MOSHEMA'oz ASAD's LEADERSHIP of SYRIA During the Last Two Decades, the Syrian-Arab Republic Under the Leadership of Hafiz Al-Asa
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MOSHEMA'OZ ASAD'S LEADERSHIP OF SYRIA During the last two decades, the Syrian-Arab republic under the leadership of Hafiz al-Asad has undergone a remarkable trasformation in several important fields: from a notoriously shaky regime with a fragile state structure, a breeding ground for military coups and countercoups, Syria has become since 1970 a stable, powerful country with a higly centralized rule. The socio-political revolution which started in March 1963 by the Ba 'th has continued although with different emphases: the old urban oligarchy of wealthy landowners and proprietors has been replaced by a new political elite, mostly composed of lower classes' upstarts from the countryside. Simultaneously an unprecendented large, strong and modem military force has been created, partly on the expense of economic growth, turning Syria for the first time into a regional power. Indeed, from an object of influence and encroachment on part of neighbouring countries until the 1960s, Syria under Asad' s leadership has asserted itself on certain small neighbours and challenged the other regional power. Thus, while recently turning most of Lebanon practically into his protectorate, and part of the Plo into his instrument, (since 1983) Asad's defied Egypt's predominance in Arab politics after the Camp David Accords (1978) as well as boldly opposed Iraq's military ventures in the Gulf in the early 1990s (against Kuwait). More significantly, and daringly, Asad has attempted to challenge Israel's military superirity and counterbalance its potential threat: the Syrian army for the first time has lately reached a quantitative military parity with the israeli army1 - although not Asad's ambitious "strategic balance". This important 1 - Moshe Ma'oz, Asad, the Sphinx of Damascus, A Political Biography, London and New York, -98- achievement may contribute to deter Israel from attacking Syria, and enable Asad to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights from a position of military strength. Asad even ventured to indirectly obstruct Us military involvement in Lebanon during 1983-84, employing by proxy, terrorist/guerrilla activities against American troops. And although he obtained until recently substantial Soviet military, political and economic help, Asad by no means became a client of the Ussr. Maintaining full Syrian independence Asad managed in certain periods to skillfully manoeuver between Moscow and Washington, and during the recent Gulf crisis he established good working relations with the Us,while still maintaining his strategic links with the Soviet Union. Vis-a-vis these impressive achievements, there occurred also serious mistakes and difficulties, grave setbacks and failures in Asad's foreign relations and particulary his domestic policies, for example: Syria's disastrous intervention in Lebanon during the mid-late 1970s, its miscalculated support of Iran against Iraq during the 1980s and the hazardous involvement in international terrorism, as well as its failures to establish a "Greater Syria" strategic system and its inability to regain the Golan Heights. But Asad's most conspicuous predicament was the 1982 Hama massacre which severely thwarted his great efforts at nation building, and branded his regime as brutal-secterian-Alawi dictatorship, murdering, suppressing and terrorizing many thousand of Sunni Muslims2. Already during the late 1970s Asild's regime was severely criticized by many Syrian Muslims including secular intellectuals because of its corruption (Asad himself was singled out as honest) and failure to solve the major economic and social problems of the country3. This brief, dualist depiction of Asad's balance sheet raises serious queries regarding the character or type of his leadership and policies particulary in relation to the Syrian population and its various political and social institutions. Is it a tyrannical leadership, personal-cohersive, sectarian military by a member of the Alawi minority group (some 12 percent of the population) who rose to power through the military service, and, misusing the name of the Ba'th party, Wcidcnfcld and Nicolson, 1988, pp. 179 - ff. 2 - For details, sec ibid, pp. 149 - ff; P. Scale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, London, Taurus, 1988, pp. 326 - ff.. 3 - Al-Hawadith (~cbanon), 7 December 1979 and 25 January 1980, cfr. Al-.larida al-Rasmiyya (Syria), 11 September 1980. .