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4-1-2018 Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship: Global Evidence from Eighty-Six Countries Kristin Michelitch Vanderbilt University

Stephen Utych Boise State University

This document was originally published in The Journal of Politics by the University of Chicago Press. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1086/ 694783 Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship: Global Evidence from Eighty-Six Countries

Kristin Michelitch, Vanderbilt University Stephen Utych, Boise State University

Elections are defining elements of democracy but occur infrequently. Given that elections evoke mass mobilization, we expect citizen attachments to political parties to wax during election season and wane in between. By leveraging data from 86 countries across the globe to investigate the effect of the electoral cycle on partisanship, we find that the predicted probability of being close to a political party rises 6 percentage points from cycle midpoint to an election—an effect rivaling traditional key determinants of partisanship. Further, fluctuations are larger where the persistence of party presence throughout the cycle is weaker and socioeconomic development is lower. These findings challenge the discipline to introduce dynamic political events into the study of partisanship, alongside “static” individual-level and country-level determinants. Additionally, presumed cross-country or temporal differences in mass partisanship levels, long used as indicators of democratic consolidation or party system institutionalization, may be confounded by electoral cycle effects.

When will I see or hear from those political party people again? They just come around here making noise and giving t-shirts around the election period. If I may say something, between elections, they just abandon us. What those MPs are actually doing there in Parliament, we do not know it.1

lthough they are the most defining element of elec- for coordinating mass action (Tucker 2007). Since elections are toral democracies, national elections are few and far the apex of partisan group competition over policy direction Abetween. Every four years, on average,2 electoral com- and societal resource allocation, such actors not only draw missions stage an event of epic proportions—producing mil- citizens into politics around elections but also endeavor to mo- lions of ballot papers, hiring and training an army of polling bilize citizens to take sides into partisan camps through in- station agents, and executing perhaps the country’s only nation- person events and the mass media (Abney et al. 2013; Ander- wide event in which every citizen could theoretically partic- son 2003; Anderson, Tilley, and Heath 2005). ipate. During election season, a wide variety of actors mobi- In this article, we argue that the cyclical nature of citizen lize citizens. Political candidates and party elites, salivating in mobilization efforts over the electoral cycle affects the level anticipation of obtaining or retaining power, are incentivized and intensity of mass partisanship. Higher levels of mobili- to reach out and mobilize the masses for political support, zation around elections increase the relative influx of infor- whereas they otherwise shift attention to elite legislative pol- mation regarding party brands and partisan conflict (Brader itics (Box-Steffensmeier and Lin 1997; Fisher 1999; Horowitz and Tucker 2008; Lupu 2013), as well as the net benefitofpo- 2012; Lindberg 2010; Wilkinson 2004). Interest groups ramp litical participation in partisan activities (Khemani 2004; Lind- up citizen mobilization efforts around elections given the added berg 2010; Tucker 2007). Exposure to such information and leverage to extract policy from parties (Chandra 2012; Khemani political participation are both well founded to engender and 2004). Civil society movements use elections as focal points reinforce partisanship (Brader and Tucker 2001; Dinas 2014;

Kristin Michelitch ([email protected]; http://www.kristinmichelitch.com) is an assistant professor at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203. Stephan Utych ([email protected]) is an assistant professor at Boise State University, Boise, ID 83725. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu /dataverse/jop). An appendix with supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694783. 1. Michelitch interview with Ghanaian citizen prior to the 2008 elections. 2. Calculation from study data.

The Journal of Politics, volume 80, number 2. Published online February 13, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694783 q 2018 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-3816/2018/8002-0004$10.00 Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 413

Greene 2004; Iyengar and Simon 2000; Valentino and Sears cle when such elections are incorporated as qualifying elec- 1998). Finally, a well-known body of evidence has shown that tions in the cycle, a finding driven by subnational elections from as group competition intensifies, individuals desire to take sides powerful subnational bodies. and increase identification with their in-group, taking actions This study provides an important advance in the study of to strengthen in-group cohesion or out-group hostility (e.g., partisanship. We find that a dynamic factor—the position in Brewer and Kramer 1985; Choi and Bowles 2007; Tajfel 1981). the electoral cycle—can influence whether and to what de- Applied to this setting, party competition alone may induce gree individuals feel attached to political parties. By contrast, individuals to become partisan or intensify existing partisan- existing scholarship has considered “static” individual, institu- ship (Huddy 2013; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Taken tional, and cultural determinants of partisanship (e.g., Brader together, we hypothesize that partisanship waxes during elec- and Tucker 2008; Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Ishiyama tion season and wanes in between. and Fox 2006) or the long-term stability in aggregate parti- By constructing the widest cross-national data set on par- sanship in response to long-term political, economic, and so- tisanship to date, spanning 86 countries across Africa (2000– cial environmental change (Clarke and Stewart 1998; Dalton 2014), the Americas (2004–14), Asia (2001–12), and Europe and Wattenberg 2000).3 Additionally, while previous research (2002–12), and pairing it with data on the dates of national has tended to focus on country-specific or region-specificex- elections using the NELDA data set (Hyde and Marinov 2012), aminations of partisanship,4 with the vast majority of studies we find that partisanship fluctuates, on average, a total of concentrating on high-income countries,5 this study offers the- 12 percentage points over the electoral cycle—dropping 6 per- ory and evidence that is so general as to be applicable to all centage points from an election to the cycle midpoint and regimes with multiparty elections. rising 6 percentage points up to the next election. The mag- Uncovering the significance of the electoral cycle as a de- nitude of this effect rivals traditional key determinants of terminant of partisanship is both normatively and empirically partisanship in these data, such as being male (6 percentage important. Notably, partisanship determines and mutually re- point increase), educated above the country mean level (6 per- inforces a wide range of political behavior and opinions. As centage point increase), and age (4 percentage point increase Brader and Tucker sum up: “Partisanship is the central orga- for each additional decade). The finding is robust to an ex- nizing principle of mass politics” (2008, 3). Scholars have found amination of the intensity of closeness to a political party in partisanship not only to be highly associated with the pro- a subsample for which we have data: partisanship is more pensity to vote and vote choice (e.g., Butler and Stokes 1963; intense at election time than in between. Given the statisti- Campbell et al. 1960; Dinas 2014; Ishiyama and Fox 2006) but cal and substantive significance of these findings, we believe also with other forms of political participation and engagement that the discovery that the electoral cycle influences parti- (e.g., Fowler and Kam 2007; Gerber, Huber, and Washington sanship represents a novel advance in one of the most well- 2010; Greene 2004; Huddy 2013; Huddy et al. 2015), as well as studied phenomena in political science. political attitude formation (e.g., Lodge and Hamill 1986). We expound upon this finding in three ways. First, an Given the salient role of partisanship, stable and high levels observable implication of the theoretical mechanism is that of mass partisanship have been cited as the glue that attaches fluctuations in partisanship should be larger where parties do citizens to elite politics in a democracy, allowing them input, not have permanent community presence over the electoral oversight, and a vehicle for participation in politics (Almond cycle. Indeed, we find evidence that fluctuations are much and Verba 1963; Weisberg and Greene 2003). Our work has larger where the permanence of party presence is weaker. shown that this glue dissolves over the years between the Second, we posit and test whether fluctuations in partisan- ship over the electoral cycle are larger where the country level 3. Relatedly, those studying vote intention and turnout in second-order of development is lower, democracy is younger, competitive- elections have long noted that such behavior is affected by the position within ness is higher, voting is compulsory, the effective number of the first-order election cycle (e.g., Reif and Schmitt 1980) and even that such fi parties is higher, the electoral system is more party-centric, and second-order elections may affect behavior toward rst-order politics (Bechtel fi 2012). the electoral cycle is longer. We nd evidence that electoral 4. Huber et al.’s (2005) inter-regional investigation spanning Western cycle fluctuations in partisanship are indeed larger in lower Europe and North America is a notable exception. income countries, as measured by the Human Development 5. For Africa, see Ferree and Horowitz (2010), Harding and Michelitch Index, but find no support for other moderating effects. Last, (2017), Ishiyama and Fox (2006), and Kuenzi and Lambright (2011). For Latin America, see Lupu (2013), Medina et al. (2010), Perez-Linan (2002), and Sam- we collect data on the dates of nation-wide “second-order” uels (2006). For Eastern Europe, see Brader and Tucker (2001, 2008), Miller fi (subnational and supranational) elections. We nd evidence and Klobucar (2000), and Rose and Mishler (1998). For Southern Europe, see that partisanship fluctuates slightly more over the electoral cy- Gunther and Montero (2001) and Lisi (2014). And for Asia, see Sheng (2007). 414 / Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship Kristin Michelitch and Stephen Utych

“cheap talk” of electoral campaigns—when the “real politics” the extent possible, public opinion surveys could consider keep- of legislating and implementing policy occur. Sagging parti- ing the timing of survey data collection consistent during the sanship between elections—and with it political engagement— electoral cycle so as to facilitate within-country over-time and can thus be seen as problematic for a well-functioning democ- cross-national comparisons of partisanship and other mea- racy in terms of a weakening citizen-state connection for many sures affected by the electoral cycle. years between elections. As the opening quote suggests, cit- izens can feel “abandoned” by national politics outside of THEORY elections when politicians no longer need citizens’ votes (Lind- Partisanship has been conceptualized in comparative poli- berg 2010). Indeed, depressed citizen engagement between tics scholarship as when an individual “feels close to a political elections has been well noted to mutually reinforce political party” (Brader and Tucker 2008; Huber et al. 2005; Ishiyama business cycle dynamics, in which government is much more and Fox 2006). Importantly, this study focuses on partisan- responsiveness around elections (Golden and Min 2013). That ship toward any party whatsoever and not the more well- the present study found electoral cycle fluctuations in parti- studied phenomenon of partisanship type—allegiance toward sanship to be much larger in low-income countries is consis- one party over another (see discussion and review in Johnston tent with Shi and Svensson’s (2006) finding that the political [2006]). Thus far, partisanship presence has been found cross- business cycle is stronger in such contexts. nationally to be determined by both individual traits (e.g., On the other hand, fluctuations in partisanship over the gender, education, age, urban/rural status), country-level insti- electoral cycle may be beneficial. For one, partisanship biases tutional factors (e.g., clarity of responsibility), or an interac- attitude formation and the consumption and perception of tion between the two (Huber et al. 2005). In addition to these political news media (e.g., Bartels 2002), as well as attribution “static” factors, researchers have examined long-term change in of blame for political failure (e.g., Malhotra 2008). Having a partisanship presence over decades due to macrolevel changes less-biased citizenry between elections may help citizens more in society (e.g., Clarke and Stewart 1998; Dalton and Watten- clearly evaluate government performance or consider and in- berg 2000). In this article, we seek to expand upon these veins corporate new ideas—allowing citizens to hold government of scholarship to include a dynamic determinant of partisan- actors more accountable. The presence and intensity of par- ship: the electoral cycle. tisanship is also linked to higher levels of societal polariza- As an 86-country study, this article seeks to provide as tion (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and discrimination broad a theoretical and empirical treatment of the effect of between citizens on partisan lines across diverse settings in the electoral cycle on partisanship as possible, given the data ostensibly nonpolitical activities (Carlin and Love 2013; Fowler available. Our arguments apply to any regimes holding multi- and Kam 2007; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Moreso, elec- party elections, whether they be new or old democracies, com- tions have been shown to exacerbate interpartisan discrimi- petitive or noncompetitive, or characterized by various styles nation in ordinary, real-life economic activities (Michelitch of campaigning. Like others taking a cross-national approach, 2015) and correlate with increased political violence (Dun- we remain agnostic about the “pathways to partisanship” (Brader ning 2011). Such authors may view sustained “election levels” and Tucker 2008) as being a social psychological attachment of partisanship throughout the electoral cycle as a danger to to a party as a social group (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse the well-being of society in terms of national unity. 1969; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Greene 2004), a Last, levels of partisanship are often compared cross- running tally of parties’ performance information (Achen 2002), nationally as an indicator of party system institutionalization or both (Fiorina 1981). (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007) and Importantly, our central arguments in this article are rel- democratic consolidation (Brader and Tucker 2001; Converse evant to both perspectives, and we draw from both to theorize 1969). This work has shown that electoral cycle effects are quite the relationship between the electoral cycle and partisanship. large in magnitude, implying that cases of presumed cross- Both perspectives underscore the stability of partisanship national differences in mass partisanship levels (e.g., Ishiyama type, that is to say, that individuals do not typically switch and Fox 2006; Keefer 2010; Lisi 2014; Pereira 2012; Sheng allegiance between parties without major shifts in the party 2007), as well as over-time differences in mass partisanship landscape. However, both perspectives allow for changes in levels within a country (e.g., Schickler and Green 1997), may partisanship presence and intensity. The running tally per- be confounded by election cycle effects.6 We suggest that, to

not face this potential omitted variable. Unfortunately, election studies are 6. Surveys that hold proximity to an election relatively constant (e.g., scarce in the developing world and researchers therefore can rely more election studies such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) would heavily if not exclusively on the public opinion barometers. Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 415 spective, for example, holds that citizens engage in Bayesian Concurrent with party mobilization of citizens, “interest updating with respect to expected future benefits from a party groups” (e.g., ethnic groups, business associations, and civil (Achen 2002) or retrospective party evaluations (Fiorina 1981). society groups) play an active role in mobilizing citizens to As individuals receive more information about party fitinthe partisan sides at election time (Chandra 2012; Green and short or medium term, they update their closeness to the Gerber 2008; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Of course, such party. On the other hand, the social psychological theory of interest groups conduct important activities throughout the partisanship as a social group identity would hold that the electoral cycle (e.g., lobbying political officials around law intensity (also called salience or strength) of group identity making and implementation, holding meetings and events). could fluctuate in the short-term due to in-group mobili- However, elections represent a key time of leverage to extract zation efforts and/or intergroup competition (Brewer and policy from politicians in exchange for “electoral resources” Kramer 1985; Huddy 2013; Huddy et al. 2015; Tajfel 1981). such as votes or campaign donations (Khemani 2004). Thus, In line with these theories, we expect individuals’ partisan- citizen mobilization efforts by interest groups are much more ship to wax and wane in presence and intensity over the active at election time to marshall such electoral resources course of the electoral cycle. (Anzia 2011). Last, elections may act as focal points for coordinating Electoral cycle fluctuations in citizen mobilization partisan political participation in the form of civil society We expect that the temporal proximity to an election in- movements (Tucker 2007). Not only can citizen movements, creases partisanship for multiple reasons. First, elections cat- like interest groups, take advantage of the political competi- alyze an increase in partisan mobilization of citizens (Box- tion to capture domestic and international attention and gain Steffensmeier and Lin 1997; Fisher 1999; Horowitz 2012; leverage over political elites, but elections make a convenient Lindberg 2010; Plasser and Plasser 2002; Tucker 2007; Wil- rallying point to coordinate collective organization. For ex- kinson 2004).7 As party elites and their candidates anticipate ample, by revealing a growing level of popular discontent with the prospect of obtaining or retaining political power leading major fraud by an incumbent party, elections may spark im- up to an election, they hit the campaign trail to mobilize mediate post-election citizen mobilization (Little, Tucker, and citizens. Partisan mobilization efforts from political parties LaGatta 2015; Tucker 2007). Citizens throughout the country are lower during the midpoint of the electoral cycle and in- receive a relatively simultaneous signal, and there is a lim- crease during “campaign season” as the next election draws ited time frame to resolve the issue before the incumbent near, lingering afterward during any disputes or protests party takes office. over election results (Tucker 2007; Wilkinson 2004), coali- tion formation (Fisher 1999), or distributions of patronage The effect of citizen mobilization on partisanship (Lindberg 2010). In some instances, parties may completely There are two major and well-demonstrated pathways through disappear outside of elections, as the opening quote of this which partisan mobilization efforts may increase citizens’ par- article suggests. Local offices, staff, and candidates may pack tisanship: (1) through an influx of partisan campaign infor- up and head back to the capital, and funds deplete for “party mation and (2) by increasing the net benefit of political par- boys” to blast campaign messages from speakers strapped to ticipation. slow-moving vehicles. In other instances, parties may main- tain more of a permanent presence in local communities, An influx of partisan campaign information. One of the holding party meetings, sponsoring soccer clubs, conducting most intuitive pathways through which such campaigning outreach, providing information about efforts to achieve par- strengthens citizen partisanship is through an influx of par- tisan goals, or otherwise making themselves available for cit- tisan campaign information, and citizen attention to it (Abney izen complaints or requests. However, even in such cases, et al. 2013; Anderson 2003; Anderson et al. 2005; Bechtel parties shift resources from citizen mobilization to routine 2012). Citizens can be exposed to partisan campaign infor- expenditure on organizational operations, assistance in leg- mation by mobilizing actors in-person—through tours (Jourde islative and executive governing, and fund-raising outside of 2005), rallies (Horowitz 2012), quid pro quo clientelist rela- election season (Box-Steffensmeier and Lin 1997; Plasser and tions (Hicken 2011), or informally through social networks Plasser 2002). (Sinclair 2012). They can also be exposed through mass me- dia (e.g., television, radio, newspapers, the internet), either by the procurement of advertising space by mobilizing agents, 7. Further, government spending increases ahead of elections (Golden and Min 2013), which might be seen as an implicit form of incumbent or by independent coverage of the election by journalists campaigning even in electoral authoritarian regimes (Pepinsky 2007). (Strömbäck and Kaid 2009). Campaigns thus “subsidize” in- 416 / Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship Kristin Michelitch and Stephen Utych formation costs for citizens (Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein vote” campaigns aim specifically to lower the cost of regis- 2004). tering to vote or increase the cost of not voting by evoking Much of this information emphasizes “party brands,” civic duty or social pressure (Green and Gerber 2008). Be- characterizing for what and whom parties stand at election tween elections, such widespread opportunities may not be time (Lupu 2013), as well as valence issues (e.g., integrity, available, especially where parties are not particularly em- competence; Abney et al. 2013). According to theorists of bedded in local communities. Interacting with a party offi- partisanship, such information allows citizens to “update” cial between elections is often costly and difficult. their fit with political parties (Iyengar and Simon 2000), and Citizens expect to receive both experiential and, in many partisanship strengthens (Brader and Tucker 2008; Lupu cases, material benefits through political participation during 2013). Because campaigns and the media seek to organize election season (Hicken 2011; Lindberg 2010). There are two political conflict on partisan lines to mobilize citizens (Freed- types of material benefits citizens in some countries might man et al. 2004; Schattschneider 1960), it follows that in- expect. First, they may expect cash or in-kind goods at elec- creased exposure to party brand information strengthens par- tion campaign events—t-shirts, sugar, soap, rice, stickers, yard tisan divisions and persuades citizens to take sides (Brader and signs, bands, dancing, football matches, and so forth—much Tucker 2008; Greene 2004; Valentino and Sears 1998). Often, like one expects to consume drinks, snacks, and entertain- competition is framed as a shared quest for candidates and ment at a party. Second, citizens may expect if they partici- their supporters to use their symbiotic relationship to gain pate as good partisans by supporting candidates at rallies, access to state resources and policy control versus opposing meetings, and at the polls, they will be rewarded by favorable candidates and their supporters (Lindberg 2010; Michelitch access to state resources or policy if the party they support 2015). Indeed, citizens often select into self-confirming par- wins the election. Outside of election season, political par- tisan media, thereby reinforcing partisanship (Iyengar and ticipation may not be rewarded with such a high amount of Simon 2000). benefits because the benefits have been exhausted at election Party loyalties could also be reinvigorated during cam- time and citizens lose leverage over the parties (Chandra 2012; paigning through an agenda-setting effect. Exposure to party Khemani 2004). competition increases its accessibility in the minds of citizens The positive correlation and mutual reinforcement be- and the importance of partisanship for citizens’ attitudes and tween partisanship strength and political participation is a behaviors (Iyengar and Simon 2000; McCombs and Shaw well-known empirical regularity with strong psychological 1972; Scheufele 2000).8 Electionsmayfurtherincreaseincen- foundations (Brader and Tucker 2001; Campbell et al. 1960; tives to seek exposure to campaign information to become Dinas 2014; Fowler and Kam 2007; Greene 2004; Huddy informed in anticipation of voting or other political partici- et al. 2015; Plasser and Plasser 2002). Behavioral choices pation, perhaps because the utility of such participation in- supporting a party, especially repetitive choices, result in a creases when one is informed (Shineman 2013). sense of commitment and loyalty, intensifying partisanship (Brader and Tucker 2001; Dinas 2014). This reinforcement An increase in the net benefit of political participation. may reduce cognitive dissonance, in which individuals seek Not only do campaigns “subsidize” information costs for conformity between behavior, identity, and attitudes (Dinas citizens, but they also subsidize the cost and raise the benefit 2014; Festinger 1957). Thus, repetitive acts can lead to “esca- of political participation. Mobilizing actors from parties, in- lating commitments” toward an identity (Benabou and Tirole terest groups, and civil society make available and solicit par- 2006). Internally, such acts are “self-signals” to one’sself- ticipation in activities such as rallies, neighborhood or town- concept of identity. Visible acts of support—wearing t-shirts, hall meetings, appearances at prominent businesses, religious staking yard signs, flying flags, attaching bumper stickers— services, markets, or civil society groups, voter-registration remind others of one’s loyalty, reinforcing identity externally. drives, and other culturally specific local events (see, e.g., In turn, stronger partisanship reinforces political participa- Chandra 2012; Horowitz 2012; Jourde 2005; Lindberg 2010). tion (Fowler and Kam 2007; Gerber et al. 2010; Greene 2004; In addition to explicitly partisan mobilization, some civil Huddy 2013; Huddy et al. 2015). When groups are engaged society groups simply endeavor to promote political partici- in competition, individuals can desire to increase the status pation at election time for its own sake—such “get out the and welfare of their group at the expense of other groups, which tends to blur the lines between group utility and in- dividual utility, and perceive costs of political participation 8. Exposure to party brands may be nonvoluntary by observing bill- boards, overhearing radio blasted in open air markets, or driving behind a to further group interests to be lower (Brewer and Kramer car with aggressive partisan bumper stickers. 1985). Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 417

Intergroup competition and group identity salience Last, there may be deeper psychological mechanisms through which elections draw citizens closer to political parties. Tem- poral proximity to group competition, especially high-stakes competition over societal resources, is known to increase in- dividuals’ desire to take sides on group lines in that compe- tition, as well as strengthen in-group cohesion and out-group hostility (Brewer and Kramer 1985; Tajfel 1981). Indeed, some believe it may be central to the fundamental nature of group competition, even dating back to prehistorical times, for humans to attach themselves to groups in times of com- petition for leadership or control of resources (Choi and Figure 1. Electoral cycle effects on partisanship. We hypothesize that parti- sanship waxes toward elections and wanes after, as depicted in this stylized Bowles 2007). Such a fundamental psychological effect of symmetrical illustration. electoral competition between parties may therefore rein- force participation, exposure to information, and partisan “ ” identity. demonstrated that post-electoral euphoria increases polit- ical engagement directly subsequent to major elections.9 Summary and hypotheses Figure 1 depicts a stylized version of our hypothesized In sum, we argue that elections induce a rise in citizen relationship between the electoral cycle and partisanship. mobilization by parties, interest groups, and civil society Partisanship descends moving away from the last election as movements to take partisan sides, which wanes in between. campaigning wanes and ascends toward the next election as fi Higher levels of campaigning increase partisanship through campaigning waxes. Although gure 1 depicts a symmetric an influx of political information regarding party brands and relationship before and after an election for simplicity, we fl partisan conflict, an increase in the net benefit of political wish to emphasize that uctuations may certainly be asym- — participation, and perhaps even a psychological anticipation metric partisanship may drop off quickly after an election of partisan group competition. Gains in partisanship may and increase slowly and steadily as the next election draws mutually reinforce increases in political participation, ex- near, or vice versa. We do not have a strong hypothesis as posure to political information, and group cohesion. We do to the exact slope and shape of the quadratic relationship in recognize that each country—and election—is unique. In- this cross-national study. deed, the exact “bundle” of activities and actors mobilizing citizens at election time, and the strength of different path- RESEARCH DESIGN ’ ways connecting such activities to partisanship, is likely to To test our primary hypothesis that citizens partisanship vary cross-nationally and over time. This article posits that, increases as elections are more proximate, we merge large despite such differences, a very general relationship may exist cross-national surveys from regional barometers. We lever- ’ between the electoral cycle and partisanship. age 464,171 respondents from 86 countries cross-national – While much campaign hype occurs in the lead-up to an barometer surveys in Africa (Afro Barometer 2000, rounds 1 election, it is important to remember that it does not in- 5; http://www.afrobarometer.org), the Americas (Americas – stantly cease after election day. Lengthy waiting times to Barometer 2004, rounds 1 5, by the Latin American Public count ballots, protest and contestation of results or fraud, Opinion Project; http://www.LapopSurveys.org), Asia (Asia – and coalition formation mean that citizen mobilization often Barometer, rounds 1 3), and Europe (European Social Sur- – lasts for quite lengthy time periods after an election (Fisher vey 2012, rounds 1 5), as well as election dates and features of 1999; Little et al. 2015; Tucker 2007). Media coverage of the winner and loser continues to report on party reactions.

Furthermore, once people have participated in an election, 9. Specifically, scholars (e.g., Reif and Schmitt 1980) have found that they may continue to experience a boost in partisanship di- proximity to “first-order” (major) elections carries over into behavior— rectly afterward. Dinas (2014), for example, underscores this such as increased turnout—in “second-order” (minor, such as European fi post-election increase in partisan salience due to the act of Parliament or regional) elections that are positioned shortly after the rst- order elections in the first-order election cycle. However, when such casting a ballot: “party identification is strengthened when second-order elections occur more distantly during the first-order election individuals convert a partisan identity or leaning into a be- cycle (long after such euphoria has depleted), turnout is much lower in havioral choice through the act of voting.” Indeed, it is well second-order elections. 418 / Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship Kristin Michelitch and Stephen Utych elections from our own research and the NELDA data set tion to be the last voting experience, and next election to be version 3 (Hyde and Marinov 2012).10 the next voting experience to create the cycle.13 Our main dependent variable, Partisanship, is measured Further, we hypothesize that the effect of the election cy- by the question “Do you feel close to a political party?” with cle on partisanship will be nonlinear—a U-curve with the response options “yes p 1/no p 0” in these data sets.11 In a salience being the lowest when the elections are furthest away. subset of country-rounds, respondents can state the answer Thus, we utilize the term Proximity 2 along with Proximity to to “How close?” with response options “not very close, some- allow for such a quadratic form. This modeling choice is sub- what close, and very close.” Where included, we can addi- stantiated by observing the relationship between Partisanship tionally examine Partisanship Closeness, coded as 0 if not and Proximity via a Lowess regression, a nonparametric lo- partisan, 1 if not very close, 2 if somewhat close, and 3 if very cally weighted scatterplot smoothing regression (see app. 3.1; close.12 appendix available online). Operationalizing the electoral cycle is a bit tricky, given The focus of this article is on the effect of the electoral that electoral cycles vary in length and electoral rules vary cycle on partisanship. Because the electoral cycle can be rea- widely across countries. We thus measure a respondent’s sonably taken as exogenous to other determinants of parti- position in the electoral cycle between the last election and sanship, it is not necessary to control for other determinants.14 the next election as the percentage of time passed between However, the including known individual level predictors the two, calling this variable Proximity. Increasing values of partisanship allows us to improve statistical efficiency and indicate increasing temporal proximity to the next election. compare the effect of the electoral cycle to standard bench- For example, 0 is the day after an election has taken place, marks. We therefore include individual-level demographics .5 is halfway through the cycle, and 1 is the day of an that have been demonstrated to be causes and not conse- election. In the main analysis, we consider national elec- quences of partisanship. Female is an indicator variable coded tions for president or legislature, designating the last elec- as 1 for females and 0 for males. Urban is an indicator var- iable coded as 1 for urban residents and 0 for rural residents. Age is a continuous measure of respondent age. Educated is an indicator variable for whether a respondent is above the 10. Afro Barometer countries include Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, median education level within his/her country, or below. Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, We model each individual i living in country c at time t

Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Americas Barometer countries include Argentina, as having a level of partisanship Yict: Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re- p 1 2 Y ict g Proximity g Proximity public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 1 ct 2 ct ð Þ Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, 1 1 X0 b 1 S0 1 ϵ : United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Asian Barometer countries include ict f ict Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Phillippines, South Korea, The vector X ict contains individual-level variables. We in- Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. European Social Survey countries include Austria, fi Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, clude country xed-effects to control for unmeasured country- Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxem- level effects, given by a vector of country indicator variables S0 15 ϵ bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, . Last, ict is unobserved/unmodeled determinants of in- Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. We leave dividual i’spartisanship.16 We use logistic regression to esti- out countries that have only had 1 round of surveys, because there would be no good counterfactual along the election cycle for such countries. We include future scheduled elections where possible. Arab Barometer has no 13. Thus, if the last election had two rounds of voting due to a runoff partisanship question. election, the last election date would be the runoff. If the next election had 11. We recognize that the standard comparative politics survey ques- two rounds of voting due to a runoff election, the next election date would tion may capture different notions of partisanship across countries, ranging be the first round of voting. from ideological proximity to clientelistic linkages, to contact with politi- 14. We do not know of a control variable that causes both election cal party actors. Changes over the cycle thus might reflect fluctuations in timing and levels of partisanship. ideological proximity, clientelistic linkages, or contact with political party 15. Including country fixed effects in the analysis allows each country actors. Such a question may further be interpreted differently across indi- to have its own intercept, thereby removing country level effects that could viduals, language translations, or over time. Future work should examine confound results if left uncontrolled. 2 change in the meaning of this question across individuals and countries to 16. We further note that Proximityct and Proximity ct , where we have ’ ensure consistency of the measure. In this investigation, we find it inter- respondents interview dates for surveys, would be Proximityict and — fi — 2 esting that closeness to a political party however de ned waxes and wanes Proximity ict . Otherwise they are the median date in which the survey was over the electoral cycle. fielded. Mostly surveys are fielded over a span of a few weeks to maximally 12. The follow-up question was not asked in the Americas Barometer a few months, and therefore this should make little difference in a cycle of or on rounds 1, 2, and 5 for the Afro Barometer. many years in this type of large-scale cross-national regressions framework. Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 419 mate the odds of having Partisanship, given that it is a bi- Table 1. Proximity to an Election and the Presence and nary outcome variable. With the ordinal Partisanship Closeness Intensity of Partisanship outcome variable, we use an ordered logistic regression. In order to weight each country survey round equally, each ob- Model 1: Model 2: Partisanship Partisanship Closeness servation is weighted by 1/(number of observations from that country round). Standard errors are clustered at the country- Electoral proximity 21.20*** 2.96** round level to capture nonindependence in answers for each (.376) (.435) country-round. Electoral proximity2 1.13*** .90** We present descriptive statistics for Proximity in appen- (.356) (.449) dix 1.3 and for the main dependent variables—Partisanship Female 2.26*** 2.24*** and Partisanship Closeness in appendix 1.1. Appendix fig- (.011) (.015) ure 3 reveals that there is good variation in the electoral cycle Age .02*** .02*** in the data set: surveys were conducted throughout the cycle, (.001) (.001) 2 2 with a median of 50% of the way through.17 We also have Urban .08*** .03 (.019) (.022) ample variation in the two dependent variables. Interest- Educated .23*** .25*** ingly, the world is almost evenly split when all citizens in the (.020) (.026) sample are pooled: 49% are partisan and 51% are not. In Cutpoint 1 2.24 examining the spread of the closeness in the subset of ob- (.321) servations for which we have data, 12% of all respondents are Cutpoint 2 .30 very close, while 28% are somewhat close, and 12% are not (.320) very close. Thus, of the individuals who are close to a political Cutpoint 3 1.98*** party, the majority are “somewhat close.”18 (.325) Observations 464,171 291,449 Country rounds 293 184 RESULTS Countries 86 59 The results support our hypothesis that the electoral cycle influences partisanship. Model 1 of table 1 reveals the results Note. Model 1 is logistic regression results whereby the dependent vari- of a logistic regression of partisanship on proximity to an able is Partisanship (1 p close to a political party, 0 p not). Model 2 is election across 86 countries. As we predicted, partisanship ordered logistic regression results whereby the dependent variable is strength of attachment to a political party (ranging from 0 to 3). In both fluctuates quadratically over the electoral cycle. Figure 2 de- models, standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country-survey fl picts the relationship graphically; the uctuation in the pre- round level, and observations weighted by 1/(number of observations from dicted probability of being close to a political party takes a country round). Country fixed-effects not depicted for brevity. quadratic U shaped form, with partisanship dipping to its * p ! .10. ! lowest near the midpoint of the electoral cycle. The pre- ** p .05. *** p ! .01. dicted probability of being close to a political party is roughly .54 in the first and last quintile of the cycle, while the mini- mum is in the middle (fifth) quintile at .48. This is a total individual level determinants of partisanship. Being male absolute change over the cycle of 12 percentage points. For and having greater than country mean level of education, for the interested reader, appendix 2 contains a graph of the mar- example, is each associated with a 6 percentage point increase ginal effect of the position in the electoral cycle on the proba- in the predicted probability of partisanship. Thus, a counter- bility of partisanship. factual sex change from female to male or counterfactually The substantive magnitude of this result rivals that of achieving relatively higher education is equivalent to moving common determinants of partisanship. In this sample of coun- from the midpoint of the electoral cycle to an election. Last, tries, we can compare the effect of the electoral cycle to the age is associated with partisanship—for each additional de- cade of life, there is a 4 percentage point increase in the pre- 17. See also a histogram showing the number of survey rounds per dicted probability of partisanship. Thus, counterfactually aging country in app. 1.4. The modal number of surveys per country is 5 rounds. by 15 years is equivalent to moving from the midpoint of the We exclude countries for which only one survey has taken place (for which electoral cycle to an election. there is no counterfactual data collection collected otherwise in the electoral The results of the more continuous measure of parti- cycle). 18. A violin plot in app. 1.2 depicts wide variation in the percentage sanship intensity (for which only a subsample of countries partisan in each survey. have data) complement the findings with the dichotomous 420 / Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship Kristin Michelitch and Stephen Utych

robust to the inclusion of countries for which at least three or more, four or more, or five or more survey rounds exists, given the increasing number of counterfactual positions along the electoral cycle from countries with a larger number of rounds (app. 3.4).20 Fourth, the results are robust to dropping elections in which the de jure timing was not de facto re- spected, in case of any possible endogeneity (app. 3.5). Fifth, while election timing in presidential systems is fixed and exog- enous to levels of political participation due to other fac- tors, elections may be called in parliamentary systems, raising questions of potential endogeneity in the latter. The literature on calling parliamentary elections, however, shows that elec- tions are called when the incumbent believes that it is per-

Figure 2. Predicted probability of partisanship over the electoral cycle. On the forming well (i.e., the distribution of partisan type is favorable x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the last election to the incumbent) and might not perform as well in the future (0) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the predicted probability of (e.g., due to economic shocks), not when overall levels of par- identifying as partisan. tisanship for any party whatsoever are higher (Smith 1996). Nonetheless, we show the results are robust to dropping coun- measure of partisanship (table 1, model 2). Given the poor tries for which elections may be called off a fixed term, by le- readability yielded by graphing the predicted probabilities veraging the V-dem variable v2exdfdshs_ord (app. 3.6). Last, of four categories across the electoral cycle, we report the pre- we find robustness of the results to examining only presi- dicted probabilities and fluctuations in tabular form. Draw- dential elections as qualifying elections in presidential sys- ing attention to table 2, we find that the “very close” and tems; that is, dropping legislative elections (app. 3.7). “somewhat close” categories boost at election time, fluctu- ating by 5 and 7 percentage points over the cycle in absolute EXTENSIONS terms. There is no change over the cycle in the proportion We have found robust support that the electoral cycle is a of individuals predicted as “not very close.” Commensurate major determinant of partisanship cross-nationally: partisan- to the gains in the somewhat and very close categories, the ship waxes around elections and wanes in between. We ex- number of nonpartisans fluctuates a total of 11 percentage pound upon this finding in three ways. First, an observable points over the cycle, with the number being higher at the implication of the theoretical argument is that fluctuations in cycle midpoint than close to an election. That is, as elections partisanship should be larger where parties have less perma- become more proximate, individuals are less likely to identify nent presence to mobilize the citizenry over the electoral cycle. as nonpartisan and more likely to identify as at least some- Second, we posit and test whether fluctuations in partisan- what strong partisans. ship over the electoral cycle are moderated by a range of The results are robust to numerous robustness checks country-level factors. Last, we examine whether findings are (see app. 3). First, the results are robust to multi-level mod- flattened or amplified when “second-order” elections are in- eling, a different statistical approach to analyze these effects corporated. (app. 3.2). Second, the results are robust to alternative weight- ings of individual observations (app. 3.3): (a) no weights, points, only round weights 13 percentage points, and all three 34 per- (b) survey and country population weights, (c) survey and sur- centage points. In the main analysis, we use the standard survey weights: vey round weights, (d) only round weights, and (e) survey, 1/(number of observations from country round). Larger effects when more survey round, and population weights. These robustness checks populous countries being able to “count more” thus seem to show effect ensure that the result is not driven by particular countries that sizes to be much larger. Since 86 countries do not represent all countries, 19 we do not make inferences to the global population, however. have more data or a smaller population. Third, the results are 20. If there were only one survey conducted per country, for example, this would be concerning because a “bad draw” could yield that high partisanship countries happen to be surveyed around elections and low 19. Interestingly, the magnitude of the total fluctuation varies ac- partisan countries happen to be surveyed outside of election season. We cording to the different weighting schemes. When no weights are applied, are confident in the results because of the ample variation in the electoral fluctuations change an absolute value of 13 percentage points, while when cycle cross-nationally and a large swath of countries for which we have survey and country population weights are applied, fluctuations amount to many surveys at varying times during the electoral cycle, but these ro- 25 percentage points, survey and survey round weights 14 percentage bustness checks provide further confirmation. Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 421

Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of Partisanship Closeness over the Electoral Cycle

Start to Midpoint Midpoint to End Cycle Start Cycle Midpoint Cycle End Change Change

Nonpartisan .41 .47 .42 .06 2.05 CI .37, .44 .45, .49 .38, .46 .01, .12 2.11, 2.01 Not very close .13 .13 .13 .00 .00 CI .12, .15 .12, .15 .12, .15 2.03, .03 2.03, .03 Somewhat close .32 .29 .32 2.04 .03 CI .30, .35 .27, .31 .29, .34 2.01, 2.08 2.02, .07 Very close .14 .11 .13 2.03 .02 CI .13, .16 .10, .11 .11, .15 2.01, 2.06 .01, .05

Note. CI p confidence interval.

The permanence of party presence individual candidates maintain offices and paid staff at the If our theory is correct, one observable implication is that local or municipal-level? If yes, are these offices and staff per- when the fluctuation in partisan mobilization activities is manent or only during national elections?” The data are cross- greater across the electoral cycle, the fluctuationinpartisan- sectional and were collected in 2008 and 2009, which is for- ship should also be greater. While time-series data on par- tunately in the middle of our study time period. We recode tisan mobilization efforts do not exist for any country, much the experts’ responses in increasing order of permanence: less all 86 countries in our data set, Kitschelt’s (2013) Dem- 0 p no permanent offices, 1 p the party maintains local of- ocratic Accountability and Citizen-Politician Linkages Project fices only during national elections, 2 p the party maintains (DALP) has collected data in a large swath of the 86 coun- permanent local offices in some districts, and 3 p the party tries on the permanence of political party presence in com- maintains permanent party offices in most districts. Given that munities over the electoral cycle. multiple coders coded each party, we next calculated an av- Parties are perhaps the actor most responsible for mobi- erage score for each party.21 Finally, we take a weighted av- lizing citizens. With more permanent party presence in local erage of the party scores based on party vote share (provided communities throughout the electoral cycle, parties may be in the DALP data set). Thus, the operationalization is meant able to maintain more active linkages to citizens that would to capture the overall atmosphere of party presence in a coun- act to increase exposure to party brand information and lower try.22 Figure 7 in appendix 4 displays a violin plot of our mea- the cost (raise the net benefit) of participating in partisan sure of Party Permanence, showing good variation cross- politics in between elections. Where parties have permanent nationally. offices and paid staff, they often hold regular meetings, conduct We estimate a logistic regression interacting Party Perma- community service and outreach, liaise with interest groups, nence with Electoral Proximity and Electoral Proximity Squared, and sponsor youth sports teams or women’s associations. Per- including the same demographic variables and survey weights manent offices and paid staff also ensures a higher degree of as previous models, and clustering standard errors at the availabilityforcitizenstobringcomplaintsorrequestsduring country level. We find that the interactions are significant (see the electoral cycle. By contrast, where parties’ local presence table 12 in app. 4). Figure 3 displays predicted probabilities with voters is fleeting and centered only on the election season, of partisanship over the electoral cycle when Party Presence the contrast may be much starker in the level of opportunity is 1 standard deviation below the sample mean (left panel) to participate in partisan politics, contact politicians, or be ex- posedtopartybrandinformationinsideandoutsideelection 21. The DALP data set also provides the standard deviation of each season. Thus, consistent with this theoretical mechanism, we party rating. This rating has a mean value of .673, with a standard devi- posit that where parties maintain less permanent presence in ation of .307 and a range of 0–2.12. We conduct a successful robustness local communities, fluctuations in partisanship may be larger check dropping countries for which there is higher than 1 standard de- than where parties maintain a higher degree of permanent viation disagreement across experts regarding the permanence of party presence (see app. 4). presence in local communities. 22. Observing party activities and offices in the local community may ’ In Kitschelt s (2013) data set, expert coders respond for affect one’s partisanship even if the party in question is not the party to each party in a country: “Do the following parties or their which one is attached. 422 / Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship Kristin Michelitch and Stephen Utych

Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of partisanship over the electoral cycle. Left, low permanence of Party Presence; right, high permanence of Party Presence. On the x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the last election (0) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the predicted probability of identifying as partisan.

and 1 standard deviation above the sample mean (right panel). 2. Lower socioeconomic development may be associated Low permanence of party presence is associated with an with greater fluctuations in partisanship over the absolute partisanship fluctuation of 22.1 percentage points electoral cycle because: (a)thenetbenefit of political over the cycle. By contrast, partisanship levels are quite stable participation around elections may be greater in low throughout the electoral cycle where the permanence of party income countries due to political clientelism, rein- presence is high.23 forcing partisanship at this time (Horowitz 2012; Lindberg 2010); and (b) the contrast in the avail- Country-level moderators ability of political information via the mass me- We posit and test whether fluctuations in partisanship over dia may be starker over the electoral cycle in low- the electoral cycle are moderated by the following country- income arenas where the mass media infrastructure level factors. Readers can find an expanded version of this is weaker (Horowitz 2012). We utilize the United subsection in appendix 5 detailing thicker theoretical motiva- Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI) as a tion, data sources and coding.24 measure. 3. Systems with compulsory voting may increase the 1. Information about parties, party organizational struc- electoral cycle’s effect on partisanship by drawing tures, knowledge of institutions, and thereby vot- high numbers of people into politics at election time ers’ attachments to parties, grow over time (Converse who are otherwise politically disengaged. When vot- 1969). These more permanent, long-run partisan at- ers are incentivized “exogenously” to vote, they have tachments in older democracies may help mitigate been shown to become more informed and engaged electoral cycle effects. We use the cumulative age of (Shineman 2013). We use the PIPE data set for an democracy variable from the Political Institutions and indicator variable for compulsory voting. Political Events (PIPE) data set (Przeworski 2013) 4. Higher effective number of parties may lead to larger logged to investigate this proposition. fluctuations in partisanship because they lead to mo- bilization more on club, rather than public, goods (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004), thereby inten- sifying the stakes of partisan competition and per- fl 23. Appendix 4 contains graphs of the marginal effect of the position haps increasing electoral cycle uctuations in par- in the electoral cycle on the probability of partisanship at high and low tisanship. The Varieties of Democracy (V-dem) levels of party permanence. data set has a measure of the effective number of 24. Readers may make correlational rather than causal inferences, parties. given that some of the moderating variables may be endogenous, not to the primary explanatory variable (electoral proximity), but to partisanship 5. The electoral cycle effect may be stronger in party- (the dependent variable). centric electoral systems where voters are more likely Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 423

to attach to parties rather than individual politicians base of Political Institutions’ (Beck et al. 2001) (Carey and Shugart 1995). To operationalize, we the measure of average party age. Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote (ESPV) data set, which includes a variable ranking candidate cen- With these data, we undertake two main types of anal- tricity (Johnson and Wallack 2012). yses in appendix 5. First, we show results are robust to the 6. Competitive electoral races may stimulate a higher inclusion of these variables as simple “control” variables in degree of fluctuations over the electoral cycle be- appendix table 14. Second, we interact these variables with cause they are known to entail increased mobili- the electoral Proximity and Proximity Squared variables. We zation activities and lead citizens to learn more in- caution that many moderators are either fixed at the coun- formation about political candidates (Kam and Utych try level or have limited variation over time within a country 2011). However, noncompetitive elections could rep- during the study time period. Because the study has 86 coun- resent focal points for opposition mobilization tries, statistical power therefore becomes limited to detect ef- or ruling party repression (as in electoral authori- fects, especially because the moderator must be interacted tarian regimes) and may thereby intensify partisan- twice. Thus, we urge the reader to view the results with a grain ship (Tucker 2007). We calculate the margin of vic- of salt—that there may be small effects that exist that are not tory by expanding the NELDA data set. statistically distinguishable from zero due to limitations of 7. Voters have “short political memories” (Healy and statistical power. Lenz 2014), thus, it may be that the longer the elec- In table 15 in appendix 5, we show that the only one of toral cycle length,thegreaterthefluctuations in par- these nine moderators for which statistical significance is tisanship over the cycle. We calculate cycle length reached is the level of country development, as measured by from our own data. the UN’s HDI. Figure 4 depicts the predicted probability of 8. The quality of democracy, which we measure by partisanship over the electoral cycle when HDI takes on a the V-dem Electoral Democracy Index, may affect value of 1 standard deviation above the mean (left panel) and the magnitude of fluctuations in partisanship. When 1 standard deviation below the mean (right panel). When democracy is lower quality, we may see smaller fluc- HDI is high, there is very little fluctuation in partisanship tuations if citizens disengage over the entirety of the over the electoral cycle. When HDI is low, the predicted prob- cycle due to disenchantment with the process of ability of being partisan decreases by a little over 10 percent- elections. On the other hand, when elections have age points from the beginning of the cycle to the midpoint, poor quality, it can represent a focal point of mo- and increases just under 10 percentage points from the mid- bilization (Little et al. 2015). point to the end of the cycle. This finding is consistent with 9. Older parties may yield more permanent attach- our hypothesis that countries with lower levels of develop- ments that are less prone to short or medium term ment experience greater fluctuations in partisanship over the fluctuations versus newer parties. We use the Data- electoral cycle.

Figure 4. Position in the electoral cycle on the predicted probability of partisanship with HDI high and low. The left panel is when HDI takes on a value of 1 standard deviation above the mean, and the right panel, 1 standard deviation below the mean. On the x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the last election (0) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the marginal effect of the position in the electoral cycle on identifying as partisan. 424 / Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship Kristin Michelitch and Stephen Utych

Second-order elections Taken together, these results indicate that second-order elec- In the main analysis, we empirically focused on “first-order” tions are important for partisanship, but that some second- elections for the head of government and/or elected repre- order elections (those regarding important subnational bod- sentatives to national government. Many countries have ies) are more important than others. This work thus joins subnational or supranational “second-order” elections that scholars emphasizing the importance of second-order elec- are important but less so than first-order elections. When tions for citizen political engagement (e.g., Bechtel 2012) and such second-order elections do not coincide with first-order is consistent with work emphasizing that the degree of in- elections, they typically see subdued political activity by mo- stitutional authority affects citizen engagement around its bilizing actors and engagement from citizens (e.g., Reif and elections (e.g., Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar 2012). Schmitt 1980). However, second-order elections can none- theless be important mobilizing events drawing citizens into CONCLUSION national level partisan competition (e.g., Bechtel 2012). We discover a striking result: across 86 countries in the It could be that fluctuations exist between any elections Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa, partisanship fluctuates a at all, including second-order elections. We might expect total of 12 percentage points over the national electoral cycle. fluctuations to be smaller when noncoinciding second- The magnitude of this effect rivals traditional determinants of order elections “qualify” as a voting event because off-cycle partisanship such as being male (6 percentage point increase), second-order elections are less likely to be as mobilizing as educated above the country mean level (6 percentage point first-order elections. However, fluctuations may be larger increase), and age (4 percentage point increase for each de- when we include second-order elections, given that they are cade). We extend the analysis in three main ways. First, as an no longer “hidden” throughout the first-order cycle, poten- observable implication of the theory, we find that where tially buoying partisanship in between first-order elections. The parties are more permanently present throughout the elec- role of second-order elections may further depend on degree toral cycle, partisanship fluctuates little, but where they are to which second-order institutions are important enough only present around elections, we observe very strong elec- to induce partisan mobilization (Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar toral cycle fluctuations in partisanship (22 percentage points). 2012). Second, we analyze the importance of a range of country-level We collected dates and expanded our data set to include factors that could potentially moderate electoral cycle fluc- two forms of nation-wide second-order elections—supra- tuations. We demonstrate that fluctuations are larger in lower- national elections and subnational (regional and local) elec- income countries. Last, when “second-order” (supranational tions—that are not simultaneous to national elections in the and subnational) elections are included alongside “first-order” sample. The only countries with supranational elections are (national) elections, we show fluctuations to be slightly larger, European Union countries with European Parliament elec- an effect driven by subnational elections for powerful sub- tions. To measure the power of subnational authorities, we national bodies. use Hooghe et al.’s (2016) Regional Authority Index (RAI) That the electoral cycle affects partisanship, in addition to data set and the V-dem data set. See appendix 6 for more “static” individual factors and country-level institutional fac- detail on the data, coding and statistical models. tors, is an important advance in the study of partisanship. Compared to the 12 percentage point total fluctuation in While our theoretical expectations are motivated by existing partisanship over the electoral cycle when using only first- comparative political science research, this result also resonates order election dates, the magnitude of the effect of the elec- with lay knowledge of people and politics. Political events— toral cycle on partisanship when adding second-order elections especially elections—candrawpeopleintotakesidesinpar- as qualifying elections is very similar. The total fluctuation in tisan camps. As a result, many people cite particularly striking partisanship over the electoral cycle when all second-order political events that activate their interest and attachment to elections are included is 13 percentage points, with only su- political parties. It is time to incorporate such dynamic events pranational election dates added—9 percentage points, sub- into our study of partisanship and, more broadly, political national election dates only—14 percentage points, and with behavior and public opinion. Scholars of elite-level politics only those subnational election dates added from above mean importance subnational bodies—15 percentage points.25 of powerful subnational bodies, finding it is not. We also examine whether the existence of noncoinciding second-order elections moderate parti- sanship fluctuations over the first-order election cycle, finding that the 25. With the logic that decentralization may mitigate the electoral first-order electoral cycle fluctuation is strong in settings with and without cycle effect since politics is continually “closer to the people,” we examine off-cycle second-order elections, but the fluctuation is slightly stronger in whether the first-order electoral cycle is moderated by the mere existence the latter. Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 425 have long established that the electoral cycle governs such by the omitted variable of the countries’ relative position in outcomes as government expenditure (Golden and Min 2013) their electoral cycles (i.e., it appears that country A has higher and racial bias in US state death penalty executions (Kubik and levels of partisanship than country B, but it is an artifact of Moran 2003). the upcoming election in A). Similarly, what might appear This article sets the stage for multiple avenues of future tobeupwardordownwardtimetrendsinpartisanshipwithin research. First, future studies might attempt to conduct more a country may be confounded by electoral cycle effects. If microlevel research over the electoral cycle that could disen- possible, regular public opinion barometers could consider tangle which features of election campaigns suggested in this keeping the timing of their public opinion surveys relatively study—for example, the mass media, interest group activi- consistent during the electoral cycle so as to facilitate com- ties—are the largest catalysts of partisanship, especially when parisons and analysis of mass partisanship levels and other parties are not embedded locally over the electoral cycle. attitudinal or behavioral measures prone to electoral cycle Further, given the finding that being a copartisan with a effects. winning versus losing party affects citizen attitudes toward democracy as a whole (Moehler and Lindberg 2009), one ACKNOWLEDGMENTS could further examine how partisanship with the incumbent We would like to thank Sangeun Kim and Arturo Maldonado fl versus opposition parties affects the ebb and ow of parti- for research assistance. Thank you as well to Liz Zechmeister, sanship. Cindy Kam, Mitchell Seligson, Larry Bartels, Josh Clinton, Second, a strong relationship exists between partisanship Chris Karpowitz, Marc Hetherington, Sean Westwood, Tariq and political participation (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Thachil, Matt Rhodes-Purdy, and Albert Falco-Gimeno for Powell 1986), as well as political attitudes (Bartels 2002; discussion. We also thank our anonymous reviewers for their Gerber et al. 2010). The results of this article suggest that a feedback. Previous versions of this manuscript were pre- fruitful research agenda lies in investigating the effects of the sented at the European Political Science Association, the electoral cycle on patterns of political behaviors and attitudes. Southern Political Science Association, the Midwestern Po- While a large body of work on second-order (minor) elections litical Science Association, and Vanderbilt University. We (e.g., European Parliament) emphasizes that their timing thank the institutes and their donors for producing and fi during the rst-order (major) electoral cycle increases the level disseminating public opinion data from the 86 countries in ’ of citizens political engagement if clustered around the latter this study. (Reif and Schmitt 1980), scholars have yet to examine the electoral cycle’s effect on yet other forms of political partic- REFERENCES ipation (e.g., contacting representatives, political discussion, Abney, Ronni, James Adams, Michael Clark, Malcolm Easton, Lawrence demonstration) or attitudes (e.g., trust in government ac- Ezrow, Spyros Kosmidis, and Anja Neundorf. 2013. “When Does Va- tors, support for democracy) save Michelitch (2013) study of lence Matter? Heightened Valence Effects for Governing Parties dur- sub-Saharan Africa. 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