IRAQ’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE: ELECTIONS AND BEYOND Middle East Report N°94 – 25 February 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. LESSONS FROM THE 2009 PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS ....................................... 2 A. STRIKING OUTCOME ....................................................................................................................2 B. LESSONS LEARNED ......................................................................................................................7 1. Maliki and his party .....................................................................................................................7 2. The main rival parties ..................................................................................................................8 3. Independents ..............................................................................................................................10 III. PRE-ELECTION POSITIONING................................................................................. 12 A. ELECTORAL POLITICS AND ALLIANCE FORMATION ...................................................................12 1. The Iraqi National Alliance........................................................................................................13 2. The State of Law list..................................................................................................................15 3. Two secular alliances: Unity of Iraq and Iraqiya......................................................................17 4. The Kurdistani Alliance.............................................................................................................18 B. THE ELECTORAL LAW CONTROVERSY .......................................................................................19 1. Amending the 2005 law.............................................................................................................19 2. The Hashimi veto.......................................................................................................................22 C. POLARISING POLITICS ................................................................................................................27 IV. FORMING A GOVERNMENT..................................................................................... 33 V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 36 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ...................................................................................................................................38 B. GOVERNORATES AND DISTRICTS .....................................................................................................39 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................40 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2007 ..........41 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................43 Middle East Report N°94 25 February 2010 IRAQ’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE: ELECTIONS AND BEYOND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS As a rule, Iraq’s post-Saddam elections have tended to neither they – nor the underlying ethnic and confessional magnify pre-existing negative trends. The parliamentary fault line they reflected – are close to genuine resolution. polls to be held on 7 March are no exception. The focus on electoral politics is good, no doubt, but the run-up has The mid-January announcement by the Accountability highlighted deep-seated problems that threaten the fragile and Justice Commission (AJC) that it would disqualify recovery: recurring election-related violence; ethnic 511 candidates for alleged ties to the banned Baath party tensions over Kirkuk; the re-emergence of sectarianism; was the most disturbing. The decision was blindly adopted and blatant political manipulation of state institutions. The by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC); most egregious development was the decision to disqualify Prime Minister Maliki’s government proceeded to em- over 500 candidates, a dangerous, arbitrary step lacking brace it and then pressured the appeal panel to perform due process, yet endorsed by the Shiite ruling parties. a hasty and cursory review. Most appeals were denied. The Under normal circumstances, that alone might have suf- episode caused havoc, raising questions about the AJC’s ficed to discredit the elections. But these are not normal legal standing, the judiciary’s credibility, the electoral circumstances, and for the sake of Iraq’s stability, the commission’s legitimacy and ability to fairly administer elections must go on. At a minimum, however, the inter- the polls, and thus the election’s integrity as a whole – national community should ramp up its electoral moni- not least because the AJC’s leaders themselves are par- toring and define clear red lines that need to be respected liamentary candidates. A naked power play with sectar- if the results are to be considered legitimate. And it ian overtones in that its most prominent victims are Sunni should press the next government to seriously tackle Arabs, it also reopened old wounds and cast a troubling the issue – long-neglected yet never more critical – of light on Maliki, who only a year ago had won votes by national reconciliation. eschewing sectarian rhetoric and has pledged to stitch together a broad non-sectarian electoral alliance. Over the past year, there were grounds to believe that Iraq’s post-war wounds were healing and that the pri- Thankfully, there is little talk of boycott, as the spectre mary challenge had become one of state building. De- of 2005 – when Sunni Arabs shunned the polls and thus spite a spate of high-profile attacks in Baghdad and voluntarily disenfranchised themselves – looms heavy. lower-level ones elsewhere, violence was down. Politics That said, in the absence of an impartial internal monitor, took centre stage. The outcome of the January 2009 the international community – primarily the U.S., EU provincial elections was a setback to the more openly and UN – now has an even greater responsibility to en- sectarian parties and brought a change in local govern- sure that these flawed elections are damaged no further ment. Most significantly, perhaps, those elections marked and to clearly define the requirements for them to be the Sunni Arabs’ unambiguous acceptance of and entry considered legitimate. Iraqi and international observers into the political and institutional arena that they had once should be able to deploy freely to all polling stations and massively rejected and violently resisted. monitor both the vote and vote count. They should, in particular, observe the conduct of institutions and agen- But simmering conflicts were not long to come to a boil. cies whose impartial role will be critical in ensuring free Negotiations over an electoral law in the second half of and fair elections: the Supreme Court and IHEC, as well the year took far longer than anticipated, forcing a five- as the military and police. Blatant interference or mas- week election delay. The perennially difficult question sive fraud should be seen and stated as red lines that of Kirkuk’s administrative status, as well as Sunni Arab will force a review of how the international community concerns that refugees would not be fully represented, views a future government. further stood in the way. These finally were overcome with the help of external pressure and mediation but Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond Crisis Group Middle East Report N°94, 25 February 2010 Page ii That leaves what happens after the elections, assuming 3. Reform the Accountability and Justice Commission they pass this threshold. The question then will be as a matter of priority by setting clear criteria and whether the incoming government is able and willing to procedures embedded in law, and providing de- address the country’s numerous political deficiencies, from Baathification with a time horizon of a maximum sectarianism to politicised institutions and much in be- of two years, at which point all remaining files should tween. Serious work toward national reconciliation is long be closed and the effort terminated. overdue. This time, forming a coalition government and holding it up as an example of national unity will not To Members of the International Community suffice. There will have to be meaningful progress on (notably the UN, EU and U.S.): opening up political space, increasing cross-sectarian par- 4. Play an assertive role in ensuring the elections are ticipation and improving transparency and accountability. free, fair, transparent and inclusive. Reform of de-Baathification should be a priority, at least 5. Define clearly and publicly what constitute red lines to set clear criteria and procedures embedded in law; the that, if crossed, would discredit the elections, notably: process should also be given a time horizon of a maxi- mum of two years, at which point all remaining files a) discouraging voters from reaching polling stations should be closed and the effort terminated. In this endeav- for lack of security; our, it will remain critical for members of the international b) obstructing their