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A Bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A Bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy Inaugural Issue | January - March 2021 The Kenya-Somalia maritime boundary dispute: emerging dynamics Impact of the ICJ Ruling on Kenya’s National Security Interests 1 The Influential | January - March 2021 Issue A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy Contents A Bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy 2 The Influential | January - March 2021 Issue A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy TABLE OF CONTENTS Contents Pg. 11 About Us ii Welcome Note iii Editor’s Note iii Introduction iv Editorial Team iv Pg. 20 Internal Dynamics Affecting Kenya’s Diplomatic Leverage in the Kenya–Somalia Maritime Boundary Dispute 1 Development Factors Influencing the Kenya-Somalia Maritime Dispute 10 Pg. 28 Role of Somalia’s Constitution in Resolving the Kenya-Somalia Maritime Boundary Dispute 19 Implications of Piracy on the Kenya-Somalia Maritime Dispute 26 The Kenya-Somalia Maritime Dispute: Impact Pg. 34 of the ICJ Ruling on Kenya’s National Security Interests 31 i The Influential | January - March 2021 Issue A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy ABOUT US he Global Centre for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS) is a non-profit organization based in TNairobi, Kenya. GLOCEPS was founded in 2020 and has an overarching vision of being a leading global centre of excellence in action research, policy influence, and strategy formulation. The Centre is a pioneer institution of excellence that provides a strategic link between experience and inter-disciplinary research on one end and policy formulation and action on the other. In pursuit of this vision, GLOCEPS achieves research excellence through partnerships with like-minded Copyright. organizations, experts and practitioners. The Centre The Global Center for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS) prides itself in its diversity of expertise that combines All rights reserved. seasoned public policy experts and researchers with veteran practitioners and experienced academicians. In doing so, we remain open to new ideas and innovation. The Global Center for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS) Off Kiambu Road, Nairobi Kenya P.O. Box 27023-00100, Nairobi. Telephone: 0112 401331 Mobile: +254 700 279635 Email: [email protected] Web: https://www.gloceps.org Research|Knowledge|Influence ii4 The Influential | January - March 2021 Issue A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy WELCOME NOTE EDITOR’S NOTE It gives us great pleasure as the Global We invite you to read our inaugural Issue Centre for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS) to of The Influential Bulletin. This January- welcome you to read our first edition of The March 2021 periodical contains papers Influential Bulletin. This inaugural publication centered on the Kenya-Somalia maritime contains papers written by our research team. dispute. Each paper examines varied The content is derived from the following implications of the dispute from security, research pillars of the Centre: Defence diplomacy, development and governance and Security; Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; lenses. The insights synthesized from Strategic Interests and Transnational Crimes; the discussions advance key debates on Public Policy, Ethics and Governance and; the intersections between blue economy Development. In line with our vision, these potentials and maritime governance in papers define our interdisciplinary research The Horn of Africa. In the end, succinct orientation that is bound to influence policy recommendations are offered on actions and strategies. how to navigate the dispute including strengthening cordial relations between This edition is organized around the ongoing the two neighbors. Kenya-Somalia maritime dispute and its related impacts on national security, strategic Enjoy the read. We look forward to interests, foreign policy, development, and receiving your feedback or comments on governance. The papers offer several incisive our Inaugural Issue. Feel free to reach us recommendations for amicable resolution of on email at [email protected]. the dispute. Kind regards, We would like to acknowledge the Board Dr K O Asembo, OGW, HSC of Directors and administrative team for their leadership, planning and support roles; ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR research teams for their deep inquests into the phenomenon; and the editorial team for peer reviewing and finalizing the bulletin. We welcome you to be part of our exploratory journey to inspire the globe insightfully. Warm regards, Brig (Rtd) C M Kang’ethe, EBS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR iii The Influential | January - March 2021 Issue A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy INTRODUCTION The third paper by Stephen Nduvi offers insights on the role of Somalia’s Constitution in resolving the This publication contains research discussions dispute. This paper examines the strategic leads that themed on the Kenya-Somalia maritime dispute. the Somali constitution provides to both sides. The five research papers advance scholarly and policy debates at the intersections between blue The fourth paper by Ida Gathoni examines the economy and maritime governance in the Horn of relationship between piracy and the resolution of the Africa. Each document examines varied dynamics dispute. This discussion suggests mitigation options that have a bearing on the maritime dispute. They to counter piracy in the disputed maritime space. contain practical recommendations for various publics including governments, regional organizations and The fifth paper by John Mwangi analyzes the inter-governmental bodies. implications of the ICJ ruling on the dispute while focusing on Kenya’s national security and economic The first paper by Janet Kiguru examines internal prosperity. This discussion recommends that dynamics affecting Kenya’s diplomatic leverage in the addressing the existing policy gaps in maritime dispute. The discussion concludes that before the governance and engagement of the diplomatic determination of the International Court of Justice muscle are crucial in ensuring that Kenya maintains (ICJ) case, Kenya has the opportunity reorganize her her sovereignty and territorial integrity. internal mechanisms and craft a strategic diplomatic recourse. The debates advanced in these five papers rely on global insights from delimitation of maritime The second paper by Michael Owuor explores the boundary issues as well as local and regional development factors influencing the maritime dispute. dynamics. They situate how national security, Among the factors are Somalia’s population dynamics diplomacy, development, governance and strategic and vested interests of local and geopolitical actors. interests matter in regional prosperity. Editorial Team Editor-in-Chief Dr. K O Asembo, OGW, HSC Editors Dr. John Mwangi Janet Kiguru Michael Owuor iv The Influential | January - March 2021 Issue A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy Map of Kenya - Somalia disputed maritime zone Disputed Area (Map not to scale) Photo credit: Allan Muchira v The Influential | January - March 2021 Issue A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy A bulletin of the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy Internal Dynamics Affecting Kenya’s Diplomatic Leverage in the Kenya–Somalia Maritime Boundary Dispute Janet Kiguru Executive Summary Introduction Contradictions within government institutions This paper examines the influence of have largely affected Kenya’s diplomatic internal politics, divided loyalties, Al- capacity in resolving the Kenya-Somalia Shabaab infiltrations and institutional maritime dispute. These stem from pre- inefficiencies on Kenya’s approach to its occupation with internal political issues such maritime dispute with Somalia. These as the 2007/8 post-election violence; the domestic and regional variables have 2005 and 2010 constitutional referendums; profound effect on Kenya’s diplomatic the International Criminal Court (ICC) cases; leverage on the issue. The key findings the 2013 and 2017 elections and the Building and recommendations are informed by Bridges Initiative. Further incongruities expert opinions and secondary data on revolve around divided loyalties, nepotism, Kenya’s foreign policy and diplomacy. corruption, and the impact of the post-election The discussion concludes that with Government of National Unity (GNU) on the two months to the determination of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2008. These the International Court of Justice (ICJ) paradoxes are further deepened by Kenyan- case, Kenya has the opportunity to Somali irredentism factor, cross-border craft a strategic diplomatic recourse. tensions and the Al-Shabaab question. Nevertheless, she should prioritize getting her house in order. Thereafter Since 2005, Kenya has had a series of internal recommendations are offered on dynamics to deal with. These have disoriented reconstitution of the negotiation task and undermined her capacity to deal with global force; reorganization of institutions and regional issues that require proper and managing the dispute; winning the immediate attention. Some of these internal support of the people of northern Kenya dynamics were remotely
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