Willy Pfändtner A postcolonial philosophy of and interreligious polylogue

n this article, an agenda for the development of a phi- very theorizing itself is an expression of a Christian losophy of religion which is informed by the challeng- theology that is characterized by Western pre-Kant­ Ies and possibilities of religious plurality is suggested. ian metaphysics. And it is implicitly, or even explicit­ It is argued that the as an aca- ly, apologetic in nature. It is thus more precisely a demic discipline is in need of a kind of reconstruction if of , where the position it is to maintain its relevance and connection to actual of the dialogue partner is preconceived in terms of religious phenomena as they present themselves glob- someone holding truth claims akin to one’s own, al- ally. The problem originates in the fact that the modern beit incomplete or plainly false ones. concept of religions has a distorting effect when applied Interreligious dialogue in the version described to non-western traditions. above is religiously motivated, with the aim of devel- The article focuses on a way to understand religious oping one’s own theology. However, the call for dia- diversity by using aspects of Heidegger’s fundamental logue in the political and social context is generally ontology to illuminate different ways of being religious not theoretically motivated in that sense. The focus is within the same tradition and also to find similar reli- rather to improve the social and political situation by gious dispositions across traditions. It is argued that this can inform interreligious dialogue so that this dia- developing tolerance and openness. The need to en- logue—or rather, polylogue—itself can serve as a tool hance understanding and cooperate in the attempt to to develop a postcolonial existential philosophy of re- overcome religiously motivated conflicts and develop ligion. peaceful coexistence is urgent in societies where re- Part of this project would be to find and apply con- ligious plurality is a conspicuous fact. To be sure, a cepts and categories by reading religious traditions and certain kind of religiousness, characterized by meta- subtraditions through each other. The article ends with physical realism, may impinge negatively on the so- a few suggestions on how this can be done, in this case cial and political situation, due to the universalistic by drawing on traditions from India. and philosophically problematic nature of its theor­ etical stand. Therefore, some theological positions may be very problematic when tolerance and open- Introduction: conceptions of interreligious dialogue ness are the desired outcomes. The questions of what interreligious dialogue is and Apart from contexts where religions are seen to how it should be conducted are, of course, depend- cause problems, there is also a potential threat oper­ ent on the question of why it is carried out and what ating in today’s world where religious traditions outcome is desired or expected. All this is dependent could be helpful in contributing to a positive change. upon which context the dialogue is carried out in. I am referring to the ecological crisis; environmental Theorizing about interreligious dialogue must there- catastrophes and climate changes caused by extreme fore also be put into a context. There is no neutral exploitation of nature and polluting activities. Since philosophy of religion that can form the basis of such a Western consumerist way of life is now spreading theorizing. When for example Paul Griffiths (1991) rapidly all over the world, this threat is becoming im- and Keith Yandell (1974: 185–6) theorize about the manent. I think there is some weight in the words of logic of and criteria for interreligious dialogue, that Philip Goodchild when he says that

Approaching Religion • Vol. 1 • May 2011 33 [i]n order to survive the ecological threat, The modern concept of religion dominant powers will have to undergo un- Many postcolonial thinkers have recently seriously paralleled transformations of social, cultural, questioned the modern concept of religion, especially political, economic and ecological practice and when applied to Eastern religious phenomena. I am consciousness. Indeed, for such a conversion very much in agreement with this criticism. For the to gain sufficient power, religious motives may sake of convenience, I will retain the term ‘religion’ have to come into play to replace a system based but only in its most general sense, as a human phe- on greed and consumption. (Goodchild 2002: nomenon, different from other human phenomena viii.) such as art and economics. Richard King has the fol- lowing to say about the modern concept of religion: Many ways of being religious, independent of tra- dition, do not sanction the present exploitation of The concept of ‘religion’ is the product of the nature (Nasr 1997), and if these religious existential culturally specific discursive processes of Chris- dispositions come to the fore, they may inspire major tian history in the West and has been forged changes in life styles. In order for this to come about in the crucible of inter-religious conflict and interreligious dialogue may be an important tool for interaction. The term thus implies a pluralistic bringing mutual inspiration and influence to bear on context. As Balagangadhara points out, Chris- the public sphere. tianity has generally served as the prototypical What is obvious here is that we cannot be con- example of a religion and thus as the fundamen- cerned only with the Western part of the world. It tal yardstick or paradigm-case for the study of is a global problem and if we are to involve religion, ‘other religions’. This being the case, one should we have to do it globally. For practical and moral acknowledge that the comparative study of reasons­, we have to accept that the fact of religion is religion remains founded upon a conceptual the fact of religious plurality. I claim that there is a framework that is unmistakably theological and plur­ality of ways of being human and in understand- Christian in orientation. (King 2002: 40.) ings of what it means to be a human being. By this I want to say that there is no one religion or worldview As Wilfred Cantwell Smith has pointed out, the term that can be shared by all human beings. Indeed, due ‘religion’ actually stands for several different concepts to the indecisiveness of the question of what it means (Smith 1963: 48–9), one of which King here refers to be human, there should not be any attempt to pol­ to, and which I prefer to call ‘the modern concept itically reinforce any one such understanding. I am of religion’. I very much share the postcolonial cri- well aware that our history shows ample examples tique of this concept as presented by thinkers such as of such attempts, and that they are not only historic­ Timothy Fitzgerald (2010) and S. N. Balagangadhara al, but quite conspicuous in today’s world. There are (1994). Balagangadhara gives an extensive argument religious fundamentalists with such views. There in his book, ‘The Heathen in His Blindness’: Asia, the are those with political ideologies. There are repre- West and the Dynamics of Religion, to the effect that sentatives of a scientistic position. I do not believe India, traditionally, has a culture without ‘religion’ in any such utopian dreams. In fact, I think they are and without ‘worldview’ in the Western sense of the unwanted. I shall argue that they represent a certain terms. existential disposition, characterized by a control- My concern in this paper is to stress the distinc- ling mood. I claim that what can unite people is not a tion between ‘religiousness’ and ‘religion’ and to cat- shared worldview, but a shared acceptance and toler- egorize different kinds of religiousness. Although al- ance of each other’s differences. most half a century has passed since Wilfred Cantwell To understand and conceptualize differences, Smith in his book The Meaning and End of Religion then, becomes a quest for an existential philosophy of (1963) convincingly argued for an abandonment of religion, where interreligious dialogue, or polylogue the modern concept of religion, this very concept is as I would like to call it, becomes a contributing fac- still the cause of much confusion, misrepresentation tor. If we want to understand religious phenomena and even oppression. I argue that this is due to the globally, I am of the opinion that certain concep- fact that those who adhere to the concept represent tions of religion must be put into question, or at least only a certain kind of religiousness, which they ex- stripped of their universal pretensions. trapolate to religious phenomena in general. Smith

34 Approaching Religion • Vol. 1 • May 2011 expresses it in this way: ogy that saw the human being primarily as a need- fulfilling agent became the tacit point of departure I have become strongly convinced that the when studying human behaviour globally. There was vitality of personal faith, on the one hand, and, an idea that all human behaviour could be explained on the other hand (quite separately), pro- from this perspective, in roughly the same way as gress in understanding—even at the academic the workings of nature could be explained by refer- level—the traditions of other people throughout ring to basic natural laws. This came to inform the history and throughout the world, are both first attempts to build theories of religion. Thus, for seriously blocked by our attempt to conceptual- example, James George Frazer assumed that the ac- ize what is involved in each case in terms of (a) tivities of local (what he called primitive) people were religion (Smith 1963: 50). centred around the struggle to survive. Religion, in his view, thus became a naïve way of controlling and Smith argues for retaining the concept of religion transforming nature to suit human needs. when referring to the faith of the religious subject, but Theorizing about religion from a presumed neu- for abandoning the concept of ‘religion’ as an overt tral perspective in the West started earlier in history system of beliefs, practices, values etc., idealized in with philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume theologies and studied as an empirical phenomenon and Kant and was part of the Enlightenment project. historically and sociologically. Although the modern These philosophical perspectives on religion were, I concept of religion was developed within a specific claim, brought about by social, moral and political Christian historical situation, where the necessity problems occurring from within the Christian con- to employ putatively universal conceptions of truth text, where religion was used by political and reli- and reason made its appearance, it was used in the gious leaders to enhance their power through vic- construction of so-called world religions into more timization and war. Out of this specifically Christian or less conflicting belief systems with, as one imag- context developed the modern concept of religion ined, universal pretensions. For Smith ‘faith’ was the as an overt system of beliefs, practices, values etc., universal and primordial concept and I claim, as does which became the conceptual framework for study- Kuk-Won Bae, that his arguments rest on the philo- ing the so-called other religions, with the invention sophical anthropology of a homo fidei (Bae 2003). I of the concept of ‘world religions’ as a consequence. see religiousness in much less essentialist and univer- This concept brings about a specific understanding of sal terms than Smith, and consequently the concep- religious phenomena that has had immense influence tualization of religiousness in my version becomes a and has come to support the colonial and imperial creative, complex and provisional matter. interests of the West. After the so-called ‘death of ’, the presumed universal narrative of Christianity has been supple- The colonial misrepresentation mented and transgressed by the narrative of mod­ of non-Western religion ernity, where the superior position of the West is In this section I will bring to light distorted under- established through evolutionary thought and his- standings of religious phenomena globally, caused toricism. Even non-religious theorists did, however, by the colonial and imperial endeavours of the West consider Christianity as the most advanced religion, during recent centuries. This misunderstanding and but that it was now, due to the progress of man, being misrepresentation, I claim, is caused by a combin­ replaced by a scientific worldview. To explain human ation of an obvious aspiration for domination, both behaviour by referring to an overall explanation of religious and economic, as well as of more innocent what there is, and in terms of certain beliefs in origin prejudices. These more innocent prejudices have and causality, overall in expressions of an attempt of been the underlying foundation when theorizing bringing order to chaos, is, however, an expression of about religion within academic disciplines such as a certain existential disposition, a certain very spe- anthropology, religious studies, and the philosophy cific and provincial way of being religious, which has of religion. unfortunately been considered universal and which Along with the Enlightenment and the modern is reflected in the scientism of today. Richard Daw­ project, a certain existential disposition, character- kins would in this sense represent the non-religious ized by exploitation, knowledge and control, came to mirror-image of this kind of religiousness (Dawkins dominate Western culture. Philosophical anthropol- 2006). So my argument is that what the modern con-

Approaching Religion • Vol. 1 • May 2011 35 cept of religion is representing is a certain kind of re- formulations themselves become ontological ligiousness, based on what Martin Heidegger terms activities whereby a person’s sense of value and onto-theological presumptions (Heidegger 1953). reality are given form and content. Since the time of Heidegger it has been common to distinguish between two different kinds of inquiry. We may conclude, therefore, that the nature of One is the ontic, which deals with different kinds of reality is manifested as much in the process of beings or entities in their totality of causal connected­ knowing and valuing it as in the formulations ness. The other is the ontological, which investigates that specify it. In this sense, a cross-cultural the being of these entities, for example what it means philosophy of religion will be well served by to be a human being, the manner or way it shows it- looking beyond the labels of systems of ideas self or comes to presence. Now, if religious phenom- to the existential importance that they have in ena are studied under the modern concept of religion disclosing the truth about life. (Streng 1995: in relation to systems of belief, as an ontic inquiry, 222–3.) then certain consequences follow. The consequences will be different if religious phenomena are studied This example shows that, of the three, it is only one, as an ontological inquiry. (Schrag 1999: 69–70.) The Tillich, who for the meaning and reason of his reli- religiousness involved in the ontic inquiry is primar- gious endeavour is dependent on a categorization of ily interested in ‘what there is’. It is important for what there ‘is’. Thus I suggest, that for a better under- the religious person to have the right beliefs about standing of religiosity in general, globally, we would the order of things. It is governed by a controlling benefit by changing our focus to the existential dis- mood. When religious behaviour is studied from an position of the religious subject. historical or sociological point of view, the first ques- tion asked is thus: ‘What do they believe?’ This way of investigating religious behaviour in general tends What is authentic religion? to be distorting, since it is primarily concerned with If we recognize that the modern concept of religion belief in ‘what there is’. To illustrate what I mean, I (as a system of beliefs about what there is) itself is will quote Frederick Streng, who has observed that the problem, then such putative perplexities as multi­ anyone talking about the nature of reality does not religious belonging would no longer be a perplexity. stand outside of that to which they refer, but stands We would realize that a single Chinese person’s being within it (Streng 1995: 205). After comparing three simultaneously a Confucian, a Buddhist and a Daoist different structures of ultimate transformation—one is not an example of a religious dichotomy. It is rather Christian (represented by Paul Tillich), one Daoist indicative of something wrong with the modern con- (represented by Hellmut Wilhelm) and one Buddhist cept of ‘religion’ as applied to Confucian, Buddhist (represented by Keiji Nishitani)—Streng concludes: and Dao religiosity. Using the modern concept of religion when in- In the first case [Tillich] we saw that the sense terpreting contemporary religious phenomena in of reality assumed the expectation of the West may also be misleading. So-called multiple whereby life is given value. Life has a reason and religious belongings in the West are detected by, for meaning through the categorization of what “is”. example Peter Phan, (2003) and Catherine Cornille The sense of reality in the second case [Wil- (2002). Can it be ascertained from a non-confession- helm] focused on a holistic grasp of principles al point of view whether persons who involve vari- which themselves were not abstractions of ous different religious narratives and symbols in their essences but intuitions of moving forces within religious practice are really Christians or Buddhists, a concrete situation where a person lived. In the for example? Is it not much more interesting, and final expression [Nishitani], regarding the field fruitful in the dialogic encounter, to investigate and of emptiness, the sense of reality is much more a mutually conceptualize what kind of religiousness is state of consciousness or an attitude whose chief involved? I have a colleague who is doing research on quality is found in the paradoxical expression a Sufi group in the US. When asked whether they are that one knows “selfhood” when one is aware Muslims, they are hesitant to answer ‘yes’ so they give of the noself. These formulations of ultimate the answer: ‘We are not not Muslims.’ reality, then, are not seen as “mere speculation” One interesting question in this connection is: or systems of verbal abstraction. Rather, the what is religious authenticity? Generally the so called

36 Approaching Religion • Vol. 1 • May 2011 mixing of religions is considered inauthentic. But if major­ religious traditions, the so-called world reli- we rid ourselves of the concept of religion, where do gions, it in fact only expresses a very specific kind of we stand then? The interesting thing is to see what religiousness, extrapolated to religious phenomena function religious symbols and narratives have in the in general. Thus it is clinging on to a concept of re- life of the religious subject? What are her expecta- ligion that is outdated and does not conform to reli- tions and motives, what kind of religiousness is she gious phenomena as they manifest themselves today. expressing? The whole enterprise becomes a concern only for cer- tain Christian academic scholars. I have a vision for a much more creative form of interreligious dialogue, Religious diversity: problems and possibilities where a non-tradition-specific space for conceptual- I will bring up another misconception arising from izing and categorizing is developed. the modern concept of religion, which has had un- A prerequisite for creating a non-tradition-speci­ fortunate consequences when it comes to under- fic space is a willingness to dislocate oneself. A post- standing interreligious dialogue, what it entails and colonial situation offers an opportunity to place one- what can come out of it. So, first of all: ‘What is reli- self on an equal standing with the other. It implies a gious diversity?’ The question is important because rupture, where one’s own tradition and narrative is many philosophers of religion have in recent decades parenthesized. If one adheres to Hans-Georg Gada­ discussed so-called problems of religious diversity, mer’s idea of dialogue and philosophical herme- where a preconception of what this diversity is all neutics, one may consider this impossible. But it is about is taken for granted. This preconception also impossible only if one sees the dialogic encounter as takes for granted that religious diversity entails prob- a way of using the other as a means to self-improve- lems. This, of course, raises another question: why ment rather than as taking an existential risk. I view problems and what kind of problems? To some, the a postcolonial philosophy of religion as a creative ac- answer is obvious. The media are continually report- tivity involving interreligious polylogue. The purpose ing on so-called religious conflicts with violent pol­ is to develop concepts and categories concerning mo- itical and social consequences. When religion is de- tives, goals and various ideas of the good. bated in the public sphere, it is most often these kinds of problems that are the concern. However, this only mirrors a very limited form of religiousness, which Fundamental ontology: unfortunately then is given a lot of public space, over- attunement and understanding shadowing other forms. Unfortunately, academic If we apply Heidegger’s ideas, developed in what he fields like the philosophy of religion, philosophical calls fundamental ontology, that we are attuned to theology and to some extent even religious studies the world in different ways that determine how we are often preoccupied with a concept of religion that understand our life worlds and act in them (Hei- supports this situation. degger 1996: 123–44), then we will understand that Now, a phenomenon related to religious diversity it is not one worldview that determines our actions, is interreligious dialogue, and this is often seen as a but our existential disposition and the moods that we way to combat social and political conflicts. Theor­ are tuned into that determine how we experience and etical reflections on the nature, possibilities and de- conceptualize our various life worlds. sirability of interreligious dialogue have, along with When it comes to moods, there are those who problems of religious diversity become the subject of like to stress the role of social conditioning. Hubert a subset of the academic philosophy of religion. Re- Dreyfus, for one, suggests that mood should refer lated to this is also the so-called theology of religions, to ‘cultural sensibility’ and be located in the public which is a kind of philosophical theology where from sphere of the culture to which one belongs, not in the within the Christian tradition you reflect over how to individual (Dreyfus 1991: 169–70). I admit that cul- deal with the fact of religious diversity. The precon- tures and communities may be dominated by certain ception involved in these attempts is the presupposi- moods, but it is important to stress that individuals tion that the problems of religious diversity primar- who find themselves governed by other moods can ily entail problems of conflicting truth claims about reject these. a so-called Ultimate Reality. The point of departure Another point I would like to make is that basic­ is onto-theology. Although this kind of philosophiz- moods in general are universally human. Moods ing is conceived of as being able to encompass all the like love, grief and fear are found in all human cul-

Approaching Religion • Vol. 1 • May 2011 37 tures. Having said this, I shall suggest how one could Intrareligious differences conceive of religious diversity by giving attention to Religious narratives are seemingly open to a variety some basic human moods. To discern differences by of interpretations according to moods. I would like, giving attention to moods is, I think, a field that is in this connection, to refer to what can be termed almost unexplored. What I am here suggesting is just ‘intrareligious incoherence’. Keith Ward has detected one, probably of many, ways to start. By observing within five major religious traditions the existence of religious traditions and religious phenomena, I have a ‘double-aspect doctrine’ in the context of conceptu- detected three basic human dispositional moods, ex- alizing God or the Ultimate. This doctrine reveals the pressing themselves in various ways in religious con- paradoxical co-existence of both personal and imper- texts. These I have termed: sonal conceptions of the Ultimate. (Ward 1987: 156– 8.) Since these conceptions seem to contradict each The mood of exploitation. other, it is unlikely that they originate from a neutral, The mood of renunciation. disinterested space of a universal rationality. More The mood of dedication. likely then is the assumption that they spring from human experience from within different moods, and The mood of exploitation may not sound very re- since the doctrine is found in several different tradi- ligious. It is probably the most basic human mood, tions, it seems as if these moods are trans-cultural. since it is absolutely necessary for maintaining our When the same person cultivates both of these con- existence. We need to exploit the world in order to ceptions of the Ultimate from within a religious tra- live. However, it becomes religious, for example, dition, I suggest that it is a kind of aspect-experien­ when God is seen as sanctioning, or even ordering cing, analogous to the aspect-seeing exemplified by our exploitation. Rationality is an important aspect the duck-rabbit-picture. However, the concepts are, of this mood, which may even come to govern the in the religious context, not developed from sense moral and the religious aspects of life. As an example experience, or the experience of something objec- of the exploitative mood, one could cite John Locke, tively present, but rather from religious moods, one who in his An Essay Concerning Human Understand- relational (the mood of dedication) and one unitary ing (2008) proclaims that the native inhabitants of the (which is linked to the mood of renunciation). Both American continent are morally inferior to the white of these can apparently affect the same individual. man since they lack the ability to exploit their very Seeing moods as existential has bearings on rich continent, and that it therefore is the moral duty how one views a presumed knowledge of God. of the white man to carry out this exploitation. From my perspective even the so-called natural or The mood of renunciation is more conspicuously philosophic­al way of attaining a supposed knowledge religious. It expresses itself in attempts to renounce of God originates in a certain mood, a certain exis- the world and become monks, mendicants, eremites tential disposition. Bernhard Lonergan distinguishes or ascetics. It is linked to a view according to which between the intellectual and the experiential paths to we are entangled in the world by our desires, and that a knowledge of God (Jonsson 2002: 33). He presents this makes us suffer. the intellectual as an unprejudiced possibility, in The mood of dedication becomes manifest in the principle open to everyone, independent of culture. loving service of God in churches and temple and in However, I claim that it is actually dependent on the the service of fellow human beings of limited means. mood of dedication, which expresses itself intellectu- It also comes to expression in religious festivals and ally as a kind of glorification of God by the intellect. pilgrimages. Even this kind of religious taste for ‘intellectual devo- These are just examples of three basic moods tion’ I claim to be trans-cultural. It can be found in all which I claim come to expression in all religious tra- traditions and can therefore function as a means for ditions, but express very different kinds of religious- understanding through dialogue. ness, which make way for variety within each tradi- That religious moods seem to be transcultural and tion. They also make it possible to detect similarities that religious traditions are pliable and can accom- in religiousness between traditions in that, for ex­ modate quite a variety of moods, I take to be empiric­ ample, a renunciate in one tradition should be able to ally detectable. There is an interchange between the understand and share experiences with a renunciate religious narrative and the religious person’s mood of another tradition. (Pfändtner 2010: 89–91.) and her way of valuing her experiences. Thus we have

38 Approaching Religion • Vol. 1 • May 2011 seen within all of the major religious traditions, in mean the attempt, from a number of different tradi- the course of history, radical reinterpretations of no- tions, to find concepts and categories that could be tions within these narratives by individuals in a spe- understood and applied within a common shared cific mood and with specific experiences. This has of- space of religious experiences, motives and expecta- ten been considered as heresy, but later on these, we tions. Concepts and categories that can be developed could term them ‘new insights’, have developed into in this way may be seen as akin to Weber’s ideal types. sub-traditions. They are ideal constructs, meant to help us in under- I will give a few examples: we find in the origin­ standing one another and a plurality of ways of being ally non-monotheistic Japanese Buddhist tradition human. the heretic monk Honen expressing the mood of First I would like to make clear some of my pre- complete surrender and dependence on the grace suppositions. I claim that the division between the of Amida Buddha. Similar moods are prominent in philosophy of religion and the history of religions can the Hindu bhakti-tradition, where a personal God no longer be as clear-cut as it once was. I also claim subsequently gains superiority over the impersonal that the atheistic presuppositions of modern secu- Brahman. These moods are characterized by devo- lar thinking should be disputed, and as phenomena tional love and saving grace resembling ways of being from within the Christian tradition today are used religious in the dominant Christian contexts. How- for critical thinking about religiosity per se, phenom- ever, in the Christian tradition we also find mystics ena from, for example, the Indian tradition can be like Meister Eckhart, suspected of heresy within his used, and applied to religiosity per se. I claim that this own tradition, who expresses a religious mood and is fruitful and maybe necessary if we are to develop a understanding which, according to many, resemble postcolonial philosophy of religion. the ones found in Zen Buddhism (Suzuki 1975). I will now give an example of how concepts from One important point I would like to stress is that Indian religious traditions can be used to conceptu- the religious experience of truth is not just a trigger- alize different kinds of religiousness. In verse 16 of ing of the intellectual taste, the curious and some- the seventh chapter of the Bhagavad-gita four kinds times mastering desire to conceptualize the Ultimate. of pious people, sukritinah, are said to engage them- It is rather a total life experience, a transformative selves in religious activity: (1) the one who suffers, (2) experience, which includes both aesthetic and ethical the inquisitive, (3) the one who desires material gain, elements, and this I take to be true with all traditions. and (4) the wise. We find here, thus, certain existen- So the moods involved are of a great variety, a fact tial situations that can trigger a religious life, on one that has generally not been observed by leading intel- condition, of course, that the subject is a sukritinah. lectual interpreters (mainly male) of the different tra- Since the motives here are very different, I would like ditions. The existential perspective, the turn to the re- to suggest that the religiousness involved is also of ligiousness and experiences of the individual, which various kinds, or moods. I would also suggest that nevertheless is not an arbitrary one, will also be a way these differences in religious motives are not con- of disclosing a greater variety of moods through dia- fined to the Indian traditions, but can also be found logic interaction across traditions.1 elsewhere and are also not limited to certain times in history. Another example of categories of religiousness Drawing from non-Western traditions is the Indian division of religiousness into karma, I will now present some ideas of how the conceptual- jnana and bhakti—activity, intellectuality and devo- ization of religiousness could be carried out by draw- tion—where the path of karma is characterized by ing mainly from the Indian tradition. In this way I surrendering the fruits of your work, bhakti by de- am not claiming that the Indian tradition is superior votional love and jnana by philosophical introspec- in this regard. It is just to give an example of what I tion. I claim that also these are categories that can be am aiming at. By interreligious polylogue, I simply applied trans-culturally and help us recognize what kind of religiousness is involved. If we think in these terms, it would in my opin- 1 These observations are often made by feminist ion be much more fruitful to do research on recent philo­sophers of religion. They claim that if women’s religious experiences are considered, a new dynamics religious phenomena such as New Age. We would be of interreligious dialogue will follow. See for example able to categorize all kinds of religiousness that now O’Neil 1990, 1993 and Young 1995. quite hazardously are clumped under the concept of

Approaching Religion • Vol. 1 • May 2011 39 New Age. We would also be able to specify phenom- Dreyfus, Hubert L., 1991. Being-in-the-World: A Com- ena that now go under the very general concept of mentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I. spirituality. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. An aspect of religiousness which I consider to be Goodchild, Philip, 2002. Capitalism and Religion: The Price of Piety. London: Routledge. neglected is the aesthetic. Here we can also draw from Griffiths, Paul J., 1991. An Apology for Apologetics: A Study the Indian tradition and the concept of rasa, which in the Logic of Interreligious Dialogue. Maryknoll, NY: could be translated as taste. Here the prime motive Orbis Books. for religious engagement is to enter into a mood of Heidegger, Martin, 1953. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max loving relation to the Supreme with a certain kind of Niermeyer Verlag. taste, be it as a lover, a parent, friend, or servant. The —1996. Being and Time. A Translation of Sein und Zeit. concept is used in conceptualizing Indian poetry and Trans. Johan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press. has been extended to the religious realm. I would say Jonsson, Ulf, 2002. Bernhard Lonergans filosofiska -te that a lot of religious behaviour and fervour is moti- ologi. Svensk Teologisk Kvartalstidskrift 78: 30–8. vated by aesthetic moods. With this in mind, I think King, Richard, 2002. Orientalism and Religion: Postcolo- a whole field of creative conceptualizing activity to nial Theory, India and ‘The Mystic East’. London & make more vivid the religious life worlds could take New York: Routledge. place, akin to the kind we find in the realms of art, Locke, John, 2008. An Essay Concerning Human Under- literature and music. standing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. If religious scholars would only focus on these as- Nasr, Hossein Seyyed, 1997. Man and Nature: The Spiritu- al Crises of Modern Man. Chicago: Kazi Publications. pects of religion we may just experience a re-enchant- O’Neil, Maura, 1990. Women Speaking, Women Listening: ment after the disenchantment observed by Weber as Women in Interreligious Dialogue. Maryknoll, NY: having been caused by the exploitative mood of greed Orbis Books. and consumption in the capitalist modern world.  —1993. A Model of the Relationship between Religions Based on Feminist Theory. In: Ö J. Kellenberg (ed.). Willy Pfändtner (Dr.Theol. in Philosophy of Religion, Inter-Religious Models and Criteria. 37–57. New York: Uppsala University) is Senior Lecturer, Study of Religions, St. Martin’s Press. Södertörn University, Sweden. His research interest is Pfändtner, Willy, 2010. Constructive Dialogical Plural- postcolonial philosophy of religion. His main publications ism: A Context of Interreligious Relations. Sophia 49: include Understanding Religious Diversity: A Contribution 65–94. to Interreligious Dialogue from the Viewpoint of Existential Phan, Peter C., 2003. Multiple Religious Belonging: Op- Philosophy (Uppsala 2005), ‘Conceiving Religious Diver- portunities and Challenges for Theology and Church. sity’ in: Willy Pfändtner & David Thurfjell (eds) Postcolo­ Theological Studies 64: 495–516. 2008 nial Challenges to the Study of Religion (Uppsala ), Schrag, Calvin O., 1999. The Problem of Being and the ‘Constructive Dialogical Pluralism: A Context of Interreli­ Question about God. International Journal for Phi- gious Relations’ (Sophia 49, 2010). E-mail address: willy. losophy of Religion 45: 67–81. [email protected]. Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, 1963. The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind. New York: Macmillan. Bibliography Streng, Frederick J., 1995. Structures of Ultimate Trans- Bae, Kuk-Won, 2003. Homo Fidei: A Critical Understand- formation and the Hermeneutics of Cross-Cultural ing of Faith in the Writings of Wilfred Cantwell Smith Philosophy of Religion. In: Thomas Dean (ed.), Reli- and Its Implications for the Study of Religion. New gious Pluralism and Truth: Essays on Cross-Cultural York: Peter Lang. Philos­ophy of Religion. 205–23. Albany: State Univer- Balagangadhara, S. N., 1994. ’The Heathen in His Blind- sity of New York Press. ness’: Asia, the West and the Dynamic of Religion. Suzuki, Dasetz, 1975. Mysticism, Christian and Buddhist. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Westport: Greenwood Press. Cornille, Catherine, (ed.) 2002. Many Mansions? Multiple Ward, Keith, 1987. Images of Eternity: Concepts of God in Religious Belonging and Christian Identity. Maryknoll, Five Religious Traditions. London: Darton, Longman NY: Orbis Books. & Todd. Dawkins, Richard, 2006. The God Delusion. London: Yandell, Keith, 1974. Religious Experience and Rational Transworld Publishers. Appraisal. Religious Studies 8: 173–87. Fitzgerald, Timothy, 2010. Who Invented Hinduism? Young, Dickey, 1995. Christ in a Post-Christian World: Re­thinking Religion in India. In: Esther Bloch et al. How Can We Believe in Jesus Christ When Those (eds), Rethinking Religion in India: The Colonial Con- around Us Believe Differently or Not at All? Minnea­ struction of Hinduism. 114–34. New York: Routledge. polis: Fortress.

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