., Distr. GENERAL _'j'; ;. S/10308* 16 september 1971 i,! ENGLISH ORIGIIJAL: FRENCH

lyai~ -I --- REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MISSION OF TEE SECURITY COUNCIL ,, ,.j ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLIJTION 294 (1971) ,;,, .

Letter_---. dated 16 September--- 1971 addressed to the President of the S?iy Council by the members of the Special F4ission We have the honour to submit to you herewith a report prepared by the Special ifission of the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 294 (1971).

Accept, Sir, etc.

Nicaragua (President) (Simed)2- Guillermo SEVJLLA-SACASA 1 Belgium (Si&ed) J. GERARD ::.! $; Burundi (Sipned) F. MGENGE ,' 1 I- ., (s&nn$) R. ISHIKAWA , (Sifned)1. E. KULAGA (Sijmed)I__ R. ,JOUEJ,ATI

, * This is an advance edition of the report, which will be subsequently issued as Special S-tent No. 3 to the Official Records of the Security----1 Council Twenty-sixth,._---. Year CONTEMTS Pm-am-aph Page

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . ~ ...... " ...... 4

A. Establishment of the Special Mission ...... 1 - 10 4

B. Mandate and procedure . . ~ . . . ~ . ~ ~ . ~ . . ; ~ ~ . 11 - 16 7

C. Organization of work ...... ~ a 17 - 31 7

D. Requests to the parties for co-operation . . . . ~ . a . 32 - 36 9

II. TASKS OF THE SPECIAL MISSION . ~ ...... 11

Introduction a ...... 37 - 43 11

A. Audience with the President of the Republic of Senegal, Mr. L&opold S&dar Senghor . . ~ ...... 44 - 56 11

B. Special Mission's working meeting with the Prime blinister of the Republic of Senegal, Mr. Abdou Diouf a ...... 57 - 66 14

C. Activities of.the Special Mission in the casamance region ...... 67 - 68 16

1. Working meeting: in the Ziguinchor military camp . . . 69 - 77 16

2. Inquiries into incidents reported to the Security Council . . . s ...... a a ...... 78 - 92 17

a. Inquiry near Santiaba Ma&jack s ...... 78 - 82 17

b. Inquiry in the vicinity of Sare N'Diaye a . . . . 83 - 87 18

c. Inquiry at the Bala Kounda bridge ...... 88 19

a. Inquiry into the attack on the village of Kandjenou ...... I . . . . * . . 89 - 92 19

3. Inquiries into incidents which occurred duriw the visit of the Special Mission ...... 93 - 104 20

a. Shellin,g in the area of M'Pak-Boffa Bayotte,on25July1971 ...... 94-97 20

b. Attack near the village of Singuere Diola on the night of 29-30 July 1971 ...... 98 - 100 21

c. Attack on the village of Bagame . . . . . 1 . . .lOl - 104 21

-2- CONTENTS (continued)

Parwraph Paw-

4. Examination of the situation on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau) ~ . ~ . . . . . 105 - 114 2,2

Il. The Special Plission's interview with Mr. Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of PAIGC ~ . ~ . 115 - 121 23

III. CONCLUSIONS ...... a . . , . . ~ ...... , , , 122 - 127 26

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS a . . a . 1 ~ . . . . 1 ...... , . I 128 28

I. REPORTS OF THE MILITARY EXPERTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THF SPECL4L MISSION

A. Report on the inquiry of the military experts of the members of the Special Mission into the incident of 25 July 1971 ~ . . . . 29

B. Report of the military experts, members of the Special Mission on the incidents at !kmdjenou and Singuere Diola . . 1 ~ . 34

C. Findings of the military experts concerning incidents reported totheSpecialMission.....'...... 39

II. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE SPECIAL MISSION BY THE GOVERMM!WT OF SENEGAL

A. Summary of incidents along the frontier from 1961 to 1971 . . . . 44

B. Listofmines ...... ~ . ..~..69

C. Map of frontier region indicating places cf incidents . . . ~ . . 70

-3- I. IATRODUCTIO1~~

A. Establishment---.--__-_ of the Special__,--- Mission

1. In e letter dated 6 July 3.971 (S/10251) addressed to the President of the %curity Council, the Pemsnent: Representative of Senegal to the United Fations, after referrinfc to his previou:; letters of 27 April (S/10182) and 16 June 1971 (S/10227), concerniw incid~ents on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Dissau)? requested that R met-t;ing of the Security Council should be convened as a matter of ureency. The points at issue were, in particular, attacks on villages and numerous explosions of nines laid by the Portuguese army which had caused loss of human life and considerable material damaye. Other mines and explosive devices, of which some bore Russian or Portuguese markiws, were discovered and disarmed in time. Furthermore, Portuguese aircraft had violated the air space of Senegal. The Goverment of Senepal considered that the laying of mines in Senegalese territory by the regular ?ortuquese armed forces constituted a further obvious and flaKrant violation of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial inte,witY, which should he punished by the international community.

2. In a letter dated 10 June 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10255), the Chary(6 d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United >!ations regretted that the Government of Sene@l had asked for ,the convening of the Security Council Twitho& having first sowht recourse to the procedure, provided in the Charter, for seeking to clarify, by means of direct contacts, the truth of the fxts in question. The Portuqxse Government had. continually drawn the attention of the Governmnt of Senegal to the fact that all the problems that had arisen in the frontier areas of the two States were exclusively the result of the activities of the subversive group calling itself souehtPAIGC )(Partido ._,.._ -.,.-.-,-_~--..- Africano da._.. -_.- Inde?znd&cia ..-... __ ---:---.--,.--.da Guin& e Cabo Verde!. That @oup at a.11 costs. to create in the frontier areas of Senegal and I'ortufPortuguese Guinea. :iith resard to the mines which, according to the Permanent Representative of Senegal, had been discovered in Sene&ese territory, the Portuguese letter stressed that it should be noted that no clarification was :@ven which vould have made it possible to identify those who had laidtlen, and also that, if some of thm were indeed of Rmsian origin, that would tend to confirm that a I-manoeuvre of PAIGC was involved. The Government of Portugal repudiated with t!le utmost firmness the Senegalese accusations, and categorically rejected any responsibility for the alleged incidents.

3. The request for a meeting: of the Security Council was supported by 37 African S-t&es (S/10259 and Add.1 and 2) which, after referring to a relevant resolution of the OrEanization of African Unity, requested the Security Council to take such measures as were necessary to preva.i,l upon Portugal to conform to the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning Portufxvese ag,Eression as well as the self-deterninat,ion and independence of the Portur;uese ColonieS. In addition to Sene@, Guinea, !'!ali, ?lauritania, Mauritius, Sudan, Toso and Zambia requested permission to participate in the Council debate without the right to vote (s/10251, s/lo2:;8, s/10260, s/10261, s/10262, S/10263, s/10264, S/10265).

-4- , 4. Senef~al's complaint was considered by the Security Council at its 1569th to 1572nd meetings, from 12 to 15 July 1971.

5. At the 1569th meeting MY. Grim Gay@, Minister for Foreipn Affairs of Senegal, said that since !? &nil 1963 Senegal had every year been compelled to draw the Security Councilss attention to new acts of aGgression committed by Portuguese troops in Sene~alese territory. ReferrinK more particularly to the letter before the Security Council, dated 6 July 1971, he pointed out that while the escalation of violence against Sene@ was taking, a new form, namely the criminal layin,? of anti-,-tanksnd anti-personnel mines on Senqxlese territory by Portuguese forces, thet was in fact only one nore in a long series of acts of aggression which included, -__-_--.inter slia 9 violations ofthe frontier both on land and in the air,, shelling, the burning of villages, the destruction of harvests, the theft of ca-ttle and the kidnapping and killing of persons. It was the task of the Security Council to prevent any !Lferriber State of the United ?Iations from resortini: to the use of force against the territorial integrity of any other Merber of the Orpanization and the Council therefore should take effective me&sures to orevent any threat to the peace and to repress any acts of aggression.

6. At the 1572nd meeting the following draft resolution was submitted to the Council by the representative of Somalia, on behalf of five co..sponsors: Burundi, Japan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Syria (s/10266):

"The-.- . .._Security -.-__A-3 Council Taking note of the complaints of the Republic of Senegal against Portugal contained in document S/10182 of 27 April 1971 and S/10251 of 6 July 1971, Taking note of the letter of the Chari d'A?faires 8-i. of Portugal (s/lo~~srana-~~~.l),

a&i? heard the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Seney;a1, Bearing in min&that all States Members of the United Netions must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other nanner inconsistent wi-Lh the purposes of the United Nations (Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter), sonscious of its duty to take effective collectivz measures for the prevention and removal of threats to international peace and security and for the supplression'of acts of aggression (Article 1, pararjraph 1, of the Charter) ) , Disturbed et the increasinply serious situation created by acts of violence perpetrated by the Portuguese armed forces against the Republic of Senegal since the adoption of Security Council resolution 273 (1969) of'9 December 1969 (E/C:J.4/1050 of 2 February 1971), Deeply distressed b:y the repeated layin, of mines in Senegalese territory,

Gravely concerned that incidents of this nature, by threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal, might endanKer international peace and security,

Bearing, in mind its resolutions 178 (1963) of 24 April 1963, 204 (1965) of 19 May 1965 and 273 (1.969) of 9 December 1969,

Havinp: taken note of the report of 2 February 1971 of the T!orking Group of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights concernin:: Portuguese acts of violence in Senegalese territory (E/CN.4/1050), Noting that Portugal has not complied with the provisions of operative parwraph 2 of resolution 273 (1969) of 9 December 1969 (E/CN.4/1050),

1. --Demands that the Government of Portu& should stop immediately any acts of violence and destruction in Sene@lese territory, and respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Senegal;

2. --Condemns the acts of violet&e and destruction perpetrated since 1963 by the Portuguese armed forces of Guinea (Bissau) against the population and villages of Senegal (E/CN.4/1050);

3. -_Condemns the unlawful laying of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in Senegalese territory;

4. Requests the President of the Security Council and the Secretary- General to send to the spot, as a matter of urgency, a special mission of members of the Security Council assisted by their military experts, to carry out an inquiry into the facts of which the Council has been informed, to examine the situation along the border between Guinea (Bissau) and Senegal and to report to the Sec,uritg Cuuncil, making any recommendations aimed at guaranteeing peace and security in this region."

7. At the request of the Un:ited States, operative paragraph 4 was put to the vote first. It was adopted unanimously. The resolution as a whole was adopted by 13 votes in favour and none a!:ainst, with 2 abstentions (the United Kinp,dom of Great Britain and Nort&ern Irsland and the United States of America) &solution 294 (1971)1.

8. On 21 July 1971, the President of the Security Council and the Secretary- General indicated that in accordance with operative parapTaph 4 of that resolution the Special Eission of the Security Council should be composed as follows (S/10274):

Ambassador G. &villa-Sacasa (Nicaragua), Chairman Mr. J. G&ard (Belgium) Ambassador Nsan& T&exe (Burundi) L/ Vx. R. Ishikawa (Japan) Ambassador E. Kulaga (Poland) Mr. R. Jouejati (Syrian Arab Republic) The members of the Special Mission would be assisted by their military experts. A/ Subsequently replaced by Mr. Fklix Magenge. A-

.\;l ..~ 9. The following military experts were desi@lated by their respective Governments : Colonel C. DeWilde (Belgium) Commander s. Sota (Burundi) Colonel J. Guti&rez ;gi;ap Colonel S. Kazmierski 0 an Colonel Fayez Bayassi (Syrian Arab Republic)

10. It was also announced that Secretariat staff would accompany the tiission.

B. uanad.te and Procedure 11. The mandate of the Special Mission, as set forth in operative para@-aph 4 of Security Council resolution 294 (1371.), was."to carry out an inquiry into the facts of which the (!ouncj.l has been informed, to examine the situation along the border between Guinea (Bissau) and Senegal and to report to the Security Council, mdcing any recommendations aimed at guaranteeinrz peace and security in this region:'. 12'. The Special Mission established its oun procedure on the basis of the provisions relating to its mandate. I-L decided that it would first hold consultations with the Government authorities concerned and that it might then receive, at hearings or individual interviews, oral or written statements or testimony by the public authorities, organizations or private individuals. 13. It was furthermore decided that the Mission would proceed to the frontier region in order to examine the situation on the spot, to hear statements, to question witnesses and to obtain all possible information. 14. It was also agreed that the Special Hission would keep a record of its inquiry and would select from the documents available to it those which it .wished to annex to its report.

15. It was decided that during the investigations and hearings of witnesses the military experts appointed to assist the members of the Special Mission in technical matters would enjoy the same prerop;a-tives as the members themselves in elicitinf: information.

16. The Special Mission considered it preferable for the hearings and interviews, as well as working meetings, to be held in camera.

C. Organization- of Work 17. Before leaving for the Republic of Senegal, the members of the Special Mission discussed with the President of the Security Council the duties which the Council had entrusted to the I‘?ission. 18. The Special blission left New York on 24 July 1971 and on 25 July arrived at Dakar, where it uas welcomed by Mr. '&run Gaye, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Adama N'Diaye, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and other officials of

-7- the Senegalwe Government. In a brief statement, thee Chainlan of the Special Mission stressed the iqortance of the tasks entrusted to the Special Iviission, which it was determined to perform in a cmpletely objective and thorouch manner.

19. The Special Mission met i,n thL0 mornin-, of 26 JuQ to decide on its work programme during; its stay in Sene&. In the afternoon it had an audience with the President of the Republic of Senqal, Mr. L6opold S6dar Sen8hor.

20. Imuzdiately after this audience, the Special Mission was informed of an incident which had occured on 25 July in Sene@ese territory in the frontier region adjoining Chine,? (Bissau). Since the Special Mission had to stay at Dakar for consultations it had arranged to hold on 27 July with the Prime Kinister and some of his advisers, it (decided to send its members' military experts to the scene of the incident, to obtain all possible inforcation and report back to it. On the following day - 27 Jul:y - the military experts left by air for the Ca~samance rexion, where they 'vex met by the re@onnl military authorities. They examined the scene of the incident and that evenine submitted a prelilninary report to the Special Mission. Their final report was submitted to the Mission on 30 July 1971. L-1.,\ The working: meeting with Mr. Abdou Diouf ) Prime Minister of the Republic of. Senegal, was held in the afternoon of 27 July. The Prime Minister was accompanied by other members of the Government and .by General Jean Alfred Diallo, Chief of Staff.

22. On 28 July 1971, the Special Mission., accompanied by the military experts, flew to Zifiuinchor, the capital of Casamance, where it was net by Lieutenant- Colonel Amadou Bela1 Lyv the Govercor of the Region, Commander Coumbe Diouf ?Jiang? Coilnander of the Southern District of Caszmance, and other civilian and military officials. Soon after its arrival, the Special Mission, accompanied by the military experts and escorted by the Governor, proceeded by the Santiaba F:!andjack road to the vicinity of the frontier where it examined a number of places where a public transport vehicle had been blown up by a mine and where other mines had been discovered. Near tZ?e hamlet of Santiaba Wlandjack, it held a meeting;; at which the G~overnor and the Commande? of the Southern District outlined the problems caused by the laying of mines in the re(:ion. During its visit, the Special Mission heard testimony from an inhabitant of Santiaba Mandjack.

23. The Special Mission, accompanied by the zlilitary experts, returned to Zi&uinchor in the eveninp of the same day and was received at Ziguinchor Military Cainp9 where it held a working meetin,: with the Governor and the Commander of the Southern District. It then held a hearing of a Portuguese prisoner of African extraction at which no Seneralese authorities were present.

24. On 29 July 1971, the Special Mission, nccomganied by the military experts, flew to IColds (&pproximately 200 kilometres from Ziguinchor), from which it travelled by road to the vicinity of the frontier village of Sa& N'Diaye, where two vehicles had been blown up by Mines. It then examined the bridge at Bala Kounda (Sari: Sissao), situated 200 metres from the frontier, under which two explosive charges 'vere reported to have been discovered in Ilay 1971. ‘!

25. On its return to Kolda, at a place called "gite d'etape", the Special Mission held a meeting during which it heard a witness injured in one of the mine explosions. The Commander of the Southern Zone also gave details concerning the two above-mentioned explosive charges.

26. On 30 July 1971, the Special Mission sent its members' military experts, accompanied by members cf the Secretariat, to the Tanaff district in the Department of Sedhiou to undertake an on-the-spot inquiry into various incidents which had taken place in the region. During their visit, the military experts were informed of an incident which had just occurred and also collected all available information. On their return, they reported to the Special Mission on the results of the inquiry and on the new incident.

27. In the evening of the same day, at Ziguinchor, the Special Mission and the military experts held a meeting during which the Governor of Casamance, the Commander of the Southern Zone, the Prefect of Ziguinchor and other authorities gave additional details concerning the last incident mentioned above, and on a new incident which had occurred that day, in the early afternoon, on the outskirts of the frontier village of Bagame, 15 kilometres from Ziguinchor.

28. The Special Mission and the military experts returned to Dakar on 31 July 1971 where the members of the Mission visited Mr. Abdou Diouf, the Prime Ministe?; i4r. Karim Gaye, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and General Jean Alfred Diallo, the Chief of Staff, were also present. During the visit, several documents were submitted to the Special Mission and are annexed to this report. 2/ 29. In the evening of the same day, the Special Mission held a meeting with Mr. Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the PAIGC.

30. On 1 August 1971, the Special Mission concluded the programme of work which it had drawn up. It met again at United Nations Headquarters in i'Jew York on 5 August 1971 to prepare its report. 31. This report prepared for the Security Council was approved on 9 September 1971.

D. Requests- to the Parties for co-operation 32. On 21 July 1971 the Chairman of the Special Mission addressed to the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations and to the Charg6 D'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Portugal two identical letters, reading as follows: "Your Government has been informed, by a cable dated 15 July, Of the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 294.

The President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have constituted the Special Mission provided for in this resdlution as follows: myself, the Permanent Representative of

21 See annex II. Nicaragua, Chairman, Mr. Jacques G&m-d (Belpium), N.E. l?!r. Nsanz6 T&ence (Burundi), Xi-. Ryoko Ishikawa (Japan), B.C. Eugeniuez Kulaga (Poland), and Mr. Rafic Jouejati (Syria). The members of the Mission will be assisted by military experts. They will be accompanied by United Nations officials. The Mission plans to travel at the end of this week in order to begin its work in the field on Monday, 26 July. In order to carry out its mandate, and particularly to make 'any recommendations aimed at guaranteeing peace and security') the Mission must be able to gather full information regarding, the situ&ion on both sides of the border between Senegal +nd Guinea (Dissau). I would therefore a,ppreciate it if your Government would extend to the Special Mission a,11 the facilities it may need for its work.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my h&he& consideration." 33. Upon the adoption of resolution 294 (1971) of 15 July 1971, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal' assured the Security Council that the Senegalese authorities were ready to grant the Special Mission. '?a11 facilities within their power for the, accomplishment of its task". In reply to the letter of 21 July, the Government of Senegal verbally confirmed this position. It co-operated fully with the Special Hission and granted it all the neressary facilities. 34. By a letter dated 24 July 1971 31 addressed to the Chairman of the Special Mission, the Char@ d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Portugal indicated that his Government was unable to consider as relevant a resolution of the Security Council which condemned its country without advancing proofs and, only after the condemnation, determined to proceed with an investigation of the facts alleged by the Government of Senegal. 35. In addition, the Portuguese Government could not accept that,, in order to carry out suchaninvestigation, the inquiry should have to take place within Portuguese territory seeing that what was in question was an investigation regarding events that had taken place on Senegalese territory and with which Portugal had nothing to do. Consequently, the Portuguese Government could not accept the principle of collaboration with the mission of inquiry since that would presuppose an acceptance of an unjustified condemnation which it had received and which, in fact, it repudiated.

36. The letter

31 The text of the letter has been published in document s/10284.

-10.. II. TASKS OF THF SPECIAL MISSION

Introduction

37. The Special 1'4ission considered that the incidents into which it should inquire, in other words, "the facts of which the Council has been informed", were, specifically, those reported by the Government of Sene&al in its complaints which led to the adoption of Security Council resolution 294 (1971).

38. Those facts involved attacks conducted by members of the Portuguese Army in Senegalese territory, the shelling of Senegalese villages from Guinea (Bissau), violations of Senegalese air space by Portuguese aircraft, and in particular, the laying of mines and explosive devices in Senegalese territory by Portuguese forces.

39. In addition, new incidents occurred along the froxitier during the Special Nission's stay in Senegal. They are reported in detail below. 40. The tasks of the Special Mission also included examining the situation along the border between Guinea (Bissau) and Sene@ in order to elicit all possible information which would enable it to form conclusions and to submit to the Council recommendations aimed at guaranteeing peace and security in the region.

41. The Special Vission therefore appealed to the Government of Portugal and the Governmedt of Senegal to grant it all the facilities it needed in order to fulfil its mandate, which required that it should be able to gather the fullest possible information on both sides of the border between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau). 42. For the reasons given in its letter of 24 July 1971, the Portuguese Government informed the Special Mission that it could not a,ccept the principle of collaboration with the mission~of inquiry. As a result, the Special llission was able to fulfil its mandate only in Senegalese territory. 43. As a result of its consultations with the Senegalese authorities, its activities in the frontier area and its interview with the Secretary--General of PAIGC, the Special Mission succeeded in obtaining the essential data which would enable it to report to the Security Counci;.

A. Audience with the _President of the Rewblic of Secwal, !& Lgouold Sgdar Sennhor

44. On 26 July 1971, the day after its arrival at Dakar, the Special Xission was received by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Senegal, ?Ir. L6opold S6dar Senghor. Both in the statement which he made to the Special :Jission and in the exchange of questions and answers which,followed it, the President of the Republic mentioned, specifically, the following points:

-ll- -Senep-al's . ~-,... ~.- _..__..__._,__. attitud~e -.. towards-.- ..,...,______Portugal

45. The President stated that Senegal had no hostile feeliqs towards Portugal. The,question at issue was a purely political one: since the United Nations had adopted the principle of self-determination, any people had the right to demand its independ~ence while concluding agreements, if it so wished, with its former colonizers. The fundamental dispute was therefore not between Senegal and Portugal, but rather between Portugal and the nationalists of Guinea (Bissau). While Senegal did indeed wish to engage in a dialogue with Portugal, it was not to settle the question of Guinea (Bissau), but to help brins about a dialogue between the Portuguese Government and the nationalists. Unfortunately, every time the Senegalese Government attempted to pave the way for such a dialogue, the Portuguese soldiers stationed in Guinea (Bissau) committed acts of aggression against its territoryy. For example, when recently, as part of a new effort, talks on the subject had takewplace between the two countries at the m~inisterial level,, mines had been laid along the frontier, in Senegalese territory, just two weeks after the Sene~alese Vinistw for ForeiEn A~ffairs had returned to Dakar.

46. Perhaps that situation demonstrated the existence of differences of opinion between the civilian authorities in Lisbon and the military authorities of Guinea (Bissau): for its part, however, the Senegalese Government, discouraged in its efforts and compelled to protect its population and its territory, had thereupon severed all contact with the Portuguese Government, reinforced its

Layinp; of mines in -.-_.Senegalese -.,-- territoryI_.

47. The Senegalese Government believed that the layin of mines in its territory was the most serious form of aggression which it had had to face.

48. The Portuguese disclaimed responsibility for this, and implicitly accused the nationalist movements, in particular PAIGC. Nevertheless, the information was reliable and had, moreover, been confirmed by a peasant who had seen a helicopter set down, and later pick up, persons who laid mines. PAIGC, however, had no helicopter. Woreover, the Portuguese had even admitted to general responsibility for their incursjons, invoking the right of pursuit as justification. Almost every time Sene~alese villages were attacked, the Portuguese admitted that they had taken prisoners.

49. That the Portuguese wanted was to induce Senegal to close the frontier and withdraw its support from the nationalist movements.

-Attitude ----.-----~.-__-_ of the Government of Senegal towards the nationalist- _.--.__- movemen.ts

50. The President of the Republic stat& that he knew of two nationalist movements .^ PAIGC, whose Secretary-General was Mrir. A. Cabral and which was currently taking military action and occupyin% a part of Guinea (Bissau), and FLING, (Frente da Luta pela Independencia da Niu6 dita Par-tuguesa) another movement with which the Senegalese Government ms also in contact.

51. The Portuguese particularly blamed Senegal for protecting the PAIGC combatants. They claimed in particular that PAIGC initiated attacks again& their garrisons from Senegalese territory, and that Senegal prepared the attacks by artillery fire. -12- The inaccuracy of such assertions could easily be verified, both from the testimony which the Special Vission might hear and from the simple fact that Senegal possessed no artillery. It vas only in the last two weeks, m a result of the recent acts of a@ression, that a number of anti-aircraft guns had been installed and .the order given to fire without prior challenge on aircraft flying: over Senegalese territory. Apart from that, Senegal's artillery consisted only of one training mprtar .

52. The Portuguese accusations that PAICC had military bases in Sene,?al were likewise completely unfounded. Like the other inhabitants of Guinea (Bissau), who were of the same race as the Senegalese of Casamance, members of PASCC could enter and leave Senegal freely, subject only to frontier checks. 53. Senegal had recoz+zed the PAIGC combatants and ,gave them moral support, since it was Portugal's refusal to ensage in a dialogue which had driven them to war. It also gave them financial assistance through re~ylar payment of its contributions, to the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity. On the other hand, Senegal required that no attack should be launched~ from its territory, and that PA~IGC fighters should be unarmed when they were in Senegalese territory. In the same spirit, a PAIGC military hostel had been closed by the Government, which had replaced it with a surgical station for wounded combatants.

.-Consequences . .-_-..- .._.__of the _,-.-,-present .._.,..situation-- for Senegal 54. President Senghor stressed the $reat harm which the war was causing to Senepl~ The attacks on the frontier, which often occurred at night, had created a climate of insecurity in Casamance, the richest r&on of the country. The Senegalese Government had had to evacuate villap;es along the frontier. In addition, the presence of 70,000 refugees from Guinea (Bissau) placed a heavy burden on the budget, since they must, amon,g other things, be ,given land, their children must attend schools and their sick must be given hospi.tal treatment. The additional resources spent by the State on aid to refugees and the necessary reinforcemnt of the armed forces alone - measures which were direct consequences of Portugal's attitud~e .~.amount& to some $4 million a year. And now the Portwgxzse soldiers were layin mines which blew up civilian vehicles on the roads of Casamance. j+aceful solution 55. With rewrd to the solution of the conflict, 'President Senghor recalled that several years previously the Government of Senegal had contacted the nationalists and the Portuguese Government to request them to begin talks aim& at formulating a plan for achieving independence by stages. After the cease-fire, which could be negotiated only between the Portuguese' Government and the combatants, ne@tiations could be opened between tihe Portuguese Government and the nationalist movements with a view to establishing an autonomous r&$x? under a democratically elected local government possessing real authority. Independence would then follow, and a kind of Lusitano-African community alon:? the lines of the Commonwealth or the French-speaking world would be set up. Such a peace plan was acceptable,, with perhaps a few changes as to the form, the stages and the duration of autonomy, to the nationalist movements, which, in the,Presid~ent's personal opinion, were

-1% genuinely agreed on moving towards independence in stages, and in friendship with Portugal. So far, however, Portugal had refused to open a dialogue with the other party concerned. That attitude was even more regrettable in thnt there was no reason to think that the independence of the Portuguese colonies would mean an end to their relations with Portugal, any more than Senegalese independence had brought an end to Seneeal's economic and cultural relations with France.

Co-operation of the Senepalee Gover_nment with the Soecial Mission

56. Finally, the President of the Republic recalled that he himself had been responsible for requesting; the Security Council to send a mission of inquiry, thanked the members of the Special Elission for coming, and assured them that the Government of Senegal was fully at their disposal to submit to their inspection everything they might wish to see and to enable them to hear all persons whom they might wish to question.

B. Special -'__I---?iission's ,vorkina 'L---2---meeting with the Prime hlinister -...-_of the -----__-ARepublic of Senepal, Mr. Abdou Diouf

57. On 27 July 1971, the Special Mission held a working meeting with His Excellency W. Abdou Diouf, Prime Vinister of the Republic of Senegal. The Prime Minister 3 who was accompanied by members of the Government, the Chief of Staff and other high-rankinK officials, asked the members of the Special Mission to indicate the matters concerning which they would like to have information. In the course of the meeting, the Prime Kinister dealt mainly with the following points.

Vine-layiw in Senenalese territory

58. Contrary to what the Portuguese wished people to believe, the PAIGC had no reason to lay mines in Senegalese territory. This seemed to be obvious, since, firstly, the Government of Senegal was supplying aid to the movement and, secondly, it was difficult to see what the PAIGC would gain from such activity against their Senegalese brothers.

59. Howver, witnesses had confirmed the fact that Portugal was laying mines in SenegaleSe territory. For example, villagers who had relatives on the other side of the frontier and used to cross it frequently had learned that Portuguese whites accompanied by black auxiliaries had come and laid mines in Senegalese territory. On 30 June 1971, a further witness had seen a helicopter land in Senegalese territory: some soldiers had disembarked and had laid mines before taking off again.

60. As to the question of whether some of the mines were in fact of Soviet origin, all that could be said was that some of them did seem to be Russian. However, it was obvious that, even if they were from the Soviet Union, they might have found their way to the PAIGC first, before the Portuguese somehow acquired them. It ms also possible that Portugal had manufactured the mines and deliberately disguised their origin.

-14- 61. At all events, other mines which showed clearly that they were Portuguese had been found.

--,.-Sene~al's attitude.--~,,---..- towards the liberation,__._ movements 62. The Government of Senegal had given systematic moral and financial support to the liberation movements, and especially the,PAIGC. Apart from Senegal's regular contribution to the OAU Liberation Committee, Senegalese aid consisted fundamentally of social aid, i.e., medical, educational, and f&d supplies and 'other forms of assistance which the Government was granting to its own nationals. Such aid, the Prime ~.lnister explained, v&s in keeping with the pertinent United Nations resolutions.".

63. Senegal 3 on the other hand, was not giving any bilateral military aid to PAIGC combatants. There were no PAIGC bases in Senegalese territory. Its members could cross the frontier into Senegal only if they were unarmed and out of uniform. The Senegalese Arqyy, for its part, was not posted along the frontier to fight Portugal or help the PAIGC in its strug$e, but solely to protect the population of Sew& against attacks by Portugal. Portuguese statements that PAIGC combatants were being trained by Cubans and Russians in Senegalese territory were entirely without foundation and were doubtless aimed exclusively at lending credence tc false assertions concerning alleged training of PAIGC fighters in Sene&al.

Peaceful solution

64. With regard to the possibilities for a peaceful solution, the Prime Xinister said that he could do no more than refer to the statements which the President of the Republic had made earlier to the Special hlission. He expressed the hope that, in Portugal, the balance would swing in favour of the liberals and that certain nations would have more success in making Portugal realize that it was not proceeding along the path of reason, progress or history.

Co-operation of the Government of Senegal with ,the Special Mission

65. The Prime Minister assured the Special Mission of his Government's full co-operation in supplying information and assistance to facilitate its task.

66. He said that the Special Mission's main purpose in travelling all the way to Senegal was ) no foubt, to report facts and not just statements to the Security Council. For that reason the Government of Senegal intended to submit to the Special Vission a summary list of all the losses Senegal had suffered during recent years and, where necessary, sworn statements by officers. However, the possibilities of determining the nature of some incidents varied. Accordingly, since some of the acts were carried~ out in a clandestine manner, and there was little likelihood of the Special Vlission catching Portugal red-handed, it was bound to supplement the data received with its own evaluation of the situation, so as to arrive at its own convictions and report to the Council.

-15- c. Activities of the Snecial-~-.._--~------.---~.--.- Xssion in the Casamnce region 67. After holding at Dakar the consultations reported above, the Special b'yission proceeded to Casamance, where it drove through a great part of the Senegalese side of &he frontier zone. It. also flew to Kolda at the eastern cart of the Senec~al-~Guima (Bissau) frontier, where it also covered the frontier region. 68. As described above, in the course of its travels it tried both to inquire into the events themselves an0. to examine the situation prevailin,rr, in the region.

1. Workins meetina in the 7,iauinchor,,mmL%ary__-.- cam 69. On 28 July 1071, the day of its arrj.val in Casamance, the Special Yission was received in the Ziguinchor military camp:, headg,uarters of the Command Post of the Casnrmnce Group and of the Southern District by the Governor of the Region, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Bellal Ly, and the Comma~ier of the Southern District, ?Vajor Counba Diouf Fiang.

70. The Commander of the Southern District stated t!lat, since the Port~uguese shelling of the village of E&line in 1969, 4/ the Portuguese army had continued its attacks, especially against villages. Thus, the villages of Kandjenou, Tankanto, %dip;assama, Sekownaya and Karoumbo had been set on fire during the 'brief period of "larch-April 1771 alone. In addition to these arm~ed attacks, the Portuguese army was shelling the Senegalese villages, violatinp the air space, attacking individuals, including: the village chiefs who were hostile to it and the Guinea (Bissau) refugees in Senegal, stealing cattle and plunderinp the harvests.

71. In recent months the situation had become even worse as a result of a new kind of ag:pr+sion over and above the daily incidents, namely, the laying of mines in Sene~alese territory. In less than five months, three mines had exploded, killing four persons snd rqound~ing 27, while 17 other anti,-tank mines had been removed or destroyed. In addition to the losses in terms of human lives and material damage, those serious and repeated acts of aggression were paralysing; the entire economic life of the region.

72. The District Commander then presented to the Special Mission various weapons and explosives which the Seneealese forces had, he said, collected in Senegalese territory alon?; the frontier, some taken from Portuguese soldiers.

73. Among those items, the Commander drew the Special Mission's attention to a four-,.tube rock&-launcher from a Portuguese aircraft that had been found in Senwalese territory after the attack on the village of Sare NsDiaye. He indicated on,a"map of the frontier the place where each object had been found and the circumstances in which it had been obtained.

74. The military experts examined these objects,> which are enumerated in a list drawn up by the Senegalese authorities. The m~ilitary experts confirmed the number and description of the articles indicated. 5/

!&I See resolution 273 (1969), adopted by the Security Council on 9 December 1969 in which Portu(?al was condemned. .2! See annex I, C.

-16- 75. The Special Wssion then accept& the offer of the military authorities to hear a Portuguese soldier, a native of Guinea (Rissau), whom the Senepalese forces had cspturea two weeks before. The prisoner stated that his name was Manga Conte, service number 112469, and that he belonged to the Portuguese troops; more specifically, an artillery company based at Paunca in Guinea (Bissau). For five years he had operated a bazooka and had once participated in mine-laying in the vicinity of the frontier villa&e of Canquelifa (Guinea, (Bissau)) and in protective missions for other mine-laying operations. He added that his company commander, a Portuguese from Lisbon, had told him and his companions that the enemy were $he PAIGC, but bar' never said that they were Senegalese soldiers, The prisoner also stated that if he had received an order to go and set Senegal on fire, he would have obeyed since he was a soldier. 76. After stating that he had enlisted, in the Portuguese army, the prisoner said that the men of Guinea (Bissau) who did not volunteer for the Portuguese forces were considered by the Portuguese to belong to the PAIGC and, if they refused to join up, they were taken by force.

77. So far as the weapons used by the Portuguese were concerned, the artillery v&s not deployed on the frontier but fired at the request of the companies which sometimes came up to the frontier to fight. The Portuguese aircraft came to observe the results of the operations and also participated, as required, in the attacks on the Senegalese frontier. The prisoner, speaking when the Senegalese military personnel were not present, told the Special Vission that he had not been ill-treated or threatened since he had been arrested.

2. Inquiries into incidents resorted ++o the Security Council

a. ___Inq.uiry _._...near-.------..~i.-- Santiaba Mandjack 78. Oti the sam~eday, 28 July 1971, the Special Mission, accompanied by its military experts and guided by the military authorities of the region, went to the vicinity of the hamlet of Santiaba Nandjack, Department of Oussoya, where it examined a civilian bus which had been blown up on a mine at a place situated approximately one kilometre from the frontier in Senegalese territory. .6_/

79. According to the military experts of the members of the Special Nission, the explosion took place under the right rear wheel, as the dent in the rear drum and traces of burnin,? proved. The quantity of explosives used must have been as large ELSan anti-tank mine. As the mine had exploded its origin could not be de,termined. 80. According to the Zone Commander, the explosion which occurred on 1 July 1971 had killed one and wounded 13. Three other mines had been discovered by the Senegalese army near the place of explosion. The Governor of Casamance said that ,one of the three mines had been removed in his presence on 2 July. These mines were unmarked. They were large square boxes containing two concentrated lumps of an explosive substance and fitted with a fuse. Pointin& out that the road passed through a dense forest, the Commander emphasized the facility with which anyone _- q See annex I ) c.

-17- who wishing to lay mines, especially d,uring the nigh-t, could infiltrate into 'the region particularly since the Portuguese base of Varela was only 11 kilometres away *

81. The Commander also stated that the road on which the mines had been laid was frequented both by the 1oca:L population and, occasionally, by tourists.

82. In the vicinity of the hamlet of Santiaba Mandjack, the Special Mission questioned a witness, ilr. Koubaye Diatta, who said that he had noticed at the same time two helicopters from 'Guinea (Bissau) landing in the neighbouring rice-fields. He had also seen Portuguese soldiers in lorries. On the next day, the Portuguese soldiers in lorries had come baclr and had asked the villagers whether they had heard any noise in the area that day.

b. -.--.l_Inquiry in the ------.___vicinity of Sare N'Diaye 83. On 29 July 1971, the Special Mission, accompanied by the military experts of its members and guiijed by the military authorities of the region, went to the District of Dioulacolon, in the Department of Kolda, to a place about 1 kilometre from the frontier on the road from Sare M'Diaye to Alpha Sado. Two land Rover-type vehicles were lying at the edge of the road, approximately 150 metres apart. The military experts found from their examination of these vehicles that they had been blown up by explosive charges having the force of an anti-tank mine and had been thrown five metres and seven metres respectively from the place where the explosions had occurred. I/

84. According to the information given, one of the vehicles had been blown up on 23 Nay 1971. The vehicle in question, in which the-chief of the frontier sector had'been riding with a driver, had struck the mine at about 2.40 p.m. The sector chief had been killed and the driver seriously wounded. According to the Commander of the Southern Zone, the incident had occurred at a time when the Governor of Casamance and the Prefect of the Department of Kolda were scheduled to pass along the Sare N'Diaye - Alpha Sado road on their tour of the region and the mine had obviously been intended for the authorities.

95. The second incident had occurred on 19 June, at about 11 a.m. when the vehicle involved, carrying four persons, had struck another mine, Two of the passengers had died, one instantly and the other shortly after. The other two had been wounded.

86. Notin:? that the border was 1 kilometre away, the Zone Commander emphasized that this region was frequently subjected to Portuguese incursions. For instance, the neighbouring villages of Sare M'Diaye and Selikenie had been attacked several times and the Ad Hoc FJorlting Group of I?xperts oLf the United Nations Commission on Hman Rights had also visited them to observe the evidence of the attacks.

87. The Special Hission then heard the testimony of the man who had been wounded in the accident of 23 May, WI-. Daouda Ba, the driver of the vehicle. He stated that the chief of the front,:ier sector had been on mission along the frontier when

'I/ See annex I, c.

-18- his vehicle had struck the mine. The witness had been knocked unconscious. He did not know who had laid the mine.

c. n&wiry---.-----,.-----_A at the Bala Kounda brid~fe

RE. On 29 July 1971, the Special Nission stopped at a place 800 metres from the border on the road from Bala Kounda to Sare Sissao (Department of Kolda) near a bridge approximately 3.5 metres lon& consisting of two logs with a support in the middle. The Zone Commander told the Special fi'fiission that in May 1971 two explosive charges had been found under this bridge consisting of bags of T!!IT, together with a lump of TNT bearing the follgwing inscription in Portuguese: "PETARDO.,.TNT .I PR x,1 - 011 - 66 (IOOO)'~. These charges had been handed to the Special Mission on the previous da>r, 28 July, at Ziguinchor military camp. e/ The two charges were attached to a detonating cord and a slow fuse which had been ignited. However, the fuse, which was bent, had burnt out and the device had failed to explode.

a. -.___-----._---_Inquiry into the attack on the villa,rre L- of Kand.jenou 09. On 30 July 1971, the military experts of the members of the Special Mission went to the district of Tanaff, where the SenegaLese Government had reported that several attacks by Portuguese forces had taken place, ,particularly on the villages Of Kandjenou, on the night of 31 March - 1 April 1971, and Tankanto and Karoumbo, on the night of 16 - 17 April 1971. All these villages are approximately one kilometre from the frontier.

90. Because of a further incident which was reported to them while they were on the way, the mil?tary experts concentrated their inquiryon the village of Kandjenou.

91. According to the testimony which'they obtained there, the village had been attacked at about midnight by a detachment of the Portuguese regular army. The attack had only lasted about 15 minutes. One person had been killed and 17 wounded. Wore than half the village had been burnt, leaving 400 homeless. There had been considerable material damage, as a result both of the destruction itself I and of the thefts which had been committed. The Governor of Casamance said that the operation had been carried out by Portuguese regulars, probably in order to capture a member of PAIGC, Another witness stated that.there were no members of PAIGC hiding in the village; he added that after the attack the assailants had departed towards the border. Finally, the Zone Commander stated that this attack on Kandjenou was only one of many acts of aggression in the area which had left people dead, wounded or homeless and bad caused extremely heavy material damage. These acts of aggression against defenceless villages had been carried out ) according to the Zone Commander, by Portuguese soldiers, as was confirmed by the testimony that was heard and by the fact that a Portuguese soldier had been killed in the attack on the neighbourin& village of Tankanto. This soldier's equipment had been shown to the Special Pission during its vorking meeting at Ziguinchor military camp.

Y See annex I, c.

.-l9- 92. From the evidence they w(?re able to examine, the military experts of members of the Special Vission arrived at the following conclusions: (i) the evidence collec-ted proved that the village of Kandjenou had been subjected to an att;xk and that this attack had been particularly devastating:

(ii) The assailants had .used individual military weapons; and

(iii) It was probably, from the outcome of the operation and from the weapotis used, that this attack could only have been carried out by a properly trained force, equipped with suitable rreapons and having a safe refuge nearby. 21

3. Inquirie~~o -- incidents~-- which --__occurred -____-- duri?w the visit of the Special- Mission 93. During: the Special !Nission's visit to Senegal, three further incidents occurred and were brought to its attention.

a. &ai,nfz in the area of ?I'Pak-Boffa Rayott@. on 25 July 1971, 94. This incident occurred on the very day the Special Mission arrived in Sex%@. The Special Mission received word of it on the following day and decided, in vie>> of the urgency of the situation, to send the military experts immediately to make inquiries on the spot. They went there on 27 July.

95. A~ccordini: to the statements made bg witnesses, the village of ?I'Pak, the site of a Senegalese military post on the frontier, had already been subjected to several recent attacks by the? Portuf+ese. In January 1971, Portuguese troops had shelled the village, woundinn, one inhabitant. On 5 July, the.Portu@eSe had again opened fire. The purpose had apparently been to provide barrage fire so that a Portuguese raidin party could abduct some refugees from Guinea (Bissau) who were in a house in the village. The attack had been repelled by the Sene~;alese military post D Finally the last incident just reported to the Special ETission had taken place on 25 July. A Portuguese convoy had reportedly been intercepted by PAIN in Guinea (Bissau). The Portugxse had reacted immediately by shelling and about 40 shells had fallen on the neighbouring hamlet of Boffa-Bayutte. According to the same testimony, PAIN combatants had not been active in that part of the border region. Furthermore, the shelling could not have been carried out by PAIGC troops because in that area only the Portuguese troops were equipped with artillery, particularly in the S&I Domingo sector. 96. The military experts saw the evidence of this shelling and heard teStiROnY from, ahong others, two villagers w&o had been vounded by shellfire. 97. They examined a number of craters caused by 105 or 155 mm shells and noted the effects of the impacts on the surroundings. They concluded that it was not possible, from the form of the impacts and the effects they had examined; to .- 21 See annex I, B.

--20- indicate scientifically where the shots had come from. Nevertheless, the statements of witnesses and the examination of the places where the shells had exploded led the military experts to beliwe alrrost certainly that the shelling had come fron the heavy artillery posts in Guinea (Bissau). g/

b. Attack near the,villaae of Siwuere Diola on the night of 29-30

90. While on their way to the village of Kand.jenou, on 30 ,July, as they were passing through the village of &mine, the military experts were informed of an .. . incident which had taken place only the night before near the village of Singuere Diola. -ll/

99. They then decided to go first to Kandjenou to carry out the task which had been assic,ned to them, after which they would immediately return to gather information on the new incident, in order to be able to submit an urgent report on it to -the Special Mission.

100. They were informed that four young villagers, who had been tending the village flock during the,night, had been attacked with rifle fire and grenades. Since the attack had taken place at night, they had not been able to identifytheir assailants. The village is a few hundred metres from the frontier. According to the information obtained, the four Young herdsmen had been wounded, one of them seriously. The doctor in charge of the hospital stated that all the raounds had been caused by grenade splinters. The Governor of the region later explained the' circumstances of the attack to the Special Mission. Twenty head of cattle had been taken and several animals killed or wounded. According to the Governor, the attack had been carried out by members of the Portuqxese army.

C. Attack on the village-1 of- Bapame--.',-- 101. The third incident brought to the attention of the Special Mission took place on 30 July. The Governor of the region, the Prefect of the Department of ZiEuinchor and a non-commissioned officer of the Rendarmerie informed the Special Ilission that the frontier village of Baeame,% the J&artment of Ziguinchor, had just been attacked.

102. Accordiny; to the information received, at about 12.15 p.m. on that day the inhabitants had been cultivatiq their rice-fields approximately one kilometre from the :frontier. SLtddenly, they had heard bursts of machine-gune fire aimed at them, then a barrage aimed between them and their village. The villagers had seen a group of soldiers on the Senegalese s%de of the frontier and had then scattered. The village chief, beiny: older, had hidden among the branches on the spot. He had then seen a white Portuguese, armed and in uniform, leave the group of soldiers and walk over to where the villqers had been working in the rice-. field at the time of the attack. This white man had examined some things left behind by the villagers acd had gone back without seeing the man who was hiding.

lO/ See annex I,, A. llJ See annex I, B.

.-21- 103. The military experts of the members of the Special Mission examined some items of weaponry which, according to the Senegalese military authorities, had been picked up on the spot. 121

104. These items consisted of: three 81-m rocket fins; one 81-mm self-propelled rocket launcher with the following inscriptions: "To keep in shadow tem~. UM-20 to + 120' F"; one 60-mm mortar fin; one 60-m mortar charge, type 1970 L2 SPE -2 -16; one 24-mm bullet.

4. -Examination of the situation on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau) 105. During their visits to the frontier areas of Casamance the Special Elission and its members' military experts were able to obtain some information regarding the situation on the border between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau).

106. According to the information obtained from the local authorities, the frontier' in the Casamance region between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau) is about 375 km. long. The vegetation is dense and in places consists of thick forest. Accordino; to the information obtained, the other side of the border has the same type of terrain and vegetation. There are not many roads; some are mere tracks. Casamance has a population of approximately 7C0,OOO. The villages or hamlets on both sides of the border are populated by the sane ethnic groups. A Senegalese inhabitant told the Special Mission during an interview near Santiaba Mandjak that he had relatives and friends in an adjacent village on the other side of the border and that they often crossed over to visit each other for joint ceremonies. 107. According to the local authorities, Casamance is of great economic importance to Senegal, being the "granary" of the country, especially by virtue of its rice and fruit production; furthermore, its scenic beauty, which is unique in Senegal, has made it a major tourist attraction. 108. On numerous occasions the Senegalese authorities emphasized that there was an atmosphgre of insecurity throughout the frnntier areas as a result of the almost daily incidents. The President of the Republic said that the existing situation was very harmful to the country and seriously affect&d its economic development., He added that the Government had had to evacuate several villages along the border. 109. Not only had the Senegalese population been evacuated to the interior of the country, but, as a result of the war, 70,000 inhabitants of Guinea (Bissau) had sought refuge in Senegal, whose? border had remained open. This imposed a very heavy burden on the Senegalese Government. The Governor of Casamance said that a census of these refugees was taken, at first by district and later by department: after processing at Dakar, they were settled in various villages throughout the territory of Senegal, with due regard to their affinities. They were provided with as much technical and financial assistance as possible. Villages had been constructed to accomodate some of them.

110. The Commander of the southern zone said that there were 105 Senegalese fpards posted at several,points along the frontier. Their main duty was to prevent smuggling.

- 12/ See annex I, C.

-22- 111. There were also some military posts, such as the one at M'P&, where the military experts of the nenbers of the Special Mission held an inquiry. 121

112. The military authorities also stated that there were Portuguese posts and bases, such zs the ones at :':!'i, Domin:w, Susann, Vnrela and others, on the other side of the border.

113. With regard to weapons in the rei;ion, the President of the Republic stated that the only artillery piece that Senegal had was a. training; Ecrtar. Nevertheless, the President said that, in view of the recent attacks, Sene[:al had decided to reinforce its border defences and had installed anti-aircraft artillery to counter the aerial violations of SeneCalese territory.

114. On its tour of the border on the Sene,galese side, the Special Mission szw no fortifications or artillery pieces in the area covered by it.

D. The Special Missicn's interview with Mr. !.nilccr Cabral, Secretary-GenLrsl of PAIGC

115. On 31 July 1971, the Special Mission interviewed Mr. Amilcar Cabral, Secretery- General of PAIGC. In his statement to the Special Mission and in the subsequent question and answer period, Mr. Cabral touched in particular on the following; points.

Mine-l&w; in Senei;alese territory

11.6. Portugal, said the Secretary-General of PAIGC, was tryin;; to make the United .Nations believe that it was PAIGC thet ias laying mines in Sene@ese territory. It alleged, in support of its arl;ument, that the mines were Russian and that PfiIGC had admitted that the Soviet Union had supplied it with such FFt6riel. However, it was always possible to use the same weapons as one's opponent, either because in any WBY weapons~werf captured from the enemy or because in the international market there was no one-way traffic in arns. Moreover ) each year the Portu{;uese published a list of the mat6riel allegedly seized from the troops opposing then. For example, they had issued a comnuniqu6 at the end of 1969, stating that they had captured 40 tons of mat&iel during that year, including a few hundred anti-tank mines and & few thousand anti-personnel mines. A similar bulletin, issued early in 1971, mentioned a fii7ure of 50 tons of mat&iel for 1970. However exac,[!,erated those figures nli{;ht be, it was possible for each side to obtain,possession of arms frcm the ether. Moreover, if a comb&x.nt had skilled ,I experts, it could always clear a road which had been mined by the enerny and make use elsewhere of the mines it thus acquired. Lastly, Portugal could not accuse Senei;al of aiding PAIGC and at the same time accuse PAIGC of mining the Sene&ese roads which the Portu!Tuese claimed it was usin{:.

lJ/ See Annex I, A.

-23- PAIGC's relations with the Government.of--- Sene,-:al 117. As to P,%IGC's relations with the Sene~alese Government, it hx3 to be borne in mind, first and forenmt, ,that the General Assembly of the United Nations h&d proclaimed the le{;itinacy of the amed stru;&e of the mtioniil liberation movements and had called on till Member States to render assistance to ther:. PAIGC's struggle was therefore lawful, and any State that assisted it was merely fulfilling an international morn1 and political obligation.

118. AS a practical matter, Sene@l had never supplied PJ'JGC with my mm. PAIGC , for its part, hed no bases outside Guinea (Bissau). One of the fundamental principles of the movenent was to keep its cmbatsnts inside its own country, of which it controlled two thirds. In Senegal PAIGC maintained only such personnel as were essential to the operation of its centres, which were an information office at D&k&r and a rest-home at Zip;uinchor where convalescents spent a few d~.ys before returning to Guinea (Bissau). These two centres also served as reception centres for PAIGC personnel on mission. The number of persons who cane to Senesal on mission each month was not ns e rule greater than twenty. In eddition, PAIGC used any facilities which Sene[

Attitude of PAIGC to the Portuguese Government 119. For.nany years, snid Mr. Cabrzl, the nntionelist rrovelrent had been calling on Portugzl to recognize the elementary rights of the people. The response had been savage repression. Demonstrations, strikes and peaceful methods, had then been used and the Pidjiguite nassa~cre, at the port of Bissau, had followed when in the space of 20 minu>es) durinq a, strike, 50 African workers had been killed and core than 100 wounded. Nevertheless, it was only after submitting nemornndn both to Portugal and to the United Nations and after explaining the,situation to the United >Tations before the Committee of Twenty-Four in December 1962 that PAIGC hzd been compelled to recognize the necessity of resorting: to arms. Iiowever, PAIGC was always reedy to encage in a dieloy,ue with Portupnl, that Portugal would at lest ecknowledee the ripat of the people of Guineit (Bissau) to self-determination and that a new kind of relationship would be established between them and the people of Portugsl, who should not be identified with Portuguese colonialism. 120. Mr. Cabral noted that several years previously the Committee of Twenty-Four had been invited to send a dele,Tztion to examine the conditions in which the people of Guinea (Bissau) were iivine in the liberated areas and said that, if a free plebiscite with observers in attendance wzs organized by the United Nations, end provided that Portugal withdrew its troops, now numbering about 40,000, the people of Guinea (Bissau) would undoubtedl.y vote for freedom.

-24- Expression -- of thanks to the Special Mission 121. In conclusion, after referrinp to the ereat responsibility borne by the Special Mission and expressing his thcnks for the opportunity to addreSS it, Mr. Cabral stressed that the Special Mission had come to Africa to n&e en inquiry into a conflict, not between the Portuguese Government itnd the Senegalese Governrznt or between the Portuguese Government and the people of Guinea (Bissau), but between the Government of' Portugal end the United Nations, between the Governwnt of Portugal and mankind.

-25- III. CONCLUSIONS

122. In the execution of its mandate, the Special Mission of the Security Council received the full and entire co-operation and assistance of the Senegalese Government. It also had the opportunity of acquainting itself with the views of the Secretary-General of PAIGC. The Portuguese Government, however, communicated to the Special Mission that it could not accept the principle of collaboration with the Special Mission. The Special Mission strongly deplores this lack of co-operation with prevented it from implementing fully the mandate given to it under paragraph 4 of resolution 294 (1971). 123. From the statements made to the Special Mission, as well as its own observations, it is clear that it is a strict principle of the foreign policy of the Republic of Senegal to avoid any engagement with Portuguese forces other than for the actual defence of its territory and also that the recurrent armed attacks against Senegal cause considerable loss of human life, as well as material damage; they create a climate of insecurity snc' instability and imply a threat to peace and security in the region.

124. The Special Mission inqui:red into a series of incidents reported by the Government of Senegal to the Security Council. It visited, inter alia, three sites where mines had been laid, incidents which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal had also referred to, among other similar cases, in his statement of 12 July 1971 to the Security Council. In the three cases, the Special Mission noted the traces of explosions and the very heavy damage inflicted by the mines on:three,vehicles including a $us. The Senegalese authorities reported that four people had bee& killed ahd'l6'itijured as a result of these three incidents. 125. On its arrival in Senegal the Special Mission had to deal immediately with a series of frontier incidents which occurred successively on 25 and,,30 J$y 19,71. It devoted particular attention to these incidents which, as it informed the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations in a cable dated 30 July 1971, had been "repeated apparently in vioiation of resolution 294 (1971) by Portuguese forces according to statements of Senegalese witnesses on the spot" thus implying defiance of the Security Council.

126. On the basis of the declarations made to it and the inquiries which it conducted, as well as its observations, the Special Mission of the Security Council reached the following conclusions:

(a) Thc~ military experts established the following on the basis of the inquiry into the attack on the village of Kandjenou: (i) the evidence examined at Kandjenou proves that the village was attacked and that the attack was particularly devastating; (ii) the attaCkers used individual military weapons; (iii) judging from the results of the operation and from the,weapons used, it is probable that this attack could nave been made only by a properly trained force equipped with suitable weapons and provided with a safe refuge near at hand. In addition, the witnesses heard by the military experts stated that the attack had been carried out by +rtuguese forces. The military experts were agreed that what they had just observed and heard in the village of Kandjenou was sufficient for them to form their opinion concerning the attacks on villages carried out in the area. (b) Several persons testified that a group of soldiers crossed the border into Senegalese territory and made an armed attack against Bagame in daylight on 30 July 1971. One person testified that he 'had seen a Portuguese (white) in uniform and bearing a weapon who had violated the Senegalese frontier. (c) The statements made established that the shelling by heavy artillery of Senegalese territory on 25 July 1971, came from Guinea (Bissau). It was pointed out to the Special Mission that only Portuguese armed forces possessed heavy artillery in this area. (d) In other cases it was found that mines had been laid in Senegalese territory causing the death of individuals and material destruction. The Special, Mission examined the sites of the explosions and took note of the damage caused.

127. 'Since the Special Mission was refused access toGuinea (Bissau), some additional information for carrying out its task completely was lacking. All the evidence of acts of violence and destruction found by the Mission itself was along the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau), an area in which, according to the observations of the Mission, PAIGC is not engaging in any military activity. Thins was confirmed by the Senegalese author?ties, the Secretary-G~eneral~of PAIGC and several,other witness"es questioned by,the Mission. '@{:',~$&a1 Mission found the indications such as t.o designate ~the,~l%$uguese a$+prities in,Guinea (Bissau) .~as,,respons,ible. It reaches the,conclus<,on .4hat the above-mentioned acts of violence and destruction,app+r to be the,consequence '-OF-the special situation prevailing in Guinea (Bissau), which, as the,Mission n&es with regret, is in contradiction to the Decla+.ion on the Granting of rtidependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 1514 (XV) adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1960). IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

128. The Special Mission of the Security Council, having regard to resolution 294 (1971-j ) vhose full and unconditional implementation it supports, and to the foregoing conclusions, recommends to the Security Council that it should: (1) Ensure the prerequisites for eliminating the causes of tension in the region and creating an atmosphere of trust, peace and security, namely:

A - Senegal

(a) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal; (b) the iumxdiate cessation of acts of violence and destruction against its territory and its people in order to contribute to the,safeguarding of peace and security in the region.

B - Guinea (Bisssu)

(a) that the principle of self-determination and independence, as laid resolution 1514 (XV) should be respected;

c - Portugal The Special Miss&n accordingly recommends hould take all w&%+&y steps and initiatives espect and fully implement the recommendations

(2) The Special Mission further reconmend.s that the Security Council remain seiz,ed of the matter and request the President of the Security Council and the Secre,tary-General to keep the situation under review. Finally, it recommends that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council within an appropriate period and at the latest within six months.

* * K

The Special Mission wishes to thank its Chairman, Ambassador Gu'illermo Sevilla-Sacasa, and to congratulate him on having directed its work with competence, authority and tact and on having guided it until the adoption of its report on9 September 1971.

-28- ANNEX I REPORTS OF THE MILITARY EXPERTS OF THE MEMBERSOF THE SPECIAL MISSION

A. Report on the,7----T- inquiry of,,the military experts of the members of --__-..__---the Special MIssion into the incident of 25 Julyxz

(Ziguinchor, 30 July 1971)

, --.---Introduction - jl. After its meeting with the President of the Republic of Senegal on 26 July i971 in Dakar, the Special Mission was informed of an incident which, according to a press report, had occurred on the previous day, Sunday, 25 July, in the border region of Casamance.

That same evening, the Office of the President of the Republic transmitted to the Special Mission the report in question, which reads as follows: "APS-08 BIS

"Another Portuguese bombing in Casamance

"Ziguinchor, 26 July (APS). On the eve of the arrival in Cassmance of the United Nations Mission to investigate Portuguese harassment in this southern 'part of our country, Portuguese shells fell on Bousanoume, a peaceful Senegalese village situated 20.5 km from Ziguinchor. &/

"Fortunately no lives were lost. Two persons, however, were seriously wounded by the colonialist shells. It should be noted that it is not the first,time that the Portuguese have done this. There was the Portuguese bombing of the Salikegne sector, Department of Kolda, which coincided with the,arrival of the United Nations Mission to assess the damage caused by repeated bombings by the Portuguese military forces. "The Mission of Inquiry of the United Nations Security Council will find all the evidence it requires right on the spot. It will be able to see for itself the distressing situation which prevails throughout Casamance, where not a day goes by without reports of harassments by the Portuguese colonialist troops in the border villages...."

1/ It appeared from the inquiry subsequently performed, that most of the shelling had hit the hamlet of Boffa-Bayotte, near Bousanoume.

-,23- 2. The Special Mission, which proceeded immediately to examine the question, felt that, if confirmed, an incident of that kind, occurring at the time of the Special Missionss arrival in the Territory where it was to conduct its inquiry, had to be examined immediately. Since it was to hold talks the following day in Dakar with the Prime Minister and some of his close advisers, and taking into account the urgency of the matter, it decided to send the Military Experts of its members to the, scene of the incident to gather all possible information, examine the facts and report back.

Travel and work of the -.-Military ~- Experts 3. The Military Experts, namely, Colonel C. De Wilde (?elgiLm)j Ccrmander S. Sota (Burundi), Colonel J. Gutierrez (Nicaragua), Colonel S. Kazmierski (Poland), Colonel Fayez Bayassi (Syria), flew on the following day, i.e. on 27 July 1971, to Ziguinchor, Region of Cassmance, on a plane placed at their disposal by the Government of Senegal.

4. Lieutenant-Colonel Amadau Bela1 Ly, Governor of the Casamance Region, and other officials received the Military Experts and gave them information on the military situation of the region.

5. Led by the Governor and Commander Coumba Diouf Niang, Commandant of the Southern Zone, the Experts drove to the village of M'Pak, the area in which the incident had occurred. The village of M'Pak is situated 19 kilometres south of Ziguinchor on the border between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau).

6. After inspecting the area and interrogating witnesses, the Mil'itary Experts returned to Ziguinchor, where they visited a Senegalese villager who, according to the testimony heard, had been wounded during the incident; his wounds were sufficiently serious to require his removal to the regional hospital of Ziguinchor. They also spoke to the doctor who had ,&ken care of the wounded man.

7. The Military Experts fl.ew back td Dakar the same day, 27 July 1971, at 1800 hours.

Statements of witnesses; heard by the Military Experts a. During the course of their inquiry, the Military Experts heard the followi@ six statements on the above-mentioned incident:

(a) Commandant Coumba Diouf Niang, Commander of tne Southern Zone, who was not on the spot when the incident took place and whose testimony was based'on hearsay, stated th,at Portuguese attacks were a continuous source of worry in this Senegalese region. Since the beginning of 1971, among other incidents such as frequent overflights of the region by Portuguese aircraft, three particularly serious incidents had occurred in the region,of M'Pak. In January 1971 Portuguese troops had opened fire on the village at night, wounding one villager. Seven shell holes had been found.

9. More recently, on 5 July 1971, a Portuguese commando had attacked the same village, apparently intending to kidnap Portuguese refugees who were lodged in a house. In order to ensure that the operation would be successful, the Portuguese troops had launched an artillery barrage, but the fire from the heavy machine-gun of the Senegalese post had stopped the assault and the attack therefore ended in failure. -3o- 10. The last incident had taken place on Sunday, 25 July 1971, between 1230 and 1400 hours. According to the information gathered by the Senegalese army, a Portuguese convoy had been intercepted by PAIGC 1_! troops in Guinea (Bissau) territory. The Portuguese opened fire with heavy artillery and about 40 shells had fallen on Senegalese territory, on a hamlet called Boffa-Bayotte, a distance of one km from M'Pak. Two villagers had been Qounded; one of them had to be taken to Ziguinchor hospital. 11. The Military Experts then put' various questions to the witness, who supplied the following details: (i) No movement of PAIGC nationalists towards Senegalese territory had been observed at the time of'the last incident. Whenever shooting indicating an incident on Portuguese territory was heard, the official orders were to deploy men along the border in order to prevent anybody from crossing' into Senegalese territory. Those orders had been followed from the moment the incident began. (ii) The shells could not have been fired by PAIGC troops, because in that region Portuguese troops were the only ones equipped with artillery, particularly in the San Dcmingo sector.

(iii) The only heavy armament at the post of M'Pak, the only military post in the area, was a 12.7 mm machine-gun, which the witness pointed out to the experts. The nearest Senegalese military post, which was several dozen kilometres away, had nothing but anti-aircraft guns. (iv) The region where M'Pak and the hamlet of Boffa-Bayotte are situated is about 800 m - 1 km north of the Senegal-Guinea (Bissau) border.

(b) -A-.Serpeant Barth616my Da, Chief of the M'Pak military post, who was on the spot when the incident occurred, stated that there had been no exchange of fire before the shells fell on Senegalese territory. The first shells had fallen in the Boffa-Bayotte sector. They came at a very rapid rate. Sergeant Diane had been in M'Pak ani as soon as he heard the explosions, he proceeded in their direction. He then found M. Dapananto Mendy, who had been wounded in the arm, and a little distance away he found M. K6ba Cisse, who had been wounded in the chest. He had sent those two tnhabitants of Boffa-Bayotte to the military post of M'Pak. According to Sergeant Diane's estimate, first 155 mm shells and then 81 mm shells had been fired. The shellings had started at 1213 hours and lasted until 1400 hours. It had probably come from several weapons; the firing could have been as rapid as one shot per second. (c) M. Dapananto Mendy (36 years old), a resident of Boffa-Bayotte, whose statement in the Diola language was translated into French by a local interpreter,, s&d that on Sunday, 25 July, early in the afternoon, he was having a siesta outside. A series of explosions (about 40) had been set off around him. He was injured in the arm by shrapnel from a shell which exploded about 200 me,tres from where he was. He went to the military post of M'Pak, where he was treated. (d) M!adou Coly (30 years old), a resident of Boffa-Bayotte, whose : statement in the Diola language was translated into French by a local interpreter, said that on Sunday, 25 July, early in the afternoon, he was in his hut when he heard a succession of artillery shots: over a hundred. The shelling lasted from

L! PAIGC - Partido Africans da Independencia da &in6 e Cabo Verde. -31- approximately 1200 hours to 1400 hours. There were villagers in the vicinity, but they were in widely separated groups; Senegalese soldiers were near by. There were about 40 explosions in the immediate vicinity of Boffa-Bayotte.

(2) --14. K6ba Ciss6 (45 years old), a resident of Boffa-Bayotte, was questioned at Ziguinchor hospital. He stated that on Sunday, 25 July, at about 1200 hours, he had heard shelling; the shells were falling close to where he was. He was wounded by one of the last exglosions in Senegalese territory. He then went to the military post and was removed to Ziguinchor hospital.

(f.) --Doctor Xavier Imbert, Chief Doctor of the Ziguinchor hospital stated that Mr. K6ba Ciss6 had been brought to Ziguinchor hospital on Sundays 25 July 1971. Mr. Ciss6 had been wounded near the breast-bone. The wound was fairly serious but,, since he had been taken care of right away, Dr. Imbert thought that the wounded man would be able to leave the hospital within a few days. In his opinion, the wound had been caused, without any doubt, by a shell fragment.

---AFindings 12. In the course of their inquiry, the Military Experts established the following facts: (i) Area of the incident: (a) The village of M'Pak, site of a military post, is situated a few hundred metres north of the Senegalese border with Guinea (Bissau). The border is indicated by a horizontal pole.

(b) The only piece of heavy weaponry visible on that military post is a 12.7 mm machine-gun. (c) No fortification is visible in the vicinity of the post. (d) The hamlet of Boffa--Bayotte comprises a few thatched mud huts. It is situated approximately 1 km west of MPPak~ (e) The surrounding vegetation is a savanna forest with tall trees (f) The ground is covered by a dense network of roots.

(ii) The incident: (a) The Military Experts examined twelve shell holes, eight of which were craters. Measured at ground level, the craters were approximately l-l.5 metres in diameter and 0.60-0.75 metres in depth. (b) The Military Experts themselves were able to dig out shell fragments from the bottom surfaces of the craters, which had been partially blackened by the explosions.

-32- Cc) In the area surrounding the explosions, within a radius, which for the craters was of 15-20 metres, the Experts were able ,to find impact traces on several trees, as well as indications of ricochets on the ground. Those traces had obviously been left by the explosions. (a) The Military Experts estimated the calibre of the shells at 105 or 155 mm, approximately. (e) The nature of the impact as well as the traces examined in the surrounding area did not permit a scientific determination of the direction from which the shells were fired. HOWeVer, according to the witnesses' testimony and inspection of the target areas, the Experts concluded that there was a quasi certitude that the shots had come from heavy artillery emplacements located in Guinea (Bissau), (f) The Senegalese authorities offered to show other shell holes to the Military Experts. However, the latter considered that they obtained all the necessary information from their inspection of the first twelve.

13. The Military Experts wish to state that they received the fullest assistance from the Seneg;alese authorities in carrying out their mandate.

-33- B. Report of the Military-.-- Experts members of the Special Mission -_~-.__.-on the incidents at Kandjenou and Singuere__ .,_.---.-.-_ Diola

(Second report,, 9 August 1971)

--contents ^Paw I. Introduction . . . . ~ . . . ~ . . . . . ,. T . ~ . ~ . " j . . 35

II. Inquiry into the attack on the village of Kandjenou . . . . ~ . 35

III. Inquiry into the incident of 30 July 1971 (attack on herdsmen and theft of cattle) ~ I . j . j ~ . ~ " ~ . . . . . I . ~ ~ . . . 37

-34- I. Introduction 1. As decided by the Special Mission, the Military Experts left Ziguinchor (Casamance) on 30 July 1971 to visit the district of Tanaff where they were to inquire into some acts of violence which, according to the Senegalese authorities, the Portuguese army had perpetrated in the region. More specifically, these were attacks made on the village of Kandjenou during the night of 31 March-l April 1971 and the villages of Tankanto and Karoumbo during the night of 16-17 April of which the Government of Senegal had informed the Security Council in a letter of 27 April 1971 addressed to the President of the Council. L/ 2. The itinerary of the convoy lay through the district of &mine where the chief town had been bombed on 25 November and 7 December 1969 - an act which caused the Security Council to condemn strongly the Portuguese authorities for the shelling of the village of &mine. g/ 3. On arrival at &mine, the Military Experts saw a crowd of people gathered in the roadway. The Governor of the region of Casamance, who was guiding the convoy, then told the experts that, according to information which he had just received, there had been an attack & few hours before on the village of Singuere-Diola situated about 30 km. along the frontier from &mine, in approximately the same direction as Ziguinchor. Some herdsmen had been attacked by men armed with grenades and rifles. Several men had been wounded and two of them had been brought to &mine, a village situated on the main artery, before being transported to the regional hospital at Ziguinchor. 4. The Military Experts went to see the two wounded men, who were on the spot, end questioned them briefly. They then decided to go ahead with the task entrusted to them by the Special Mission and to inquire into this new incident on their return.

II. Inquiry -- into the attack on the village of Kandjenou 5. The Military Experts visited the village of Kandjenou in the district of Tanaff approximately 800 m. from th'e Senegal-Guinea (Bissau) border where they heard the following testimony: 6. (a) Lt. Cal. Amadou Belai Ly, Governor of the region of Casama~ce, stated that, during the night of 31 March-l April 1971, a detachment of the Portuguese army had attacked in the dark the village of Kandjenou which had at the time about 750 inhabitants. 130 dwellings, or more thzn one half of the village, had been burnt down, the school had been half destroyed, and the attack had left one dead and 17 wounded. 400 persons had been left homeless. The material damage caused by this attack was considerable. 200 head of cattle had been carried off, more than 400 fowl had been burned, and 4 carts and 2 manual grinders had been destroyed; in addition, 200 tons of ground-nuts were burned, 50 sacks of palm-nuts and 600 empty sacks were destroyed. 15 rifles given to the inhabitants for self-defence purposes had been stolen.

IJ s/10182. 21 Resolution 273 of 9 December 1969. -35- 7. The witness further st&zd that the attack had been carried out by re@ar Portuguese troops who had prob:Ibly been intending: to capture e rr.ember of the PAIGC. As the attack had taken place at night, the Portuguese had used neither aircraft nor artillery, but only grenedes and rifles. All the victim had been wounded either by shots or by splinters; none hzd been burned.

8. (b) Mr. Famara Mandian, Chief of the villaq, whose testimony in Diola was rendered into French by a local interpreter, stated that the attack had taken @ace around midnight and had lasted about 15 minutes. Explaining thet he was on the spot at the tine of the incidmt., the witness said that he had been awakened by it. The attackers had made off afterwards in an easterly direction (approxinately the direction of the frontier). There was no nmber of the P?JGC or any refugee in the village. ps a result of the attack, s,ome of the inhabitants had had to leave the village. Those who had stayed had received protection from Senegalese troops. The attack had been carried out by Portuguese nercenaries, that was to say the regular Portuguese army, and, the witness said, the damage was still very visi'ble.

9. (c) Commander Coumba Diouf Ninny, Commander of the Southern zone, stated thrt on 1 ftpril 1971, Senegalese troops in the area had been reduced %o ninimucl numbers because of preparations for the national holiday on 4 fipril. That was why the attack had net with such little resistance. A few days later on 6 April, the Portuguese mercenaries had rtttenpted to burn down the village of Diamaye situated a few kilometres away, but, encountering some resistence, had withdrawn after stealing 300 kg. of rice and some money. On 11 pLpril, two other villages in the same area, Madigasama and Soukounaya, had been burned; 10 concessions of coffee had been fired and 100 huts burned down; the crops stolen or destroyed on the spot. ,Uso in the distric:t of&meff, the villages of Karoumbo and Tankanto had been attacked during the night of 16-17 April 1971. At Takanto, three civilians had been killed and three more wounded. One Portuguese mercenary had been killed. His equipment had been kept at the military cmp at Ziguinchor. Tie witness hr.d explained, in this connexion, that the Sene@ese used the terra "Portuguese l:xrcensry" to designate any soldier in the Portuguese srny, whether white or black.

Findings

10. At the village of Kandjenou, the 12ilitary experts observed the following: (i) The charred rensins of a very large number of huts which had been destroyed by fire;

(ii) A number of huts whose roofs had been renlade; (iii) A pre-cast block structure, largely destroyed, the interior showing signs of fire, which was identified by the fillaf;e he&Tan as the former ground-nut storehouse; (iv) Another partially destroyed structure whose pre-cast block walls showed about a hundred bul:Let and grenade splinter scars. A hole about 45 cm. in diaxeter in the corrugated iron roof might have been caused by a projectile, es miph-t another hole, in one of the walls, approximately 35 cm. in diaxter. The village hecdrnan stated that this buildiny; was the school, and that it had not yet been possible to rebuild it. -36- 11. The military experts reeched the following conclusions:

(i) The evidence examined at Kandjenou proves that the village was attacked, and that the attack was particularly devastating; (ii) The attackers used jndividual nilitary weapons: (iii) Judging from the results of the operation and frorx the wer.pons used, it is probable that this &tack could have been made only by a. properly trained force equipped with suitable weapons and provided with r^. safe refu,le near at hand.

12. Believing that the Special Mission should be informed as Soon w possible of the new incident which had occurred at Sinp,uere-Diola, the military experts discussed among themselves the procedure to be followed. They agreed that what they had seen end heard at the village of Kandjenou was sufficient to enable theta to state an opinion on the attacks on villcges which had taken piece in the region.

III. -Inquiry into the incident of 30 July 1971 (attack on herdsmen and theft - of cattle)- 13. I\% the village of Samine, the militrtry experts learned that the four wounded, one of then in serious condition, had left for the regional hospital at Ziguinchor, accompanied by a witness. They immediately made their way there.

Testimony heard

14. (a) Mr. Papilla BadEi (aged 19), inhabitant of Singuere-Dioln, stated that at e.bout 9 p.n. on the eveninp of the preceding day, 29 July, he had gone as usual to mind the village herd a few hundred netres from the village, in the company of Lenzana Mendy, Keba Badgi and fibdou B&pi. The latter two were resting while awaiting their turn on watch. Towards 1 a.n. they were attacked by men armed with rifles and grenades. Since they were unarmed, all they could do was run. In answer to a number of questions, the witness indicated that at least one grenade had been thrown, and that rifle shots had been fired. ,The distance from which the attackers had fired Imust have been about 30 metres. Owing to the darkness, the witness hzd been unable to identify the attackers. IIe had been wounded in the left arm.

15. (b) Mr. Keba BadPi (aged 20), inhabitant of Singuere-Diola, who was still suffering fro3 the shock of the incident, confirmed the statements of the preceding witness.

16. (c) --.Mr. B&ari Manda (aged 22), (testimony in Diola, rendered into French by a locel interpreter), resident of Singuere-Dials, stated that he had come from the village to accompany the wounded plen. He had found signs of a grenade explosion on the ground at the place of the attack, and of another grenade thrown at the place where the two boys who were not on watch had been sleeping. The attackers had taken twenty head of cattle from .the village herd, killed two and wou,nded six.

-37- 17. (d) Doctor Xavier Imbert, Senior Doctor, regional hospital of Ziguinchor, stated that towards the end of the morning the four wounded men referred,to above had been received in his hospi.tal. He had immediately X-rayed them. OIlI?, Mr. Lansana Mendy, had been wo.unded in the abdomen by a shell or grenade splinter. Doctor Imbert had operated immediately, under general anaesthesia, and had removed the splinter from the wound. The operation appeared to have been successful. The other three wounded men had slight wounds, also fron splinters. One of the wounded had been hit in the base of the neck. The splinter had been removed before he arrived at the hospital. Another of them had a wound in the arm containing a small splinte,r, and yet another a similar wound in the thigh. Because of the small size of t:hese splinters and their location, which did not endanger any important ama of the body, they were not removed.

18. The inilitary experts were unable to interrogate Mr. Lanssna Mendy, who was still under anaesthesia. Nor (did they interrogate young Abdou Bad@, aged 13, who was still in a state of shock.

19. With regard to these particular incidents, the military experts can only testify that they saw four Senssgalese nationals wounded by grenade splinters.

-38- C. Findings of ,tlYe Wlitary Experts concerning incidents reported to the Special Mission

(Third report, 9 hgust 1971)

I.

II. Examination of exhibits at Ziguinchor army camp . ~ . . I . . . ~ e .

III. Incident near Sare Ndaye . . . ~ . ~ . . . ~ j ~ ~ o . . " . . . ~ 1

IV. Bridge at Bnlo Kounda ~ . n I ~ . . ~ j . '...... ~ I . . . 41

v. Incident at the village of Bagme ...... 9 ~ . . j . . ~ ~ j ~ 41 Annex: Exhibits produced before the Special Mission at Ziguinchor army camp ...... 42

-39-

;,;.- ,i TheMilitary Experts of the m&bers of the Special Mission wish to state the following findings:

I. Incident - near Santiabs-Mand,iack At 2.30 p.m. on 28 July 1971, at a spot in Senegalese territory, near' Santiaba-Mandjack and about one kilometre from the frontier, the Military Experts found that a civilian vehicle of the minibus variety had set off a mine.

The explosion occurred under the right rear wheel, as was demonstrated by the fact that the brake drum had collapsed and by the traces of burning. The quantity of explosive used must have been about the size of an anti-tank nine. Since the mine had exploded, its origin could not be determined.

According to the area commander, three other mines had been found by Senegalese soldiers close to the site of the explosion.

II. Examination of exhibits at Ziwinchor army camp At 7.30 p.m. on the SUE day, 28 July 1971, the Senegalese military authorities produced before the Special Mission at Ziguinchor army camp various weapons and explosives which they said h;sd been found along the frontier in Senegalese territory, some of them on the persons of Portup,uese soldiers. The military experts examined these objet-ts and requested the Senee,alese authorities to provide a list of then. The list is annexed hereto. The Clitary experts are able to confirm the,number and description of the objects concerned as indicated in the list.

III. Incident near Sare Mdaye At abort 10.50 a.~. on :29 July 1971 the military experts exar?ined, on the earth road from Sare Ndaye to IAlfa Sado, less than a kilometre from the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau), two jeeps of the land rover type lying beside the road approximately 150 metres apart. The remnmts indicated that the vehicles had been destroyed by mines with the power of an anti-tank mine. They also showed that the mine had exploded under the front right-hand wheel of the vehicle closer to Sare mdaye, which had been thrown a distance of about five metres.

The second vehicle had been thrown a distance of about seven metres after the explosion of a mine under a rear wheel. Because of the explosions, the origin of the mines could not be determined. IV. Bridge at Bala Kounda i,t about 1.00 p.ra. of the same d;,y, 29 July 1971, on the road from Sare Ssssao to Bala Kounda, the Military Experts examined a bridge approximately 3.5 metres long, built in two sections with a central post. The Senegalese authorities stated that two sticks of TNT bearing Portuguese markin@ and each weighing one Kg., together with 16 bags of TNT powder, had been discovered on the bridge, and that the detonator had been installed. Since no damage was apparent, the military experts could only take note of these statements.

V. --__-Incident at the villwe of Ba~ax At about 5.00 p.m. on Friday, 30 July 1971, while the Governor of the Cesamance area, Lt. Cal. Bela1 Ly, was speaking with the members of the Special Mission, in order to inform them of an incident which had just occurred at the village of Bagame, situated on the frontier in Senegalese territory, the Military Experts met to examine the following objects produced before the Special Mission as having been found at the site of the incident:

(1) Three 81 mm rocket vanes; (2) One propulsion unit for a rocket-launcher, calibre 81 mm with the following inscription: "to keep in shedow temp. Lin.-20 to +120° F.";

(3) One 60 mn mortar vane; (4) One firing cartridge for a. 60 m mortar, type 1970 M2 ~~~-2-16; (5) One bullet, calibre 24 mm.

-4l- L!tST PREPAREDBY THE SENEGXLESEGOVERNMXNT OF THE EXHIBITS PRODUCEDBEFORE TIHE SPECIAL MISSION AT ZIGUINCHOR ARMY CAMP ON 28 JULY 1971 Exhibit Quantity Legible Markings Semi-automatic rifle 1 - G.3-FMP- 144 180 -4/69 on Portuguese soldier Manga KAMTE on 14 July 1971 by a patrol of the National Army, close to the Senegalese village of Nianao. Magazine rifle 1 - C.I-D 6171 - FSPINGARADAPORTUGUEZA 65 MOM-1904 - DEUTSCHEWAFFEN UND MUNITIONSFABRIKEN - Berlin. Recovered by the National Amy on intercepting a Portuguese unit which had come to burn and pillage the village of Thianle (Senegal). Portuguese rifle 1 - M.22 - N 022 159 - IvlB. Taken from the body of a Portuguese soldier killed in the attack on the village of Tankanto on 17 April 1971. - Cartridge clips 4 - Cartridges 25 50/E. - Helmet 1 Equipment of the Portuguese killed at - Belt 1 Tankanto (Senegal) on 17 April 1971.

O.F. Grenade 1 No markings. O.F. Grenades 2 Body: G.M. OF - Ml962 - TNT - SPELOTE 4-4. Handle: ESPL - DM 72 - use 4-4 3 to 4 sec. Recovered in the field during interception of the attack on M'PACK at Sanou (Senegal). Portuguese cases and ammunition 140 Picked up in the villages of SANOU, THIAMLE, MARSAILLE, SAFANE, TANKANTO, KANDIENOUNGand W,DIGASSAMA. Undetectable anti-tank mines, wooden 3 Dimensions 22 x 31 x 13 cm. TWO concentrated TNT charges with intermediary charges. Detcnation by traction 2nd pressure igniter. Removed or deactivated: 17 mines. Exploded: 3. Casualties: 4 dead, 27 wounded. -42- Exhibit Quantity

Undetectable anti-personnel 5 Dimensions 19 x 6 x 9 cm. mines ) wooden Marking on charge: RABOUNTOPTMAMKA- BEC-200R. On base of mine: OMO-~ M-6MQ-M 33-19-OR. Mines found at SARE-MAMSALY, SARE MANSOAand KOUMBAKARA.

Anti-personnel igniter, 3 MYB - 2 - 583 - 4 - 58. pressure and traction Concentrated TNT sticks 3 PERTARTO-TNT - PR x 1-011-66 (1000). Bags of TNT powder 16 No markings. Explosive charge removed from under the bridges of SAFE-SASSAO, BALO KOUNDA and KAONE. FIAT G.91 4-tube rocket leuncher 1 G.91 Portuguese. LF 691 - 4 x 2 - ~1/66 - L.F '71. Lost by a Portuguese FIAT aircraft and picked up ,close to SABE-N'DIAYE in Senegalese territory after an air attack on 1 July 1971.

155 shell 1 Not exploded, picked up at XOLINTO after the bombardment close to SARE-N'DIAYE in Senegalese territory.

Rifle rockets 2 T.O. - KEEP-IN-SHADOV-TEMP-LIM-20 TO 120 F. Mortar vanes 8 SPE-2-15 1969x32. Rocket vanes 3 Found during the attack on BAGAME village on 30 July 1971.

Ziguinchor, 30 July 1971 Commander Coumba Diouf NIANG Commander of the Casamance Group and the C.O.S.C.

(Sirned) Head of the 3rd office, Seal of the General Staff of the .Armed Forces

-43-

:,, ,’ ANNEX II DOCUMENTSSUBMITTED TO THE SPECIAL MISSION BY THE GOVERNMENTOF SENEGAL

A. Summary of incidents along the frontier from 1961 to 1971

DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

1961 10/6/61 K0lda Incursion into Scnegalese territory of one SGga Demba, without Portuguese military identity papers, interpreter.~informer; 'he was brought to the Kolda military barracks.

18/10/61 K0lda Toguel Balde, a Portuguese intelligence agent, attempting to reach the village of Tauyel (Kolda), was intercepted and brought to the Kolda military barracks.

---”1962 9/2/62 Seleti Arrest of 7 elements of Portuguese Guinean (1800 hours) nationality who entered Senegalese territory secretly carrying weapons without a licence.

1963 8/4/63 Bouniack (Ziguinchor) Violation of air space over Senegalese (0800 hours) territory by 4 Portuguese military aircraft, which dropped grenades, wounding a child. Salikenie (Kolda) Two Portuguese whites, Arthur Amaro Meal and (1915 hours) Manuel,Colha Garcia entered Senegal in a vehicle bearing licence number G.1012 armed with rifles and ammunition. They went to the Salikenie post, claiming they were lost and asked the guards for permission to go to a village to collect their belongings. 1964

3/l/64 Sare--%ly (Kolda) Clash between Nationalists and Portuguese soldiers on Guinean territory. Stray bullets landed on the farm holdings belonging to Amadou Balde and Samba Seydi so that no one 'j was wounded.

-44.. DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

6 and Salikenie (Kc&da) clash between PAIGC and Portuguese soldiers on 7/1/64 Guinean territory near Salikenie. One woman wounded in the arm, 6 huts and storehouses burned down by grenades.

18/4/64 Sare N (Diaye A Senegalese apprehended by Portuguese soldiers and led away in the direction of Bissau.

24/5/64 Sitatou (Kolda) The Portuguese set fires, leaving 2 dead and carrying off sheep (60), goats and 1 bull.

16-17/B/64 sare Koube (Kolda) Portuguese patrol entered Senegalese territory; overflight by Portuguese military aircraft between the said village and Salikenie.

lo/lo/64 Kolda Overflight by a Portuguese Broussard aircraft (from Senegalese territory) from the frontier to Kolda. '_

--1965 am65 Salikenie (Kolda) A band of Portuguese mercenaries attacked inhabitants of the village with incendiary grenades - no casualties.

15/2/65 NYGobaye (S6dhiou) Rifle attack by Portuguese soldiers and destruction by fire of 8 farm holdings and all their crops.

28/2/65 Mansacounda Hut burned down by Portuguese soldiers. (V6lingara)

12/4/65 Bambato N'Ding Portuguese soldiers set fire to and destroyed (SGdhiou) 14 farm holdings, with all their crops, leaving all the families who had lived there without shelter or resources.

14./4/65 Djirband (SGdhiou) Portuguese soldiers looted 4 shops, stole 487,750 francs, then set fire to the village.

18/4/65 Djirband (S6dhiou) Portuguese soldiers attacked, stripped the inhabitants of their clothing and stole 487,500 francs from merchants.

2o/4/65 Bambato-Fassada- Soldiers carrying weapons marched into said Yarang-Djirband villages and spread panic among the villagers. (S6dhiou)

25/4/65 Faradianto (S6dhiou) Shots fired by soldiers of the Portuguese regular army - no casualties.

.-45.. DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

26/b/65 Coumbacara (Kolda.) Unauthorized entry into and presence on Senegalese territory of an officer, 4 soldiers and a guide of the Portuguese regular army.

WV65 Salik&ie-Kolda Low flight of a Portuguese aircraft over said village.

1/7/f% Bafata (Sedhiou) Capture of 3 Senegalese by Portuguese loyalist mercenaries.

2419165 Bafata (S6dhiou) Five women and 3 children in Senegalese territory kidnapped by mercenaries from Portuguese Guinea.

26/9/65 Kaguite (Ziguinc:hor) Murder of Portuguese nationsls by mercenaries from Portuguese Guinea on Senegalese territory and exhumation of their bodies.

29/9/65 Barry-.Disga (Kolda) Approximately 50 cattle carried off by Portuguese forces.

12 and Karantabe (Kolda) Seven grenades thrown by Portuguese mercenaries n/11/65 in said village; no damage.

17/u/65 Portuguese Territory Two Senegalese killed by Portuguese mercenaries. 12/12/65 Kandi&oung (Sedhiou) Two Senegalese and 4 cattle carried off by elements of the Portuguese regular army after the villagers were scattered by gun fire.

20/12/65 Sinthiane El-Hadji Portuguese soldiers kidnapped Senegalese (Kolda) nationals from said village, killed 4 persons by automatic weapons fire and caused substantial property damage.

24/12/65 Sinthiane El-Had~ji Portuguese aircraft flew over this hamlet and (Kolda) dropped leaflets written in Portuguese.

1966

16/l/66 Diamaye (S6dhiov) Soldiers of the Portuguese regular army set fire to said village, made off with the peanut and millet harvest and killed 3 bulls and 2 heifers.

m/3/66 Sar&Koubk-Sanka- Portuguese attacked said villages; the village Sar6 NsDiaye of Sinthiane was set afire leaving many dead (Kolda) and considerable property damage.

15/3/66 Firgui (Sgdhiou) Capture of 2 Senegalese and 1 refugee by African soldiers serving in the Portuguese army. -46- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT 25 and Djidadji (S&dhiou) Capture of 9 Senegalese and 24 refugees by 26/12/G African soldiers serving in the Portuguese regular army, following heavy automatic weapons fire.

28/5f66 Bouniack (Zichor) A Portuguese loyalist mercenary unit captured and shot 1 refugee and 1 Senegalese.

23/6/66 Youtou (Oussouye) Engagement between a company of Senegalese parachutists carrying out a sweep of the area and Portuguese from a frontier village (Esatem). No casualties. l/7/66 Djid-Dji-Balante One Senegalese captured by soldiers of the (S&hiou) Portuguese army. 18 and, Combsa (Kolda) Portuguese set fire to a farm holding; 19/11/66 resulting damage amounted to 44,000 francs.

--1967 2/1/67 Sijidian (Kolda) Elements of the Portuguese regular army set fire to said village and, during the panic which followed, mowed down the villagers with rifle and mortar fire. There were 3 dead and 5 wounded, and property damage amounted to 1,139,352 francs.

Sa&-Samba; 'Joulin, Portuguese incursion into the village of Counda (Kolda) Sar&Samba; they carried off 53 head of cattle and 3 women.

8/l/67 Sar&Demba A Portuguese unit, consisting of a general, a captain, a lieutenant and soldiers, took up position in 3 trucks for 30 minutes at the frontier post of Sare'-Waly.

24/l/67 Say&-Walg Portuguese elements attacked said village and destroyed approximately 30 huts.

1512167 Bsmbato A company of Portuguese soldiers set fire to the entire peanut harvest of a villager, whom they captured.

9/2/67 Bantagnel (SGdhiou) A two-company unit led by a white officer and, 2 white non-commissioned officers looted villages and abducted 2 refugees. The value of the stolen merchandise was estimated at 311,635 francs.

-47-. DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

213167 Bjirband (SGdhiou) A unit of the Portuguese regular army killed 2 farmers and set fire to 5 farm plots; the flames destroyed 61. huts, 27 storehouses, 21 oxen, sheep and goats. They carried off 8 bicycles and merchandise worth an estimated 150,000 francs.

7/3/67 Sar&-Waly (Kolda) Portuguese elements attacked said village, destroying some property by rocket-launched shell fragments.

W3/67 Fassane (Se'dhiou) A unit of the Portuguese regular army searched 2 houses and stole 82,000 francs.

W4/67 !~landiancounda (Kolda) Mercenaries from so-called Portuguese Guinea, hurled incendiary grenades into 2 farm holdings. Damage: 11 huts and 438,190 francs destroyed by fire.

13/4/Q Sax-6 Bocar (Kolda) Portuguese mercenaries set fire to 3 farm holdings, destroying 18 huts and 5 storehouses.

1af4m Boundisloum Elements of the Portuguese regular army (Ziguinchor) kidnapped 2 Senegalese.

22/4/67 Boundialown Escape of 1 of the Senegalese who had been (Ziguinchor) captured by elements of the Portuguese regular army and held at the military camp of Saint-Domingos. a/7/67 Faradianto (S6dhiou) Part of said village was hit by a number of mortar shells fired by the Portuguese regular army, 2 frightened Senegalese children were wounded by shell fragments.

WI/67 BOUSsalOUl Attack by elements of the Portuguese regular (Ziguinchor) army, leaving 1 dead, 1 wounded and 2 missing.

16/9/67 Santhiaba-,Manjak Portuguese soldiers burned dmn 7 huts, sacked (Oussouye) plantations and carried away 1 36--m rifle, No. 6973 M., and 2 cleaning-rods.

22 and Djirack (Oussouye) The Portuguese regular army, with militia 23/9/67 reinforcements beheaded a Portuguese refugee.

6/u/67 Rissassow-Douma Mercenaries of the Portuguese regular army (Sedhiou) captured a Portuguese refugee and stole 1 36-mm rifle and 10 7.5~mm cartridges.

11/12/67 Missirah (SGdhiou) Elements of the Portuguese regular army committed outrages against the population, resulting in 2 Senegalese dead. -4a- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

1968

12hf6a Salik6ni6 (Kolda) Portuguese attack resulted in 4 persons slightly wounded and some property damage. h/2/68 Djidadji (%dhiou), Three armed mercenaries coming from Portuguese Guinea shot a. man to death.

27/2/6t? Samba-Oulicounda Village of Sambe-Oulicounda, Kolda Department, (Kolda) attacked with incendiary grenades and mortar and automatic weapons fire. The incidents left 4 wounded, 2 seriously. Substantial property damage. Nearly 200 cartridges, 8 grenades and 2 Rokts were recovered on the ground.

18/3/68 Ha&allay&Thierno Portuguese elements crossed the frontier at the (Kolda) village of Hamdallaye-Thierno. They abducted 1, M'Balouf6 Dioula, and his son. They set fire to 3 farm holdings in the village of Hamdalaye-Dism, capturing the village chief and 2 men. They withdrew, setting fire to the village of Hamdallaye-Thierno.

1af 3168 Hamdallaye-Thierno Portuguese mercenaries returned and set ,fire to (Kolda) the villages of Kandio and Sark-Sembel. l9/3/68 Hamdallaye-Thierno The same Portuguese elements returned to the (Kolda) village of Kandion. They set fire to 4 huts and carried off 9 oxen and 2 people.

6/4/6a Sar6 N'Diaye Threatened attack by Portuguese elements on Sar6 N'Diaye during the night of 6/7 April 1968 foiled by intervention of the Casamance Group.

25/4/Q Fassane (S6dhiou) Portuguese elements infiltrated Fassane and Bsmbato, Tanaff District, S6dhiou Department, for the purpose of kidnapping refugees. m/5/68 Bambato (Scdhiou) Armed soldiers of the Portuguese regular army went to the village of Bsmbato from their base at Big&e to escort several refugee families and their flocks back to Guinea (Bissau). They searched the horne of one Souar6 Toure, whom they struck several times with a rifle butt. No shots were fired.

23/5f6a SarkSissao (Kc&la) Reliable sources report that Portuguese elements cleared a trail from the Portuguese villages of Sar&Waly and Walykounda to the frontier opposite the village of Sarb-Sissao. Y The Senegalese village chief was summoned and told to carry out the same operation from his village to the frontier. -49- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

916168 Bafata No. 2 (S6dhiou) The frontier post comnander reported a Portuguese incursion in which 4 nen were kidnapped from the fields.

28/6/68 Salikenie (Kolda) Arrest of a Senegslese, !b!ette M'Ballo, from Kamboa, by a Portuguese element when the former chased his cattle into Portuguese territory.

9m6a Combakara (Kolda) Guards at the Coumbakara post arrested EL Guinea soldier in the Portuguese Aruy answering to the name LUIS TECIXE, who W&S handed over to the Security Forces.

14/a/68 Salikenie (Kolda) Arrest by the guards at the Salikenie post of a Guinesn n?ilitianan answering to the name Oula BALDS. The soldier was released on 15 Auiugust 1966 following an investigation.

G/9/68 M6dina Alpha Ssdm Arrest of a white Portuguese deserter by Republican guards in the village of M6dina Alpha Sadou. The given nanf of the deserter was SENHOR MANUAL VERISSINO. He ms from CUNTIMA Base, w&s carrying a 79-dartridge light machine-gun, 4 grenades and a knife 2nd was handed over to the Security Forces.

1019168 Benidega and Violation of Senegalese territory by a Sar6 Bambado Portuguese Army unit in search of the deserter referred to in P.V.7/SFK dated 6/9/68.

2llOl68 Faradianto At about 0900 hours on 2 October 1968, the regular Portuguese Army abducted 30 persons, 9 of them Seneealese nationals, and made off with som cattle and food supplies frotithe village of Faradianto.

9/10/6a Ousscuye Some light, low-flying bombers and a helicopter flew over Kaheme-Djirack.

28/10/6a Y 8X8Jl.g A'shell fired frm BIGENE Base landed several hundred metres east of the village of Yaran.

22ml6a Fourteen heavy artillery shells exploded in the Yarane-rlangaroungou-Djirban triangle.

-5o- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

23/u/60 Toubacouta Madina Two shells exploded 200 metres west of the village of Toubacouta Wadina.

23/11/68 YaT-ang Some leaflets were dropped on the Fassane- Yarang-Kougne areas fron a Portuguese aircraft.

23/u/68 Between Sanka,and Having learned that a weapons convoy from PAIGC Sar6 N'Diaye would go by way of Sax+ N'Diaye and Sanka, ?ortuguese elements infiltrated Senegalese territory at a point between those villages and abducted a Il-year-old girl whom they released after questioning. ,Then 'they went back.

Four unarrwd Portuguese soldiers were reported to have slipped into the village of Dialacounbi vi'& the help of Mr. Fanta GANO of that village. The purpose of the,ir visit presumably was to force nationals of Portu(;uese Guinea living in Senegalese border villages to return to their ! homes.

2-r/12/68 Youtou (Oussouye) Mariama DIASSE, born in 1938 at Boula (Portuguese Guinea) and daughter of DIASSE and : SAMOUNEN'GABANA, came as a refugee to the home of Mr. Koualio DIATTA in Youtou. She was taken to the OUSSOUYEmilitary barracks where she i stated that her husband and 3 small children had been killed by the Portuguese Array. : 25/l/69 Djirban (Sgdhiou) Harassment of the abandoned village of DJIRBAN by heavy weapons fire fron Bigene Base (no casualties or property damage).

25/2/69 Salik&iG Sector Portuguese aircraft flew over Senegalese territory searchine for a PAIGC ambulance which supposedly crossed the border and entered the territory of Senegal at Sanka.

16/3/69 Mangnroungou A heavy artillery shell fired from the (Se'dhiou) Portuguese carlp at BIGENE exploded on the public square of the Senegalese village of MangarWlg0u, it impacted at a point 0.50 metres from the National Highway (South). ,i

Gendarmerie report of incident lists 3 dead and 9 wounded, some seriously. DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF TRE IN%IDE:NT

19/3/69 Sa&-Yoro Sabaly Thirty-five (35) Portuguese mercenaries infiltrated Senegalese territory at the village of Sar&Yoro Sabaly to provide an escort for refugees wishing to return to Portuguese Guinea.

3/4/69 Sar&Koube/ (K&da) A Portuguese intelligence agent known as Alpha M'Ballo was stopped by the commander of the G.R.S. post at Sar&Koub6 and taken to Kolda where he was returned to the territory of Portuguese Guinea.

914169 Sar&Sar6boye Entry of a Portuguese unit comprising about (Skdhiou) 50 mercenaries to provide an escort for the family of the refugee Omar BALDE, who wished to return to their home in the village of Diour B6b6. lo/‘+/@ Salik&i6 (Kolda) A former Portuguese African soldier named Souka BALDE was apprehended at Salik&ie', taken to Kolda and returned to Portuguese Guinea.

22/4/69 Sar&Souban At approximately 1100 hours, mercenaries entered Senegalese territory to escort Mr. Demba BALDE back to Portuguese Guinea at his request. w 5169 Sar6 Madi (village Three civilians in the pay of the Portuguese of Sinthiou Diaya) mercenaries arrived in the village of Sinthiou Diaya in the Tanaff District to recover the millet supply of a refugee who had gone back to Portuguese Guinea.

After the civilians were captured by the Republican guards at Sare' Madi, mercenaries came 'co the village of Sinthiou Diaya. They disobeyed the order to surrender and withdrew in the direction of Guinea (Bissau). a/5/69 Sibidianto (56dhiou) Eight (8) girls kidnapped by a group of mercenaries who had entered the village of Sibidianto. They also stole 93 oxen.

20/5/69 Sinthiou-Diaya A group of Portuguese militiamen infiltrated the Senegalese border village of Sinthiou-Diaya for the purpose of escorting the family of the refugee,Malick SOWback to Portuguese Guinea.

W/5/69 KandienounC A Portuguese detachment operating in the vicinity of the border directed ten (10) rounds of artillery fire at the Senegalese village of Kandienoung. Three shells landed less then 150 metres from the village school.

-52- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

23/5/69 Vicinity of some Portuguese troops laid an ambush for PAIGC Sar6-Diaya nationalists between Sare'-Diaya and Sare'-Coub6. The operation was unsuccessful and the Portuguese withdrew, taking with them 96 oxen belonging to Senegalese nationals from Sar&Diaya.

28/5/69 Another Portuguese shell exploded at the centre of the village of Mangaroungou. (There was no material damages, but 2 people, Mrs. Mariama MANE, aged 25, and Mr. N'Faly DIATTA, aged 17, suffered minor injuries.)

2815169 Two Portuguese shells fired from BIGENE exploded in the Senegalese village of Yarang. It should be noted that this village is mere than 50 per cent deserted. w5/69 Link&ing A hail of shells fired from the territory of Portuguese Guinea fell on the villages of Sar6 Coube' and Linke'ring.

12/6/69 Guidadji (S6dhiou) Meeting at the border village of Guidadji to exchange 3 Portuguese citizens for 8 Senegalese girls. The exchangz was carried out. mv69 Sar$-Ooub6 Some shells fired from the Portuguese base at Kountima landed 20G metres from the Senegalese village of Sar&Coub6. There were no casualties or material damage. l/9/69 Diamaye Two villagers from Diamaye, S&i SOUANE and M'Balouf6 SADIO, were kidnapped from the rice fields east of the village by a group of mercenaries while a Portuguese aircraft flew over the border sector. 3/10/69 Arrondissement of A Portuguese helicopter flew over the National Diattacounda Highway (South) from Mangaroungou to Diattacounda.

6/10/69 Arrondissement of Amadou MANE, a villager from Baconding, struck an Diattacounda anti-personnel mine in the vicinity of the border village of Ad&na, (1 km south of Bafata). He was severely wounded in the left leg and was taken to hospital at Ziguinchor on the same day.

7/m/69 Babonda A regular Portuguese Army detachment committed (arrondissement atrocities in the Senegalese village of Babonda. of Niassia) Casualties: 1 killed 1 wounded 4 huts destroyed by fire

-53- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

21/10/69 Arrondissement of Several rounds of heavy artillery fired from the Diattacounda Portuguese base at Big&m landed in Senegalese territory. (1) 7 shells at the abandoned village of Yaran; (2) 4 shells at Madina village (no damage);

(3) 11 shells at the village of Adiouty 1 girl, aged 10, killed 1 man sustained minor injuries;

(4) 6 shells in tils vicinity of the village of Madigassma.

25/10/69 M6dina Alpha Eight Portuguese jet aircraft flew over the border villages Me'dina-Alpha, Sadou-SW& N'Diaya, Sar6 Youssouf and Bsntancountou Maounde' .

2/11/69 Bafata (S&dhiou) Severe heavy-weapon fire from the Portuguese base of INGORE, during which several shells landed in Sene@ese territory, at the village of Bafata. The G.R.S. station in this village was slightly damaged.

5/11/69 Yomtou (Oussouye) Assirif DIATTA, a peasant 1ivinC in the village of Youtou, was seized at the border by a Portuguese patrol and taken to SUZANA. He was released the following day.

10/n/69 Sar6 Coly (Kolda) Shortly after 2400 hours the Sa& Coly village headmen and his wife were kidnapped by commandos numbering five (5) Africans, four (4) mercenaries and one white man. On the way back to the Portuguese post, the ,village headman managed to escape from l:is captors when they relaxed their vigilance.

20/u/69 Bantancounda Macunde' Shelling in area of village by Portuguese artillery from Cuntima. Violation of sir space by a reconnaissance plane.

25/11/69 &mine (Se'dhiou) Intense fire in the border area of Samine from the batteries at Bi&ne. Thirty-five shell craters were counted in the area.

Casualties: 1 dead, 9 wounded.

Durin& the incident, a Portuguese helicopter was directing the fix.

...54-. DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

20/U/69 Kdda The commandant of the border sector received a letter containing threats and offers of bribes from Major J. CARVALO, OR and Personal Secretary to the Governor-General of Bissau.

29/=/69 Sar 6 Waly Duriq reconnaissance of a mined area, sn ,anti-personnel mine of the Schumine-42 Type'was found.

29/=/69 K0lda An unidentified aircraft with no lights dropped leaflets on the town. The flight presumably originated from CUNTIMA Base in Portuguese Guinea.

2/12/69 Sar6 Kob6 Flight over national territory by two Portuguese jet aircraft.

6112169 Kolda Masladou SOW, a Portuguese spy from PIRADA who was born at PIRADA (Portuguese Guinea) in 1950, was arrested.

9/12/69 Kolda Flight over the town of Kolda by two air patrols each composed of two Portuguese jet fighter aircraft.

E

2412170 Salike'ni6 Portuguese soldiers from CAMBADJOUset fire to 11 huts'at Salikknie'. Considerable damage done.

2/3/7o Salike'nie' Violation of air space by a Portuguese DORNIER- type reconnaissance plane which flew at a low altitude over troop position. Five rifle shots were fired at the aircraft, which departed.

15/3/7o Incursions by Portuguese troops into national territory. Houses ransacked and one Senei;alese kidnapped. The villagers, who are co-operating with the Portuguese, did not report these events.

16/3/7o Sad N’Diaya Violation of Seneyalese air space by two G.91 jet fighter aircraft operating o& of the PAIGC base at FAKINA.

9/4/7o Selinke'nie' Threatening manoeuvre by 2 G.91 aircraft following overflight by a helicopter fron the First G.A.S.

2614no &link&i6 Fire opened on a. DO-27 flying at low altitude over Senegalese position.

28/4/,70 !l'Pack Flight over Senegalese territory in the M'Pack sector by Portuguese FG.91 aircraft.

-55- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

28/4/70 M'Pack Portuguese shelling near the village of Babonda and the Bayottes forest 300 metres south of boundary-past 162.

2315170 Fassada Three shells fired by the Portuguese landed at Fassada, one of them on target. Casualties: 7 children wounded, 4 severely. One little girl died during evacuation. I 2315170 Sare Samba Niana Five (5) shells, fired by the base at CAMBADJOUfell on deserted Sene&zalese village of Sar6 Samba Niama. No casualties.

30/5/70 Sax-6 Sambam Portuguese armed soldiers went to the Senegalese village of Sax-6 Sambam to evacuate a refugee who had been there for 5 years. The man concerned, Sambarou BALDE, was taken away together with his wife, Diango SEYDI and his son Sankou BALDE and their luggage, in the direction of DJUMBEMBEM,

:’ 13/6/70 Salik&ni& A patrol of 6 G-91 jet fighters flew over the Sark N'Diaya border and violated air space for at least 3 km. Sal-6 N'GOUlOU A cow struck a mine and was killed immediately in national territory. sar6 !&ly A cow belonGing to Samba SANGHADANEhad one leg torn off by a mine explosion in the national territory.

,20/6/70 Sar6 Samba Disyel The village of SAHE SAMBA DIAYEL was shelled by the Portuguese artillery in BADJI-COUNDA and was then burnt down during the night by the Poftuguese soldiers.

25/6/-m Thiamle Seven oxen were stolen from the Senegalese village of THIAMLE by Portuguese mercenaries from Guinea Bisssu. M'Pack Three (3) Portuguese Fiat G.91 jet aircraft, flew over the Senegalese village of M'PACK.

25/6/m N'Djiba Sixty oxen were stolen from the village of N'DJIBA by a band of mercenaries from Guinea-Bissau.

--56- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF TRE INCIDENT After the departure of the MUGUET secto? paratroopers, large Portuguese elements broke into the village. Two refugees kidnapped. b/7/70 Sal-6 Waly A cow belonginG to Samba SINGHADANE ha!I a let: torn off by a mine explosion.

6/7/W Ssr6 Nafa Village of Sa& Nnfa attacked by the Badjicounda Portuguese company - 6 huts and 1 storehouse burned down. Villase of Ssre' Sory attacked by the sane cornpay from Badjicounda. Ninety-two huts, 30 storehouses, 158 sheep and goats, 2 donkeys burned. Ei,:hteen people kidnapped.

Pirrin-Maounde ' Village completely burnt down by the same Portuguese company. One hundred and fifty-nine huts, 72 storehouses burnt down. Fifty-eight sheep and goats, 1 cow also killed.

12/7/70 A Portuguese Fiat G.91 aircraft crossed the border at Man[;aroun~ou. It flew over national territory in the eastern part of the road to the South. The aircraft crossed the border sg3.in at Fassane.

13/7/70 Mangaroungou A Dakota aircraft flew over national territory Bambato-Fassada in the Man,qaroungou, Bambnto and Fiissnda sector. 11 Kolodinto-Maound6 Shelling of the Senegalese village of Kolodinto-Maound6 by Portuguese artillery based at Bsdjicounda and Pirada. Casualties: 12 dead, 2 wounded.

Wassadou Arrest of a man named Sada., born at Wassadou, by the border police, for having allegedly guided the Portu@wse company during the attacks on Pirin Maounds - Sa& Sory and Sax-6 Nnfa.

w7m M'Paok Portue;uese harassing fire. Shells fell 2500 01 west of M'Pack.

18/7/70 sare' Waly A Portuguese element from CUNTIMA broke .into the village of Sar6 Waly; Couraba BANE (18 years' old> w&s kidnapped by his wife, who is serving with the Portuguese, with the help of her stepfather was arrested by the police.

-57-- DATE PLACE UESCRIPTION OF TIIE INCIDENT

21/7/ 70 Diabancounda A band of mercenaries including two armed mm Batooul-Tiamle went into the villa&es. one person was mlested. No materiel damage.

21/7/70 M'Pack TWO ~.91 aircraft from Saint-Dmingos crossed the border.

2517170 Djirban A Portquese bush plzne flew over the Sene&ese villa@ of Djirban. l/8/70 An unidentified unlit aircraft flew over the area at medium hⅈht. Flight over Salike'nie' et Scr.6 IV'Diaye prior to Kolds, during the same night.

Bcmbst3 Two Portuguese G.91 aircraft flew over. Mandinn The villai;e he&man of Mandinn reported kidnepped from his field by Portufiuese, on x/8/70 at 5 p.m.

10/8/70 Kossi Kossi villn@rs reported kidnapped by Portuguese elements.

17/8/70 M'Psck An unidentified nircrcft flew over the village of M'Pack north-east to south-west.

2218170 Banina Armed robbery by n band of nercenories, reported to have thrown three C;renades into the village. 'Three oxen and one hunting gun stolen.

25/B/70 Snlicte A band of arned mercenaries reported to have entered the village of Stiiote durin; the night of 24 to 25/8/70. Upon being pursued by the villal;ers, they threw grenades. Casualties: one dead and two sericusly wounded.

2718170 A Portuguese reconnaissance aircraft flew over the village of Ssr&Kobf'.

6/9/m A policeman cane across a group of armd Portu[;uese rzercennries clair.?ing to be looking: for stolen oxen on the COUMBAKABAtrail.

9/9/70 Nisnso A white Portu.guese soldier, a deserter from NOVA LAMEGO, sought refu-e in Senei;al.

10/g/70 Koqge Arried robbery in the villcge of Koqne, by !xrcenarles. A grenade wasp thrown at the @?oup which ms on the scene to investi&ce. Casualties: 4 seriously wounded.

-5a- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

30/9/m M8Jlg:arOUngOU Emen Fcrtuguese keliqcters and c~ie bxsh plane flew over the naticr&l territory. e/10/70 Diran-Fou Eight mercenaries with 40 men infiltrated Diran-Fou and stole 95 oxen. Casualties: 1 wounded. a/10/70 Ziguinchor Two Portuguese Fiat G.91 fighter--,bombers flew over the town.

9/lC!70 Sanako About thirty mercenaries, led by a white Portuguese, ransacked the village of Ssnako, looking for Joseph N'ZALY. Casualties: 3 dead and 7 seriously wounded.

10/10/70 Fassada Portuguese elements, .guided by the village headman, Mamadou DIATTA, slipped into Fbssada and took back hostages, one suitcase and a basket of cola-nuts. Casualties: 2 wounded.

12/10/70 Samine-Yaman Portuguese fighter aircraft flew over the national ,territory.

13/10/70 Faradiang Infiltration by Portuguese elements.

15/10/70 Sirlbandi-Balante Three (3) hostages taken by a platoon of black Portuguese armed with rifles, sub-machine-guns and grenades. Three farm holdings burgled. a/10/70 Bilassm Armed robbery by mercenaries. Casualties: 1 woman killed and 1 man wounded.

19/10/70 Salik&i& A Portuguese helicopter flew over Salik6ni6 repeatedly. Engaged by the detachment and flew away.

21/10/70 Ss& N'Diaye - Flagrant violation of air space by two Kolda Salik&ik Fiat G.91 flying at low altitude and buzzing Senegalese vehicles.

21/m/70 Gamine-Yarang TWO Portuguese fighter-bombers flew over the positions. 22/10/70 Kolda Flight over the town by 2 Fiat G.91, which are reported to have flown over the entire border area as far as Ziguinchor.

28/10/70 Dar-Salam A Portuguese helicopter took up a position between the village of Dar.-Salam and the border.

-59-

, , DATiS PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

29/10/70 Coumbakara Air space violation by 2 Fiat G.91. Sare Koube

4/11/70 Cattle rustling by Portuguese elements. Nine oxen stolen, 6 gremdes picked up.

13/11/70 Fas sane Clash between 1st platoon and a platoon of Portuguese mercenaries who had come to steal cattle at Fassane. Human casualties nil. Private 2nd class August-in MINYABO lightly grazed.

15/11/70 Two (2) mercenaries arrested in the Tanaff area.

15/11/70 One mercenary, arrested by the 2nd platoon in a night ambush, reported to have taken part in the kidnapping of the Fassane village headman.

Twenty-eight sacks of peanuts stolen by manodjis and mercenaries in the Senegalese village of Sonako.

lb/l/71 Safane Incursion by mercenaries and manod,jis into the Senegalese village of Safane, where 28 sacks of peanuts were stolen.

14/l/71 Djirban A Portuguese aircraft flew over the territory above Djirban.

17/l/71 During heavy Portuguese artillery fire from the Saint-Domingos base, 4 shells fell on Senegalese territory. There were no casualties

Faradiang A shell from the Portuguese artillery at BIGENE fell in the Faradiang paddy-fields

21/l/71 Harassing fire from the Portuguese base at Ingore into Senegalese territory.

24/l/71 Toubacouts Portuguese harassing fire from opposite Toubacouta.

25/l/71 M'Pack-Mankagne Artill.ery fire from the Saint-Domingos base. Four shells fell on the Senegalese village of M'Pack-Mankagne. . Casualties: 1 wounded child taken to Ziguinchor hospital. -CO- DA’I’li PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDEN'T

31/l/71 Faraba Incursion of manodjis and mercenaries from the base at Ingore mto the Senegalese village of Faraba. Two villagers suffered machete wounds and two suitcases of effects were stolen.

4/2/n Cownbakara Arrest of a suspect, named Fade MANE, who was carrying 3,600 escudos, 7 photographs of African mercenaries and Portuguese military effects. He "as handed over to the head of the KOLSDA border area.

5/2'/71 or Sare-coma This village, situated az more than ten 6/2/71 (10) km. from the border, became the target for the Portuguese artillery unit based at Cambadju (Portuguese Guinea). Six shells were fired, three of which came near the village. The inhabitants left the area to seek refuge at Fandaga and Kadial. Casualties: 2 goats killed by shrapml.

11/Z/71 Salik&i& The Portuguese base at Cambadja aimed mortar fire at Salik&iG. A shell fell in the very centre of the area. No casual.ties.

11/2/71 Mangaroungou Two cattle thieves were captured by .the villagers of Mangaroungou.

12/2/n hlad (P.G.) Souleymene DIALLO, Tahirou DIALLO and Amadou DIALLO, three nationals of the Republic of Guinea, living with Mr. Aliou Diallo at DIALL COUMBI, had their throats cut by mercenaries inside Guinea Bissau. They were professional smugglers.

23/2/71 Sare-Bambe After the shelling of SALIKENIE and SARE-SOUNA, the inhabitants of SARE-BAMBE and SARE-SISSAO evacuated their village.

20/2/71 Mangaroungou Infiltration by elements of the Portuguese Fas saaa regular army and mercensries, about the size of one platoon, into the national territory; they kidnapped two Guineans, Andre SAGNA and Andre SANTOS. Some effects were found stolen.

4/3/7i Salik&iG A Portuguese reconnaissance aircraft flew over the border in an east-south westerly direction.

5/3/71 Koumbakara Violation of air space by a Portuguese reconnaissance aircraft in the Koumbakara sector.

a- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

813171 Csmbadju A Dornier flew over the border and the Portuguese base at Cambadju in a west-easterly direction.

8.35 a.n. A large concentration of Portuguese was -MsPack identified between the villagas of lslYP~ck and Eahonda ~ This concentration makes patrols more dangerous because they lay ambushes in Senegalese territory.

1213171 Salik&i6 A Portuguese Dornier flew over the border in an east-south westerly direction.

2113171' Koumbakara Presence of Portuguese mercenaries in Senegalese territory at the SARE-DION Paddy-fields between KOUMBAKARA and DIALACOUNBI.

2313171 Salik6ni6 A tiakakota of unknown nationality flew over the border.

Kandienoung A platoon of the Portuguese regular army attacked the village of KANDIENOUNG, 10 km south-west of Tanaff. Half the village was set on fire.

Casualties: 1 dead, 17 wounded, 400 left homeless. Poultry destroyed by fire: 400. Small cattle destroyed by firer 203. Compounds 'burnt down, 22, comprising 130 huts, 4 carts, 2 crushers, 600 empty sacks, 50 sacks of palmetto nuts, 193 tons of peanuts burnt, 17 self-defen~ce guns. The reason for this disaster was the presence of refugees in the village.

614171 Diamaye After taking 300 kg of rice, a robe containing 250 francs and a pair of shoes, mercenaries threatened the villagers of Diamaye, saying they would burn down the village.

6/4/n Five artillery shells landed in the BINAKO forest. One villager wounded by shrapnel.

11/4/71 Madigassama The villages ;of IWDIGASSAMA and SEKOUNAYA were Sekounaya set on fire by Portuguese elements. Ten farm holdings with more than 100 huts-were burned. All'the cattle and poultry, as well as the CKQS) were stolen.

-62- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

17/4/71 Karournbou- On the night of 16 to 17/4/71 the Senegalese Tankanto villages of KAROUMBOUand TANKANTO were attacked simultaneously and were set on fire by Portuguese mercenaries. Casualties: Karoumbou .- 4 dead, including 3 civilians and mercenaries. Tankanto -. 3 civilians seriouly wounded. Substantial property dalrage estimated at several million francs.

20/4/U Thiaml6 Six mercenaries entered the Senegalese village of Thiaml&. After firing three rounds, they stole 2 oxen, 2 trunks, 1 suitcase, 2 bicycles and 1 pigs

21/4/u Sare N'Diaye Six shells fired by the Portuguese base at and CUNTIMA between 2145 hours and 2220 hours Sare Kobe landed in Senegalese territory. Two shells landed at SARE N?DIAYE and 4 at SARE KOBE.

2514171 Salikkni6 Intense heavy-weapon and small-arms fire from the CAMBADJU base. One shell landed near the village of SALIKENIE. One person wounded.

6/5/71 M'Balo-Counda Elements of the Portuguese army based at Cambadju attempted to sabotage the M'Balo-Counda bridge. The device was disconnected and Lefused, Eighteen kg of explosives, consisting of 18 bags and 4 blocks of TNT, were recovered.

6/5/u Lingueyel One unexploded 105~mm shell. found and defused. Probably fired at the beginning of February by the Portuguese base at SARE-BAKARY.

B/5/71 K0lda An unidentified aircraft flew over the town, causing alarm among the inhabitants.

9/5/71 Bambato An anti-tank mine was found on the right side of the South Samine-Tanaff road, 200 metres from the village of Bambato; an anti-personnel mine was also found on a trail leading to some fields. They were placed by the Portuguese for the sole purpose of blowing up the PAIGC ambulance which usually runs from Ziguinchor to Kolda every evening.

1415171 Kountada M'Balo DIABOUL, a soldier serving in the 15th company stationed ,at Pithiou (PG), deserted.

-63- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE IBCIDENT

23/F/71 Mr. Abdou DIASSE, Frontier Sector Commander, was killed. His Land Rover had hit a nine at about 1600 hours between Sa& N'Diaye and Alpha Sadou. Daouda BA, a driver trainee, was wounded.

5/6/n Border A U.55 lorry, No. 240-403, driven by Private First Class Theodore FAYE, hit a mine, 600 metres from the TOUBACOUTA SAMINE trail. Casualties: Private Second Class Jean-Pierre MALACK simple fracture of left arm, evacuated to Dakar: Private Second Class Mandiaye BABOU fracture of right wrist, evacuated to Dakar; Private First Class Path& NIANG, deep scalp wound; Corporal Macodou MARE, Private Second Class Momar Lissa SARR, lumbar injuries; Private Fnst Class Theodore FAYE, a'brasions, Private Second Class Mor TALLA.

516171 Simbour Village of SIMBOUR, south of SAMINE, attacked by a band of armed mercenaries. Four head of cattle stolen. One girl killed by a bullet in the head.

Border Anti-tank mine found on the trail from Faradianto to Samine.

8/6/n Kaniko Village of KANIKO was attacked by a band of armed mercenaries. During the fighting:, a 30-year-old civilian was wounded in the left leg.

10/6/71 The village of SAFANE was attacked by a band of armed mercenaries who kidnapped a person named MALANG, accused of spying for us. Eighty head of cattle were stolen.

11/6/71 The village of SOUBOUTE, 2 km south of DJIMDANA, was attacked by a band of armed mercenaries at about midnight. Casualties: 3 civilians wounded.

11/6/71 The village of SOUBOUTE, 2 km south of DJIMBANA, was attacked by a band of armed mercenaries at about midnight. Casuulties: 3 civilians wounded. One was a woman who was shot in the thigh, and two were beaten. Five trunks containing clothing and 100,000 francs were stolen.

-64- DATE PLACE DESCRII?TION OF THE INCIDENT

14/6/71 r:lanecounda The village of MANECOUNDAwas attacked on the night of 13 to 14/6/71 by a band of armed mercenaries. Five bicycles, some cooking utensils and effects valued at 150,000 francs were stolen. A Portuguese spy by the name of Moussa CISSE was arrested and handed over to the police.

17/6/71 Bani-Safane- The villages of Bani-Safane-Djibana were Djibana attacked by & band of mercenaries. A villager from Djibana was wounded.

17/6/71 Toubacouta A band of mercenaries fell into an ambush laid by elements of the TOUBACOUTA post. After the encounter it left its booty at the scene. After an explosion, part of the band was intercepted and 8 Manodjis, including 2 mercenaries, were captured..

19/6/n Sare NsDiaye A Land Rover fron the Dioulaoolon district, carrying 4 persons, hit a mine on the SAi?E-N'DIAYE-AL?HA SADOU road. One dead, 3~wounded.

22/6/n Niafor The village of NIAFOR was attacked by a band of armed mercenaries. Sixty--two head of cattle stolen. One villager wounded.

29/6/n Kaniko The village of KANIKO was attacked on the night of 28 to 29/6/n by 5 mercenaries, 2 of them armed. Effects and articles valued at 10,000 francs and 15 goats were stolen. l/7/71 Border Two anti-tank mines were discovered on the Cap-Skiring road, approximately 10 km from Oussnuye. One person was sent to defuse them. They are in the hands of the 7th Rifle Cornpsny ~

1/7/71 Santhiaba Nanjack Three hours later, a bus carrying 13 passengeys hit a mine at Santhiaba Manjack, 100 /metres?/ from where the other mines had been discovered. It kzs reTorted that there were 2 dead and 11 seriously wounded, 4 of whom were evacuated to Dakar. l/7/71 Pako&ou On the nig!II; of 23 to 24/6/71, 3 mercenaries stole cat.tle from the headman of the village of PAKOUROIJ. Two patrols were sent out after them at dawn, but they had already crossed the frontier, together with the cattle, at Kopa.

-65- i , \’ / DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

One of the patrols found 2 anti-personnel mines on the road from KOPA to PANAKAR. They were defused.

The artillery at Saint-Domingos base laid down a barrage in an area between M'PACK and ZIGUINCHOR. The shells which landed,in our territory exploded in the rice fields. Fortunately, there were no casualties and no property damage.

4 jet aircraft patrol flew over the GM1 post at Bafata at 1400 hours. It dropped leaflets which appeared to land in Guinean territory.

The COAL detachment at YARANG opened fire on a DORNICR-type reconnaissancf plane which flew over its position. The plane quickly flew back in the direction of BIGENE without being hit.

2/7/71 Santhiaba-Manjack A fourth anti-tank mine was found on the CAP-SKIRING road near SANTHIABA-MANJACK, about 1,000 metres from those found earlier. It. was defused and is now in the hands of the 7th Rifle Company. m/n Santhiaba-Manjack At the same place, a suspect answering to the name of Djissabo DITTA, born at EFTECK BALA DIATE (Kabrouss), was apprehended. In view of the weighty evidence found, he was charged on suspicion of bringing explosives into Senegalese territory. The inquiry is continuing.

2/7/71 Santhiaba-Manjack In connexion with the incidents at Santhiaba-Manjack, the village headman and several notables state that,a hel,icopter from the VALERA base landed at a,bout 1800 hours on 30/6/71 in the rice fields to the south, in Guinean territory. Four men with spades and pickaxes got out.

They were picked up by a lorry and departed in the direction of Oussouye. When they re~turned, they boarded the helicopter, which took off at about 2300 hours in a southerly direction. The helicopter was reported to have returned on the morning of Friday 217'171 to photograph 'the bus which had hit a mine the night before. DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

3/7/n Dialacoumbi The Senegalese villdge of DIALACOUMBI was attacked by a band of Portuguese~mercenaries. Casualties and losses: an old man, approximately 100 years of age, beaten to death, 4 huts set on fire; 1.15 tons of ground-nuts and 200 kg of millet destroyed; 2 bicycles, 1 radio and various articles valued at 115,000 francs stolen. When the villagers fought back, one of the attackers was hit by a bullet from a hunting rifle and his companions took him with them. Two grenade explosions were reported. A 7.62-m cartridge and 8 cases of the same calibre were picked up in the area.

5/7/n Fassada A band of Portuguese mercenaries attacked the village of Fassada, 1 km west of Yarang, on the south road. They had surrounded a village square and fired on the huts with bursts from automatic weapons. There was no report of any property damage. However, a woman about 60 years of age,was hit by 2 bullets in the left arm'and died from her wounds while she was being transferred to the Ziguinchor Hospital.

A surprise attack by the Portuguese against a family of refugees at M'Pack failed, thanks to the action taken by the local police.

WI71 Mangaroungou A civilian driving from Kolda to Ziguinchor reported to the chief of the Yarang detachment that he had found a mine on the south road 700 metres from the northern edge of the Mangaroungou forest. The commander of the detachment which was sent immediately to the spot discovered that a hole had been dug but that no mine had yet been laid. The 2 white men and the group of mercenaries who had dug the hole had heard,the sound of the motor of the vehicle and had gone . : off in the direction of the border. mm Diabouga An anti-personnel mine was found on the trail from the deserted village of Diahouga, 500 metres south of Sare-Mansoc. It consisted of a canister containing 100 granunes of TNT.

-67- DATE PLACE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

8/7/-n Yarang At 1225 hours on e/7/71, the COAL detachment opened fire on a Portuguese aircraft flying from the east in the direction of BIGENE over the Yarang position. It m,s reported that the las,t gun hit the aircraft, which pitched momentarily before righting itself and returning in the direction of BIGENE, leaving behind it a dense trail of smoke.

10/7/71 Faradianto A band of mercenaries attacked the Senegalese village of FARADIANTO, east of Samine. The attackers, 7 in number and 3 of them armed, stole 6 goats. A 65-year-01d villager approaching them was killed point- blank by what seems to have been the only shot fired during the incident. A person named Arona SIDIBE, accused of spying for the Portuguese at SUZANA, was apprehended. It appears that he was contacted by the units which laid mines on 30/6/71. The headman of the village of CASSABOL (PG) is said to have been his go-between and the person to whom he transmit-ted all the information collxted in Senegal. He was handed ovw to the police.

15/7/n Pirrin-MaoudG A Portuguese mercenary answering'to the name of Manga KANTE, serial number 82.10 29/69, from the PAHOUKAbase, was arrested by a patrol at Pirrin-Maoud~. He had a semi- automatic rifle, wm-e a commando uniform with a TAP belt and twin canvas cartridge pouches with 20 cartridge clips and had a case containing a radio set and various articles, plus the sum of 8,805 escudos. He was taken to the V&lingua police headquarters and he will be sent on to the COSC Command Post at Ziguincho& for military interrogation on 18/7/n.

(Signature illegible) Major Coumba Diouf NIANG Commander, Casamance Group and COSC Ziguinchor, 29 July, 1971

-68- B. .~List of mines

DATE PLACE TYPE OF MINE COMMZNTS 9 May 1971 BAMBATO 1 anti-tank mine (destroyed) 1 anti-personnel mine (destroyed)

4 Flay 1971 SARE SISSAO 2 TNT charges neutralized '\ 20 May 1971 SARE MANSALY 1 anti-personnel mine (destroyed) 2 anti-tank 2nd 2 anti- personnel mines (r.emoved)

23 May 1971 SARI? N'DIAYE The. chief of the frontier ALPHA SADOU sector set off a mine; 1 killed, 1 wounded.

5 June 1971 SAMINE-TOUBACOUTA A military truck struck a mine: 7 wounded, 2 of them seriously.

6 June 1971 SAMINE-FARADIANG 1 anti-tank nine Destroyed. 10 June 1971 NIANAO 1 anti-tank mine Rt?rr,OXWd.

11 June 1971 SAMINE FARADIANG 1 anti-talnk mine Destroyed. 19 June 1971 SARE N'DIAYE- A Land Rover in the ALPHA SADOU Medina Yom Foula arrondissement struck a mine; 1 killed, 3 seriously wounded.

1 July 1971 SANTHIABA- 2 anti-tank mines Removed. MANJACK A public transit vehicle struck a mine; 2 killed and 11 wounded, 4 Of them seriously.

2 July 1971 OUSSOUYE-CAP 1 anti-tank mine Removed. 3 July 1971 SARE MANSOA 1 anti-personnel mine Removed.

!%.jor Coumba Diouf Niang Commander of the Casamance Group and C.O.S.C.

-@- ‘_

C. Map of frontier region indicating pkces of incidentc