Our ref: 168/21

I'm a postgraduate research student at the University of Sheffield writing to you regarding a request for information about West Yorkshire Police under Freedom of Information.

I would please like to request access to information held on this subject: Policing of the industrial dispute between the National Coal Board and the National Union of Mineworkers in 1984-1985. In particular, I would please like to specifically request a copy of West Yorkshire Police's review of the policing of the strike.

This document should be West Yorkshire Police's equivalent to the report submitted to the South Yorkshire Police Committee Policing The Coal Industry Dispute In South Yorkshire, 1984-1985; Derbyshire Constabulary's review was titled Focus On The Miners Strike. I would like to request the review of the policing in the West Yorkshire Police area.

Electronic copies of this information would be preferable.

Please see the attached documents.

Unfortunately, West Yorkshire Police is unable to provide you all information within the document therefore redactions have been applied by virtue of Section 31(1) Law Enforcement, Section 38(1) Health & Safety and Section 40(2) Personal Information.

Please see Appendix A for the full legislative explanation.

Appendix A

The Freedom of Information Act 2000 creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in receipt of a request must, if permitted, state under Section 1(a) of the Act, whether it holds the requested information and, if held, then communicate that information to the applicant under Section 1(b) of the Act.

The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities, to withhold information that is unsuitable for release. Importantly the Act is designed to place information into the public domain. Information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual, should a request be received.

DECISION

Your request for information has been considered and I regret to inform you that West Yorkshire Police cannot comply. This letter serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Section 17 of the Act provides:

(1) A public authority which, in relation to any request for information, is to any extent relying on a claim that information is exempt information must, within the time for complying with Section 1(1), give the applicant a notice which:-

(a) States the fact, (b) Specifies the exemption in question, and (c) States (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

REASONS FOR DECISION

The reason that we are unable to provide you with this information is covered by the following exemptions:

Section 31(1) Law Enforcement Section 38(1) Health & Safety Section 40(2) Personal Information

Section 40 is an absolute exemption and there is no requirement to evidence harm or conduct a public interest test.

Section 31 is a qualified and prejudice based exemption, as such there is a requirement to provide evidence of harm and conduct a public interest test.

Section 38 is an absolute and prejudice based exemption therefore there is a requirement to provide evidence of harm and conduct a public interest test.

Section 31

Harm Every effort should be made to release information under Freedom of Information. However to provide information that would undermine operational policing would not be in the public interest. The redacted information includes details of tactics and methods adopted by the police service in order to police large scale disorder which are as relevant today as they were in the 1980s. Should this information be

disclosed it would undermine the effectiveness of these tactics. This would have a direct impact on the ability of the police service to achieve its core functions of the prevention and detection of crime. Factors favouring disclosure To disclose this information would adhere to the basic principle of being open and transparent, it would also provide reassurance to the public that West Yorkshire Police have a number of different resources available to prevent and detect crime.

Factors favouring non-disclosure Disclosure of the redacted information would place into the public domain tactical details which would undermine the effect use of policing methods. The criminal fraternity would be educated as to the tactics used for specific purposes which would have an adverse effect on West Yorkshire Police’s ability to prevent and detect crime and keep our communities safe.

Balancing Test The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. As part of that policing purpose, various policing tactics may be used. The Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of policing tactics. This will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

Section 38

Harm The Battle of Orgreave is a very high profile case with emotions of family, friends, witnesses and general members of the public running high. Disclosure of names of specific individuals could lead to their personal safety being placed at risk. In addition to this West Yorkshire Police have a duty of care to the victims and their families. There is an abundance of information already in the public domain by way of media and other avenues. Disclosure of the redacted information has the potential to have adverse effects the survivors’ and the deceased’s relatives.

Factors favouring disclosure Disclosure would adhere to the basic principle of being open and transparent and would allow for a more accurate public debate. It would increase public confidence by showing the full extent of information held by West Yorkshire Police.

Factors favouring non-disclosure Safety of individuals is of paramount importance, and whilst it is unclear what specific effects disclosure may have on the named individuals or their families, any disclosure which has the potential to cause them significant distress and put their wellbeing and/or mental health at risk will not be made.

Balancing test Whilst accountability, transparency and public debate is important, public safety is of paramount importance and any disclosure which has the potential to jeopardise the wellbeing of an individual will not be made. It is therefore our opinion that the balance lies in favour of non-disclosure of the information.

A REVIEW OF THE POLICING OF THE COAL INDUSTRY DISPUTE 1984-85

WEST YORKSHIRE METROPOLITAN POLICE

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A Review of the Policing of the Coal Industry Dispute 1984/85

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7 FOREWORD

The strike in the mining industry which ended on 4 March 1985, gave rise to what was undoubtedly the largest police operation which this County has seen. Many people inside and out of the industry have expressed their views of that operation, their perception of it being coloured by their particular stance in relation to the issues involved. West Yorkshire Metropolitan Police sought to adopt a philosophy which was not about winning battles, but was concerned with "winning the peace" and upholding the law. Our aim was to police the mining communities of West Yorkshire with sensitivity and impartiality. There was an acute awareness that the majority of miners, like all decent law-abiding citizens, were keen to act within the framework of the law. Our objective, therefore, was to employ a combination of reasonable firmness and maximum tolerance with a view to maintaining stability. In pursuit of this traditional policing role we developed a strategy of flexible arrangements combining a "relative response". Great emphasis was placed upon identifying the nature of each situation and dealing with it in the most appropriate manner. As a result, the number of officers deployed to any particular location was the m1n1mum consistent with the safety of all parties. We were intent throughout upon maintaining the traditional role of the police. Officers were deployed wherever possible in normal police uniform. In recognition of the fact that the wearing of protective equipment was alien to our policing philosophy, it was used only in response to violent action and as a last resort. The reversion to ordinary uniform on those rare occasions when protective equipment had been worn followed swiftly to help to normalise relationships. Attempts were made to restrict the police input to officers from this Force, because they understood the West Yorkshire ethos. They were regularly reminded at briefings about their responsibilities and of the need to act with propriety to facilitate a return to harmonious relationships with all concerned at the end of the strike.

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When it became necessary, due to the escalation of violence, to draw in officers from other forces in support of those from West Yorkshire, great efforts were made to secure their complete integration. They were accommodated on police premises in the Force area, regularly briefed as to the philosophy prevailing in West Yorkshire, and commanded by senior officers from this Force. By these means we encouraged them to recognise for themselves the sensitive nature of the operation and come to terms with the West Yorkshire approach. Officers involved in the operation at all levels were encouraged to promote dialogue between the parties involved in the dispute. My regular consultation with the Police Authority through the medium of the Special Sob-Committee proved extremely useful in this respect. This openness led to an even-handed approach towards resolving problems and did much to smooth the transition towards normality. When the dispute ended I was confident the amalgamation of these initiatives would enable us to pick up the tradition of normal community policing in this Force area, with little or no loss of the excellent police/public relationship we have so carefully fostered. I am grateful to all those who brought about such a successful conclusion. I look forward to the continued support of all those concerned with policing in our communities. It is their wish and mine to achieve for the public of our County a stable and secure future.

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COLIN SAMPSON Chief Constable May 1985

CONTENTS

• I PARAGRAPH FOREWORD

PART I - THE DISPUTE l. BACKGROUND 1.1 - 1.8

2. PATTERN OF EVENTS PHASE I - 12 March to 13 August 2.3 - 2.7 PHASE II - 20 August to 1 October 2.8 - 2.9 PHASE III - 2 October to 10 November 2.10 - 2.12 PHASE IV - 11 November to 17 January 2.13 - 2.15 PHASE V - 18 January to 4 March 2.16 - 2.19

PART II - THE POLICE OPERATION

1. POLICING PHILOSOPHY, STRATEGY AND TACTICS PHILOSOPHY 1.1 - 1.7 The Use of Minimum Force 1.6 - 1.7 STRATEGY 1.8 - 1.16 Patrol 1.11 - 1.13 Defensive Action 1.14 Positive Action 1.15 - 1.16 TACTICS 1.17 - 1.31 Establishing Rapport 1.20 - 1.21 Arrests 1.22 Control of Picketing 1.23 - 1.29 Protective Equipment 1.30 The Use of the Truncheon 1.31

2. OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

PHASE I 2.4 - 2.8 PHASE II 2.9 PHASES III and IV 2.10 2.29 Operational Command 2.11 - 2.12 Incident Command 2.13 Officer-in-Charge, Command Room 2.14 Ground Commanders 2.15 - 2.16 Group Commanders 2.17 - 2.18 Police Support Units 2.19 - 2.21 The Command Room 2.22 - 2.28 Liaison 2.29 PHASE V 2.30 - 2.32

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3. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT The use of Coal Board Premises 3.6 3.10 Determining the Ground Rules 3.11 - 3.12 Standard Opening Deployment 3.13 - 3.15 The Use of Horses and Dogs 3.16 - 3.17 Dog Patrols 3.18 - 3.23 Mounted Support 3.24 - 3.29 Crime Prevention Arrangements 3.30 - 3.34 Mutual Aid Arrangements 3.35 - 3.49 4. INFORMATION GATHERING AND DISSEMINATION The Establishment of Surveillance Groups 4.3 4.6 The Establishment of the central Information/ Intelligence Unit 4.7 4.9 The Establishment of the Force Information/ Intelligence Unit 4.10 - 4.16 THE COMMUNICATION OF FORCE POLICY AND BRIEFING Operational Briefing of Personnel 4.17 - 4.20 De-briefing of Personnel 4.21 - 4.23 5. THE ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT IN LARGE SCALE PUBLIC DISORDER

Monitoring Movements of Demonstrators 5.2 5.3 Surveillance of Suspects 5.4 Interrogation of Suspects 5.5 Investigation of serious and associated crimes 5.6 5.8 Preparation of Offence Files 5.9 Intimidation Squads 5.10 6. RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA 7. RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC Special Sub-Committee of the Police Authority 7.8 7.10 Seminar "The Way Ahead" 7.11 - 7.12 8. COMMUNICATIONS Facilities 8.1 8.4 Control Methods 8.5 8.9 Equipment 8.10 - 8.18

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9. LOGISTICS

TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS

The Transport Officer 9.5 9.8 Vehicles and Drivers 9.9 9.17 RECEPTION POINT AT FORCE TRAINING SCHOOL 9.18 - 9.24 MOBILE RENDEZVOUS POINT 9.25 - 9.30 PRISONER HANDLING 9.31 - 9.37 CATERING ARRANGEMENTS 9.38 - 9.44

10. WELFARE

11. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

The Scale of Charges 11.5 - 11.6 Home Office Grant 11.7 - 11.10 Interpretation of Police Regulations 11.11 - 11.17

12. THE USE OF COMPUTERS 13. TRAINING

14. THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW PART III CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CONCLUSIONS Internal Review 1.1 1.6 Force De-brief 1.7 1.8 Association of Chief Police Officers 1.9 Training 1.10 Communications 1.11 - 1.13

2. RECOMMENDATIONS Policy 2.1 Command 2.2 Information Systems 2.3 Briefing 2.4 Role of CID 2.5 Media Relations 2.6 Police/Public Relations 2.7 Communications 2.8 Logistic Support 2.9 Welfare Arrangements 2.10 Administration 2.11 Training 2.12 Application Of The Law 2.13

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Part I The Dispute

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1. BACKGROUND

1.1 The period 1972 to 1984 brought a series of incidents which have tested the ability of the police to deal with large scale incidents of , disorder. All have led to increased preparedness on the part of the service to deal with these incidents.

1.2 The closure of the Saltley Gas Works in Birmingham in February 1972 after reinforcement by a mass picket of miners was perhaps the most notable in policing terms. 1.3 The lessons learned from that experience led to the introduction of the concept of the National Reporting Centre to improve co-operation in the deployment of the extra manpower needed to cope with mass demonstrations and disorder. Based at New Scotland Yard when activated it was placed under the direct control of a Steering Committee headed by the President of the Association of Chief Police Officers. 1.4 When the country was again faced with a strike in the coal mining industry in 1974 the provision cf Mutal Aid in the form of Police Support Units under the co ordination of the National Reporting Centre proved to be effective. In the event, this strike was conducted with little, if any, disorder in the Force area and outside resources were not called upon. 1.5 Police training in tactics designed to counter public disorder was refined following riots in London and Bristol in the late 1970's. This led to this Force establishing procedures to train and call rapidly to duty large numbers of officers to deal with large scale incidents of public disorder. 1.6 The next challenge to the police ability to cope came in 1981 when major riots were experienced in Brixton, Toxteth and other areas of the country. These disturbances, mainly racial in their overtones, brought the sight of police officers wearing protective equipment into the homes of almost all the Nation through their television screens. 1.7 As a result of these incidents, police strategic and tactical training in public order developed and intensified. In this Force public order training was given to officers of all ranks. When problems associated with the miners dispute began to surface during 1984 the service was prepared to deal with them.

1.8 Events at the Grunwick Photographic Company in London and the Stockport Messenger Printing Works

had set the scene for the future pattern of industrial disputes. Those involved had shown a tendency to use violence, intimidation and disorder in increasing amounts in the pursuit of industrial objectives. Regrettably, there were others only too willing to follow the example and the police service knew it would be called upon to intervene. In this Force the agreed approach was to adopt a traditional role of upholding the law and seeking to maintain the peace in a firm but fair manner.

7 2. PATTERN OF EVENTS

2.1 The policing of the coal industry dispute can be divided into five phases. Each is characterised by the nature of the involvement of the Force and the problems being experienced in West Yorkshire. Not all of the counter-measures taken by the police fall precisely into one phase or another. Nevertheless by dividing the pattern of events up in this way a good indication can be given of the progress of the dispute and its policing. 2.2 The various phases are summarised below. A refer• ence has been made to more notable matters, though many of these are amplified in succeeding Sections of the report. Appendices A and B contain a full account of National and local events. PHASE I 12 MARCH TO 19 AUGUST 1984 2.3 During this period all collieries in West Yorkshire were strikebound. Picketing activity from this area was directed against collieries in the Nottinghamshire area or elsewhere. In the later weeks of this phase there was a shift of picketing emphasis towards coal suppliers and coal users generally. 2.4 Some picketing was experienced at suppliers in West Yorkshire and a small picket was maintained at Power Stations. Relatively little trouble was experienced by comparison with the problems being faced elsewhere. 2.5 Strenuous attempts were made to restrict supplies of coke to steel works and other industry. Large pickets were concentrated at Orgreave Coking Plant in South Yorkshire and at the British Steel Plant at Scunthorpe. 2.6 Locally, large scale public disorder was experienced in the Hemsworth and Fitzwilliam areas during the first two weeks of July. There was extensive damage to the Kinsley Drift Colliery and damage to other property including houses occupied by police officers in Fitzwilliam, Kinsley and Crofton. 2.7 Throughout this phase, attempts were made to ensure the policing of West Yorkshire continued normally. The drain on manpower raised through the Mutual Aid arrangements to assist other forces varied, but began to be more noticable as the dispute escalated in scope and nature.

PHASE II 20 AUGUST 1984 TO 1 OCTOBER 1984 2.8 The first miners to resume work at a West Yorkshire colliery went back to Allerton Bywater on 20 August 1984. This situation persisted

throughout the second phase of the dispute, with policing controlled locally from Pontefract. 2.9 The Force ceased to supply Mutual Aid at this time because of its own commitment. With two notable exceptions identified in Appendix B (see 21 August and 27 September 1984), when mass picketing on a large scale occurred, we remained self-sufficient in policing this colliery throughout the second phase. PHASE III 2 OCTOBER TO 10 NOVEMBER 1984 2.10 In the last week of September, Woolley Colliery re-opened, and in the week commencing 2 October it was followed by Bullcliffe, Denby Grange, Emley and Park Mill. By 14 November 1984 workers were attending at almost all West Yorkshire collieries. Command and Control of the operation was centralised at Fell House, Wakefield from the outset of this phase. 2.11 Mass pickets were still being experienced at collieries, although with the re-opening of more premises the trend was towards large groups of local pickets concentrating on their own workplaces. At the same time, violence and intimidation of workers increased as did the level of attacks on colliery premises. 2.12 West Yorkshire remained self-sufficient in its policing of the dispute up to this point.

PHASE IV 11 NOVEMBER 1984 TO 17 JANUARY 1985 2.13 The heightened levels of violence and intimidation away from the picket lines, coupled with the increased number of collieries involved and miners at work, necessitated the introduction of round• the-clock-police operations. 2.14 Despite extensive use of overtime to enhance the levels of manpower available from Divisions, self• sufficiency could no longer be achieved and reluc• tantly Mutual Aid from other forces had to be sought. Command Room facilities and Logistic Support were expanded to cope with the influx of manpower and the operational command was extended to take account of the increased workload.

2.15 In the period leading up to the Christmas break, violence and intimidation was at its height. It was at this time following a brutal assault on a working miner that a dedicated Crime Investigation Team was established. As a result of its activity the offence was detected and some 35 people were arrested. This no doubt had a salutary effect and,

coupled with the substantial Christmas break which acted as a cooling-off period, led to a reduction in the numbers and violence of pickets.

PHASE V 18 JANUARY TO 4 MARCH 1985 2.16 The resumption of work gathered pace after the Christmas break and the problem of mass picketing disappeared as pickets concentrated their efforts on their own collieries. The instances of violence and intimidation declined as a greater proportion of miners abandoned the strike. 2.17 With the restoration of greater peace the need for Mutual Aid diminished until on 17 January 1985 a decision could be confirmed that West Yorkshire could once more be self-sufficient in policing the dispute.

2.18 Constant assessment of the police operation continued and during the month of February as substantial percentages of workers attended at a number of collieries the drain on Divisional manpower was reduced.

2.19 On 4 March 1985 the National Union of Mineworkers abandoned their strike and returned to work. A reduced police presence was maintained for the next few days but thankfully calm quickly returned to the coalfields. The task ahead in the Force was recognised as the rebuilding of a harmonious police/public relationship. Since then the efforts of all officers have been channelled into achieving the prioritised objectives previously set by the Chief Constable which were interrupted by the year long dispute.

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Part 11 The Police Operation

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7 1. POLICING PHILOSOPHY. STRATEGY AND TACTICS

PHILOSOPHY

1.1 From the outset of the dispute it was the intention of the Chief Constable to adopt a policing style which combined reasonable firmness with maximum tolerance. Our philosophy, strategy and tactics recognised that the majority of striking miners involved were honest, decent, law-abiding people from local communities. 1.2 A clear distinction was made between the policing of public order incidents in an industrial setting and others where the propensity to use unnecessary violence is greater. 1.3 Our objectives were clearly stated as maintaining the peace and upholding the law. The temptation to define our aim as being to facilitate the entry of working miners into collieries was strongly resisted in the interests of impartiality. This subtle difference enabled us to embrace conciliation into our strategy.

1.4 Opportunity was taken to disseminate this philosophy to all those involved in the operation by way of briefings using the document show at Appendix C.

1.5 The operation required a different policing response each day. Recognising this, there was a conscious effort to ensure that a blanket approach was never applied. Supervisory Officers were encouraged to constantly assess the situation and respond accordingly. The use of minimum force 1.6 A sustained effort was made to keep the use of force to a minimum. Officers were regularly briefed on the need for tolerance and understanding and reminded of their individual and collective responsibility to ensure they used "only such force as reasonable in the circumstances". 1.7 In developing this philosophy into the resultant strategy and tactics, guidance was sought from various documents. Among the most important were the manual of The Association of Chief Police Officers for the Guidance of Senior Police Officers in Public Order, The Tactical Options Manual and the Department of Employment Code of Practice on Picketing.

STRATEGY 1.8 A strategy was developed based upon a concept of J "relative response". This relied upon a system of

ensuring the build-up of police resources at a scene was commensurate with the number of persons present and deployment was in response to events at that location. 1.9 Implementation of the strategy of "relative response" required the development of a prioritised deployment system, both at the colliery premises and in associated communities. 1.10 Broadly, this consisted of four phases; patrol, defensive action, positive action and normalisation. Progress from one level to the next was a judgemental issue decided upon by liaison between the various levels of command.

Patrol

1.11 The patrol phase was the norm at all locations with officers deployed in ordinary police uniform in sufficient numbers to keep the peace. As numbers of picketing miners grew, extra officers were drafted in to maintain order. If there was an unusually large picket, or the mood of the crowd suggested potential for disorder, officers were held in reserve at suitable nearby locations. This reserve included Dog Patrols and Mounted Officers when the situation demanded. 1.12 Whenever possible officers deployed were from West Yorkshire. Only during Phase IV of the dispute, when picketing activity was at its height, was it necessary to supplement available manpower with Mutual Aid Units from other Forces. During this period initial deployments were of West Yorkshire Officers, with those from other Forces providing support later. 1.13 The exercising of maximum tolerance meant that sporadic throwing of missiles did not automatically lead to the deployment of officers with protective equipment. Only if there was a sustained attack would the defensive phase be implemented.

Defensive Action 1.14 In West Yorkshire, Police Support Units are all equipped with short riot shields and selected Units carry long shields. In the defensive phase long shield Units were deployed in the face of those responsible as a protective measure. If missile throwing persisted other Units equipped with short shields were then brought up. This was achieved either by Units deployed in normal uniform returning to their vans to equip themselves or by summoning already equipped extra Units if avail• able. Positive Action

1.15 In the event of serious public disorder continuing there was then a judgemental issue for the Ground

Commander as to whether to take more positive action to disperse the crowd and attempt to arrest stone throwers. At this stage, the support of mounted officers or dog handlers was sometimes required. The adoption of this option was implemented rarely and only in extreme cases when all others had failed to prevent the continuance of violence. 1.16 Wherever possible demonstrators were warned before positive action was taken either by the use of a loud-hailer or liaison with picket leaders, or preferably a combination of the two. In either case an opportunity was given for those present to disperse before positive action was taken to move them. As soon as disorder was under control the priority was to de-escalate and a return to normal uniform was effected as quickly as possible.

TACTICS

1.17 A range of tactical options were employed in carrying out this strategy. All of these fell within the guidelines set down at ACPO level. The tactics actually employed were few, though there were infinite variations on the theme to manage the various collieries which had to be policed. 1.18 A Ground Commander of Superintendent rank was appointed at each location; he was always a West Yorkshire Officer. There was constant liaison between him and the Incident Commander on the development of the operation. He was assisted in the selection of appropriate tactics by a Tactical Adviser of Chief Inspector rank. The Chief Inspector was also available to assist Ground Commanders at locations where there was an escalation of events, by providing on-the-ground assistance with tasks such as supervision of dogs/horses, command of shield Units, etc. 1.19 If positive action was to be adopted this was carried out with the authority of an officer of Assistant Chief Constable rank. Such an officer was always available, most days on the ground. Unless it was vital to act without delay, the apoption of this level of action awaited his arrival. He then took control of tactics and retained it until the situation was normalised. His authority was also required for certain manoeuvres in initiating the use of horses and dogs.

Establishing Rapport

1.20 All levels were encouraged to enter into dialogue with colliery officials, pickets and working miners. At senior level, this rapport sought to establish ground rules within which all parties operated. At junior level, it was intended to

develop mutual understanding and de-escalation of violence.

1.21 The simple initiative by the police of arranging talks between union officials and workers on colliery premises in the presence of management was effective. Indeed, it went a long way towards easing tensions and earning the respect of all parties.

Arrests

1.22 At colliery premises the making of arrests was kept to a minimum. Retrospective arrests were encouraged to reduce the risk of inflaming the situation. Similar flexibility was encouraged in the subsequent disposal of prisoners. The action taken was determined according to the seriousness of offence(s) involved and the background of offenders. Many persons benefited from on the spot caution and release, and others were dealt with by process or charge and bail. Only the more serious or repeat offenders were put before the court. Remands in custody or the imposition of bail conditions were only sought in extreme cases.

Control of Picketing

1.23 When ground rules had been established, the siting of the official picket was decided as was the proper place for other persons to mount a demonstration. This took into account the natural frustration of those involved and sought to permit a reasonable demonstration by those in support of the strike.

1.24 An early priority was to secure the ground at each individual colliery. Times of deployment were fixed with this in mind in the firm belief that success in meeting our objectives was more easily achieved if this was done.

1.25 At most times and places a line of officers was all that was needed to control this situation and keep the various groups in their proper place. The strength of this line was adjusted in response to the numbers present.

1.26 There is a traditional view among miners' pickets that to mount a push against a police line is acceptable. Although this can relieve tension and frustration there are real dangers with such direct confrontation. Injuries can be sustained, leading to offences occurring, arrests result and there is a consequent inflammation of feelings. At most collieries it was possible to negotiate away the push. Where this was done, it was to the benefit of all parties.

1.27 At one time or another almost all locations experienced a situation where large numbers of pickets attempted to block the approach of working

miners. This required the setting up of some type

of cordon of officers in depth to deter the attempt and to counter the push if it occurred. 1.28 When it was necessary to disperse large gatherings this could often be achieved by pushing back the crowd until they gradually split up and dispersed. 1.29 These tactics were net always sufficient to contain or disperse large or violent demonstrations. It was then that more positive tactics had to be introduced.

Protective Equipment 1.30 The wearing of protective equipment was not authorised lightly. It destroys the traditional image of the British police officer and in the context of this dispute came to be seen as a hostile tactic which drew adverse reaction. It was worn for the protection of officers only in the circumstances detailed at paragraph 1.13. The Use of the Truncheon

1.31 The drawing of batons was never adopted as a tactic. The use of the truncheon remained a matter for an individual officer in accordance with the normal requirement to keep the use of force to a minimum in any particular circumstances.

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2. OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1 The concept of a clear line command was vital to the operation. Appendix D charts the structure which developed as it expanded Force-wide. Ultimately a central Control was established from where the Incident Commander (Chief Superintendent) had an overview of operations through which the effective and efficient use of resources was possible. Perhaps more important he was able to direct things in a way which ensured that the policy of the Force was adhered to throughout.

2.2 Initially it was necessary to implement chains of command both for the despatch of Mutual Aid to other forces and to deal with incidents within this Force area.

2.3 Certain key posts were necessary to establish and maintain the command and control structure. These essential posts and the differing chains of command will be indicated in this section of the report.

PHASE I

2.4 The Force commitment to Mutual Aid through the National Reporting Centre was 26 Police Support Units. This was based on a prioritised call-out system of two PSU'S from 12 Divisions and a further one each from the smaller Millgarth and Bradford Central Divisions.

2.5 A Task Force capability to organise into four additional PSU's permitted some load sharing. This was used effectively to reduce the demand upon Pontefract and Wakefield Divisions, which are areas in the heart of the mining industry and where there were some notable incidents as the strike pro• gressed.

2.6 During Phase I the Force Command Room was established at Fell House, Wakefield, to effect the call out of PSU'S for Mutual Aid. Staff from Headquarters Operations Division manned the room operating through their normal command structure under the authority of ACC Operations. Attempts were made to equalise the demands made upon Divisions at a time when the call was for a number of PSU'S which was less than the Force capability.

2.7 The Command Room also maintained liaison with the National Reporting Centre and recipient forces to satisfy their requirements for aid. Deployment details and ancilliary provisions were communicated

through the Message Switch System.

2.8 An indication of the forces aided and the relevant

period of aid is included in the summary of events at Appendix B. PHASE II

2.9 When incidents of disorder arose in the Pontefract Division and later when Allerton Bywater colliery was re-opened in the Gipton Division operational command of these incidents was undertaken from Pontefract Division. A separate Operations Room was established at Pontefract though the Command Room at Fell House continued to function in its former role, modified by the need to raise in-Force manpower. During this period there was co• ordination of the movement of aid between adjoining Forces by the National Reporting Centre on a daily basis. The level of activity tended to be concentrated in one force or another with one colliery being selected for attention each day.

PHASES III AND IV 2.10 The scale of the operation increased with the re• opening of further collieries in October 1984 and it was recognised duality of control would no longer be viable. At this time the Force ceased to be in a position to send aid to other Forces and it made sense to introduce a unified command based at the Force Command Room at Fell House under the control of Operations Division. Operational Command 2.11 Operational Command was vested in Assistant Chief Constable Operations. His role was to oversee all facets of the operation particularly when large or violent pickets were encountered. His authority was needed for the implementation of positive policing tactics and unless prevented from so doing simply by the immediacy of the problem he would attend and take control of tactics on such occas• ions. 2.12 Assessment of police morale and the mood of pickets and demonstrators was an important part of his role. He frequently visited the various collieries in company with his Tactical Adviser. At such times he was able to offer advice and support to the Superintendent Ground Commanders and all other personnel with a view to ensuring that the overall objectives cf the operation were understood and the policy of the Chief Constable was adhered to. Incident Command 2.13 The Chief Superintendent Operations Division was appointed Incident Commander. The key note of his role when the operation was 'live', ie immediately before, during and immediately after the times of arrival and departure of working miners, was to

ensure there was compliance with the philosophy of relative response. To this end he maintained

direct central command from the Command Room, controlled deployment of all manpower, and was responsible for the regular briefing and debriefing of all personnel involved in the operation. He was assisted in this task by a Staff Officer of Chief Inspector rank. At times other than when the Command Room was 'live' he was responsible for overall planning and co-ordination of all activities related to the operation. Officer-in-Charge, Command Room 2.14 When the Incident Commander was not on duty the officer in command of the Command Room took over these responsibilities. Initially of Super• intendent rank, this post was upgraded to that of Chief Superintendent in November 1984 as virtually all pits in West Yorkshire re-opened and pressure upon the Incident Commander increased. A Staff Officer to the Officer-in-Charge of the Command Room in the rank of Chief Inspector was appointed to assist. Ground Commanders

2.15 Ground Commanders of Superintendent rank drawn from the Force were appointed to supervise each separate colliery. They were invaluable in providing the vital day-to-day control of police resources at their location and maintained constant dialogue between the police, union officials and colliery management. In liaison with the Incident Commander they supervised the deployment of an appropriate level of police response, identified and resolved difficulties as they arose and ensured that staff deployed to their particular location operated in accordance with their brief as to Force policy. 2.16 When large or violent pickets were encountered the Ground Commander received the support of the Assistant Chief Constable Operations as previously outlined. It is important to note that while the authorisation of the use of positive tactics rested with the Assistant Chief Constable, the Ground Commander remained responsible for manpower deployment.

Group Commanders 2.17 Group Commanders of Chief Inspector rank were directed by the Command Room to attend at those collieries where there was large scale picketing activity. They maintained liaison with and gave tactical advice to Ground Commanders. 2.18 They also provided for the reception and deployment of manpower, supervision and deployment of shield units, supervision of horses and dogs, and direction of the police line deployed in the face of mass pickets. In carrying out these tasks they

operated in accordance with the directions of the Superintendent Ground Commanders.

Police Support Units

2.19 Each Police Support Unit was under the command of an Inspector who, having been briefed as to the overall philosophy and the particular role of his Unit, was responsible for the deployment of his men in accordance with those instructions.

2.20 In many respects it is fair to say that the calibre of this officer, was reflected in the calibre of his Unit. The training given to Inspectors in charge of Police Support Units in recent years made a significant contribution to the success of the operation. The difficult nature of his task, however, in commanding his men while being required to spend long periods in close contact with them throughout a protracted and arduous dispute cannot be over-emphasised.

2.21 In all of these roles the desirability of continuity of employment was recognised. In most cases this was possible. Inevitably the competing demands for personnel, particularly at Superintendent level, introduced changes but attempts were made to keep these to a minimum. The Command Room

2.22 In constant liaison with the Force Communications Officer and Buildings and Supplies Officer the Incident Command arranged for the range of facilities available in the Command Room to be expanded from a two position VHF control facility at its inception to a control suite with 14 operator positions, a separate telephone enquiry room and rooms for equipment and briefing by October 1984. A diagramatic representation of operator positions is included at Appendix E. It was found the noise generated militated against the use of telephones and radios in one room although key and lamp units enabled telephone calls to be integrated into the main control room at quieter times. A terminal of the Force Message Switch network was also installed.

2.23 A wide range of visual displays were provided for the benefit of persons working in the Command Room. These included:-

A large board displaying details of PSU's dispositions, their tours of duty, location and stations together with equipment carried.

Colliery details showing the identity of the Ground Commander, levels of picketing, numbers of workers, starting and finishing times and details of any arrests for each day's operation.

Aerial photographs and hand-drawn large scale street maps of collieries and the surrounding areas mounted on metal backing boards with magnetic discs to display police deployments. Display boards showing other police units available such as Mounted and Dog officers with call signs, scales of duty, deployment etc. Lists of useful telephone numbers for police and other agencies.

Duty rosters for Command Room staff. Message logs and running sheets of infor• mation to be brought to the notice of the Incident Commander or for inclusion in briefings.

Records maintained separately for each working colliery including details of union and colliery officials, a day by day log of events, pick-up points and routes of workers convoys and other essential details of the police operation in respect of each colliery.

2.24 The briefing of Ground Commanders, Group Commanders and escort drivers was provided for in a room adjacent to the Command Room. Other briefings were conducted at the Reception Point at Force Training School where officers reported for duty.

2.25 The physical limitations on space, the technical limitation of available equipment, and the late start on a unified command system all led to problems as the Command Room developed. The lessons learned are subject of comment at Part III of this report.

2.26 The Command Room was at the heart of the operation. Staff were selected for their competence and for their willingness in radio and telephone communi• cations. Most were drawn from Force Control but because of the benefits to be obtained from local knowledge selected personnel were drawn from Divis ons in the coal mining areas. 2.27 Staffing levels in the Command Room were maximised during the 'live' period prior to, at the time of, and immediately following the times when workers entered and left each colliery. During these periods an Inspector was present. Outside these hours an Inspector and a Sergeant provided 24 hour supervisory cover between them.

2.28 At weekends, when activity at collieries was low, a Sergeant and Constable manned the room at all

tim es, mai nly for sec uri ty rea son s, but als o to

maintain communication links both within and outside the Force. Liaison

2.29 The Command Room staff, together with the Staff Officer to the Incident Commander, carried out liaison in several important areas and it is felt that it will be useful to mention two of these:- (a) The Extraction of Information for Briefing This was the foremost task of the duty supervisor. It was his job to ensure that relevant and up-to-the-minute information was available to officers responsible for operational briefings. Also included was the prompt follow up of items raised on de briefing parades. (b) Liaison with Emergency Services There are agreed procedures between the police, fire and ambulance services on the involvement of emergency services personnel at public order incidents. In this dispute it was not necessary to activate the fire service plans. In the case of the ambulance service, however, a control car was frequently on standby for much of the 'live' period of the operation. Day-to-day liaison and activation of the agreed procedures when this became necessary was the responsibility of the Incident Commander.

PHASE V

2.30 Appendix Q charts the build-up and reduction of manpower raised through local and Mutual Aid PSU's as the scale of the operation grew through phases III and IV and later contracted in phase v. Mutual Aid was no longer called in during Phase v and the level of manpower raised in-Force was reduced in response to the reduced level of activity being experienced. 2.31 Alongside the run-down of resources during the latter stages of the dispute was a parallel con• traction of the command structure. Opportunity was taken to allot to collieries one of three starting times and Ground Commanders covered two or even three pits. In the case of the quieter locations one Ground Commander eventually covered a group or area of collieries, eg. Emley, Park Mill, Denby Grange and Bullcliffe and their subsidiary outlets at Caphouse, Springwood and Silkstone Screens. 2.32 Staffing of the Command Room and of all other facets of the operation was reduced to match that of manpower and command levels.

7 3. OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT

3.1 During the dispute the highest level of PSU turn• out achieved in-Force was 33. This figure excluded any manpower from Pontefract Division, because of problems encountered in the area which has the highest concentration of collieries and associated communities. A list of collieries in West York• shire can be found at Appendix G which indicates also the size of the colliery. The total number of PSU's used excludes 3 potential Task Force PSU's which were committed to investigation into the murder of Sergeant Speed at Leeds from November 1984 onwards. 3.2 Such a high level of demand clearly has a deleterious effect on normal policing. It could not be sustained for any longer than absolutely necessary. Indeed, it was only justified at all on the basis that it reduced our dependence on aid from outside the Force. 3.3 It should be stated at the outset that the concept of 'relative response' referred to earlier is more manpower intensive than the adoption of a more overtly positive policing style. 3.4 Impartiality has already been identified as an important feature of our approach. This was the key to establishing mutual confidence and respect between the various factions. Self-sufficiency in support services such as parking of vehicles, feeding, toilet facilities, recreation at standby areas, etc., was another. 3.5 Away from the picket lines arrangements had to be put in hand to secure the protection of working miners, investigate offences committed, collate relevant information and to give early warning of picket movements so as to implement the appropriate levels of police response. The relative importance of these aspects of the operation varied as the dispute progressed. Each aspect is identified later in this report. The use of Coal Board Premises 3.6 There was a conflict between the need for adequate resources to be assembled sufficiently close to the scene of activities and the necessity to maintain a profile appropriate to the required response. Available options were restricted when a proximate Forward Holding Area could not be identified. The choice often rested between holding the majority of manpower some distance away or having them at the scene. This in turn resulted in either an unacceptable increase in response times or

criticism for over-response.

3.7 Difficulties were experienced in identifying suitable temporary accommodation, reasonably near to collieries, as Forward Holding Areas. There was understandable reluctance on the part of business concerns and local authorities asked to make premises available; they felt that by so doing they were seen to be taking sides in a sensitive situation. By the time consultation had taken place involving the Police Authority and agreements had been reached, events had overtaken the need. 3.8 Initially, in furtherance of the policy of impartiality, Police Support Units did not use National Coal Board Property or facilities. In this we differed somewhat from other Forces, but it was considered to be a sign of our neutral posture. 3.9 As the dispute lengthened damage to colliery premises increased in frequency and scope. At the same time violence and intimidation towards working miners and their property grew. In consequence the requirement to protect both life and property led to the presence of police personnel on Coal Board property. As a result it was possible to place officers close to a location where history or information suggested they may be required but held as a ready reserve should the anticipated level of disorder occur. 3.10 Any criticism which resulted was countered by an explanation to the- regular pickets of the reasons for the change in policy. In the main the explanations were accepted since at many collieries the pickets themselves occupied Coal Board premises and enjoyed the use of some colliery facilities. Determining the Ground Rules 3.11 The policy of encouraging dialogue between police, pickets and colliery management led to the establishment of ground rules at colliery locations. Regular talks with Union representatives resulted in stable and self regulating arrangements for picketing with a minimum of police involvement.

3.12 At some locations as a result of such agreements the level of picketing and the resultant policing thereof was minimal. At others high profile policing was frequently required to stabilise an otherwise volatile situation. Persistent dialogue achieved some results in the reduction of picketing and violence at certain locations as the dispute progressed. This in turn considerably reduced injuries and arrests. Regrettably however, a few locations showed little response despite the best efforts of the police. Standard Opening Deployment

3.13 A standard opening police deployment was established for each colliery taking into account

the level and nature of picketing normally experienced . This was regularly reviewed and varied to keep it to an absolute minimum at each separate location. The remaining police resources were then held at strategic Forward Holding Areas from where they could be despatched to assist at a variety of locations.

3.14 Having secured the ground early, available officers were deployed in normal uniform as required to maintain the status quo. If, but only if, the number or the mood of pickets escalated beyond the capacity of the officers deployed to deal with them, further officers were then added at a rate dictated by the build-up being experienced.

3.15 The development of an operation from that point on from the patrol mode through defensive and positive stages to an eventual return to normality is described elsewhere.

The Use of Horses and Dogs

3.16 The Association of Chief Police Officers in their Public Order Manual of Tactical Options and Related Matters have considered the implications of using horses and dogs in Public Order operations. A variety of Tactical Options available are set out at Appendices Hand I of this report.

3.17 The use of either is emotive and tight control needs to be exercised over the circumstances in which they are used. In this Force this was achieved by the relatively simple expedient of a requirement that the Operational Commander of Assistant Chief Constable rank approve their intended use.

Dog Patrols

3.18 Dog Patrol officers were excluded from situations which would normally bring them into direct contact with a picket line. Additionally, in recognition of their capabilities and limitations, any proposed deployment was discussed with a supervisory officer from the Dog Section.

3.19 In any manoeuvre attempts were made to ensure both dogs and their handlers were deployed at a safe distance away from any groups of demonstrators. This normally ensured they were out of range of stone-throwing, except where the demonstrators themselves approached the dogs.

3.20 The principal use of dogs was to protect vulnerable property, including police vehicles and parking areas, as well as colliery premises and surrounding areas. Their use in this way provided a considerable deterrent against would-be attack and helped to conserve manpower.

3.21 The protection of areas on the periphery of serious disorder was another role undertaken by Dog Patrol officers. This permitted concentration of police resources on the picket line whilst protecting them against attack on the flanks.

3.22 The other options discussed in The Tactical Options Manual were considered to be too sensitive to be implemented.

3.23 Some 72 dogs and handlers (including supervisors) are available in the Force, operating under normal circumstances under Sub-Divisional control. As the dispute grew, they had to be brought under central control. As many as 58 were engaged on any one day on duties connected with the policing of the strike. Mounted Support

3.24 Horses were used infrequently, but it is well recognised there is considerable merit in their use when confronting large and hostile crowds. Indeed, their use in crowd control has a long tradition. Deployed properly they can reduce the risk of injury to police and, if care is exercised, to members of the crowd. 3.25 A positive decision was taken in this Force to use a m1n1mum of six horses in formation. If this number could not be justified ,it was felt that the use of horses was not necessary at all. 3.26 When used, the numbers of horses actually deployed at any incident was only sufficient to meet the need. On most occasions it was enough to utilise them as a display of strength. If they came into contact with demonstrators they were used only 'at the nudge'. This involved them advancing at a very slow pace as a close contact cordon to either hold a line where foot officers were unable to do so or to press forward gently to regain ground lost. 3.27 Another option employed was to sweep areas clear of groups of demonstrators or disperse more dense crowds which were blocking essential routes. In this mode the advance of mounted officers into the crowd was slow. Care was taken to ensure that demonstrators had a way out of their path. Once routes or areas had been cleared in this way they were secured by foot officers. 3.28 Before horses were deployed every effort was made to convey to the demonstrators that their use was intended together with the reason for this. Commun• ication was by loud-hailer and/or by direct contact with picket leaders, accompanied by requests to the demonstrators to disperse of their own volition. 3.29 Available horses were organised into two separate groups and deployed to strategic locations. It had

to be bor ne in min d tha t if the y wer e not mov ed

close to the scene at an early stage the time taken to move them up tended to preclude their use. Crime Prevention Arrangements

3.30 Various steps were taken to secure the safety of workers and their property. Crime prevention through surveillance was considered to be an essential part of the operation.

3.31 Divisions were supplied with details of working miners and of incidents which occurred. They were then asked to provide supervision appropriate to the risk assessment at any given time. Naturally their capacity to provide cover was limited by the manpower demands being made of them by the central operation. In Pontefract Division, in which area there is a heavy concentration of colliery premises teams of Traffic, CID and uniformed officers were dedicated to the task of intimidation prevention and response.

3.32 Observations were arranged at vulnerable locations where the convoys picked up. Vehicles manned by suitable numbers of officers were used. Once again the primary aim was to prevent offences , though physical presence led to the detection of those which took place.

3.33 Throughout much of the dispute convoys of working miners travelling to and from collieries were accompanied by marked police vehicles carrying uniformed officers. As the incidence of attacks decreased, it was possible to limit escorts to accompany them on the inward journeys only. Such close supervision prevented many offences of intimidation and provided a detection capability. Vehicles protected by grills had to be used when violence was at its height and these arrangements are referred to elsewhere.

3.34 Personal attack alarms were made available to those few persons at high risk who had no alternative means of communication with the police. The allocation of such devices was strictly controlled. Approaches were channelled through NCB Area Management who had a duty to sift requests. There was then a further evaluation procedure by the police.

Mutual Aid Arrangements

3.35 As indicated earlier in this report it was not until the onset of Phase IV of the dispute that West Yorkshire required Mutual Aid Units. Prior to this any Mutual Aid arrangements had concentrated upon the supply of PSU's to other forces. The first line of response to any policing requirement in this Force is by West Yorkshire officers. Great efforts were made to apply this principle to the

operation, even to the extent of raising more PSU's than our recognised commitment.

3.36 The arrangements were co-ordinated by the National Reporting Centre, established under the direct control of a Steering Committee which in turn reported to the Central Conference of Chief Con• stables. 3.37 The centre is activated when a situation necessitates the prov1s1on of Mutual Aid on a larger scale than that provided to a Chief Constable from a neighbouring force.

3.38 Following consultation between the President of ACPO, Chief Constables of affected Forces and Horne Office, the NRC undertake:- (a) to arrange Mutual Aid when:- (i) the national situation demands it; and (ii) local Mutual Aid arrangements are inadequate or would create difficulties in deploying police resources on a national basis; or (iii) the powers vested in the Home Secretary by virtue of Section 14(2) of The Police Act 1964 are invoked; (b) to collate and disseminate any information appertaining to the situation for which the NRC is activated; (c) to provide the Home Secretary with the inform• ation required by virtue of his accountability for such matters.

3.39 In this instance the centre was established on the initiative of the Association of Chief Police Officers. 3.40 The Police Service is rightly expected by Govern• ment and public alike to respond speedily and effectively to incidents of public disorder. This is so whether th y emanate from industrial dispute, racial conflict, hooliganism or other social discord.

3.41 The efficacy of the response from forces is geared to the ability of the Service as a whole to co• ordinate a complex, transient and logistically large operation. The success of arranging aid on such a scale is entirely dependant upon the good• will of Forces and their willingness to co-operate with the NRC in the supply of information. 3.42 In this Force every effort was made to co-operate with the NRC. In return the Centre was found to be

hel pfu l and sup por tiv e in ach iev ing our obj ect ive s, not lea st thr oug h the est abl ish men t of goo d lin es of com mun ica tio n.

3.43 Despite the vital co-ordinating function of the National Reporting Centre the Chief Constable remained very firmly in command of the operation in West Yorkshire. At no stage of the dispute did he meet with interference or attempts to direct the progress of the operation. At no time was pressure exerted to accept aid in any particular numbers or from any particular source. Rather the experience was that the NRC endeavoured to tailor requests from the aid available Nationally.

3.44 Appendix F outlines the Mutual Aid received by this Force, identified by source, numbers and period of engagement. A graphic representation of Mutual Aid supplied on a weekly basis is included at Appendix Q. 3.45 Once the necessity for Mutual Aid arose a decision was needed as to their accommodation. Options of Territorial Army accommodation in the Force area or military establishments within reasonable travelling distance were rejected in favour of police premises. It was considered they offered a better standard of accommodation closer to the scene of operations and avoided unfounded suggestions already being made elsewhere that the use of military establishments indicated the involvement of the Armed Forces in the dispue.

3.46 Accommodation levels were agreed at the larger police stations and arrangements were made at short notice to supply and install beds, lockers etc, as well as to enhance catering and other facilities. Naturally the influx of such large numbers caused some logistical problems but with the benefit of experience drawn from others who had faced the same difficulties and the goodwill of the staff con• cerned these were soon overcome. 3.47 The effect of the decision to accommodate on police premises was to divide up the number of officers into groups of manageable size. A more personal approach was then possible to meeting their needs in the fields of quartering, feeding, welfare and recreation. 3.48 Our visitors had all experienced accommodation elsewhere as had officers from West Yorkshire who had been sent on residential Aid. It is fair to say that facilities provided at west Yorkshire Police Stations were superior to those provided at many military and other establishments in other Force areas. 3.49 Practical difficulties encountered in the deploy• ment of Mutual Aid personnel were in the areas of non-standardised equipment; use of callsigns which differed from their own force and National identi• fiers; and the differing use of radio codes and

wor ds of com man d. All of the se iss ues hav e bee n

identified and are in process of resolution at either Regional or National level.

4. INFORMATION GATHERING AND DISSEMINATION

4.1 The collation, evaluation and dissemination of information is a corner stone of the success of any large scale operation. It aids the effective deployment of manpower and the detection of criminal offences. Of equal importance, it ensures that officers involved in all aspects of the operation are fully conversant with relevant matters.

4.2 During the first phase of the dispute, when West Yorkshire collieries were strike-bound, the activities of pickets from this area were concen• trated in other Force areas. Information about their movement was not gathered in any structured form. Anything of relevance was passed through the Command Room to other Forces without the need to collate and evaluate this information. Its dissemination in West Yorkshire had limited relevance. The Establishment of Surveillance Groups

4.3 Following resumption of work at Allerton Bywater colliery, West Yorkshire began to experience large scale picketing. Information began to be received in the Command Room from other forces and a system of 'spotters' was introduced. This involved the use of Motorway and other Traffic patrols and officers from the Criminal Investigation Department.

4.4 The object of these initiatives was to give early warning of movements of pickets so that the Ground Commander could respond within the overall philosophy of "relative response". The number of officers deployed in this role increased as more collieries returned to work to become the target for mass picketing.

4.5 Large scale picketing reduced with the opening of most of the collieries in the West Yorkshire area during the period October/November 1984. In consequence the number of officers employed as 'spotters' was steadily reduced. At the same time the role of those remaining changed, with greater emphasis being placed on observation to protect those at risk both at home and at those locations where they assembled for transportation to their place of work. Workers convoys were observed to prevent and detect offences of intimidation.

4.6 By 14 January 1985 when the likelihood of mass picketing had receded and when the increased number of working locations had in any case made it almost impossible to pin-point the likely destination of travelling pickets, CID officers engaged on these duties were re-deployed in other roles more relevant to the conduct of the dispute at that time.

The Establishment of the Central Informatio/nIntelligence Unit 4.7 The level of criminal activity being experienced in some forces in August 1984 led to an examination of the use being made of information and intelligence by forces concerned in the dispute. 4.8 The recommendations were published on 3 September 1984, and led to the setting up of a Central Information/Intelligence Unit under the auspices of the National Reporting Centre, based at the Leicestershire Constabulary Communications Centre at Enderby. Its terms of reference were restricted to current criminal activities. It was commanded by a Superintendent seconded from the West Midlands Police. 4.9 The Unit was established on 24 September 1984. Its staff included a constable seconded from this Force to represent the Yorkshire and Midlands area of the dispute. This officer subsequently returned to West Yorkshire on 7 December 1984 to be replaced by a member of South Yorkshire Police. The Establishment of the Force Information/Intelligence Unit 4.10 On the same date the Central Intelligence Unit was established at Leicester, West Yorkshire, in common with other forces involved in the dispute, established a Local Intelligence/Information Unit. Its role was to process the information which prior to this time had been the province of Local Intelligence Officers in the Divisions affected by the dispute operating, when needed, with extra staff. 4.11 The terms of reference of the Unit were to collate, evaluate and disseminate information relative to criminal activities connected with the dispute and to establish and maintain liaison with the Central Information Unit in respect of such activities which transcended force boundaries. For the purpose of the dispute criminal activities were considered to be intimidation, violence and damage to property.The sensitivity of such information gathering was recognised and a conscious decision was made to establish a Unit dedicated to the dispute,which was completely divorced from Special Branch and other existing Criminal Intelligence agencies. Records were kept separately from those maintained elsewhere in this Force for other purposes. 4.12 The Unit was established initially at the Force Training School under the supervision of an Acting Chief Inspector. As it evolved the provision of related statistical and other information required by the Horne Office, the National Reporting Centre and other agencies, became responsibilities of the Unit.

4.13 As the tempo of the return to work increased so did the level of associated criminal activities. The Acting Chief Inspector responsible for the Unit had other strike related duties. It soon became apparant that officers engaged in the Intelligence Unit needed to be free from other responsibilities.

4.14 Accordingly on 29 October 1984 an Inspector was appointed full-time to take over the Unit which was transferred to Fell House, adjacent to the Command Room. The constable strengh was increased from one to three as activity increased.

4.15 A summary of the indexes maintained in, and statistical information provided by, the Intelligence Unit is to be found at Appendix J.

4.16 Weekly Intelligence Bulletins were published and disseminated throughout the Force. Persons believed to be particularly active in organising and carrying out criminal activities were targeted and made the subject of special presentations. Information was provided for briefing at all levels. Additionally the Unit maintained a close liaison with the Incident Commander in the planning of future police deployment and with officers engaged locally or centrally in the investigation of criminal offences.

THE COMMUNICATION OF FORCE POLICY AND BRIEFING

Operational Briefing of Personnel

4.17 Crucial to the success of such a large scale and long term operation was regular briefing of the personnel involved. This ensured that the policy laid down at Force level was communicated effectively to all levels of the operation. It also facilitated the dissemination of current information about the policing operation. Throughout the dispute the Incident Commander or his deputy was responsible for initiating daily briefing down to Inspector level. (For specimen see Appendix K).

4.18 The information required by officers involved in different facets of the operation varied and several separate briefings took place. At the most senior level the Superintendents appointed as Ground Commanders at the various collieries reported for duty at the Command Room daily where they were briefed by the Chief Superintendent Incident Commander or his deputy before travelling to their colliery. They in turn briefed Units at that colliery on matters particular to that location and on the deployment and tactics to be employed, thus ensuring a consistent approach.

4.19 On every occasion that Police Support Units reported at the Reception Point at Force Training

Sc ho ol fo r is su es of ra di os , me al s an d ot he r eq ui p• me nt , th e Un it Co mm an de rs we re as se mb le d an d

briefed by the Staff Officer to the Incident Commander on the progress of the operation and policy matters. At regular intervals Assistant Chief Constable, Operations, the Incident Commander and other Senior Officers involved in the operation addressed all members of these Units to reinforce Force policy and emphasise the information given about important issues. At the same time an opportunity was provided by these means for those assembled to raise matters which were causing concern.

4.20 Officers responsible for 'spotter' teams, escort of convoys of workers and other specialised tasks were briefed by the Incident Commander or his Staff Officer when they commenced duty. They in their turn briefed relevant personnel.

De-briefing of Personnel

4.21 De-briefing of Ground Commanders by the Incident Commander took place daily before they finished duty. This facilitated constant feedback and helped in the early identification and resolution of problems either of an operational or welfare nature.

4.22 Senior Officers regularly attended operational locations, where they took the opportunity to discuss current policy with those of more junior rank. This action played an important part in achieving a better understanding of the role and tactics of the police in the dispute. It also enabled an assessment to be made as to how effective communication had been through the various levels of briefing and created a channel through which welfare problems could be identified.

4.23 In the latter stages of the operation violence and intimidation decreased considerably. As this happened it was possible to deploy Police Support Units direct from home station to colliery reducing travelling time and costs incurred in visiting the Force Training School. When this occurred the level of understanding achieved through regular briefing and the continuity which had been achieved ensured weekly briefing of Police Support Units supplemented by daily briefings through Ground Commanders was sufficient.

5. THE ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT IN LARGE SCALE PUBLIC DISORDER

5.1 The main tasks of the CID in connection with the dispute were identified as:- a) monitoring movements of demonstrators, b) surveillance of individuals suspected of criminal activities,

C) interrogation of persons arrested for crime, d) investigation of serious and associated crimes, and e) assisting in the preparation of prosecution files for criminal activities.

Monitoring Movements of Demonstrators 5.2 During the period August to December 1984 West Yorkshire had to contend with a number of mass demonstrations at working collieries. Early information on the gathering and movement of large numbers of pickets was central to our policy of "relative response". To this end teams of CID officers operating in private vehicles together with Motorway and other Traffic patrols monitored these movements. Valuable information on the build-up of large scale picketing was gathered in this way. 5.3 As workers returned at more collieries it became increasingly difficult to identify picket movements with particular locations. As a result the covert following of groups of pickets by CID 'spotters' was introduced in an effort to improve predictions as to their intended destinations. Eventually when work had resumed at most collieries in West Yorkshire the mounting of large scale pickets ceased to be a tactic of the National Union of Mineworkers in pursuance of their dispute. Surveillance of Suspects 5.4 From time to time individuals were targeted by the Information Unit because of known or suspected involvement in criminal activities. Problem areas were identified where serious cases of intimidation of working miners was prevalent. Surveillance of locations and individuals was an investigative task in the resolution of such difficulties. Interrogation of Suspects

5.5 Throughout the operation it was the practice to have CID officers interrogate persons arrested for

crime and suspected to be involved in the organisation of violence/intimidation. Many of the persons arrested had no previous criminal history. The use of CID in this way enabled a consistent standard to be applied and ensured a quick, firm but fair follow-up to arrests. The Investigation of Serious and Associated Crimes 5.6 Parallel with the return to work in West Yorkshire there was an increase in intimidation towards and attacks upon working miners. This was typified by two serious incidents; the assault of Paul Fletcher at Castleford en 23 November and an offence of arson at the home of Steven Spencer at Upton on 24 November 1984. (See Appendix L). 5.7 In response to the escalation of violence and intimidation a Crime Investigation Team was established under the command of a Detective Inspector on 20 November 1984 • At its peak it was staffed by 5 Detective Sergeants and 15 Detective Constables. They were responsible for investigation of the more serious incidents and provided co-ordination of local effort in respect of less serious matters. Initially the unit worked from Normanton Police Station but later it moved to offices in the Headquarters complex to improve liaison with the Information Unit and other facets of the operation. 5.8 The Criminal Investigation Department's involvement in the operation was a significant one. By bringing to bear their expertise they brought about a successful conclusion to a number of enquiries into serious offences. A summary of the cases dealt with by the Crime Investigation Team is to be found at Appendix M. Preparation of Offence Files 5.9 Following interrogation, officers from the CID were able to assist in the preparation of prosecution files. This helped to achieve consistency in the follow-through to prosecution and minimised delays in view of the fact that uniform arresting officers were already working long hours on picket line duties. Intimidation Squads 5.10 Much of the criminal activity centered on· Pontefract Division. Preventive measures in the form of cars jointly manned by Traffic and CID officers were introduced in the area in consultation with the Divisional Officer. Their role was to respond to incidents involving reports of intimidation and to make follow-up visits to the homes of working miners who had been threatened or attacked.

6. RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA

6.1 For over a year this dispute dominated the media Nationally and locally. The demand for information created a substantial extra workload. Eventually systems had to be developed to lift the weight of media attention from the shoulders of operational personnel. 6.2 In the early stages of the strike it was possible for normal arrangements to cope with the demand. Regular liaison between Assistant Chief Constable Operations and the Force Press Officer was sufficient. Interviews were arranged or statements prepared about specific events as necessary. 6.3 As the return to work gathered pace the Yorkshire area became the focus of much of the media attention.In response to increased demands for information and comment during the time of day when picket activity was at its peak, the working hours of the Force Press Office were extended to provide cover from 0500 hours daily. 6.4 On-going information was provided on a daily basis to the Press Office by a Press Information Officer, of the rank of Inspector. He was in attendance in the Command Room dealing directly with the Incident Commander. The numbers of workers, picket levels, injuries and arrests in respect of each working colliery were recorded. A summary of the more serious incidents and an assessment of the mood and level of picketing was also prepared. (See Appendix N for an example). 6.5 The extent of media interest was such that several television companies completed documentary and news programmes in the area. The cameras were frequently present on the picket lines at various collieries. The Force co-operated fully and involvement in this was co-ordinated by the Community Affairs Department. 6.6 The establishment of a centralised media contact point not only relieved the Incident Commander and other Operational personnel of the burden of media attention, it also prevented inaccurate or inadequate statements being given about incidents. Thus a proper and professional image was presented whilst ensuring that media enquiries were dealt with promptly and efficiently. 6.7 Press statements and media coverage drew some invidious comparisons between the operations in this Force and others. It is worth stating that:- a) We were not drawn into the policing of this dispute until a stage much later than other

forces;

b) By that time we had gained a tremendous amount of experience by sending our manpower (at all levels up to Superintendent) elsewhere; and c) Our training had prior to the dispute been very thorough and we were well prepared to handle events.

7. RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC

7.1 Germain to the strategy adopted during the strike was an accute awareness that we were policing part of our own community with whom normal working relationships needed to be maintained during and after the strike. Indeed the Chief Constable's declared intention to police picket lines with reasonable firmness and maximum tolerance was an attempt to preserve police/public relationships in the normal policing sphere. 7.2 Equally there was a consciousness of the need to convey to the public an accurate perception of the way in which the Force sought to handle the dispute. In achieving this objective advantage was taken of the many opportunities which presented themselves to put forward this point of view. A positive use of effective media relations referred to in Section 6 was just one of the ways this was achieved. 7.3 Emphasising that the majority of miners were honest, decent, law-abiuing people and that only a minority would ignore the law in pursuit of their aims was one of the objectives of briefing. Officers on the picket line were encouraged to establish a dialogue with the pickets as a means of obtaining from them their views of police actions and understanding the issues involved. 7.4 Equally through dialogue it was hoped to convey to the pickets an awareness of the philosophy of the police in the handling of the dispute. Press statements by the Chief Constable and other senior members of the Force also sought to reinforce this point. 7.5 Despite strenuous efforts made in certain quarters to capitalise on the apparent conflict between police and public, there appeared to be an awareness among pickets and the public of what the police were trying to achieve. A small minority of the public did express concern about police actions but it is particularly encouraging to note the lack of criticism from the majority. From this negative feedback it is not unreasonable to conclude that the majority of the public thought the police were carrying out their task in a reasonable manner in difficult circumstances.

7.6 Public satisfaction may also be measured by an assessment of public complaints made and letters of appreciation received. The complaints specifically related to Against connection with the dispute this one against an officer has to be

police actions in total 17, including from another force. set the 12 letters

complimenting the police on their actions in connection with the dispute. A more detailed analysis of complaints and letters of appreciation appears at Appendix o. 7.7 Without embarking on a costly survey of public opinion it is impossible to make a full and accurate assessment of their views. Nevertheless our assessment is that the Force has been able to maintain a high level of public support while meeting its responsibilities of maintaining the peace and upholding the law throughout a long and sometimes bitter dispute. Special Sub-Committee of the Police Authority 7.8 The Sub-Committee was formed in September 1984 with the following terms of reference:- "To consider all aspects of the policing of the dispute and its effects in West Yorkshire and to liase withe the Chief Constable on the day-to-day and long term issues raised by the dispute". After the first meeting held at County Ball, Wakefield on 28 September 1984, they met on eighteen subsequent occasions; the regularity of meetings being dictated by the tempo of the dispute. 7.9 At ordinary meetings there was a frank exchange of views between the Chief Constable and the members of the Police Authority. Representatives of the National Union of Mineworkers and the National Coal Board in Yorkshire and representatives of those District Authorities affected by the dispute were invited to attend and discuss various aspects. 7.10 The initiative of establishing the Special Sub• committee opened up a regular line of communication between the police and the Police Authority enabling both sides to achieve a better understanding of the issues and resolve any areas of concern. In addition it provided the means by which all parties to the dispute were able to establish dialogue away from the pressures of picket line confrontation. The existence of the Sub-Committee made a significant contribution towards the speedy re-establishment of community relations at the conclusion of the dispute. Seminar - 'The Way Ahead' 7.11 In response to the forbearance which the public showed in mining and non-mining areas alike, the Force has subsequently embarked upon a programme designed to ensure its energies are channelled towards meeting its declared objectives in respect of burglaries in dwellings, crime prevention, street

offences and accident prevention.

7.12 Officers of all ranks have attended one-day seminars at the Force Training School where this re-affir • mation of objectives has been a major item. Early opportunity has also been taken to ensure Community Forums address the same issues. Equally the Force commitment to community based policing has been stressed wherever possible.

8. COMMUNICATIONS

Facilities

8.1 During the early stages of the dispute the permanently equipped Command Room at Fell House provided all the facilities necessary to deal with the deployment elsewhere of Police Support Units from this Force on a Mutual Aid basis. Access was available to the Force's five VHF channels and both internal and external telephone links were provided.

8.2 During the latter stages of phase I of the dispute after incidents of public disorder in the Hemsworth and Fitzwilliam areas in July 1984 an additional Operations Room was established at Pontefract Police Station. Two of the four emergency UHF channels available for special operations {channels 25 and 29) were allocated to deal with the deployment- of manpower in the area and a VHF repeater facility was installed. There were no direct links established between the Operations Room and the Command Room at this time.

8.3 As the dispute moved into its second phase the concentration of police operations shifted from Hemsworth and South Elmsall to the colliery at Allerton Bywater. As a result the Operations Room at Pontefract was extend d in size, though essentially the same facilities were used. At this stage a UHF monitor was provided in the Command Room at Fell House to facilitate deployments.

8.4 Wnen notice was received that further collieries located in the Wakefield and Huddersfield Divisions were to re-open in early October, a decision was taken to re-establish central control at the Force Command Room. Accordingly offices adjacent to the Command Room normally allocated to Wakefield Division were taken over. This enabled the Command Room to be expanded to establish the Force Incident Control.

Control Methods

8.5 It was an historical accident which initially established the control of the dispute at Pontefract. A control system installed to deploy manpower concerned with the separate though related operation in the Hemsworth/Fitzwilliam area was extended to cover the re-opening of Allerton Bywater colliery. At that stage there was a feeling the Yorkshire area was solidly behind the strike and the return would be short-lived.

8.6 As the prospect of more collieries opening became a reality the decision was taken to establish a unified control at Headquarters. This sprang from

a realisation that effective command and optimum

use of manpower could only be achieved by centralisation. The installation of UHF emergency base stations working to one incident control and the appointment of Ground Commanders at each location followed logically to match the chain of command imposed; actions which were later to become vital to the success of the operation. 8.7 The planning and implementation of the communications network was dictated by the pace of further colliery openings. Frequently only a limited survey was possible and consequently the quality of cover provided was often restricted. More notice would undoubtedly have led to better service, but any delay may have prejudiced the whole operation.

8.8 The initial Incident Control was arranged in such a way that each position was dedicated to the control of a particular colliery. As the number of working collieries grew more control positions in the Command Room were demanded. Physical restrictions then led to a decision to allocate to the more troublesome collieries a separate control position. Other collieries were grouped by reference to geography and channel usage as described in Appen• dix E. This rigid grouping was a compromise which was sometimes more manpower-intensive than necessary. 8.9 By the ime phase IV of the dispute was reached, the number of control heads had grown to fourteen. Daily colliery openings were spread over two and later three fixed times. The associated base stations also numbering fourteen were allocated between three of the four emergency UHF channels, namely 23, 25 and 29. All PSU communications at collieries were dealt with using these frequencies. VHF coverage to provide for PSU deployments and escort monitoring had initially been on channel 4. This had moved to channel 5 due to reception difficulties.

Equipment 8.10 As a short term solution to providing UHF cover in Pontefract Division a Land Rover mounted 70 foot aerial mast was erected at Hemsworth Police Station. By the end of July, more permanent base stations had been installed at three sites at Hemsworth Police Station, South Kirkby Ambulance Station and South Elrnsall Fire Station. Coverage of the South Elmsall area was further enhanced by the erection of a 100 foot trailer mast at a suitable location in Ackworth. These were all linked by land line to the Pontefract Operations Room, and operated on talk-through from that location. Later when Allerton Bywater colliery opened three additional base stations were installed to extend cover to that area. At this

stage the trailer mast at Ackworth became superflous and was removed.

8.11 It is apparent that had further expansion of the operation been necessary we would have had neither the equipment nor the range of frequencies available to offer the flexibility needed. Indeed in respect of equipment, it was only due to the possession by the Home Office of essentially obsolete equipment, that we were able to provide any flexibility at all. 8.12 The operation was limited by the selection of three UHF channels for control purposes. Despite the allocation to this Force of four channels for emergency use, the UHF handsets available at the ·commencement of the dispute operated on a choice of three channels. Obviously it was not practical to expect an officer to carry two sets. Channels 23, 25 and 29 were selected to m1n1m1se overlap problems as heavy use of channel 19 frequency was being made by other forces. Later in the operation some six-channel sets were provided, but not in sufficient numbers to allow us to take up the fourth channel option. 8.13 Practical difficulties were experienced in the re• crystalling of sets to the frequencies used. This was a time-consuming exercise which was partially resolved as sets with a capacity for a range of six frequencies became available. A full-scale issue of such sets should aid future operations of this magnitude.

8.14 Some 21 operational locations had to be controlled using these three UHF frequencies, which were also in use by adjoining Forces. Both in-Force and Home Office staff did their best to allocate channels to avoid 'break-through', but with so many collieries in a small geographical area their task was impossible. Distorted and inadequate communi• cations often resulted. 8.15 At busy times in the Command Room each control position had to be separately manned, frequently by two people, to cope with the volume of radio traffic. At other times had the flexibility been available to route the various schemes through even one or two alternative control points, a better utilisation of manpower could have been achieved. 8.16 Although the operation centred around a network of linked UHF schemes, channel 4 VHF frequency was dedicated to the operation for deployments. As the volume of traffic using this frequency grew and talk-through mode was used more regularly, interference became continual. Despite engineering intervention it became necessary to substitute channel 5, with the consequent and inconvenient loss of that frequency to the regular users. Plans are underway to change the frequency of channel 4 to overcome its deficiencies.

8.17 Effective communication is crucial to the control of large numbers of men in response to a constantly changing scene. It is tempting to say that an operation such as that created by the miners' strike is a once-in-a-lifetime affair. It would however be unwise to assume that the police will never again have to mount such a major operation. Some provision will have to be made in terms of radio communication and it is hoped the Horne Office can meet the challenge. 8.18 In terms of improvements to our own in-Force facilities, work is already in hand to install a new Command Room within the suite occupied by Headquarters Operations Division. Account has been taken of this operation to re-design it to permit the installation of facilities which provide greater flexibility.

9. LOGISTICS

9.1 National guidance in the form of the ACPO Manual of Guidance for Senior Police Officers in Public Order highlights the need for proper planning of those aspects which are essentially logistical in nature if a Force is to be successful in monitoring a fast moving operation to meet a developing situation. The NUM/ NCB dispute presented just such a challenge.

9.2 Considerable strain was placed on the existing officers of the Force when they were required to meet the extra demands of a complex and protracted operation while at the same time carrying out their role in the maintenance of the normal policing of the County.

9.3 In response it was necessary to enhance the staffing of those Departments where the load fell most heavily, while remaining mindful of the competing demands for manpower and equipment with which to adequately police the dispute.

9.4 A diagrarnatic representation of the Logistics arrangments eventually made are shown in the Command Structure at Appendix D.

TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS

The Transport Officer

9.5 The Chief Inspector, Traffic Administration, is the designated Transport Officer for the Force in respect of any major incidents involving the mobilisation of large numbers of police officers. The extent of his other duties precluded the appointment of the Transport Officer as a full-time member of the logistics team in the early stages of the operation.

9.6 Owing to the length of the operation and the demands placed upon him, the Chief Inspector, Driver Training, was appointed as Deputy Transport Officer with effect from 16 November 1984. This enabled him to provide support and permit sharing of knowledge. Additionally, when the staffing of the Reception Point at the Force Training School was enhanced the arrangement enabled both of them to become more involved in transport matters.

9.7 The whole of the Force Vehicle Fleet was placed at the disposal of the Force Transport Officer at an early stage. Despite this action the temptation remained for others to direct transport to meet short notice requirements. Although this was done with the best of intentions it had a knock-on

effect on future deployment of vehicles. It was

not until a closer integration of the transport function was achieved that some of the conflict was reduced. 9.8 The busiest time for the Transport Officer was at the commencement of each day's mobilisation. It was necessary for him or his deputy to be available at the Force Reception Point at this time to resolve difficulties presented by broken down vehi cles, absent drivers, etc. The hours of duty he was required to work further emphasises the need for an individual to be dedicated to this role. Vehicles and Drivers

9.9 Different types of vehicle and driver had to be used to greatest effect to meet the varying demands imposed. Personnel, cars and motor cycles drawn from Traffic Patrol and Driving School were readily re-deployed. They were used for escorts for workers' convoys, transportation for Ground Commanders and Senior Officers, and in the case of motorcyclists, as guides for officers who were unfamiliar with the geography of the ground to be covered. In adverse weather, motor cyclists were carried in PSU transport, though they acted in the same capacity. 9.10 The number and type of vehicles available throughout the Force enabled all needs to be met. Clearly this reduced the level of patrol vehicles, but this was inevitable in view of the exceptional nature of demands made upon the Force. Details of the Force fleet are included at Appendix P. 9.11 During Phase IV of the dispute from 22 November 1984 to the end of the year when the throwing of missiles at police vehicles was more prevalent, escort duties were performed by drivers of Range Rovers and Land Rovers which were fitted with protective grills. This afforded greater protection to the occupants and enabled extra officers to be carried who could respond positively to attacks by seeking to arrest those responsible. 9.12 The extent to which this tactic could be employed was limited by the number of suitable vehicles available in the Force. Such vehicles are expensive to purchase and even when potential hirers were identified permission to fit protective grills and use them in dangerous circumstances was accompanied by prohibitive restrictions. This option was therefore not pursued. 9.13 Our prime means of transport for men and equipment was the Ford Transit van. At the height of the dispute 86 such vehicles were required to cater for conveyance of PSU's and other essential in-Force duties. To provide this number, 13 vans scheduled for disposal were retained and a further 11 had to

be hir ed to mee t the sho rtf all . It is rec ogn ise d the se cir cum sta nce s wer e exc ept ion al, but the

shortfall highlights the imbalance between the potential number of PSU's which can be raised in the Force and the transport capability. 9.14 Apart from the inability of hire companies to meet requests to ·pro vide transit vans, hiring of vehicles has further disadvantages. They are a costly item and Police Authority approval is needed for such expenditure. Perhaps the greatest drawback is that they are unprotected and cannot be adapted for police purposes. 9.15 In-Force the vehicles normally fulfil a multi• purpose role as the carriers of personnel and goods. Extended use as personnel carriers highlighted their inadequacy for this purpose alone. Seating in the rear of the vans is longitudinal and uncomfortable. The allocation of 2 vans per PSU to carry 23 officers and protective equipment also caused some discomfort. 9.16 With the onset of winter the heating of the passenger area in the transit vans proved to be totally inadequ ate. A suitable heater originally designed for cara vans and operating off the vehicle's fuel supply was identified and fitted. In the light of use in snow conditions wheel chains were also purchased. These proved to be difficult to fit and had to be removed for dri ving at speed or on cleared roads. As a result only limited benefit was obtained at the more exposed locations. 9.17 Adaptations to the Ford Transit vans at present in use to make them more suitable for the carriage of personnel in a protracted operation needs further investigation. (Note: A small Working Group has been set up to look into this problem).

RECEPTION POINT AT FORCE TRAINING SCHOOL

9.18 During Phase I of the operation the Force Training School at Bishopgarth acted as the Reception Point for Police Support Units en route to other forces to provide Mutual Aid. A small office in the Administration Block was staffed by two Sergeants who issued radios, and other equipment, logged PSU's on and off, and completed other related administrative tasks. The Lecture Theatre and the Gymnasium were available for briefing purposes and meals were served in the Dining Hall.

9.19 As the operation entered the second and subsequent phases the importance of the Training School as a Reception Point increased. Facilities were enhanced and transferred from the Administration Block to the Gymnasium. Staffing levels and times of activation were extended and a range of recreational and welfare facilities were made available. The Training School assumed an

imp ort anc e as a cen tra l loc ati on whe re bri efi ngs

could be held and information disseminated to all ranks.

9.20 At the height of its activities the Reception Point was staffed by an Inspector, five Sergeants and three Constables who gave round- the- clock cover from Sunday evening to Friday afternoon. It booked PSU's on and off duty centrally, controlled the issue of radios and batteries, allocated meal times and locations, and provided extensive facilities for the comfort and welfare of PSU members. At the busiest time, in excess of 1200 officers took advantage of the facilities each day. 9.21 Bishopgarth continued to operate as a Training establishment throughout the dispute. In consequence there were some limitations on available accommodation. Nevertheless, Units on standby had access to video films, table tennis and other recreational games, as well as an unlimited supply of hot drinks and probably most important the comfort of a heated atmosphere at a spacious indoor location. 9.22 As an ideal, in view of the long and unsocial hours worked for a protracted period, separate but closely adjacent areas for rest, television or film viewing and more active forms of recreation would have been advantageous. The tannoy could have been extended to these various rooms to help to muster a PSU required for deployment or to assist in passing other messages. 9.23 One shortfall at the Training School was the absence of adequate parking facilities. Spaces were occupied by students' vehicles, but primarily the problem was the reception and patrolling of more than 100 vehicles. This was aggravated by the consideration which had to be shown to students on the campus and to residents of adjacent properties.

9.24 Despite the deficiencies outlined, the Training School was the location best equipped to provide for these various needs and its availability was an asset to the operation.

MOBILE RENDEZVOUS POINT

9.25 The Mobile Rendezvous Point provided an important 'staging post' for PSU's and for the location of other services necessary to deal with the mass pickets which were regularly experienced in the second and third phases of the operation. It was first established at Allerton Bywater on 21 August 1984 when the concept of a Forward Holding Area emerged.

9.26 A police caravan was moved onto site daily being positioned at or demonstrations were

sited with it were near locations where large anticipated. Other facilities the telehoist vehicle removal

truck, a mobile toilet block and facilities for the prov1s1on of hot and cold drinks to be served. Prisoner Reception Squads were located at the same place. 9.27 The caravan was staffed by a Sergeant and a Constable. They were responsible for recording and controlling the deployment of PSU's to and from the Forward Holding Area, the issue and control of radio equipment to ad-hoc Mutual Aid provided from neighbouring Forces and insofar as the facilities available to them permitted, the welfare of Units at their location. 9.28 A Mobile Rendezvous Point also provided a useful cenral information point and in its capacity as Forward Holding Area a staging post from which assistance could be despatched quickly to nearby collieries. To assist in the recording and control of these Units a suitable board was installed.

9.29 As more collieries resumed work there was a need for improved mobility. Rendezvous Point officers took over a Ford Transit van and the ancillary functions were held centrally. 9.30 As the number of working collieries increased and the frequency of large demonstrations declined the number of occasions when the services of the Mobile Rendezvous Point was called upon decreased. · Nevertheless it made a worhtwhile contribution to the operation until it was finally dispensed with on 28 January 1985.

PRISONER HANDLING

9.31 In situations which involve large crowds, Force instructions emphasise the need for efficient handling of prisoners so as to facilitate their prompt removal from the immediate vicinity and the early release of arresting officers to return to their Units.

9.32 In this dispute because mobility was essential, extensive use was made of the Mobile Cell Blocks. Two Units were established, drawn respectively from Millgarth and Bradford Central Divisions. 9.33 The necessary equipment, i.e. cameras, property bags, stationery, etc., was held in readiness and taken into use. This equipment included a supply of "Plasticuffs" for the immobilisation of prisoners. As the strike progressed, however, their use became an emotive subject and was suspended. 9.34 In view of the policy of minimising arrests (see

Par t I, Sec tio n 1, par a 1.2 2) the num ber of pri son ers arr est ed in pic ket lin e sit uat ion s was

few. As a result only one Prisoner Reception Squad was used from 26 November 1984. On 14 January 1985, this Squad was also dispensed with. 9.35 The method of use of the Mobile Prisoner Reception Squads was to hold them on stand-by at their Unit 41 base, or Forward Holding or Rendezvous Point Areas. They were only activated when substantial numbers of demonstrators were experienced or anticipated and there was consequently the likelihood of a large number of prisoners being taken. 9.36 Isolated arrests were conveyed from the immediate area of a disturbance to Police Support Unit transport to be taken to a nearby police station as soon as possible. Prisoner handling was then in accordance with normal established methods. 9.37 With few exceptions, the number of prisoners taken at any one incident was small. The value of the Prisoner Reception Squads was allied to their prompt and consistent handling of these prisoners, rather than to their capability to deal effectively with large numbers.

CATERING ARRANGEMENTS 9.38 The figures for meals provided during the dispute give a fair assessment of the problems facing the Catering Department. Some 140,000 packed meals and 130,000 hot meals were provided between 20 August 1984 and the end of the operation on 15 March 1985. The total cost involved was in the region of 500,000 pounds.

9.39 The provision of these extensive refreshments was in addition to the provision of routine catering services throughout the .Force area and at the Training School. To meet the demand the civilian staff of the Catering Department were called upon to work the same long and unsocial periods of duty as police officers.

9.40 Co-ordination of the catering arrangements was placed in the hands of a Catering Liaison Group. This comprised an Inspector, three Sergeants and two Constables. They were responsible for day-to• day assessment of the meal requirements and the communication of this information to the Catering Manager. The group were on duty from 2130 hours to 1500 hours daily except weekends. 9.41 Meals were supplied to match the demand through allocation of PSU's to different static feeding points. Although limited use was made of other Force canteens, cooked meals were provided mainly at the Training School and at Force Headquarters. A second feeding point was established at Force Headquarters utilising the mobile canteen when

re si de nt ia l Mu tu al Ai d wa s re ce iv ed . Th e Li ai so n Gr ou p co nt ro ll ed th e th ro ug h- pu t of Un it s fo r

cooked meals and provided on-site security and control of parking at these locations.

9.42 The provision of packed meals was co-ordinated at the Leeds canteen at Brotherton House. Officers of the Catering Liaison Group collected and distributed them daily. Most were given to PSU's on arrival at the Force Reception Point at the Force Training School. Otherwise delivery was arranged to places of deployment. 9.43 Mutual Aid Units residential in this Force area were accommodated at Police Stations. When on duty they were fed alongside West Yorkshire Units. The responsibility for the provision of meals during off-duty periods fell to the staff of the canteens at the Police Stations where they were living.

9.44 Despite the extensive calls made upon the Catering Department, standards remained consistently high. Few grumbles were heard and at the post-operation de-brief there was not a single complaint. This says much for the dedication of the Catering Staff and the effectiveness of liaison with them.

10. WELFARE

10.1 In this section of the report it is intended to:- a) cover the input of the Staff Associations to the operation, b) touch briefly on matters related thereto such as hours of duty and Police Regulations (which are covered at greater length under Administrative Support),

c) highlight statistics relating to injury and sickness, and d) detail some of the measures taken to provide for the greater comfort of police officers performing long and arduous tours of duty.

10.2 10.6

10.3

10.4

10.5

their Terms of Reference of welfare and efficiency. The Equally all those engaged in operational command Chie were encouraged to maintain day-to-day liaison on f matters of concern so as to resolve difficulties Cons quickly and effectively as they arose. tabl e arra Internal arrangements of the Superintendents' nged Association and the Police Federation ensured their for representatives put in appearances on the picket the line from time to time so as to be accessible to Staf their membership. Feedback was established by f these means. Any difficulties experienced or Asso problems identified were then made the subject of • briefing items by the Incident Commander to ensure ciat they were satisfactorily resolved. ion to General satisfaction has been expressed with the meet way in which welfare aspects were dealt with. The regu Staff Associations were closely involved in the larl issue of extra uniform for use in inclement y weather, the provision of heaters in vans and the with setting up . of welfare and recreational facilities him at the Training School. They have expressed appre• and ciation for the arrangements made. othe r In the case of the Superintendents certain protect• memb ive equipment on permanent issue to regular PSU ers members was not available. Although there was an of understanding reached on issue to those Super• Seni intendents performing duty as Ground Commanders, or difficulties in obtaining supplies of the required Mana sizes meant that some never received NATO style geme helmets or appropriate footwear. nt of Of concern to the Police Federation was the policy the of wearing normal uniform and the timing of change Forc e thro ugh• out the disp ute. This enab led them to cons ult on matt ers fall ing with in

into protective equipment. A difficult balance was sought between maintenance of a policy of "relative response" and the need to protect officers under attack. Where the line was drawn on each occasion was a very finely balanced judgemental issue for the Ground Commander with approval of the Incident Commander. 10.7 Research is being carried out to identify the incidence of head injuries sustained. The much greater preponderance of deployment in normal uniform and the concentration of deployment in protective equipment at the worst incidents may preclude the emergence of any firm statistical conclusions. What can be said however is that the helmet normally worn for PSU duties is in itself an item of protective equipment.

11. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

11.1 The challenge to the Financial and Administrative support of the Police Authority and the Force provided by such a long and protracted dispute has been as great as that in many other facets of this operation. 11.2 Close budgeting control was necessary throughout with ACC Management Services, Chief Superintendent (Administration) and Superintendent (Admin- istration) personally vetting applications for expenditure. 11.3 What did become evident as the dispute progressed was that a dedicated team was needed to accept responsibility for the many financial implications involved in the operation. However, there was no clear information available either to the Police Authority or the Force as to the financial commit• ments being taken on.

11.4 Uncertainty due to:- a) absence of agreement on the scale of charges to be applied in respect of Mutual Aid, b) late decisions affecting the proportion of policing costs which would be borne by the Home Office, and c) the absence of any special Police Regulations to cater for the operation, militated against such a team being established. The Scale of Charges 11.5 The method of charging between Forces for Mutual Aid varies according to whether the level of aid is declared 'Small' for which no charge is made, or alternatively either 'Large Scale' or 'Major'. In the event of 'Large Scale' aid being applied additional expenditure incurred by the supplier only is charged. 'Major' aid involves the recouping of all costs including administrative costs and overtime incurred. 11.6 The information which needs to be extracted and collated is very clearly affected by such dec• isions. It was not until the receipt of Home Office circular No. 5/1985 that many of the issues involved were identified and clarified. Only at that stage could plans to capture information be introduced.

Home Office Grant 11.7 The estimated costs of policing the dispute as calculated to date are of the order of eight million pounds. A summary applicable to the Force is attached at Appendix R. Figures have not yet been finalised but it seems that in general terms the total average cost of raising a Police Support Unit in-Force has been of the order of 1,000 pounds per day against 2,250 pounds for a Unit on Mutual Aid. These costs are affected by various factors, not least the amount of overtime actually paid. 11.8 Central Government in an announcement made on the 9 October 1984 indicated the proportion of the costs to be borne were those raised by the product of three-quarters of a penny rate in the County, ie; 1.65 million pounds. 11.9 In the calculation of intermediate amounts the normal Horne Office 50% grant will apply to the first 2.2 million pounds of lp rate. The next 5.5 million pounds will attract a special 90% grant and extra costs thereafter will be the subject of a 100% grant. It has also been announced by the Secretary of State for the Environment that the additional expenditure in 1984/85 which arises from the policing of the dispute will be exempt from grant holdback. 11.10 It must be emphasised that the maintenance of systems to record the final commitment has been a major administrative burden on existing administrative support at Divisional and Force levels.

Interpretation of Police Regulations 11.11 Another area of difficulty for Administrative Support was in the interpretation of Police Reg• ulations and the spin-off therefrom in the absence of special Police Regulations dealing with the dispute.

11.12 This involved:- a) liaison with Operational Command and advice on financial implications of levels of manpower and duty changes; b) advising all branches of the Force on the interpretation of Police Regulations and Force instructions; and c) identifying anomalies in interpretation and policy at Divisions and Departments together with the giving of instructions aimed at standardisation.

11.13 To achieve this it was necessary to introduce audit systems and documents to account for overtime as well as transport, feeding and other 'knock-on' effects in Divisions.

11.14 Restrictions imposed by Police Regulations and the interpretation thereof aggravated the difficulties experienced in the functioning of Administrative Support. The areas giving rise to most anomalies revolved around those Regulations affected by the designation of the police day.

11.15 In West Yorkshire this has been fixed as 0600 to 0600 the following day except where it follows a period of night duty when subsequent rest days continue until 12 noon. The sub-division of duty periods and overtime calculations around these dividing lines, the effect on periods of duty of rest days, and the protection of subsequent rest days after night duty caused endless debate. The solutions devised at Divisional and Departmental level were legion.

11.16 While recognising the need to protect the interest of officers working long and unsocial hours for a protracted period, the present Regulations have been devisive. More or less similar periods of duty have attracted widely differing payment depending on the days allocated as rest days.

11.17 Differing interpretations have lent themselves to manipulation. They have manifestly failed to provide the balance between the protection of the individual officer and reasonable compensation for long and arduous duties. In future more speedy guidance will be necessary to avoid similar difficulties.

12. THE USE OF COMPUTERS

12.1 The first involvement of the Computer Development Unit of the Communications and Technical Support Department in relation to the dispute was a request for the provision of Viewdata facilities in the Command Room established at Pontefract Police Station.

12.2 An incident logging system was provided (based on a system developed by Kent Constabulary) together with Telephone Directory and Information Sheet facilities designed to replace the paper system being maintained. The design of the facilities closely followed that of the existing paper re• cords.

12.3 A major problem was experienced in establishing the necessary communications links and in user familiarisation with two different types of terminal which were available. The associated delays and difficulties inhibited user-reliance on the systems which were installed. Nevertheless valuable experience was gained for the future.

12.4 Assistance was also given to the Force Command Room in the provision of Viewdata facilities to aid the Logistics Section when Mutual Aid was being given to other Forces.

12.5 As the dispute progressed, and the theatre of operations moved to West Yorkshire, demands changed. Requests were made for a computer package to deal with the Incident and Administrative aspects of raising large numbers of men from this Force and the Mutual Aid received from other Forces. Improved retrieval of incident plans including aerial photographs and plans was also considered.

12.6 At the time it was not possible to meet these demands and manual systems were established. Work was commenced and continues in the development of suitable packages. It is fair to say that the contribution of the Computer Development Unit was limited. Its value in future operations will come from increased awareness and hopefully the development of systems required in support of large-scale operations such as this.

13. TRAINING

13.1 Following the riots in inner-city areas in 1981 this Force formed a Public Order Training Depart• ment. Since then regular training has been given to all members of Police Support Units (PSU's) between the ranks of Constable and Inspector. The training of Inspectors commanding PSU's has also been extended by their attendance on specialised courses. Similar though less comprehensive training has also been given to other officers not normally members of Divisional PSU's as it is reasonable to assume they may be required to be present in the early stages of any outbreak of public disorder. 13.2 Situation-based training has been given to officers of senior rank up to Chief Superintendent. This has given them an appreciation of the command of PSU's in dealing with staged incidents both in the classroom and at training locations.

13.3 The main thrust of training has been in strategic and tactical appreciation and the development of command abilities. This has brought home very forcibly the need for each situation to be properly assessed and responded to relative to the problems being presented. In addition, it has also included physical training as a means of encouraging officers to embark on a programme designed to maintain and develop their own fitness. 13.4 The whole programme of training has closely followed the recommendations of the Scarman Report. Due regard has also been paid to the Manual of Public Order produced by the Association of Chief Police Officers, as well as the Manual of Tactical Options. 13.S When the challenge of the miners strike arose the value of in-Force training in public order became readily apparent. Officers forming PSU's were well practised in tactical manoeuvres. They were confident that their commanders had the skill to analyse incidents and deploy them quickly and effectively when required. The use of protective equipment could be minimised because of the skill of its users, and back-up arrangements using horses and dogs could be developed. Their fitness met the demands of working extended hours under difficult conditions demanding strenuous physical effort. 13.6 Fortunately few flaws were revealed in our training though the philosophy of "relative response" which applied demanded a shift of emphasis away from rigid tactics towards a more dynamic style. Flexibility was the watchword. As a result reliance upon a complicated system of manoeuvres was abandoned in favour of a simpler and more readily adaptable

sys tem . Thi s cal led int o que sti on the nee d for the

extensive and sometimes complex range of deployment methods contained in the Tactical Options Manual. 13.7 A simple example of the dynamic development of tactics relates to the recommended practice of marching police officers into position when they are facing a mass demonstration. In many instances it was considered more appropriate to walk them into place when dealing with a local picket involved in the industrial dispute so as to avoid confrontation. The judgement of the mood of a crowd became a vital issue in the avoidance of adverse reaction to their deployment.

13.8 It will be recognised this style of tactics is more demanding of management, though it is considered to be an effective means of involving them in the resolution of the problem. In practice it minimised many difficulties and in many cases avoided the escalation of incidents. The need to train Commanders in this skill by means of on-going dialogue at briefings and de-briefings should not be underestimated. In this way the Incident Commander can stamp his authority on the operation. In the dispute it also ensured the declared objectives and policies of the Chief Constable were pursued. 13.9 Prior to the dispute, National agreement had been reached by the Association of Chief Police Officers on a programme of Command Band Training. This closely followed the command training already being carried out in West Yorkshire. Training was due to begin in March 1984, but had to be suspended following the commencement of the miners' strike during that month. This training will now be re• appraised, and extended before being introduced.

14. THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW

14.1 A clear distinction should be drawn between picket line offences and those committed elsewhere. Insofar as the picket line was concerned a tolerant stance was maintained. When violence, intimidation and serious offences occurred elsewhere, however, the Chief Constable's already declared policies of dealing firmly with calculated acts of criminal behaviour and lawlessness on the streets prevailed. 14.2 Inclusion of maximum tolerance in the operational philosophy applying at colliery premises sprang from an awareness of the natural frustrations felt by miners involved in such a protracted and emo• tively charged dispute. Equally, it was a recog• nition of the impracticality of arresting large groups who were often merely by their sheer weight of numbers obstructing the highway per se. 14.3 Reasonable firmness extended to endeavouring to ensure arrests were limited to cases of persons guilty of more serious misconduct. Attempts were made to restrict charges/process to those which would reflect individual culpability, in preference to .a blanket charge against a group of individuals. These policie are reflected in the details of arrests and process/charged included at Appendix J. 14.4 Due consideration was given to the Department of Employment Guidelines on Picketing. The official picket line was normally restricted to six per colliery though this figure was not rigidly applied if circumstances were normal. Other persons present on picket lines were marshalled separately as demonstrators wherever possible in a position to minimise obstructions. 14.5 When arrests were necessary a range of options was then open. The action taken depended on the seriousness of the case and any previous history of picket line transgression on the part of the offender. The person may have been warned about his misconduct and released immediately; reported for summons and released immediately; or if necessary taken to a Police Station to be charged and bailed or put before a Court. 14.6 The early release of persons arrested on picket lines was valuable in reducing tension. Whenever circumstances permitted it this was done. Equally effective in reducing tension was the application of a policy of retrospective arrests. This in• volved actions being noted at the time together with the details necessary to identify an offender later. Arrests could then be considered at a later time so as not to exacerbate already tense situations.

14.7 Existing Public Order legislation and the law relating to damage and assault were most commonly used. The Common Law in respect of breaches of the peace helped to provide a flexible means of con• trol. In many instances those detained were released once the threat of a continuing breach had diminished.

14.8 Little use was made of the more serious provisions of the Common Law, such as Unlawful Assembly, Riot and Affray. It is considered the proposed codification of the law in these areas will prove to be advantageous in the future both in terms of clarification and enforcement in particular circumstances.

14.9 Great emphasis was placed upon the prevention, reduction and detection of intimidation directed at working miners away from the picket lines. In this regard the application of Section 7 of the Con• spiracy and Protection of Property Act proved effective. Enforcement would have been eased by a power of arrest, and stiffer penalties may also have had a greater deterrent effect.

14.10 Insofar as the law relating to offences against Coal Board Property was concerned all offences of damage were pursued. Offences of theft were treated according to the wishes of the N.C.B. As an example, the police did not take action against persons taking coal unless requested to do so by the Board. Even when action was taken, attempts were made to diplomatically resolve the situation by the intervention of local police officers and large-scale 'raids' using PSU's were avoided.

Part III Conclusions & Recommendations

1. CONCLUSIONS An essential part of any large scale operation is the review thereof, both during and on conclusion so that lessons may be learned and improvements made where possible. Internal Review

1.1 In November 1984, under the direction of the Chief Constable, the Force Organisation Department undertook a review of the policing of the miners' dispute in West Yorkshire. The review team made contact with police officers involved in all aspects of the operation and also spoke to pickets and colliery officials. Their brief was to:-

establish that resources were being utilised in the most effective and efficient manner;

examine the organisational and command struc• ture for dealing with the dispute; and

identify areas of waste and other issues requiring attention.

1.2 The Review Team reported on 4 December 1984. Taking into account the uncertainty of picketing activities and the widespread nature of public disorder at that time they came to the conclusion that:-

(a) the high level of resources being used were necessary to maintain the Force's philosophy of "relative response", and

(b) the deployment strategy was being reviewed regularly to meet the requirements of providing that response.

1.3 In the area of command the value of co-ordinating the operation centrally at the Incident Control was recognised. Recommendations were made to ease the pressure on key post holders, specifically to nominate deputies to the Incident Commander, the Transport Officer and the Officer in-Charge of Logistics.

1.4 The adequacy of the new Command Room site identi• fied in Headquarters Administration block was questioned and other areas were identified where savings or improvements were possible.

1.5 Much of the remedial action necessary was taken immediately it was identified during the review; where this was not feasible steps were taken to put the necessary work in hand. For example, in the area of computerisation, work is still proceeding on the development of a suitable system. 1.6 In concluding their report the review team ex- pressed satisfaction with the way in which the operation was being commanded; the philosophy strategy and tactics adopted; and the use being made of resources. Force De-Brief 1.7 On 14 March 1985 a debriefing was held at Force Training School. The Chief Constable attended and addressed the meeting which was chaired by Assis• tant Chief Constable, Operations. Officers of Inspector rank and above and those of lower rank who filled important roles were present and were encouraged to contribute. 1.8 Arising from comments made two small working groups have been set up. One is examining the type of vehicle best suited for use by PSU's and the equipment needed in such a vehicle, while the other is examining PSU protective equipmen.t A revision of the PSU 1 Book which is used to record deploy• ment, duties and other relevant details in respect of Police Support Units has also begun. Other valid points stemming from the meeting have been incorporated into the recommendations listed later in this Section. Association of Chief Police Officer 1.9 The Association of Chief Police Officers has initiated a review which will restrict itself to examining the professional policing issues involved in policing the dispute. It will not concern itself with the wider and more fundamental issues arising. The object of the review is to make recommendations to the ACPO Council on National guidelines for the future.

Training 1.10 A National Working Party has been set up to review tactical training in the light of experience gained. An Inspector from this Force will partici• pate. He was closely involved in Public Order Training prior to the dispute and has since exper• ienced police operations in other parts of the country. He will emphasise the need for simplicity and flexibility. It is considered a few basic manoeuvres modified by adequate briefing just prior to execution are all that is required.

Communications

1.11 The Home Office Directorate of Telecommunications are to hola meetings to discuss the suitability of equipment available and to make recommendations for the future. These meetings will be attenaea by Communications Officers from the involvea Forces including our own. The deficiencies in equipment will be highlighted. 1.12 The in-Force Review Team previously referred to lookea at the communications network established in West Yorkshire. They concludea that the policy of using UHF radios operating on the available chann• els and linked by lana-line to a central control was preferable to decentralisea schemes with no effective overall control operated elsewhere. 1.13 It was generally agreed that Horne Office equipment designed for Sub-Divisional radio schemes had severe limitations for this type of operation, where it was necessary to police so many busy locations in a confined geographical area. Not enough UHF frequencies were available and the equipment provided at the Command Room and to the inaividual officer lacked the necessary flex• ibility.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS The following recommendations are based on the lessons learned from the policing of such a pro• tracted dispute:- 2.1 Policy Industrial disputes need to be policed with sensitivity. (paragraph 1.1)

A clear statement of impartiality in main• taining the peace and preventing crime needs to be made at the outset and regularly re- peated. (paragraphs 1.3 and 3.4) The use of premises under the control of any party to the dispute is to be avoided if possible. To this end early discussions need to be held with local authorities and other persons to obtain the use of sites under their control. (Paragraph 3.8) Philosophy, tactics and strategy need to be positively defined at the outset of an oper• ation and regularly reviewed throughout it. (paragraph 1.4 and 1.5) In the context of policing industrial disputes the importance of establishing rapport with all parties to the dispute should be iden• tified. (paragraph 1.20) A clear policy on the making of arrests both at the scene of disorder and retrospectively needs to be stated from the outset. (paragraph 1.22) The deployment of horses and dogs is an emotive issue and a clear policy on their use has to be established. (paragraph 3.16). The philosophy of ensuring only sufficient manpower is used in response to changing circumstances is commended. (paragraph 1.8) Outside factors, such as the onset of winter with deteriorating weather require constant review of strategy in protracted operations. The establishing of self-regulating picketing arrangements which require minimum police involvement by on-going dialogue is to be encouraged. (paragraphs 1.23 and 3.10)

2.2 Command

A clear line of command is vital to the implementation of the philosophy, strategy and tactics agreed. (paragraph 2.1)

Continuity in command personnel plays an important part in maintaining a consistent approach.

Key posts in the operation should be identi• fied at an early stage in any operation. (paragraph 2.3)

In protracted and intensive operations the appointment of deputies in all key posts should be considered.

A centralised Command Room and Incident Control is essential to the establishment of a unified approach. (paragraph 2.10)

2.3 Information Systems

The effective gathering, evaluation and dissemination of information as an aid to effective deployment of manpower and invest• igation of offences should not be overlooked. (paragraph 4.1)

Consideration should be given to the early establishing of a dedicated information unit at Force level in large scale operations. (paragraph 4.10)

Records maintained about industrial disputes should be completely separate from Special Branch and existing Criminal Intelligence Units in view of their sensitivity. {paragraph 4.11)

Where cross-boundary information is important a Central Information Unit uninhibited by local political pressures is desirable to co• ordinate the work done in different forces. (paragraph 4.7) The Central Unit should aim to identify trends in different areas and collate relevant statistical information for the Horne Office.

2.4 Briefing Regular briefing of personnel of all ranks is crucial to the effective communication of Force Policy and ultimately the success of the operation. (paragraph 4.17) Where the conflicting demands for manpower permit, it may be advantageous to set up a dedicated Briefing Team under close control of the Incident Commander. Briefing needs to be supported by regular contact between senior officers and officers 'on-the-ground' to establish two-way communi• cation and facilitate feedback. (paragraph 4.22) 2.5 Role of CID The tasks of the Criminal Investigation Department in dealing with incidents of large scale public disorder should include:- monitoring movements of demonstrators; surveillance of suspects; interrogation of persons arrested for crime; investigation of serious criminal matters; and assisting with the preparation of pros• ecution files. (paragraph 5.1) 2.6 Media Relations Good media relations should be sought to facilitate the effective communication of the "Police view" to the public.

The setting up of a central media contact point is recommended to remove the load of media attention from the shoulders of the Incident Commander and to prevent the dissem• ination of spurious or inaccurate information. (paragraph 6.6)

2.7 Police/Public Relations Germain to the success of the strategy adopted is the need to promote public awareness of the philosophy in policing an operation. (paragraph 7.2) Following protracted public order operations officers may need to be re-appraised of policing objectives. (paragraph 7.12) In the post-operation period the public should be reassured about the Force commitment to community based policing through the medium of Community Forums and other contacts. (paragraph 7.12) 2.8 Communications Communications equipment needs to be improved technically to provide the required degree of flexibility. (paragraph 8 .10) More UHF frequencies should be available to the Force for special or emergency operations to spread the load in multi-site operations. (paragraph 8.11) Hand-held radios need to have a greater capacity of alternative frequencies to remove the need for re-crystalling. (paragraph 8.12) Flexible Control Room equipment is needed to match variations in the tempo of long running police operations to ensure staffing levels can be optimised. (paragraph 8.14) One of the VHF channels allocated to this Force suffers from excessive inteference and needs to be re-allocated. (paragraph 8.16) More consideration should be given to the allocation of call signs to Mutual Aid Police Support Units to prevent confusion with those already in use in the recipient force. Th use of the '10-code' should be standard• ised between forces.

2.9 Logistic Support The ACPO Manual of Guidance on Public Order rightly stresses the need for proper planning in the area of logistics; the trade-off between manpower-intensive tasks and disorgan• isation leading to inefficiencies needs to be recognised. (paragraph 9.1) Accommodation of residential Mutual Aid in police premises provides a higher standard of accommodation and better control than that which can normally be achieved using available military premises. (paragraph 3.46) The whole of the vehicle fleet needs to be brought under the command of the Force Tran• sport officer at an early stage. (paragraph 9.7) The use of multi-purpose vehicles by PSU's calls for investigation into the most suitable vehicle and equipment to be provided. (paragraph 9.13) Force Training School should be considered as the Reception Point for all large scale PSU deployments in view of its location and facilities. (paragraphs 9.18 to 9.24) Forward Holding Areas with Mobile Rendezvous Points providing toilet, refreshment and other facilities should be considered when multi-. site incidents occur. (paragraphs 9.25 to 9.27)

Prisoner Reception Squad and vehicle removal facilities can usefully be stationed at Forward Holding Areas near to the scene of operations. (paragraph 9.26)

It is useful to centralise the provision of packed meals at a remote site and concentrate the supply of cooked meals at Headquarters and the Training School. (paragraphs 9. 41 and 9.42) Available catering facilities at Headquarters may be enhanced by the use of the Mobile Catering Unit. (paragraph 9.41) The usefulness of Prisoner Reception Squads should be constantly re-appraised during long running operations. (paragraph 9.35)

2.10 Welfare Arrangements Adequate provision needs to be made for the welfare of personnel involved in protracted operations. (paragraph 10.4)

There is value in an arrangement whereby the Chief Constable and other Senior Officers commanding the operation meet regularly with Staff Associations to discuss welfare matters. (paragraph 10.2) Officers of the Superintendents' Association and the Police Federation should be invited to observe all facets of protracted operations so as to be available to members. (paragraph 10.3) When welfare problems arise their early recognition and immediate resolution should be a high priority. (paragraph 10.3) 2.11 Administration The complexities of Police Regulations partic• ularly in relation to compensation for hours worked should be clarified at an early stage in protracted operations and standardised systems adopted. (paragraph 11.16) The establishment of a dedicated team to provide Administrative and Financial support at any early stage in an operation should be considered. (paragraph 11.3) Early guidance from the Horne Office as to the level of central finance to be provided should be sought. (paragraph 11.4) Advice should be sought on the calculation of charges to be levied for Mutual Aid in large scale operations. (paragraph 11.5)

Suitable computer systems should be developed to assist both in the Command Room and with Administrative and Financial Support for major operations. (paragraph 12.5)

2.12 Training Nationally, there needs to be a unified format for training. Future training should concentrate on a few simple rnaneouvres which can be adapted to different situations by Commanders' briefings. (paragra ph 13.6) 2.13 Application of the Law The proposed codification of the present Common Law offences related to public order is welcomed. (paragraph 14.6) It is preferable to charge persons arrested with offences related to their individual culpability and avoid 'blanket' offences. (paragraph 14.5) Use should be made of a system of retro• spective arrests in volatile situations to avoid inflammatory action. (paragraph 1.22)

Temporary detention of persons and release without charge is an effective tactic in combating violence in situations of disorder. (paragraph 14.5)

Appendices

J

APPENDICES

APPENDIX

A. Diary of events (National) B. Diary of events (Local) c. Policing philosophy/strategy in West Yorkshire D. Command structure

E. Diagram showing wireless operator positions F. Mutual Aid PSU's supplied to West Yorkshire between 11 November 1984 and 17 January 1985 G. Collieries in West Yorkshire H. Tactical Options for use of police dogs

I. Tactical Options for use of police horses J. Force Information/Intelligence Unit

outline of indices maintained catagories of offences arrests at each colliery criminal and non-criminal offence totals K. Example of daily briefing sheet L. List of serious crimes committed during the dispute

M. Offences detected by Crime Investigation Team

N. Sample daily information sheet sent to Press Office o. Complaints against police P. Distribution of vehicle fleet

Q. Average manpower deployment

R. Summary of policing costs

APPENDIX A Diary April 12: NU M executi\·e rules pit• head national ballot out of order and sets in motion plans to change rule to lower majorit · needed for strike eventsof acllon from 55 to 50 per cent. plus one. April 19: Strike vote rule change approl'ed by del E>gate conference in March l U, l IS4 : Half l:sn tam 's coal• spite of four motions calhn11 for A"-: Al\NOllNCF:MENT b\' the field launch st rikes , with Nott ing• national b11llo1 . The conference give Na t1o n.d Co11I Roard on Marrh I last hamshire mine rs meeting and decid• the NUM national leadership the yE'ar that 1t wanted to rlose Yor kshir e· ing to hold a ballot. Lanrashi:-e and power to run the st rike . inste ad of it Cononwood Colht'ry was the spark Mid land miners also expected to bemg organised at individual .,.·h1c-l, f1rt>d thP mm n · /;trike . ballot membe rs on a st ri kE'. Leices t e r striking coalfields . Mr.Arthur T he men nt Cortonwood walked out mine rs say they will not join the Scargill lieclares the strike ··a fight - and o did the rt' t of the men in thf action. to the finish . . . against Ian Yor ksl11r f' roa lf1t-ld March 12: T he first full-day of the Ma cGregor , Mrs . Thatcher and the F n·e da ·s late r. the Yorkshire Are a O!f lClally -sa nc tion ed strikes ends Tory Gov e rn men t." of tht' National linior, of Mine worke r• with 81 pl!S. employing 96,000 April 23: Mr . MacGregor agrees to call ed an in def in ite strike to start ;, mine r-s. out and 8 3 p its and 79 .000 request from mine management wt'e k latE'r over the closurt> 0 1 men still wor kin g Picketing starts union to consider extending time Cortonwood and Bullc l1ff e Wood Col• peacefu lly in ge ne ral b ut violence limit for pit closures but not chang• h e ry Next day. the Scottish NUM fla re at Bilston Gle n. Scotland 's ing redundancy or pit closure totals. ca IIPd for a strike over the closur e o l la r est pit. when flying pickets from April 25: Government again re jects S co tt ish pit s Polma1se break through police lines Labour calls to intervene to bring Two day later. on Mar ch 8. the and aim kicks and punches at 300 the two sides together. Nottingham• 1':ll l\1 national ext-cutive sanctioned mine rs trying to get into the pll. Pit shire Count • Council says Notts is stnkt' action t hroug hou t Britain 's coa l• wil·e confront Yor kshire 's flying bleeding to death meeting £2m. a fi eld, . with lo cal \'Ote s but no national picket in Nottinghamshire and week cost of pol icing. ballot. And one. of the longes t-r un ning Notts miners go to wo rk . April 26: Mr . S c argill says T rade and most bitter dispute s in British March 14: Hi gh Court grants injunc• Union Congress will ask ali members lnOllerton Colliery, Rave nscraig . . March 19: NCB postpone contempt of Nott in gh a mshire . after picke ts' cars May 1: 7,000 Notts miners stage an anti- court action aftn flying pickets are atta('ke rl b\' locals. strike ra!l v in Ma nsfi eld . More than break High Court in; unr tion . North Marrh 15: Picke t. Da\'1d Jones. of 1.000 striking miners and the Notts Derbyshire mine rs. in sp1tt' of nar • South Kir kby . cl1P 5 d urin 11 continued men hurled stones and abuse ro\,· vote aI;ain st s tri ke. ordert'd out v1olE>nC'E' at Ollertc>n Moor . Mos t each other. ' by the ir oif1cials Running battles Notis mmt>rs st OJl work to let strike Ma, · 2: Focus on the strike moves to ht>tw t!en J.00(1 p ir kt>ts end police ballot go ahea d Minns from r:,any Scotland as pol1cE' and pi c ket s battle outs Hle York shire NUM h ead • re i;w m demand national ballot on o\·er con\·oys of lorries bringing coal QUa r tn s in Ba rn s le ·. thi' coal st rike to Rave nscrai 11. Hampshire Police Matc·h 2ll: Hi gh Cour t refUSt'S Ken t March 16 : Min e rs in La nc ashir e. the fly 120 men into Castle Donington. nu nt' rs· attempt to curb pohre Mid lands . South Derbyshire and West Yor kshire po lice officers meet vowe rs aimed at pr t>i · e ntin g pohce Northumberland vote to def\' strike and cn uc:1s e co uncil for not s u pport • turning baci< pi ck e ts heading to call · ing them in the disvute. No1tm i;:ha msh1r <' March 18: Nott s mmn \'Ole bv three Ma 3: Mr . Sirs says Ravenscraig will March 23: NCB chief. Mr . Ian to on no! to st rike . Poh ce rein • close wit h the loss of 4,000 jobs if it .Ma c Grf' ,eor, p lt-dgE's a job for every fo r r e me nt5 occup y Ar m)' camp5 in does not gtt mort' coal. mmn who want s one. At the end of Nott and L in col nshire to ensure Ma 4: The giant Llanwern steel wor ks the s t-co nd wee k. 12i of I:lrita m ·s 176 working mine rs l!E't p a st mass Nott s in South Wales also signals severe pill' out on strike picke ts problems imminent without extra March 25: British Steel announces coke supplies . Jnd ust · Sec r eta ry, producti on hal ve d at Scunthorpe Mr . Norman Tebbit. forecast s the dut- to dwind ling coal s tocks . P icke ts strike could last beyond Christ mas. and voli C<.' c la s h outsi de Coal House . May 6: Miners claim soldiers in police Doncaste r At least 2i m ine r unifor m s ha \'f be e n seen on picket ar rested for defy in g polic-e order lines Mr . Sir pledges his men will no? tu e nt e r J\.o tu ngha mshi re use whate\ ·e r fuel is available to !'l:a t1onal J\ssociat1on of Collie r) keep steelwor ks at Sc unthorpe. On , rt ner. Depuue and Shotfirers acc.- Ra\·ens c ra1g and Llanwem going. pt 5.2 per cent. pay offe r. on i, mon th Mrs . Thatcher again refuse to af te r Rrit1sh Associati on of C o ll ie r y intervene. .Ma nagetne nt. May 8: Five pickets injured and 65 Marrh 27: SJ0 11.·- mo\·mg cars full of arrested -.."hen mounted police clash picke ts bior kad e Ml. Righ t-Wm /.' with miners a! Hunte rston coal min ers· leade rs demand national terminal. where coal bound for ba llo t Ravenscrai i: is unloaded . March 29: Rail and transport union Ma · 9: T h e worst violence to date sees leadns decidE' to reco m me nd 20 police, four pickets and two t,lack mg coal mc \'e mf'n ts. miners injured at Creswell Collie ry. March 30: Leader of the Iron and Stee l Ma..·, 10 : Mr . Scargill claims approaches T rad es C on fed eration , Mr . Bill Sirs to NCB intermediaries by NUM say he will put ; obs before suppor t· failed -..·hen NCB refused to change in;: miner!' its mind O\'er pit clos ures . NCB April 6: Lead.-rs of the coal. ste el anc! denies approach took plact . rai l "T r, µlt- Alliance.. reach "com• plt- Ma · 11: NCB pled ges that working lt c1g r 1.:e men t " Ol' e r supplies of r miners penalised by NUM for cross• oa ! t o Ra\·enscrai g steel plant. . ing picket lines will not lose their April 9: As M r i. That che r prais es jobs. Home Secretary. Mr. Leon pohc·t' on picket dut, y a b o ut 100 Bn tta n. tells Commons Government , mmn !' arrt>ste d duri ng clas hes at i.Jut no t enough for strike action - Bab hing ton Collie ry . Nott s.. and \'Ott' lo )Otn d is pute Cr es11.ell Coll ie ry . De r bysh ir e . /. pr ll 11 : A ma Jo r n y of pit de putie s -

will foot 90 per cent. of policing costs. NCB claim s 12.000 miners have asked about redundanc · terms. Triple Allianc e strikes deal over Ra\'ens r rai g supr,lies · May J.t: Carnn·al atmosphere of lar ges t s!Jp port demons t r&ti o n - 15.00 0 people - turn s in to carnage as 88 ool1ce a r e in1ur erl in Man sfield .

APPENDIX A ( Continued)

July 18: Courts outlaw new disciplin· May 15: More -than £2m. of equipment June 16 / 17: Violence transferred to pit ary procedure aimed at miners still sealt:d off as fire takes over coal face communities as police and mine rs wor kin g. NUM says rule will be . at Rossington Colliery . Doncaster. battle at Malt b,y near Rot her ham. 16 operated anyway. Talks resum!! in May 16: Mrs. Anne Scargill arrested on ing machinery to Ferrybridge power arrested as mob stones police station. Nous picket line. station. Pickets turn their attention NCB buvs coal from abroad to fulfil May 17: Mr. Brittan announces special to Europe's richest coalfield, at U.S. con t racts . squads of police being sent into Selby. June 18: Battles between 6,500 pickets mming areas to protect working anRotherham hotel end have formed hard core of picketin° but after 90 minutes with Mr . Scargill , with 4.000 arr ests and 1.500 inJu rie s. repeating demand for no pit picket resources decline. Government closures. says it will use emerg• ency powers June 14: Mr. MacGregor threatens to within two weeks to combat pir and hold NCB postal ballot on strike if docks strikes . NUM does not hold national ballot. June 15: Another picket. Mr. Joe Green. 55, from Knottingley, dies after being struck by lorry deliver•

London but break down afte r 13 · Colli t!r y, Cas t leford . Face hours . NUM blames NCB. Board and equipme nt abandoned . says meetinR ended amicably. . July 19: Mrs . T hatche r's '_'e ne my with in" speech calls strikes political and outrages oµpos1uon and NUM. July 22: Yorkshire Labour constitu• ency parties call for inquir y into "political" use of police on picket lines . July 23: More violence at Bilston Gle n. Government says coal faces at 24 collienes m danger of co lla pse. Coal stocks ..t power stations 18.5m. tonnes, compared with 28.5m. tonnes a year before . July 24: 500 miners block Humber Bridge. Police car turned over. another damaged and 27 pickets arrested . July 25: Secret movement among working mmers to encourage return to work led by Notts mine r code• named "Silver Birch." July- 26: As Mr . Scargill describes strike a battle of ideolo !!ies. Energy Secretary, Mr. Peter Walker, SJys NCB made £875m. loss in 1983, is insolven t and can only carry on because of Government support. July 29: Indust ry S ecretar y. Mr . Nor• man Tebbi t, gives warn in g of higher electn city prices. NCB says 60 face•s now at n sk. E ight have been shut with the loss of equipment worth £16m. July 30: South Wales NUM signals intent to ignore High Court deadline over payment of £50.000 cont empt of court fine for continumJ? wit h secondary picketing at road haulie rs. July 30: Chancellor . Mr. Nigel Law• son's "mine rs' str ike 1s a good in vestme nt•· speech causes furore m Commons . South Wale s miners pre• pare to def end HQ against 1- equest- ra tors . . August I : Mr . Scargill meets eight trade union lead ers . No statement issued but speculation over moves to escalate support for mine rs. August 2: Cen tral Electricit y Generat• ing Board says strike costing £20m. a week in replacing coal with oil at power stations. August 5: TGWU's Mr . Ron Todd calls for total trade union commitment to miners' strike. August 6: Mr . Christopher Butcher - alias Silver Birch - admits return• to- work call has failed. Mr . · Ma cGre go r makes another written appeal urging miner s to give up strike . August 8: Two working miners · homes under hea\'Y police guard as they seek court ruling to outlaw the stri ke. Hundreds of pic:kets and demonstrators go on rampage in Notts pit village of Harworth.. with 95 a rrested. Polic-e accuse mine rs of orchestrating \'iolencc. August 9: NCB mstalls close circu it TV at vulnerablE> location:: to catch people rt!sponsibl :· for criminal damage running into hundreds of tho usan ds cf pounds August 10: Mr . Scargill refuses to condemn picket line violence. August 12: Five NCB coache s des• tr oye d in North Derbyshire arson au ack. August 13: Fire engulfs face and equipme nt worth H m. at F r y ston

APPENDIX A ( Continued)

August 14: Mr . Tony Benn accuse s September 20: T GWU calls on mem• December 3: Special delegate confer• p0llce of terror campai gn on picke t bers not to move coal. ence of NUM votes to conunue li ne and minin g comm uniu es in September • 21: Liberal leader . Mr. defying courts. attempt to fn11hten mine rs back to Steel. and Bishop of Durham call for December 6: NUM's Receiver fails to wor k. Mr . MacGre J?or ' s resignation . gam control of cash held in Dublin August 15: Rebel min ers meet in September 25: South Wales Police and Luxembourg. secret and claim 80 per Cf'nt. of w rn strikers that_ murder charges December 10; Government set. as'ide strikers want ret urn to work - will be pre fe r red 1f motorway mis• unlimited funds to allow sequest• includin g at least 17 at Corronwood. siles cause death. rators to seek out NUM finances . where strike be1?an . Only one miner September 26: Mrs. Thatcher lavs December 14: "Talks about talks" breaks strike in Yor ksh ire . blame for violence on picket lines ·at between TUC and Energy Secretary. August 16: NCB and NUM in propa• NUM's door. Mr. Peter Walker. Mr . Scargill ganda battle over numbers involved September 28: 750 pickets ambush 20 found guilty of obst ru ction at in drift back to wor k. J udge rules olice in stone-throwing incident -a t Orgrea ve. fmed £250 and ordered to £770,000_ seized _ by sequest aton Silverwood Colliery, Rotherham. pay £750 costs. from South Wales NUM mus t be NACODS votes for national strike December 20: Nottinghamshire Area held until fine paid. and calls for ACAS to be brought in. NUM decides to distance itself from August 18: 23 hurt as 6.000pickets and October 1: Labour Party Conference at the national union through rule police clash outside Gascoigne Wood Blackpool pledges unconditional changes. pit . near Selby, as lone Yorkshire support for strike. . January 2, 1985: Only 300 new starters working miner runs pickets' gaunt• October 2: NCB -' to study NACODSt go back to work after holidays in let. ACAS peace plan. Mr . Nell Kin nock. spite of new £1 ,000 coal board carrot. August 19: NCB says 905 strikers have at par ty conference, condemns all City analysts say strike has cost retu rned to work since dispute violence. £2.400m. Another striking miner is began and announces plans to lay on October 5: Mr. Scargill receives second charged with Mr. Wilkie 's murd er. buses for those wanting to go back in wri t for contempt of cou rt . January 6: Mr. MacGregor says return October -S: NCB agrees to meet ACAS to work will force NUM to realise North East. strike is over. August 20: Police find two petrol to consider NACODS plan . bombs behind picket barricade at October 11/12: ACAS talks continue as January 7: Production resta rt s at the Brodsworth Colliery. Doncaste r. as 12 are hurt when police and 4.000 c_oun try • biggest pit. Kellingley Col• number of arson incidents involving pickets clash at Brodsworth Colliery liery, near Pontefract . NCB property grows. after three men return to work. January 9: NUM areas put pressure on October 17: Mystery donor pays Mr the NECto re-start talks. August 21: Mr. MacGregor says Mr. January 10: Mr . MacGregor reiects Scargill should be taken to court for Sca rgil l's £1 ,000 contempt fine. October 19: Power workers vote not to NUM overtures for talks. NUM inciting picket line violence. More threatens to ext,el Notts men if thev ugly scenes as pickets seek to halt back strike . handful of returning miners. October 21: Working miners meet to do not rescind rule changes. · August 22: Masked hit squ ad. 50 discuss plart to oust Mr . Sca rgill . January 13: Notts men ignore expul• October 24: NACODS calls off national sion threat , more areas call for talks st rong , raids two pits near Doncas• with NCB. ter. TGWU warns of another docks strike after reaching agreemen t with strike should British Steel unload NCB over pit closures. January 15: South Derbyshire NUM coal from the bulk carrier Ostta at . October 25: NUM and NCB talk at leaders decide to recommend rule Hunterston terminal. Mr . Scargill ACAS . Pnce Waterhouse told to changes similar to those passed bv and Mr. MacGregor in face to face seize NUM f unds . Notts men. · T\' confrontation. October 31: NUM t NCR talks at ACAS Januar,• 16: One-day rail stri ke in August 23: 14 big unions demand new break down. with each side blaming suppoi:1 of railmen allegedlv pit strike talks as Mr. Orme con• the oth er. , •1c t1m1sed for back;ng miner s. · tinue s attempt to get sides together. November 1: Mr. Scargill pledges not Januar:r 19 .: Revelations that Notts August 24: Second docks strike called Chief Constable to sell pohce horses. to accept monev from Libva. after · Ost1a is unload ed . Mr. September 18: Th ree-wee k-old nationa November 5: £2:1s m. of NUl\1 fund s frozen MacGregor rejects multi-union move l docks strike called off. Home Secre• in Dublin bank. Miner killed digging for for new talks and says NUM must tary backs keepin g South Yor k• coal in railway embank• ment. Mr. make approach. . shire's horses. Kinnock refuses to attend series of rallies August 26: Miners step up pressure on in support of stri ke. TU.C to provide more concrete sup• November ·6: Return to work move port in run up to TUC conference in continues with 410 more breaking the Brighton. st rike. August 27: Split in docks strike as November 12: W ides pread· violence in some dockers refuse to join " politi• South Yorkshir e. including the use of cal" strike. Mr. Scargill demands molotov cocktails against police. l 5min. peak TV time a week to put November 13: TUC general st!cretary, mine rs' case. Mr . Norman Willis, shouted down by · August 29: . Mrs . Thatcher postpones miners at a South Wales rally after he Far East visit because of dock and condemns violence. pit strikes. Number of day s lost to November 16: Return-to-work momen• strikes is more than l l.5m.. five tum increases as 2.201 go back durin times total during first seven months g week in res ponse to NCB offer of of 1983. Miners account for 9.3m. holiday pay for those breaking strike days lost. four weeks before Christmas. September 2: Hooligans demolish November 18: Two teenage brothers killed £250.000 office block at Thurcroft digging for coal in railway e mban Colliery, near Rotherham. using kment. bulldozer. November 19: 2.282 strikers return - the September 3: TUC conference pledges most on a single day - to get support for strike but key power and Christmas bonus. steel workers say they will not be November 22: Miners rejoin strike at used as weapons. three Yorkshire pits but only after September 9/12: NCB and NUM meet intimidation. the NCB claims. for talks at Edinburgh and Doncas• November 23: NCB offers another £175 to ter . Mr. MacGregor arrives at on·e temp t st rike rs back. •· • meetin l! with j!"reen plasti c ba g over November 29: Luxe mbour g court unfreezes head. NACODS call s for strike £4m. of NUM funds sought by ballot. sequestrator s. September 14: Talk s coll apse. T UC November 30: Taxi dr iver. Mr . David calls meeting to discuss support for Wilkie , killed when two concrete blocks strike. drop on his cab as he takes a wor kin g September 17: Ar bit ration . Concili• miner to Merthyr Vale pit. Two striking ation and Advisory Service steps miners are charged with his mu rder. into dispute as mediator . South High Court appoints Derbyshire Yorkshire Police Committ ee tell s solicitor as Receiver to take control of

NUM's assets . w rkmg mmers leaders have met with NCB to seek sole 0 negcti:itina rights in the area. January 21: Talks about talks between NCB and NUM fail as 1.847 more start work. the highest daily total for two months. January 24: Miners' leaders agree talks with coal board without pre• conditions. February 1: NCB finallv rules out anv peace talks unless mi'ners capitulate m advance over management's right to close uneconomic pits. Fe bruary 4: A record 2.318 mmers return to work - and Mr . Scargill makes desperate effort to avert total collapse of st rike . February 11: NACODS decides not to walk out in sup port of NUM. _Fe bruary 15: New peace moves involv• mg Mr . Willis end in fa ilu re. Fe_bruary 17: TUC asks Pnme Minister to in tervene. February 19: A TUC group meets Mrs Thatcher and, late r, Mr. Walker. February 20: NUM rejects as infinitelv worse than before a re vised coal board peace formula after twohours of talks with Mr. Willis. Februarr 24: More than 100 arrested foll ow1!1g clash with police duri ng mmers ra]IY in Trafalgar Square. • Fe bruar · 2:>: A record 3.80i mine rs return . to work - 1.312 m the Yorkshire coalfield . Februar,· 26: Mr . Scargill expresses anger at J ck of trade union suppor t for the miners and says it will be regretted as the months and vears go bv. . .Fe tiruarJ' 2 7: The number of mine rs back at work - almost 9-i 000 accordin g to the NCB - mean s fewer than half are still on strike. March .1: Min er s· mandate deleizates to s ec1aJ conference to vote for return without settlement of 51- week st ri ke.

KEY LOCAL EVENTS APPENDIX B

March 15 David Jones, striking miner from South Kirkby dies during violent picketing at Ollerton Colliery, Nottingham. 19 First involvement for West Yorkshire when six PSU's sent to Nottingham on mutual aid.

23 Mutual aid suplied to Staffordshire Funeral of David Jones takes place at South Kirkby.

April 2 Wakefield Power Station picketed by about 50 demon• strators - policed by one Sergeant and three Con• stables.

6 First mutual aid supplied to Humberside.

May 9 Smith's Coalyard at Horbury policed by one Sergeant and four Constables. 29 Orgreave erupts as 7000 demonstrators picket the coking plant - 1700 police from 14 Forces are seconded to the area including 8 PSU's from West Yorkshire.

June 2 Large scale disturbance at the SYD (Scottish York• shire and Durham) Miners Club at Knottingley when 10 arrests were made. 5 Damage caused at Frickley Colliery to the value of $50,000. 12 Mutual aid supplied to Leicester.

15 Fatal accident involving Joseph Green whilst picket-ing at Ferrybridge Power Station.

15 Windows of Maltby Police Station broken followed by large scale disorder in Town Centre involving some 200 persons. 16 16 arrests made, 3 Police Officers injured. 16 Further serious disorder in Maltby involving a crowd of 350/400 persons. 28 arrests, 3 Police Officers injured.

APPENDIX 'B'(Continued)

June cont'd 16 Annual Demonstration and Gala, Wakefield 30/35,000 attended.

16 Fatal accident involving Andrew Moorby from Fryston who died whilst coal picking.

17 Further disturbances by a crowd of 30/40 persons at Fitzwilliam and police vehicle damaged.

18 Mass picketing at Orgreave involving some 6,500 demonstrators and 3,300 Police Officers. 51 pickets (including Mr. Scargill} injured, 28 police officers taken to hospital, 93 persons arrested. Petrol bombs in use by demonstrators.

20 Windows broken at police officers house in Fitz- william.

21 First mutual aid suplied to North Yorkshire. 22 Funeral of Joseph Green at Pontefract.

23 Windows of Goldthorpe Police Station and other properties broken. Unused petrol bombs discovered later in daylight search. 3 arrested later.

29 Windows of Police Station broken at Askern. 2 Police vehicles damaged.

July 1 Windows broken at Police Officers house at Crofton. 2 Damage and disturbances in and around Kinsley Drift Mine.

3 First Yorkshire miners to cross picket lines at North Selby and Whitmoor despite 2000 strong demon• strators. 9 13 Management staff members beseiged at Rossington Colliery by 500 demonstrators.

9 Meeting of extremist group at the Fitzwilliam Hptel resulted in large scale disorder. 9 arrests made after police reinforcements drafted in. Incident became known as the "Fitzwilliam 9" with public demontration following at later court appearances.

10 Damage in excess of $100,000 was caused at the Kinsley Drift Mine. The main Leeds/London railway line was blocked by obstructions and police cars and houses stoned.

APPENDIX 'B' (Continued)

July cont'd 14 Hemsworth Police Station beseiged by a large crowd and all of the windows broken. Reinforcements again drafted into the area and 2 persons were arrested. 24 The Humber Bridge was blocked by 500 demonstrators.

August

7 Mutual aid supplied to Warwickshire.

13 Fire engulfs face and equipment worth $4M at Fryston Colliery. The face and equipment abandoned.

18 6000 strong picket at Gascoigne Wood, near Selby, failed to stop lone miner from working. 19 Last mutual aid supplied to Humberside. 20 Allerton Bywater returns to work, first pit in West Yorkshire. Command room established at Pontefract. 21 2000 strong picket at Allerton results in first mutual aid being drafted into West Yorkshire.

22 Masked raiders, 50 strong, go on the rampage at two pits in Doncaster area.

23 Disturbances outside a nightclub in Castleford result in police officers being stoned. 5 arrests made.

September

2 Damage caused to office block at Thurcroft Colliery using a bulldozer, to a value of $250,000.

8 Fatal accident involving Paul Womersley picking coal at Upton Old Colliery stacks. 14 Last mutual aid supplied to Nottingham. 19 Last mutual aid supplied to North Yorkshire. 25 Woolley pit re-opens. 27 5000 strong picket at Allerton Bywater results in 28 mutual aid units being drafted in to area. 28 Inaugural meeting of Police Authority Sub Committee. 28 20 Police Officer ambushed by 750 pickets in stone throwing incident at Silverwood Colliery, Rotherham.

AP?ENDIX 'B' ( Continued;

September cont'd

28 Last day of mutual aid supplied to other Forces as 10 PSU's give support to South Yorkshire.

October

1 Command room moved to Fell House, Wakefield and takes over central control of dispute.

2 Denby Grange and Bullcliffe return to work.

8 Emley re-opens.

9 Park Mill re-opens. Total number of In-Force PSU's increased to 29 units.

16 2000 strong picket at Allerton Bywter.

17 2500 strong picket at Woolley. 30 officers injured, including officer stabbed with a dart.

19 3000 strong picket at Denby Grange, 9 arrests, 6 police officers required hospital treatment.

22 In-force PSO level increased to 31 units. 23 Police Photographs introduced on a daily basis to photograph picket line action.

24 6000 strong picket at Denby Grange, subject driven in by Land Rover over field by-passing main entrance

25 6000 strong picket at Denby Grange. Barracades built and local woodyard raided for sharpened stakes. Horses and shields deployed after missiles thrown. 44 police officers injured. Seven arrests.

30 Kinsley drift mine re-opens. Information Unit established to collate statistcal facts and figures, and provide intelligence data.

November

5 Fatal accident involving Eric Knaper digging coal near Sharlston.

6 Prince of Wales re-open.

10 Damage and assault on police officers at Mill Lane W.M.C. South Kirkby. A crowd of about 100 drunken youths involved in numerous serious assaults on police and theft of helmets and police radio.

APPENDIX 'B' (Continuec

November cont'd 12 In force P.S.U's increased to 35 and 13 mutual aid units located at Spittalgate Barracks for deployment in this Force. 12 Several more pits re-open including South Kirkby, Savile, Royston Drift, Sharlston, Frickley, and Allerton Bywater Workshops. 12 Widespread violence in South Yorkshire including the use of molotov cocktails against the police. 13 Police Vehicles ambushed at Frickley resulting in 44 injuries to police officers. Petrol bombs thrown but failed to ignite. 13 Ledston Luck re-opens. 14 Glasshoughton re-opens. 18 15 mutual aid units now housed in police stations in West Yorkshire. 19 Subjects van attacked near Woolley Colliery and occupants assaulted and van overturned.

21 - home subject of large scale beset• rsons. 22 Special Investigation Unit established at Normanton to combat growing problem of intimidation and be• setting of miners homes.

23 Michael Fletcher attacked by a group of masked men wielding pick-axe handles causing him frightful injuries. 34 persons arrested.

24 - home which was unoccupied was d and set on fire. 3 men later arrested. 26 Mutual aid assistance increased to 25 Units resident at Police Stations.

26 Pontefract Division P.S.U's returned to normal duties.

December 21 Large-seal disturbance took place in Castleford town centre which took some two and a half hours to restore order. 42 persons arrested.

APPENDIX 'B' (Contd)

January 7 Production starts at the country's biggest pit, Kellingley. 7 Last day when mutual aid supplied to this Force. 29 Mobile Rendezvous Point disbanded.

February 12 Injunctions granted restricting mass-picketing at Allerton Bywater and Frickley.

15 Last day of Mounted Branch involvement in dispute.

March 4 In Force P.S.U's reduced to 24. Officially last day of strike.

5 Picketing by Kent Miners at several collieries caused confusion and walk-outs.

15 Command Room closed.

APPENDIX C

POLICING PHILOSOPHY/STRATEGY IN WEST YORKSHIRE

The philosophy underlying the whole Police operation in West Yorkshire should be based upon a number of clearly defined objectives:-

(a) Impartiality From the outset our aim is to maintain the peace and uphold the law. The temptation of stating that our aim is get working miners into the Collieries has been resisted. This subtle difference will enable us to embrace colciliation in our strategy.

(b) Rapport All levels are to be encouraged to engage in dialogue with Colliery officials, pickets and working miners alike. At Senior levels there should be some encouragemer.t to establish a rapport between the various factions. . The simple initiative of the Police in initiating talks on Colliery premises in the presence of the Manager between Union officials and working miners may go a long way towards easing tensions and earning the respect of all parties in what is proving to be a protracted and bitter dispute.

(c) Local Policing Wherever possible the Policing of picket lines and associated communities will be carried out by Officers from this Force. However, Mutual Aid Units may be required to be held in reserve or used as back-up. It may well be that, for example, Pontefract Division will not supply PSU personnel, pursuir.g instead a policy of community Policing of the sensitive areas.

(d) Accountability There will be strident effortsmade to ensure that we have nothing to hide. The media will be encouraged to view operations and regular information will be available as required to the Police Authority.

(e) Minimum Force A sustained effort will be made to try to ensure the Criminal Law Act will be complied with at all times. That is to say, all those engaged in the operation will be regularly briefed about the need for tolerance, understanding and patience, and reminded of their collective and individual responsibility to ensure they use 'only such force as is reasonable in the circumstances'.

(f) Responsiveness The operation will, no doubt, demand a different Policing response each day. Recognising this, a conscious effort will be required to ensure no blanket approach is being applied. Supervisory Officers are to be encouraged to constantly assess situations and respond accordingly.

Appendix C Continued

-2-

The success of the whole operation may turn on several key issues:-

(1) Command The concept of line command is vital tc the operation, particularly in times of ensuring the Force policy is being adhered to. The use of Ground Commanders of Superintendentrank at each Colliery, supplemented by Tactical Advisers of the rank of Chief Inspector, will be essential. Superimposed upon this is a need for an Officer of ACPO rank with his S perintendent Staff Officer capable of providing support and if necessary leadership in particularly difficult circumstances.

(2) Control The establishing of one centre from which all operations are controlled has been necessar.y The Incident Commander of Chief Superintendent rank has a complete overview of the situations. The efficient use of resources and the effectiveness of their use will result from this co-ordi ation. Perhaps more importantly, however , Force policy will be complied with as a result of direction by the Incident Commander.

(3) Communications The use of UHF personal radio communications should produce a positive control system. The development of a network which utilises the emergency UHF channels is a must for operations of this nature, where precise information and effective control of manpower are of the essence.

(4) Operational Briefings The dissemination of Force policy through operational briefings is an absolute necessity, particularly where Units from other Forces may be involved. The constant repetition of the philosophy of the Force and the responsibility of Supervisory Officers to achieve it is a must. The value of identifying all those at the various levels of command involved with the operation, coupled with the opportunity it provides for them to stamp their authority on the operation, must not be overlooked.

(5) Flexibility Flexibility will be the watch word of the operation. Adapting to the changing circumstances is the very essence of operational success. Constant appraisals of the organisation of the operation will be made in response to changes in picketing tactics with the emphasis always upon mobility of manpower. As an example, the shift of emphasis in other Forces away from the Coll:ery gates towards working miners' homes, routes to work and families has led to an increased use of manpower on surveillance and escort duties.

Appendix C Continued

- 3-

(6) ) Training One of our great strengths has been our capability to draw upon Police Support Units from this Force who are reasonably physically fit and capable of acting in unison under the command of a Superintendent. This is a direct result of the training policy which has applied in this Force since the Riots of 1981. Such training will no doubt enable us to use considerably less manpower and lead to a reduction in the number of injuries that can be expected in disorders of this type.

The most telling point will be if we are able to rn1n1m1se the use of protective equipment. However, I am confident that Officers are skilled in the use of long and short riot shields and will have confidence in their Commanders to deploy them quickly when necessary.

The training given to Mounted Officers and Dog Patrols with Police Support Units should also produce the desired results, each knowing the capability of the other and perhaps more importantly Supervisory Officers (including Superintendents) knowing their limitations.

(7) Relative Response The overall strategy applied at any Colliery will be one of responding to the situation as it develops. These can be expected to be in broadly four phases: patrol, defensive, offensive and normalisation, which will be applied according to prevailing circumstances.

At the outset Officers are to be deployed in the patrol phase in ordinary Police uniform in sufficient numbers to control the situation. Extra Officers will be drafted in as the picket size increases - again in ordinary Police uniform. If there is an unusually large picket or the mood of the crowd suggests potential problems manpower will be held in reserve, and this may include Mounted Officers and Dog Patrols.

All West Yorkshire Units can expect to carry short riot shields and specially selected ones will carry long riot shields. If missile throwing begins, this will not necessarily lead to the deployment of shields, but if it becomes sustained a defensive phase will begin. Long shields are to be deployed carried by one of the reserve units as a protective measure. Should any missile throwing persist units should return to the vehicles to equip themselves with short shields or extra short shield units are to be brought up from the reserves.

Appendix C Continued

- 4 -

The justification for the implementation of the next offensive phase will be a judgemental issue. If public disorder continues, however, short shield units possibly supplemented with the horses and dogs would go forward in an attempt to disperse the crowd, isolate the stone throwers and make arrests.

Immediately the disorder has been controlled there will be de-escalaiton of the operation and Officers reverting to ordinary Police uniform as quickly as possible. There will then be a concerted effort during this normalisation phase to regain the situation as quickly as possible.

Ground Commanders (Superintendents) are to make initial assessments of the build-up of defensive tactics in liaison with the Incident Commander (Chief Superintendent). Tactical advisers (Ch ief Inspector) are to be deployed to assist at the location to control the line, supervise the use of the animals, command and shield units etc.

Unless it is vital no offensive action is to be taken until the arrival of the Assistant Chief Constable and his Staff Officer. His authority is required for various manoeuvres especially with the borses and dogs. Control of tactics during the offensive phase then passes to him. When concluded the supervision of the Colliery premises then reverts to the Ground Commande.r

(8) Retrospective Arrests The making of arrests from the front of the picket line may well prove to be counter productive to the operation. Pickets in daily face-to-face confrontation with Police Officers can normally be expected to be local to that particular Colliery. Their arrest for minor public prder offences may merely inflame the situation. It is the real trouble causers that we must concentrate upon. If it should prove impossible to arrest them at the line, we should try to concentrate upon taking photographs of missile throwers and agitators. Officers may then identify refular offenders and a 'profile' of each can be built up.

(9) Intimidation Squads Where intimidation away from the picket line has become a large scale problem in other Forces, they have set up special investigative units, and it may be something for future consideration.

Chief Superintendent

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GIUJP SLlR\/EII.l.J \f U1 • l.l'Ct" . ,. 'La H (DIMAl'OERS SUPERVISIO - P- - OFFICER DET. SERGEANl' , .lJ ~ .)11 a;. IlSP IN:iPECirn

r.EDIA SOiEDl.JLIN3

'- AI{) I.NFORMATIOO FOUCE I"" RADIO I""'- OFFICER SllPRRI' ro-ORDrnATICN P.S.U. a:NIRJUER P-- 1..NITS RECEPTIOO - crnsTABLES IN5PEC'I'Cli Qi. lJ'Ot' - FOINI'

n-sPEC'1".l5 IIB?EC'I'OR

PHJIDiRAFHIC M:X.NIED OFFICER OFFICER MJIUAI.. AID IiWOi - - ClV.l.Ll.AN -

INFOOMATIOW MJBilE DMSICXW. lNIEU.IGEl'O: r -- REJ'a2VCXE tNCT FOINI' LIAis:::w' I- - .._ AI:MINIS'lRATIV I IN3PECT0R -- Sl.lP'fl:Rl' I OFFICER I ------, I SEFU:ANl' I Mm) I PRTin£R IREO:>IDm; lNCTI RECEPTIOO I r ---- 7

I ATIOO riI - - j SERGEANI' IPR'.:O.IDF.NT Al"1 r, --- , SUPER\/ISICN I:r.rGATIOOII I I a-i. :ooP -1 i.-J 00T I - - - - . l------1 - -- - - 1 I I IN3PEC'ltR I I SUPPLIES Atll L:- - _J MA.INlEN/l10;

I G.C. 'IRA!'5R:Rl' [ r M)sILE- - -, I HIDt;!PAt I 1 CDMNICATICIB I .An'tml OFFICE:R_J

CXl'STABLES

I mrn®ATIOO 1 - - - - L, RE.SFO-SE 1'EMfJ I I 1 rus'l'ABLES _I

POCKET PHONE CHANNEL NUMBER TRANSMlTTOR / OPERATOR POSITION t E:MLE.'< 2 / \ WOOLLE.'< 23 PLOCKTON

I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

23 2 25 23 2.3

0-lANNE.L C ANNEL EMLEY RO''( MEMSWORT WOOLLE.Y PARK MILL 4 5 PS e,ULLCLIFF E. 51--lAQLS'TON

t

REDHILL 25 E.t) IU.. 29 PONTE.FRACT 23 SOUTH E.LM ALL 2 SOUTH KIRKe>Y 25 ACKWORTH 2 NOSTELL 22>

9 10 I I 12 13 14 15

25 29 2.3 2:; 25 '23 23

ALLERTON FRYSTON OUT l-\ KINSLEY NO&TE LL S>R.INC-e. FR1CKLE.Y KIRKBY ALLERTON w/s Gl.ASSI-\OU Gl-\TON OF LUCK LEDSTON WHELbAl£ WALE$ 5AVILLE

'

COLLIERY

,

POLICE SUPPORT UNITS

SUPPLIED TO \I/EST YORKSHIRE

FROM 11 NOVEMBER 1984 TO 17 JANUARY 1985

NOV NOV NOV DEC DEC DEC JAN JAN 11 - 1 6 18-23 25-30 2-7 9-14 16--21 6-11 13-17

WEST MIDLANDS 13 21 20 12 10 5

WEST MEHCIA 2 7 8

5 + 3 AVON AND SOMERSET 2 from 28/1

SUFFOLK 3 3 on 23/11 GREATER MANCHESTER only

CAMBRIDGESHIRE 4

SUSSEX 2 12

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE 3 2 fro m HERTFORDSHIRE 28/11

TOTALS ..... 13 18 30 21 20 20 10 5

)> ' d "'Cl

tzrl CJ H X 'rt

APPENDIX G

COLLIREIES IN WEST YORKSHIRE - OUTPUT AND MANPOWER

OUTPUT MANPOWER COLLIERY ( •000 TON'. ES) 1982 1975 1982

CollieriesOpen In January 1984

1. Ackton Hall 650 1,41;:1 1,530 2. Allerton Bywater 780 1,274 1,230 3. Fryston 600 1,033 1,150 4. Glasshoughton 320 711 670 5. Ledston Luck 320 412 520 6. Nostell 420 589 625 7. Prince of Wales 1,030 1,187 1,460 8. Savil e 308 541 570 9. Sharlston 780 1,290 1,265 10. Wheldale 440 768 940 11. Bullcliffe Wood 183 318 328 12. Calder Drift Under Development 13. Caphouse 227 296 272 14. Denby Grange 109 263 256 15. Emley Moor 112 335 320 16. Ferrymoor/Riddings 621 592 607 17. Kinsley Drift 119 - 305 18. Park Mill 211 323 384 19. Royston 613 61 519 20. South Kirkby 932 1,951 1,575 21. Woolley 653 1,997 1,945 22. Frickley/ 1,000 2,141 1,950 South Elmsall

Totals 10,528 17,496 18,421

APPENDIX H

TACTICAL OPTIONS FOR THE USE OF

POLICE DOGS

OBJECTIVES

Police dog3 and handlers may be deployed on public order duties to achieve one or more or the followi. g objectives:

( a ) To guard police stations and other vulnerable property, thU!3 relievi g foot personnel for other duties.

(b) To patr-ol on the per i phe ry of serious disorder, a.."ld thus contain the area and prevent looting.

c ) To cont'rcnt a hostile cr-owd with a display cf strength in order to prevent riotous behaviour.

To support toot personnel engaged in dispersing a hostile crowd.

( e ) To disperse a hostile crowd.

APPENDIX H (Continued)

.'iPPENDIX H { Co nt i n ue d )

APPENDIX H (Continued)

/.PPENDlX 1

APPENDIX l ( COnt1nued)

APPENDIX I (Continued)

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

A?P!::NDIX I (Continued)

APPENDIX I (Continued)

APPENDIX I (COntinueci)

APPENDIX J

FORCE INTELLIGENCE UNIT

RECORDS AND INDICES MAINTAINED

NUMBER OF RECORDS HELD

1. Persons arrested (Pitbail) 426

2. Victims of intimidation 262

3. Other persons coming to adverse notice 521

4. Vehicles {i) By number ( 1 Card) 348 ( ii) By make " ( iii) By colour " ( iv) By first letter"

5. Vehicles used to transport pickets etc. 1053 ( with PNC printout details)

6. Intelligence reports received 153

7. Subject fact sheets 17 (Target agitators and vehicles)

8. Messages of general interest 292

APPENDIX J ( Continued) CATEGORIES OF OFFENCES

From the start of records being kept on the 9th July, 1984, until the strike officially finished on the 5th March, 1985, a total of 426 persons were arrested ir. the West Yorkshire Metropolitan Police Are&, for strike related offences.

Of these persons 199 were arrested on the picket lines and the remaining 227 for offences away from the picket lines.

The offences for which these persons have been arrested can be categorised as follows:-

Breach of the Peace & Section 5 P.O.A. 232 Criminal Damage 87 Burglary 20 Theft 60 s 3

Assaults S 18 9 S 20 2 S 47 16 Police 37

Affray 9 Offensive Weapon 6

Going Equipped 4 Besetting 35 Persistantly Following 11 Obstruction Highway 5 Police 11 Resisting Arrest 3 Breach of Bail Conditions 3

Drunk and Disorderly 4

Total 557

APPENDIX J (Continued)

CATEGORIES OF OFFENCES

The breakdown of the 199 persons arrested on the picket lines, the following cha ges have been laid .

Breach of the Peace & Section 5 P.O.A. 162 Criminal Damage 19 Assaults S.20 1 S.47 5 Police 30 Offensive Weapon 3 Persistantly Following 1 Obstruction Highway 3

Police 8 Resisting Arrest 3 Breach of Bail Conditions 3 Drunk and Disorderly 1

The remaining 227 persons, who were arrested away from the picket lines have been charged with the following offences:-

Breach of the Peace & Section 5 P.O.A. 70 Criminal Damage 68 Burglary 20 Theft SO Arson 3 Assaults S.18 9 s.20 1 S.47 11 Police 7 Affray 9 Offens ive Weapon 3

Going Equipped 4 Besetting 35 Persistantly Following 10 Obstruction Highway 2

Police 3

Drunk aid Disorderly 3 Total 318

APPENDIX J (Continued)

NUMBER OF ARRESTS AT EACH COLLIERY

Since the 20th August 1984 when the first worker returned to Allerton Bywater Colliery, there have been 199 persons arrested on the picket lines. The breakdown of these arrests Colliery by Colliery is as follows:-

Allerton Bywater Colliery 37 Allerton Bywater Workshops 1 Woolley 16 Denby Grange 17 Bullcliffe Wood 10 Emley 6 Prince of Wales 30 Savile 6 South Kirkby 22 Royston Drift 6

Park Mill/Springwood 4 Frickley 1 Ledston Luck 2

Glasshoughton 4 Nostell Nil Sharlston 9 Fryston 7

Wheldale 4 Kinsley 2 Whitwood Workshops Nil Ackworth Nil Caphouse Nil Newmillerdam Nil Robin Hood Plant Nil Skelton Grange Power Station 2

Total 199

APPENDIX J ( Continued)

WEST YORKSHIRE METROPOLITAN POLICE

NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS DISPUTE

FROM 21st AUGUST 1984 TO 7th MARCH 1985

TOTAL NUMBER ARRESTED

426

CRIMINAL OFFENCES TOTAL 191

PROCESS 161

CAUTIONED 7

NO FURTHER ACTION 23

NON CRIMINAL OFFENCES

TOTAL 235

PROCESS 224

CAUTIONED 1

NO FURTHER ACTION 10

NOTE:

These figures do not include those persons detained on picket lines

and then released after being warned as to their future conduc.t

APPENDIX K GROUND COMMANDERS BRIEFING MATTERS

(TO BE REMINDED FROM TIME-TO-TIME)

1. To position themselves at Colliery Gates, and appoint Group Cor.imander to:

(a) receive manpower and assemble ( b) control the line (use loudhailer) (c) in charge shield units ( back-up) (d) in charge Mounted and Dogs

(NB: 5 PSU's to one Ground Commander is maximum).

2. Deploy manpower:

( a ) relative response - slow build-up ( b) long shields in reserve (c) short shields available

3. Watch approach routes of vans, parking of vehicles and accessibili y of vehicles for quick removal. (Specify safe routes in and where officers should disembark).

4. Specific instructions about:

( a) use of NATO helmets/shields {b) use of truncheons {c) arrests

5. Minimise arrests on the line; use 'running squad' cf short shields to arrest missile throwers.

6. Tactical Adviser available to co-ordinate activities of Group Commanders and give advice on tactics. NOT IN COMMAND. His role supportive.

7. Use dogs only is PROTECTN.E ROLE on the flanks - control - ensure ACC aware.

8. Use horses only 'at the nudge' - control - ensure ACC aware.

9. Clear barricades at last possible moment - sweep in front of subject vehicle (use horses and/or shield units, if necessary.)

10 . Watch for 'drawing situations' which may result in isolation of manpower, horses or dogs.

11. Consider 'topping and tailing' subject vehicles for extra protectio , using P.S.U.

- 2 - APPENDIX K (Continued)

12. Considersweeping road on foot ahead of subject vehicles, if necessary.

13. Use 'dragon lamps' to illuminate scene, identify 'throwers', spot barricades and debris, etc in road.

1 . When going forward to disperse crowds, ensure 30-40 yards move, stop and regroup tactics are followed.

10.10.84

APPENDIX L

SE IOUS CRIME

The follo•.,ing instances of serious crime committed in connection with the dispute have been recorded:-

15. 4. 84 At Frickley Colliery intruders entered the Colliery buildingswhere they damaged windows and electrical gear

and discharged fire extinguis hers. Value £4,000.

5. 6.84 Frickley Colliery was again entered forcibly with similar damage being caused to the incident on the

15th April 1984 but to a value of £50,000.

23. 6.84 At Kinsley Colliery, a number of persons entered the yard and broke windows. Value £1,000.

10. 7.84 Again , at Kinsley Colliery, during widespread disorde , the premises were entered, one building set on fire and

three vehicles overturned and ignited. Value £50,00.0

9.10.84 The solitary miner who had been working at Wool:ey Colliery , , was attached and badly beaten

by four men wearing balaclavas as he left for work. Received hospital treatment and release.d

13.11.84 Bricks were thrown through the windows at the home of a working miner at Havercroft and his car overtur.e d.

Value £700. Six men have been arrested and charge.d

19.11.84 In the area of Sharlston Colliery, telegraph poles were sawn down and garden gates removed to be used as

barricades. Value unknown.

19.11.84 At South Kirkby Colliery, lamp standards were pulled down and used as barricade,s together with materials from a nearby building site. Value £8,200. One youth was arrested for criminal damage and one man arrested for throwing a petrol bomb.

APPENDIX L (Continued)

19.11 .84 At Fryston Colliery large scale damage was caused to the premises, a van was burned out and lamp standards demolishe.d Value £10,000. Two persons have been arrested for criminal damage.

19 .11.84 Extensive damage was caused to " eldale Colliery

premises. Value £50,000. Thirteen persons have been

arrested and charged with this offence.

19.1 1.84 A Ford Transit Van carrying two working miners to

Woolley Colliery was overturned in a field and both

occupants assaulted. An attempt was also made to set the vehicle on fire.

20 .11.84 At Kinsley Colliery large barricades were erected in the

vicinity and extensive damage was caused to the Colliery

premises.

23.11.84 A large group of men attacked a working miner at his home at Castleford causing him serious injury requiring hospital treatmen.t This incident received extensive national news coverage and 27 men were later charged with various offences arising from their involvemen.t

23.11.84 At Pontefract Labour Club a Section 20 wounding was committed by a striking miner on a working miner. One

man was arrested and charged.

24.11.84 At Upton, Pontefract, the home of a working miner was

completely gutted by fire. Value £40,000. Three men

have been arrested and charged with 'arson' and one is currently still re anded in custody.

2.12.84 One window was broken at Knottingley Police Station and three Police Officers' private vehicles w re damaged.

2.12.84 At Pinewood Close, Glasshoughton two telegraph poles were cu down during the night. Value not known.

APPENDIX L (Continued)

8 . 1 2 .84 A brick and wooden hut owned by a working miner was set

on fire at Altofts, Normanton. Damage was also caused to a nearby greenhouse on the allotment.

29 . 1 2 .84 An arson attack was made on a car owned by a working miner at Lupset, Wakefiel.d The vehicle was destroyed and the value estimated at £2,000.

29.12.84 Intruders entered the wages office at Fryston Colliery and ransacked the contents. they stole nothing but

caused extensive damage. Value estimated to be several thousand pounds.

3. 1 . 8 5 Arson at the home of a working miner at Castle:ord.

Rags soaked in inflamable liquid were pushed through the letter-box and ignited. The occupant discovered the fire

and was able to extinguish it before serious damage was caused. Value £100.

9. 1.85 The weighbridge office at Packfield Colliery was entered and the contents of a filing cabinet were set alight.

Damage estimated at £1,000.

16 . 1.85 Damage was caused to a working miner's car at Leeds 14 when a lighted rag was pushed into it after the window

had been broken. Value £1,400.

13. 2.85 The working miners' bus from Allerton Workshops was ambushed near to Ledston Luck Colliery by ten men. A

brick was thrown through a window causing injury to one of the passengers, three other windows being broken.

13. 2.85 A very similar incident occurred at Frickley Colliery when another miner was cut by broken glass.

8. 3.85 For the second time since the dispute started a working miner has suffered an arson attack on his property at Lupset, Wakefield. On this occasion, his shed was burned out with damage estimated at £700.

APPENDIX M OFFENCES DETECTED BY CRIME INVESTIGATION TEAM

Locat:ion Offences Arrested Charged Reported

Wheldale Colliery Burglary 18 13

S. Kirkdale Assaults 35 27 ( a) Airedale Agg. Burglary (home of Mr. Fletcher) Affray Besetting

7 Eden Dale Criminal Damage 2 2 Castleford S.47 Assault ( home of miner) Besetting

NormantonArea Theft 5 5 Besetting S.5 Public Order

Wagon Lane, Upton Besetting 6 6 (home of miner)

Hill Estate Besetting Upton Offensive Weapon 4 S.5 Public Order

Ackworth Colliery Theft 3 1

Wistow Colliery Burglary (N. Yorks) Criminal Damage 3 1 (b) (handed to North Yorkshir)e

Kinsley Drift Mine Criminal Damage 2 2 S.5 Public Order

Sunnyhill Criminal Damage 1 1 Normanton (home of miner)

\oJak efield Area Besetting 6 6

Fryston Colliery Burglary 2 1

Normanton Area Going Equipped 4 - ( C )

Totals 91 62 6

Notes

(a) 5 persons used as witnesses and 3 not proceeded against.

( b) Result not known, but one person returned to West Yorkshire and

charged with theft at Fryston.

(c) No further action, but high-powered catapult found in car but insufficient evidence to charge.

APPENDIX 'N'

COHMk'!l{D nooM, m..L IlOOSE

PRESS IW..EASE, TUESDAY 13 NOVEHBER 198.ft

Tbere -was early activity shortly after midnight with •a build up of pickets in the Soutb Kirby and South Ebmall areas and the approaches to both collieries. Barricades were built across the roads in these areas and tbe Police were stoned whilst endevouring to remove them. This was repeated several times during the night and barricades -were also erected on main roads leading to the collieries.

Further activity toot place at fc.oyston -where wall was demolished and barricades erected. Later during the mt>ming there were crowds of demonstrators erecting and re-erecting barricades on the approach to Frickley Colliery.

Police Officers vere heavily stoned from side roads by several hundred demonstrators causing injuries to approximately O officers and damaging several vehicles• -

A cumber of petrol bombs were also throi.'ll but fortunately did not ignite.

It vas necessary to deploy officers wearing protective equipment and horses to minimise injuries.

There vere ::; arrested at Fri.ckl ey, 1t arrested at Boyston and 1 arrest at Ledston Luck Colliery for Public Order Offences•

.All vorking miners entered the collieries safely.

endent i/ c Co1lllll8Dd Room

APPENDIX 'N'(Continued)

COLLIERYSTATISTICS FOR PERIOD 11 JANUARY - 15 FEBRUARY 1985

WORKING AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE TOTAL INJURIE MINERS DAILY DAILY DAILY TOTAL ON WORKING PICKETS PSU ARRESTS POLICE OTHER 14.2.85 MINERS DEPLOYMENT

SAVILLE 108 63 43 l 1 Nil Nil

ALLERTON PIT 152 93 86 l½ 1 Nil Nil

ALLERTON ORKSHO?S 177 125 29 5 PC's Nil Nil 1

LEDSTON LUCK 61 37 33 5 PC's Nil Nil Nil

FRICKLEY 9 4 108 3 2 Nil l

SOUTH KIRKBY/F'ERRYMOOR 42 28 134 3 4 Nil Nil

PRINCE OF WALES 69 46 130 3 11 Nil Nil NOSTELL 30 20 25 ½ Nil Nil Nil KINSLEY 1 1 47 l½ Nil Nil Nil ACKWORTH/ACKTONHALL 30 22 81 l½ Nil Nil Nil

YSTON 29 22 90 l½ Nil Nil N1'.,.. GLASSHOUGHTON 39 31 75 l¾ 2 Nil Nil

WHELDALE 21 15 91 1 Nil Nil Nil i BULLCLIFFE WOOD 57 38 37 4 ?C's Nil Nil I Nil DENBY GRANGE 288 232 20 5 PC's Nil Nil I Nil ROYSTON DRIFT 9 7 82 l½ Nil Nil Nil SHARLSTON 83 51 91 2 2 Nil Nil WOOLLEY 99 65 93 2½ 1 5 Nil EMLEY 132 101 29 9 PC's 2 Nil Nil

PARK MILL/SP?.INGvJOOD 111 56 42 1 1 Nil Nil

CAPHOUSE 9 8 5 2 PC's Nil Nil Nil

NEWMILLERDAM 6 5 9 2 PC's Nil Nil Nil

'N!-!!T\11OOO WORKSHOPS 15 13 8 2 PC's Nil Nil Nil

ROBIN HOOD 3 3 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

TOTAL ...... 1580 1086 1388 28 PSUs 27 5 2

APPENDIX 0

COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE

Number of complaints 17

Number of Officers complained against

(a) Own Force 16

(b) Aiding Force - West Midlands 1

NATURE OF COMPLAINTS

(a) Assault 14 (b) Damage NIL (c) Harassment 5 (d) Incivility NIL (e) Irregular Procedure NIL (f) Motoring Offences NIL (g) Neglect of Duty 1 (h) Oppressive Conduct NIL (i) Other 3

Number of Complainants 22

Complainant Details

(a) Ages Under 20 years 1 21 - 25 years 2 26 - 30 years 1 31 - 40 years 6 41 - 50 years 5 Not known 7

( b) Sex Male 22 Female NIL (c) Occupations Miners 14 Student 1 Councillor 4 Transport Officer 1 Not Known 2 Allegations Withdrawn 2 Unsubstantiated 2 Letters of Appreciation 12

APPENDIX P

WEST YORKSHIRE METROPOLITAN POLICE

DISTRIBUTION OF VEHICLE FLEET

i I I ,_ .. I I t I TFlllFFIC DIVISION I i 1 •I I COMMUN I TY .t.1'!'4fRS i , i! - - j 'i • ' f ., j W-0torw1 r , Dl\f!SION j i t - I ! i Un n I """ 1 2 1 l j 1 I SUB•OIVISION I i p, ' t • I > I .. Unh 41 i I t 1 .. I ,. • I I f i j i I ! ! fi'. : ! £ ! ! !! ! 1&! v. I ] l. , f Pomotroc, I f I I .2 1 ...,., IS .J i u- i f J..:i f ..i ! ; I I I CnmePrl'¥ent,on I i I A ; I l JII-' 1 2 If I , IJ , I ' I ,, I I 1 , I f i 0, I' IWS.U J t / I I W et hlon,y I I I l ':':' t 7 .i i I l I !,I.fo l I ! ' TOT-. l I I Id e ! 3 l ' CRl lo!tNA L tNVESTI C.4TIOt. B , ...... ,, 17 3 .3 1 ? ! 3 !3 I I : / ;;r l 1(£JG1Ul I _,, 1 3 J 3 I l i : I I ii I ( H.0. C.10. . : f i FORCE TRAININGSCiiOOL I C 1- '. b l l I}! .., l I IJ I. I I i I 25j H.o . c .1.0 - e-, lu.o: 1 e>.pertm.nt z l:,:.kc..v, ..,.. - !- - 15 J i l J 1 I I ! I ( ft i H.0 . C.LO - Wff l !35 /

, l,, , .; g I t jj ; J I 0 J 1.,., I I I j) ,2 j H .Q . C LD - Sout• """"- i ' l.1 I s i J I s l 110: co,,; I I 0n_, ,..", "'9 bl i I : I ! I ! E jl.f l ;i 111- 1 i I '..iS' TOTAL l tnc.1VMt $1;11"9WY tflll iolMO:I 1_ "".3 ·,' u ( I J I J

I t CO$A;. 3 1 3 : I 1 Dogl,_"'9 I i ' .. .. , ,, . ,. ., I s I I i 1 .2.

! TOTAi. ;_ • I F TR4FAC DIVISION I t ' .; I I .3 J , IJ I I l.is ...... IS ! l•- -1- • I J lll)Ufc,. 7 2 1 2 I I ! I : ! I 13 Oepat"IJ'Mn! ,.._ic.,., .. .• .t.icn Nr1 I _,, ti , .._. s l3 17 1, l -+-!.2. l 1 I I ! ; I l 3ol , ....LE I' .I5- 1. I'

H.Q. OPERATlOl(S DI\IISION 1 I ! = i - g .1 i l l I l, l , ! I : / 1.2v l ls.-...... - e.. , j i. i I

J 1 I I i,J. 1 - 1.2 1 3 s l s , i ¥' I js101en v.,.oc1ee- w,.. ! I I l 13 1 : K_ ,_IJ Ls :u.: .2. i / ! / i ' 1:.-=".!4; 133 : IJ 3 IJ.I , "'1 "'.".LTQW)f : : · 5 13 3 e I I l23: T-F«ct-Eal - i tl.MosGe,. 1-, , J i .2. I 3 i+- 1 i ot.i- ! I3 I 2 * 7 I I L :t..Z' - ;·"'""'"" j : i.,1f - !IJ l i 1I 1-1-- l - _, 3 t./- ""I3 II I1.i. ll - 1-...... b ! ---- 3 2 M S' "'

J IOl111MC q I s 7 u- 2 3.2.. TOTAi. ol !oi 3I 3 .i.o; l 3 3 ! I I ,,,,! N i f.:. REGION/l L CRIM SQU/ltl - - 1 WAXERELI' - 1 1.2,. u - ! I l.2 I I u j .. I ,., 1 2 t I I /! TOTAi. 111 p 2 IJEWSalllt< ..,., ).. 31 - .. II TOTAL , s I l I ! ! Q I 2 i 3 I lo J i "'" - 1 1 l.2 i 2 i I 1 31 - - - II I I' 1331ct3l !f e! siss·,11 1 s: I 1 12'!!s.iQ Tll!A. -

AUTHORISED ESTABL.ISHMENT Two-Wheel ! Trailers (Exclu ding R.C.S. ) IACTUAL ESTABLISHMENT St .2l j(Exclud ing R.C.S.)

IAUTHORISEDESTABLISHMENT i Four• Wheel i Two-Wheel

R.C.S I i .2, , ( ! Act u al Estab lishmen t .25

AVERAGE. WEEKLY MANPOWER DE.PLOYME.NT ON NUM DISPUTE. -1984 M()Nl)A"t ,0 FQIDAV

-I SO

WEST ICS PlUslb fln loo bnu.11fOl!Ct M£-.S ,.J. I - rttST VORl

750 - MUtu4L .a.11> Pl\/1 IM f"' \'iESTYORKS Alt{A f , '·.·.,

I 700 I r-:, l- ,l2 - + - .f- --l l- -+-- +- - +- -+ - -+ - +- - +- -+ - + - +- - 1- -+-- +- - t-- -l ,-- -f. - + - t-- --l l-- -l- - + - +- -l l-- -+ - + - ..r..,-_·J2 ; -- I rgg r.nI j . sso l-- --l - -l-- +- - 1- -+- -+- - +- --i l-- -+- +- +- --i l- -+ - + _.- _- +---t , 1 -:iH I SS i

l- -+----11- -+--+ - -F"- f- -+- -t - +- -+ - +---+- -t - -t- -t- --, f-- -t- -t - -t- -+ - t- -1 mo I ' I I I 450 l- -+- --l l- -+- -+ - -+ --l f-- -+- -+ - +- -+ --l f-- -+- -t - +---+- --1 -+- -t - +- -+ -t ' HJ. t:

Ir 400 l L-J " - I I 3 !Sl- 1 - I.I___J so 0 .. S Sl·I CL -_.,, 31'·1. 1 300 l- --l - l-- -+ - +- - t-- -+ - -+-- +- - 1- -+ - -+_--t , 293·1 ...,_ ◄ 21H, i 2&0 -n, 200 ,

.

i, 9 ,1

150 1- ..!!.!.. I SO b - 1-4-1 t I 100 !iiil :i> - 11r1---1. -1 I 'U - I I 'U ' I I I trJ 'I z 'ro:i:' ,,,.., I 0 so i:= ! H 11" t ! _ ., I X 9 ·1 i •.,, r '"\ 23 1.3 ! ·····1 0\ ' H : ...! 0 -!! 0 0

I .0 ('j

,::;- '- c'1 'I) E' I -en- t i f ¥ «

AVERAGE WEEKLY MANPOWER DEPLOYMENT ON NUM DISPUTE - \985 MONDAY TO FRIDAY

WEST YORI<.$ P$1ls IN pr, WEST'l'ORIC$AA!A , l 100 -io1 MlJlUA\. AID KU$ IN rs 1ii., I WU,1 't'OQl(SJ!Jt£A,.I'" ( \ ..: I --J "lSO , 'IS9 L"1'59- I I I 700 1---4 . ··-- 1eo iii<>-, ""° I 1- ... J I I i I I I (,00 -.,-.-

I 550 --1 I I I --i . I I I 4SO ,---, I I « >o I r-: I I I J I I Wl ·I .k.S--·+· , I I I 300 r-- I I I 250 I ►'U I I 'U :oo·: I t'1 • z eoo : I 0 : I H : I X : I ,so I .0 : I : I : :...... I 0 IIS I 0 100 : I ::, I ct I ..,. I :, 5o I r;; ( ' 0, I' : I

APPENDIX R

ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE NUM DISPUTE TO

28 FEBRUARY 1985

Police Overtime 5,540,520

Mutual Aid 1,797,330

Domestic Equipment 35,000

Riot Equipment 17,070

Hired Transport 17,500

Clothing Uniforms 50,000

Heaters/CateringStaff 40 ,000

Catering, Accommodation and other

miscellaneous costs 502,580

8 ,000 ,000