Enlightening the Constitutional Debate

The third in a series of discussion events to enlighten the public debate on Scotland’s constitutional future.

Defence and Interna(onal Rela(ons 29 May 2013 at the Royal Society of Edinburgh

Introduc(on This seminar examined ques3ons on how the UK’s role within NATO might be affected by cons3tu3onal change, and about the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrence, given the SNP’s an3-nuclear policies. The seminar also discussed how the UK’s posi3on on the interna3onal stage might be affected by cons3tu3onal change, and what the implica3ons of separa3ng the Sco5sh and UK armed forces might be. The la4er half of the seminar addressed ques3ons from the audience. The subject of Defence & Interna3onal Rela3ons was addressed by a panel of four expert speakers: • Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford, Stuart Crawford Associates, former SNP defence advisor • Dr Phillips O'Brien, Reader in Modern History and Convenor of the Global Security Network • Professor William Walker, Professor of Interna3onal Rela3ons, University of St.Andrews • Rt Hon Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Former Secretary General of NATO and former Secretary of State for Defence The discussion was chaired by Lieutenant General Sir Alistair Irwin, President of the Royal Bri3sh Legion for Scotland. The seminar was conducted as an open, public discussion seminar. This report provides a summary of the posi3ons outlined by the speakers, and of the subsequent discussion.

Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford, Stuart Crawford Lieutenant Colonel Crawford began by defining what Associates, former SNP defence advisor the wider func3ons of a na3on’s armed forces are. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford began by observing The three main tasks of any armed force, he suggested, are: that the ques3on around how an independent Scotland • ensuring the survival of the state against internal might organise its own armed forces has been central to enemies (for example insurrec3on, non-democra3c recent debate on Scotland’s future. He suggested that in uprising and terrorism) and providing disaster relief; recent years the focus of this ques3on has shi#ed, so that it is no longer about whether or not Scotland could • protec3ng the state against external aggression; run its own armed services, but rather about whether it • promo3ng stability in regions where the state has should . In making this point, he suggested that there is strategic interests, for example through exchange li4le doubt that Scotland could, if it wished to, manage training and diplomacy. an independent armed service. He also pointed out that a na3on’s armed forces may be In addressing the ques3on of whether Scotland should deployed in voluntary ventures being undertaken by the seek an independent armed force, which would be a UN or by NATO. consequences of a ‘Yes’ vote in the Referendum, When considering what an independent Sco5sh defence which is around 1.3% of Scotland’s GDP. This compares force might look like, Lieutenant Colonel Crawford observed favourably with the Sco5sh defence expenditure of that a convenient sugges3on is that Scotland would have £3.3 billion in 2010/11, and the SNP’s recently declared armed forces around 10% the size of those the UK has at defence budget of £2.5 billion per annum. the moment; or that Scotland’s armed forces would look Summing up, Lieutenant Colonel Crawford suggested the same as those of roughly equivalent countries, for that there are three ques3ons to ask when considering example Denmark or Norway; or that Scotland would the poten3al for an independent Sco5sh armed force: have a defence budget equivalently propor3onal to its GDP as the current average for EU countries. While • Is it necessary? these sugges3ons make sense, or are at least cceptable, • Is it feasible? from the point of view of a straigh2orward size or GDP comparison, this sort of approach actually tackles the • Is it affordable? ques3on from the wrong direc3on. A be4er way to On the basis of the model he had proposed, Lieutenant approach the ques3on, he suggested, is to look at the Colonel Crawford declared that we can answer ‘Yes’ to all level of risk faced by an independent Scotland. This can three of these ques3ons. The evidence, therefore, is that be achieved by asking the following ques3ons: Scotland could have an independent armed force if it • What might Scotland have, which others might want to a!ack? wanted to; the ques3on which remains to be answered is whether this is an op3on that Scotland should pursue. • What would Scotland need (in terms of military resource) to protect this? • What would this cost? Dr Phillips O'Brien, Reader in Modern History, University of Glasgow, and Convenor of the Global Security Network There are no clear predic3ons about what an independent Scotland’s foreign policy might be, but Lieutenant Colonel Following on from Lieutenant Colonel Crawford, Dr Crawford hypothesised that the focus of an independent Phillips O’Brien referred to the nature of the debate Scotland’s armed forces would be regional and not global, around Scotland’s cons3tu3onal future, and conducted and that this focus would be primarily on defence; although a brief analysis of what the big issues to feature in this an independent Scotland would have the op3on of debate have so far been. He observed that the ques3on contribu3ng to allied engagements overseas, if it wished to. of defence has been one of the largest issues to feature so far and that, under the heading of defence, the largest On the ques3on of what an independent Scotland would ques3on has been around the Faslane nuclear base and want to protect, he suggested that the main focus would be what would happen to this base in the event of Sco5sh on territorial integrity, oil and gas revenues and fishing independence. Dr O’Brien pointed out that Faslane is grounds. He observed that Scotland is not at high risk from currently one of the largest employers in the west of conven3onal military a4ack, but that a more likely risk is Scotland, accoun3ng for around 6.5 thousand Sco5sh from elements such as cyber warfare, terrorism and jobs, with current plans to see this rise to eight thousand. organised crime. Taking these interests into considera3on, The SNP has expressed a desire to maintain all of the jobs he suggested a model for what an independent Scotland at this base; however, Dr O’Brien pointed out that the might need in order to best protect its na3onal security Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) has a loud voice and assets from likely threats. This is as opposed to a model in the independence debate and will want an independent of what Scotland might want in terms of defence structure. Scotland to commit to removing all nuclear weapons and Lieutenant Colonel Crawford suggested that Scotland would bases from Scotland. Dr O’Brien suggested that this may need something like 60 aircra#, 20 to 25 ships and two army prove problema3c for the SNP if Scotland does become brigades, one deployable and one for reinforcement and independent. He pointed out that the issue of an independent home du3es, amoun3ng to between 13,000 and 17,000 Scotland’s rela3onship with NATO is also a large one, armed forces personnel across all three services. He sug - especially now that the SNP has declared a change in policy gested that an independent Scotland would be very unlikely and is now commi4ed to Scotland becoming a member of NATO. to need the sort of hardware used by the UK military, for example aircra# carriers. On the ques3on of how these Following the ques3ons around Faslane and Scotland’s forces might be raised and equipped, he suggested that rela3onship with NATO, Dr O’Brien suggested that the third much of this could be taken from Scotland’s share of UK biggest ques3on under the defence heading has been forces, and indicated that horse-trading might be required around whether an independent Scotland would return to to facilitate this, including Scotland taking cash in lieu of the original Sco5sh regiment model, with a permanent assets, such as Trident, where appropriate. regimental iden3ty. Ques3ons that haven’t figured as highly in the debate so far are ques3ons around what would Lieutenant Colonel Crawford es3mated that the cost of the happen to Rosyth and other Sco5sh bases such as Inverness model proposed would be around £1.84 billion per annum, and Fort St George, or to the shipbuilding yards on the Clyde.

2 In rela3on to the big ques3ons, Dr O’Brien suggested that crea3vely address this issue. A Transi3on Fund could be used most of these are not debatable, but refer to issues to manage the change. Dr O’Brien also suggested that in an (e.g. NATO and Faslane) where there is not actually much independent Scotland, Glasgow would lose out to Edinburgh to debate. On the issue of an independent Scotland’s on the loca3on of defence bases and the associated jobs. rela3onship with NATO, for example, Dr O’Brien suggested This would also require crea3ve management. The SNP that Scotland has to be a member of NATO because the should accept smaller defence facili3es, but should use the rest of the EU member states would make Sco5sh EU money saved to manage the transi3on to fewer defence jobs membership extremely difficult if Scotland was not a in Scotland, especially on the west coast. member of NATO. Walking away from NATO, he suggested, would damage Scotland’s nego3a3ng posi3on on EU membership. On the ques3on of Sco5sh regiments, he Professor William Walker, Professor of Interna(onal argued that this is not a model that Scotland can return Rela(ons, University of St Andrews to, and that to do so would make no sense. This is not, Professor Walker focused on the ques3on of Trident, which therefore, a realis3c issue for debate. On the big ques3on he observed to be central to the debate about Scotland’s of what would happen to Faslane in an independent cons3tu3onal future. He undertook an analysis of the Scotland, Dr O’Brien stated that Faslane simply could Trident replacement policy developed under the Labour not be expected to con3nue at its current size in an Government, and the credibility of this policy in the current independent Scotland. By trying to consider and debate poli3cal and economic environment. Professor Walker these issues, he suggested, the SNP is posing ques3ons suggested that the replacement policy is no longer as that are too poli3cally difficult. On this basis, he proposed secure as it once was, and that this is not just because to address the ques3on of what a poli3cally feasible policy of the possibility of Sco5sh independence. The original for the ‘Yes’ campaign would be, and what issues would replacement policy was for a fleet of four submarines lead to useful and worthwhile debate. carrying Trident missiles, of which one would constantly Dr O’Brien proposed star3ng with the ques3on of money, be at sea; the inten3on being the new system would be fully and suggested that the defence budget of £2.5 billion implemented during the 2020s. Professor Walker pointed proposed by the SNP is a mistaken figure, because it is either out that this target is based upon an assump3on that the UK too much, or too li4le. Elucida3ng the point, he observed can afford a like-for-like replacement of Trident. This that this figure represents a much higher sum than Scotland assump3on dates back to a pre-2007 climate in which it was actually needs for a feasible defence programme, but not not an3cipated that there would be a shi# from high public nearly enough to maintain the status quo . He suggested that expenditure to austerity, or that the current Chancellor of for a lower figure of around £1.75 billion, Scotland would get the Exchequer would require that the costs for Trident’s a very reasonable defence structure. He proposed Denmark replacement be met en3rely out of the UK Defence Budget. as an excellent model for an independent Scotland. Denmark Neither was it an3cipated that Trident would consume more has two dis3nct facili3es, one base for domes3c patrols and than a quarter of the UK Procurement Budget, nor that the another to train units for deployment with NATO opera3ons. SNP would call a referendum on independence, nor that This model would be very operable within an independent Trident’s evic3on from Scotland would be promised to the Scotland. Dr O’Brien suggested that an independent Scotland Sco5sh people as part of an independence package. In would have to place any domes3c naval bases on the east considera3on of these unan3cipated changes that have coast, and observed that pu5ng an en3re Sco5sh navy at affected the poli3cal and economic landscape of the UK since Faslane would be a derelic3on of duty, because it would the Trident replacement policy was first framed, Professor leave the east coast very exposed. A reserve base could be Walker asked why this policy has not been suitably revised. located at Faslane. Answering this ques3on, he suggested that any big spending on Trident’s replacement will not need to take place un3l Dr O’Brien pointed out that the remaining ‘big ques3on’ 2016, so any debate about this policy and its feasibility can is around the size of an independent Scotland’s air force. be delayed un3l a#er the next UK general elec3on. He He suggested that this is a very debatable issue because the observed that Trident is something of a ‘sacred cow’ of the air force is a ‘big 3cket’ item. Dr O’Brien suggested that Conserva3ve Government, and added that the UK Scotland would only need one air base, which could be Government is observing a policy of not pre-nego3a3ng, located at Lossiemouth or Leuchars. He es3mated that his or con3ngency planning, on the ques3on of Scotland’s proposed defence model would come in at around £1.75 cons3tu3onal future. In spite of this, he asserted that the billion, as opposed to the £2.5 billion proposed by the SNP. Trident replacement policy will need to be revised. He suggested that the SNP, instead of arguing that Scotland would require a military that would cost £2.5 billion, should On the basis of the stated need for a revised Trident accept one that would cost £1.75 billion, but should place replacement policy, Professor Walker turned his a4en3on the difference between these two figures in a Transi3on to the available op3ons. He raised the op3on of the UK Fund. Scotland would inevitably lose defence jobs if it adop3ng a different nuclear deterrence system, for example became independent, so there would be a need to the use of cruise missiles, but observed that this op3on has

3 been widely rejected. He also referred to the op3on of of weapons; rogue states; cyber warfare; organised crime; complete nuclear abandonment, according to which the UK climate change, which will be linked to conflicts over resources would abandon its nuclear deterrent en3rely, but suggested and to migra3on flows; pandemics; piracy; and fragile and that there is not sufficient courage or convic3on within failed states. He made the point that none of these threats Whitehall to contemplate this dras3c step at the moment. has a na3onal solu3on that can be dealt with by one Professor Walker observed that there is a third, less radical government. Instead, collec3ve solu3ons must be sought. op3on, which involves the UK changing its nuclear posture Lord Robertson suggested that other separa3st movements and moving away from the idea of having a constant nuclear will also be watching the debate around Scotland’s deterrent deployed at sea. In response to this third op3on, cons3tu3onal future, for example in Catalonia, Flanders, Professor Walker suggested that there is an argument that a the Basque country, Lombardy, Transylvania and Corsica, part-3me deterrent is no deterrent at all, and that if we do and that the states affected do not represent small or not have all four submarines, with a con3nuous deterrent at sea, there is no point in having a nuclear deterrent at all. He negligible factors in the world today. Lord Robertson added that reducing the number of submarines will not speculated that a ‘Yes’ vote in the Sco5sh referendum deliver substan3al savings, and certainly not in the first five could represent the first domino to fall in what he referred to ten years, and the opportunity cost would be substan3al. to as the ‘Balkanisa3on’ of the European con3nent. Professor Walker concluded that the decisions made on Lord Robertson acknowledged that independence would Trident and the UK’s nuclear deterrence programme will give Scotland the opportunity to remain poli3cally and depend upon the nego3a3ons which take place between the militarily neutral in respect of global issues and conflicts, Sco5sh and UK Governments, and that the situa3on will if it wished to. However, he added that he did not believe inevitably change a#er the referendum on Scotland’s future. this stance would be in the spirit of the Sco5sh people. He suggested that in the event of Sco5sh independence, and He observed that an independent Scotland could follow assuming that Scotland pursued its policy of becoming a fully the model set by states such as Denmark and Norway, but non-nuclear state, it would be difficult for the UK to have its noted that both Denmark and Norway are established main nuclear deterrent opera3ng out of Scotland. It is not na3on states which have built up their defence forces over clear how tenable it would be for a nuclear weapons state to many years, observing that both accept the US and NATO operate out of a non-nuclear weapons state, and this is likely nuclear umbrella without any equivoca3ons, and both to be a less than desirable arrangement. Professor Walker have deployed troops with NATO. observed that there would need to be nego3a3on of a treaty, Lord Robertson made the point that if Scotland did become between an independent Scotland and the UK, on a range of independent, it would need to create its own Ministry of conten3ous issues, including Faslane. He suggested that the Defence, army, navy, air-force, logis3cs and intelligence. He stances taken on how to manage the UK’s nuclear deterrence agreed with Dr O’Brien that an independent Scotland would programme will depend on which poli3cal par3es are in have to be in NATO, and argued that there is no sense in an power when these issues come to the fore, and whether independent Scotland being outside NATO if it is to these par3es have the power to make decisions on these effec3vely defend itself. He pointed to the inconsistency issues. He closed with the observa3on that Sco5sh between Scotland’s proposed NATO membership and the independence would inevitably increase the cost of Trident’s Sco5sh Government’s commitment to making Scotland replacement, and suggested that the Trident replacement a non-nuclear state, and suggested that the Sco5sh policy is currently in a state of flux, but that the outcome is Government must either renege on its long-held bound to be one of a diminished nuclear deterrent or no commitments regarding nuclear weapons, or risk nuclear deterrent at all. leaving a newly independent Scotland poorly defended and at risk. Lord Robertson concluded by sta3ng his Rt Hon Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Former Secretary belief that Scotland should remain a part of the UK. General of NATO and former Secretary of State for Defence Lord Robertson opened with the observa3on that the Ques(ons & Answers referendum on Scotland’s cons3tu3onal future represents A comment was raised about Lord Robertson’s reference a one-in-ten-genera3ons decision and one which will be to ‘Balkanisa3on’, and Lord Robertson was asked to clarify irreversible. He suggested that there are a lot of other his meaning. It was suggested that the idea that people countries watching the approach to the Sco5sh referendum, across the world are nervous or afraid of Sco5sh and that many are concerned that the poten3al break-up independence is a misrepresenta3on of the situa3on, of the UK represents the poten3al break-up of a stabilising and Lord Robertson was asked to offer evidence power in the interna3onal arena. He went on to suggest demonstra3ng this fear, in support of his comments. that the referendum and the lead up to it will be watched by enemies and poten3al enemies of Scotland and the UK. Lord Robertson responded by referring to the break-up of He observed that there are a lot of threats and challenges the former Yugoslavia, and the crea3on of new Balkan states facing states today, including: terrorism; the prolifera3on that followed, as an example of the instability that may result 4 from separa3sm and the break-up of na3ons. He observed Lord Robertson added to this response, sugges3ng that that there are separa3st movements in other parts of the intelligence is likely to represent a serious problem for an world, and suggested that there is some apprehension in independent Scotland. He suggested that Scotland could Europe that these movements are star3ng to get the upper not replicate the networks of rela3onships that currently hand. Lord Robertson pointed out that Belgium suffered a exist as part of UK intelligence. He observed that these severe iden3ty crisis at the onset of its independence, and networks are based on long-established habit and trust, that it took 1.5 years to establish a Government a#er the which have been built up over a very long 3me. The Sco5sh last na3onal elec3on. He observed that in Spain, there Government has indicated that it would create a Sco5sh have been huge demonstra3ons demanding independence version of MI5 and MI6 in the event of independence, but for Catalonia, and suggested that people across Europe will Lord Robertson asserted that this would be a Herculean task. be watching Scotland because there is to be a referendum Picking up on Dr O’Brien’s comments about an independent on Sco5sh independence. This gives the Sco5sh separa3st Scotland’s membership of the EU, the ques3on was posed as movement a legi3macy not allowed to other separa3st to how important it would be for an independent Scotland to movements in Europe; a referendum on Catalonia’s be a member of the EU, and what would be required of the independence being prohibited under the Spanish Sco5sh Government with regards to Trident if it wished for cons3tu3on. He pointed to the example of the EU’s inability Scotland to become an EU member. to recognise Kosovo as a na3on state as an example of the concern that other EU member states have over separa3st Dr O’Brien replied that states are hos3le to Sco5sh and independence movements. The EU has not yet been able independence because right now the UK meshes very well with exis3ng defence structures, and breaking up the UK to take a posi3on on the na3on statehood of Kosovo because creates a ques3on mark over how this might con3nue. certain members of the EU, for example Spain, Italy and States, as dis3nct from individuals, tend to be cau3ous Slovakia, refuse to recognise Kosovo on the basis of their and conserva3ve. Dr O’Brien raised the ques3on of why concerns over separa3sm. the United States would see itself as having a strategic Lord Robertson’s earlier point that the decision made in the interest in the UK or Europe if Scotland le# NATO, and Sco5sh referendum will be a one-in-ten-genera3ons decision suggested that Scotland leaving NATO is not a realis3c op3on. was referred to, and the ques3on raised as to whether In nego3a3ng entry into the EU, Scotland has quite a weak speakers could think of any facts about Sco5sh defence hand to begin with. If Scotland wishes easy entry to the EU which are true now, and which will s3ll be true in 50 years. therefore, it is not in a posi3on to make demands around its Lieutenant General Sir Alistair Irwin (the Chair) responded coopera3on with NATO. that it is very difficult to make these sorts of predic3ons, Following these comments, Professor Walker suggested but indicated that those making decisions now do perhaps that it would be difficult for an independent Scotland, given have a duty to be as “least wrong as possible” about the the SNP policy on nuclear deterrence, to retain the principle way things might look in the future. of providing a base for NATO nuclear deterrents. However, The point was raised that the main threats facing Scotland he observed that if Scotland expelled Trident from its na3onal today and in the future are from terrorism, organised waters, that decision would be frowned upon interna3onally, crime and cyber-crime. The main weapon against these and would be inconsistent with Scotland seeking membership is intelligence, and yet it was observed that the issue of of NATO. He added, however, that the UK should not be seen intelligence had not yet been addressed by the panel. as coercing Scotland to host UK nuclear deterrents, as this The ques3on was therefore posed as to how an form of coercion would also be frowned upon. independent Scotland might be expected to manage Lord Robertson added that it is part of NATO’s strategic in respect of intelligence. concept to ensure the par3cipa3on of allied states in collec3ve Lieutenant Colonel Crawford responded that an independent nuclear defence planning, and suggested that it would be Scotland would be unable to replicate the intelligence difficult for a non-nuclear state to seek to become a member structure which is currently in place in the UK, for example of NATO. He observed that, following the break-up of the GCHQ and all of the networks which feed into it. He did former Soviet Union, the Ukraine became a non-nuclear state, suggest, however, that there are aspects of UK intelligence but the nego3a3ons for this took 20 years, concluding in the in which Scotland plays an integral part. He suggested that decision that Russia would con3nue to use Sevastopol in the an independent Scotland would have to rely on the UK for Ukraine as a nuclear base. He pointed out that the speedy a lot of its informa3on, for example regarding terrorist removal of Trident, which Alex Salmond has promised as part of threats, but added that how much intelligence the UK Sco5sh independence, must be understood in that context. might be willing to share was conten3ous. He referred A point was raised that the 3tle of the discussion seminar to England’s par3cipa3on in the Five Eyes agreement 1 was ‘Defence and Interna3onal Rela3ons’, and the and suggested that the best an independent Scotland observa3on was made that Interna3onal Rela3ons has come could hope for would be to be a part of this.

1An intelligence opera3ons alliance between the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 5 up only sideways into the discussion. The whole panel were Dr O’Brien responded that an independent Scotland could invited to answer the ques3on; would an independent not dictate to NATO, and would simply not be able to adopt Scotland have a) the capability to iden fy an interna onal such a contradictory posi3on. He observed that Scotland rela ons stance and b) the credibility to ensure that stance could make the unilateral decision to become a non-nuclear is respected by the interna onal community? state, but it could not dictate to the rest of the UK, which will have much more power and pull over NATO than an In response, Professor Walker suggested that Scotland is independent Scotland could hope to have. He added that regarded with respect by the interna3onal community, as an assump3on can be made that Scotland and the UK would a place with many a4ributes, including a sound economy, have a desire to reach a coopera3ve solu3on to the nuclear good administra3on and a long democra3c history. When ques3on, should Scotland become independent. compared to other small states, he suggested, it is seen as a place that could easily run itself. He observed that most Professor Walker pointed out that any a4empt by an independent countries don’t want to see the UK broken up, but suggested Scotland to join NATO would have to come only a#er an that if this did occur, most would expect Scotland to be able agreement over the loca3on of the UK’s nuclear deterrent to run itself with ease. He added that many foreign diplomats had been reached between Scotland and the rest of the UK. He suggested that the most logical posi3on for the Sco5sh know Scotland well, and hold a deep respect for Scotland as Government to take would be to allow the current deterrent a na3on, and stated his expecta3on that an independent to be based in Scotland, but to refuse to allow the replacements, Scotland would be accepted by the interna3onal community. once these are ready. The likely 3meframe for this is between Lieutenant General Sir Alistair Irwin (Chair) reminded ten and twenty years, so this posi3on would be regarded by Professor Walker that the ques3on related to an independent the interna3onal community as quite reasonable. He added Scotland’s significance as an interna3onal player, as well as that NATO would find it difficult to turn down this posi3on. its acceptance by the interna3onal community, and asked Responding to this, Lieutenant Colonel Crawford observed him to comment on Scotland’s poten3al significance. that the SNP have not so far placed a firm 3metable on the Professor Walker responded that Scotland would obviously removal of nuclear weapons from the Clyde. Lord Robertson be a small power, and the UK would be a much greater observed that the problem the SNP will face is that they have power. He observed that the aspect which concerns foreign made it very clear that they want to expel Trident if Scotland governments about the poten3al breakup of the UK is not becomes independent, and have even proposed that this be so much whether Scotland would cope as an independent included in the wri4en cons3tu3on of an independent state, but rather how stable the remainder of the UK Scotland. He added that NATO is not a monolith, but is made would be and how it would relate to the EU. However, up of 28 member countries, so that every decision made by he acknowledged that Scotland could not expect to have NATO must be taken by consensus. He suggested that if other a large influence interna3onally. countries within NATO have accepted the shared responsibility of nuclear deterrence, they might find it difficult to accept a Lieutenant Colonel Crawford added that in terms of defence, state which has a policy of ul3mately rejec3ng this responsibility. the model for an independent Scotland that he developed in A ques3on was raised as to whether much thought has been his book, A' the Blue Bonnets: Defending an Independent given to the future interna3onal rela3ons between Scotland Scotland, accepts that Scotland would not have global scope and England in the event of Sco5sh independence. The for its defence policy. He suggested that in the absence of a ques3on put to the panel was: What would the transi on clear statement from the Sco5sh Government about what from domes c neighbour to interna onal partner be? its foreign policy might be, we can do no more than hypothesise about an independent Scotland’s poten3al Lord Robertson suggested that this would depend on the interna3onal rela3ons. nature of the debate that takes place between now and the referendum. He observed that, so far, the debate about Lord Robertson asserted that an independent Scotland would Scotland’s cons3tu3onal future is largely taking place in certainly be able to stand on its own two feet with regard to Scotland, and has been given li4le perspec3ve by the rest defence and interna3onal rela3ons, but suggested that the of the UK. Certain decisions, for example on the possibility real ques3on is why it would want to. He pointed out that of a currency union between an independent Scotland and Scotland is currently part of a union in which Scots play the rest of the UK, are not just between Scotland and Lon - a dispropor3onate role in the way the UK as a whole is run, don. There are other na3ons within the UK (Wales and and suggested that Scotland has its own na3on within the Northern Ireland) which might not be keen to share the UK already, with more powers to be devolved to Scotland pound with a Scotland which has claimed it will take 90% when the Scotland Act comes into force fully. of North Sea oil, for example. The ques3on was posed as to what NATO’s reac3on to an Professor Walker added that the ques3on of the UK’s independent Scotland seeking membership might be, if membership of the EU is currently seen as a more important at the same 3me Scotland was commi4ed to doing away issue in England than the ques3on of Scotland’s future with the Faslane base en3rely, given that this base is part membership of the UK. He suggested that the dimension of NATO’s strategy. introduced by the possibility of the UK leaving the EU 6 complicates greatly the poli3cs around the possibility of The Chair then asked the rest of the panel for their thoughts Sco5sh independence. on what opportuni3es and advantages might be accrued The ques3on was posed as to what the rela3onship between through having an independent defence force. an independent Sco5sh armed force and a UK armed force Professor Walker observed that an independent Scotland might be, bearing in mind that there are obvious economies would have the opportunity to make its own choices about of scale to be achieved through coopera3on. its levels of ac3vity and engagement. He suggested that the Dr O’Brien responded by asking, what does the rest of the UK had made some enormous mistakes in the past, and UK become if Scotland leaves? He suggested that people quoted the Iraq war as a per3nent example. He added that are not yet ready for this ques3on, and made the point that an independent Scotland would be free to make its own if Scotland does become independent, the UK will probably decisions, and poten3ally its own mistakes, observing that have to de-nuclearise. He observed that if the UK does scale there is a degree of responsibility and accountability which down its nuclear role on the interna3onal stage, it could inevitably goes with the power to make these choices. probably cooperate well with an independent Scotland. If the Professor Walker added that there is a role for small states UK wishes to remain a major world power, however, it will to play in diplomacy and conflict resolu3on, but suggested mesh well with NATO and the other NATO member states. that while there are certainly opportuni3es, there may also be risks, and that being a small state can be very lonely and Lieutenant General Sir Alistair Irwin made the point that uncomfortable. Scots are embedded within the en3rety of the UK armed forces, and suggested that to try and separate the UK Dr O’Brien made the point that people from smaller armed forces out into a Sco5sh-only and a UK-only segment countries tend to be happier, and suggested that there is would be organisa3onal pandemonium. He added that a ‘cosmic no3on’ that smaller na3ons are more op3mis3c. mutually-agreed coopera3on would probably be achieved He observed that the real advantages for an independent between two such forces eventually, but that this would Scotland would probably be found outside the arenas of not be possible un3l all of the complex organisa3onal aspects security and interna3onal rela3ons. of separa3ng out the armed forces had been addressed. Lord Robertson acknowledged that an independent Scotland He observed that this would be a long 3me coming. would have the op3on of remaining neutral, or of picking Lieutenant Colonel Crawford suggested that the rela3onship and choosing which opera3ons to become involved with. between separate UK and Sco5sh armed forces would be He pointed out that the SNP has suggested Scotland would based upon mutual coopera3on. He pointed out that there is take part only in UN-mandated opera3ons, and observed currently no army officer training school in Scotland, for that the war with Afghanistan was just such an opera3on. example, and that Sco5sh soldiers would therefore con3nue A final point was made that there is a democra3c component to go to Sandhurst to train. He stated that he could not to this debate which had not, so far, been men3oned. It was foresee a situa3on in which rela3onships between dis3nct observed that if Scotland does vote for independence, it will Sco5sh and UK forces are less than cordial. be vo3ng ‘Yes’ to doing things differently on an interna3onal Lord Robertson observed that the UK armed forces are highly scale, and that if mistakes are made, these will be made on integrated, and that they are respected and acknowledged Scotland’s own terms. across the world. He suggested that unpicking these forces would render the armed forces of both Scotland and the UK sub-scale and sub-op3mal. On the basis that two such forces Concluding remarks would be sharing and coopera3ng, he posed the ques3on of The seminar was brought to a close a#er a very engaging why we should consider separa3ng them in the first place. discussion, during which the audience posed both A ques3on was raised about the opportuni3es that would interes3ng and challenging ques3ons. be available to an independent Scotland with regard to A range of topics under the heading of Defence and the decisions it makes about interna3onal engagements. Interna3onal Rela3ons were addressed, and a range An independent Scotland, for example, would be able to of stances on the challenges and opportuni3es for an make its own decisions about whether or not to go to war. independent Scotland were explored by the panel. Lieutenant Colonel Crawford agreed that an independent The overwhelming point which emerged from the discussion Scotland would have the op3on to par3cipate in foreign was that ques3ons about Scotland’s cons3tu3onal future military engagements. He observed that much has been made, in the debate so far, of the idea that those in the armed forces are not thought to rest on whether an independent Scotland would have reduced opportuni3es in an independent Scotland. could manage its own defence and interna3onal rela3ons, However, he suggested that a reduc3on in the size of the military but rather on the ques3on of whether this is a preferable based in Scotland would not necessarily mean a reduc3on in alterna3ve to maintaining the Union. the number of commitments Scotland might have as a na3on. By opening up this ques3on and elucida3ng some of This means that there might actually be an increase in the arguments around it, this seminar sought to inform oppor tuni3es for those employed in the armed services and enlighten the public debate on this subject. in Scotland. 7 Reports of this and other events in the series are available at: www.royalsoced.org.uk

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