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James Stewart Martin – All Honorable ALL HONORABLE MEN All Honorable Men by James Stewart Martin Little, Brown and Company . Boston I950 COPYRIGHT 1950, BY JAMES STEWART MARTEN Published September IQ~ To my children, members of a generation entitled to ask, "What did you do about it?" The material from Decision in Germany by Lucius 1). Clay is i by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc. Preface and Acknowledgments ANY man has a right to stop after a chain o harrowing experi- ences and to ask why things happened as they did. Our generation has had its share of harrowing experiences and therefore the pe- culiar chain of circumstances that kept me enmeshed for five and one half years was not unusual. It is not simply the rebirth of German nationalism and Nazism that occasioned the writing of this book, nor even the return to power of the industrialists who put the Nazis in. These events in themselves are significant. But more so is the fact that, along with them, action was aborted on other questions in Germany: questions of the treatment of organized labor, the improvement of agriculture, the reform of public education, the public ownership or control of industry, and others just as basic. As the postwar pattern unfolded, this chain of events in Germany became more and more of a piece with a larger pattern. In this book I have tried to tell the story of an important problem and some of the things that happened when we tried to deal with it. Though many of the events occurred in Germany, before and dur- ing the military occupation, they seemed in an increasing degree to be echoes of something more fundamental that was happening hack in the United States. For whatever reason, the larger pattern is a repetition of what followed after World War I; but the pace has been quicker, as though greater powers were moving more rapidly toward a more catastrophic result. Some people assume that everything is somehow connected with the cold war, and that any other course than the one we are pursu- ing has been rendered impossible by disagreements with Russia. ... Vlll PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This is surely an oversimplification. Disagreements with Russia have been a major issue for only twenty or thirty years, whereas the pattern I have traced in this book has been unfolding for a much longer period. If this work has any lasting value, acknowledgment is due to the men and women who staffed the Economic Warfare Section of Contents the Department of justice and the Decartelization Branch of Mili- tary Government, and whose reports of their researches and in- vestigations brought together the fabric of this story. Mention should Preface and Acknowledgments vii also be made of the many factual materials furnished to us in Ger- many by the Foreign Funds Control Division of the Treasury De- PART I Private Worlds partment and the Finance Division of Military Government. For her help in the preparation of this book I owe a debt of I The Fraternity House gratitude to my wife, Caroline Collins Martin, who not only worked 2 The Termites with me during the last strenuous year in Berlin, hut also cast a critical eye on the manuscript at every stage of its development. For 3 The Heavy Timbers help of various kinds I owe thanks to Johnston Avery, Charles C. 4 The Fraternity Brothers Baldwin, Stringfellow Barr, Scott Buchanan, Norman Burster, Francis W. Laurent, Russell Nixon, Alexander Sacks, Peter Weiss, 5 Hare and Hounds and others too numerous to mention. Special thanks are due to 6 Seek and Find Virginia Marino, who returned from Germany to work tirelessly on every phase of the book from first rough draft to finished page 7 The Heavies proofs. Many of the highlights are the result of the thoughtful sug- 8 The Cantilevers gestions of these people. The faults are my own. For the necessary time away from other employment to do the g Banks of the Rhine writing, I am indebted to the generosity of Leon and Sonia Mohill; io The New Hague Convention for time to prepare the manuscript for the press, to my present em- ployers, the Foundation for World Government; and for research 11 Electric Eels facilities, to the Library of Congress. PART 11 The Lapse of a Policy JAMESSTEWART MARTIN Annapolis, Maryland 12 The Call of the Wild June 6,1950 13 The Hollow Squares 14 Reducing Exercises I; Sabotage 16 The Christmas-tree Economy CONTENTS 17 Double, Double Toil 18 The Decline and Fall 19 The Nineteen PART I 20 The Hand in the German Glove 21 Microcosm and Macrocosm Private Worlds 22 Angels and Men Index CHAPTER I The Fraternity House THE day I started to write this we discovered termites in the base- ment. We were preparing to build a wing on our old house and found a colony of them in the heavy timbers. Termites are able organizers, and thoroughly attached to their way of life. The area they occupy is small in relation to the house- just the heavy underpinnings. They object vigorously to outside interference from the people who live in the other parts of the house. They object especially to structural changes, which they are bound to consider unwarranted. They have two good reasons for objecting to changes. In the first place exposure to light and air kills them. In the second place any movement of the underpinnings ruins the whole structure of tunnels and channels which their enterprise has built within the framework of the house. We hated to disturb them. They looked busy and enterprising. They seemed to want nothing more than a comfortable existence in accordance with their way of life. We cleared the termites out to save the house, but I think I know how they looked at the whole matter. At the end of the Second World War I spent two and a half years in Germany dealing with some people who must think pretty much the same way. My story goes back to 1938, when I was a lawyer recently turned college professor. I was serving as general counsel and treasurer, as well as teaching, at St. John's College in Annapolis, the "Great Books" college. Between reading the famous list of one hundred great books and untangling the college finances I found only occa- sional opportunities for the pastime of studying international affairs and the movements of international business. Certainly I had no 4 ALL HONORABLE MEN THE FRATERNITY HOUSE 5 intention at the time of becoming actively involved with inter- vast sweep of their arrangements, reminded one of an ancient Greek national monopolies or with the Germans who backed World epic. I began to piece together a story from a growing collection of War 11. newspaper clippings. The cases Arnold and his men were talking My introduction to the specific problem of the German cartels was about had to do with a series of arrangements dating back for a casual, almost accidental. On my infrequent days off I usually took decade or so, to 1926 and 1929, when international agreements a busman's holiday and went to Washington to listen to arguments among some of the biggest American, British and German firms in the Supreme Court or to visit friends, most of whom were had quietly divided up the world. government lawyers. Washington was a happy place in 1938. Ex- What I heard and read of these antitrust cases and the new sort cept for a lawyer's usual concern to keep the details of pending of international brotherhood they implied -a business brotherhood cases confidential, the exchange of fact and opinion between citizen more solidly built than the "international finance" of past genera- and public servant was normal. The talk with my friends was tions- began to bring other events closer to home. In mid-March about law. I swapped stories about our troubles in carrying a half- 1939, when a group of some of the largest British and German million dollars in debts without throwing the college into bank- industrialists gathered at Dusseldorf to map plans for the economic ruptcy, for stories about their troubles in enforcing the Securities collaboration between their two countries, the press barely reported Exchange Act and the antitrust laws. the meetings. I might have skipped the news items entirely had I Throughout this period there were occasional rumblings in the not been already familiar with the subject matter. It was impossible press from Thurman Arnold, who was complaining about the to overlook the fact that the industrialists who were meeting at international affairs of some American corporations. These com- Dusseldorf were from the same groups of companies which ten panies were often mentioned in connection with the German dye- years earlier had arranged the three-way split of the world's markets. stuffs and chemical trust formed about twelve years earlier, known The growing conviction that these private international arrange- as the I.G. Farbenindustrie. Other foreign companies too were ments were important was brought to a head by my encounter with mentioned. Most of them would have been familiar to constant the German ex-chancellor, Heinrich Bruning, early in 1940, during readers of the financial pages, but they were not as well known the pied of the "phony war." St. John's College invited Dr, among the general public as their American counterparts would be. Bruning to give a lecture about the last days of the German Re- Later on, during the war, the subject of private international public and how he had been deposed to make way for Hitler.
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