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Eurostar Case Study 00 © Bettina von Stamm 28 January 2000 THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROSTAR – A CASE STUDY 1.0 Introduction The Eurostar is a high-speed passenger train that runs through the Channel Tunnel, connecting the capitals of Belgium, France and the UK. This Case Study starts with a brief history of the project, followed by a description of the project set-up. It concludes by looking at the difference between the Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV), the French high-speed train on which Eurostar was modelled, and the Eurostar. 2.0 Background The precondition for the development of the Eurostar was the award by the French and British governments in January 1986 of a concession for building and running the a fixed channel link between France and the UK to the consortia ‘Channel Tunnel Group’ and ‘France Manche’, later to become ‘Eurotunnel’. After the announcement, the British and French national railways, British Rail (BR) and La Societé Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF), agreed to jointly develop a train to service the route between London and Paris and to set up a task force to discuss engineering issues involved in the project. 1 Around the same time SNCF encouraged Alsthom, which manufactures the TGV, to find a British partner for the development of the TMST (Trans Manche Super Train), as the high-speed train was called during its development. The suggestion to find a British partner was strongly influenced by government intervention. The Governments of both countries were keen for national manufacturers to be involved in the development of the new, prestigious train. In July 1987 the two railways issued a joint technical outline to invite expressions of interest from manufacturing consortia. 1 Belgium was not part of the initial negotiations, the Belgian national railway, La Societé Nationale des Chemins de Fer Belgique (SNCB), joined the project later, in summer 1987. Eurostar 1! © Bettina von Stamm 28 January 2000 It was also in Summer 1987 that the Belgium government expressed an interest in joining the project.2 After Belgium joined the project it was implicitly understood that Belgian manufacturing companies would have a share in the project also. After preliminary contracts, the relationship between the three manufacturing consortia, who by then had formed the Trans Manche Super Train Group (TMSTG), and the three railways was formalised during a meeting in Brussels in November 1987. SNCF and Alsthom, as representatives for the railways and manufacturers respectively, signed a preliminary contract regarding the manufacturer’s involvement in the specification development.3 At the same meeting the railways announced the establishment of the IPG, the International Project Group (IPG). The IPG comprised one senior engineer from each of the three railways plus an additional person for administration and co-ordination of the team. Besides forming the interface between railways and manufacturers, the IPG was charged with developing a joint specification, procuring the trains, and reaching consensus among all parties involved in design and engineering issues. The official decision to model the TMST on the TGV was made in 1988, after an evaluation of high-speed trains available at the time.4 Despite the fact that the TGV was seen to be the most ‘proven’ train, it would also have been politically unacceptable to commission a train outside the countries involved, for example from Japan or Germany. Following a suggestion by British Rail’s Architecture and Design Department, in October 1987 the IPG commissioned a competition for the industrial design aspects of the train. Three design consultancies from each country were invited to participate in the competition, which covered the interior and exterior design of the train, focusing primarily on aesthetic rather than technical aspects. During the assessment of the designers’ submissions, the design concepts were scrutinised for technical realisability by technical personnel from the three railways. At the presentation of the results in London in December 1987 it did not seem possible to agree on one design consultancy for the entire project, which apparently was the initial idea. Even though it was not explicitly stated, interviewees indicated 2 However, the Railway Usage Contract (signed 29.7.1987), which sets out for the voyage through the tunnel how costs and revenues are split between the railways and the tunnel operator, was signed only by BR, SNCF and Eurotunnel; SNCB, the Belgium national railway, had a separate set of contractual agreements. 3 The reason for SNCF acting as representative for the three railways was driven not only by their past experience but also by the fact that BR was constrained by tight financial controls and hence could not have signed a contract of this size (£ 1million) without lengthy consultations with the Department of Transport. 4 However, it was indicated that most parties involved implicitly understood that the new high-speed train would be modelled on the TGV and its technology. Other high-speed trains available at the time were: X2000 by ABB, Sweden; ICE by Siemens, Germany; the Pendolino by Fiat Italy; the Shinkansen by JNR, Japan. See also Table XX, page XX. Eurostar 2! © Bettina von Stamm 28 January 2000 that voting was influenced by each country’s desire to have a share in the design of this new train. Hence, it was decided that each country should get a share in the design effort that would be equal to its financial backing of the project (UK and France 44% each, Belgium 12% - the 44/44/12 rule). The task was split as follows: the British design consultancy, Jones Garrard, was asked to design the nose of the train and the driver’s cab, the French designer, Roger Tallon, ADSA, the interior and the livery (i.e. exterior) and the Belgian designer the toilets, overhead luggage racks and the seats.5 As the IPG wanted only one contract, not three, they asked Roger Tallon to act as design co-ordinator. Even though his overall responsibilities had been set out in the contract between the designers and the railways, to quote from an article published in May 1994, ‘it [the IPG] appointed Roger Tallon as the overall design co-ordinator, although, now, no-one seems totally sure what his position meant’ (Evamy, 1994). The relationship between the design consultancies, the railways (IPG) and the manufacturers (TMSTG) during the design specification phase is shown in Figure 1 below. Set-up During Design Specification Phase Rolling Stock 3 monthly meetings TMST Steering Group Policy Board Representatives of major policy issues 3 railways overlooking overlooking progress progress IPG TMSTG Representatives monthly meetings Project of 3 railways Manager day-today operations responsible to Roger Tallon, France (lead designer) consulting coordinating consulting INOV Belgium Jones Garrard ! UK Figure 1 Set-up during Design Specification Phase 5 Roger Tallon had designed the TGV Atlantique and had, as a result of that experience, a close working relationship with SNCF as well as Alsthom. Eurostar 3! © Bettina von Stamm 28 January 2000 The design specification developed by the three design consultancies (between March and November 1988) became part of the technical specification to the manufacturers. Essentially, it meant that the manufacturers had to find a solution that would allow the realisation of the industrial design concepts. In situations of conflict between design and technical specification the contract ruled that ‘the technical solution should be given preference, but only after it has been sufficiently proven that best effort has been made to match the original design’. In parallel with the development of the design specification the manufacturers conducted difficult and lengthy negotiations as to how to split the design and manufacturing task, leading to the submission of the tender document in December 1988. However, the technical specification was issued in its final form only in October 1989, followed by a contract for 31 trains in December 1989.6 The fact that the deadline of 1 May 1993 had been laid down in the contract between the three railways operating Eurostar and Eurotunnel - with financial penalties for anyone causing delays to the commencement of commercial services - meant that only three and a half years were left for the development of the train. Compared with other high-speed train developments, most of lesser complexity, this was a very tight time schedule (Table 1). Major High-Speed Train Development Eurostar TGV Shinkansen X2000 Pendolino APT Country Belgium. France, France Japan Sweden Italy UK UK Manufacturer GEC-Alsthom Alsthom JNR ASEA Fiat British Rail (now part of ABB) Initiation 1987 1966 1957 1968 1962 1967 First 1994 1981 1964 1992 1976 1981 Passenger Train Development 7 years 15 7 years 24 years 14 years 14 years Time years New France: on TGV Yes yes no no no Infrastructure lines; Belgium: under construct.; UK: in planning Operating 300 km/h 270 km/ 210 km/h 200 km/h 200 km/h 200 km/h Speed h 6 BR bought 11, SNCB four, and SNCF 16 trains. Eurostar 4! © Bettina von Stamm 28 January 2000 Major adapt to 3 power speed speed, active passive active Constraint supply systems; problem of tilting tilting; tilting; safety legislation high weight weight maintenance constraints constraints costs Degree of High medium low high high very high Innovation Table 1 Comparison of High-Speed Train Developments7 The Tunnel was officially opened by President Mitterand and the Queen on 6 May 1994, one year after the original deadline. However, daily service between London, Paris and Brussels only commenced on 14 November 1994, about 18 months behind schedule. 3.0 Organisational Set-Up The core of the co-operation between the three railways and the manufacturing consortium was the IPG and the project manager for the TMSTG.
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