COUNTERINSURGENCY in NORTHERN IRELAND – a Case in Point?

2014 Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen COUNTERINSURGENCY IN NORTHERN IRELAND – a Case in Point? C.A. Beumer COUNTERINSURGENCY IN NORTHERN IRELAND – a Case in Point? ◦◦◦ Master thesis ◦◦◦ Christiaan Alexander Beumer SUPERVISORS Dr. R.A.A. Malejacq (Radboud University) Dr. T.B.F.M. Brinkel (NLDA) Nijmegen School of Management Human Geography Specialisation: ‘Conflicts, Territories, and Identities’ Radboud University Nijmegen July 2014 Acknowledgements This thesis reflects the research I conducted on the British counterinsurgency effort in Northern Ireland in order to complete the master programme ‘Conflicts, Territories, and Identities’ at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. It is the end result of an eventful year which has taught me a lot and allowed me to broaden my view upon our world. As an officer in the Royal Netherlands Navy, it was not implicit that I could take this path following the bachelor ‘Krijgswetenschappen’ I enjoyed at the Netherlands Defence Academy. I am therefore grateful that I have been given the opportunity to do so. The Troubles of Northern Ireland have intrigued me ever since I learnt about its existence as it represents a violent conflict that, contrary to ‘the norm’, took place within the realms of a highly developed Western state. In addition, I have always had a special interest in military operations in general. Hence, when the opportunity arose to take on an internship at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy, I found the perfect opportunity to combine these interests into a workable subject for my thesis. I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who have contributed to, or supported me in my research process. In particular Dr. Romain Malejacq, who was appointed to me as my first supervisor based at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, and Dr. Theo Brinkel, who facilitated my internship and with whom I have closely cooperated throughout my time at the Faculty of Military Science in Breda. Both have provided me with valuable advice and took their time to discuss the content of my thesis with me. Their critical look has contributed towards a better end result. Finally, special thanks to my family and my girlfriend, Myrthe, for their unwavering support throughout this past year. Wormerveer, July 2014 ------------------------------------ Christiaan Alexander Beumer i Summary In this thesis it is argued that Northern Ireland became the stage for a revolutionary war during the Troubles of 1969-98. The conflict is thus perceived as a politico-military struggle in which Republicans waged an insurgency in order to secede from the United Kingdom while the British government acted as a counterinsurgent to prevent them from doing so. Here, an insurgency is defined as an internal struggle in which a disaffected group (the insurgents) seeks to gain control of a nation. It is a hybrid form of conflict that combines subversion, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Counterinsurgency is its reactive strategy which is adopted by – or in aid of – the government defending the status quo. It covers the wide range of political and military efforts taken to prevent the insurgents from winning over the support of the population while simultaneously convincing this population of the government’s cause. This thesis shows that the outcome of the Troubles can be perceived as a counterinsurgency success because the British government retained its authority over Northern Ireland and achieved a settlement in which the Republican insurgency dwindled. Yet despite this relatively successful outcome, it is questionable whether the British government deployed a successful counterinsurgency strategy that led to this success. Therefore, the following question is central to this thesis: to what extent has the British government deployed a successful counterinsurgency strategy during the Troubles in Northern Ireland? It derives from the classical counterinsurgency paradigm to answer this question. Based on the works of leading classical counterinsurgency theorists such as Robert Thompson, David Galula, Frank Kitson, and Charles Gwynn – whose views take a central position within classical and contemporary counterinsurgency discourses, a five- point framework for analysis is used that largely corresponds with Thompson’s counterinsurgency principles. It reads as follows: 1) a clear political aim; 2) acting in accordance with the law and minimum use of force; 3) an overall plan and civil-military cooperation; 4) priority on political measures; and 5) intelligence. Rather than examining the Troubles as a whole, this thesis approaches the conflict as three subsequent phases that are based on the strategic approach of the British government. These phases are: (i) 1969-74: the militarisation phase; (ii) 1975-81: the Ulsterisation phase; and (iii) 1982-98: the politicisation phase and peace process. Each phase is analysed using the abovementioned five-point framework. This leads to the following findings: ii During the militarisation phase, the British army was deployed in aid of the civil power on what was believed to be a temporary basis. Initially, Westminster sought to avoid assuming full responsibility for the situation in Northern Ireland. This resulted in a primarily military approach that was unbacked by an equally determinant civil effort. In addition, the adaptation of poorly informed policies and a series of violent clashes between the Catholic-nationalist population and the government’s security forces led to a rapid alienation of this minority community. Overall, the counterinsurgency effort was not in line with the five points mentioned above and the British government thus performed poorly in regard to the counterinsurgency theory. During the Ulsterisation phase, the government sought to normalise the situation in Northern Ireland and adopted a policy based on the criminalisation of paramilitary organisations and the professionalization of the local security forces. In effect, this meant that the government adopted an internal security approach that was meant to de-politicalise (and thereby delegitimise) the Republican insurgency. In doing so, it did not prioritise the political aspect over the military aspect of the conflict. While considerable improvements were made in comparison to the militarisation phase, the British counterinsurgency effort was thus fatally flawed because it undermined the political nature of a primarily political conflict. During the politicisation phase and peace process, the British government’s approach towards the conflict remained largely unchanged. However, it did come to the realisation that it could not defeat the Republican insurgency. Instead, it sought to contain it using its security forces and the intelligence organisation. It was believed that this would eventually lead to the demise of the Republican insurgents. When the conflict eventually cumulated in a stalemate of which both the British government and the Republican insurgents were aware, the peace process began to take hold. Nevertheless, it was not until the 1990s before a substantial effort to tackle the sources of Catholic-nationalist discontent was undertaken and, while the counterinsurgency effort had significantly improved in comparison to the 1970s, the British government did not ‘win over’ the Catholic- nationalist population, nor had it set out to do so. The findings of this analysis lead to the conclusion that while the British government did develop an internal security approach that ultimately contained the Republican insurgency, it did not deploy a successful counterinsurgency strategy in keeping with the classical counterinsurgency theory. iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements i Summary ii Table of Contents iv List of Figures and Tables vi List of Acronyms vii Chapter One – Introduction 1 1.1 Research Objective and Questions 3 1.2 Scientific and Societal Relevance 4 1.3 Methodology 5 1.4 Structure 8 Chapter Two – Theoretical Framework 9 2.1 The Classical Counterinsurgency Paradigm 9 2.2 Revolutionary War 12 2.3 Insurgency 15 2.4 Counterinsurgency 20 2.5 Success in Counterinsurgency 21 2.6 Principles of Counterinsurgency: a Framework for Analysis 25 Chapter Tree – The Troubles of Northern Ireland 36 3.1 The Background to the Conflict 36 3.2 Warring Parties 38 3.3 Analysing the Troubles in Phases 41 Chapter Four – Counterinsurgency during the Militarisation Phase: 1969-74 45 4.1 A Clear Political Aim 46 4.2 Acting in Accordance with the Law and Minimum Force 48 4.3 An Overall Plan and Civil-Military Cooperation 51 4.4 Priority on Political Measures 52 4.5 Intelligence 54 4.6 Conclusion 55 Chapter Five – Counterinsurgency during the Ulsterisation Phase: 1975-81 56 5.1 A Clear Political Aim 57 5.2 Acting in Accordance with the Law and Minimum Force 59 5.3 An Overall Plan and Civil-Military Cooperation 61 iv 5.4 Priority on Political Measures 64 5.5 Intelligence 66 5.6 Conclusion 68 Chapter Six – Counterinsurgency during the Politicisation Phase and Peace Process: 1982-98 69 6.1 A Clear Political Aim 70 6.2 Acting in Accordance with the Law and Minimum Force 72 6.3 An Overall Plan and Civil-Military Cooperation 74 6.4 Priority on Political Measures 77 6.5 Intelligence 78 6.6 Conclusion 79 Chapter Seven – Conclusion 81 7.1 Conclusions 81 7.2 Implications and Recommendations for Further Research 86 References 88 Appendices 96 v List of Figures and Tables Figure A.1 Map of Northern Ireland viii Figure 2.1 Logic for Assignment of Case Outcomes as used by Paul et al. 22 Figure 2.2 Support

Load more