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Home , Culture, Hybridity

or Hybridisation? Cultural Mixing and *

By Paolo Gomarasca (Catholic of the Sacred Heart of Milan)

Abstract The aim of this article is to analyse the recent debate on the end of multiculturalism. It has become a commonplace to say that multiculturalism has failed because of its presumed differentialism, i.e. its tendency to conceive different cultures as cognitive islands. The competing model is characterised by an intercultural approach. The article firstly intends to demonstrate that this is a false alternative within limits. Contrary to popular caricature, one version of multiculturalism is in fact attuned to the emphasis on cultural exchanges and connections. The problem is that the differentialist version has become the standard version of multiculturalism. That is why the article further argues for the importance of the concept of hybridisation as a way of moving beyond the controversy over multiculturalism’s supposed failures. Hybridisation suggests one aspect which can be considered relevant: Cultures are originally and intrinsically intertwined. Finally, the article investigates the political implication of this concept of culture and tries to justify the request that cultural mixing processes should be channelled within the political framework of democracy, especially at the level of civil . Keywords: multiculturalism, hybridisation, cultural mixing, civil society

Introduction come to a dead end due to the fact that ‘both What is the political implication of cultural opponents and proponents of multiculturalism’ – hybridisations? Is it possible (and politically jus- as Benhabib suggests –, ‘despite disclaimers to tifiable) to implement democracy by following a the contrary, continue to defend a faulty under- ‘mestizo logic’? In order to address this question, standing of cultures as unified, holistic, and self- I shall start, in section one, by tackling the issue consistent wholes’ (Benhabib 2002: 86). Hence, of the so-called backlash against multicultural- section two sketches the phenomenon of cultural ism and the competing model of . hybridisation and advocates for an idea of culture With respect to this opposition, the first step of as a fabric of processes. This leads to the my argument is to justify hybridisation as a third second step of my argument: If culture, as hybrid- approach to . In my opinion, the ity suggests, ‘is made through change’ (Modood result of the discussion between opponents and 2007: 86), I believe it is important to examine proponents of multiculturalism seems to have the specific contexts and conditions in which cul- tural changes occur. In particular, my theoretical * An early version of this paper was presented and concern is with two basic conditions of democ- discussed in 2008 in Amman (Jordan) at the annual racy: a) civil society, and b) ‘good governance’. conference of the International Scientific Committee a) In section three, I discuss the key for of Oasis Foundation on “Religious Freedom: An asset for every society”. I thank the Committee Members the associational sphere of ‘civility’, where ‘new for their helpful comments and questions. forms of sociability and solidarity’ (UNESCO

Diversities Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013 ISSN 2079-6595, www..org/shs/diversities/vol15/issue2/art6 © UNESCO Diversities Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013 • ISSN 2079-6595 P. Gomarasca

2009: 237) can generate cultural hybridisations stance: With reference to the position he held through dialogue and cooperation. in The Politics of Recognition (1994), and specifi- b) In section four, I further argue that this cally in regard to the case of Québec, Taylor has --based dimension of hybridity in declared ‘a rejection of Canadian multicultural- the sphere of civil society needs to be comple- ism and a call for interaction and integration’ mented by an institutional framework: That is (Bouchard and Taylor 2008: 19). That is to say why emphasis is also placed on ‘good gover- that, owing to the recognition of minority rights, nance’, i.e. the standards of democratic legiti- the diversity between groups has become an macy, especially openness, participation and obstacle to cultural exchanges and then a seri- accountability. The idea is that civil society must ous claim against the originally advocated soci- itself satisfy this of standards. This demo- etal integration. cratic consistency should ensure that hybridity The domain of political correctness is now can play a role in building a unitary political com- occupied by another discourse, with the inten- munity through diversity. tion to pay more attention to the relation between persons from different cultures, with- 1. ‘Requiem’ for multiculturalism? out obviously denying their dissimilarity. As a ‘Multiculturalism is dead’: thus announced the consequence, it is trendy (at least in Europe) to Daily Mail in July 2006. Rather than giving cause speak the of interculturality, a concept for mourning, this state of affairs is a case for somehow naïvely contrasted with the old mul- relief, even if mixed with a touch of resentment ticultural refrain, as happens – for instance – in at this far too late demise of the concept of multi- the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. As to , not to mention at the introduction of the shareable goal to build an inclusive society the concept in the first place.1 This global refusal based on the of , the White would remain inexplicable without the securiti- Paper states that the intercultural dialogue ‘is sation caused by the fear of terrorism, as argued understood as an open and respectful exchange by Aggestam and Hill (2008: 106). Fragmented of views between individuals, groups with dif- pluralism, considered a necessary outcome of ferent ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic multiculturalism, threatens social and political backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual cohesion. And diversity without unity seems the understanding and respect’ (Council of Europe breeding ground for and groups Ministers of Foreign Affairs 2008: 10). whose loyalty to a transnational might There is no doubt that ‘open and respectful lead them into acts of violence against their own exchange of views’ and ‘mutual understanding fellow citizens. and respect’ are essential building blocks of dem- The test of this generalised backlash (Vert- ocratic society. In particular, it is impossible for ovec and Wessendorf 2010) is that even some of dialogue to take place in the absence of respect the supporters of multicultural policies are now for freedom of opinion and expression. However, convinced they made the wrong choice. Note- it may possibly be considered naïve to think, as worthy, from this point of view, is Taylor’s recent it seems in certain parts of the document, that equal respect is a sufficient condition ‘to ensure 1 It can be useful to suggest a shared definition of that dialogue is governed by the force of argu- multiculturalism and some key features regarding the ment rather than the argument of force’ (Council state of the . As clearly stated by Song, ‘multicultur- of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs 2008: 19). alism is a body of thought in political about the proper way to respond to cultural and religious di- ‘Freedom – as clearly stated by UNESCO (2009: versity. Mere toleration of group differences is said to 198) – is meaningless so long as the necessary fall short of treating members of minority groups as conditions for its effective exercise have not equal citizens; recognition and positive accommoda- been ensured.’ From this practical point of view, tion of group differences are required through group- differentiated rights, a term coined by Will Kymlicka’ I think that Arendt’s view is correct: ‘not the loss (Song 2010). of specific rights, but the loss of a

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willing and able to guarantee any rights what- It is therefore undeniable the weight of a cer- soever’ (Arendt 1973: 297) is the fundamental tain multicultural which is typically ‘dif- deprivation of human rights. The deprivation of ferentialist’ (Ritzer 2010: 245); and it is true that ‘a place in the world which makes opinions sig- this ideology has contributed to causing serious nificant and actions effective’, continues Arendt, impasses in managing cultural differences. Yet turns freedom of opinion into a fool’s freedom, again, the alternative to differentialism is more for nothing ‘the others’ think matters anyhow. complex than a (nevertheless important) call to That is why I believe that the crucial point of the ‘the willingness and capacity to listen to the views White Paper is rather when it identifies the ‘key of others’ (Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign role for the associational sphere of civic soci- Affairs 2008: 17). ety where, premised on reciprocal recognition, It must be remembered, however, that multi- intercultural dialogue can resolve the problems culturalism cannot be tout court identified with of daily life in a way that governments alone differentialist ideology. This is what Kymlicka cannot’ (Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign states in response to his critics, though the argu- Affairs 2008: 20). As I will try to demonstrate in ment whereby multiculturalism is bound to spark the conclusion, ‘civil society’ can function exactly disruptive phenomenona is not new (Sandel as the place advocated by Arendt, where we 1997). On the contrary, – writes Kymlicka – ‘mul- (‘us’ with ‘the others’) can collaborate in building ticulturalism-as-citizenization is a deeply (and a common understanding and realise practices of intentionally) transformative project, both for coexistence.2 minorities and majorities’ (Kymlicka 2010: 39).3 Therefore I consider ‘civil society’ a stronger This approach does not intend to turn mul- starting point than a generic call to intercul- ticulturalism into a fetish to be dogmatically tural dialogue when it comes to finding a preserved, excluding a priori the possibility to to foster ‘a sense of common purpose’ (Council explore alternative solutions to the dilemmas of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs 2008: 17). of a plural society. It can therefore be admitted That call, although necessary, is at risk of remain- that, seen from this viewpoint, Kymlicka’s liberal ing abstract, purely theoretical. Consequently, it multiculturalism does not seem that different is not sufficient, in my opinion, for replying to from the intercultural model, as it shares the lat- an anti-Kantian objection like that of Iris Young, ter’s political goal of achieving a form of integra- who invites to discuss (that is, ‘dispose of’) the tion based on the respect for differences, within oppressive (western) chimera of ‘a mythical com- the framework fixed by the human rights revolu- mon good’ (Young 1990: 119): If indeed the com- tion. mon good is rejected as a sign of white/bour- In conclusion, if we admit that multicultur- geois domination over the world, then ‘a sense of alism tries, as Alexander would say, to build common purpose’ is not enough. But we cannot ‘a shared understanding’ (Alexander 2003: 114) content ourselves, as Young would, with a mere within civil life, on which alone to build a sense of show of differences, even if only because the ‘we-ness’ (Alexander 2006: 43), it seems that this so-called neglected minorities can become just model, at least in Kymlicka’s liberal version, still as oppressive as the hateful West (Barry 2001). enjoys good . But why then rejoice in its Secondly, promoting difference at any cost, as if death? How is it that everyone, except for Kym- cultures were pieces, cognitive islands licka and very few others, has failed to under- to be left alone, has actually exacerbated some stand that multiculturalism is the best hope for already difficult relations between ethnic groups. building just and inclusive around the world? 2 The White Paper rightly argues that ‘diversity with- out any overarching common humanity and solidarity would make mutual recognition and social inclusion 3 Some other arguments in defense of multicultural- impossible’ (Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign ism are presented, for example, by Parekh (2000) as Affairs 2008: 14). well as Laden and Owen (2007).

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The question, as stated above, is actually more views between individuals, groups with differ- complex than the multiculturalism/intercultural- ent ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic back- ity controversy: Opposition to multiculturalism grounds’. This , i.e. understanding of may emanate from different sources. Three pos- cultures and identities as self-consistent entities sible scenarios can be sketched. (or mosaic of entities), may be criticised on the 1) Opposition can firstly be motivated by basis of new forms of immigration. Think, for an oblique (or not so oblique) xenophobia, as example, about the growth of multilingualism noticed by Grillo (2010: 31). Many so-called in the UK: Compared to this growing linguistic ‘new right’ movements, a significant factor in complexity, the essentialist representation of local and national politics across Europe, have cultures provides – as Vertovec noticed – ‘a mis- charged multiculturalism with a dangerous leading, one-dimesional appreciation of contem- ‘excess of alterity’, which aims to counter national porary diversity’ (Vertovec 2010: 66). cohesion. This paranoid vision is obviously unjus- It is then this call to take more sufficient tifiable, not to say dangerous, considering that account of the of migration that explains, mainstream politicians sometimes echo such in my opionion, a justifiable opposition to mul- populist voices. ticulturalism (and also to some version of the 2) But there is another possible explanation, interculturalist model). It also explains why even linked to the fact that multicultural theory does Amselle, who shares with Kymlicka a rejection not exactly match multicultural policy. Assum- of earlier models of the unitary, homogeneous ing this non-coincidence, one can plausibly -state, does not side with the -support think that the mentioned backlash is a polemic ers of interculturalism. The proposal he puts reaction against the shortcomings of certain so- forward, ‘an originary or lack of dis- called ‘multiculturalist’ agendas: Many migration tinctness’ (Amselle 1998: 1), is definitely more policies have been based on a highly simplified or radical and cannot be interpreted as assimila- occasionally somewhat distorted version of mul- tionism in disguise. It involves an effort to chal- ticulturalism. That being the case, I would here lenge the supposed ‘natural’ frontiers between endorse Taylor in saying that the European attack the ethnic groups as a political solution against on multiculturalism often seems a classic case racialisation. of , blaming phenomena of This famous endorsement of ‘mestizaje’, i.e. ‘a the ghettoisation of immigrants, instead of rec- kind of Spanish-American conceptualisation of ognising the home-grown failures in promoting hybridity’ (Stockhammer 2012: 16), needs to be integration and combating discrimination (Taylor discussed. As argued in the next parapraph, an 2012: 414). alternative understanding of culture is required. 3) Finally, there is a third possible source of What seems clear, for the moment, is that the criticism, which I consider reasonable. Aside ‘mestizo logic’ – as Canclini accentuates –rep- from the difficulties in translating multicultural resents a ‘detonating’ idea, which ‘has altered theory into practice, I believe that the dominant the manner of speaking about identity, culture, political bias towards the differentialist ideol- difference, inequality, (and) multiculturalism’ ogy is not only a caricature. I argue that multi- (Canclini 2005: 23). In this light, it becomes even cultural theory involves a specific anthropologi- more interesting to notice the ‘refined, sophisti- cal assumption concerning how human beings cated, self-critical and moderate multiculturalism’ are seen. From this point of view, Sen’s analysis proposed by Modood (2007: 98, 112): ‘we have seems to me correct: Multiculturalism tends to be flexible’ – writes Modood – ‘to the form to classify individuals and groups by a singular that this takes. Hence, multiculturalism can take (ethnic, above all) identity. Interestingly, we can a hybridic, multiculture, urban melange form’. detect the same ‘solitarist illusion’ (Sen 2006: 82) But how can the practice of cultural hybridi- in certain parts of the White Paper: e.g., where sation constitute a real alternative to essentialist interculturalism is defined as an ‘exchange of models of multiculturalism whilst avoiding the

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naïve rethoric of certain representations of inter- generated and structured through ongoing pro- cultural dialogue? cesses of communicative negotiation, both inter- nal and external. That is why cultural identities, 2. From ‘travelling cultures’ to ‘mestizo as suggested in the image of travelling cultures, democracy’ are fragile achievements in weaving together dif- As a process of encounter and fusion of differ- ferent and occasionally conflicting into ent cultures, mestizaje has always accompanied a unique (and always hybrid) life . That human history. In spite of all paranoid delusions is why ‘cultural humility’ (UNESCO 2013: 24) is, of purity, the fact of hybridisation demonstrates in my opinion, a necessary skill to practice and that persons and cultures are originally and manage the hybridisation processes within dem- intrinsically mixed. This is a fundamental lesson ocratic frameworks. from cultural : Despite past com- Naturally, the travel may also plicity with the colonial régimes, it is up to the become ideological: In opposition to the objecti- ethno-anthropological to help decon- fication of cultures, one could be invited to wan- struct the so-called ‘ of the Framework’, by der around the world in a ‘rhizomatic’ (Deleuze discovering that cultures are not self-referential and Guattari 1994) way, taking a bit of everything. monoliths. This is a myth, according to Bernstein, Besides, it is well known that Kroeber (1963: 68), that compromises dialogue (Bernstein 2010: one of the founding fathers of cultural anthropol- 390). On the contrary, cultures are never-ending ogy, argued that ‘cultures can blend to almost any processes of self-understanding and interchange. degree’. As a result, cultural identities are often By right, as Amselle points out, we should not considered less important than they used to be; even speak of a culture in itself, because cultural what counts is only the possibility of altering the identities arise from a structured field ofrela- individual, i.e., the possibility of being deeply tions. non-identical and fitting into any situation. So we have to go with the flow, or – as Clifford As far as I can see, it is undisputable that cul- says – with ‘travelling cultures’ (Clifford 1997). Of tures are ‘miscible’. But things are less obvious course, as they travel, people and cultures meet than an indiscriminate fusion of differences. This and may, in fact, mix. That means that under- ‘tourist hybridism’ is based on the perfect conti- standing the hybridisation processes is possible nuity between cultures, which seems to me an on the basis of a new conceptualisation of cul- unverifiable datum. Therefore, I consider more ture. Outside the travel metaphor, I follow here convincing the conclusions drawn by Lévi-Strauss the narrative account claimed by . (1977: 331) at his famous seminar on identity: Cultures, according to Benhabib (2002: 5), are ‘Between two cultures, between two living spe- ‘complex human practices of signification and cies as close as imaginable, there is always a dif- representation, of organization and attribution, ferential gap and […] this differential gap cannot which are internally riven by conflicting narra- be bridged.’ tives. Cultures are formed through complex dia- ‘Differential gap’ means that cultures have logues with other cultures.’ What is important to their specific identity, with different narratives, stress in the present definition is that dialogue intersecting and possibly mixing with each other. is a constitutive element of every culture, not Consequently, hybridisation requires both the an extrinsic duty to act ‘interculturally’. Inter- vector of similarity and continuity and the vec- culturality is then, first of all, a question of life, tor of difference and rupture. The first vector is because daily social life, as clearly phrased by the condition of contact and potential mixing; UNESCO (2013: 32), is a ‘fabric’ of relationships, the second vector is the condition of identity. On made of ‘lasting cross-cultural personal bonds’. this account, it seems reasonable to doubt the The argument that justifies this narrative defini- simplistic view that cultures are fluxes without tion of culture is simple: We are born into and breaks in continuity: conceptually, because this live in webs of interlocution, then our culture is ‘essentialist anti-essentialism’ – in Kompridis’

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terms – impedes the realisation that ‘the lack mative interpenetration is not indiscriminate of any identification with our culture renders hybridism because Burke bridles its process us indifferent to its fate, indifferent to its future within a working logic that – for him – is specific possibilities as much as to its past injustices’ to métissage: ‘a hermeneutical unity-in-diversity’. (Kompridis 2005: 340); politically, because it is In doing so, he can simultaneously avoid falling untrue that anything can so happily mix with back into an assimilationist position, as unity-in- anything. Conflict, as stated in the famous Mem- diversity is also a logic ‘beyond the unum-pluri- orandum for the study of (Redfield, bus divide’4 (Burke 2002: 20, 156, 10). Linton and Herskowits 1936: 152), can occur as a possible outcome of contact between differ- Let us now test his model. ent narratives. Besides, how can it be claimed First of all, I need to confirm my original -per that hybridisation is always and always and ever plexity: There is no guarantee that hybridisa- enriching for persons and cultures? The reality tion processes evolve as Burke would like, i.e., in is that ‘the borrowings or hybrid forms to which with a mutually enriching exchange. cultural diversity gives rise can take the form of In addition, this exchange, which could happen reductive syntheses that are little more than ste- anywhere in varying degrees, is not guaranteed reotypes’ (UNESCO 2009: 164). to be beneficial even to democratic cohabitation. However, an uncritical advocacy of hybridi- The hybridisation process – it is worth repeating – sation tends to overemphasise cultural mixing can entail the very type of conflict charged to the phenomena as a quasi-magical solution to the differentialist version of multiculturalism. problems of negotiating difference in democratic In Burke’s proposal, however, there is a philo- societies. It follows that this debate between sophically crucial point that needs stressing. To supporters and opponents of hybridisation is explain the mestizo logic of unity-in-diversity, liable to a fruitless clash: Burke refers to Gadamer (Pantham 1992: 132). (a) differentialism (identity without flux, i.e., The argument, in short, is that ‘unity-in-diversity closed, fixed identities); and urges a sense of community through hetero- (b) indiscriminate hybridism (flux without geneity, each culture contributing both to the identity). community and to one another without any one I would try to avoid this dead end. From this culture necessarily becoming hegemonic’ (Burke point of view, it can be interesting to evaluate 2002: 50). a political suggestion based on Burke’s Mestizo ‘Community through heterogeneity’ is an Democracy (Burke 2002). Surely, there is an interesting way to refer to the universal by avoid- exaggerated nonchalance in using the phenom- ing two extremes: enon of hybridity to qualify a political order. Here (a) the abstract and hegemonic placement of it is worth remembering Clifford’s caution, in say- the universal, which assimilates differences; ing that blending processes are unpredictable, (b) the renunciation of the universal, which for ‘the politics of hybridity is conjunctural and eliminates even the political (Laclau cannot be deduced from theoretical principles’ 2000: 305). (Clifford 1997: 10). According to Burke, we have to think of a com- That said, Burke’s proposal seems at least an mon good, if we do not intend to renounce the attempt to avoid both ideological extremes (dif- political project of living together; but we can ferentialism/hybridism). His intention is precisely think of it dynamically, as hybridsation processes to go ‘beyond Eurocentric castings of multicul- suggest: turalism’, i.e., differentialism: ‘Rather than ren- dering cultures in terms of ‘us v. them’ – a poli- 4 tics of possessive identity – a mestizo democracy ‘One-many divide’. The idea is, in a nutshell, that mestizo democracy guarantees a space in which cul- accents how cultures dynamically interpenetrate tures encounter each other as equals, without privi- and transform each other.’ Now, this transfor- leging one culture over others.

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In a unity-in-diversity the substantive com- directing the civil movements within democratic mon good is not static but, rather, persistently . Diversity-in-unity is critical, because contested and reconfigured through democratic it is at this political level, as Carr suggests, that engagement among diverse persons and cultures we should try to answer the following question: in public life (Burke 2002: 169). ‘How might the members of disparate groups sus- This conception of a dynamic common good tain their independent group identities and still is the ‘natural’ outcome of a democratic process come to regard one another as fellow citizens in of dialogue between different groups; or, to be a common polity? This is the problem of e pluri- more precise, a dynamic (not hegemonic) com- bus unum’5 (Carr 2010: 14). mon good supposes a political engagement struc- It is only by ensuring these two conditions that tured through what Benhabib terms ‘democratic a society can consider including a certain degree iterations’, that is, ‘complex processes of public of hybridisation. Generally speaking, cultural argument, deliberation, and exchange through contact depends on different combinations or a which universalist rights, claims and principles disentanglement of narrative traits. The degree are contested and contextualized, invoked and of the composition/decomposition can be mea- revoked, posited and positioned, throughout sured on a four-level scale, according to John legal and political institutions, as well as in the Berry’s well-known model (Sam and Berry 2010): associations of civil society’ (Benhabib 2004: 1) integration; 2) assimilation; 3) separation; and 179). 4) marginalisation. Yet, if we follow this line of reasoning, Burke’s A broad evaluation of these levels is beyond proposal needs a further . We agree the reach of this paper. But it is clear, as Ang that, if the intention is to avoid a totalitarian drift, argued, that we have to examine the specific unity needs to be conceived within diversity, that contexts and conditions in which hybridity is, as an outcome, temporary and revisable, of occurs: A rethorical call for harmonious amal- cultural interactions. Nevertheless, even diver- gamation risks to be ‘neglectful of the specific sity can be thought of in a despotic way, typi- power relations and historical conditions con- cally when a particular is assumed as the totality. figuring the interactions and encounters which This is why diversity also needs to be conceived, induce forced and unforced processes of hybridi- in turn, within the horizon of unity. To put it in sation’ (Ang 2001: 197). The degree of hybridi- Burke’s terms: Unity is not only contested and sation I have in mind is then ranked at level reconfigured by diversity contests and recon- 1, because only integration, which I interpret figures; unity is also what enables diversity to according to Mododd’s account (Modood 2007: be contested and reconfigured, urging it in the 46-51), involves a two-way process of mutual direction of the common good. adjustment (and hence unforced combination) As a consequence, the political problem is no between different narratives. That is why the key longer to conjecture a mestizo quality of democ- question, in my opinion, is to consider whether racy. It is, rather, a case for examining under hybridity occurs within the framework of the which conditions a democracy is able to on double logic of ‘unity-in-diversity’ and ‘diversity- the basis of the double logic of ‘unity-in-diversity’ in-unity’. This framework, as I try to demonstrate and ‘diversity-in-unity’. in the following discussion, works on the basis of In more practical terms, we could try to test human rights standards. Accordingly, it should a political model as follows: Unity-in-diversity allow us to identify those processes of hybridi- could exemplify the logic of civil society, where sation which are consistent with democracy; the common good is common precisely because at the same time, these hybrid identities could it is the outcome of (more or less conflictual) 5 ‘Out of many, one’. This is the first motto impressed interactions between the different social actors on the great seal of the United States. It affirms an involved; whereas diversity-in-unity could inform original plurality and suggests that unity comes out of the logic of the political dimension through diversities.

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function as detection of masked forms of racial great end of civil association’ – continues Carr – stereotyping.6 ‘is the domestication of the ongoing intergroup conflict arising within the context of the fact of 3. Civil society as a place of (possible) cultural flux’ (Carr 2010: 92). hybridisations Consequently, a civil society is ‘civil’ insofar The reference to civil society is crucial for a politi- as it is able to promote – within the the fact cal theory intending to pay attention to hybridsa- of flux – what Habermas terms ‘the unity of tion processes. Michel de Certeau was aware of a social life-world through values and norms’ this: At the beginning of the 1980s, he said that (Habermas 1979: 144): not the mere sum of the presence of immigrants requires ‘to open to single life-worlds, but the (temporary) shared them a free space of speech and demonstration result of common deliberation, aiming to avoid in which their own culture can be displayed or any form of reification and, positively, to fight offered for the of others’ (Certeau for social relationships based on the recognition 1997: 134). A free space of speech should be of our common humanity. At the same time, it exactly the structure of civil society, where cul- must also be taken into account – as Fraser dem- turally different people meet each other and try onstrates – that there cannot be recognition of to communicate, in order to establish shared human value without a just redistribution conditions for living together. This is why Certeau order (Fraser 2003). assumed that civil society could play host to cul- It appears that, at a civil society level, foster- tural changes and mixing. We can thus argue that ing the ‘capture of speech’ processes in view of a civil society works on the basis of unity-in-diver- shared social understanding can defuse sclerotic sity. In fact, as Carr suggests, assuming pluralism, interpretations such as ‘us’ vs. ‘them’; then it is possible to move towards a non-particularistic unity clearly requires that the groups coming to- gether to constitute a common unit actually share sense of unity through diversity. In fact, the unity something in common and recognise that they of a social life-world invites an understanding of share something in common. At its most basic level, civil society as suggested by Alexander: ‘It is the this means that these groups must share a com- we-ness of a national community, the feeling of mon understanding about why civil association connectedness to one another that transcends matters, why it is a good idea, and why it deserves particular commitments, narrow loyalties, and their allegiance (Carr 2010: 87). sectional interests’ (Alexander 2006: 43). Besides, a civil society is not ‘civil’ merely It is crucial to emphasise that this ‘feeling of because it displays cultural differences (this is, connectedness’ is not purely emotional; rather, it instead, the ideologic imagination supported by is the outcome of a reasoning process of deliber- differentialist multiculturalism); the mere fact of ation which presupposes what Seligman clearly flux between travelling cultures is rather a source calls ‘the mutual recognition of each individual’s of instability and potential conflict. Hence, ‘the innate human dignity’ (Seligman 1992: 172). Civility, I believe, has this human-rights-based dimension that requires to be recognised. But 6 As suggested by Servaes and Verschooten (2008: 47), a good example of how hybridisation really works this agreement cannot remain at the purely the- in this sense is the way Islamic and Western dis- oretical level: ‘Rights and freedoms – as stated courses have met in recent years: ‘In Afghanistan, by UNESCO (2009: 221) – are not exercised in a women defend their right to and health vacuum. All rights and freedoms have a cultural care by drawing on Western discourses about human rights. At the same time, however, many of them in- dimension that contributes to their effective sist on being faithful to Muslim at home. exercise. It is precisely this dimension that forms Elsewhere, many young Islamic women insist on the link between the individual, the community wearing veils because it makes them less vulnerable and the group, which grounds universal values to reproaches of Westernization and allows them to go out for work or study. They are not necessarily on within a particular society. Civility, I argue, has to their way to a complete assimilation of Western ideas.’ be imagined and practiced exactly as this ground-

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ing, where ‘the management of cultural diversity self-sufficient source of democracy. As recently can turn a societal challenge into a democratic demonstrated, ‘most civil society actors suffer strength’ (UNESCO 2009: 221). from severe democratic deficits, including non- Consequently, solidarity is not a rhetorical call existent, poor or unequal participation and weak to stir up positive emotions towards others but accountability mechanisms’ (Archibugi, Koenig- the awareness of this core value of civility (Shils Archibugi and Marchetti 2012: 227). 1997); in other terms, our humanity depends That problem is precisely what urges Haber- on the common good of we-ness, based on the mas not to look on civil society ‘as a focal point respect for a unique, irreplaceable, ‘capture of where the lines of societal self-organization as a speech’. Because its practical framework remains whole would converge.’ Besides, we cannot con- the diversity between cultures, in order to func- sider ‘civil’ any form of societal self-organisation: tion as a basis for democratic order this we-ness civil is only the form that passes ‘through the fil- does not require a full (utopian) consensus on ters of the institutionalized procedures of dem- everything. What is needed is rather a funda- ocratic opinion and will-formation and enters mental agreement on civility, i.e., on the fact that through parliamentary debates into legitimate ‘we-ness’ is better (morally and politically) than lawmaking’ (Habermas 1996: 371). free-riding. It becomes clearer that hybridisations cannot Therefore, this agreement is not an institu- be valued as normatively compulsory. Inter-cul- tional product, an artificial, Hobbes-style,- con tural mixing cannot be scheduled or imposed; it tract supposedly guaranteeing an otherwise is always relative and contingent. Consequently, impossible civil life; the we-ness is a possible democracy can be compatible with hybridity outcome of what Adam Smith terms ‘the natu- olny under the historical conditions of civil- ral inclination every one has to persuade’ (Smith ity. Otherwise we should argue the absurd idea 1982: 352), i.e., our constitutive competence in that civility work under the abstract category of generating trust and building bonds of communi- hybridity; an idea which would be also politically cation. The crucial evidence of this fundamental unmanageable, because it would fail to discrimi- virtue is the multiform phenomenon of associa- nate between the concrete modalities of hybrid- tions, more specifically, ‘horizontal relations of ity. That is why, as already noticed, we have to reciprocity and cooperation’ (Putnam 1993: 88) detect the conditions in which hybridity occurs. called ‘intermediate bodies’ (as originally sug- What are, then, the actual circumstances the gested by Montesquieu), on which depends the immigrant finds him/herself in? It is a paradoxi- production of a category of goods that are not cal, sometimes dramatic, criss-cross situation: consumer goods, but sources of ‘social capital’ at the intersection between two different (and (Edwards 2011).7 sometimes conflicting) narratives. The case of All this leads us towards the idea that the French of North African descent (also intermediate bodies of civil society work as called Beurs in French street slang), is illustrative a ‘pre-political source’ – as Habermas argues of the difficulty of negotiating creative solutions (Habermas 2008: 105) – that can ensure pub- for hybrid forms of identity and belonging (Berry lic forums between people of different cultures et al. 2006). and, therefore, a hospitable democracy for pos- What are then the possible choices? Normally sible hybridisations. Obviously, we must avoid we are inclined to think there is no option beside the naïvety of believing that civil society is a freezing traditional affiliations and becoming totally alienated. Actually, an alternative exists. 7 Rawls is not far from this relational idea when he Civility, as I have hinted, can accommodate a defines it as ‘social union of social unions’, adding that different choice: that of participating in collab- this is ‘the idea of the good of such a society’ (Rawls orative practices, based on reciprocal recogni- 2001: 142). It is worth noting that this notion of soci- ety as ‘union of unions’ is already present in A Theory tion. It is therefore plausible that cooperation, of (Rawls 1999: 462). conviviality, solidarity, together with the percep-

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tion of sharing overarching values, lead - differ and political cohabitation, can be termed – by ent narratives to bring about the crucial work another Habermasian term – ‘co-membership’ of ‘ and mediation’ (Certeau 1997: (Habermas 1998: 441). 120). This mutual commitment to a common Habermas uses this word to define the specific understanding can eventually assume a mestizo relationality of the civil sphere. The idea, in a nut- form, but certainly moves towards a reshaping shell, is the following: A democratic state of right of citizenship. I obviously do not think it is pos- cannot exist without its citizens’ shared com- sible to eclipse the juridical of national mitment to the primary good of being-together citizenship as is the case, for example, in certain as subjects reciprocally recognising each other. forms of extreme . The idea Obviously, Habermas supposes an intersubjec- that all human beings, regardless of their politi- tive approach, whereby relationality is, anthro- cal affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens pologically, the fundamental structure of the of the world is in conflict with the fact that the human subject. Consequently, this structure is UN General Assembly and the Human Rights not only a fact discovered through social inter- Council have adopted several resolutions on action but also a principle orienting the whole statelessness and the arbitrary deprivation of social and political life. , reaffirming that the right to a nation- Now, this social capital (which has its political ality is a human right (Kesby 2009); not to men- correlate in popular participation) must be insti- tion that the results of the Immigrant Citizens tutionally promoted and granted. It is here that Survey (2012) showed that around three out of the passage to the political sphere takes place, four immigrants are or want to become citizens.8 i.e., the necessary filtering of civility through the That being said, I acknowledge that the defini- logic of diversity-in-unity. In fact, co-member- tion of citizenship as civic laboratory of we-ness ship should be promoted if and only if its value, provides a context for a moderate cosmopolitan generated and shared at the pluralistic level of claim. For example, I would endorse Joppke’s civil society, is able to forge a unitary political account of EU citizenship as ‘civic citizenship for community of citizens. Actually, only thus can immigrants, attributed by virtue of residence the multiple processes of intercultural trans- rather than nationality’ (2010: 27). This cosmo- lation and mediation within a civil framework politan definition illustrates what exactly is at be assessed on their real propensity to enrich stake in cultural mixing within civil society: The democratic life. If not, co-membership degen- of hybridisation, as in the case of erates into ‘fraternity vs. fraternity’, showing Beurs, suggests an ethical membership which ‘the dark side of social capital’ (Putnam 2000: challenges the static binarisme of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 350, 362). ‘We have obligations to others,’ – writes Appiah – ‘obligations that stretch beyond those to 4. Inventing ‘good governance’ whom we are related by the ties of kith and kind’ It is worth restating that co-membership, con- (Appiah 2006: 15). ceived as we-ness, or solidarity-fostering civility, Are we then bound to an anarchic fusion is not an institutional artefact. With Rawls, we of differences, an infinite patchwork of identi- could say that there is a ‘ of association’ ties? There is an unpassable limit, for passing (Rawls 1999: 409) to be considered the basis of it would mean ruling ourselves out of a ‘civil’ the political community. place, pushed towards the non-place of chaos. It does not mean, obviously, that we become This limit, this fundamental measure for social friends to everyone: ‘While every citizen is a friend to some citizens’ – writes Rawls –, ‘no citi- 8 The Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), piloted by the zen is a friend to all.’ It means, instead, a focus King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy on the political capacity to found a ‘common alle- Group, captured the insights of over 7,000 people in 15 cities in seven countries (Belgium, France, Germa- giance to justice’ providing ‘a unified perspective ny, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain). from which they can adjudicate their differences’

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(Rawls 1999: 415). Interestingly, this ‘allegiance governance: openness, accountability and to justice’ is founded on the human propensity participation. Openness equates to clarity and towards friendship, i.e., a ‘morality of associa- transparency in the way in which institutions tion’ that every human being learns to exercise and political actors operate. Accountability has from childhood, provided that he lives within a at its core the obligation to explain and justify family whose love is identified by its ‘caring for conduct. Participation follows the basic prin- his good’ (Rawls 1999: 429). ciple that ‘democracy depends on people being It would be difficult to exaggerate the impor- able to take part in public debate.’ This means tance of this ‘natural meaning of fraternity’, as that ‘the linear model of dispensing policies Rawls continues: Human beings are actually able from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, to agree with ‘the idea of not wanting to have based on feedback, networks and involvement greater advantages unless this is to the benefit from policy creation to implementation at all lev- of others who are less well off’ (Rawls 1999: 90). els’ (Commission of the European Communities Such a ‘fraternity’, based on cultural diversity, 2001: 11). is pivotal to nurturing ‘a culture of human rights, Obviously, civil society must itself follow the which has been one of the international com- standards of good governance. From now on, the munity’s main goals for over 60 years’ (UNESCO open question is about an institutional architec- 2009: 242). That is why this fraternity is all the ture that may channel civility through a partici- more important because of its irrepleaceable patory process – a question which, nevertheless, dimension, nowadays at great risk of being ‘colo- cannot be fully addressed here. nised’ by a bureaucratic logic or a profit logic. This One final observation. It seems clear that double logic, Touraine (2011: 397) argues, is the without a civil life, that is, without the logic of very threat of a pluralistic democracy, because unity-in-diversity as a means of freely cooperat- it ‘transforms and cultures into markets, ing towards a ‘shared social understanding’, no especially for mass consumption, mass commu- good governance would exist, only totalitarian or nication and .’ individualistic degenerations; vice-versa, without It should by now be clear that the only way good governance, that is, without any institu- to avoid this negative transformation is to fos- tional guarantees to promote certain fundamen- ter ‘a responsibility of civility on part of the citi- tal goods (civility first and foremost), no demo- zenry’ (Carr 2010: 97). But it would be a serious cratic life would exist, only . Now, these mistake to think of civility as self-sufficient: This pathologies (totalitarianism, anarchy, individual- pre-political source of social unity might change ism) lead, sooner or later, to violence. Certainly, into non-political, or even anti-political, which, no one can eliminate this possibility: Democratic would obviously mean anarchy. Then, any pos- life, in fact, is never a definitive acquisition. On sible cultural hybridsations would soon become the contrary, democracy is always a prospective chaotic as, without a policy (and an economy) in task, as Dewey argued. charge of protecting and promoting the sense of Consequently, today more than ever before, co-membership, civil society would fragment in the task of democracy cannot be subjected to the clash of particularistic interest groups. the illusion that it has finally discovered the Hence, civil society needs what secret of a transparent dialogue between people termed ‘good governance’: a political class sup- from different cultures. This task is, instead, a porting its more valuable trends (towards a work in , an experiment resembling, in unitary sense of citizenship), and an economy9 Bauman’s words, ‘the twisted road to shared capable of enhancing its potential for respect- humanity’ (Bauman 1997: 30). ful coexistence. For this aim, three main stan- In the meantime, and without our permission, dards of democratic legitimacy underpin good hybridsations keep occurring, sometimes causing us to stray from that ‘twisted road’, sometimes 9 The reference is, for instance, to Dasgupta (2000). just making it more tortuous – but occasionally

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making it easier, if just by highlighting the com- Nevertheless, this double crisis does not lead mon human dignity we embody in our diverse us to the conclusion that social fragmentation cultural ways. It is an open challenge, provided is unavoidable. Against the temptation to slide we do not cease to move in this direction. into essentialism, and beyond a naïve view of dialogue as magical shortcut to reciprocal rec- Conclusion ognition, I have argued that the experience of It may be possible that the major models of - hybridisations occurring within civil society is agement of cultural diversity are in crisis. Mul- highly instructive: It encourages us ‘to invent ticulturalism, with few exceptions, tends to con- ways of living together’ (UNESCO 2013: 18). ceive different cultures as cognitive islands; con- I consider this joint creativity as a key feature of sequently, it proves itself unable to understand democratic societies, very close to the Socratic what is really at stake within plural societies. idea of ‘mutual search’ among peers for a com- Interculturalism rightly emphasises cultural con- mon understanding (Phaedo 78ab). Creativity nections, but it may be sometimes considered makes us partners, because it requires the cul- naïve in belivieng that a completely harmonious tural humility to learn from the other, through a dialogue can ever come into existence. patient of the public sphere.

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Note on the Author

Paolo gomarasca is a researcher at the Department of Philosophy, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan (Italy). His research interests include Social and , Public Ethics, Philosophical Anthropology. [email protected]

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