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The Fletcher School Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2007

Lessons From the Interior: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Syria Ethan Corbin

The role of Islam in Syria today is changing In many ways, however, the Syrian Ba’th and a key instrument behind this change is the party, long the bulwark of regional secularism and President Bashar al-Asad. Hama, Halab, and champion of the near obsolete notion of pan- Homs, the traditional centers of conservative Islam Arabism, is beginning to show distinct signs of in Syria, are no longer the only arenas for outward change under the rule of President Bashar al-Asad. civil expression of adherence to the tenets of Islam. The son of the former dictator Hafiz al-Asad, who Syrian Islamic revival is evident from the city ruled Syria with an iron fist from 1970 to 2000, is centers of Damascus to Aleppo and from the plains proving to be a more skilled statesman than many 4 of Al-Hasaka into the mountains of the Jabal ad would like to think. President al-Asad’s Druze. Increased sensitivity to the state of the incorporation of a brand of state-sponsored Islam is 1 global umma, often referred to as re-Islamization, part of a concerted counter-insurgency effort that is is taking hold large and crosscutting swathes of the changing the character of Ba’thist Syria and 2 Middle East. Re-Islamization is particularly reaffirming the al-Asad family’s grip on power. prominent among the large numbers of In the decades following the 1963 Ba’th party economically and politically frustrated Arab coup and the subsequent Corrective Movement of youths increasingly concentrated in urban centers Hafiz al-Asad in 1970, designed to erase the Arab throughout the region. This fact can be troubling shame of the defeat in the Six Day War by seeking when taken in tandem with regional demographic strategic parity with Israel through a massive arms pressures, from which virtually no Arab state is build-up, Damascus tended to have an approach to spared. It is not uncommon in the region for over Islam that bordered on apathetic. The secular Ba’th fifty percent of a state’s population to be below the ruled the day, often citing the adherence to Islam 3 age of twenty. Syria is no exception to these and its inability to embrace modern science and technology as the reason behind the Arabs’ lack of increasingly interconnected trends. What is 5 exceptional about Syria is the fact that the changes success in the war. The embrace of Islam shifted to are happening under the watchful eyes of the more of a nod to cultural powerful and ardently secular members of the heritage than societal Syrian Ba’th party who have a long history of piety. Nonetheless, fear President al-Asad’s showing very little tolerance for any forms of certainly factored into incorporation of a expressions of Islam on a grand scale. public expressions of Islam following the brutal brand of state- crackdown in Hama of the sponsored Islam is part 1976 to 1982 Muslim Ethan Corbin, Fletcher MALD 2007, completed his Brotherhood-led Islamist of a concerted counter- MA in Middle Eastern History at Paris IV- La insurgency that left insurgency effort that Sorbonne in 2005. Currently, he is a second-year anywhere from 5,000 to student concentrating in International Security 10,000 dead at the hands is changing the Studies and Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization. 6 of government forces. character of Ba’thist His current article is based upon his MALD thesis, Today, the streets of “Bashar Logic: State-Building in Syria and the Syria and reaffirming Damascus are replete Dilemmas of Succession.” He will begin his Ph.D. at with examples of these the al-Asad family’s the Fletcher School this fall. changes in the heretofore, grip on power

relatively secular city. The number of restaurants and hateful speech has always been directed withdrawing alcohol from their offerings is on the outwards – most often at the United States or Israel. rise. Women are increasingly wearing headscarves Their continued growth in popularity has led to a from the souks in the heart of the medina to the new nickname for the state-endorsed clerics, 9 bourgeois neighborhoods. Previously nonexistent mushayikh al-sultan (Sultan’s Clergy). Salah Eddin traffic jams are a common Kuftaro best exemplifies this phenonemon. affair during the Friday call Kuftaro’s mosque, Abu Nour, is the most popular Syria is now the state 7 to prayer. These in Damascus, receiving over 10,000 weekly of Bashar and the phenomena in even the worshipers at his services. Kuftaro is considered the 10 manipulation of Islam most secular and hard-line most high profile of Bashar’s Clergy. The Syrian of states in the Middle East state also recently added religious programming is one of many tactics lead many to question not on television, is constructing new mosques, and is in the strategy of only the stability, but the establishing new religious schools – changes longevity of the ruling Ba’th deemed shocking by many Syrians given the regime survival 11 party as well. virulently secular history of the Ba’thist state. Much of the literature Still, in an historical review of what constitutes today on Syria portends the coming dissolution of authority and the degree of underlying legitimacy the state at the hands of long dormant sub-state it brings, President al-Asad’s increasing tolerance pressures such as political Islam. Bashar al-Asad of Islamic expression is a gamble that history shows faces a stiff challenge in the face of growing to be quite dangerous. A study of the waves of popular support for Islamic expression, but by all pressure upon the state by sub-state Islamic forces indications, the al-Asad regime remains resilient. reveals not only the strategy and goals of the President al-Asad’s real challenge lies in balancing Islamic insurgent forces but also the general between Islam and his discrete battle against the effectiveness of the Syrian state at quelling these subversive forces of political Islam. The tendency to forces within its borders. speak of a growing chance for civil disorder is often, in part, specious journalistic and government speculation that is easily exacerbated by the closed A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC REBELLION – nature of the regime, and fueled by the warnings of long-exiled members of the scattered Syrian PRECURSORS TO HAMA 8 Muslim Brotherhood. Articles on the handful of The history of the twentieth century in Syria violent attacks from Mezzah in 2004 to the most reveals that Islamic forces challenge the state with recently foiled attempt at the American Embassy surprising regularity. Beginning with the Arab on September 12, 2006 reveal the dual nature of revolt in 1925, a form of an Islamic-led insurgency these phenomena. In one sense, these attacks signal occurred approximately every twenty years. With a potential prelude to the rise of Islamist forces this in mind, it is not shocking to see the state so against the Syrian state; in another, they may mark involved in a pre-emptive counter-insurgency a clear measure of continuity between Hafiz al- campaign. After the collapse of the Ottoman Asad and his son Bashar in their effectiveness at Empire and during the contentious reorganization waging counter-insurgency campaigns. The of Syrian territorial and ideational identity, Islamic gradual shift in the nature of the regime from less groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood rose up as Ba’th-focused to a hybrid socialist state caught a force to challenge the state and, until their between gradual political and economic reform, decimation in 1982 at the hands of Hafiz al-Asad, measured acceptance of Islam and continued managed to improve the efficiency and regional realpolitik underscores the personal effectiveness of their campaigns with each effects the leader has upon the Syrian state successive attempt. structure. Syria is now the state of Bashar al-Asad In 1925, the Great Revolt broke out in the and the manipulation of Islam is one of many remote Jabal ad Druze among a geographically tactics in the strategy of regime survival. confined religious minority, the Druze, with A state-led embrace of Islam is in full effect in tenuous ties to the existing nationalist forces Syria. It is being used as a preemptive means of clamoring for the establishment of an independent countering the threat of renewed radical Islamic Arab state on the historic bilad al-sham. The bilad elements in the country, elements long dormant in al-sham, the ‘northern region’ in Arabic, but which the wake of the 1982 Hama massacre and the also encompassed the concept of Suriya al-Kubra subsequent draconian legal and security measures or, Greater Syria, in modern day Lebanon, Israel, taken against them. Throughout the past decade a Jordan as well as parts of Iraq and Turkey, was the vast network of state-sponsored imams have Arab nationalist conception of statehood in the appeared delivering a message of tolerant Islam, region for the post-Ottoman era. Following the

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lead of the Druze, the Turkoman captain in the support can be used to confront popular 16 Syrian Legion, Fawzi al-Qawuqi, led a rebellion resistance. Al-Quwatli sought to turn supporters out of Hama against the French occupying forces. against the clerics by publicly discrediting them. The French had always been wary of Hama as it With most al-Gharra supporters living in the was the most religiously conservative and anti- poorer neighborhoods of the city, Quwatli French town of all of their mandate territory. terminated the government hand-out programs Aiding al-Qawuqi was a newly formed legion of (primarily milk and flour). When the people came disaffected Hama religious leaders. The group had to collect, they were told to see the sheikhs that established contact with an extensive network of were inciting them against the state for their 17 nationalist leaders throughout the country, hoping provisions. The popular resistance soon faded as to establish an Islamic state after France’s 12 the people no longer saw a reason to support the al- expulsion. They called themselves Hezbollah. Gharra movement. The first, albeit small, attempts When reinforcements from Damascus and at a form of political Islam in Syria by the al-Gharra Aleppo arrived, the French counter-insurgency bloc are interesting for several reasons. Most campaign was brutal. The French air force bombed important among them was that it was able to the commercial center of Hama, killing hundreds penetrate the nascent Syrian governing system and devastating the infrastructure of the city’s and articulate the grievances of the population that center. The French also used Senegalese tirailleurs felt marginalized by the state’s secular policies. Yet as colonial troop reinforcements to burn the houses al-Gharra ultimately failed to sustain any form of of local notables. Within three days French troops resistance to the Syrian state once drained of its emptied the city of insurgent fighters. Al-Qawuqi popular support by the state’s actions. fled with his men and Hezbollah separated from the insurgent forces rising up in other regions of 13 the country. Lacking a common political goal, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC REBELLION – cohesive popular support, and external funding or sanctuary, the Great Revolt was crushed by the THE HAMA DILEMMA following year, never again to challenge the In their two large-scale encounters with the boundaries or structure of the French Mandate. Muslim Brotherhood, the Ba’thist governments of Less than twenty years later, political Islam Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1963 to 1970), and Hafiz al- emerged in the Syrian Parliament under the Asad (1970 to 2000), found their regimes mired in elected bloc al-Gharra, the party of the deceived. violence in the same city – Hama. Though it The bloc was in direct opposition to the secular changed its outward appearance over the years regime of Syrian president Al-Quwatli and after the armed uprising against the French in presented a list of demands calling for, among 1925, the essential characteristics of Hama other things, the end to gender mixed public remained the same – it was the fourth largest city transportation, the prohibition of serving of alcohol, in Syria, by far the most religiously conservative (Sunni) and a long-standing symbol of the and the elimination other vice establishments – all 18 was to be policed by a moral police force under the oppression of the rural poor. Hama was the most 14 aegis of the state. The anti-Ba’th of all regions. Goutte du Lait ball, where Shortly after the 1963 coup that installed the The history of the local Damascene politicians Ba’th party, the Muslim Brotherhood rose up twentieth century in and notables’ wives would against what it considered an apostate, and attend unveiled provided therefore illegitimate, government in Damascus. Syria reveals that the necessary spark for the While the Ba’th was distracted with the events of its Islamic forces ensuing violence. affiliate party in Iraq, a campaign of incendiary Animosity was so anti-Ba’th sermons spread across urban centers in challenge the state with strong it sparked street Syria, resulting in street riots. External support for surprising regularity. rioting, pushing al-Gharra the growing Muslim Brotherhood insurgency leaders, along with local flowed in from sympathetic regimes in Iraq and Beginning with the clerics, to threaten the Egypt. As a result, splinter cells such as the Islamic Arab revolt in 1925, a unleashing of a greater Liberation Movement in Aleppo and the Fighting 15 Vanguard (al-Tali’a al-Muqatila) in Hama burst onto form of an Islamic-led popular uprising. With the 19 nascent Syrian paramilitary the fray. insurgency occurred forces lacking arms, the By April 1964, the rioting, now buttressed by methods used by the an external support network as well as action cells, approximately every developed into an ostensible religious war in Quwatli government to 20 twenty years quell protests are a clear Hama. Banding together, the extreme elements of demonstration that popular the Muslim Brotherhood erected roadblocks and

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stockpiled weapons and provisions. Upon derivative of Islam, prominent Lebanese Shi’a encountering stiff military resistance from the cleric Imam Musa al-Sadr eased the tensions Ba’th military, Marwan Hadeed, the leader of the between al-Asad and his Sunni critics in general, Fighting Vanguard, moved the fighters into the and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. Though Sultan Mosque where they positioned themselves Sadr’s move further aided al-Asad with the for a stand-off. Believing that other militias around continued sectarian claims against his regime, the the country would soon engage the military as fatwa was of dubious conciliation to those who well, thereby forcing a government collapse, the viewed the ‘Alawi as apostates. Fighting Vanguard unleashed all of their As the appeasement of the Sunni radical 21 firepower on the government forces. Faced with elements was still far from reach in Syria, the the prospect of a nationwide insurgency, the Prime period between 1964 and 1976, therefore, must be Minister, General Amin al-Hafiz, ordered air raids looked as a time during which the Muslim 22 and full-scale shelling of the mosque. The severe Brotherhood opposition sought to reorganize, measure worked, as the Fighting Vanguard and rearm, and draw upon the lessons learned from other fighters surrendered. The government killed their previous defeat. In addition to having over seventy Muslim Brotherhood fighters and recovered materially and morally, four other key captured hundreds more. Though the bombing of precipitants to the renewed Muslim Brotherhood the Sultan Mosque sparked outbreak in 1976 existed. The first was economic. outrage throughout the country, it Though al-Asad rode on the served as a sufficient warning to As the appeasement of shoulders of giants at the stymie agitators in other cities. A the Sunni radical beginning of the decade due to lack of organization, clarity of genuine economic success, the message, and popular support elements was still far Corrective Movement, in the words of Patrick Seale, “began to throughout Syria crippled the from reach in Syria, the 27 chances of the insurgent forces period between 1964 look tarnished.” Inflation, against the state. unemployment, and a loss of When Hafiz al-Asad assumed and 1976, therefore, strategic rent sent the Syrian power in 1970, his Corrective must be looked as a economy into the doldrums. The Movement imbued the country loss of rent was due to the Gulf with renewed enthusiasm and time during which the States’ reluctance to continue to bolstered the Ba’th’s popular Muslim Brotherhood support al-Asad, because of his support. The series of elections and decision to side with the Maronite economic reforms infused al- opposition sought to Christian Phalangist militia in the Asad’s regime with levels of reorganize, rearm, and confusion of the nascent Lebanese legitimacy unmatched in modern civil war. Second, as the realms of 23 Syrian history. His state building draw upon the lessons regional realpolitik clashed with strategies exploited the naturally learned from their the realms of domestic sensitivity, bifurcated Sunni majority, previous defeat the general Muslim population commanding loyalty from each was outraged at the idea of Syria with either patronage vis-à-vis the entering the Lebanese civil war on urban elites or continued land reforms for the rural the side of the Phalangist militia. The third 24 poor. Al-Asad further bolstered his legitimacy in assumes that in the massive waves of Ba’th party the eyes of the Syrian population by his relative recruitment during al-Asad’s presidency, successes against Israel in the war of 1973 – not only significant infiltration by the extremist elements was he a Syrian hero, but he was an Arab hero as occurred. The fourth is the fact that the Muslim well. Brotherhood had been very effective at creating a sort of monopoly over the Syrian school system for As an ‘Alawi, and therefore of a minority 28 ethnicity within Syria, such skilled state long enough to have a near generational effect. consolidation was particularly necessary for al- Assassinations and bombings shattered the Asad. Among the Syrian sectarian mosaic, the relative tranquility of Syrian life following the ‘Alawi were particularly disliked by the majority Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil war. Sunni population. They had been used by the Reminiscent of the Front de Libération nationale’s French in the troupes spéciales du Levant as a (FLN) tactics in Algeria under the leadership of 25 method of calming the interior. Though they Ben Bella, in the virtually impenetrable urban claimed to be a Shi’a offshoot, specifically of the terrain of the medinas and casbahs of the northern Twelver Shi’a branch, the rest of the Syrian Islamic cities of Hama and Aleppo, insurgents could 26 execute an attack and then disappear into the community viewed them as heretics. By issuing warren of the city that had become their sanctuary. a fatwa in 1973 declaring the ‘Alawis to be a Shi’a

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The attacks continued for three years and what the post- al-Asad regime in Syria would be 33 remained relatively small scale until the June, 1979 like. attack on the Aleppo Artillery School. Also known At the Seventh Ba’th Regional Conference as the Aleppo Massacre, the attack on the school, at (December 23, 1979 to January 6, 1980), Hafiz al- which a majority of the students were ‘Alawi, Asad’s brother, Rifa’t, marked the tenor of the killed upwards of 83 cadets when a staff member government’s position vis-à-vis the solidifying assembled the cadets in the dining-hall and insurgency by stating, “He who is not with the 29 34 opened the doors to gunmen. This was a Ba’th at this phase is against it.” The socialist declaration of war by the Muslim Brotherhood on nature of the Ba’th party, and testimony to the the ‘Alawi-Ba’th state. success of their organization, allowed for another In October 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood extremely effective, but simultaneously moved quickly to rally a support base by sending dangerous, vehicle for the state counter-insurgency letters to the ulama, or the community of religious program – Ba’th party civil militias. The arming of scholars, calling for a united front against the state. local militias forced the people to face the choice of The letters specifically asked them to support the fighting with the government or against it. Syrian mujahedeen by serving as a single trench of Fortunately for al-Asad, the majority decided the moral and even material support for them (al- insurgency had not proven itself enough for the 35 khanaq al-wahid). Another plea was sent to the militias to switch sides. On June 26, 1980, an armed forces in the hopes of fracturing military 30 assassination attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood unity. Muslim Brotherhood propaganda on al-Asad, thwarted only by a swift kick of one eventually reached the whole country through grenade by the president and the self-sacrifice of a outlets such as An-Nadhir, a newspaper containing personal bodyguard as he pounced on the other, information about the insurgency’s motivations. added a very personal dimension to the 36 By March, 1980 the insurgency was able to hone its insurgency. A direct result of the attempt on al- tactics and apply further pressure on the state by Asad’s life was the establishment and application organizing massive urban uprisings that of Law 49, whereby membership to the Muslim paralyzed cities across the country. Specifically, the Brotherhood became a capital offense. riots spread from their center in Hama to Homs, The fighting in Hama reached its peak in Idlib, Dayr al-Zur, and to the Kurdish region 31 February, 1982 when an army unit fell upon the capital, al-Hasaka. By late 1980 the Islamic Front cell of a young fighter named Omar Jawwad, who, in Syria (al-Jubhah al-Islamiyya fi Suriyah) was in a panic, launched the call for jihad against the formed as a broadly based union of diverse Islamic Ba’th party. Thousands of jihadi fighters and pro-Islamic secular elements in Syria with the throughout the city of Hama soon found Muslim Brotherhood at its core. In many respects, themselves pitched in a fierce battle with the Muslim Brotherhood viewed this as a strategic approximately 12,000 government troops. Within a victory over the Ba’thist state. Not only had they week the fighters were scattered, and for two more broadened their support network, but with the weeks those fighters still alive were hunted down variance of the groups forming the front, they and killed. Though some members of the 21st and believed they had expanded the breadth and 47th Brigades deserted to join the insurgent forces, depth of their popular support network in addition the military remained unified, even in the face of 32 37 to having secured sufficient external support. massive indiscriminate killing of civilians. The Still, the leader of the struggle, Abu Nasr al- death toll in the wake of the Hama fighting was Bayanouni, remained vague in his demands of the estimated between 5,000 and 10,000 – the state and his visions of the government forces often lacking discrimination 38 future. References to Salafist between civilian and insurgent fighters. In the The Syrian Islamic thinkers such as Hassan al- th wake of Hama, the membership of the Muslim insurgencies of the 20 Banna and Sayyid Qutb Brotherhood disbanded into surrounding regional century were abounded in the countries, particularly seeking shelter in Jordan proclamations of the and Iraq, after it was decimated. consistently fractious, Brotherhood, quotes from The insurgent fighters had been regionally contained, Social Justice in Islam figured formidable opponents for the Ba’thist forces. Their among the proclamations levels of training and foreign support at both the and lacking necessary that the Brotherhood would political and financial levels were by far the most countrywide popular emulate the Iranian advanced of any organized insurgency in the revolution and establish country’s history. Their sophisticated support for strategic Shari’a law. Yet this rhetoric communications networks, the size of their arms depth was not sufficient to convey caches and security of their redoubts were yet a clear idea to the masses of another layer of sophistication that the Ba’th

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realized later had been built-up under their noses. from an almost negligent figure two decades 40 Yet, despite the advanced character of their before. The Syrian public and private sectors are organization, size of their arms caches, and depth of only able to channel about 80,000 of the 250,000 to their external support, the Muslim Brotherhood 300,000 new entrants into the work force per year revealed themselves to be politically inept. Their and, as unemployment continues to rise unabated, campaign of terror had long reached the tipping many young men are turning to the mosque for 41 point by the time of the arming of the Ba’th local guidance. The population of unemployed, idle militias, thereby generating a paucity of popular young men in Syria is therefore growing at high will to reject government militias. The levels of rates. One readily available channel for these violence initiated by the terror campaigns allowed young men has been the Iraqi insurgency. al-Asad to incorporate both a powerful response Syrian fighters in the Iraqi insurgency, with a and message of solidarity in his ruthless campaign tacit degree of complicity on the part of the 42 against the Muslim Brotherhood. The vague government, are filtering back into the country. Islamic message, comparisons to Iran, and Syrian fighters are reported to be the second subsequent alignment with highest number among the Arab volunteers in anti-Ba’th secular forces sent 43 Iraq. These so-called ‘third generation’ fighters, The rationale behind mixed messages at best. The veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, have popular support they the Syrian state’s been inspired by the teachings and sermons of embrace of Islam may, garnered ultimately proved 44 to be insufficient for Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. His book on Syria, The in part, be due to the protracted conflict with the Syrian Experiment, underscores two principle reasons for Islamic action against the Syrian state: realization that the Ba’th. In addition, the campaign remained an the perception of the heretical ‘Alawi control over a Islamic forces are urban phenomenon with Muslim country; and, the state apparatus as a the rural plains and hills whole being supported by the West in their changing their tactics regional machinations to maintain the Israeli under al-Asad’s tight 45 and are increasingly control. hegemonic presence. The presence of a growing number of Syrian ‘third generation’ jihadists is capable of challenging inherently destabilizing for the al-Asad regime. the state Further, a failed state in Iraq could serve as a LESSONS LEARNED AND necessary external sanctuary for a Syrian NOT LEARNED insurgency. The Syrian Islamic A well-established Syrian network for foreign 46 insurgencies of the 20th century were consistently fighters flowing into Iraq already exists. External fractious, regionally contained, and lacking supply networks for the insurgency in Iraq find a necessary countrywide popular support for safe haven in Syria as it is within reason to believe strategic depth. The movements were also often that a U.S. failure in the region is in the interests of 47 deficient in external support due to mixed a state like Syria. Once inside Syria, the foreign messages and divided leadership. As such, with a jihadis receive basic training in the use of AK-47s, confused overriding political message, the Islamic Rocket Propelled Grenades and Improvised 48 insurgents found themselves repeatedly unable to Explosive Devices. One estimate in 2005 cited the protract the conflict. Engaging the state in arrival of 150 non-Syrian foreign fighters per geographically limited, asymmetric warfare month. The number of Syrians entering the without an external center of gravity for re-supply 49 western regions of Iraq is less clear. Under and sanctuary has shown itself to be an ineffective significant pressure from the U.S., the government method of confronting the Syrian state. Yet, there is has made efforts within the past year to block these reason to believe that this is no longer the case. The movements. rationale behind the Syrian state’s embrace of There are two types of Syrian fighters Islam may, in part, be due to the realization that the currently flowing into the mêlée of the insurgency Islamic forces are changing their tactics and are in Iraq: tribal members on the eastern Syrian increasingly capable of challenging the state. As border with Iraq sharing a kinship with Sunni one student in Damascus put it, “Since their defeat tribes in western Iraq, and young, Salafi-inspired [in Hama], the Islamists have adopted a strategy of 50 39 jihadists. A key inspirational figure in the infiltrating society from below.” recruitment of these young fighters is Abu al- Today, indications are that there is an amount Qaqa, a preacher known for his incendiary, Salafist of truth to this potential for Islamist infiltration in 51 Syrian Society. For example, even government rhetoric. A U.S. victory in the region would put officials now estimate that almost 30 percent of Syria in an almost impossible regional vice-grip Syrian men regularly attend Friday prayers, up with only Iran to serve as a regional pillar of

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support of the country remaining. Iranian relations foiled September 12, 2006 attacks on the U.S. with Syria have only strengthened since the embassy bear the hallmark of Mukhabarat outbreak of the war in Iraq; in addition to Shi’a orchestration. Mukhabarat, meaning intelligence kinship, the two countries have a keen strategic or intelligence agency in Arabic, has a rather relationship with one another in the ongoing special meaning in Syria. Not only does it signify struggle against Israel as Iran uses Syria as a funnel the internal intelligence agency in Syria, but more for arms to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Yet, in specifically its enforcement division. The character another example of the delicate balance of the of the attacks, and their timely failures, more likely super and sub-state pressures in Syria, the threat of serves as a method of the Mukhabarat a Sunni-inspired insurgency in Syria mirroring demonstrating to the public the climate of terror that of Iraq looms large. If al-Asad is too complicit and fear that any kind of Islamist movement would in his sponsorship of homegrown radicalized, bring down on the country if allowed to challenge 55 Salafist fighters he faces the internal threat of a the state. Confusing and potentially terrifying for significant base of returned jihadists. the Syrian public, these actions further undermine Such a base of idle, battle-hardened young attempts at coordination within the opposition men would not take long before turning their circles both at home in Syria and abroad. A key attention to what they consider to be the indicator of this fact is the nebulous character of the illegitimate, apostate regime of the ‘Alawi ruling group reportedly behind the small numbers of president. An example is the June 2, 2006 failed attacks, Jund al-Sham. attack by a cadre of ten armed masked men on From the attacks at Mezzah to the shootout on Umayyad Square in the heart of Damascus. Mount Qassioun to the most recent failed attack on Surprised in the morning before their planned the U.S. embassy in Damascus, the mysterious attack by Syrian security forces, the young men Jund al-Sham appears at convenient times for the exchanged fire with the guards before Syrian government and is foiled in its attempts surrendering. The young men were said to have 56 52 with uncanny accuracy. Muslim Brotherhood been carrying copies of al-Qaqa’s sermons. If leader Bayanouni stated in a recent interview that 57 these were in fact genuine protagonists displaying he was unaware of the existence of such a group. true signs of Salafi-inspired political violence Government countermeasures, coupled with the against the state, then the indicators could point to political mistakes of the Muslim Brotherhood, bode the existence of radicalizing insurgent cells within well for al-Asad but not the Islamists. Syria. Underscoring the delicate balance inherent President al-Asad is well aware of the popular to the long-standing indirect approach of Syrian impression of the moribund character of Arab involvement in regional affairs, it would now seem nationalism and of the ascendancy of extremist that Bashar faces the challenge of the destabilizing Islamic ideology, particularly in the wake of the effects of such actions within Syria’s borders. strategic victory of Hezbollah this past summer Yet, there are also many indications that the against Israel. This is quite Syrian opposition remains unsure of its direction, significant as probably the Iranian relations with organization, and message. A serious internal- primary pillar upon which external leadership gap remains between the Ba’thism rests is the pan- Syria have only Muslim Brotherhood in exile, led by Ali Sadreddin Arab nationalist ideal. Yet, strengthened since the Bayanouni from its headquarters in London, and much like his father, its internal counterpart within Syria. Bayanouni President Bashar al-Asad outbreak of the war in admits to having very little real knowledge of the adopts a very pragmatic character of Islamic events taking place within Iraq; in addition to 53 approach to the problems Syria. The recent alliance of the Muslim facing Syrian society today. Shi’a kinship, the two Brotherhood with former Vice President In a 2004 interview, he went countries have a keen Khaddam’s secular – and rather personal – so far as to practically negate resistance to the al-Asad government, called the the importance of the Ba’th strategic relationship National Salvation, Front has mixed a secular in Syria today stating that with one another in the message into the Brotherhood’s formerly Islamic- prosperity was his only only message. Such actions have distanced the goal. In a rebuke to ongoing struggle exiled Muslim Brotherhood from the nascent questions of the continued against Israel as Iran internal Islamic networks forming in the wake of relevance of the Ba’th, he Iraq and in the light of the growing government stated, “If it contributes to uses Syria as a funnel 54 acceptance of an Islamic presence in Syria. The prosperity in Syria, we can for arms to Hezbollah 58 recent handful of attacks from Mezzah in 2004, call it socialism.” in southern Lebanon when two bombs exploded near the Damascene In the run-up to his neighborhood’s notorious political prison, to the accession as president in the

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wake of his older brother’s Bolstering this image is the emergence of a By proving himself as death in 1994, Bashar new sort of trinity on view in the omnipresent the defender of the hurried home from his iconographic salutes to President Bashar al-Asad, residency program in Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, interests and values of London to be groomed to and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, follow in the footsteps of his the image of the rise of the powerful and successful Islam, he is able to 60 father. After the requisite Shi’a crescent. Such images are striking examples coalesce his anti- year’s mourning period, of Bashar al-Asad’s ability to manipulate popular Western campaign with public spaces all across Syria aggression outward, focusing it toward Lebanon, his state-endorsed soon became covered with Israel and the United States – much like his father, posters of the al-Asad trinity but in a way that fits the circumstances of the day. Islamification at home of Hafiz, Basil, and Bashar This underscores the remarkable degree, at least with captions reading, by Syrian standards, that Bashar al-Asad is willing “Qa’idna, Mithalna, Amalna” to adapt the Syrian state apparatus in order to 59 (Our Leader, Our Ideal, Our Hope). During the contribute to regime survival. With the counter- remaining years of his father’s rule, Bashar insurgency effort in full swing, and the Islamic face remained in the background, showing up at the of Syria changing, it remains to be seen how appropriate Ba’th ceremony when necessary and successful Bashar al-Asad’s gamble, with speaking only of the necessity of party unity and historically dangerous forces, ultimately proves to the secular state, the dream of pan-Arab unity and be for long-term regime survival. the defeat of Israel. While all of these elements remain today, in a seemingly antithetical twist of fate, Bashar al-Asad has also begun to tout himself The views and opinions expressed in articles are as defender of Islam, the new Arab defender in the strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily face of continued aggression and large territorial represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and footprint of the West on Arab lands. By proving Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia himself as the defender of the interests and values and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher of Islam, he is able to coalesce his anti-Western School. campaign with his state-endorsed Islamification at home.

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WORK CITED

1 Arabic for community or nation, the word umma is now commonly used to denote either the collective nation of Islamic states or (in the context of pan-Arabism) the whole Arab nation. 2 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 19. A major theme of Globalized Islam is the socio-political dynamic of the Arab civil society’s attention to the global umma and the subsequent disassociation with traditional regional expression of Islam, or deterritorialization. This trend is apparent in Syria in several ways. The most obvious being the proliferation of Syrian fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan as a means of ‘going to the front’ of the global Jihad as well as the high number of Syrians involved in the echelons of Al-Qaeda. Other examples would be the outer expression of traditional Islamic dress in non-traditional places such as Damascus and Latakia. 3 Ibid, 18-20. 4 See for example, Eyal Zisser, “Will Bashshar Al-Asad Last?" Middle East Quarterly 7, (3) (2000) 3-12, or, “What does the Future Hold for Syria?” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10 (2) (June, 2006), 84- 107. 5 Hashim, Ahmed, “Iraq: Profile of a Nuclear Addict,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 4 (1) (Winter/Spring, 1997), 103-126. 6 Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), 191. 7Scott Wilson, “Religious Surge Alarms Secular Syrians; Islam’s Clout Among Frustrated Youth Challenging Governments Across Mideast,” Washington Post, January 23, 2005. See also Agence France Press, “Islam on rise in Syria 25 Years after revolt crushed,” January 31, 2006. 8 Maham Abedin, “The Battle within Syria: An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ali Bayanouni,” Terrorism Monitor 3, (16) (August 11, 2005): 8-11; and Murad al-Shishani, “Abu Mus’ab al- Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi Jihadists,”, Terrorism Monitor 3, (16) (August 11, 2005), also Sami Moubayed, “The Islamic Revival in Syria,” Mideast Monitor 1, (3) (September-October, 2006). 9 Anthony Shadid, “Syria’s Unpredictable Force: The State-Sponsored Clergy,” the Washington Post, May 27, 2005. 10 Ibid. 11 Wilson. 12 Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 170-1. 13 Ibid. 14 Salma Mardam Bey, La Syrie et La France: Bilan d’une equivoque, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994), 137-140. 15 Ibid. 16 As a means of maintaining a semblance of control over their former possession, the French had been able to control the amount of arms in the country to the point where the Syrian domestic forces were virtually unarmed at the time of the Damascus riots. 17 Mouibayed, Sami, “The History of Political and Militant Islam in Syria,” Terrorism Monitor 3 (16) (August 11, 2005.). 18 Seale, Patrick, Asad, The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 317. 19 Moubayed. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Hafiz al-Asad commanded the Air Force in its raids over the Sultan Mosque in 1963, which would serve as an eerie precursor to his actions in the same city during his rule 18 years later. 23 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria, Revolution from Above, (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 147. 24 Ibid, 53-56. 25 Khoury, 80-1. 26 Abd-Allah, 42-48. 27 Seale, 317. 28 Moubayed. 29 Seale, 316. 30 Abd-Allah, 116.

10 Al Nakhlah

31 Seale, 325. 32 Ibid., 117-18. 33 See Seale, 336-7, also Abd-Allah, 145. 34 Moubayed, 2. 35 Seale, 327 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid, 333. 38 Abd-Allah, 191. 39 Agence France Presse. 40 Ibid. 41 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Syria, November, 2006. 42 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 140- 1. 43 Murad Al-Shishani, “Aub Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-jihadists,” The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 3, (16) (2005): 1-3. 44 Al-Suri was captured in Pakistan in November, 2005. Though Pakistani officials deny his capture, U.S. officials have stated that he has been captured. Al-Suri’s name has subsequently been taken off of the State Departments list of Most Wanted Terrorists, yet his name has not been added to the capture list. 45 Al-Shishani. 46 Abdul Ahad Ghaith, “Outside Iraq, but deep in the fight: A Smuggler of Insurgents Reveals Syria’s Influential, Changing Role,” Washington Post, June 8, 2005. 47 A good example of this is the ‘French Connection’ discovered in February of 2005 when the DST (the French equivalent of the FBI) discovered a well-established, jihadist recruitment center in the 19th arrondissement of Paris that was funneling young, Salafist-inspired recruits into Iraq through Syrian Mosques. See Feurat Alani, “Le réseau de trois français,” Le Point, February 10, 2005. 48 Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-insurgency, 141. 49 Richard Beeston, “Following the Trail of Death: How Foreigners Flock to Join Holy War,” The Times, London, June 25, 2005. 50 Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-insurgency, 141. 51 Ibid. 52 Moubayed. 53 Abedin. 54 The Open Source Center, “Syrian Opposition Pushes Forward Despite Division,” Washington, March 29, 2006. 55 Moubayed. 56 Ibid. 57 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Syrian Islamist leader, analyst discuss attack on U.S. embassy,” September 13, 2006. 58 Leverett, Flynt, Inheriting Syria (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 70. 59 David Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) 67. 60 Leverett, 114.