Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War Author(s): Michael Heffernan Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996), pp. 504-533 Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/622594 Accessed: 16-07-2015 09:01 UTC

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This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 504 Geography,cartography and military intelligence:the Royal Geographical Societyand the FirstWorld War Michael Heffernan

This essay examinesthe connectionsbetween geography, cartography and military intelligencein Britainduring the FirstWorld War. It focuseson the Royal GeographicalSociety (RGS) and its wartimeactivities on behalfof the British intelligenceservice. Evidence is presentedon the role of the RGS in the dispute betweenthe so-called 'westerners',committed to an all-outclash with Germanyon the westernfront, and the 'easterners',who argued thatthe key to deadlock in westernEurope lay in the OttomanEmpire. For a shortperiod, the RGS became a significantmetropolitan focus forthose advocatinga Britishintervention in the Middle East coupled with an Arab revoltagainst the Turks,the campaignpopularly associated with T E Lawrence.The essay concludes with an assessmentof the significanceof geographyto the Britishwar effortand an evaluationof the impactof the war on the institutionsand prestigeof the discipline.Some finalcomments are offeredon the moral and ethicalquestions raised by the mobilizationof geographicalexpertise in wartime.

key words historyof Britishgeography and cartography FirstWorld War Royal GeographicalSociety

Departmentof Geography,Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicester LE11 3TU e-mail: [email protected]

revised manuscriptreceived 22 November 1995

Introduction shatteredfor ever on the killingfields of Flanders and Picardy.Into their place came thecharacteristic War has been one of the greatestgeographers. (Sir uncertainties,ambiguities and ironiesof twentieth- GeorgeTaubman Goldie 19071) century modernity.The 1914-18 war not only War,in themodern sense of theword, is altogether anticipatesthe even greaterhorrors which were to basedon geography.(Rev. H B George19072) come; it also marksthe birthplaceof our modern neurosisabout global apocalypse.3 The years 1914-18witnessed the firstmodern war. A particularlydisturbing feature of the First All the majorindustrialized powers were involved WorldWar (and one reason why it is seen as such and all partsof theglobe were directlyor indirectly a tragicallyironic turning point) was the unprec- implicated. Huge armies were mobilized, sup- edented mobilizationof science and technology. portedby powerfulstate bureaucracies and by the Militaryand politicalleaders could draw upon the labour of entirecivilian populations. harvestof more than a centuryof rapid scientific The Great War, as it is still often called, is development.The war revealed,more clearlythan generallydepicted as a fault-linein world history. ever before,the awesome destructivecapacity of The progressive and optimistic values of the modern technology.This was the dark side of Victorianand Edwardian eras were, it is claimed, the machine age; an era of feverishindustrial

TransInst Br GeogrNS 21 504-533 1996 ISSN 0020-2754? Royal Geographical Society (with the Instituteof BritishGeographers) 1996

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 505 productiondevoted almost exclusivelyto devas- Waras well as theimpact of thatperiod on particu- tation and death. From the crisis of 1914 was lar disciplines,notably chemistry.10 Despite the ob- forged a new and more intimate relationship vious significanceof geographical expertise in between science, the state and the military.Thus wartime,there have been surprisinglyfew recent emerged one of the central paradoxes of the attemptsto interrogatethe role of geographyin modern age - the idea that logic and rationality war.1 This essay is, therefore,an opening foray could sustain somethingas illogical and irrational into a largelyuntouched, and perhaps consciously as 'total war'. ignored,arena. Its theme is the dialecticbetween Depressinglyfew scientistsresisted the call to geographyand war in theperiod from1914 to 1919 arms in 1914. Those who did, such as Bertrand as revealed by the activitiesof the Royal Geo- Russell in Britainand G F Nicolai in Germany, graphical Society (RGS), Britain's oldest and, at were subjected to merciless campaigns of vilifi- thattime, most prestigiouscentre of geographical cationand abuse.4Faced withthis kind of pressure, expertise. My concern is not with the broader the vast majorityof academics threw their full intellectualimpact of the GreatWar on geographi- weightbehind the war effort.5A sense of patriotic cal theory(which will be considered elsewhere) duty and a firmbelief in their nation's cause but ratherwith the practicaland technicalrole of were powerfulmotives but less elevated personal the discipline,particularly in the fieldof cartogra- ambitions also influencedthe behaviour of aca- phy, and with the connections which were demics.Many enteredthe fraywith an enthusiasm establishedbetween the Britishgeographical com- and belligerencewhich embarrassedrather than munityand the intelligenceservices. By exploring gratifiedthe political leadership. Throughoutthe this specificrelationship in a particularhistorical summer of 1915, for example, some of Britain's and geographicalcontext, I want to emphasize the most distinguished scientists waged a spirited importanceof consideringthe full range of dif- campaign, initiatedby H G Wells, to force the ferent,and often rival, geographies in both the government to increase funding for scientific past and the present.What follows,then, is one of researchof relevanceto the war effort.6This theme the 'unfamiliar'histories of geography.Although was echoed by the zoologist E B Poulton in his rarelyconsidered in conventionalaccounts, such 1915Romanes lecture at Oxford.7The message was historiesraise the most profoundmoral, ideologi- simple:knowledge is power and whateverGerman cal and intellectualdilemmas which reverberate scientistscould do, Britonscould do better,pro- across the decades frompast to present.12 vided the necessary resources were made avail- able. F H Royce, the engineeringgenius behind wentso faras to in Rolls-Royce, propose, language Geography and militaryintelligence chillinglyprescient of laterdecades, thatthe British governmentshould offera 'substantial'cash prize The historiesof geography and militaryintelli- to the scientistwho devised the most efficient gence in Britain are closely interwoven. As means 'to destroy... German, Austrian, and ChristopherAndrew has demonstrated,explora- Turkish combatants in the greatest possible tion, map-making and cartography were the number in the shortestpossible time'.8Scientists centralelements of early intelligence-gathering.'3 whose research was stimulated by war needs The firstBritish intelligence agency, the earliest revealed more than a hint of euphoria at their ancestorof MI5 and MI6, was theDepot of Military newly acquired power. The words of JA Fleming, Knowledge, established during the Napoleonic professorof electricalengineering at University wars by the QuartermasterGeneral's Department College, London, are characteristic: of the War Office.Its responsibilitywas to collect foreign maps and related informationon the theoutcome of the present war must be an entirelynew chapterin humanhistory and a pointof freshdepar- militaryresources and topographyof othercoun- turein social,economic and intellectuallife ... It is tries.This activitybecame virtuallymoribund after beyondany doubt that this war is a warof engineers 1815 despite attempts to revive intelligence- and chemistsquite as muchas ofsoldiers.9 gatheringto facilitateBritish imperial expansion around the world. The most tirelessadvocate of Several studies have examined the role of betterintelligence was Major Thomas BestJervis, a scientistsand academics during the First World senior officeron the Survey of India during the

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 506 MichaelHeffernan 1830s and an active Fellow of both the Royal 5500 volumes per year).Significantly, it was one of Societyand the RGS. Jervisforesaw a centralgov- the first British libraries to adopt the Dewey ernmentagency which would collectand compile Decimal classificationsystem. Its effectivenesswas accurate maps and othergeographical material; a hampered,however, by the implacablehostility of secretive organization operating alongside the senior army officers,especially Field Marshal the Ordnance Survey (OS), althoughdevoted entirely Duke of Cambridge, and by an all-pervading to overseas territories.14 public school code of honour, equally evident This argument was strengthenedby British withinand withoutthe IB, which was uncomfort- militarydisasters in the CrimeanWar which were able with the idea of covertintelligence-gathering, widely attributedto a lack of geographicalintelli- an activityseen as ungentlemanlyand worthyonly gence.Jervis impressed the Duke of Newcastle,the of the most reprehensibleforeign governments. Secretaryof State forWar, by presentinghim with Most IB informationwas gleaned from widely detailed Russian and Austrian maps of the war available foreignpublications and fromthe reports zone, hithertounavailable in Britain,which he had of Britishmilitary attaches in overseas capitals boughton the open marketin Belgium.Newcastle with whom it was reluctantlyallowed to corre- promptlyrecruited Jervis to oversee reproduction spond. Attitudesslowly changed, however, and of theseand othermaps. Earlyin 1855,Newcastle's 'spying'was widelyaccepted from around the turn successor, Lord Panmure, established a Topo- of thecentury, although it remainedthe preserve of graphicalDepartment under Jervis'sdirection.15 eccentricvolunteers with a taste for travelling This stagnated after hostilitiesceased in the incognitoand compiling 'intelligencereports' of Crimea, though a major reorganizationin 1857 variable quality.18 merged the TopographicalDepartment with the By his third premiership (1895-1902), Lord remnants of the Military Depot to establish a Salisburyhad become convincedof the need fora Topographicaland StatisticalDepartment (T & S) betterintelligence service and thefortunes of theIB under the nominal control of the OS. Further improvedunder his influence,especially after the reformstook place after1870, when Major (later appointmentof Sir John Ardagh as directorin 1896. Major-GeneralSir) Charles Wilson took over at Once again,it was themanifest failure of the British T & S. Like Jervis,Wilson was a cartographer,a army,this time in the Boer War,that provided the Fellow of the Royal Society and the RGS, and a main impetus.Ardagh's SouthAfrican intelligence foundermember of thePalestine Exploration Fund reports,subsequently recognized as accurate,had (PEF).16Appalled by the primitivestate of military rarelybeen taken into account by senior officers intelligence,Wilson submitted a highly critical during the war. Spenser Wilkinson, the first reportto Edward Cardwell, Gladstone's reform- Chichele Professorof MilitaryHistory at Oxford, minded Secretaryof State for War. This precipi- likened the War Office'suse of the intelligence tated a series of organizational improvements serviceto thatof a man who 'kepta small brainfor culminating in the creation of a reorganized occasional use in his waistcoatpocket and ran his department,the IntelligenceBranch (IB), under head by clockwork'.19Lord Esher's 1903 reporton a new director, Major-General Sir Patrick the Boer War recommendedwholesale reorganiz- MacDougall. The IB, witha staffof 27, was charged ation of the War Office,the establishmentof a both withgathering intelligence and withdevising GeneralStaff and an expanded intelligenceservice. war strategies,particularly in relation to India. The BritishAdmiralty, unnerved by a series of Later directors, such as Major-General Sir potentiallydisastrous reportsabout non-existent Archibald Alison and Colonel AylmerCameron, foreignfleet mobilizations, belatedly came to the were particularly concerned with the 'Great view that it too required a naval intelligence Game' of Anglo-Russianespionage and counter- agency.Once again, it was fromthe mapping and espionage along India's vulnerablenorthwest fron- surveyingsection of the Admiralty(the Hydro- tierand an Indian branchof theIB was established graphic Department) that the new organization at Simla (knownas IBS) to coordinateintelligence- emerged. Following the 1883 Royal Commission gatheringin the region.17 on the Defence of BritishPossessions and Com- By the mid-1880s, the IB had acquired an merce Abroad, a Naval IntelligenceDepartment unrivalledcollection of foreignmaps and a 40 000- (NID) was established, directed by Captain volume library(which was growing at a rate of WilliamHall.20

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 507 In the years before 1914, the War Officeand imperial expansion, which spawned the modern Admiralty intelligenceservices became increas- discipline,was virtuallyover. Most English geo- ingly interconnected,particularly after the estab- graphicalsocieties, established at the high noon of lishmentof a GeneralStaff in 1906 and the creation 'geographicalfever' in the 1880sand 1890s,were in of a separate Secret Service Bureau with both genteel decline.23The exceptionwas the RGS in militaryand naval sections.From this emerged the London which remaineda flourishingsocial and complex structure of British intelligence that intellectualcentre for the geographical and im- existed in the summerof 1914. At the Admiralty, perial elite. With 5300 Fellows and spacious new the NID was still the focus of activityunder the premises in KensingtonGore, it was easily the directorship,from November 1914, of Captain largestand wealthiestgeographical society in the (laterAdmiral Sir) WilliamReginald 'Blinker'Hall, world.24Its continuingsuccess was due in part to son ofthe first director of the NID and so-namedas its metropolitanfocus, close to the centreof politi- a resultof his pronouncedfacial twitch. In the War cal and imperial power, but also to its greater Office,several intelligencesections existed in 1914, willingnessto move beyond the traditionalcon- each prefixed by the letters MO for 'Military cerns of travel and explorationto embrace more Operations' (thiswas changed in 1916 to the more prosaic educationalissues. In 1907,the subjectwas familiarMI notation for 'Military Intelligence'). finallydeemed worthyof examinationby the Civil MO1 was concerned with general strategic Service. By 1914, geography was beginning to questions and war games; MO2 with Europe, the establish a position in the nation's schools and OttomanEmpire and Africa;MO3 with India and universitiesfrom which it was to develop strongly the rest of Asia, the Americas and Russia; MO5 after1918. These developmentswere due, in no with espionage and counter-espionagein the UK small measure,to the encouragementand generos- (especiallyconcerning Ireland); and MO6 withthe ity of the RGS.25Change was in the air in other same activitiesabroad.21 MO4, the directoffspring respectstoo. In 1913,after a long and acrimonious of the originalintelligence agencies, was the pre- campaign, the RGS belatedlyopened its doors to serve of map-making,map collectionand topogra- women Fellows.26 phy. It was more commonlyknown as the GSGS, The new President of the RGS in 1914 was the GeographicalSection of the General Staff.The Douglas WilliamFreshfield, a wealthyold Etonian, GSGS was responsiblefor collecting and producing pioneerAlpine climberand indefatigableadvocate maps forthe armyin all parts of the world (with of the educational value of geography.27The the exceptionof India which was handled by the Society's permanentsecretary was Dr (later Sir) India Office) and with providing geographical JohnScott Keltie, widely respected chroniclerof facts,particularly on boundaries,to othergovern- the 'Scramblefor Africa' and author of a famous ment ministries.It was commanded in its early 1885 report on the teaching of geography in years by Major E H Hills and then by Colonel Britain.28Keltie's assistant (and successor from (later Sir) Charles FrederickClose (subsequently early 1915) was ArthurR Hinks, an astronomer Arden-Close).22Close became Director-Generalof and previouslylecturer in cartographyand survey- the OS in 1911 and was replaced at the GSGS by ing at Cambridge.29The RGS Council forthe 1914 Colonel (laterSir) WalterCoote Hedley who was in session was a veritableroll call of Britain'simperial charge throughoutthe war. 'Blinker' Hall and establishmentand included several men closely Walter Coote Hedley were key players in the associated with the intelligence community. Britishintelligence community in 1914 and both Colonel Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich, for were to have a significantimpact on the mobiliz- example, had been a long-servingfrontier intelli- ation of Britishgeographical expertise during the gence officerin India at the height of the 'Great FirstWorld War. Game' and was probablythe country'sforemost experton boundarydelimitation.30 Both Close and Hedley, past and present chiefs of GSGS, were Global war and global mapping: the RGS Council members. and war cartography Freshfieldassumed a key role in the RGS as the countrylurched towards war. On 31 July1914, 48 In August 1914,British geography was at thedawn hours beforenews reachedLondon of the German of a new era. The age of Victorianexploration and attackon Belgium,Freshfield placed what he later

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 508 MichaelHeffernan called 'the personal and materialresources' of the 10 August, offeringto produce a similar skeletal RGS at the disposal of Hedley's GSGS, an offer map covering the whole of Europe, but on the accepted aftersome hesitation.31From that date 1:1 million scale. No such map existed,although until 31 March 1919, the RGS remained on an Hinks claimed it would have considerable'strate- emergency,wartime footing. Freshfield was plainly gical use during the war and ... political use relieved when the governmentdeclared war on during the re-arrangementsthat are likely to 4 August: followit'.38 The idea of an international1:1 millionmap had Well thankGod thatEngland has been sparedthe a tortuoushistory which providesan illuminating ignominyof hanging back in thewar of Right against on the and fearsof the Might.One could neverhave goneto theContinent commentary hopes fin-de- againhad we failedFrance.32 siccleworld in whichit was conceived.The concept dated back to 1891 when the leading German Within 24 hours of the declaration of war, geomorphologistAlbrecht Penck, then at the Hedley sent orders to the RGS to begin work on University of Vienna, proposed to the Fifth two urgentGSGS projects.The firstwas an index of InternationalGeographical Congress in Bernethat what The Timessubsequently called the 'horribly a new world map should be constructedon this unpronounceable place names' on the tactical scale, based on a standardset of conventionsand large-scale GSGS maps of Belgium and France stylesto be agreed by the cartographicagencies of issued to all officersof the BritishExpeditionary all the major powers.39Penck argued that, four Force. The second involved the production of centuriesafter Columbus set sail forthe Americas, a new four-sheet1:500 000 skeletal wall map of sufficientinformation had been gatheredabout the Britainshowing railways,principal towns, rivers land masses of the world to justifythis grand and countyboundaries. Reproductions of thismap internationalventure. The InternationalMap, as it were requiredby the War Officein planninghome came to be known,was to be a tributeto the great defence strategies in the event of a German age of explorationand mapping which was draw- invasion.33 ing to a close. Producingan internationallyrecog- Hinks took charge of both projectsand hastily nized 1:1 million global map would provide an recruited dozens of female volunteers from appropriatesummation of 400 years of geographi- CheltenhamLadies' College and various colleges cal inquiry.Based on the solid foundationsof this of the Universityof London. Afterround-the-clock map, a modern, twentieth-centurygeography work, the index was completed with remarkable could emerge to ask new and more complex speed by the beginning of September.34Hinks questions about the naturalworld and its human wroteto Hedley in ebullientmood: inhabitants.40 An investigativecommission was established ithas been a blessingto have hard work to do... [The] which, predictably,achieved little. Penck and volunteersdeclared that they never enjoyed anything his growing band of supporterspersevered and so muchin theirlives, and are piningfor more ... resolutions were at the International perfectlythrilling, the ladies call it.35 passed GeographicalCongresses in London (1895), Berlin Hedley was delightedwith the index,the prompt (1899),the USA (1904) and Geneva (1908),followed arrival of which ended an uncomfortableand by an inauguralconference of a new International embarrassingepisode for the GSGS which had Map Committeeat the BritishForeign Officein scandalouslyoverlooked this basic requirement.'I November 1909.41Progress was painfullyslow, trembleto thinkwhat would have occurred,if we however, mainly due to the mutual suspicion had been obliged to try to get the work done between the differentmapping agencies involved. withoutyour help', Hedley confessed."6 Only six provisional European sheets had been To assist with the 1:500000 map, Hedley des- compiled by 1913 and several of these had been patched one of his staff,Captain O H B Trenchard, rejected by one or more participatinggovern- to work full-timeat KensingtonGore.37 Hinks,by ments.42Further high-sounding resolutions were now effectivelyin controlof the day-to-dayrun- issued at theTenth International Congress in Rome ning of the RGS, was determinedto enhance the (1913) and a second conferencewas organized in Society'ssignificance through its war work.To this Paris that December by General Bourgeois of the end, he drafteda long memorandumto Hedley on ServiceGiographique de l'Armie to accelerate the

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 509 project.43The impact of this event was lessened, Hinks' provisionalobjective was a 24-sheetmap, however,by the withdrawalof the United States to be prepared over two years, based on five which opted to develop its own ambitious existing InternationalMap sheets plus newly scheme to map South America at 1:1 million researched material for nineteen other sheets scale freedfrom the disciplineof an international covering the rest of the continentgleaned from agreement.44 existingmaps and surveysat differentscales. Each The Britishdelegation in Paris - Close, Hinks, sheetwas to containthe basic featuresof reliefand Hedley and two otherGSGS officers,Captain E W drainage plus the principalcentres of population Cox and Major E M Jack- was authorizedby the and communicationexpressed in English.49 ForeignOffice to suggest thatthe headquartersof Hedley was enthusiastic: the should be located at the OS which had project Therecan be no doubtthat a skeletalmap of Europe on been the main focus of activitysince the 1909 the1/M scale will be mostuseful... Withoutsuch help London conference.To deflectcriticism that the theGSGS would be quiteunable to undertake the work Britishwere seekingto seize controlof the project, at thepresent time.50 Close suggested that the RGS, an ostensibly Hinks was delighted: independentand apolitical institution,should be involved alongside the OS and the GSGS.45 We arevery glad that Hedley has givenus something Ironically,Hinks was farless enamouredby the moreto do ... forit is wretchedhaving nothing to idea of internationalcooperation than Close and do forthe countryin thesetimes ... [I]f we can makea successof it [the1:1 million I his cynicismat the high-flownrhetoric of earlier map], expect declarationswas all too obvious: 'I do not know that it will last for a good manyyears before it is superseded.51 that any very definitestatement has ever been made of the precisepurpose of thismap', he wrote To help with initialresearch, Hedley sent another on the eve of the Paris Conference. GSGS officer,Captain Malcolm N MacLeod, to work alongside Hinks, Trenchardand the RGS thinkof it, as meantfor the use ofthe Wemay perhaps, draughtsmen. systematicgeographer, whenever it shall have been the end of 1914,after five months of war,the determinedwhat is thefunction of that person.46 By RGS had successfullymanoeuvred itselfinto an He was also scathingabout theexisting provisional importantstrategic position. It had become, in sheets,informing Captain H St JL Winterbotham effect,a technicaland cartographicannex to the of the OS that only two were of any use, a claim War Office.Freshfield was greatlyencouraged by whichgreatly irritated Close who had been largely this.While he did not underestimatethe strength responsiblefor theirproduction.47 Yet Hinks was of the Central Powers and was at pains to guard perfectlyprepared to be involved in the practical against any hint of complacency,he remained side of the project,not least because the War Office optimisticboth about the eventualoutcome of the was willing to provide the RGS with ?1550 per war and about the role of the RGS in contribut- annum to support its work. He informedClose ing to an Allied victory.His optimismwas based that,in thesehappy circumstances,the RGS would in part on his personal memoriesof the Franco- do its best to 'boom the map a little'amongst the Prussianconfrontation of 1870 coupled witha firm Fellowshipand in its publications.48 convictionthat war in 1914 would reflectboth By offeringto produce a simplifiedwartime the rapid pace of technologicalchange and the version of the European sector of the 1:1 million dramaticglobalization of European power which map, Hinks was seekingto take controlof a project had taken place over the precedingfour decades. which would otherwise have foundered. The Once the enormous military resources of the OS and the GSGS would, he reasoned, be too Britishand Frenchempires were mobilized (and busy with large-scalemilitary maps of the various thiswould obviouslytake some time),he believed theatresof operationto devote valuable time and the crisis would end with an Allied victoryeven resources to the 1:1 million. With the spirit of more decisive than the Prussians had achieved internationalcooperation in tatters,the RGS was over 40 years earlier. But before victory was uniquely placed to keep the projectalive, enhanc- achieved, he reasoned, the war would become a ing therebyits own reputationand ensuringBritish global and imperialconflict, involving all aspects controlof the map in the future. of modern transport and communications as

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 510 MichaelHeffernan well as the specialist technologies of war on he cordially detested) in March 1915 dismiss- land, sea and in the air. A dashing confrontation ing the RGS's work on the map as an irrelevance. of movement, thrust and counter-thrustover The trenchesof France and Belgium would be enormousdistances was thus inevitable. long-termfeatures, he argued,and new large-scale This would be, in short,a quintessentiallygeo- maps of the western frontshould be the main graphicalstruggle and an ideal opportunityfor the priority:'No-one [at the OS] ...', he wrote, 'dis- RGS to influenceevents. Freshfield was convinced plays any interestin the million ... I have asked that geographical expertise, if employed with soldiershere and theysay it is too small a scale to imaginationand flair,could play a decisive role in be of use'.54Close, althoughpersonally committed winning the war.52 His views were eloquently to theidea of the 1:1 millionmap, sharedthis sense summarized in a speech at the opening of the of priorityand the vast majorityof the 32 million 1914-15 session on 9 November: maps produced by the OS during the war were large-scalebattlefield thepresent crisis calls on us,more than most, not only sheets.55 to keepup, butto add to,our normal activities. More Britishcapacity for self-delusion was, however, thanever in timeof war and therevision of frontierslimitless and most military leaders insisted, thatmust follow war, ought we to persistin our despite overwhelmingevidence to the contrary, endeavoursto distributegeographical facts and to that the Allied armies would eventually break inculcatethe right way ofgrouping and dealingwith throughthe German lines on the western front them.For war and geographyare closely connected. A and reopen a war of movement.This ambition graspof the featuresof the country,the right maps required large-scale planning for which simple and intelligenceto use them,are among the first small-scale maps such as the 1:1 million were requirementsofa soldier."53 ideal. The rapid forwardmovement of men and Yet,even as he spoke, the natureof the conflict weaponrywhich failed so dismallyto materialize was underminingFreshfield's hopes and ambi- during the campaigns of 1915-17 around Ypres tions.The war ofmovement in westernEurope had and on the Somme would certainlyhave been already come to a shuddering halt and a great sketchedin general outlineon the RGS sheets (as sinuous scar of opposing trenchlines was estab- well as on the more detailed GSGS and OS lishing itselffrom Flanders to the Vosges. Tech- maps). 'These maps of yours', Hedley informed nology, the force in which Freshfieldplaced so Hinks about the handfulof sheets that had been much store,was in factmilitating against the kind compiled by the autumn of 1915, of mobile,decisive victoryhe predicted.Railways, havebeen of the use to ... theGeneral Staff motorizedvehicles and telephoniccommunication, greatest becausethey give a clearrepresentation ofthe ground scarcelyinvolved in previous wars, were proving andcommunications and are not confused by too many efficientat armies extremely maintaininghuge lines.They give in factjust what is required.56 in well-dug trenches. Protected by lethal new weapons, especiallythe machine gun, these subter- A month later,Earl Kitchener'sprivate secretary ranean lines could be made virtuallyimpregnable wrotestating that the 1:1 millionsheets were used to infantryassault and would remainso until the personallyby the Secretaryof State forWar who advent of modern air and tank power. When wished to offerhis thanksand congratulations.57 military'strategy' was limitedto massive artillery Political leaders of an equally optimisticoutlook barragesfollowed by futileinfantry attacks across also believed that a British1:1 million map of a fewyards of 'no man's land', detailed geographi- Europe, albeit in skeletaloutline, would be enor- cal knowledgeof topography,soils, vegetation and mouslyuseful when the timecame, afteran Allied climate- vitalto a mobilewar ofsweeping infantry victory,for negotiations about boundary alter- manoeuvres and cavalry charges - was of little ations and territorialexchanges. RGS work on relevance. the 1:1 million map was thus protectedby the These depressingfacts led some to question the wishfulthinking of Britain'smilitary and political need forthe 1:1 millionmap, by now the centre- leadership. piece of theRGS's war effortand openlypromoted Hinks set about his work with zeal. By mid- as a cartographicaid to the grand strategyof a summerof 1915,he was able to presenta detailed mobile campaign. Captain BertramF E Keeling, technical paper to the RGS on the 1:1 million, Close's assistantat the OS, wroteto Hinks (whom complete with dismissive comments about the

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 511

Index to i~Xtp .. (1N T[E SCALI OF /IIUO0N Compiledat thetieyaI Geot~phicalSoei 31 \ , underthe directionof the GeneralS 4- 191-1915. S o o .Je f y 19 . tate n 15

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Figure1 Index to the map on the scale 1:1 million compiled at the RGS under the directionof the General Staff,1914-15 pre-war InternationalMap and the small-scale West versus east: D G Hogarth, maps of otherEuropean powers. By thisstage, ten T E Lawrence and British intelligence in sheets had been completed (Fig. 1).58After some the Middle East debate, the War Officeagreed that the 1:1 million need not be treatedas secret(indeed, sheets were Each escalation of the war provoked a new burst subsequently sold to the public) and Hinks of activityin the RGS and a reschedulingof the proudly sent complimentarycopies to leading 1:1 millionwork to meet the demand formaps of politicians,including the Prime Minister.59Hinks the new theatres of conflict.The Italian Alps also managed to obtain, through Hedley, an became a new priorityafter Italy enteredthe war impressiveamount of sensitiveinformation from on theAllied side in April 1915,as did the Balkans domestic and Allied intelligence services and once Bulgariasided withthe Central Powers in the Britishmilitary attaches abroad. In October 1915, followingOctober. The most importantevent for for example, a large parcel of classifiedRussian the RGS, however,was the Allied declarationof militarymaps of the eastern frontarrived at the war against the Ottoman Empire in November RGS, via MO3 and the GSGS, fromMajor James 1914. This had littleimmediate impact on the RGS Blair, the Britishmilitary attach6 in Petrograd.6? but, fromJanuary 1915, the Middle East became Not content with providing basic cartographic the main focus of attention.This was directly requirements,Hinks persuaded Hedley that B C connectedto an increasinglyangry debate within Wallis, an accomplished cartographer,should be the upper echelonsof Britishmilitary and political employedto produce a thematicseries of language life between the so-called 'westerners', who and ethnicitymaps at 1:1 millionscale forAustro- insisted that Britishand Allied forcesshould be Hungary and the Balkans. The explicitobjective concentratedon the westernfront against the full was to demonstratecartographically the bewilder- might of the German army,and the 'easterners', ing ethniccomplexity of Austro-Hungary to under- who feltthat a vigorous campaign against a weak line the need to dismantlethe Hapsburg Empire Ottoman Empire (which Britain had previously afterthe war.61 supported as a bulwark against Russian imperial

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 512 MichaelHeffernan expansion)would allow Britainand Franceto link Hogarth, whose 'behind-the-scenes'influence up more effectivelywith Russia while,at the same on the RGS and on Britishstrategy in the Middle time,providing an opportunityto unleash Britain's East was to be enormous,was a close friendand unmatched naval power, hitherto frustratingly mentorof T E Lawrence whom he firstmet in underdeployed. Deadlock on the western front Oxfordin January1909. Lawrence was at thattime could thus be circumvented by an eastern an undergraduateat JesusCollege while Hogarth, campaign againstTurkey. who had previously combined a distinguished Most senior army officerswere committed academic careerin Britainwith periods in journal- 'westerners' but several politicians, notably ism (he was The Times' correspondentin Crete Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the duringthe rebellionagainst the OttomanTurks in Admiralty,were attractedby the 'eastern' option. 1897) and directorshipof the BritishSchool in Churchill's preferred solution was an all-out Athens(1897-1909), had just takenup his position assault on Constantinoplethrough the straits of the at the Ashmolean (succeedingSir ArthurEvans). Dardanelles. If these could be breached by naval A lively controversysurrounds both Lawrence attack, troops could be landed on the Gallipoli and Hogarth. According to some authorities, peninsula and the Turkishcapital would lie within Hogarth was a profoundlyanti-democratic mem- reach.The 'softunderbelly' of theGermanic power ber of The Round Table group, an informaland axis would be exposed and a new southernfront rather secretive Oxford club associated with a would be opened which German or Austro- periodical of that name edited by the colonial Hungariantroops would be forcedto protect,thus historianLionel Curtis.This group,which included stretchingtheir reserves and diminishingtheir a numberof leading imperialistssuch as the nov- defensivecapacity in Europe. Despite fierceoppo- elist JohnBuchan and the wartimeeditor of The sition,this daring plan was approved in January TimesGeoffrey Dawson, is generallycredited with 1915. helpingto formulatesome of the ultra-imperialist On 17 January,Hedley ordered Hinks to cease policies advocated in governmentby politicians work on the European 1:1 million sheets and such as Lord Milner.The group was, in short,a prepare another place-name index for the large- semi-officialthink-tank on Britain'simperial strat- scale GSGS maps of Turkey and the Ottoman egy in response to Frenchand German ambitions Empire. He also ordered 1:1 million sheets to be around the world.65Hogarth's unmatched knowl- prepared forthe whole of the OttomanEmpire.62 edge and experienceof the Middle East was obvi- This presentedan entirelydifferent scale of prob- ously invaluablegiven the international intrigue in lem as therewere few accuratemaps or surveysof this area. His knowledge was also well-knownto the Middle East which could be used as the basis the British intelligenceservices, particularlyto forthese sheets. Hinks had thereforeto relyon the Hedley who served alongsideHogarth on both the observations and recordings of the explorers, RGS Council and on the ExecutiveCommittee of scholars and officerswho had the It has been claimedthat became intelligence spent PEF.66 Hogarth much of the prewarera workingin the region.An an academic spy-master(of a kind subsequently obvious startingpoint was David GeorgeHogarth, associated withthe Universityof Cambridge)who Keeperof Antiquities at theAshmolean Museum in recruitedlikely young men and trained them in Oxford,Fellow of Magdalen College and a promi- the subtle arts of espionage under the guise of nentmember of the RGS Council.63Hogarth, then scholarship.Lawrence, it is argued, was one such in his mid-50s,was probablythe leading British recruit.67 authorityon the geographyand archaeologyof the Whateverthe truthof these claims,it is certain Middle East. By 27 January1915, he was working thatHogarth encouraged Lawrence's early interest full-timeat the RGS on map work relating to in Middle Eastern archaeology and introduced Turkey and the Middle East. Two other RGS his young prot~g6to Charles Doughty,the elder Council members were also recruited:Douglas statesmanof BritishMiddle Easternstudies. When Carruthers(a heartybig-game hunterwho had Sir Frederick Kenyon, Director of the British spent much of his adult lifepursuing the wildlife Museum, asked Hogarth to lead an excavation of Asia, Africa and the Middle East) and H N around Carchemishin Syriain 1911,Lawrence was Dickson (professorof physiologyand meteorology invited along. The two years of intermittent at UniversityCollege Reading).64 researchat this site, located on the westernflood

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 513 plain of the upper Euphrates,marked the begin- fromthe Survey of Egypt and writing'little geo- ning of Lawrence's serious involvementwith the graphicalessays. It doesn't sound exciting,but it Arab world, the 'turningpoint' in his life.68 has been far and away the best job in Egypt'.72 Those who believe thatHogarth and Lawrence Under the influence of Newcombe, Lawrence were part of a British spy-ringinsist that the developed an interestin the scientificand strategic Carchemishexcavation was merelyan archaeologi- possibilitiesof aerial photography.73 cal 'cover'; the real objectivewas to gatherintelli- Lawrence's superiors left an unfavourable gence on Germanrailway construction in the area. impressionon him: Under the Drang nach Osten policy,German am- bitionsin the Middle East had expanded exponen- we adviseall sortsof people in poweron geographical tially since the turn of the century.The most points.The ignorance of these people would give them obvious physicalmanifestation of this'drive to the impossible-ever-to-sitdown again experiencesin a east' was the Berlinto railway preparatoryschool. 'Who does Crete belong to?' proposed Baghdad 'Whereis Piraeus?'.74 to be builtwith German capital and expertise.The last linkin thisiron axis was thesection connecting Adana, the easternrail terminusfor the line from The image of the preparatoryschool is probably Constantinople,with Baghdad by way of theTigris moreapt in describingthis small groupthan that of valley.The railway representeda directchallenge the universitydepartment. Most membersshared to the ambitionsof other European states in the a peculiarlyEnglish, upper-class predilectionfor regionand specificallythreatened the all-important games, conspiraciesand secretagendas. The only Britishimperial routeway to India. Its routewas to exceptionwas Newcombe who was dismissed by cross the Euphrates immediately south of the theold EtonianLloyd as 'underbred'.Lawrence, on Carchemishsite, the excavation of which would the otherhand, seemed engaginglyeccentric to his thus serve a dual scientificand politicalpurpose.69 colleagues: 'odd gnome,half cad - witha touchof Followinghis experienceat Carchemish,Lawrence genius' was Lloyd's assessment.75 thenbecame involvedin a PEF projectto producea From this group emerged an influentialintelli- half-inch-to-the-milearchaeological map of the gence network,operating mainly in the Middle Sinai desert which was also designed to improve East, which sought to develop a very different Britishintelligence about the region:'We are obvi- 'eastern' option from that devised by the ously onlymeant as red herrings',wrote Lawrence, Admiraltyin late 1914. This 'band of wild men', 'to give an archaeological colour to a political as Lawrence called them, advocated an Allied job'.70 invasion of the eastern Mediterraneancoast, a Afterthe declaration of war,Lawrence, who was region many commentatorsdismissed as stra- by now back in Oxford, spent several months tegically irrelevant. If this invasion could be seekingemployment with the intelligenceservice. combined with a general Arab revoltagainst the In October 1914, followingan interventionfrom Turks,however, sustained by the promiseof some Hogarth,he joined Hedley's GSGS wherehe wrote measure of postwar pan-Arab independence, it intelligence reports and worked on military was argued that the Ottoman Empire would maps."7In December 1914,after war was declared implode. Hogarth was a key proponent of this withTurkey, Lawrence was transferredto Egyptas view. He was, accordingto Lawrence, part of a Britishintelligence department under the control of Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert Clayton Nota wildman, but Mentor to all ofus ... ourfather whichincluded Leonard Woolley (Hogarth's assist- confessorand adviser,who broughtus the parallels ant at theAshmolean), Stewart Francis Newcombe, andlessons of history, and moderation, and courage. To George Lloyd and Aubrey Herbert. This small theoutsiders, he was a peace-maker(I was all claws and teeth,and had a devil),and madeus feelfavoured team - 'more reminiscentof a universitydepart- and listenedto, for his weightjudgement. He had a ment than a militaryunit' - was based at the delicatesense of value, and would present clearly to us Continental Hotel in Cairo and its time spent theforces hidden behind the lousy rags and festering workingout strategicoptions to ensurethe protec- skinswe knewas Arabs.Hogarth was our referee, tionof theSuez Canal zone, theprincipal defensive and our untiringhistorian, who gave us his great objectiveof Britishpolicy in theregion. Lawrence's knowledgeand carefulwisdom even in thesmallest duties included liaising with civilian map-makers things,because he believedin whatwe weremaking.76

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 514 MichaelHeffernan Elsewhere Lawrence wrote, 'I owed [Hogarth] go tothe F[oreign] O[ffice] ifpossible. Point out that in everythingI had'; the war, he also claimed, had the Baghdad[Railway] Convention France gave up turned him into 'a sort of Hogarth: a travelled, Alexandretta,toGermans, and agreed that it formed no of Swearthat it doesn't form of - archaeologicalsort of man, with geographyand a part Syria. part Syria ,77 andyou know it speaks Turkish: and also tellF[oreign] pen as his two standbys'.7 O[ffice]... thatit is vitallyimportant we holdit. One The motives of and Lawrence are a Hogarth cannotgo on bettingthat France will alwaysbe our matter of furthercontroversy. Some historians friend.If France has all ofSyria south of Alexandretta, insistthat both men became genuinelyconvinced sheought to be content.sl of the need forArab Others claim independence. Once Alexandrettawas Lawrence thatneither exhibited real forthe Arab captured, argued sympathy that a Arab revolt could be cause but calculated that, in the midst of this general instigated against Turkish rule across much of Syria and nationalcrisis, British interests were best servedby beyond. In his second letter,he urged Hogarthto encouragingpan-Arab independencein the belief concentratehis effortson officialsin the govern- that a futureArab state would be dominated by ment of India who, he claimed,still regardedthe Britain(rather than Germanyor France).78Estab- Middle East as rightfullytheir responsibility and lishingthe truthin this shadowy world is notori- remained committedto an Indian-style'divide- ously difficultbut one thing is clear: fromearly and-rule' policy with respect to the Arab popu- 1915,while Hogarthwas poringover maps in the lation.The Arab revoltforeseen by Lawrencewas RGS, Lawrence and his colleagues in Cairo began predicatedupon greaterArab unitywhich Britain to ideas for a more offensive develop campaign should rather than undermine. Ulti- in the Middle East. One idea was to combine encourage mately,the government should embracethe idea of the proposed assault on the Dardanelles, which Arab self-ruleafter the war in returnfor Arab most membersof the Cairo officefelt unlikely to support against the Turks: 'It's a big game', he succeed, withan Allied naval attackon the portof observed,'and at last one worthplaying... If only Alexandretta,on the northSyrian coast. This idea [thegovernment of] India will let us go. Won'tthe was quickly rejectedin London, however,on the Frenchbe mad if we win through?'.82 grounds that it would create tensionwith France where a powerfulimperialist lobby insisted that was a French greaterSyria (la Syrieintegrale) sphere Breaking the deadlock: the RGS and the of influence.French it was politicians, judged, Middle East, 1915-16 would be alarmed by Britishmilitary involvement in a regionwhich France hoped to annex unchal- Hogarth tried hard to promote these ideas in lenged once Turkeywas defeated.79Forestalling London, not least within the RGS itself.On 24 Frenchambitions may well have been the principal March 1915,he volunteeredto presenta lectureat objective of Lawrence's scheme but the British theRGS in a serieswhich Freshfield and Keltiehad governmentdecided thata majorforce, comprising inauguratedon the geographyof the war, part of mainlyof Indian imperialtroops, should advance theirattempt to increasethe wartimeprofile of the instead throughMesopotamia from the Persian Society.83"The date of the lecture,suggested by Gulf towardsBaghdad. Hogarth,was 26 April, the day afterthe Allied Lawrence had little faith in either the naval assault on the Dardanelleswas due to begin. Dardanellesor theMesopotamia proposals, neither This was clearlychosen, with obvious inside infor- of which were to relyupon local Arab support.80s mation,to maximizethe lecture'simpact on public He soughtto communicatehis views to Hogarthin and political opinion. Hogarth's presentation,a London duringthe earlyweeks of 1915.Two of his surveyof thewar in the 'Near East', ended withan letters,dated 18 and 22 March (as preparationsfor eloquent warning against underestimatingthe the Dardanelles campaign gatheredmomentum), militarypower of Turkey.The attack which had seemed to escape the vigilance of the British just begun, he argued,was extremelyrisky for the militarycensors. In the first,Lawrence entreated straitsof theDardanelles were narrow,treacherous Hogarth to use his influence and contacts in and offeredfew naturallanding places. All was to London to revivethe Alexandrettascheme and to the defender'sadvantage in this natural fortress. undermine those who were concerned about Hogarth'spaper was, in short,a severeindictment Frenchsensibilities: of the agreed strategy,all the more effectivefor its

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 515 calm understatement.The best chance of success, various reasons ... so I feel tied by the leg - or rather he concluded, lay in combiningthe Dardanelles by a veryobvious duty and evenif I wereto getfree campaign with other assaults on the Ottoman and return,what should I do? Odd jobs at the and RGSsome useful, but futile.The Empire,particularly in Syria,though no mention Admiralty many worstof all wouldbe to havenothing to do. So I stay was made of an Arab rising.84 unwillinglyhere.89 While he remainedat the RGS, Hogarthworked diligentlyto develop militaryoptions for an attack Two monthslater, he was on themove again and on Syria drawing upon his own expertiseand an on 9 August he wrote fromthe ContinentalHotel impressiverange of secretintelligence reports on in Cairo, headquartersof the Egyptianintelligence the Middle East supplied by Hedley. The main group,where he was reunitedwith Lawrence: sourcesof informationwere Hogarth'sclose friend At presentthere is no particularsecret about my Gertrude the remarkable who Bell, archaeologist movements.I am attached to the War Office Intelligence travelled widely in the Middle East before 1914 Department here as an expert on Turkey ... I go and spent much of the war on intelligenceduty in throughmy daily round of office work and interview- the region,and Captain W H I Shakespear,whose ing and interrogatingTurkish prisoners contentedly pioneeringmotorized travels in Arabia beforeand enough.9? duringthe war ended withhis death fightingwith A week later,he observed: Ibn Saud's men againstpro-Turkish Arab forceson 24 January1915.85 Mywork is interestingbut not exactly exciting, though Incorporating this mass of often-conflicting it puts me in theway of hearinga good deal of what is information(which arrived in frustratinginstal- reallyhappening ... (sometimessingularly different ments)onto the 1:1 millionsheets was a majortask. fromwhat is statedofficially) and whatis expectedto By May 1915, followingan Admiraltyrequest for happen ... Here it is all politicsand war!91 informationon the Persian Gulf Hinks con- sheet, Withindays of Hogarth's arrivalin Cairo, intel- fessed that progress on that sector was being ligence reportsbegan to flow fromEgypt to the 'delayed in order to incorporatethe recentwork GSGS and the RGS in London.92Hinks was rarely of Miss Gertrude Bell and the late Captain satisfiedeither with the quality or the quantityof Shakespear'. The following August, Hinks the materialhe receivedand constantlysuspected informedHedley that critical details were being withheld. He wrote All thenotebooks and observationsof thelate Capt. innumerablecomplaining letters to Hedley and to Shakespearhave recently come into our hands, and we Cairo, particularlyabout Lawrence whose reports areputting on as much... staffas possibleto working and statisticaldigests on Syriaand Damascus were this up. When it is finishedwe shall tackleMiss composed in his inimitablestyle which playfully GertrudeBell and I hopethat by Christmas time all that refusedto conformto any consistentsystem for the materialwill be ready.86 transliterationof Arabic place-names.93'I cannot Hinks confided to 'that Lawrence's own map-work and reconnaissance help thinking', Hedley, Lawrence is a bit of a crank because at rate information,particularly on Damascus and its any be environs, also began to filterback to the RGS thereseems to a very great weight of serious him'.94 who had directed map-room via GSGS (Fig. 2).87 This new infor- opinion against Hedley, Lawrence's work at the GSGS earlierin the war, mation generated several ideas including one in tones: developed by Lawrenceand Hogarthwhich, draw- replied soothing ing heavily on Shakespear's reports, outlined Lawrenceis a youngman who is verycock-sure. It is a a surprise motorized invasion of Syria from goodfault and he is veryoften right but not always. If Mesopotamia.88 I was [sic]you I would continueyour 1/1M series In May 1915, Hogarth leftEngland forAthens, withoutbothering about Lawrence except to use any probably at Hedley's instigationand with some informationor material he maysupply.95 mixed feelings:'The fact.., is...', he informedhis Hogarth remained in the Middle East, though wife, not always in Cairo, until the last weeks of 1915. I havebeen pushed here into a jobwhich I alonecan do The Gallipoli campaign continued,despite appal- as itis atpresent constituted. Even if TEL [Lawrence]or ling losses, throughoutthis period; the decision GLB[Bell] return, they can't quite do thesame thing for finallyto abandon the assault comingat the end of

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 516 MichaelHeffernan

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October after newspaper reports about the true Censor and my own discretion:I can't writeabout scale of the disasterended the commandof Sir Ian anythingreally interestingand trivialitiesdon't Hamilton.96The Britishadvance towardsBaghdad, suit at a timelike this'.97 whichbegan earlierin the year,also ran intomajor The ignominiouscollapse of bothAllied assaults difficultiesand was forcedto retreatafter the Battle on the OttomanEmpire intensified intrigue in the of Ctesiphonon 22 November to the town of Kut region.To an extent,these disasters played intothe where the Indian troopswere besieged by Turkish hands of Lawrence and Hogarth whose ideas for forces.Faced with these reversals,which he had encouragingan Arab risingin returnfor pan-Arab predicted,Hogarth found it difficultto conceal his self-governmentafter the war began to win wider weariness:'I hate this sortof lifeas much as ever', support.Vague Britishpromises were made to the he wroteon 8 November,'and thiscloudy stateof HashemiteArabs to this effectin the summerand the political situationdoes not make it any more autumn of 1915.98But powerful,and less subtle, bearable'. He was, he claimed, 'pen-tied by the imperialist voices in both London and Paris

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 517 remained hostile to any talk of postwar Arab about an Arab risingwhen the lattervisited Cairo independence as this would compromise the to consult with Britishofficials in the protectorate uncomplicated division of the Ottoman spoils just before negotiationsbegan. Hogarth's return amongst the Allied powers afterTurkey's defeat. to the RGS shifted the focus of the NID Matterswere furthercomplicated by the emerging group stronglytowards the Middle East. Detailed Zionist lobby which was agitatingfor a Jewish research began on the distributionof different homeland in Palestine. tribesand on the territorialjurisdiction and loyal- Secret Anglo-Frenchnegotiations, led by Sir ties of various Arab sheiks and warlords. The Mark Sykes (Tory MP for Hull and Kitchener's NID team in the RGS became, in essence, a adviser on Orientalmatters) and London branch of the Cairo office, FrancoisGeorges intelligence Picot (formerFrench Consul in Beirutand a lead- preparing the way for an Arab revolt and a ing advocate of France's Middle East claims), renewed Britishcampaign in the Middle East. began in London on 23 Novemberto clarifyAllied This created some tension within the RGS policy towards the Middle East.99The Admiralty, between the two intelligence operations: the the ministerialfocus of an 'eastern'strategy which GSGS 1:1 millioncartographers answerable to the mightcapitalize on Britishnaval power,was keen 'westerners'in the War Officeand the NID group to develop its intelligenceon the Middle East in representingthe 'easterners'in the Admiralty.The anticipationof the Sykes-Picottalks leading to a row focused initiallyon the allocationof space. In relaunchedAllied offensivein the region.'Blinker' December 1915, 'Blinker' Hall made a formal Hall thereforemade two importantchanges to his request to the RGS Council formore rooms to be intelligence-gatheringcapacity. First, he ordered made available forthe NID team. Followingpres- GertrudeBell to Cairo to work alongside Hogarth sure fromHinks, this request was turned down. and Lawrence.She arrivedon 26 November,three Instead, the Council offeredthe stables,provided days afterthe Sykes-Picotnegotiations began, and the Admiraltypaid for theirconversion and run- set about helping 'to fill in the Intelligencefiles ning costs.106Early in 1916, however, an over- with informationas to the tribesand sheikhs'.100 workedand exhaustedHinks succumbedto a form Almost immediately,she began to agitate for a of pneumonia and was bedridden fromaround resurrectionof the Syrianoption.101 Secondly, Hall 10 January.Cozens-Hardy, abetted by Dickson, asked Hogarthto returnto London to work along- seized this opportunityto take over most of the side several other academics who had recently RGS, citingthe overwhelmingnational importance been recruitedby the NID to research strategic of their work on the Middle East. Work on the alternatives with respect to differentlocalities European 1:1 millionsheets was to cease immedi- around the world where naval power could be ately and all other researchwas to focus on the deployed.102Other NID recruitsincluded the his- Middle East. Freshfieldwas reluctantto prevent torianand philosopherR G Collingwood and the this lest his actions be interpretedas obstructive aforementionedH N Dickson.103The latterwas and unpatriotic. alreadyworking at theRGS and, partlythrough his An outragedCarruthers, who was stillworking influence,the new NID team installeditself along- on the GSGS 1:1 million map, wrote a series of side the GSGS cartographersin KensingtonGore angry memos to Hinks. The Society,he claimed, where the RGS map and referencelibrary proved was 'upside down': the libraryhad been 'cleared perfectlysuited to its needs. One of the NID tasks for action'; the officeof the librarian,Edward was the preparationof a series of geographical Heawood, requisitionedby Dickson; and the map handbooks on the actual and potentialtheatres of room mysteriouslyrelabelled 'The Arabia Room'. naval warfare,although the team's responsibilities Carruthersnow shared this with Hogarth,effec- embraced other, more general intelligence tivelyas his assistant.His orderswere to 'under- duties.104By October1915, there were twentyNID take immediatelythe Arabian maps to accompany academics workingfull-time at the RGS squeezed Hogarth's work' at a variety of scales from into fourlarge rooms,under the immediatecom- 1:1 millionupwards: mand of Lieutenant-CommanderCozens-Hardy.105 I thinkit is thedirtiest trick I have ever seen played... Hogarth'sreturn to London and his recruitment The onlything that might happen now is thatI might by Hall were clearlyconnected to the Sykes-Picot loose [sic]my temper and hitsomeone! I will tryto negotiations.Hogarth had triedto convinceSykes controlmyself for the sake of the 1/M!107

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 518 MichaelHeffernan Hinks wrote a long and vitriolic letter to It was decided, followingan eloquentintervention Freshfieldfrom his sick-bed,attacking the NID fromHogarth, that the Admiraltywould support group,particularly Cozens-Hardy and Dickson,in GSGS work on the 1:1 millionmap but the Middle the most bloodcurdlingfashion: East research,including the 1:1 million sheets, should have top priorityuntil both the Admiralty Theyare quite impossible people to co-operate with ... and theWar Officeissued new instructions.113This an amateurorganisation run by a KC [Cozens-Hardy policy was formallyagreed at the next RGS was a who halfhis time... barrister] spends cleverly Council meetingon 7 February.114At this stage, exploitingpeople and the other half... attendingto his thirteen1:1 million European sheets had been ownprivate practice in the Courts. The more he can get and a further were in outof other people the more time he has to devoteto compiled eight press. hisprofitable career. Thirteenmore were in preparationcovering most of the Middle East.'1s As forDickson, Hinks had been Hogarth had busied himself in London on detailed intelligencereports in supportof his pre- politelyat war[with him] for some weeks ... I should ferredpolicy. While at the RGS, he completedthe resistwith all the at command(which I strength my Admiraltyintelligence handbook on Arabia and admitfor the momentis verylittle) any attemptto undertookfurther research which culminatedin a exploitour ... 1/M map ... justin orderthat these two-volume of more than Admiraltypeople may carrythrough what they comprehensive study want.1o8 1200 pages, subsequentlyissued to 'Blinker'Hall and seniorAdmiralty staff in late 1916.116At some 'Blinker'Hall, anxious to avoid any impressionof a point early in 1916, the details of the Sykes- policy split between the NID and the GSGS, also Picot agreement,which had been concluded on wrote to Freshfieldinsisting that the GSGS map 3 January,were made known to Hogarth. The work was of 'criticalimportance' to theAdmiralty accord, an uneasy compromisebetween mutually and enclosing a copy of a letter from Hedley exclusive perspectives,fell far shortof Hogarth's were the statingthat the NID researchwas of 'considerable ambitions. Once the Turks defeated, was be divided into benefit'to the War Office.Hall pointedlyinsisted, Middle East to Russian, however,that the Middle East researchshould be Italian,French, British and internationalzones plus given priorityby both the NID and the GSGS.109 Italian, Frenchand British'spheres of influence'. The coastal belt of the easternMediterranean and A 'War Maps' meeting,involving senior repre- sentativesfrom the NID, the GSGS and the RGS, much of Mesopotamia were to be shared between was arrangedon 3 Februaryto clarifyobjectives.n0 French,British and (in the case of Palestine)inter- The meetingwas attendedby Freshfield,Hedley, national control. The 'independent' Arab lands Hogarth,Keltie, Close and Leonard Darwin,a past lying between the Mediterraneanstrip and the Gulf were to be furtherdivided between British Presidentof the Society.Carruthers, Dickson and E A Reeves (theRGS Map Curatorand Instructorin and French 'spheres of influence'.These desert lands would be colonies in all but name and Surveying) were brought in to answer specific questions.11 Hinks, still bedridden, submitteda isolated fromthe sea otherthan throughthe pro- marginallyless offensivememorandum expressing posed British, French or internationalcoastal his views, as did 'Blinker'Hall who was unable to zones. As far as Hogarth was concerned, this attend.112Hedley gave a ringingendorsement of directly compromised British promises to the the 1:1 millionmap and offereda further?200 to Arabs and would certainlyundermine the fragile supportthe work. trust which had been painstakinglyconstructed over the preceding months. It also gave France As a matterof fact, it is nowTHE mapin theChief of far too powerfula role in the postwar political Staff'soffice. For considerationof generalstrategical geographyof the region.Nevertheless, the archi- areait is useful.It is thebest anygiven extremely map tectsof the schemebelieved thatthis arrangement forshowing the country and representingthe position would be sufficientto facilitatean Arab rising oftroops from day to day. It is veryclear. The Staff does notcare a bitabout a lotof names because in thatcase against the Turks and the agreementwas subse- theycannot show the position of their troops. They like quently ratified by the various governments thecommunications clear and thetopography, and to involved, subject to such an insurrectiontaking haveplenty of space to writeon. place.117

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 519 By the end of March,Hogarth was back in Cairo dominate all map work in the OS, the GSGS and as head (in all but name) of a new Arab Bureau, the RGS. In May, Hedley issued Hinks with an establishedin the wake of the Sykes-Picottalks to urgentdemand for special thematicmaps of the preparefor the Arab revoltin the Hejaz desertof Britishsector of thewestern front coloured to show westernArabia, due to begin in June.Clayton, who differentrelief and drainage features,for which was the officialhead of the new unit,was eager for another?200 was made available.Although hastily Hogarthto becomeinvolved: 'if you can letHogarth prepared,these maps were received,according to come lateron', he wroteto Hall in mid-January,'he Hedley, 'with rapture'by the General Staff.122 will be of the greatestvalue'.11s Hogartharrived in The failureof the 1916-17campaigns to reopena Cairo withthe revised and officiallyratified version war of movementserved only to underline the of the secretSykes-Picot agreement. If thisbecame futilityof small-scale maps for strategicmilitary known to theArabs, Hogarth feared that the entire purposes.Recognizing this, Hinks soughtvaliantly campaign would be undermined. He therefore to devise new cartographicoptions with which wrotelong despatchesto Hall in London insisting to impress his War Officepaymasters. His most thatthe detailsof the Sykes-Picotaccord should be successful scheme was a new 1:2 million map kept 'strictlysecret'. The agreementshould, more- of Africa, designed specificallyto allow British over, be regarded as provisionaland in need of territorialclaims in the German ex-coloniesto be furthernegotiation after the war.119 advanced more effectively.123Work also began on Despite Hogarth's absence, the cartographyof an Asian map at 1:5 million scale, though only a theMiddle East remainedan importantpriority for single sheet,for Manchuria, was ever prepared.124 the RGS throughlate 1916 and 1917. Intelligence The 1:1 million map was never in serious reportsand commentson provisionalcopies of the jeopardy,however, and the collapse of the last- 1:1 millionMiddle Easternsheets arrived regularly ditch German offensivein the spring of 1918 fromCairo, includinga 'big roll of tracingswith broughtit once again to the forefrontof War Office correctionsand comments'from Gertrude Bell.120 planning. By the late summer of 1918, an Allied Hogarthmade two furthershort visits to the RGS victorywas at last withinsight and preparations in thesummers of 1916 and 1917to inspectwork in forpostwar negotiations were intensifyingaround progress,and Freshfield,in his annual Presidential theworld. Hedley and Hinks were determinedthat addresses, reserved his most lavish praise for the 1:1 millionshould be adopted as the principal the Middle Easternactivities of Hogarth,Bell and base map for the initial redrawing of political others,though he was carefulnever to citenames and boundaries in Europe and the Middle East at the to keep his remarksas vague as possible.121Once the coming peace conference.Not only would this Arab revoltand the Britishcampaigns in Palestine boost the prestigeof the RGS and the GSGS but and Mesopotamiawere successfullyunderway by it would also give Britaina significantstrategic mid-1916,launching Lawrence to his legendarysta- advantage over othercountries. The objectivenow tus in the pantheonof Englishromantic heroes, the was to achieve maximumterritorial coverage at the focus of intelligence-gatheringand interpretationmillion scale. Hinks also began to champion the shiftedalmost entirely to the new Arab Bureau and 1:1 million as the obvious 'peace map' amongst otherintelligence agencies in the Middle East. The leading geographersin Allied countries.125When RGS, whichhad functionedthrough 1915 and early finallythe guns fellsilent at 11am on 11 November 1916as a convenientmetropolitan focus from which 1918, over 90 sheets had been prepared covering to promotethese Middle Easternprojects, became far most of Europe and the Middle East.126No other less significant.As thewar movedinto its final phase, Allied countryhad devoted comparabletime and other cartographicdemands became increasingly effortto small-scalemapping of the main theatres importantin KensingtonGore. of war.127 Peace negotiationsbegan in Paris at the begin- ning of 1919. On 6 February,representatives from the of the War and peace: the RGS, 1916-19 cartographicagencies major powers, under the chairmanshipby General Bourgeois, By the springof 1916,'western' strategic planning agreed that the 1:1 million should be adopted as for the battle of the Somme and the subsequent the base map forgeneral political discussion, to be 'third' battle of Ypres (Passchendaele) began to photographicallyenlarged or reduced as the need

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 520 MichaelHeffernan arose.128 On 27 March, an officialletter of thanks ous or too subtlefor the Britishpolitical leadership arrivedat the RGS fromthe ChiefSecretary to the which opted insteadfor an Anglo-Frenchdivision War Office.The map, it stated, of the Ottoman imperial spoils, albeit under the cosmeticguise of the mandatessystem introduced was notonly of greatvalue duringthe war, but has under the new of Nations.132Thus ended provedto be indispensablefor the work of thePeace League Conference... [It]has been, and willalways be, of the the wartime prospect of an independent Arab greatestpossible value.129 state. Despite the much-vaunted expertise of geographers such as Holdich and Sir Halford This was a notable forthe RGS but it did coup Mackinder, whose wartime had been littleto liftthe sense of disillusionmentand resent- writings devoted to the political geography of postwar ment within the senior Fellows Society. Many reconstruction,neither was called upon to offer believed the nation's storeof geographicalknowl- advice.133The sole representativesof the British and had been underused edge expertise woefully geographical communityin Paris (beyond those during the conflict.Freshfield, whose Presidency concernedwith the Middle East) were the mem- had ended in 1915 (he was succeeded May by bers of a small GSGS team, led by Hedley and Holdich), seemed bitter.The mur- particularly includingMajor O E Wynneand Captain Alan G derous of British reversalswas, catalogue military Ogilvie, who offeredcartographic advice to the he attributableto argued, directly geographical Britishdelegation.134 ignorance: Providingnew maps and cartographicexpertise muchof... [thework carried out in the RGS] ... ought was one thing;a substantiveinvolvement in for- to havebeen done before the war. Owing, however, to mulatingBritish policy on the new political map ourtraditional attitude in timesof peace, it has had to was quite another.Hinks belatedly realized that be doneunder great pressure ... Is it an extravagant draftingthe base map for the Peace Conference hopethat a lessonhas been learned, and thatin future would in itselfdo little for Britishgeography's theuses of geographyboth in war and politicsmay intellectualstatus, either at home or abroad. A be more fully recognizedat Westminsterand week beforethe Armistice,he wrote to Hogarth Whitehall?130 and othersenior Fellows exhortingthem to write short notes' on different of the This lament was echoed other RGS 'geographical parts by Fellows, world which could be submitted to the Peace Sir H the diminutivebut notably Harry Johnston, Conferencein the name of the RGS. 'So far as I vocal Africanexplorer and colonial administrator, can see', he claimed, 'if this Society does not who observed as earlyas November1916 that get togethersomething of the kind it won't be Geography...is worthyof the greatest deference from done systematically'.Not surprisingly,no such itssister sciences, as it is reallythe Eldest Sister of the publicationswere ever produced.135 Band.It keeps house over the other sciences and should Othercountries used theirleading geographical be theovermastering subject in theeducation of the experts in a much more substantive political British [Yet]... lackof knowl- people... geographical capacity. Leading French geographershad been edgein ourGovernment and possiblyour generals ... prominentlyinvolved in planning their nation's [has]led to theunhappy issues of our land campaigns war aims and official ... andmay yet react on us otherlamentable directions elaborating negotiating ... I believe that ignorance of geography in high positionson everyconceivable subject during the quartershas tripledthe length of theWar, tripled its war. The Service GiographiqueFrangais, which cost,and endangeredits victorious issue for the British included Emmanuel de Martonne,Emmanuel de Empire.'1' Margerie,Albert Demangeon, Lucien Gallois and Jean Brunhes, also wielded real influence on The peace negotiationsin Paris did little to Frenchpolicies at the Peace Conferenceitself.'36 In alleviate this sense of frustration.Although the USA, PresidentWilson agreed to establishan Hogarth, Lawrence and Bell, whose views had ambitious American investigationunder Colonel such an influenceon the RGS in 1915 and 1916, Edward Mandell House to prepare for a future were prominentlyinvolved as advisers to the peace conference even before the Americans British delegation with respect to the Ottoman enteredthe war in April 1917.The headquartersof Empire,their visions of the postwar geopolitical the House Inquirywere the New York officesof orderin theMiddle East proved eithertoo danger- the American Geographical Society,which was

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 521 directedby Isaiah Bowman. By mid-1918,this had effortand to the subsequent peace process was become arguably the most exhaustiveexercise in limitedto technicaland cartographicissues rather geographical and historical data collection ever than substantive research on military or geo- attempted,the idealisticobjective being to provide politicalstrategy. While the war stimulateda great a futurepeace conferencewith an unprecedented deal of theoreticaldebate withinthe Britishgeo- mass of factual material in an accessible form graphicalcommunity (debate whichwas to have a which would ensure fair and equitable nego- considerableinfluence on the subsequentdevelop- tiations. Over 150 leading American academics ment of Britishgeography), geographical theory were involved, representingvirtually every disci- had littlediscernible impact on politicalor military pline and including several prominentgeogra- leaders.143 phers such as Douglas W Johnsonfrom Columbia The failure of Britishgeographers to play a Universityand MarkJefferson from Michigan State significantrole in the Peace Conferencepossibly Normal School. Bowman, whose ambition was relates to the largelyamateur natureof the disci- such thathe usually ended 'in chargeof whatever pline in the UK at the time.The geographerswho organization he happens to be a part of', was advised othercountries on the complex questions effectivelyin controlof theentire operation.1'37 Less relating to war aims or territorialclaims were thana monthafter the Armistice, three huge truck- drawn from well-establishedgeographical com- loads ofAmerican evidence had been assembled to munities in major universitieswith formidable be shipped across to France aboard the George intellectualreputations. In Britain,the status of Washingtonalong with Wilson and the other geographyin highereducation was stillrelatively members of the American delegation, Bowman precariousin 1914 and the country'smost influen- included.'""3 The 'new' nations lobbying for tial academic geographer,Mackinder, had long territoryat the peace negotiations were also since moved into the world of party politics. In representedby senior geographicalexperts, most these unpromisingcircumstances, it is perhaps notably Jovan Cvijic from the University of understandablethat few politicalleaders thought Belgrade, who was a leading member of the of geographersas anythingother than technical Yugoslav delegation, and Eugeniusz Romer cartographicadvisers. fromthe Universityof Lwbw, who was equally Yet the practicalcontribution of the disciplineto prominentin the Polish delegation.139 the war effortdid not go unnoticed either by SeniorBritish geographers were understandably political authoritiesor academics in other disci- fearfulthat the presenceof so many distinguished plines and this seemed to strengthenthe argu- foreignscholars at the Peace Conferencewould ments of those who advocated the relevanceand overwhelmthe effortsmade by Britishgeographi- necessityof the subjectin the moderneducational cal agencies. Hinks became especially concerned system.It is, perhaps,not entirely coincidental that, by the scale of the Americaninvolvement in what despite severe wartimerestrictions on university was, he insisted,a European affair.His irritation resourcesand a massive reductionin studentnum- increased through 1918 as Bowman and his bers (conditions which, in other circumstances, co-workers in New York made increasingly mighthave fatallyundermined a fledglinguniver- extravagantrequests for maps and otherinforma- sity discipline),geography's place in higheredu- tion,ending with an orderplaced a few days after cationwas immeasurablystrengthened by thewar. the Armisticefor a complete version of the RGS Once the threat of closure was lifted from the 1:1 millionmap plus all GSGS war maps.140Money, Oxford School of Geography (precipitated by it seemed, was no object.'4"' The relationship Herbertson's death in 1915), the firsthonours between Hinks and Bowman quicklydeteriorated schools were established in other British uni- into a mutual loathingas intenseas it was long- versitiesduring or immediatelyafter the war - lasting.142 Liverpoolin 1917;the London School ofEconomics Despite theirpolitical connections and growing and Aberystwythin 1918; University College, intellectual respectability,the involvement of London, Cambridge and Leeds in 1919; Britishgeographers in the peace negotiationsand Manchester in 1923; and Sheffieldin 1924.144 in the formulationof officialpolicy was negligible Despite the tensions and antagonisms of the compared with the experienceof othercountries. previous months,as well as the frustratedambi- The contributionof Britishgeography to the war tions of some senior figures,British geography

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 522 MichaelHeffernan emergedfrom the war witha noticeablyenhanced justificationfor untrammelled imperialist exploita- reputation.145 tion or a universityhaven for assorted racialists and environmentaldeterminists. This is modern geography's own brand of postcolonial angst, a Conclusion collectivedisciplinary 'guilt trip' in whichan over- simplified 'evil' past is laid bare with all the The historyof theRGS duringthe FirstWorld War confessionalzeal of a reformedalcoholic. While it illustrateshow geographicalknowledge and exper- can reasonably be argued that confrontingthe tise can become implicatedin broaderpolitical and unpalatableaspects of a discipline'spast represents ideologicalconflicts, and how ostensiblyuniversal, a necessaryfirst step towardsthe constructionof a 'scientific'objectives can readily become fused new and more challengingversion of the disci- with the narrow,strategic objectives of the nation- pline, there is an ever-presentdanger of over- state. In a controversialand polemical review of stating the case and, usually by implication,of the discipline, Yves Lacoste has writtenof two vastlyover-emphasizing the institutional cohesion, apparentlydistinct forms of geographywhich have intellectualpower and political influenceof geo- developed side-by-sidefrom the late nineteenth graphicaltheory and practicein the past. century.The firstand older form,which Lacoste The experience of the RGS during the First calls 'la gdographiedes 6tats-majors',is the kind WorldWar is a case in point. The RGS did play a of strategicgeography carried out by armies and significantrole as a cartographicagency closely secret services as a means of reinforcingstate linked to the intelligenceservices of both the War power.This has generateda seriesof huge, largely Officeand theAdmiralty. Its mostnotable achieve- secret geographical archives dotted around the mentwas theproduction of a simplified1:1 million world developed for, and controlled by, rival map of Europe, the Middle East and northAfrica nation-states.Lacoste's second formof geography, which was designed and used as an important which he calls 'la gdographie des professeurs', strategicand geopoliticaldevice both during war representsthe ostensiblymore open and disinter- and at the postwar Peace Conference.For a short ested educational and research activitiesof the period in 1915 and early 1916,at the heightof the academic geographicalcommunity. Couched in the dispute between 'westerners'and 'easterners',the familiarlanguage of rational science and liberal RGS began to play a more significantrole as a scholarship,it is 'la g6ographiedes professeurs' centre of military and political strategy with which ends up in the published record of the respectto the Middle East. Here the influenceof disciplineand which dominatesour conceptionof Hogarth,Hall and the NID was all important.But what geographymeans. Yet, as Lacoste argues,and thisis not to say thatthe diverseFellowship of the as this articlehas tried to demonstrate,the same RGS adopted a coherent,institutional response to personalities,institutions, research methods and the Middle Eastern campaign or to any other techniqueshave frequentlybeen employedwithin aspect of the war. The vast majorityof the Fellow- bothcamps, to theextent that it becomesdifficult to ship would have been only dimly aware of what draw a clear and comfortingdistinction between was happeningwithin their Society and even those these two versionsof the discipline.146 who were closelyinvolved in the war work rarely This is an important lesson which should articulateda consistentview on theselarger strate- certainlyinform current debates in the historyand gic questions.In thissense, the RGS was simplya presentcondition of geography.An awareness of convenientlylocated and well-resourcedmetro- the differentkinds of geography which have politanfocus for those few Fellows whose connec- existed in the past, and an understandingof the tions,vision and grasp allowed them to develop tensionsand overlaps between them,allows us to and promotepolicy objectiveson thisgrand scale. make more informeddecisions about the moral I have not, so far,considered how individual and intellectualdilemmas which continueto con- British geographers coped with the moral and frontthe disciplinetoday.147 Yet, when considering ethical dilemmas raised by the wartimemobiliz- episodes fromgeography's past, it is importantto ation of theirdiscipline. The depressingreason is avoid thetemptation to make excessivelydark and that such questions seem never to have been simplistic claims; to depict the discipline as a debated in the correspondenceor publicationsI putativemilitary science, an elaborateintellectual have examined. While Britishgeographers were

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 523 increasinglywilling to criticizeBritain's political influentialmember of its Council duringthe war, and militaryleadership and to mount spirited was also President of the Eugenics Education attacks on both the conduct of the war and the Society. In common with many of his fellow peace negotiations,there was littleclearly articu- eugenicists,Darwin came to the conclusion even lated or consistentopposition to the war on moral beforeAugust 1914 that war had become essen- or ethical grounds in Britishgeography. Most of tiallydysgenic. In contrastto otherscientists such the key actors on the Britishgeographical stage as Sir ArthurKeith (who viewed war as 'nature's seemed to detect no contradictionbetween their pruning hook', periodically removing society's scientificrole and theirmoral responsibilities. surplus population and thus sustaininggrowth, The implications of this are, of course, far- energy and virility),Darwin believed that war reaching and were widely debated during and destroyed the best and the brightest,leaving afterthe war. For some, like the radical economist behind a morally and physicallyinferior stock. J A Hobson, the fusion of science and politics War,once ennoblingand uplifting,had become an threatenedto underminethe foundationsof a free evolutionary retrogressiveforce, reversing the and tolerantsociety: march of human progressand acceleratingracial degeneration.1soThat geography's only moral Thegraver perils to free-thought and scientific progress lie in ... [the]timid conservatism of... professorsand oppositionto war should be based upon this dis- theirgenuine class sympathiesand reverences.They turbingrationale is perhaps the finalironic lesson are not so muchthe intellectualmercenaries of the of thistragic era.151 vestedinterests as theirvolunteers.148

This may be an accurate assessment of the geo- Acknowledgements establishment the First World graphical during Research for this was made a War but few members of this small essay possible by community British The staffof theRGS shared Hobson's concern that their war work Academygrant. library and archive,and the custodiansof theMiddle East compromisedtheir scientificcredibility. Hogarth, archiveat St Antony'sCollege, Oxford,have been writingon the eve of the Armistice,expressed a more commonview: very helpful.Keith Boucher and ProfessorDavid Wallace of Loughborough University,Professor thelast four years have been a timein whichthere has David Stoddart of the Universityof California been no questionof a Governmentapart from the at Berkeley,the editor of this journal and the individualsof the Nation, or of an Armyas opposedto anonymousreferees all provideduseful comments Civilians. whocould do hashad to Everyone, anything, and information.I am especially grateful to become ofthe Govt. or the It is a part Army. People's, ProfessorCharles Withers of the of nota Government's,War! I offeredmyself four years University forhis and to Dr ago formy specialist knowledge of one theatreof this Edinburgh generous hospitality war,and bitby bit was putin chargeof our policy in Caroline Barron (Hogarth's granddaughter) of theNearer East. I wentin neitherfor pay nor honours, Royal Holloway,University of London, forallow- andat first lost some hundreds a year by it... withone ing me to quote fromher grandfather'sletters and sole object- to beatthe Bosche! and keepGrt. Britain forher invaluable advice. Any errorsare entirely whereshe was beforethe War.149 my responsibility. It would not be accurate to conclude that a principledanti-war sentiment was entirelyabsent Notes fromBritish geography. Most geographers,particu- larly in the universities,remained silent on the 1 Goldie G T 1907 Geographicalideals Geographical 29 from 8. broader moral questions raised by the war and it Journal 1-14, quotation p. 2 H B 1907 The relations and would be unjustto assume thatthis implied acqui- George of geography historyClarendon Press, Oxford, 95. escence or There was, moreover, implicitsupport. 3 On thecultural impact of theFirst World War, see at least one senior in the estab- figure geographical Fussell P 1975 The GreatWar and modernmemory lishment who found it impossible to reconcile OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford; Kern S 1988The war in its modernform with firmlyheld scientific cultureof timeand space 1880-1918Weidenfeld and and moral convictions.Leonard Darwin, son of Nicolson,London; Eksteins M 1989Rites of spring: Charles, a formerPresident of the RGS and an theGreat War and thebirth of themodern age Black

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 524 Michael Heffernan Swan, London; Hynes S 1990 A war imagined:the 10 Schwabe K 1969 Wissenschaftund Kriegsmoral:Die FirstWorld War and Englishculture Pimlico, London; deutscheHochschullehrer und die politischenGrund- Winter J 1992 Catastrophe and culture: recent fragendes ErstenWeltkrieges Musterschmidt-Verlag, trendsin the historiographyof the FirstWorld War Gottingen;MacLeod R M and Andrews E K 1971 Journalof ModernHistory 64 525-32; Pick D 1993 Scientificadvice in thewar at sea, 1915-1917Journal War machine:The rationalisationof slaughterin the ofContemporary History 6 3-40;Whittemore G F 1975 modernage Yale UniversityPress, New Haven. WorldWar I, poison gas research,and the ideals of 4 Russellwas hounded fromhis Fellowshipat Trinity Americanchemists Social Studies of Science 5 135-63; College, Cambridge, and Nicolai, professor of TrumpenerU 1975The road to Ypres:the beginning physiology at the University of Berlin, was of gas warfarein World War I Journalof Modern imprisoned and subsequently forced to join the History47 460-505; Gouber C S 1976 Mars and Germanarmy, although he refusedto wear a sword Minerva:World War I and theuses of higher learning in and eventuallyfled to Denmark in 1916. Russell's AmericaUniversity of Louisiana Press,Baton Rouge; views were eloquently expressed in a number Gusewelle J K 1977 Science and the Admiralty of wartimepublications including Russell B 1915 duringWorld War I: thecase of theBIR in JordanG The ethics of war InternationalJournal of Ethics25 ed. Naval warfarein the twentiethcentury Croom 2 127-42; Russell B 1915 War: the offspringof Helm, London 105-17; Pattison M 1983 Scientists, fear Union of Democratic Control, London. For inventorsand the militaryin Britain,1915-19: the Nicolai's eugenicistperspective, see Nicolai G F MunitionsInventions Department Social Studiesof 1919 The biologyof war Century,New York (orig- Science 13 521-68; Haber L F 1986 The poison- inally published in Zurich in 1917). See also ous cloud: chemicalwarfare in the First WorldWar Wallace S 1988 War and the image of Germany: Clarendon Press,Oxford; Hartcup G 1988 The war British academics 1914-1918 John Donald, of inventions:scientific developments, 1914-1918 Edinburgh, esp. 124-66; Stromberg R N 1982 Brassey'sDefence, London. Redemptionby war: the intellectualsand 1914 11 See, however,Lacoste Y 1976 La glographie,ga sert, Regents Press of Kansas, Lawrence; Wohl R d'abord,ti faire la guerreMaspdro, Paris; Balchin 1979 The generationof 1914 Harvard University W G V 1987 United Kingdom geographersin the Press, Cambridge, MA. Second WorldWar Geographical Journal 153 2 159-80; 5 In October 1914, 93 leading German scientists,led Stoddart D R 1992 Geographyand war: the 'new by Max Planck, put their names to a manifesto geography'and the 'new army' in England, 1899- insistingtheir country was fightinga just,defensive 1914 PoliticalGeography 11 1 87-99; Godlewska war. This provoked an immediate counter-blast A 1994 Napoleon's geographers (1797-1815): from150 Britishacademics, led by JJ Thompson imperialists and soldiers of modernity in (see Stromberg1982 Redemptionby war op. cit.3). Godlewska A and Smith N eds Geographyand 6 See lettersto The Timesfrom Wells and leading empireBlackwell, Oxford 31-53; KirbyA 1994What scientistssuch as George H Raynor,J A Fleming, did you do in thewar, Daddy? in Godlewska A and E H Griffiths,H Trueman Wood, Henry E Smith N eds Geographyand empireBlackwell, Armstrongand PatrickGeddes on 21 May 9 col. e; Oxford 300-15; HeffernanM 1995 The spoils of 22 May 5 col. b; 11 June9 col. d; 12 June7 col. e; 15 war: the Socidtdde Gdographiede Paris and the June7 col. e; 16 June9 col. d; 17 June9 col. e; 19 June Frenchempire, 1914-1919 in Bell M Butlin R A and 9 col. c; 21 June9 cols d-e; 22 June9 col. d; 24 June HeffernanM eds Geographyand imperialism,1820- 9 col. d. For an anxious account of the German 1940 Manchester University Press, Manchester mobilizationof science,see Skrine F M 1915 War 221-64. and the German universitiesJournal of the Royal 12 Driver F 1995 Submergedidentities: familiar and UnitedServices Institute 60 439 469-75. unfamiliarhistories Transactions of the Instituteof 7 Poulton E B 1915 Science and the Great War BritishGeographers 20 4 410-13. ClarendonPress, Oxford. 13 Andrew C 1985Secret service: the making of the British 8 Royce F H and Johnson C 1915 Mobilization of IntelligenceCommunity Heinemann, London. For a inventionThe Times14 June7 col. d. more theoreticallycomplex argument about British 9 Fleming J A 1915 Science in the war and after intelligenceand the Victorian'information revol- the war Nature14 October 180-5; the quotationis ution', see Richards T 1993 The imperialarchive: from pp. 180 and 184. For a general discussion knowledgeand thefantasy of empire Verso, London. of the impact of the FirstWorld War on national 14 The OS, which dates from1791, has always been and internationalscience, see Crawford E 1992 primarilyconcerned with mapping the BritishIsles. Nationalismand internationalismin science,1880- Its overseas role was limited even in the former 1939:four studies of theNobel population Cambridge Britishcolonies which were surveyedand mapped UniversityPress, Cambridge 49-78. by the War Office,the Colonial Office or the

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 525 Dominion governments.For a generalaccount, see 26 Bell M and McEwan C 1996 The admission of Seymour W A ed. 1980 A historyof the Ordnance women Fellows to the Royal GeographicalSociety, SurveyWilliam Davis and Sons, Folkestone. 1892-1914Geographical Journal 162 3 (in press). 15 Jervis W P 1898 ThomasBest Jervisas Christian 27 Middleton D 1991Douglas W Freshfield1845-1934 soldier,geographer, and friend of India, 1796-1857 Eliot in Freeman T W ed. Geographers:bio-bibliographical Stock,London. studies13 23-31. 16 WatsonC M 1909 Thelife ofMajor-General Sir Charles 28 Wise M J 1986 The ScottKeltie reportof 1885 and WilsonJohn Murray, London. the teaching of geography in Great Britain Geo- 17 On the 'GreatGame', see Hopkirk P 1982 Trespassers graphicalJournal 152 367-82;Jay L J 1986 JohnScott on the roofof the worldOxford UniversityPress, Keltie 1840-1927in Freeman T W ed. Geographers: Oxford;Hopkirk P 1990 The GreatGame: on secret bio-bibliographicalstudies 10 93-8. servicein High Asia John Murray,London; and 29 Steers J A 1982 A R Hinks and the Royal Geo- Richards 1993 The imperialarchive op. cit. 11-44. graphicalSociety Geographical Journal 148 1-7. For German attemptsto destabilize BritishIndia 30 Holdich worked forthe Surveyof India from1865 beforeand duringthe First World War, see Hopkirk to 1898 and eventuallybecame Superintendentof P 1994 On secretservice east of Constantinople: the plot FrontierSurveys. From 1900, he was a memberof to bring down the British EmpireJohn Murray, the BritishArbitration Tribunal which adjudicated London. on internationalboundary disputes, particularly 18 Robert (later General Lord) Baden-Powell, who in Latin America, working alongside Lord and Sir then head of took a particularpleasure at dressingup in unusual Macnaughton JohnArdagh, the Holdich bears some to the charac- costumes,was a notable pioneer.On one occasion, IB. similarity ter of Colonel the British he masqueraded as a butterflycollector in Dalmatia Creighton, omnipotent officerin Kim in orderto sketchnaval fortificationsonto the wings intelligence RudyardKipling's (1901), of insectsdrawn in his notebook.See Andrew 1985 thoughthere is no evidence thatHoldich ever met Secretservice op. cit.53. Kipling. 19 Ibid.58. 31 RGS archives,Freshfield correspondence, Freshfield to 5 1914 20 Ibid.36-42. Keltie, August (hereafterRGS Freshfield Freshfieldto Keltie5 August 1914); Hinks to Fresh- 21 WinstoneH V F 1982 Theillicit adventure: the storyof field 5 August 1914; Keltie to Freshfield5 August politicaland military in the Middle East intelligence 1914; Place-nameindex for BEF maps Secretaryto 1898 to 1926 Jonathan London 6-8; from Cape, Sir Edward Grey (Foreign Secretary)to the RGS Andrew 1985 Secretservice op. cit.259. Council 3 August 1914; Hedley to Hinks 4 August 22 Freeman T W 1985 Charles FrederickArden Close 1914;Council minutes 9 November1914 (item1). For 1865-1952 in Freeman T W ed. Geographers: brief accounts of the RGS during the war, see studies bio-bibliographical 9 1-13. Anonymous 1919 War work of the Society Geo- 23 Mackenzie J M 1995 The provincial geographi- graphicalJournal 53 336-9; Mill H R 1930 Therecord cal societies in Britain, 1884-1914 in Bell M of the Royal GeographicalSociety 1830-1930 Royal Butlin R and Heffernan M eds Geographyand GeographicalSociety, London 189-205. imperialism,1820-1940 Manchester University Press, 32 RGS FreshfieldFreshfield to Keltie5 August 1914. Manchester93-124. 33 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hedley to Hinks 5 August1914; 24 FreemanT W 1980 The Royal GeographicalSociety Anonymous 1915 Geographers and the war The and the developmentof geographyin Brown E H Times18 May, col. b. ed. Geographyyesterday and tomorrowOxford 34 RGS FreshfieldKeltie to Freshfield5 and 14 August, UniversityPress, Oxford1-99; Cameron I 1980 To 5 and 10 September1914. thefarthest ends of theearth: the history of theRoyal 35 RGS Place-nameindex for BEF mapsHinks to Hedley GeographicalSociety 1830-1980 Macdonald and 2 September1914. Jane's,London. 36 Ibid.Hedley to Hinks 3 Septemberand 4 November 25 Scargill DI 1976 The RGS and the foundationsof 1914. geographyat OxfordGeographical Journal 142 438- 37 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Hedley 7 August 1914. 61; StoddartD R 1986 On geographyand its history 38 Ibid. Hinks and Trenchardto Hedley 10 August Blackwell, Oxford 59-127; Coones P 1989 A 1914. hundred years of geography at Oxford and 39 Meynen R 1983 Albrecht Penck 1858-1945 in Cambridge I: the centenary of the Mackinder Freeman T W ed. Geographers:bio-bibliographical readership at Oxford GeographicalJournal 155 1 studies7 101-8. 13-32; Stoddart D R 1989 A hundred years of 40 Penck A 1892 Die Herstellungeiner einheitlichen geographyat CambridgeGeographical Journal 159 1 Erdkarte em Massstabe von 1:1 000000 Compte 24-32. rendu du Vme Congris Internationaldes Sciences

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 526 Michael Heffernan

Giographiquestenu &Berne du 10 au 14 aoit 1891 50 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hedley to Hinks 14 September Schmid,Francke et Cie., Berne191-8; Penck A 1893 1914. The GSGS offered?200 every six months Constructionof a map of the world on a scale of to help defraycosts and the RGS provided ?150 1:1 millionGeographical Journal 1 253-61. for every War Officepayment. Council minutes 41 See resolutions and articles by Penck, Franz 9 November1914 (item 1), 31 May 1915 (item4). Schrader,E H Hills and othersin 1896 Reportof the 51 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Close 16 September Sixth InternationalGeographical Congress, London, 1914. 1895 John Murray,London, 365-70, 781-2; 1901 52 RGS FreshfieldFreshfield to Keltie 12 September Verhandlungen des Siebenten Internationalen 1914. Geographen-Kongresses,Berlin, 1899 W H Kuhl, 53 Freshfield D W 1914 The new season, 1914-15 Berlinvol. 1 208-29, vol. 2 65-71; 1905 Reportof the GeographicalJournal 44 6 525-8, quotation from EighthInternational Geographic Congress held in the pp. 526-7. United States, 1904 GovernmentPrinting Office, 54 RGS 1:1 millionmap Keeling to Hinks 2 March1915. Washington DC 95-102, 104-7, 553-70; 1909 Hinks and Keeling became so annoyed with each NeuvihmeCongrbs International de Giographie,Gen~ve, another on this matter that Hedley and Close 27 juillet-6aoat 1908: CompteRendu des Travauxdu decided thatthe two should no longer correspond Congrbspublid au nomdu Comitid'Organisation par directly.RGS 1:1 millionmap Keeling to Hinks Arthurde Clapar~deSocidtd G~ndrale d'Imprimerie, 27 April 1915, Keeling to Hinks 30 April 1915, Geneva, 1909-11,vol. 1 331-5, 388-400,vol. 2 52-3. Hedley to Hinks 6 May 1915,Close to Hinks21 May 42 RGS 1:1 millionmap Miscellaneous file 1913-14. 1915,Hinks to Keeling 21 May 1915. Contactwas, 43 See articles and resolutions by Penck, Close, however, resumed a few months later. RGS 1:1 Schrader and others in 1915 Atti del X Congresso millionmap Hinks to Keeling14 August 1915,Hinks Internazionaledi Geografia,Roma 1913 Presso la to Hedley 25 August 1915. Reale SociethGeografica, Rome vol. 1 5-65, 111-15. 55 This was a prodigious achievement. Keeling, The Paris conferencewas attended by over 80 MacLeod (also a futureDirector-General of OS), politicians,diplomats, civil servants and geogra- Winterbothamand Jack commanded OS military phers from 34 countries. RGS 1:1 millionmap topographic sections and field survey battalions Miscellaneousfile 1913-14. whichsurveyed and mapped differentsectors of the 44 The US map was completedin 1946. See Anony- Britishfront in Belgiumand Francefrom mid-1915, mous 1946 The map of Hispanic America on coordinatedin Francethrough the OBOS (Ordnance the scale of 1:1 000 000 GeographicalReview 36 1 Survey Overseas Branch) fromlate 1917. See OS 1-28; WrightJ K 1952 Geographyin themaking: the 1914-19 Reports of the progressof the Ordnance AmericanGeographical Society 1851-1951 American Survey to the 31st March, 1914-1920 in British Geographical Society, New York 300-19. Lord ParliamentaryPapers HMSO, London vol. xliv 1-39, Renellof Rodd, theRGS President,described its 107 vol. xxxi 819-30, vol. xiv 455-61, vol. xvii 815-21, sheets,as 'the greatestmap ever produced of any vol. xii 527-35,vol. xxvii1-26; GSGS 1916Catalogue one area'. See Bowman I 1948 The geographical of themaps of thetheatres of war and mapsfor home situation of the United States in relation to defenceand trainingissued by the Geographical Section world policies GeographicalJournal 4-6 112 128-45, ofthe General Staff (revised to 31st May, 1916) HMSO, quotationfrom p. 143. London; GSGS 1916 Index diagramsissued as a 45 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Hedley 1 January supplementto the catalogue of the 'maps of the theatres of 1914.Jack was Close's successoras Director-General war,&c.', by the GeographicalSection of the General of the OS. Staff(October, 1916) HMSO, London; OS 1919A brief 46 Hinks A R 1913 The internationalone-in-a-million outlineof thegrowth of surveywork on the Western map of the world RoyalEngineers Journal 17 77-86, Front HMSO, London; OS 1919 The Ordnance quotationfrom p. 86. Survey and the war 1914-1918 HMSO, London; 47 RGS 1:1 million map Hinks to Winterbotham WinterbothamH S L 1919 Britishsurveys of the 7 October1914; Close to Hinks 8 October1914. Western Front GeographicalJournal 53 4 253-76; 48 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Close 31 March WinterbothamH S L 1919 Geographicalwork of 1914. the armyin France GeographicalJournal 54 1 12-28; 49 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks and Trenchardto Hedley Jack E M 1926 The war work of the Ordnance 10 August 1914.The use of Englishthroughout was Survey ScottishGeographical Magazine 42 220-7; a significantdeparture from the policy agreed at O'Donoghie Y 1980 The Ordnance Survey 1914- both the 1909 and 1913 conferencesaccording to 1918 in SeymourW A ed. A historyof the Ordnance which place names and otherfeatures on the Inter- SurveyWilliam Davis and Son, Folkestone220-30; national Map would be rendered in the official Chasseaud P 1986 Trenchmaps: a collectors'guide. language of the countrybeing depicted. Vol.1: Britishregular series 1:10000 trenchmaps

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 527 GSGS 3062 - a cartobibliographyof maps printed 64 Ibid.,Carruthers to Hinks 15 December 1914; RGS at the Ordnance Survey, OBOS and by Field Place-nameindex for BEF maps Dickson to Hinks Survey Companies/Battalionsin France, 1915-1918 11 December 1914. For a strangelymoving tribute Mapbooks, Lewes, especially1-6. from a leading Marxist scholar of China and 56 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hedley to Hinks 23 September Mongolia, where Carruthersspent a great deal of 1915. time,see LattimoreO 1978 Douglas Carruthersand 57 RGS 1:1 millionmap Secretaryto Earl Kitchener geographicalcontrasts in centralAsia Geographical (Secretaryof State for War) to Hinks 29 October Journal144 2 208-17. Dickson's career was linked 1915; Councilminutes 15 November1915 (item4). closelyto Sir HalfordMackinder's. He was lecturer 58 Hinks AR 1915 The map on the scale 1/1 000 000, in physicalgeography and Fellow of New College, compiledat theRoyal Geographical Society under the Oxford,under Mackinder and subsequentlymoved directionof the General Staff,1914-15 Geographical to Readingin 1904,where Mackinder was Principal. Journal46 1 24-50 and 46 2 140-56.Close issued an 65 KnightleyP and Simpson C 1969 Thesecret lives of angrydefence of the pre-war International Map in the Lawrenceof ArabiaThomas Nelson, London 31-46; ensuing debate: 'We have not been listeningto a and, on The Round Table more generally, see funeraloration [for the InternationalMap]', he ob- Symonds R 1986 Oxfordand empire:the last lost served;the RGS versionis 'onlyan offspringfrom it, cause?Macmillan, London 62-79. and maybe a usefuladjunct, but it is notthe Interna- 66 Middle East Archive,St Antony'sCollege, Oxford, tionalMap. The InternationalMap is a moreauthori- Hogarth correspondence,Hogarth to his mother, tativeproduction, and differsfrom this effort in form 12 March 1897, Box A, Letter 2 (hereafterMEA and intention,in characterand detail. The map we Hogarthto his mother12 March 1897 A2). are discussingto-night has a National and not an 67 Knightley and Simpson 1969 The secretlives of Internationalcharacter' (quoted on pp. 142-3). Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit.31-46; Winstone1982 The 59 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Lord Curzon 7 June illicitadventure op. cit. 17 41-2. This view has been 1915; Hinks to Sir Edward Grey(Foreign Secretary) widely challenged,not least by Lawrence'sbrother, 8 June1915; Hinks to ArthurBalfour (First Lord of A W Lawrence,who wrotea dismissiveletter to The the Admiralty)8 June 1915; Hinks to HerbertH Timeson 22 November1969 7 cols f-g.The exhaus- Asquith (Prime Minister) 7 June 1915; Hinks to tive authorizedbiography of Lawrence also rejects BritishConsulate, Petrograd,5 April 1916; British these claims. See Wilson J1989 Lawrenceof Arabia: Consulate,Petrograd, to Hinks 1 May 1916;General theauthorised biography of T E LawrenceHeinemann, Bourgeois (Chief of the Service Giographiquede London 1008-9. I'Armie,Paris) to Hinks 10 May 1916; Hinks to 68 Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit.70. Bourgeois 30 May 1916. Copies were also sent, 69 Knightley and Simpson 1969 The secretlives of under diplomatic cover, to Allied embassies in Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit. 47-60. For worried London. accounts of Germany's eastern policy beforeand 60 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hedley to Hinks 7 November during the war, see Sarolea C 1907 The Baghdad 1915. Batches of material fromPetrograd arrived railwayand Germanexpansion as a factorin European at the RGS rightup to the 1917 revolution.RGS politicsOliver and Boyd,Edinburgh; Yate A C 1916 1:1 millionmap Hinks to BritishConsulate, Petro- War and the east ScottishGeographical Magazine 32 grad, 5 April 1916; BritishConsulate, Petrograd, to 187-98;Woods H C 1917 The Baghdad railwayand Hinks 1 May 1916. its tributariesGeographical Journal 50 1 32-57; Woods 61 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Sir Robert Blair H C 1919 The cradleof the war: theNear East and (Chairmanof theDepartment of Education,London Pan-GermanismJohn Murray, London. County Council) 23 February1915; Blair to Hinks 70 Quoted in Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabiaop. cit. 2 March 1915; Hinks to Blair 6 March 1915. 136. Cartographic experimentswere carried out by 71 Lawrence wrote,for example, a Militaryreport on Wallis using 'iso-ethnicity'lines. RGS 1:1 million the Sinai Peninsulain late 1914. See Wilson 1989 mapHinks to Blair 15 January1915. See Wallis B C Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit. 153-4. 1916 Distribution of nationalities in Hungary 72 Quoted in Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabiaop. cit. GeographicalJournal 47 3 117-89; and numerous 174, 167-8. articlesin GeographicalReview (1917 4 465-81; 19186 73 An article on 'Map making by air' appeared in 421-35; 1918 6 52-65; 1918 6 156-71; 1918 6 268-81; The Daily Telegraphon 30 October 1920 under 1918 6 341-53; 1921 11 426-9). Lawrence's name, althoughthe authorwas appar- 62 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hedley to Hinks 17 January ently Newcombe. See Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof 1915. Arabiaop. cit. 1007. 63 Ibid.,Hinks to Hogarth 17 January1915. Hogarth 74 Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit. 191. served as RGS Presidentfrom 1925 to 1927. 75 Ibid. 174.

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 528 Michael Heffernan 76 Lawrence T E 1962/1926Seven pillars of wisdom:a Hogarth went to Athens of his own volition in triumphPenguin, London 56-8. searchof an intelligencejob havingbeen frustrated 77 Quoted in Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabiaop. cit. in his attemptsto findsuch a positionin London,an 988, 147-8. impressionapparently supported by a comment 78 The rival claims are reviewed fromdifferent per- from Compton Mackenzie who met Hogarth in spectivesin Knightleyand Simpson 1969 Thesecret Athens. livesof Lawrence of Arabia op. cit.;Mack J E 1990 A 90 MEA Hogarthto his mother9 August 1915 A5. princeof our disorder:the life of T E LawrenceOxford 91 MEA Hogarthto his wife 15 August 1915 A6. UniversityPress, Oxford; and Wilson 1989Lawrence 92 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to MilitaryIntelligence ofArabia op. cit. Office,Cairo, 17 August 1915; MilitaryIntelligence 79 See Heffernan 1995 The spoils of war op. cit., Office,Cairo, to Hinks 8 September1915; Hinks to especiallypp. 240-5. Military IntelligenceOffice, Cairo, 17 September 80 Lawrence subsequentlyclaimed that he opposed 1915; MilitaryIntelligence Office, Cairo, to Hinks these strategiesbecause theywere motivatedby an 3 October1915; Military Intelligence Office, Cairo, to imperialistdesign to capture,and thenpermanently Hinks 5 October1915. retain,Arab territory.'Do make clear ...', he wrote 93 On Lawrence's Syrianreports, see RGS 1:1 million in 1928to D G Pearmanwho was preparinglectures map Hinks to Hedley 14 October 1915; Hinks on the Arab revolt,'that my objects were to save to Hedley 15 October 1915; Hedley to Hinks England, and France too, fromthe follies of the 16 October1915. No lettersfrom Lawrence survive imperialists,who would have us, in 1920,repeat the in the RGS archivesas he normallycorresponded exploitsof Clive or Rhodes. The world has passed withHedley at GSGS and all materialwas returned by that point' (quoted in Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof to GSGS afteruse. One Lawrence bundle in late Arabiaop. cit. 149). For a perceptivediscussion of Novemberwas describedby Hinks as 'amusingbut Lawrenceand theFrench, see Hourani A 1991Islam not, I think,very practical' (RGS 1:1 millionmap in Europeanthought Cambridge UniversityPress, Hinks to Hedley 30 November 1915). Lawrence Cambridge116-28 took greatdelight in his inconsistencies:'I spell my 81 Hogarth's contacts were indeed impressive and names anyhow to show what rot the systemsare'. included Sir Edward Grey,the Foreign Secretary, His mischievousresponses to his publisher'sexas- who was an old schoolfriendfrom Winchester. perated queries about the manuscriptof Revoltin Mack 1990 A princeof our disorderop. cit. 105. thedesert (1927) are characteristic:'Bir Waheida, was 82 Both lettersare reprintedin GarnettD ed. 1938 Bir Waheidi'-'Why not?All one place'; 'The Bisaita Lettersof T E LawrenceJonathan Cape, London is also speltBiseita' - 'Good'; 'Jedha,the she-camel, 193-4,195-6, and quoted in Wilson 1989Lawrence of was Jedhahon Slip 40' - 'She was a splendidbeast' Arabiaop. cit. 181-3. (quoted in A W Lawrence's prefaceto Lawrence 83 RGS KeltieHogarth to Keltie 24 March 1915.Other 1962 Sevenpillars of wisdomop. cit. 19-20). For an speakers in this series included Lionel W Lyde, opposing view, see CarruthersD and Hinks A R Hilaire Belloc, Vaughan Cornish and Harry H 1917 Notes on the transliterationof Arabic names Johnston.These lectures were published in the for the 1:1 million map GeographicalJournal 49 2 GeographicalJournal and reprintedtogether as a 141-8. special RGS bookletin 1917entitled The geography of 94 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Hedley 18 October thewar. 1915. 84 HogarthD G 1915 Geographyof the war theatrein 95 Ibid.Hedley to Hinks 21 October1915. the Near East GeographicalJournal 45 6 457-71. 96 On the Dardanellescampaign, see Rhodes JamesR 85 On Bell and Shakespear,see WinstoneH V F 1978 1965 GallipoliB T Batsford,London. Once the ter- GertrudeBell JonathanCape, London; Winstone rible scale of the Gallipoli disaster became clear, H V F 1978 CaptainShakespear: a portraitJonathan Freshfieldused the RGS as a platformto attackthe Cape, London. architectsof the campaign, particularlyWinston 86 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to AdmiralSir H Jackson Churchill.To demonstratetheir ignorance of geog- 27 May 1915; Hinks to Hedley 10 August 1915. raphy and history,Freshfield invited Dr Walter 87 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Hedley 10 August Leaf, a noted classical scholar, to speak on the 1915; Hinks to MilitaryIntelligence Office, Cairo, impregnabilityof the Gallipoli peninsula since the 17 August 1915; Egyptian Survey Department, time of Alexanderthe Great in the fourthcentury Cairo, to Hinks 8 September1915; Hedley to Hinks BC. The lecturewas followedby forthrightcondem- 17 September1915. nation of the recentcampaign fromFreshfield and 88 Winstone1982 Theillicit adventure op. cit.236. Lord Bryce.See Leaf W 1916 The militarygeogra- 89 MEA Hogarthto his wife26 May 1915A12. Wilson phy of the Troad GeographicalJournal 47 6 401-21. 1989 Lawrenceof Arabiaop. cit. 1008-9 insists that Recent historiansconcur with Freshfield.A J P

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 529 Taylorclaims that'none of the politicianslooked at in the war (Admiralty Naval Staff,Intelligence a detailed map before advocating their "side Department,November 1918, ID 1194) were more shows". They were clearlyignorant that Gallipoli thematic.On the more extensiveand detailed Sec- has steep slopes... All the side shows were "cigar ond WorldWar Admiraltyhandbooks, the produc- butt" strategy.Someone, Churchillor other,looked tion of which was partlyoverseen by Ian Fleming at a map of Europe; pointed to a spot withthe end (authorof theJames Bond books), see Balchin 1987 of his cigar;and said: "Let us go there"' (see Taylor United Kingdom geographersop. cit. A JP 1963 TheFirst World War: an illustratedhistory 105 RGS 1:1 millionmap Anonymous memo to RGS Hamish Hamilton, London 71-2). For a neutral Council (probably Hinks) 1 October 1915. On statementby a geographerinvolved as a soldier in the Cozens-Hardy family,see Cannadine D 1994 theGallipoli campaign,see Ogilvie A G 1916Notes Aspectsof aristocracy: grandeur and declinein modern on thegeography of Imbros Geographical Journal 48 2 BritainYale UniversityPress, New Haven 184-210. 130-45. 106 RGS Councilminutes 13 December1915 (item4). See 97 MEA Hogarthto his wife8 and 17 November1915 also FreshfieldD W 1916 Address at the Anniver- A8 and A9. sary General Meeting, 22 May 1916 Geographical 98 Kedourie E 1976 In the Anglo-Arablabyrinth: the Journal48 1 1-10. MacMahon-Husayncorrespondence and its interpret- 107 RGS 1:1 millionmap Carruthersto Hinks n.d.; ations, 1914-1939 Cambridge University Press, Reeves to Hinks 17 January1916. Cambridge;Fromkin D 1989 A peaceto endall peace: 108 RGS FreshfieldHinks to Freshfield13 January1916; thefall of theOttoman Empire and thecreation of the Freshfieldto Hinks 13 January 1916; Hinks to modernMiddle East St Martin's Press, New York Freshfield15 January1916; Freshfieldto Hinks 173-86. 17 January1916; RGS 1:1 millionmap Hogarth to 99 For recentanalysis, see Fromkin1989 A peaceto end Hinks 15 January1916; Dickson to Hinks 15 January all peace op. cit. 188-99; Andrew C and Kanya- 1916. See Scargill 1976 The RGS op. cit.452. ForstnerA S 1981 Franceoverseas: the Great War and 109 RGS Place-name index for BEF maps Hall to theclimax of French imperialism Thames and Hudson, Freshfield30 January1916. London 87-102. 110 RGS 1:1 million map Freshfield memorandum 100 Quoted in Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabiaop. cit. 26 January1916; RGS Councilminutes 24 January 232. 1916 (item4). 101 Threedays afterher arrival,Bell wrotea long letter 111 Reeves's bizarreautobiography contains a chapter to Lord Cromer, the elder statesman of British on his war workat theRGS. Regularlysuspected as policy-makingin the Middle East, reasserting a German spy while undertakingfield survey the case for an Allied attack on Alexandrettaco- classes, Reeves took to carryinga loaded pistol ordinated with an Arab rising (see Wilson 1989 everywherehe wentand subsequentlysigned up as Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit.232). a 'special constable'so he could devote his energies 102 The historianH A L Fisherclaims to have acted as to rootingout the real German spies. His counter- an intermediarybetween Hall and Hogarth (see espionage activities were somewhat hampered, Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit. 1008-9). however, by regular 'psychic experiences' and 103 The fulllist of academic recruitsto theNID include encounterswith ghosts, including a phantomof the F E Adcock (King's, Cambridge- ancienthistory), recentlydeceased Lord Kitchenerwhich appeared, C Bailey (Balliol, Oxford - classics); J Baillie Reeves claimed,in a rowingboat at the footof his (Aberdeen - moral philosophy); W M Calder bed (see Reeves E A n.d. Therecollections ofa geogra- (Manchester- Greek);G B Grundy(Corpus Christi, pherSeeley, Service and Co., London 165-215). Oxford - ancient history);L G Wickham Legg 112 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Freshfield27 January (New, Oxford - history); R B Mowat (Corpus 1916; Hall to Freshfield16 February1916. Hinks's Christi, Oxford - history);J Orr (Queen Mary, memorandumwas also circulatedin advance to London - French);H JPaton (Queen's, Oxford- Hedley and Close. RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to philosophy);H Rashdall (New, Oxford- philoso- Hedley 27 January1916; Hinks to Close 27 January phy);N Kemp-Smith(Princeton - philosophy);W B 1916; Hedley to Hinks 1 February1916; Close to Stevenson (Glasgow - Hebrew); R N Rudmose Hinks 8 February1916. Brown (Sheffield- geography) (see Wallace 1988 113 RGS 1:1 millionmap Minutes of Special War Maps Warand theimage of Germany op. cit.238-9). Meeting3 February1916. 104 Dozens of Admiraltyhandbooks on differentcoun- 114 RGS Councilminutes 7 February1916 (items5 and trieswere preparedduring and afterthe war, with 8) and 6 March 1916 (item 6). Relationsbetween Rudmose Brown playing a particularlyimportant Hinks and Dickson did not improve.Rather than role. Most were regionalsurveys but some, such as ask Dickson for copies of the classifiedAdmiralty the volume on Nationalitiesand nationalmovements handbooks,Hinks wrote to Hedley asking him to

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 530 Michael Heffernan requestthem through the GSGS. A farcicalsituation theAfrican spoils, see Heffernan1995 The spoils of then ensued whereby material compiled in one war op. cit.236-40. roomof theRGS was sentacross London to theWar 124 Anonymous 1919 War work of the Societyop. cit. Officeonly to be returnedto anotherroom in the 338. RGS. RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Hedley 13 and 125 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Lallemand 15 March 17 April 1917. and 13 November 1918; Hinks to Isaiah Bowman 115 RGS 1:1 millionmap Reporton the progressof the (Presidentof the AmericanGeographical Society) 1/M map compiled by the [Royal Geographical] 13 December1918. Society for the General Staff,and request for a 126 Anonymous 1919 War work of the Societyop. cit. furthergrant 10 January1916. 336. A large public exhibitionof capturedGerman 116 Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit. 1008-9. war maps, rangingfrom large-scale trench maps to 117 The map devised by Sykes and Picot is reproduced small-scalepropaganda maps of Europe and Africa, in Heffernan1995 The spoils of war op. cit.243. was staged at the RGS a few days afterthe Armi- 118 Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit. 247-8. stice. RGS HoldichHinks to Holdich 19 November Hogarthhad few doubts about his role in theArab 1918; Hinks A R 1919 German war maps and Bureau: 'in a sense, I am the Arab Bureau', he surveysGeographical Journal 53 1 30-44. informedhis wifein 1917,although such responsi- 127 The ServiceGiographique de l'Armie,under General bilitybrought him littlepleasure. 'I feelI can't stick Bourgeois,produced a fewnew sheetsat 1:1 million it out heremuch longer', he wrotearound the same scale. See Service G~ographique de l'Armie 1936 time. MEA Hogarth to his wife 12 May 1917 B14; Rapportsur les travauxexdcutis du ler. aoa~t1914 au Hogarth to his wife 28 March 1917 B11. Hogarth 31 dicembre1919: historiquedu ServiceGiographique spentmost of theremainder of thewar in Cairo and de l'Armeependant la guerreImprimerie du Service in Palestine as an adviser to General Edmund G6ographiquede l'Armde,Paris. Allenbyduring the 1917 campaign. 128 Anonyous 1919War work of theSociety op. cit.338. 119 Wilson 1989 Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit.283. On the subsequent inconclusive history of the 120 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hinks to Bell 12 September 1:1 million map, see MacLeod M N 1926 The 1916; Hinks to Hedley 3 October 1916. Bell was presentstate of the International1/M Map in OS awarded the RGS Patron's Medal in March 1917. ProfessionalPapers: New Series,No. 10 - Papersread at RGS Council minutes5 March 1917. Other RGS theBritish Association Meeting of 1925 on thework of Middle Eastern research is discussed in MEA theOrdnance Survey including an accountof the work Hogarth to Clayton 17 August 1916 A14; RGS of the InternationalBureau of the 1/M map whichis Councilminutes 19 March 1917 (item 3); RGS 1:1 locatedat the OrdnanceSurvey Office, Southampton millionmap Hinks to BaronEtienne Hulot (Secretary, HMSO, London 11-13; United Nations 1953 The Socidtdde Giographiede Paris) 28 July1917; Hinks to InternationalMap of the World on the millionth Charles Lallemand (President,Socidtd de Giographie scale and the internationalco-operation in the field de Paris) 27 August 1917; Lallemand to Hinks of cartographyWorld Cartography 3 1-13; Gardiner 6, 16 and 19 September 1917; Hulot to Hinks R A 1961A re-appraisalof the InternationalMap of 20 September 1917; Henri Froidevaux (Librarian theWorld (IMW) on themillionth scale International and Archivist,Socidtd de Giographiede Paris) to Yearbookof Cartography1 31-49; Crone G R 1962 Hinks 20 September 1917; Hinks to Lallemand The futureofthe International Map of the World 24 September1917; Hinks to Hulot 24 September GeographicalJournal 128 36-8. 1917; Hinks to Froidevaux24 September1917. 129 Anonymous 1919 War work of the Societyop. cit. 121 MEA Hogarth to Clayton 20 July 1917 B2; 338-9; RGS Place-nameindex for BEF mapsB B Cubitt FreshfieldD W 1916 Address at the Anniversary to RGS Council. War Officefunding to the RGS General Meeting,22 May 1916 GeographicalJournal ceased on 21 March 1919. RGS 1:1 millionmap 48 1 1-10; FreshfieldD W 1917 Address at the Hedley to Hinks 21 March 1919; Hinks to Hedley AnniversaryMeeting, 21 May 1917 Geographical 26 March 1919. Journal50 1 1-12. 130 FreshfieldD W 1917Address at openingof session, 122 RGS 1:1 millionmap Hedley to Hinks 29 May 1916; 6 November 1916 GeographicalJournal 49 1 1-2, Hinks to Hedley 30 May 1916; Hedley to Hinks quotationfrom p. 1. 8 June1916; Hinks to Hedley 10 June1916; Hedley 131 RGS HinksJohnston to Hinks 11 November1916. to Hinks 20 June1916; Hinks to Hedley 29 July1916; 132 Heffernan1995 The spoils of war op. cit. 240-5. Hinks to Hedley 9 August 1916. Hogarth's campaign on behalf of an Arab state 123 Hinks A R 1918 Notes on the constructionof a had continued throughthe rest of the war and general map of Africa,1/Two million Geographical culminatedwith a detailed memorandumsubmit- Journal52 4 218-37. For a briefdiscussion of war- ted to the Britishcabinet, dated 15 November1918, time Anglo-Frenchdisputes about the division of which argued that all wartimeaccords should be

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 531 renegotiatedfrom scratchwith full Arab partici- Churchillto Hinks 24 September 1919; Hinks to pation. See Memorandumon certainconsiderations Wynn25 September1919; Wynn to Hinks 8 October of settlementof westernAsia Public Record Office, 1919; Hinks to Wynn 8 October 1919; Wynn to Cabinet Papers CAB 27/36 fo.142; Wilson 1989 Hinks 13 October1919; Hinks to Wynn15 October Lawrenceof Arabia op. cit. 582. Hogarth was dis- 1919. See Hinks A R 1919 Boundarydelimitations mayed by subsequentevents in Paris which,apart in the Treatyof VersaillesGeographical Journal 54 2 fromrefusing to countenanceArab independence, 103-13; Hinks A R 1919 The boundariesof Cecho- seemed to surrendertoo much to the French.He Slovakia GeographicalJournal 54 3 185-8; Hinks A R returnedto Oxford'sick at heartat all this fiasco' 1919 The new boundaries of Austria Geographical (quoted in Knightleyand Simpson 1969 The secret Journal54 4 288-96;Hinks A R 1919The progressof livesof Lawrence of Arabia op. cit. 147-8). boundary delimitation in Europe Geographical 133 The failureto exploitBritain's geographical exper- Journal54 4 363-7. tise at the Peace Conferenceis the dominanttheme 135 RGS Hinks Hinks to Hogarth 4 November 1918; of Chisholm G G 1920 Geographyat the Congress Hinks to Freshfield4 November 1918; Hinks to of Paris, 1919 GeographicalJournal 55 1 309-12. Holdich 4 November1918. Hinks was being some- Mackinder had hoped to be involved in peace what disingenuous here as Hedley had informed negotiationsas a memberof the Britishdelegation him the previousJanuary that the GSGS had been but his ultra-imperialiststance made him an orderedto put togethera seriesof 'Peace Books' on unlikelychoice given the risinganti-imperialism of differenttheatres of war, which would include most of the other nations involved. His much- copies of the 1:1 million sheets, to clarifyBritish quoted Democraticideals and realities:a studyin the geopoliticaldesiderata. RGS HinksHedley to Hinks politicsof reconstructionConstable, London, pub- 18 January1918. lished in 1919 at thebeginning of thePeace Confer- 136 See Heffernan1995 The spoils of war op. cit. ence, summarizedhis views on the postwar order. 137 WrigleyG M 1951 Isaiah Bowman: propheticsoul Mackindercontented himself instead with a short of the wide world dreaming on things to come but notorious period as officialBritish agent in GeographicalReview 41 7-65, quotation fromp. 22. southern Russia where he agitated against the For a detailed list of names and a summary of Bolshevikregime. On this,see Mackinder H J 1949 the wartime work of American geographers,see General reportwith appendices on the situationin Anonymous 1919 War servicesof membersof the south Russia: recommendationsfor future policy in Association of American Geographers Annals of Woodward E L and Butler R eds Documentson theAssociation of American Geographers 9 53-70. On Britishforeign policy, 1919-39 HMSO, London vol. III the House Inquiry,see Gelfand L 1963 TheInquiry: 768-98; Blouet B W 1976 Sir HalfordMackinder as Americanpreparations for peace, 1917-1919 Yale British High Commissioner to south Russia, UniversityPress, New Haven. 1919-20 GeographicalJournal 142 228-46; and, more 138 For otherperspectives of Bowman's career at this generally,Parker W H 1982 Mackinder:geography as time, see Martin G J 1980 The lifeand thoughtof an aid to statecraftClarendon Press,Oxford; Blouet IsaiahBowman Archon, Hamden, CT; Smith N 1984 B W 1987 Sir HalfordMackinder: a biographyTexas Isaiah Bowman:political geography and geopolitics A&M UniversityPress, College Station. PoliticalGeography Quarterly 3 69-76; Smith N 1986 134 Chisholm 1920 Geographyat the Congressof Paris Bowman's New Worldand the Council on Foreign op. cit. Ogilvie, who joined the GSGS in May 1918, RelationsGeographical Review 76 438-60. Bowman's was subsequentlyProfessor of Geography at the summary of the new political order (Bowman I Universityof Edinburgh.Although his work with 1921 The New World:problems in politicalgeography the GSGS and at the Paris Peace Conferenceearned WorldBook Company,New York),became an inter- him theMBE, theOBE and theSerbian Order of the nationalbest-seller. WhiteEagle, he did not exploithis experiencein his 139 Cvijic had been a particularlyeloquent advocate of subsequent researchand writing.His only publi- Serbian/Yugoslavianterritorial demands through- cationon thiswas a shortfactual pamphlet: Ogilvie out the war, most of which he spent in Paris. His A G 1922 Some aspectsof boundarysettlement at work culminated in Cvijic J 1918 La pininsule the Peace ConferenceSociety for the Promotionof Balkanique:glographie humaine Armand Colin, Paris. ChristianKnowledge, New York.Hedley used his On his manipulationof the ethniccartography of position in Paris to keep Hinks informedof all Macedonia at the Paris Peace Conference,see developmentsso thatthe latterwas able to prepare WilkinsonH R 1951Maps and politics:a reviewof the a series of articleson the new political landscape ethnographiccartography of Macedonia Liverpool with impressivespeed. RGS HinksWynn to Hinks UniversityPress, Liverpool; Taylor P 1993 Political 29 July1919; Hinks to Wynn2 August 1919; Hinks geography:world-economy, nation state and locality to G P Churchill(Foreign Office) 19 September1919; Longman,London 209-12.

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 532 Michael Heffernan 140 RGS 1:1 millionmap Bowman to Hinks21 November ... the School did not enterso thoroughlyinto the 1918. work of theUniversity as it did even in the timeof 141 Followinga requestfrom Bowman, H A Bumstead, Mackinder.Practically no researchwork was carried the ScientificAttache at the AmericanEmbassy in out'. Freshfield,who made several visitsto Oxford London, wrote to Hinks asking for the loan of all to discuss matterswith the Vice-Chancellor,was German maps and publicationsin the RGS which unequivocal: 'The closingof the School would be a did not existin Americanlibraries. He was author- disgrace to the Universityand the countryand at ized to pay up to fourtimes the originalprice for the momenta flagranttoken of Britishstupidity'. the temporaryloan of each bound volume or map Freshfield, Keltie and Mackinder all wanted sheet and was even willing to employ a team of Hogarth to succeed Herbertson,although Hinks workersto copy out tables of contentsand selected had to remindthem that Hogarth was otherwise articlesin long-handif the removalof thismaterial occupied 'on confidentialservice for the gov- was impossible.The response was negative.RGS ernment'. RGS FreshfieldKeltie to Freshfield HinksBumstead to Hinks 26 March 1918; Hinks to 4 September1915; Freshfieldto Keltie 5 September Bumstead27 March 1918. 1915; Hinks to Freshfield 11 September 1915; 142 Two yearslater, Bowman wrote to Keltiein a blatant Scargill 1976 The RGS op. cit.455-7. attemptto stop Hinks reviewingThe New Worldin 145 The deploymentof new, particularlyrepugnant theGeographical Journal (Letter in theAmerican Geo- weapons duringthe war was financiallybeneficial graphical Society Archives,Bowman correspond- to one leading geographer.To fund his prewar ence, dated 17 December 1921): 'I have long since political career as an MP, Mackinder invested in learnedthat Mr Hinks's apparentanti-Americanism a chemical company in Cheshire,Electro-Bleach, and his inexplicableattitude towards me have made whose profitsincreased significantly when its war- itimpossible in myjudgement to securejustice from time productionwas switched to chlorinegas for him ... The sole questionis the proprietyof using which,sadly, there was a growingdemand. This is the journal of a learned societysuch as thatof the mentionedin passing in Blouet B W 1987 Political Royal GeographicalSociety as a weapon forpoliti- geographersof the past V: the politicalcareer of Sir cal controversyand propaganda ... I am not alone HalfordMackinder Political Geography Quarterly 6 4 in regrettingthe betterdays of the past when we 355-67,on p. 364. had both a distinguishedman and a gentlemanas 146 Lacoste 1976 La glographieop. cit.19-21. Secretaryof theRoyal Geographical Society'. Hinks' 147 Others feel very differentlyabout the moral or anti-Americanism,part of his general antipathyto intellectualrelevance of historicalawareness. See all foreigners,was indeed pronounced. He dis- BarnettC 1995Awakening the dead: who needs the missed W M Davis as a peddler of 'unfortunate historyof geography?Transactions of the Institute of jargon' and tried to block suggestionsthat either BritishGeographers 20 417-19. Davis or EllsworthHuntington should receiveRGS 148 Hobson JA 1926 Freethought and thesocial sciences medals: 'The troublewith both of themis thatthey George Allen and Unwin, London 54-5. For a are ratherdangerous people to stamp with a high similarcritique of Frenchacademics, see Benda J award as so much of what they have written 1927 La trahisondes clercsBernard Grasset, Paris. is unreliable'. RGS FreshfieldHinks to Freshfield 149 MEA Hogarth to his mother20 September1918 24 May 1918. C26. 143 I am currentlyengaged on a broader study of the 150 Darwin's position was clearlyexpressed a month Britishgeopolitics during the FirstWorld War. A before the outbreak of war in his Presidential preliminarystatement is containedin HeffernanM address to theEugenics Education Society on 2 July 1995 Geographersmilitant: British geography dur- 1914,reported in The Times3 July1914 4 col. e. See ing the FirstWorld War Workingpaper Department also Darwin L 1915-16 Eugenics during and after of Geography,Loughborough University. the war The EugenicsReview 7 91-106; Darwin L 144 Keltie J S 1921 The positionof geography in British 1916 On the statisticalenquiries needed afterthe universitiesAmerican Geographical Society Re- war in connectionwith eugenics Journal of the Royal search Series No. 4 OxfordUniversity Press, New StatisticalSociety 79 159-88; Darwin L 1917-18The York;Stoddart 1986 On geographyand its historyop. disabled sailor and soldier and the futureof our cit.41-58. Keltieand Freshfieldwere extremelycon- race The EugenicsReview 9 1-17; Darwin L 1918-19 cerned about the threatto Oxford geographyfol- The need for widespread eugenic reformduring lowing Herbertson'sdeath, widely attributedto reconstructionThe Eugenics Review 10 145-62; overwork.Keltie felt that 'the School [ofGeography] Darwin L 1926 The need for eugenicreform John has reacheda criticalstage. The feelingin Oxfordis Murray,London 499-504. For an excellentanalysis thatit is in the Universitybut not of it. No doubt of this debate, see Crook P 1990 War as genetic verygood work was done in Herbertson'stime but disaster? The First World War debate over the

This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 533 eugenics of warfareWar and Society8 47-70; Crook Oxford; Richardson L F 1960 Statisticsof deadly P 1994 Darwinism,war and history:the debate over the quarrelsBoxwood Press,Pittsburgh; Richardson L F biologyof warfrom the 'Originof species' to theFirst 1960Arms and insecurityBoxwood Press,Pittsburgh. WorldWar Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; For summariesof Richardson'slife, see Gold E 1954 and Pick 1993 op. cit.75-87. Lewis Fry RichardsonObituary Notices of Fellows of 151 One should note the heroic personal stand taken the Royal Society9 217-35; Richardson S A 1957 by the Quaker mathematicianand meteorologist, Lewis Fry Richardson (1881-1953): a personal Lewis FryRichardson, uncle of the actorSir Ralph biography ConflictResolution 1 300-4; Platzman Richardson,who not only refusedto serve in the G W 1967 A retrospectiveview of Richardson's war (other than in the Friends' Ambulance Unit) book on weatherprediction Bulletin of the American but activelyprevented his pioneeringwartime work MeteorologicalSociety 48 514-51; AshfordO M 1980 on numericalforecasting from being used by the Prophetor professor?The life and work of Lewis War Office. See Richardson L F 1922 Weather Fry RichardsonHilger, Bristol; Ashford O M 1981 predictionby numerical process Cambridge University The dream and the fantasyWeather 36 11 323-5; Press, Cambridge; Richardson L F 1919 Mathe- Charnock H 1981 Echo-ranging:L F Richardson's maticalpsychology of war Oxford UniversityPress, contributionWeather 36 11 316-22.

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