The basis of asymmetrical warfare is the superiority of the attacker to the target, despite the comparative weakness of the S.A. Eren / Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism 111 attacker’s resources. With suicide terrorism, the weaker acts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target. In this context, modern information technology provides a further asymmetrical tool: A very small terrorist organization can attack causing heavy destruction having used the internet as an easily accessible means of communication for issuing orders, propaganda and recruitment, as well as for gathering information about a target. From the account of developments in the PKK above, it is notable that there was a time when this terrorist organization changed from relying on hit-and-run tactics and ambushes, and pursued the method of suicide attacks. It is legitimate to ask why, among all the methods available to terrorists, they should choose to resort to suicide attacks? As a list of answers, one can observe that this tactic: x Is sensational, creating terror in the target population, and adulation among the terrorists, x Causes greater casualties, x Has a precise and adaptable delivery method, x Has an immense impact in the media, and by that in the population, x Requires little training, and is low cost, low technology, and low risk, x Is conducted in the place and at the time that is determined by the terrorist, x Involves no danger of being interrogated and giving away important information, x Requires no escape routes or complicated rescue operations, x Basically a punishment strategy.

Psychological Incentives for Adopting Suicide Terrorism

In the PKK’s case, the suicide attack was not used in the early days, but the group readily adopted this tactic when circumstances deprived them of other options. When one makes a comparison of the situations of organizations at the time when they chose to resort to suicide attacks, certain common psychological factors can be identified.

The need to demonstrate capabilities and determination To prove their capabilities and determination, they resort to suicide attack. This style of attack carries the message that the perpetrators are willing to sacrifice anything for their cause, and will never back down.

Immense impact on population The horror of suicide attacks has an immediate and deep effect on the population.

After a period of inaction A terrorist organization depends on attacks to demonstrate that it is still active. It has been observed that, if the group has failed to carry out an activity within a certain period, the leaders feel a need to regain influence with a dramatic attack. 112 S.A. Eren / Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism

Anxiety about losing folk support among allegedly the terrorists’ own people Terrorists are concerned about their image and the messages they give, not only to their perceived enemies, but among the population they claim to represent and they are very sensitive to losing credit in the eyes of their own members. As one of the most effective ways of proving their existence and their commitment, they resort to the suicide attack.

Having an inferiority complex When a terrorist organization compares itself with other terrorist groups, both domestically and internationally, it does not want to be behind them, and this increases its desire to show its ruthlessness.

To have their militants undergo psychological pressure This kind of action gives a message to the members who are sometimes reluctant to obey the rules. Every attack is a message to not only the relevant population, institutions or states, but also to the members of the organization.

Becoming demoralized After unsuccessful attacks or attempts, in order to show their effectiveness, the terrorists re-emerge with a wild action to boost the morale of the members.

Desire for revenge on security officials/administrators/etc. Individuals in terrorist organizations become more desirous to avenge themselves if they lost family members, relatives or close friends in the fight with security forces.

To get public support by being seen as innocent victims Sometimes the terrorists want to give a message to public that they are in such dire straits that they have no option but to commit suicide attacks. They may wish to evoke the impression of a heroic, desperate resistance.

Suicide Attacks in Turkey

There have been both successful—from the terrorist’s viewpoint—and unsuccessful suicide attacks committed in Turkey.

1. PKK Attacks

The PKK turned to suicide terrorism in 1996, clearly as a result of loses suffered when using more conventional methods. The organization resorted to asymmetric warfare, and, in an effort to restore morale; they created a cult of suicide martyrs in their propaganda. There were a total of around 25 suicide attacks, most of them carried out by women. The head of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, mentioned suicide terrorism as an integral part of his strategy in a 1997 interview. Some of the notable suicide attacks carried out in Turkey were: 30.06.1996 Tunceli; 04.08.1996 Hakkari; 29.10.1996 Sivas; 17.11.1998 Hakkari; 01.12.1998 Diyarbakır; 24.12.1998 Van; 04.03.1999 S.A. Eren / Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism 113

Batman; 20.03.1999 Van; 27.03.1999 Istanbul; 05.04.1999 Bingöl; 08.04.1999 Hakkari; 02.06.1999 ùırnak; 05.07.1999 Adana; 22.05.2007 Ankara. Targets of suicide bombs included crowds in Turkish cities, and local governors and police installations in various urban regions of Turkey.

2. Al-Qaida Related Attacks

Relgiously-inspired terrorist groups have the reputation of committing the deadliest suicide attacks, and this has also been Turkey’s experience. Of all the suicide attacks Turkey has ever seen, the Istanbul bombings, which took place in November 2003, were the most tragic. The targets were: x Two synagogues on 15 November 2003, and x The HSBC Bank and British Consulate on 20 November 2003. In all 61 people died, including 3 police officers, the British Consul and the terrorists, and hundreds (763) were wounded as a result. During the investigations, it was established that the perpetrators had received both military and political training in Afghanistan. 43 people have been arrested by judicial authorities and put the jail.

Two Case Studies of Suicide Terrorists

1. Leyla Kaplan (Forced to Commit the Attack)

In a previous article I referred briefly to the case of a young girl, Leyla Kaplan (see my article in Suicide as a Weapon, COE–DAT, ed., Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007, p. 31). She was responsible for the suicide attack committed on 25 October 1996, killing 3 police officers and 1 citizen, and wounding 12 citizens, 8 of whom were police officers, and 1 of whom was a Kyrgyz civilian. Before mentioning the results of the investigation, it is useful to examine the profile of the terrorist girl: x Born in 1979, x Her father was a worker for 7 years in Saudi Arabia,She came from a poor family with four children, x They moved to Adana 30 years before, and were living in a poor district, x The mother was illiterate, x The father was suffering from a stomach complaint, x She liked romantic TV serials, x She and her twin were working as day labourers, x She contracted tuberculosis one year before she died and was being treated, x At the time of event, like some other Kurdish families, her family were supporters of the PKK terrorist organization, x She grew up in an environment in which social attitudes favoured the PKK terrorist organization. She was impressed/affected by the people living around her, x The only toy she had was a plastic doll that her father had bought, x She had been arrested along with 13 PKK members in 1992, due to activities related to the organization, and later on she was released, 114 S.A. Eren / Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism

x She never left the city she lived in, and had gone to the cinema only twice, x She was a silent and mild girl. Two months before the attack Leyla Kaplan left her family home. She had asked for a new dress from her mother. In reply she was told that the family could not afford to buy it. She had apparently said nothing, but put her tea glass down abruptly, and left. It seems that she was in love with a boy, and her family said that they thought she had gone to be with him. At least, this was the formal statement of the family after the event. In our opinion, as police investigating the attack, the family knew where she had gone but they did not mention this to the police because they also had sympathy for the organization. Kaplan then spent her two months with the mountain cadre of the organization. Since she was a silent and mild type, and additionally sick with tuberculosis, she was kept in reserve for a suicide attack. In an operation conducted by the Turkish National Police, a videotape was seized which included a statement by Leyla Kaplan. What she said in the videotape is quoted below: ‘My code name is Rewshan. Firstly, I would like to read the writing I prepared in order to inform the whole world about my suicide action. First of all, I would like to salute our leader Abdullah Öcalan, all of his companions fighting against the enemy, all the martyred of revolution and esteemed Kurdistan people. As a Kurdish girl, of my own free will, and under no pressure, I would like to pay my debt by sacrificing my life to fulfil the requirements of devotion to the companions who sacrificed their lives heroically in Kurdistan. Long live the PKK! Long live the ERNK! Long live the ARGK! (These are abbreviations for the political and military wings of the PKK.) Now, I am thinking myself, there is a police station. Can I enter the station? Of course, I can enter easily. If they ask why I have come to the station, I will say: “Your commander called me to talk about my case. I will have my case closed.” They will take me inside. I will wear clothes to make myself attractive. At that moment, the officers will approach me and ask what I am looking for. I will say: “I want to talk to the commander for a minute.” Of course, when he comes, the inside of the station must be crowded. Otherwise I will not waste myself. When they come—hello, hello, and so on. Then, boom! That is it.’ The police investigation of this heinous event led to information which gave a very different picture of the girl’s motivations. The discoveries came as a result of the operations conducted in the ten days after the attack. Twenty-two PKK members were seized, some of whom were connected to the event, and one member was killed as he tried to resist capture. The statement of one of those who were captured was of great importance. His confessions illuminated an important aspect of the suicide attack, as well as another homicide case that had not been known to the police. The real name of this male terrorist was Bayram Yaruk, who had the code name Isa, and the false name Sadık Yikar. In the light of the investigation of this man, it became apparent that another young female terrorist, Turkan Adıyaman, had been assigned to this attack. Bayram Yaruk confessed that he killed this girl since she had refused to commit the suicide attack. It is an indispensable rule for terrorist organizations that their members cannot act in the way they wish. Terrorist organizations do not permit even the expression of different ideas because a single dissenting voice may encourage disobedience among the others. Disobeying the rules and orders is punished with death. S.A. Eren / Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism 115

As Turkan had disobeyed the order, Bayram Yaruk took her along with Leyla Kaplan to a rural district outside of the city where he killed Turkan with one bullet aimed at the head. After killing her, he buried the corpse there. When he was eventually captured he was asked to show the place where he had buried the corpse and he guided the police team and was able to show them the place. The corpse was found and taken to the mortuary for a judicial examination/autopsy. Yaruk gave the same duty to Leyla Kaplan and she was told: “Either you die as a heroine for the organization, or we will kill you as a traitor and coward.” It is clear that she decided to die as a hero. The videotape referred to above was recorded for propaganda, to motivate other militants by giving the impression that Leyla had voluntarily gone to commit the attack, whereas the truth was that she had been threatened and sent into action under overwhelming pressure.

2. Sengul Akkurt (Attack Committed Voluntarily)

The following is what militant Sengul Akkurt, a member of the terrorist organization DHKP/C (Revolutionist Peoples Salvation Party/Front), said prior to her attack to videotape. This videocassette was taken by the mentioned organization as a means of propaganda and seized later in an operation: ‘I take an oath upon the weapon which is justice of the folk, and upon our flag whose colour comes from the blood of the martyred, for the independence of our country and liberation of our nation, to fight till liberation against the imperialism and fascism that are the reasons of poverty, cruelty, and national dishonour. My oath is my revolutionary honour and modesty. If I do not fulfil my oath, may my punishment be a dishonourable death. Everything is for my people! Everything is for the Front of the Organization! Long live leader Dursun Karatas! Long live the DHKP/C! Because of all these facts, and in order to avenge 106 companions killed—I cannot recall all their names—to achieve the abolition of solitary confinement in the prisons and to terminate the coercion, cruelty and prohibition policies, and also for my people, I will sacrifice my own life. At the time I die, I will also kill without pity. It doesn’t matter how and from where the death comes. If our war slogans are spread for all to hear, and if the sounds of the machine guns are heard all around my country, it is welcome.’ The aim of the attack was to kill a politician because of policies implemented by the government. The female DHKP/C terrorist Sengul Akkurt (d.o.b. 1977) needed a place where she could strap on the bombs, and with this aim in mind she went to a cafe in Ankara on 25 May 2003, and began to place the bombs onto her body in the toilet. However, she detonated the bombs by accident before she reached her goal. Since there was no evidence which proved that this attack was committed under pressure, the case was considered to be an attack committed voluntarily.

How Security Personnel Seek to Identify Suicide Bombers

In the following, practical part of this lecture, how to identify suicide bombers will be mentioned. This is the kind of advice which can be given to security personnel. The principle is to stop the suicide attackers before they reach their target. It is therefore essential that the security staff have the ability to identify and to discern the suicide bombers and their attitudes. 116 S.A. Eren / Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism

Physical Aspect There are some clues to identify the suicide bombers, and it is possible to notice these by looking at their physical aspects. For example: x They may look sick, tired, upset, worried, pale, sweaty, indifferent, and unresponsive to the warnings, or they may be looking around decisively, x They may be posing as disabled people or humpbacks, x They may be pretending to be pregnant, and x Women wearing traditional dresses which cover them completely should be observed carefully in case they might be suicide bombers.

Unsuitable Clothing Another clue that must attract attention is improper dressing, for example: x Overcoat or jacket on a hot day, x Abnormal appearance of pregnancy, x A thin person may be wearing voluminous clothes, x An appearance which does not fit with the city routine. Why do they dress in that manner? The aim may be to conceal explosives!

Suspicious Behaviour Another point that must be observed is the suspicious behaviour of the individuals: x Individuals carrying a handbag, baby bag, backpack, or suspicious packet in his/her hand. Anyone may carry a bag or packet, but suicide attackers are likely to show some concern that the contents will not be identified. There is a target/mission to be achieved that makes them anxious. x Any person who is not moving his/her hands, or keeping hands in his/her pockets, or holding suspicious material. x Someone displaying abnormal behaviour, like a fear in the eyes, a hesitancy, etc.. x People who are looking at each other or giving signals to somewhere.

What Should Be Done When the Attacker is Identified?

Although every case has its own characteristics, and one’s reactions cannot be confined to certain rules, nevertheless we can consider the following: x You must act before than him/her. x If you detect the terrorist while at some distance, warn him/her to stop. x Keep him/her away from you. x Warn other people to keep away. x Should you need to talk, do it from the behind some barrier. x Call an expert immediately. x Set a cordon surrounding the terrorist and keep him/her in the centre of a circle. Tell him/her to put down any explosives being carried. x If he/she obeys, tell him/her to undress completely. (Since we do not know the bomb mechanism, the best way is to make the terrorist undress.) S.A. Eren / Turkish Experience of Suicide Terrorism 117

x If the conditions are convenient, attempt to capture him/her with more than one member of staff. (This is not advised.) x If you are able to capture him/her, prevent his/her movement until an expert comes to the spot. x If he/she runs towards you, or the crowd, or another target, stop him/her! x If you can do nothing else, hide yourself or lie down! Please keep in mind that these are not the precautions to be applied to every case. Every case has a specific character and reactions should be determined accordingly. The key elements of the tactical measures to be taken can be summarized as follows: 1. Strong intelligence (effective and sufficient coordination of the relevant units is of vital importance), 2. Education/notification of the personnel, 3. Check points and careful inspections, 4. Evaluation of the possible targets and increasing preventive measures. This page intentionally left blank Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 119 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-119 Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks

Assoc.-Prof. Müfit Selim SARUHAN Faculty of Divinity, University of Ankara

Abstract. In the framework of this lecture the focus is first on the philosophy of what religions teach in regard to the problem of peace in the midst of a world of opposing views. Religions in general, and Islam in particular, have as their aim living together in peace. We should judge religions by their most authentic examples rather than by their worst corruptions. Terror is the result of influences brought to bear on human nature, and cannot be attributed to a religion, just as it cannot be attributed to a nation. Terrorists of all religions may attribute their violence to their beliefs, while in fact they operate for other, human reasons. As this chapter shows, the Qur’an teaches tolerance, and condemns murder and suicide. The central point of this thesis is that, in order to overcome terrorism, we have to put forward a true and accurate understanding of religion. Only in this way can we acquire excellence. The Faculty of Divinity educates its students in the ways of peace. The students in turn carry this message throughout Turkey, which can act as a beacon for other Muslim countries.

Keywords. Terrorism, peace, Islamic teaching on peace.

1. Introduction: Framework

Before beginning my talk I would like to present a few quotations from both the Holy Bible and the Qur’an: About peace in the Holy Bible: “The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control.” – (Galatians 5:22) “...be at peace with one another.” – (Mark 9:49) About Peace in the Qur’an: 1. «To each is a goal to which God turns him; then strive together towards all that is good. Wherever you are, God will bring you together.» (Bakara 2/48) 2. «O, you who believe! Enter to peace whole heartedly.» (2/208) 3. «By (the Token) Time, verily Man is loss. Except such as have faith, do peaceful deeds and join together in the mutual teaching of the Truth, and Patience and Constancy.» (103) In the framework of this lecture I would like to focus on the essential philosophy of what religions teach in regard to the problem of peace in the midst of a world where opposite views are held by various religious and irreligious groups. Religion in general and Islam in particular do have as their aim the goal of living together in 120 M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks a world which is governed by peace. In order to comprehend the fundamental nature of terror we have to take a look at the issue of human nature. As you may recall the famous philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) introduced us to the term “tabula rasa” which is Latin for “a blank tablet”. John Locke set forth his empirical theory of knowledge in which he delineated the state of the human mind at birth. Essentially, he contended that human beings are not born with any prior knowledge or disposition; thus, their minds could only be influenced by sensory experience.1 From this starting point it must be emphasized that the human mind from the very beginning is empty. The human mind is continually being shaped by tradition, experience, religions, cultures, ethics, politic and economics. In sum we come across the importance of education. Environment and the educational system do have a vital role in the formation of the character. If we want to overcome terrorism we obviously must find solutions. Weapons formed against terror will only solve the problem temporarily. But for any lasting results in the war against terror we will be required to reach deep into the mind of the terrorist. Only in this way will there be significant or long term results. A human being is a part of society. When we look at religion, culture, ethics, politics and economics as indivisible parts of society, a terrorist may choose to misuse these things to further his bad intentions or use them as a source of motivation for them. We cannot condemn the economy because of the robbery which stems from poverty; at most we can only put blame on the misuse of an economic policy. Starting at this point it needs to be noted that religion in and of itself from time to time can be misinterpreted. A wise and well-educated person by his own decisions and observations will rightfully judge various religions and systems. However, we should not forget that all prejudices and mistakes come from individuals; in looking at the problems we cannot blame any one religion. In fact when looking at the issues we need to distinguish between the effect that religion has from that of traditional values. When we move away from prejudices we are able to see the realities. Misconceptions and misunderstandings abound when there is a lack of education.2 When we speak about freedom, human rights, and tolerance from a perspective of religion there are at least three different views which may be observed: The first group argues that religions are the source of both intolerance and war. For them religion comes against freedom, human rights and tolerance. In their opinion “Muslims perpetrate most of today’s terror, so most terror must be motivated by Islam. Indoctrination and madrassas, mosques and terror cells manufacture suicide bombers. Terrorists justify their violence with the language of Islam” 3 The second group claims that religions are the foundation of freedom, human rights and tolerance. According to them religions have at their core a philosophy of peace and they are the guarantor of human rights.

1 Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Collaborated by Alexander Fraser, Oxford 1894, p. 325. 2 Selçuk Mualla, “Din E÷itimi Özgürleútiren Bir Süreç Olabilir mi?”, (Can Education of Religion Be a Process of Freedom?), øslamiyat, c.1, 1, s. 73-87 (1998), Bilington, Ray, Living Philosophy, An Introduction to Moral Thought, Routledge, Second Edition, 1995, 390, 396. 3 Institute of Technology of the Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for International Studies, April 2006, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Building web.mit.edu/cis/acw.html, continued on page 21. M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks 121

The last group will try to make a kind of reconciliation between the first two views. For them, theoretically, religions in themselves don’t support terror. However, their adherents who misunderstand the religious text could move them towards violence. The central point of my thesis is that, in order to overcome terrorism we have to put forward a true and an accurate understanding of religion. Only in this way can we attain excellence. It is important to make distinctions. First, we should judge religions by their most authentic examples rather than by their worst corruptions. Islam, for example, flourished from Spain to India and led the world in almost every area of human culture until the sixteenth century and later. Or to take another example, Gandhi represents Hindus better than some fanatics in Kashmir do.4 Purification of the mind from any internal or external prejudices5 is the unique solution of terrorism. Only within the context of extensive education can we overcome terrorism. Terrorism cannot be applied to a religion or to a nation, just as we can not talk about English or French terrorism. Terrorism is a disease and crime of humanity. It is an obvious error to think that another society can be our friends only if they conform to our acquired way of thinking. This is an uncivilized idea just as it is an unholy one. The Qur’an is very clear in this sense: “We have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and families that you may know each other.” (Hujurat 49: 13). In terms of the ethics of religion, a lifestyle that prevents man from being happy is unacceptable. An ideal religion envisages the happiness of man in both his internal and external life. It is not acceptable that an individual or a society coerces another individual or society into accepting a certain belief. The individual is well equipped with all his free will, judicial mind and mental abilities such that he can distinguish between what is decent and indecent. Submission of the individual should take place from the heart rather than by coercion. Religion does not tolerate coercion and a groundless pressure and submission based on this type of coercion. The Qur’an provides people with the freedom of believing or not believing: “You shall have your religion and I shall have my religion” (Qur’an,109-1-7). A kind of belief or worldview that aims at coercion and stereotyping does not fit with the Qur’an. According to the Qur’an, the prophets who are the teachers and messengers of religion cannot be coercive, repressive over people, nor can they act like security guards.6

4 Dan Clendenin, Religious Terror The Journey with Jesus: http://www.intervarsity.org/followingchrist/features/feature.phpid=1.9.2007 5 Smith, D. Anthony, The Concept of Social Change, A Critique of The Functionalist Theory of Social Change, Great Britain 1980 p. 45. 6 Al-Baqarah, 256. Al-Kahf, 29. 122 M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks

2. What Religion Really Says: Conflicts between the Theory and Practice

2.1. Theory

If we look at religious texts we can easily notice that the aim of religion is to produce peace and to remove violence from society.7 Islam in particular has taken its name from peace. What I am trying to demonstrate at this point is that Islam has at its base a foundation of peace and tolerance. In the Arabic language, the word Islam means “surrender, submission” and “peace”. Muslim means “one who surrenders to God and peace. One of God’s names in Islam is also peace, “as-selam”. A sincere Muslim lives in peace with himself and others. The Arabic name for God, “Allah”, refers to the same God worshiped by Jews and Christians. Islam recognizes the divine origins of the earlier Hebrew and Christian Scriptures and presents itself as a continuation of their tradition. The Qur’an draws on Biblical stories and repeats many of the Biblical themes. For me ignoring the Bible, at the same time could mean ignoring the Qur’an itself and the Ten Commandments. Islam’s main teaching is that there is only one all-powerful, all- knowing God, and this God created the universe. The unity of God means also unity of humanity in peace justice and brotherhood. According to both the Bible and the Qur’an, Jesus is the Word of God. Islam has three dimensions: belief, worship and ethics. Belief is a confession about the greatness of God. Belief in traditional Islamic theology means to approve and to confirm. “Believe in God, believe in angels, and believe in all of the Holy Books and the Messengers.” In short, a Muslim should respect, approve, confirm and follow all prophets and Holy Books. From this respect one Muslim cannot kill other People of the Book in the name of God. The teaching of Islam clearly forbids this.8 The philosophy of worship in every religion as well as in Islam may be regarded as “every good action in order to protect and develop the body, soul and spirit.” We can sum up these benefits as being peace in our inner world and peace in our external worlds. We all should aim at striving for a good, peaceful and modern world. Peace, friendship, and tolerance are precious, and are the sacred demands of a Holy God. Religions are for God, but God is not for religion. If we bear in mind this fact I think we can develop a more healthy society. Towards this end we can offer nine principles which will hopefully correct the deceived mind of the terrorist who aims to support himself by using the religious texts. A balanced and proper religious education will hopefully give a healthy and peaceful understanding of the intent of religion: 1. Anything which fails to comply with mental and psychological health is obviously not acceptable in terms of ethics of a religion of peace.

7 Durkheim Emile, 1976) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. London: George Allen and Unwin (originally published 1915, English translation 1915); James, William, The Variety of Religious Experience. New York: Collier Books, 1961; Newsman, William M, editor, The Social Meanings of Religion. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1974.: Tillich, Paul, The Dynamics of Faith. New York: Harper and Row (Torchbook), 1958. Eliade, Mircea, Patterns in Comparative Religion. Trans. by Rosemary Sheed. New York: The World Publishing Company (Meridian), 1963. 8 Hourani, George ‘Ethical Presuppositions of the Qu’ran’ Muslim World LXXI, (1980) p. 1-28. M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks 123

2. Religion does not consider people’s differences as factors to be used for division and disunity. It teaches co-existence in benevolence and goodness as the fundamental binding principle. 3. In terms of the ethics of religion as found in Qu’ran, religion never accepts coercion and intimidation. The use of free volition is a fundamental principle in the religion of Islam. Coercion and intimidation are not compatible with the ethics of religion. 4. Religion envisages human freedom within rational limits. Religion guarantees human freedom of thought. 5. Religion rejects overindulgence in any field, but particularly in regard to matters of faith and religion. 6. Religion offers the prospect of joy and peace to all living people. Any teaching which banishes people from living and working is not compatible with the principles of religion. 7. Religion offers a philosophy for people to live by. 8. Religion rejects exploitation by deception with the pretext of following God or religion or for any other cause. 9. Sincerity is a fundamental principle of religion. Ostentation is not compatible with the spirit of religion. Hypocrisy is something which is unacceptable for the ethics of religion.9

2.2. Practice

During the Christian medieval period, the Islamic World was in its cultural and political ascendancy, and was at the centre of theoretical and practical work in both science and philosophy. But, by the nineteenth century, a gap had opened between the Islamic world and the West. Everybody was searching for the reasons of this gap. There were many solutions. But most of them were ideological. The Ottoman State was the center of Islamic life. It was in decline. In that time we see three offered solutions which can be summed up as “Nationalism”, Pan-Islamism and Pro-Westernization. In the Islamic world the rebirth of the renaissance movement between 1850 and 1914 came into focus. Jamal al Din Afgani and Muhammad Abduh in Egypt during the Ottoman Empire both argued that Islam is inherently rational and need not be abandoned in the face of the encroachment of Western forms of scientific and cultural thought. Another modern thinker, Jabiri, suggests that a viable Muslim future can only come about through a deconstruction and critique of the reasons for the decline of the Muslim world. He criticized the dichotomy between the Islamists, who hark back to a Golden Age in the past, and the liberal pro-Westerners, who praise the principles of the European Renaissance from which colonialism originated. The solution he offers is the freeing of modern Muslim thought from both the language and the theological limitations of the past (Parwiz Morewedge, Oliver Leaman, Islamic Philosophy: Modern). Another modern Islamic thinker, Hasan Hanafi, presents a form of phenomenology in which he argues that a new concept of divine unity should be

9 Hourani,George ‘Ethical Presuppositions of the Qu’ran’ Muslim World LXXI, (1980) p.1-28. Saruhan, Müfit Selim, “Mental Roots Of Terror”, Religious Studies, and “Ethics of Religion”, 303-314 Ankara (2004) Attas, Naquip Muhammed, Prolegomena to Metaphysics of Islam, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, pp. 91-94; Encyclopedia of Islam, “Saade”, Vol. 8, p. 262; Akseki, A.H. øslam, Istanbul 1943, pp. 1-6. 124 M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks developed which will involve the principle of unity and equality for all people. He uses the language of liberation theology, which holds that revelation is adaptable to the language of each age. Modern Muslims should reinterpret revelation in modern language and in accordance with present demands; fossilized conservatism is a misinterpretation of the true dynamic and dialectical spirit of Islam. Fazlur Rahman (who was an eminent professor in Chicago) contends that Islamic conservatism contradicts the essence of Islam. Islam’s aims are economic reform and the establishment of a just social order. According to the Qur’an, he argues that moral and economic decline are related events. Therefore Islamic societies should turn away from petrified conservatism and educate their children in the new technologies. Islam should not be limited to communities of the faithful, but should seek a prominent place in the new ethical and social world order. Another movement in Islamic political philosophy depicts Muslims, not as the antagonists of western culture, but rather as being in the vanguard of the globalization of peace and social justice. The most popular thinker of this school in the USA is Malcolm X, who began his career as an isolationist minister for the Nation of Islam Movement. At first he used Islam to separate African- Americans from white people, but later he preached an internationalized Islam that reached beyond racial and national differences. An important African thinker Ali Mazrui believes that Muslims should see their religion in terms of “all is Godism” as a type of globalism.10 The lack of democracy in most Islamic countries leads to internal and external problems. Foreign countries interfere in their politics for economic and political reasons thus creating a group of people who consider themselves as the enemy of the West. In the very beginning of this anti-western attitude it can be observed that it is born out of nationalist feelings. Let me remind you of Christian Arabs in Israel who are taking sides with Muslim Arabs. It must be noted that at this point there are mutual misunderstandings. A so called Muslim terrorist may attack others in the name of God, but in fact he has political and nationalist demands rather than a religious base. On the other hand there is always one group in every occasion which tries to make a connection between these terrorist attacks and religion in order to increase chaos and anarchy among civilizations. They try to show religion as being diabolic instead of good. I would like to emphasize that if we want to reach a reasonable point we must keep ourselves from emotional approaches. Emotional approaches are represented in two forms. The first approach is a full defense of religion and the second one is full attack and accusation of religion. Both approaches and attitudes arise from an inability to, or ignorance of, distinguishing religion from traditional cultural and national motifs. It is true that we can observe so-called Muslims or Jews involved in terrorist activities. I know some will disagree with me but I argue that every terrorist who acts in the name of religion or God has a basic deficiency or lack of a healthy and true understanding of religion. Religion’s main aim is to achieve mercy and love to the health of its adherents. Terrorists may call themselves religious but we must not identify them with a religious

10 Merad, Ali. “Islah,” Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. iv (Leiden: Brill, 1978), pp.141, 167.;Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Oxford, 1962), pp.11,46.;A. Albert Kudsi Zadeh. Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, An Annotated Bibliography (Leiden, 1970), p. 80.;Kerr, M. Islamic Reform and the Political and Legal Theories of Abduh and R. Rida (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1966), p. 179.;Ikbal, Muhmmad. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Oxford, 1934), pp.89, 164;Schacth, J. The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1950), p.122;N, R. Keddie. An Islamic Response to Imperialis: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani (Berkeley, 1968). M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks 125 identification. For me this is also a precaution. As you know psychologists advise us not to publish or broadcast terrible pictures of terror victims in order not to encourage terror attacks. Likewise, not naming terrorists with religious affiliations will help to decrease such actions in the long term. Whatever value or identity we give to terrorists, they will try to misuse it.

3. Religion and Terror: The Conflict between Good and Evil

If for example we talk of a Swedish terrorist, he will use this nationality to his own advantage. In sum terror and terrorists have hidden motivations beyond their avowed religion or race.11 Just as Muslims are not terrorists, likewise Christians were not responsible for the Crusades. The excesses and the wrongful use of religion can frequently be observed particularly during the Middle Ages when greedy and despotic Popes instigated wars which were based primarily upon economic, political and different social factors between people of different creeds in the name of the Holy Catholic Church. However, it should be noted that true Christians opposed these crusades and it must also be remembered that the same despotic Popes who launched the crusades against the Muslims were also responsible for the murder of over millions during the Inquisition.12 The fact is that in the Bible, Christians cannot find any support or motivation for launching such crusades or inqusitions. Just the opposite is true. For example the Bible says, “For though we live in the world, we do not wage war as the world does.” (2 Corinthians 10.4) The fact is that the Bible itself is a treasure of peace. The Bible clearly says, “If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone.” (Romans 12.18). Just as no true God-fearing Christian would ever think of using the Bible as an excuse to attack others, so in like manner no true God-fearing Muslim should ever try to use the Qur’an to support attacking people of another creed or faith. Unfortunately however, history bears out that religion has often been misused for the selfish purposes of greedy men. Whenever the human mind is predisposed towards evil, self-deceived men can and do misuse religious texts for their own selfish purposes. For example, in Matthew 10:34 where Jesus talked about the fact that he had come to send a “sword”, he obviously was not advocating the use of the sword by his own disciples. In the passage it is clear that Jesus’ teachings would stir up hatred and enmity among those who listened to his message against his disciples and that this would result in the sword being used against them. However, for a person who has an evil heart, this passage can easily be misinterpreted to warrant such things as launching a crusade against Muslims. The problem is not with the text of the Bible, the problem is one of evil so-called religious men who misuse and misinterpret the Bible for their own selfish ambition. Considering the terrorist attacks by so-called Muslims lately, we can easily say they have economics, politics and social gain as their primary focus rather than religion. They misuse religion to find support for their ideals. But any true Muslim or believer cannot feel sympathy towards a murderer. Religion has nothing to do with terrorism.

11 Hoffer Eric, The True Believer: Thoughts on The Nature of Mass Movements N.Y, 1951 and 2002. 12 Thomas F Madden A Concise History of the Crusades (Lanham:Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999) 8; Crusades in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966, Vol. IV, p. 508. 126 M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks

A terrorist is a person who tries to misuse religion. Mental prejudice and a fundamental lack of knowledge occupy the personalities of these individuals and their ability to judge. It should be noted that the actions of an individual or a small group do not represent the beliefs of a particular religion, nor is that religion responsible for such actions. Rather, such inhumane actions clearly contradict the teachings of Islam—just as the bombing at Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh and the killings that occurred at the Ibrahim Mosque, Hebron, by Dr. Baruch Goldstein clearly contradict the teachings of Christianity and Judaism, respectively. About Sikhism (the assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Beant Singh); and Buddhism (Aum Shinrikyo and the Tokyo subway gas attack), one can say the same.13 Let me remind you that the Catholic children entering the Holy Cross Primary School in Belfast in recent years, passing through lines of Protestants shouting abuse and spitting, certainly knew the meaning of terror. The association between Islam and terror is documented almost daily on the media. In the Middle East, Jewish terror is exercised upon Palestinians and Muslim terror on Israelis. In the Punjab we see several groups of Sikhs using terror to advance their religious and political ideas. Even Buddhism rightly associated with peace and compassion is not without its terrorist movements, as the poisonous gas attack some years ago upon the Tokyo subway reminds us. Particularly horrific are the murderous attacks against places of worship – Christian worshippers are attacked in Pakistan, Muslims in prayer in the shrine of Abraham in Hebron are gunned down by a Jewish fanatic. Women and children are slaughtered in an attack upon a Hindu temple in Gujarat. A funeral in a Catholic church in northern Ireland is violated by Protestant extremists. We cannot consider that all members of the IRA and the Basque liberation movement are religious. There is political terror but it is noticeable that the number and the proportion of acts of terror and terrorist groups explicitly associated with religion has increased dramatically since about 1980. Since terrorism is not confined to any one religion but appears to be a cross-religious phenomenon, we can inquire as to whether there are any characteristics of religion which might produce and justify terror. The religion itself is pure and holy; the terrorists are cynically using religion as a pretext for their atrocities, or are totally misguided about the character of the faith.14

4. Suicide Attacks: What Is the Source of This Violence?

There is no religious or Islamic justification for suicide attacks. In fact we must approach this issue by openly saying that every killing is unacceptable. Terrorism has no religion. The terrorists have no concern with the religious ascriptions of their targets. Their sole interest is to spread terror. Their actions are not representative of their creed. God begins to deal with the issue of terrorism by teaching Muslims never to become terrorists in the first place. According to the Qur’an, persecution or making people constantly fear for their lives, is much worse than killing—‘There shall be no

13 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, University of California Press 2000. 14 Religion and Terror in the Modern World: The Educational Responsibility of the Church summary of the Church and School Lecture 2002 by Professor John Hull. The lecture was sponsored by the Church of Scotland Committee on Education and given at Pollock Halls, University of Edinburgh on Thursday 12th September, 2002; Trotsky, L.D. Terrorism and Communism, Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1961, p. 3, 35; Long David E., The Anatomy of Terrorism, The Free Press, N.Y,1990 p.18. M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks 127 compulsion in religion’, that is to say that no one has the right to force others to comply with their demands or to compel others to follow their line of thinking. We need to give an excellent moral upbringing to all people so that they become upright, just, moral, kind and loving people, thereby ensuring that they never disrupt the peace of others.15 In the light of these and other Islamic texts, the act of inciting terror in the hearts of defenseless civilians, destruction of buildings and properties, the bombing and maiming of innocent men, women, and children are all forbidden and detestable acts according to all religion and Islam. The actions of an individual or a small group do not represent the beliefs of a particular religion, nor is that religion responsible for such actions. Rather, such inhumane actions clearly contradict the teachings of Islam. Credible researchers agree that “religion” neither causes nor explains suicide attacks. First, not all suicide terrorists are religious. In fact, Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have committed more suicide attacks since the 1980s than any other group. Second, when we look closely at the context in which suicide attacks take place, there are always particular grievances or perceived grievances in play that also explain the decision to use the tactic. For example, Hamas, an Islamist Palestinian group, has a clearly Islamic identity. But their goal, which is to establish an Islamist state in the West Bank and Gaza, cannot be divorced from the political conflict between Israel and Palestine from which it springs.16 Jihad literally means “holy struggle”. Jihad in Islam means struggle, not terrorism. It means to fight only when being persecuted or when lands are threatened or under occupation. But this struggle should be with our bad emotions. In fact Jihad means ethical purification. The Prophet Muhammad considered the war with our soul and bad features as the great jihad. Killing people cannot be considered a holy war. The blood of humans is holy and sacred. One of the widely-known principles of Islam is expressed as follows in the Qur’an: “...whoever kills a soul he is regarded as if he kills the whole of mankind and whoever saves a life he is regarded as if he saves the lives of all mankind...” (Al-Maida: 5:32). At this stage it is necessary to emphasize that any kind of violence is not acceptable. Lately we see suicide attacks from some terrorist groups. Suicide is forbidden. “O ye who believe! Do not kill yourselves, for truly Allah has been to you Most Merciful” (Qur’an 4:29-30). The taking of life is allowed only by way of justice (i.e. the death penalty for murder), but even then, forgiveness is better. “Nor take life—which Allah has made sacred—except for just cause ...” (17:33). Harming innocent bystanders, even in times of war, was forbidden by the Prophet Muhammad. This includes women, children, noncombatant bystanders, and even trees and crops. From these arguments it is clear that to refer to suicide bombers as martyrs is not acceptable nor is it reasonable. The act of inciting terror in the hearts of defenseless civilians, the destruction of buildings and properties, the bombing and maiming of innocent men, women, and children are all forbidden and detestable acts according to all religion and Islam.

15 Prof. Dr. Ali Bardako÷lu at the Conference on Democracy and Global Security organized by the Turkish National Police in Istanbul on June 9-11, 2005. 16 Amy Zalman , Is Suicide Terrorism Religiously Motivated? http://terrorism.about.com/od/causes/f/SuicideBombFAQ.htm, 9.26.2007. 128 M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks

Robert Pape of the University of Chicago has compiled the first complete database, reflecting a careful examination of every documented case of suicide bombing from 1980-2003. Pape’s conclusions are contained in his book, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Pape argues that the news reports about suicide terrorism are profoundly misleading. “There is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions,” Pape reports. After studying 315 suicide attacks carried out over the last two decades, the political science professor concludes that suicide bombers’ actions stem from political conflict, not religion.17 In Ankara University, where I come from, at the Faculty of Divinity we teach a culture of peace and reconciliation with other creeds. We also teach respect and love for all different religions. Our students are being prepared to the tomorrow’s world as volunteers of peace and brotherhood under the wise guidance of instructors. Theology students, after their graduations, will take part in daily religious life of our country with these motivations. Under the influence of these peaceful minds they will be religious guides of our country. Let me remind you that the Turkish experience of religion also has an influential role in other Muslim societies. At this point once again I want to emphasize the vital role of education especially in the field of religion. The great and eminent Turkish leader Kemal Atatürk touched on this point by saying “peace at home and peace abroad.”

Conclusion

Religion in general and Islam in particular do have as their aim the goal of living together in a world which is governed by peace. In order to comprehend the fundamental nature of terror we have to take a look at the issue of human nature. Any lasting results in the war against terror will require us to reach deep into the of the mind of the terrorist. Only in this way will get any significant or long-term results. The central point of my thesis is that, in order to overcome terrorism, we have to put forward a true and an accurate understanding of religion. Only in this way can we attain Excellence.

References

KORAN HOLY BIBLE Akseki, A. H., øslam, Istanbul 1943, Attas, Naquip Muhammed, Prolegomona to Metaphysics of Islam, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, Albert Kudsi Zadeh. Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, An Annotated Bibliography (Leiden, 1970), Ali Bardako÷lu, at the Conference on Democracy and Global Security organized by the Turkish National Police in Istanbul on June 9-11, 2005, Amy Zalman, Is Suicide Terrorism Religiously Motivated? http://terrorism.about.com/od/causes/f/SuicideBombFAQ.htm, 9.26.2007 Bilington, Ray, Living Philosophy, An Introduction to Moral Thought, Routledge, Second Edition, 1995, Crusades in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966, Vol. IV, Dan Clendenin, Religious Terror the Journey with Jesus:

17 Pape, Robert (2005). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. M.S. Saruhan / Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks 129

http://www.intervarsity.org/followingchrist/features/feature.php?id=1,9.2007, Durkheim Emile, 1976) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. London: George Allen and Unwin (originally published 1915, English translation 1915), Eliade, Mircea, Patterns in Comparative Religion. Trans. By Rosemary Sheed. New York: The World Publishing Company (Meridian), 1963, Encyclopedia of Islam, “Saade”, Vol. 8, p. 262; Hoffer Eric, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements N.Y., 1951 and 2002, Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Oxford, 1962), Hourani,George ‘Ethical Presuppositions of the Qu’ran’ Muslim World LXXI, (1980), 1-28; Ikbal, Muhmmad. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Oxford, 1934), Institute of Technology of the Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for International Studies, April 2006, Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Building web.mit.edu/cis/acw.htmlcontinued on page 21. James, William, The Variety of Religious Experience. New York: Collier Books, 1961, Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, University of California Press, 2000, Keddie, N. R., An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani (Berkeley, 1968), Kerr, M. Islamic Reform and the Political and Legal Theories of Abduh and R. Rida (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1966), Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Collaborated by Alexander Fraser, Oxford 1894, Long David E.The Anatomy of Terrorism, The Free Pres, N.Y,1990 Madden, Thomas F, A Concise History of the Crusades (Lanham:Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999), Merad, Ali. “Islah,” Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. iv (Leiden: Brill, 1978), pp. 141, 167, Newsman, William M, editor, The Social Meanings of Religion. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1974, Pape, Robert (2005). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Religion and Terror in the Modern World: The Educational Responsibility of the Church, summary of the Church and School Lecture 2002 by Professor John Hull. The lecture was sponsored by the Church of Scotland Committee on Education and given at Pollock Halls, University of Edinburgh on Thursday 12th September, 2002, Selçuk Mualla, “Din E÷itimi Özgürleútiren Bir Süreç Olabilir mi?” (Can Education of Religion Be a Process of Freedom?) øslamiyat, c.1, 1, p. 73-87 (1998), Saruhan, Müfit Selim, “Mental Roots Of Terror,” Religious Studies, Ankara (2004), Schacht, J. The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1950), Smith, D. Anthony, The Concept of Social Change, A Critique of The Functionalist Theory of Social Change, Great Britain 1980, Tillich, Paul, The Dynamics of Faith. New York: Harper and Row (Torchbook), 1958, Trotsky, L. D. Terrorism and Communism, Michigan Presse, Ana, Arbor, 1961. This page intentionally left blank Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 131 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-131 Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter-Terrorism and Crises

Col. Osman AYTAÇ Instructor, COE–DAT, Ankara

Abstract. One of the best tools available to policy-makers to help manage armed forces during a crisis is a set of orders known as Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE are guidelines specifying under what conditions or circumstances force may be used to satisfy political and/or military demands. Tension inescapably exits in a system that subordinates armed forces under civilian control while retaining military command. Managing this tension by delineating the boundaries of military action in support of political objectives is another major role of ROE. There are vital links between the strategic and tactical levels of conflict. The strongest of these links are often ROE. They enable mission accomplishment, force protection, and compliance with law and policy. ROE are a kind of tool for politicians to control the level of “use of force” by the military. ROE are also used by military commanders to command and control their units in order to fulfill the requirements of their mission accomplishment. The ROE for counter-terrorist operations are different to war ROE in terms of applicable law and the political desire, which must avoid being provocative in order to minimize the possibility of escalating the political situation.

Keywords. Rules of Engagement, military operations other than war, crisis, Law of Armed Conflict, mission accomplishment, force protection.

General Introduction to ROE

Definitions

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are concerned with the application of military doctrine. A commander in the field may know the doctrine, but he also needs to know immediately (1) the rules that govern how that doctrine is applied in each of the range of possible situations with which he may be faced, and in particular (2) what may trigger a change such that a different set of rules apply. The authorities therefore must decide the kind of ROE to issue to their commanders. In NATO member states, and countries with similar systems, those involved in issuing ROE are: government ministers, who give general guidance to commanders, and commanders, who may choose to re-write these rules with more specific details before issuing them to their troops. The MC 362-1 NATO ROE Document officially defines ROE as: “Directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, degree and 132 O. Aytaç / Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter-Terrorism and Crises manner in which force or actions which might be provocative may or may not be applied.”1 The US Department of Defense officially defines ROE as: “Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.”2 ROE define the degree and the manner of application of force. When force is applied, its extent is clearly defined. The manner in which it is applied, involving consideration of what will give offense, etc., is also important. ROE allow application of force to be controlled, and are distinct from orders about specific tasks, as they are not a means of issuing tactical instructions. In other words, effective ROE do not assign specific tasks or drive specific tactical solutions; they allow a commander to convey quickly and clearly to subordinate units a desired posture regarding the use of force. Thus, for example, ROE do not determine measures for determining the type of fire when an enemy is engaged, as fire control is a tactical consideration. Although ROE are parameters detailing often tight constraints, they do not have the force of law. It remains the commander’s responsibility in all circumstances to ensure that a given action is lawful. Effective ROE comply with domestic and international law, including the body of international law pertaining to armed conflict. ROE never justify illegal actions. In all situations, soldiers and commanders use force that is necessary and proportional.

General Character of ROE

The Rules of Engagement must clarify four issues: x When military force may be used, x Where military force may be used, x Against whom force should be used in the circumstances described above, x How military force should be used to achieve the desired ends.3 ROE are usually written in the form of prohibitions or permissions. Prohibitions set out certain actions which troops are forbidden to take. Permissions set out actions which may be taken. In this case the commander may judge whether the permitted actions are ‘necessary or desirable’ for carrying out the troops’ tasks. No more force than is necessary and reasonable is to be applied. In practice these limits will be delivered to the troops as follows: (1) Actions a soldier may take without consulting a higher authority, unless explicitly forbidden (sometimes called “command by negation”), and (2) actions that may only be taken if explicitly ordered by a higher authority (sometimes called “positive command”). In addition to a typically large set of standing orders, military personnel will be given additional ROE before performing any mission or military operation. These can cover circumstances such as how to retaliate after an attack, how to treat captured targets, which territories the soldier is bound to fight in, and how the force should be

1 MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement Document. 2 USDOD.DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: NATO Only Terms. 3 Sagan, Scott D., Rules of Engagement, pp 443-470 in : George, A.; Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. O. Aytaç / Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter-Terrorism and Crises 133 applied during the operation. The ROE must evolve with mission requirements and respond to the realities of the threat. The style of the instructions must be simple to understand and in keeping with established standards. Because of their importance, they should ideally be prepared during the planning process, and not left to just before the operation. If possible, all eventualities must be covered.

Purposes of ROE

These types of document are part of modern warfare, in which officers must always be aware of the legal and diplomatic dimensions of their orders, which will be followed closely, including in the press. Commanders need this tool to shape and control the actions of their soldiers. Military actions must now be controlled in three dimensions: the political, the legal, and the military. A political consideration, for example, would include the rule that, in normal circumstances, an operation must stay within the boundaries of the Area of Operation. An example of a rule determined by law would be the forbidding of firing into hospitals, churches, schools, museums, and any other historical or cultural sites, except in self-defense. 4 Military considerations determine, for example, the rule frequently invoked in the field that engaging with the target should be preceded by observed indirect fire. On the one hand, the purposes of ROE may contradict each other; typically, political considerations inhibit the accomplishment of tactical military goals, which may lead to complaints from the troops. On the other hand, there are many circumstances in which they coincide. For example, policy decisions and domestic and international law may support each other.

ROE Failures: Too Restrictive or Too Excessive

In preparing ROE before an engagement, two contrasting aims must be kept reconciled: force must be applied effectively so that the aims of the mission can be accomplished, but the force must not be excessive. If this balance is not achieved, and not enough force is permitted by the ROE, the military mission will not be accomplished. This kind of failure may well be the result of disputes and insufficient co-operation between military and political leaders. It is often the political decision-makers, aware of the sensitivities of other politicians, who argue that the army act within narrow limits. An example of this first (1st) kind of error was the United Nations Mission’s failure in Rwanda (UNAMIR). A mission made up of United Nations soldiers was in the country from 1993 to 1996 with the task of implementing the Arusha Accords, which were a peace agreement between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. However, the UNAMIR soldiers could do little when hostilities broke out owing the severe limitations in the ROE set by the UN agreement. The UN troops were under fire for two days, after which they were forced to hand over their weapons to rebel forces. The United Nations

4 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (14 May 1954), Chapter 1; Art. 2-4 ; see especially: Chapter 2, Art. 8. 134 O. Aytaç / Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter-Terrorism and Crises forces, small in number and hampered by strict ROE, could not prevent the Rwandan genocide which resulted. Some force providing countries withdrew their troops in order to avoid further international embarrassment. Sagan provides a penetrating analysis of this topic.5 The UN Peacekeeper’s ROE during the Rwandan Genocide was a tragic example of too restrictive ROE.6 Excessive use of force is the second (2nd) common error with ROE. Here, loose rules facilitate an escalation in the conflict. Although the force is tactically effective, it in fact negates the political objectives that the use of force was meant to achieve. This is the “escalatory” error.

Types of ROE

Distribution of ROE: Force-wide, Operational or Tactical

There are three levels of ROE for land forces: 1. Force-wide guidance, or “Strategic ROE”, includes: mandate limitations, operational boundaries, force size, structure, composition and capabilities. A NATO or national level ROE may be a good example of these widely-distributed rules. 2. Guidance for commanders, or “Operational ROE”, includes: the “choice of weapons” to be deployed, and the reaction profile. 3. Commander’s specific guidance to soldiers, or “Tactical ROE”, includes: “choice of weapon/ammunition type to be used” (what kind of fire support, classic or precise systems), “weapon systems readiness” (weapons charged or uncharged/ammo in magazine or in weapon) and “orders for opening fire”. At this level the so-called “soldier’s card” would be a good example.7

Types of Rule in ROE

The rules can be divided into many different types, according to the specific kinds of judgments which commanders must make in various situations: Type I: Hostility Criteria. This category of ROE sets out the objective criteria and triggers to determine whether a possible enemy has hostile intent. They make clear whether firing is permitted even when the enemy has not yet engaged. Type II: Scale of Force. Here the emphasis is on a graduated use of force when the situation is not clear. This ranges from verbal warnings, warning shots, up to deadly force. This category also sets out the situations in which pursuit is permitted. This often applies to public order disturbances. Type III: Protection of Property. Clearly, force may be used in self-defense. It may also be used to defend people. However, this category of ROE sets out what kinds of property may also be defended with force. Also, it sets out what may be done about destruction or looting, and how much force may be used in preventing criminals’ escape.

5 Sagan, Scott D., Rules of Engagement, pp 443-470, in :George, Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. 6 See: www.wisegeek.com/what-are -the-rules-of-engagement.htm. 7 NATO 362-1 Rules of Engagement Document. O. Aytaç / Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter-Terrorism and Crises 135

Type IV: Weapons Control Status. These rules, which also apply to air defense, set out situations in which fire-power can be used. Type V: Arming Orders. These rules establish which troops are armed and how heavily. The type of ammunition is also specified. The commands for loading of firearms, and who gives them, are mentioned. Type VI: Approval to Use weapons Systems. These rules designate the level of command at which approval for use of particular weapons must be given. The use of certain weapons may be forbidden by rules of this type. Type VII: Eyes on Target. This is a rule which requires a check to be made that not just one soldier or piece of equipment has observed a target which will be fired upon. Type VIII: Territorial or Geographic Restraints. This category of ROE set out the geographical limits in which the enemy may be engaged. It uses a system of zoning. Type IX: Restrictions on Manpower. Here what is important is the number of troops which can be introduced into which areas of activity. Type X: Restrictions on Point targets and Means of Warfare. Here rules specify certain people or places which may not be engaged.8

The Commander’s Responsibilities

The commander is the person mainly responsible for establishing the ROE. They must ensure that operational aims are served by the ROE, and they must draw on the assistance of legal advisers in interpreting the guidelines provided by headquarters in the light of domestic and international law. They draft and distribute the ROE. In addition, they must provide training for their officers and troops in using the rules. Interpret: Interpreting the ROE for the theater of operations is a difficult task, involving detailed political, legal, and military awareness. Legal support will provide opinions regarding the legal interpretation of general guidelines in detailed situations in the field. Ultimately the responsibility for uniting the political aims, the military objectives and the law will lie with the commander. Draft: The commander who is drafting the ROE may be from the highest ranks, for example the Land Forces Commander. These ROE are then issued to all forces under that senior commander, and remain unchanged. This method is called “top- driven” ROE. In practice the preference is for “top-fed” ROE, however. This is when the highest ranks give general rules, but the drafting is done by the subordinate commanders. Top-fed ROE have the advantage that they delegate responsibility, and also the subordinate commanders are able to tailor the ROE more to specific situations encountered in the field. In practice both top-driven and top-fed ROE are used. It is important that the lower rank commanders, at theater or brigade level, are aware of the following general advice when drafting ROE: METT-TC summarizes the factors to consider. This is a mnemonic for “mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civilian considerations” (whether the action will affect civilians and how). Secondly, if the ROE guidelines he/she has received contain elements which will not permit the mission to be accomplished, these problems must be referred back to headquarters. The commander deputed to draft the ROE should

8 www.globalsecurity.org/military/policy/army/fm/27-100/chap8.htm 136 O. Aytaç / Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter-Terrorism and Crises neither alter the guidelines, nor try to accomplish a mission when he/she is not satisfied that the ROE will permit success. Avoid: There are various errors to avoid when drafting ROE. Avoid simple restatements: ROE produced at this level should not repeat the general statements of strategy and doctrine. ROE should not be used as the means to state strategy or doctrine. Avoid restating the law of war and the tactics. Avoid safety-related restrictions. Avoid excessively qualified language. ROE must be readily understandable. Training: Training should be provided to reinforce ROE, and this must include exercises. Modern warfare is conducted in a glare of publicity, so maximum efforts must be made to ensure that each soldier understands and acts within the limits of the ROE provided. The best way to teach ROE is to rehearse real-life situations. Missions like peace-keeping and disaster relief will require great professionalism and restraint to avoid errors which may undermine the whole effort.

Counter Terrorism and Crises:

In recent years, because of the change in the global security threat assessment, 21st century’s armed forces are tasked to perform their missions in a range from peacekeeping operations to combating terrorism which are completely different to classical warfare. The concept and doctrine for the armed forces have been also changed in order for them to adapt themselves to the new threat. Meanwhile, the roles of military forces have expanded, beyond traditional war fighting, to encompass a range of tasks related to different kinds of crisis. As one of the basic tools of modern armed forces, the concept of ROE has also changed, and new approaches are needed to fulfill the appropriate requirements for the new types of operation. The operations that involve the use of military capabilities in a range of military operations short of war are called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations, and often the military mat not be the primary player. More restrictive ROE and a hierarchy of national objectives are followed. There are many types of MOOTW, several having multiple components: arms control, combating terrorism, enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, national assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids. Almost all of them can be defined as crisis situations. The ROE which are suitable for those crisis situations are different to wartime ROE, specifically in terms of the applicable law. In wartime ROE, as discussed above, the applicable law in addition to domestic law is the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and the other instruments of international law. In crisis situations, depending on the area of operation (national territory/external theaters), the applicable law may vary. In domestic terrorist-based crisis LOAC is not applicable but the domestic law of that state is applicable. Legal and operational tools, and the rules of engagement cannot, be enforced over a national territory in the same way they can in external theaters, as the legal framework is different. There are two unique aspects of the crisis theater: the primacy of political objectives and the legal complexity. O. Aytaç / Developing Rules of Engagement for Counter-Terrorism and Crises 137

Lead Role for Politicians

Crisis situations will be determined by over-arching political objectives, whether strategic or tactical. Although frequently a source of difficulty and tension in the army, it is necessary that political directives have the ultimate authority. Politicians will usually have the lead role, and ROE will have great importance because the fundamental goals of a mission can easily be undermined by military errors. Army commanders will have to have a detailed understanding of the political considerations, and an awareness of local sensitivities. In crisis situations it is often the lower-ranking commanders who will be expected to feed information about local reactions to headquarters, and junior commanders may also be asked to draft the ROE.

Specific Difficulties

Missions in crisis situations are always legally complex. Generally the intervention will be backed by international agreements, and it will be expected that internationally- agreed conditions as well as international and domestic laws will apply. It is notoriously difficult to develop ROE which allow the military to accomplish missions in legally complex situations, where the rights of contending groups must be respected. In addition, there are several unique ROE concerns in crisis situations: “ROE in crisis are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Restrained, judicious use of force is necessary; excessive force undermines the legitimacy of the operation and jeopardizes political objectives. During a crisis, ROE not only provide for self-defense, but prevent unauthorized and uncontrolled escalation, while simultaneously achieving national objectives. Crisis ROE considerations may include balancing force protection and harm to innocent civilians or non-military areas, balancing mission accomplishment with political considerations, protecting evacuees while not having the authority to preempt hostile actions by proactive military measures, enabling soldiers to properly balance initiative and restraint, determining the extent to which soldiers mat protect host nation or third nation civilians. In multinational operations, developing ROE acceptable to all troop contributing nations is important. Being responsive to changing ROE requirements is also important.”9

9 www.globalsecurity.org/military/polcy/fm/27-100/chap6.htm This page intentionally left blank Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 139 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-139 Role of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union in Countering Terrorism

Lt.-Col. Ugur ERSEN Instructor, COE–DAT, Ankara

Abstract. The United Nations (UN) is the most significant organization in the fight against terrorism. This paper details the legal basis for the UN’s counter- terrorism (CT) role, quoting both the UN Charter and relevant resolutions. Since 2005 the UN has a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), heading up coordination work with numerous international bodies. The following year saw the adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Also in the wake of 9/11, but also of the Madrid and London bombings, the European Union (EU) has taken an active role. The EU Action Plan to Fight against Terrorism dates from 21 September 2001. In 2005 The EU committed itself to a CT Strategy, covering four strands of work: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. The third organization examined in this chapter is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which endorsed a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism at the 2002 Prague Summit. Here again there are four roles: anti- terrorism, consequence management, CT, and military cooperation. The Alliance has recently developed a NATO Response Force, with over 20,000 troops. There follow details of NATO operations relating to CT. In conclusion, cooperation among UN, EU, NATO and others should be enhanced, since it is necessary to take an integrated approach to CT.

1. Introduction

Terrorism has been discussed for a long time. However, the international community has not agreed on a specific definition. Let us, however, take the common elements of existing notions and try to give a working definition for terrorism. Terrorism can be defined as: “The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political or ideological objective.” The UN, EU and NATO use different strategies and approaches for countering terrorism, however, the main objective is similar for all these organizations. These strategies and approaches will be examined throughout this chapter. 140 U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism

2. The Role of the United Nations in Countering Terrorism1 a. Legal Basis2

The UN Charter, dated 26 June 1945, constitutes the legal basis of the activities of countering terrorism. In the preamble, nations declared their determination to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security. International peace and security were promoted and emphasized in the first and second articles. (1) Article 1 (Paragraph 1): The purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. (2) Article 2 (Paragraph 5): All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. b. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)

(1) The UN Charter has been used as a tool to combat terrorism for a long time, but as the years passed terrorism has become more complicated to deal with and the requirement for additional tools have become pressing. (2) In the light of the requirement for additional efforts to counter terrorism and to ensure coordinated and coherent efforts across the UN system, the Secretary-General established the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force in July 2005. The CTITF includes representatives from 24 different UN organizations. (3) The members of the Task Force have combined efforts to assist Member States in implementing the global counter-terrorism strategy. Their efforts range from improving UN coordination in planning the response to a terrorist attack to assisting countries in strengthening domestic legislation. (4) The Task Force is currently developing cooperation with a number of regional and sub-regional organizations to promote counter-terrorism efforts. The most significant ones are listed below: 1. Organization of Islamic Conference, 2. Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 3. European Union, 4. Council of Europe, 5. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. c. UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

(1) A number of programmes, offices and agencies of the United Nations system have been engaged in specific operational actions against terrorism. To consolidate and

1 Fact Sheet, UN Action to Counter Terrorism, dated May 2007. 2 UN Charter, dated 26 June 1945. U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism 141 enhance these activities, Member States opened a new phase in their counter-terrorism efforts by agreeing on a global strategy against terrorism. (2) The strategy, adopted in 2006 marks the first time that countries around the world agree to a common strategic approach to fight terrorism. (3) Strategy spells out strict measures for Member States to take individually as well as collectively. (4) The strategy forms a basis for a concrete plan of action: To address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; to prevent and combat terrorism; to take measures to build state capacity to fight terrorism; and to ensure the respect of human rights while countering terrorism. (5) The strategy clearly states that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group. Important initiatives and aspects highlighted in the strategy include: g. No justification for terrorism, 6. Promotion of religious and ethnic tolerance, 7. Addressing the root causes of terrorism, 8. Preventing the financing of terrorism, 9. Greater emphasis on the protection of soft targets. (6) The five key pillars of the strategy are: 1. Dissuade disaffected groups, 10. Deny terrorists access to weapons, 11. Deter States from supporting terrorist groups, 12. Develop State capacity, 13. Defend Human Rights. (7) Actions taken to address the conditions conductive to the spread of terrorism: 14. The Department of Political Affairs has helped to facilitate peace agreements in 13 conflicts around the world since 2001. 15. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization promotes dialogue among civilizations, cultures and peoples, and fosters quality education through strengthening cooperation and training in science. 16. The Department of Public Information works with media, educational institutions, non-governmental organizations and civil society to promote respect, tolerance and cultural diversity. It also organizes seminars for this purpose. (8) Actions taken to prevent and combat terrorism: a) Sixteen universal instruments and protocols have been developed and adopted at the United Nations that have criminalized specific acts of terrorism including hijacking, hostage-taking and nuclear terrorism. 17. The Monitoring Team pursued travel bans and financial sanctions against terrorist organizations. 18. The International Atomic Energy Agency has implemented more than 100 evaluation missions, and as a result, 38 high-activity radioactive sources were identified and secured. 19. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has inspected 70,000 tons of chemical agent. So far, more than half of the former chemical weapons production facilities in the world have been either completely destroyed or converted for peaceful purposes. 20. Military and civilian police components of United Nations peacekeeping department have provided a more secure environment in 16 conflict zones all 142 U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism

over the world in the last five years. This has helped to deny terrorists opportunities to recruit and to conduct their operations.

Figure 1. Missions administered by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

(9) Actions taken to strengthen Nations’ individual and collective capacity: 1. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has assisted 112 countries in implementing the universal instruments related to the prevention of international terrorism. 2. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides training to national police on criminal matters including kidnapping, information-gathering, hostage-taking, close protection, and the investigation of bombings. 3. Other UN Organizations take several measures in their area of responsibility as well. (10) Actions taken to protect human rights and uphold the rule of law while combating terrorism: a) The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights provides assistance and advice to Member States on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. 4. The Office of Legal Affairs develops guidelines for States on fair and clear procedures for placing and removing individuals and entities on UN sanctions lists. 5. The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute has an important role with its efforts in promoting the work of the Task Force. U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism 143 c. UN Resolutions on Countering Terrorism

The United Nations took several measures to prevent and combat terrorism that threatens the peace and security environment globally. Accordingly, several resolutions have been adopted by the UN to support the efforts of nations and international organizations in countering terrorism. (1) Resolution 1368: Adopted by the Security Council (SC) at its 4370th meeting, on 12 September 2001. 1. Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security; 2. Expresses the SC’s readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. (2) Resolution 1373: Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001. 3. Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism, calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism, recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism; 4. To prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists; Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information; Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens; Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings; Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents. (3) Resolution 1455: Adopted by the Security Council at its 4686th meeting, on 17 January 2003. a) Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts; 144 U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism

5. Reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of all forms of terrorism and terrorist acts as noted in resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, 1438 (2002) of 14 October 2002, 1440 (2002) of 24 October 2002, and 1450 (2002) of 13 December 2002; 6. Reaffirming that acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to international peace and security. (4) Resolution 1526: Adopted by the Security Council at its 4908th meeting, on 30 January 2004. 1. Underlining the obligation placed upon all Member States to implement, in full, resolution 1373 (2001), including with regard to any member of the Taliban and the Al-Qaida organization, and any individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban and the Al-Qaida organization, who have participated in the financing, planning, facilitating and preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts, as well as to facilitate the implementation of counterterrorism obligations in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions; 2. Reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of all forms of terrorism and terrorist acts; 3. Calls upon States to move vigorously and decisively to cut the flows of funds and other financial assets and economic resources to individuals and entities associated with the Al-Qaida organization, Usama bin Laden and/or the Taliban, taking into account, as appropriate, international codes and standards for combating the financing of terrorism, including those designed to prevent the abuse of non-profit organizations and informal/alternative remittance systems; 4. Requests the Secretary-General, upon adoption of this resolution and acting in close consultation with the Committee, to appoint, consistent with United Nations rules and procedures, no more than eight members, including a coordinator, of the Monitoring Team, who demonstrate one or more of the following areas of expertise related to activities of the Al-Qaida organization and/or the Taliban, including: counter-terrorism and related legislation; financing of terrorism and international financial transactions, including technical banking expertise; alternative remittance systems, charities, and use of couriers; border enforcement, including port security; arms embargoes and export controls; and drug trafficking. (5) Resolution 1617: Adopted by the Security Council at its 5244th meeting, on 29 July 2005. 5. Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed; and reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of Al- Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban—and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities—for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the death of innocent civilians and other victims, destruction of property and greatly undermining stability; 6. Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort; U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism 145

7. Emphasizing the obligation placed upon all Member States to implement, in full, resolution 1373 (2001), including with regard to the Taliban or Al-Qaida, and any individuals, groups, undertakings or entities associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, who have participated in financing, planning, facilitating, recruiting for, preparing, perpetrating, or otherwise supporting terrorist activities or acts, as well as to facilitate the implementation of counter- terrorism obligations in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. (6) Resolution 1618: Adopted by the Security Council at its 5246th meeting, on 04 August 2005. a) Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts; 8. Reaffirms the obligations of Member States under resolutions 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000, 1390 (2002) of 16 January 2002,1455 (2003) of 17 January 2003,1526 (2004) of 30 January 2004, and 1617 (2005) of 29 July 2005 and other relevant international obligations with respect, inter alia, to terrorist activities in and from Iraq or against its citizens, and specifically strongly urges Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to and from Iraq, arms for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists, and re-emphasizes the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries in the region, particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard; 9. Expresses its utmost determination to combat terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The Role of the European Union in Countering Terrorism3 a. The EU Action Plan to Fight against Terrorism (21 Sept 2001)

(1) The EU has intensified its actions for combating terrorism since 9/11, and in particular since the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). On 21 September 2001, the European Council, adopted an action plan to fight against terrorism. On 3 October 2001, the European Commission proposed that the Member States should freeze all funds belonging to 27 organisations and individuals suspected of financing terrorist activities. On 12 December 2001, the Commission set up a group of Scientific Experts in the battle against biological and chemical terrorism. (2) In 2004, the EU supplemented the 2001 Action Plan against Terrorism and re- aligned it to pursue seven major objectives: 1. Reinforce international efforts to combat terrorism, 2. Reduce terrorists’ access to financial and economic resources, 3. Increase the capacity of the European institutions and Member States to investigate and prosecute, 4. Protect the security of international transport and set up effective systems of border controls,

3 European Council Secretariat Factsheet, dated 09 Mar 2007. 146 U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism

5. Strengthen the coordination between the Member States and thus the European Union’s capacity to prevent and deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack, 6. Identify the factors that contribute to the recruitment of terrorists, 7. Encourage third countries to engage more effectively in combating terrorism. b. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (30 Nov 2005)

(1) The European Union strengthened its commitment to fight against terrorism in 2005 in order to increase its internal security and to assist its international partners in this fight on a global scale. The European Commission has continued to play its part in delivering the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy. (2) Following proposals by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, the Council adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which commits the Union to combating terrorism globally while respecting human rights, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice. (3) The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy covers four strands of work: Prevention, Protection, Pursuit and Response. (4) The Cross-cutting contributions for these strands of work are strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European Cooperation, developing collective capability, and promoting International Partnership. c. Prevent

(1) The first objective of EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally. (2) Some of the specific actions performed on the first objective are listed below; 8. The Council has adopted a detailed action plan to combat radicalisation and recruitment (2005). 9. Implemented measures include initiatives to address radicalisation in prisons and to counter violent radicalisation through the Internet. 10. EU contributes to improving the security environment which influences the conditions for violent radicalisation in third countries. Examples include the Aceh operation (2006), the Rafah border monitoring mission (Gaza), and police support mission in Afghanistan (2007). d. Protect

(1) The second objective of the EU strategy is to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce vulnerabilities to attack, through improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure. (2) Some specific actions performed on the second objective are listed below; a) In order to improve Border Security, a directive to include biometric features in EU passports (2005) has been adopted and the FRONTEX agency (2005) has been established. 11. Measures to improve the security of transport include the adoption of the Ports Security Directive (2005) and the initiatives to improve the security at U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism 147

European airports (following the aborted attack on transatlantic aircraft in the UK (2006)). 12. A directive establishing a procedure for the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure has been put forward. e. Pursue

(1) The third objective of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to pursue and investigate terrorists across the borders and globally; to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and to bring terrorists to justice. (2) Some specific actions performed on the basis of the third objective are listed below; 1. The European Arrest Warrant, which has led to the extradition of more than 2000 criminal suspects, is being employed as a tool against terrorism. 2. Recent initiatives to combat the financing of terrorism include the Third Money Laundering Directive (2005), and the Regulation on funds transfers (2006). 3. Cooperation among security and intelligence agencies has been enhanced through the modernisation and expansion of the EU Situation Centre (2005). 4. Europol and Eurojust are each involved in around 20 ongoing terrorism- related investigations in Europe. f. Respond

(1) The fourth objective of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to prepare, in the spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath, the coordination of the response, and the needs of victims. (2) Some specific actions on the fourth priority include the following; 5. Military assets and capabilities have been identified which could support coordinated EU disaster response efforts. They include strategic transport (air/sea), tactical transport (helicopters), medical units, field hospitals and logistics. 6. Multinational exercises to test the readiness of Member States continue to be held each year. 7. A Financial Instrument for Community Action in the field of civil protection (2007-2013) has been created. 8. Counter-Terrorism Coordinator proposals have been adopted to establish EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (2005). g. External Cooperation

(1) The EU supports the United Nations to increase its role in combating terrorism. (2) Between 2004-2006, annual high-level political dialogues on counter-terrorism have been initiated between the EU and the USA, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia and Japan. (3) The EU has initiated counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives with Algeria, Indonesia and Morocco since 2004. 148 U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism

(4) The EU supports a range of CT-related projects in regions ranging from the Balkans to South-East Asia.

4. The NATO Response to Terrorism a. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an alliance of 26 countries committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with the treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. b. Legal Basis4

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, forms a basis on security matters and accordingly on counter-terrorism efforts. The beginning and the articles of the Treaty related to counter-terrorism are given below; (1) Preamble: The Parties are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. (2) Article 1: The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. (3) Article 5: Armed attack against one or more of them in Europe and North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain security of the North Atlantic Area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. c. Recent NATO Summits5

In order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the counter-terrorism activities of NATO, the recent NATO Summits and their initiatives should be focused on.

(1) Washington Summit (Apr 1999)

a) At the Washington Summit, NATO launched a Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative to address the risks posed by the proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery.

4 The North Atlantic Treaty, dated 04 April 1949, Washington D.C. 5 NATO Briefing, NATO Response to Terrorism, dated March 2005. U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism 149

9. The Initiative is designed to promote understanding of weapons of mass destruction issues and develop ways of responding to them. 10. A Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre at NATO Headquarters was established in 2000 to support this Initiative.

(2) Prague Summit (21-22 Nov 2002)

1. At the Prague Summit, NATO leaders agreed to develop a new Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, a Partnership action Plan and cooperation with other international organizations on Terrorism, and five CBRN defence initiatives. 2. In addition, they decided to streamline the military command structure and create the NATO Response Force.

(3) Istanbul Summit (28-29 Jun 2004)

a) At the Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders approved an enhanced set of measures. The enhanced package of measures include: Counter improvised explosive devices; technologies to defend against mortar attacks; detection, protection and defeat of CBRN weapons; protect harbors and ships from explosive- packed speedboats and underwater divers. 3. They agreed to improve intelligence sharing through a review of current intelligence structures at NATO. 4. They also agreed to establish a special Counterterrorism Technology Unit to lead and coordinate the efforts for enhanced package of antiterrorist measures.

(3) Riga Summit (28-29 Nov 2006)

1. At the Riga Summit, NATO leaders agreed to further strengthen the effectiveness of the NATO-led forces in Afghanistan. 2. They also confirmed that, regardless of the remaining caveats, in an emergency situation every Ally will come to the aid of the forces that require assistance. 3. The summit meeting also resulted in important decisions on deepening NATO’s engagement in Europe and beyond, and further modernizing the Alliance’s capability to project stability wherever necessary. d. NATO Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism (MC 472)6

(1) After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the NATO military authorities developed the Alliance’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, with political guidance from the North Atlantic Council. The Concept was endorsed by Allied leaders at the Prague Summit in 2002. (2) The NATO Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism clearly states that: a) NATO and its member countries face a real threat from terrorism and countering this threat will, in most circumstances, be time critical.

6 MC 472, NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, dated 21 Nov 2002. 150 U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism

4. NATO needs to be ready to conduct military operations to engage terrorist groups and their capabilities, as and where required. (3) The Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism has enhanced the counter- terrorism activities of NATO in the following years. Therefore, this concept will be examined in details. (4) There are four roles for NATO’s military operations for defence against terrorism; anti-terrorism (defensive/passive measures), consequence management, counterterrorism (offensive/active measures), and military cooperation. Force protection needs to be considered in all military operations to defend against terrorism. (5) Anti-Terrorism: In accordance with the new concept, the first role for NATO is Anti-Terrorism. It can be defined as; defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism, to include limited response and containment by military forces and civil agencies. NATO capabilities and measures for NATO Anti-terrorism actions include: 1. Standardized NATO HQ Threat Warning, 2. Standardized NATO FP Requirements, 3. Rapid Response Capabilities, 4. Air and Maritime Protection, 5. NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), 6. Theatre Missile Defence (TMD), 7. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). (6) Consequence Management (CM): In accordance with the military concept, the second role for NATO is Consequence Management. In NATO terminology, Consequence Management is defined as the use of reactive measures to mitigate the destructive effects of terrorism. The NATO military contributions for CM include; 8. Robust planning and force generation processes, 9. Capabilities to provide immediate assistance to civil authorities, 10. Establishment of a training and exercise coordination capability, 11. Contribution of Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Cell. (7) Counter-Terrorism (CT): a) In accordance with the concept, the third role for NATO is Counter-terrorism. Counter-Terrorism is defined as offensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism, including counter-force activities and containment by military forces and civil agencies. 12. NATO has two broad roles for CT Operations: NATO in lead and NATO in support. 13. The most significant initiative of counter-terrorism is the Creation of NATO Response Force. 14. Other initiatives are; Enhance NATO Standing Naval Forces and the development of a strategic lift capability. (8) Military Cooperation: In accordance with the new concept, the fourth role for NATO is Military Cooperation. NATO increasingly interacts and cooperates with International Organizations and other nations such as: 1. United Nations, 2. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 3. European Union, 4. Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations, 5. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 6. Russia and Ukraine. U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism 151 e. NATO Response Force (NRF):7

(1) NATO Response Force is the latest and the most significant feature of NATO. The NATO military command structure has been streamlined in order to create the NATO Response Force. NRF is designed to face new challenges, including terrorism. (2) The NATO Response Force is a rapidly deployable multinational unit made up of land, air, maritime and special forces components. It has a strength over 20,000 troops. NRF reached its full operational capability in 2006. (3) NATO Response Force is able to start to deploy after five days’ notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days or longer if resupplied. (4) The NATO Response Force is able to deploy worldwide. (5) Possible NRF missions are listed below; 1. Crisis Response Operations (including Peacekeeping), 2. Support Counter Terrorism Operations, 3. Consequence Management, 4. Embargo operations – maritime, land and no-fly zones, 5. Initial Entry Operations (incl. Peace Enforcement), 6. Demonstrative Force Package - Quick Response operations, 7. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations. (6) NATO Headquarters and forces conduct several joint exercises each year in order to prepare for NRF missions. f. Operation Eagle Assist8

(1) NATO took immediate measures to support the US following 9/11 Attacks. On 12 September 2001, NATO declared the terrorist attacks against the United States to be an attack against all. (2) This landmark decision was followed by practical measures aimed at assisting the United States and to: 1. Enhance intelligence sharing, 2. Provide assistance according to capabilities, 3. Enhance protection of Allies’ facilities, 4. Blanket over flight clearances, 5. Provide access to ports and airfields, 6. Deploy of Standing Naval Forces, 7. Deploy of AWACS. (3) Operation Eagle Assist ended on 16 May 2002. g. NATO Crisis Response System:9

(1) The NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), NATO Operational Planning System and NATO Civil Emergency Planning Arrangements are designed to underpin the Alliance’s crisis management role and response capability in a complementary and synergistic fashion, as part of an overall NATO Crisis Management Process.

7 NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division, 2006. 8 NATO Briefing, NATO Response to Terrorism, dated March 2005. 9 NATO Briefing, NATO Response to Terrorism, dated March 2005. 152 U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism

(2) The purpose of the NCRS is to provide required preparedness and support for crisis and conflict prevention and for crisis management across the range of Article 5 and Non-Article 5 operations. The system improves the ability of the Alliance, and where appropriate non-NATO nations, to prepare for and respond to the full range of crises that the Alliance might be required to face. To that end it comprises a full range of measures to enable the Alliance, and where appropriate non-NATO nations, to react in a timely, co-ordinated and discriminate manner. (3) The NCRS is designed to: 1. Be a fully integrated crisis management system, supporting the Alliance in responding to the full range of crises that might be encountered, 2. Ensure appropriate political control by the Council over the Crisis Response Measures (CRMs), while delegating the authority to take appropriate measures to enhance flexibility and speed of response, 3. Enhance civil-military interaction and take into account the interrelationship between civil and military measures, 4. Include a full range of measures under the authority of the Council, in support of crisis and conflict prevention efforts, 5. Take into account and enable the Alliance to respond to warnings provided by the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS) in a timely manner, 6. Complement and support the NATO Operational Planning System, 7. Command the confidence of NATO’s political, military and civil authorities, 8. Avoid unnecessary duplication with other NATO procedures and arrangements. Components of the NATO Crisis Response System: The NCRS has a number of components, including, among others, preventive options and crisis response measures. Preventive options are designed to foster crisis management and conflict prevention by assisting the Council in its consideration of possible responses to emerging or actual crises. Crisis response measures are intended to ensure Alliance preparedness for responding to the full range of potential crises. The components below are not related to any predetermined succession of events: 1. Preventive options, 2. Crisis Response Measures, 3. Counter Surprise, 4. Counter Aggression. h. Current NATO Operations10

NATO is contributing to the fight against terrorism through military operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Mediterranean area and by taking steps to protect its populations and territory against terrorist attacks. Existing and new NATO operations took on a role in the fight against terrorism.

(1) ISAF: 1. NATO has been a key component in Afghanistan, assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability and support for reconstruction and effective governance.

10 NATO Briefing, NATO Response to Terrorism, dated March 2005. U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism 153

2. In 2003, NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 3. NATO is also developing Afghan security structures, identifying reconstruction needs, as well as training and building up future Afghan security forces.

(2) Operation Active Endeavour (OAE): 1. Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime surveillance and escort operation in the Mediterranean, demonstrates the Alliance’s resolve and ability to respond to terrorism. 2. It began as a direct result of the declaration of Article 5 by the Alliance. 3. Naval forces were deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in 2001 to undertake a surveillance mission with the objective of detecting and deterring terrorist activity. 4. In 2003, NATO expanded Operation Active Endeavour by providing escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar to non-military ships.

(3) KFOR: 1. NATO is helping to bring stability to the Balkans by leading a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. 2. NATO’s overall goal has been to promote a peaceful and stable environment in the Balkans in the aftermath of the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s.

(4) Operations in Balkans: 1. In Albania and Macedonia NATO has established a Minimum Presence. Advisory teams assist the host States with military aspects of Security Sector Reform and restructuring with the ultimate aim of achieving NATO Membership. 2. In Bosnia, NATO has largely completed its mission. The European Union took over responsibility in 2004, and NATO reduced to Minimum Presence (with the establishment of the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo).

(5) NATO Training Mission-Iraq: 1. NATO involves in training, equipping and providing technical assistance to Iraqi Security Forces in order to address the security needs of the population. 2. NATO is training middle and senior level personnel from the Iraqi Security Forces in Iraq and outside, at NATO schools and training centres.

(6) High Visibility Events: 1. NATO AWACS have been an integral part of the security measures taken to protect major events, including NATO, European Union and other summits. 2. AWACS have also been deployed to help protect major public events, including the football championships and the Olympic Games (Euro 2004, 2004 Athens). 154 U. Ersen / Role of the United Nations, NATO and EU in Countering Terrorism

Figure 2. National and international counter-terrorism.

5. Conclusion

The United Nations is the most significant organization that has pursued its efforts to fight against terrorism for decades. In addition to the UN, other international and regional organizations such as NATO and the EU have enhanced their efforts to counter terrorism particularly in the last decade. Cooperation among these entities and other organizations against terrorism should be enhanced day by day since an integrated approach and cooperation is essential to counter terrorism. Difficulties can be solved more easily with the support and integration of national and international entities. Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism 155 Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-892-2-155 The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience

Supt. Suleyman ÖZEREN Turkish Police Academy, Ankara

Abstract. This chapter describes the key terrorists threats to Turkey and the main features of the country’s institutional response to these challenges. Four types of terrorism threaten Turkey: left-wing groups, right-wing groups, separatist movements, and Al-Qaeda connected international terrorism. Turkey’s Interior Ministry is the key agency responding to these threats. The authorities have carried out successful operations through diplomacy and working to address the root causes of terrorism. Nevertheless, Turkey does not always receive the attention it deserves from the international community. Much more work is needed in building an international coalition and addressing terrorism’s underlying causes. Turkey could make a much larger contribution to international counter-terrorism efforts by training other law enforcement agencies.

Introduction

After September 11, 2001, the world began to focus more attention on terrorism. Yet terrorism was an issue for several countries long before the events of 9/11. Countries, such as Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Spain have been dealing with this problem for several decades. The purpose of this chapter is to focus on terrorism and counterterrorism activities in Turkey. First, the article briefly describes the variety of terrorist groups in Turkey. Second, it describes the official institutions established to combat terrorism in Turkey and examines some innovative elements in Turkey’s counterterrorism strategy. Finally, it explores Turkey’s contribution to global counterterrorism efforts.

1. Terrorism in Turkey

Turkey, given the significance and complexity of its location, has been under pressure from many sources. Active terrorist groups include the Turkish Hezbollah (Party of God), the Kurdish separatist group known as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (PKK-KONGRA GEL, formerly called the PKK), and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C or Dev-Sol) (Özeren and Van de Voorde, 2006). In Turkey, terrorist organizations are classified into four categories: left-wing groups, right-wing groups, separatist movements, and Al-Qaeda connected international terrorism. Left-wing groups include the DHKP/C, the Marxist-Leninist 156 S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience

Communist Party (MLKP), and the Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist- Partisan TKP/ML (TIKKO). The second group involves right-wing terrorist organizations, including Turkish Hezbollah. The third group is categorized as separatist groups, such as the PKK. Finally, the fourth group is the Al-Qaeda connected terrorists. The next section briefly examines these groups.

1.1. Left-Wing Terrorism

Left-wing groups espouse a Marxist-Leninist ideology. They seek to destroy the current political system in order to establish a Marxist regime. These groups are composed of highly-educated, well-trained terrorists who have adopted the strategies and tactics of Soviet revolutionaries. They are adept at conducting clandestine activities under very high security conditions. These groups allow some of their members to participate in social organizations, such as labor unions, student associations, and the media. Group members are carefully chosen to ensure that they are loosely organized and avoid police observation. Among their tasks are organizing social activities during which they can disseminate propaganda, identifying people who are capable of acting in their illegal organization, and encouraging public opinion to support a specific anti-governmental policy. The illegal sections of Marxist groups are very tightly structured and use a very strict hierarchical model. The bureaucratic structures of Marxist terrorists make these groups difficult for police to penetrate. Because their members are so tightly knit and well-organized, it is often difficult to observe or identify them. However, once police identify the key figures, it is not difficult to identify the rest. Major Marxist groups include DHKP/C, MLKP, and TKP/ML, and of these the DHKP/C is examined in the next section.

1.1.1. DHKP/C The DHKP/C espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology, and uses the guerilla tactics of Cuba’s Fidel Castro (U.S. State Department 2004). The most prominent figure, Dursun Karataú, a fugitive who escaped from prison in 1989, is believed to be living somewhere in Europe. The group is anti-US and anti-NATO, and has been weakened as a result of successful operations by the Turkish National Police. The DHKP/C has carried out numerous attacks: x During the Gulf War, the group assassinated two US military contractors, wounded an Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 US and NATO military, commercial, and cultural facilities. x In 1996, the group assassinated Özdemir Sabancı, a prominent Turkish businessman and two others. x Since 2001, the group has started to use suicide bombings. x In addition, the group has deployed improvised explosive devices against the Turkish police and military targets (U.S. State Department 2004). The current agenda of the DHKP/C focuses on the US occupation of Iraq, and the abolition of prisons with one- to three-man prison cells, called F-type prisons. These prisons are part of an effort by the Turkish authorities to reduce the problems caused by holding a large number of prisoners convicted of terrorism or organized crime in dormitory style prisons. S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience 157

The DHKP/C provides an example of the relationship between other criminal activities and terrorism. The financial sources of the group shed light on the issue of how a terrorist group can use criminal activities to support its organization. The list below identifies some of the financial sources of the DHKP/C: x Dues from the members and sympathizers, x Income from the organization’s publications, x Burglary, robbery, and other thefts, x Donations received in Turkey and abroad, x Extortion, and x Smuggling. Extortion, burglary, and smuggling are the most common sources of income for organized crime groups as well. That means, the relationship between organized crime and DHKP/C is very important and deserves closer attention. Another important point that should be made is that the DHKP/C uses the Internet extensively for communication and propaganda. The following web sites are the examples: x www.halkinsesi-tv.com x www.ekmekveadalet.com x www.tayad.org x www.haklar-ozgurlukler-cephesi.org x www.temelhaklar.org x www.dhkc.net x www.ozgurluk.org

1.2. Separatist Movements

1.2.1. PKK/KONGRA GEL The PKK/KONGRA GEL, using Marxism-Leninism as a theoretical basis, seeks to weaken the authorities through guerilla tactics, ultimately forcing the Turkish government to negotiate with them. The PKK/KONGRA GEL was first organized by Abdullah Ocalan and his friends in Ankara in 1978. The first sensational attack came in 1984 when a group of PKK/KONGRA GEL militia attacked two different towns in southeast Turkey and killed over 30 civilians, including infants and pregnant women. The cruelty of the PKK/KONGRA GEL outraged Turkish citizens and greatly influenced the Turkish government’s formulation of counterterrorism policies against it (Özeren and Van de Voorde, 2006). The group became a serious threat at the beginning of the 1990s when it started to strike larges cities in southeastern Turkey. The Turkish government took strict measures in successfully countering the PKK. The Turkish government arrested PKK founder Ocalan on January 1, 1999, forcing the PKK to adopt new tactics. Table 1 lists these changes in terms of ideology, strategy, organizational structure, and final target. 158 S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience

Table 1. The Impact of Ocalan’s Arrest on the PKK

Before Ocalan’s Arrest After Ocalan’s Arrest

Ideology Marxism-Leninism Contemporary Socialism

Organizational Party+ Military+ Front Party+ Military+ Front Structure

Final Purpose Independent united Kurdistan Kurdish-Turkish cooperation within one country

Strategy National democratic people’s Political action revolution Activity Long time people’s revolution Legal activities taking Methods advantage of gaps within the legal system.

In recent months, the PKK has sought to expand its activities. In rural areas the number of the PKK members exceeds 1,800-1,900 individuals. The organization is seeking to win more members, build up its infrastructure of safe houses, and improve its relationship with the broader public. The PKK has also shifted tactics from street demonstrations or other peaceful activities to small-scale attacks, such as roadside bombs and assaulting police or gendarmerie security posts. The PKK feels that it has to become more aggressive because Turkish government welfare efforts in the region and recent legislation allowing the public use of the Kurdish language have undermined popular support for the organization. Additionally, the US and EU list the KONGRA-GEL as a terrorist organization. Moreover, the leadership of the organization considers its past political activities to be a failure. PKK leaders fear that losing additional ground could lead to the collapse of the group, and to avoid that, the organization is trying to spread the message that it is still powerful. In particular, it has been relying on improvised explosive devices and hit-and-run activities. In addition, the group targets check points belonging to the police and military. It also seeks targets with a high economic value, high-ranking officials, and tourist locations. The group uses suicide attacks as one of its key tactics since this kind of attack makes a big impact on the target community, as well as on the members of the group and their sympathizers. On April 7, 2006 two female terrorists killed themselves while they were preparing for suicide attacks (Milliyet 2006). Moreover, the incidents in Diyarbakir were perceived as demonstrating the frustration of the PKK since they used women and children in rallies to protest the deaths of members of the terrorist organization (Bal, 2006). S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience 159

1.3. Right-Wing Terrorism

While in some countries right-wing terrorist organizations include separatist ideologies, in Turkey, right-wing terrorist organizations means religiously-inspired terrorist groups, such as Turkish Hezbollah.

1.3.1. Turkish Hezbollah According to a U.S. State Department report, “Turkish Hezbollah is a domestic terrorist group of mostly Kurdish Sunni Islamists with no known ties to Lebanese Hezbollah. Turkish officials and media assert that Turkish Hezbollah has received limited Iranian support” (U.S. State Department, 2001). Hezbollah members are economically and socially alienated from mainstream society. They typically come from low-income families and half of them are not in regular employment, reflecting the economic crisis in Turkey. More importantly, one fourth do not have any kind of education and about a third of the members only have an elementary-school education (Akyol 2000). Based in southeastern Anatolia, Turkish Hezbollah originally operated mainly in the cities of Diyarbakir, Van, Batman and Mardin. Members of the terrorist group habitually gathered in and around bookstores, where they discussed their ideologies and spread their propaganda. In January 2000, police and security forces became yet another tactical target to boost the motivation of the group members when Police Chief Gaffar Okkan and five police officers were assassinated in Diyarbakir, the largest city in southeastern Turkey. Okkan had led a very successful operation to take apart Hezbollah factions the year before and had subsequently been added to the group’s death list. Hezbollah in Turkey has used a variety of tactics, including shootings, arson, assault with meat cleavers, kidnapping, beatings, and throwing acid on women not dressed in an Islamic manner (Morris 2000). Kidnapping is one of the most common methods Hezbollah used, and the targets were the sympathizers and members of other religious movements; businessmen; and the members of the PKK, as was discovered during police raids (Hurriyet 2000). Above all, Turkish Hezbollah has set a gruesome record for torture in Turkey. By the fall of 2000, nearly a thousand alleged members of the radical terrorist group were taken into custody. About twenty thousand pages of documents were also recovered from computer archives (Bal, 2006, p. 40). Up to seventy alleged high-ranking ùura members and local-level council leaders of the right- wing terrorist group were apprehended and put on trial, “accused of killing 156 people and wounding 80.” Most of them faced the death penalty for “organizing an armed group that aimed to bring strict Islamic law to Turkey.” (Reuters 2000)

1.4. Al-Qaeda Connected International Terrorism

In November 2003 there were four suicide attacks in Istanbul. The attacks are shown in Table 2. 160 S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience

Table 2. November 2003 attacks in Istanbul

DATE : 11.15.2003 TIME:09:30 LOCATION : ISTANBUL SISLI BETH ISRAEL SYNAGOGUE KILLED : 15 WOUNDED : 134 TERRORIST : MESUT CABUK

DATE : 11.15.2003 TIME:09:30 LOCATION : ISTANBUL BEYOGLU NEVE SALOM SYNAGOGUE KILLED : 11 WOUNDED : 87 TERRORIST : GOKHAN ELALTUNTAS

DATE : 11.20.2003 LOCATION : ISTANBUL BEYOGLU BRITISH CONSULATE KILLED : 19 WOUNDED : 380 TERRORIST : FERIDUN UGURLU

DATE : 11.20.2003 LOCATION : ISTANBUL BESIKTAS HSBC BANK KILLED : 15 WOUNDED : 139 TERRORIST : ILYAS KUNCAK

These were well-panned and well-organized attacks. After the police investigations, the individuals responsible for the attacks were identified. It became apparent that the individuals who were involved in the bombings had established an organization which was directly affiliated with the international al-Qaeda terror network. The operations revealed that: x There is very high level of secrecy among the members. Every member knows only what he or she needs to know. x To avoid identification, each member is given more than one code name and ID card. These attacks are warning signs for Turkey. “Turkey met the international dimension of religiously-inspired terrorism. It seems obvious that this type of terrorism, with the influence of developments in the world, will be effective for a long time” (Dilmac, 2005, p. 120). S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience 161

2. Turkish National Police and Counter-Terrorism Structure

In Turkey, counterterrorism activities are overseen by the Ministry of Interior. Under the Minister of Interior there are two major entities that are responsible for anti- terrorism tasks: the Turkish National Police (TNP) and Gendarmerie. In terms of jurisdiction, the police are responsible for the urban areas, and the gendarmerie is responsible for the rural areas. Accordingly, counterterrorism responsibilities are similarly divided. There is also the National Intelligence Agency (MIT, Milli Istihbarat Teskilati), which has the authority to collect intelligence along with the Intelligence Department within the TNP. Of course, since some of the terrorist organizations are active both in the urban and rural areas, effective and efficient coordination between these three entities is a must. To succeed in that, the Directorate of Counterterrorism Coordination under the prime minister’s office has been established. In terms of the police functions in countering terrorism, there are three departments within the TNP which are responsible for responding to terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism Department, the Intelligence Department, and when a target has been identified, the Special Operations Department (Ozeren and Yilmaz, 2006). These departments are organized based on two organizational structures: The first unit is the central headquarters, which is within the General Directorate of the TNP in Ankara. These units are called departments. The second organizational structure is the counterpart divisions of these departments in cities and districts. The Department in Ankara does not have a superior position per se over divisions in cities or districts. However, the headquarters in Ankara facilitates coordination and collaboration between the Department and other cities. The Department keeps all the records about the personnel working in different cities, coordinates training programs, and facilitates communication between divisions and other departments.

2.1. Intelligence Department

The TNP Intelligence Department oversees intelligence-gathering activities inside Turkey. The Department gathers intelligence regarding terrorism, analyzes the information, and based on the analysis, disseminates the information to the appropriate departments.

2.2. Special Operations Department

The Special Operations Department was a division within the Anti-terrorism Department until 1993. As a result of the significant increase in the number of terrorism incidents, the division became a separate department. The Special Operations Department is responsible for operations against terrorist targets. The Department executes raids in both urban and rural areas. In addition to pre-identified targets, Special Operation Units carry out hostage rescue operations in buildings, vehicles, airplanes, and other areas (Özeren and Yılmaz, 2006). The members of the Special Operation Units go through intensive training for all of these activities. 162 S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience

2.3. Anti-Terrorism Department

The Anti-Terrorism Department is responsible for countering terrorism in general and identifying and capturing terrorists as well as those who support them, and/or have a relationship with terrorist organizations (Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu 2003). To carry out those responsibilities, in accordance with the law, the Department uses surveillance to monitor the activities of the terrorists, determine the organizational structure of the terrorist groups, and track their financing and weapons. It also monitors their legal and illegal publications to determine their future activities, targets, and tactics. The Anti- Terrorism Department also maintains and analyzes statistics about the activities of different terrorist groups. Based on this analysis, the Department develops new policies and strategies, and implements them. Furthermore, the Department coordinates cooperative efforts among different divisions within the anti-terrorism units in different cities, and between other departments (Özeren and Yılmaz, 2006).

3. Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Turkey

Turkey has used a variety of innovative approaches to combat terrorism. The most effective have been diplomacy and efforts to address the root causes of terrorism.

3.1. Diplomacy

Turkish diplomacy in terms of counterterrorism, mostly if not always, involves bilateral relations. Turkey has tried very hard to achieve a level of success in terms of establishing multilateral cooperation as well as bilateral, however, with some exceptions, Turkey has not received the attention it deserves. Turkey did not enjoy as much international support as the U.S. received following the events of September 11, 2001. On the other hand, Turkey’s success in pressuring Syria is a good example of effective diplomacy. As a result of Turkish diplomatic efforts, Syria forced Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK terrorist organization, to leave the country. In fact, one of the major challenges for the Turkish government is to live up to the growing demand for the leadership to form and maintain an active international coalition. Without such a coalition, it would be hard to encourage even allied countries to take more serious and risky steps against terrorist group members who are living within their borders (Shennan 2004). Turkey suffers from a lack of support and sensitivity, even from NATO members, such as Belgium. For example, a Belgian court refused to extradite Fehriye Erdal, a member of the DHKP/C terrorist organization and one of the individuals who assassinated Ozdemir Sabanci, a prominent businessman in Turkey.

3.2. Addressing the Causes of Terrorism

Turkey has also sought to undermine the sources of terrorism. To be successful, such efforts should focus on potential sympathizers and supporters of a terrorist organization. In other words, this strategic approach should emphasize how the terrorist organizations recruit new members (Teymur, 2003). S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience 163

In particular, the southeastern part of Turkey is a problematic area in terms of the activities of the PKK and the Hezbollah. To gain additional support, the PKK have been exaggerating the so-called discrimination against the Kurdish population, stressing the prohibition of the Kurdish language, which in practice has not been implemented, and the high levels of unemployment. As a response to these allegations, the parliament enacted a law which recognized the Kurdish language. Also the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) seeks to improve the economic and social situation in the region. Moreover, the government has sought to improve the local education system by increasing the quality of the teaching and providing better conditions for the schools. Additionally, it has provided funds for building new recreation centers, expanding employment opportunities, and increasing the level of government subsidies. By working with NGOs, the law enforcement community has been trying to build a sense of trust among the communities who have been impacted by the terrorist attacks or counterterrorism activities.

4. Turkey’s Contribution to the Global Counterterrorism Efforts

Turkey’s long effort to combat terrorism has produced many benefits for the country. These benefits could easily be transferred to the international community. First of all, throughout these years, Turkish law enforcement agencies have gathered intelligence about the wide variety of groups and their ideological and tactical characteristics. Turkey, by sharing this knowledge, can be an invaluable source of information for on-going and future terrorism-related investigations. Secondly, Turkish law enforcement agencies, particularly the TNP, can share this knowledge and experience by training other law enforcement agencies in the region and around the world. More importantly, Turkey could be a bridge for capacity building, transforming global concerns into strategic partnership with a cooperative approach. Turkish law enforcement agencies and security forces could transfer their experience to law enforcement agencies in other countries by providing training and education: Turkey could in fact become a training hub for agencies of Middle Eastern and other European countries. Considering that many international terrorist groups have gained importance and even established networks throughout Europe, sharing intelligence and creating training programs would most likely provide new opportunities and tools to counter international terrorism (Özeren and Van de Voorde, 2006). Finally, Turkey can play another important and very critical role. By demonstrating counterterrorism practices that are in accordance with the universal values of human rights and ethical principles, Turkey can set standards for international counter-terrorism policies.

Conclusion

Turkey’s counterterrorism experience is unique for several reasons. First of all, the country is located in one of the most violent and turbulent regions in the world. Turkey is greatly affected by the problems of Palestine and Israel, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Syria, Iraq and Iran. 164 S. Özeren / The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience

Also, the Turkish police and other security forces have been fighting against a wide variety of terrorist organizations that vary in their ideology, tactics, organizational structure, financing strategies, membership profiles, and the like. Given this extensive experience, Turkey’s contribution to the area of global security can be critical. Terrorism is a crime and it should be responded to accordingly. Therefore it is imperative to acknowledge that terrorism has its underlying causes, including sociological, psychological, and economical. Different examples from different countries should be analyzed from a comparative perspective. Such an approach will broaden our perspective in terms of how the international community should respond to the issues of international and transnational terrorism.

References

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Author Index

Alkan, N. 37 Freeman, M. 81, 95 Aytaç, O. 131 Özdemir, Y. 37 Charvat, J.P.I.A.G. 23, 73 Özeren, S. 155 Eren, S.A. vii, 51, 109 Saruhan, M.S. 119 Ersen, U. 59, 139 Sütalan, Z. 1, 13 This page intentionally left blank This page intentionally left blank This page intentionally left blank