The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War Author(S): Michael Heffernan Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol
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Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War Author(s): Michael Heffernan Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996), pp. 504-533 Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/622594 Accessed: 16-07-2015 09:01 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 504 Geography,cartography and military intelligence:the Royal Geographical Societyand the FirstWorld War Michael Heffernan This essay examinesthe connectionsbetween geography, cartography and military intelligencein Britainduring the FirstWorld War. It focuseson the Royal GeographicalSociety (RGS) and its wartimeactivities on behalfof the British intelligenceservice. Evidence is presentedon the role of the RGS in the dispute betweenthe so-called 'westerners',committed to an all-outclash with Germanyon the westernfront, and the 'easterners',who argued thatthe key to deadlock in westernEurope lay in the OttomanEmpire. For a shortperiod, the RGS became a significantmetropolitan focus forthose advocatinga Britishintervention in the Middle East coupled with an Arab revoltagainst the Turks,the campaignpopularly associated with T E Lawrence.The essay concludes with an assessmentof the significanceof geographyto the Britishwar effortand an evaluationof the impactof the war on the institutionsand prestigeof the discipline.Some finalcomments are offeredon the moral and ethicalquestions raised by the mobilizationof geographicalexpertise in wartime. key words historyof Britishgeography and cartography FirstWorld War Royal GeographicalSociety Departmentof Geography,Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicester LE11 3TU e-mail: [email protected] revised manuscriptreceived 22 November 1995 Introduction shatteredfor ever on the killingfields of Flanders and Picardy.Into their place came thecharacteristic War has been one of the greatestgeographers. (Sir uncertainties,ambiguities and ironiesof twentieth- GeorgeTaubman Goldie 19071) century modernity.The 1914-18 war not only War,in themodern sense of theword, is altogether anticipatesthe even greaterhorrors which were to basedon geography.(Rev. H B George19072) come; it also marksthe birthplaceof our modern neurosisabout global apocalypse.3 The years 1914-18witnessed the firstmodern war. A particularlydisturbing feature of the First All the majorindustrialized powers were involved WorldWar (and one reason why it is seen as such and all partsof theglobe were directlyor indirectly a tragicallyironic turning point) was the unprec- implicated. Huge armies were mobilized, sup- edented mobilizationof science and technology. portedby powerfulstate bureaucracies and by the Militaryand politicalleaders could draw upon the labour of entirecivilian populations. harvestof more than a centuryof rapid scientific The Great War, as it is still often called, is development.The war revealed,more clearlythan generallydepicted as a fault-linein world history. ever before,the awesome destructivecapacity of The progressive and optimistic values of the modern technology.This was the dark side of Victorianand Edwardian eras were, it is claimed, the machine age; an era of feverishindustrial TransInst Br GeogrNS 21 504-533 1996 ISSN 0020-2754? Royal Geographical Society (with the Instituteof BritishGeographers) 1996 This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Geography,cartography and militaryintelligence 505 productiondevoted almost exclusivelyto devas- Waras well as theimpact of thatperiod on particu- tation and death. From the crisis of 1914 was lar disciplines,notably chemistry.10 Despite the ob- forged a new and more intimate relationship vious significanceof geographical expertise in between science, the state and the military.Thus wartime,there have been surprisinglyfew recent emerged one of the central paradoxes of the attemptsto interrogatethe role of geographyin modern age - the idea that logic and rationality war.1 This essay is, therefore,an opening foray could sustain somethingas illogical and irrational into a largelyuntouched, and perhaps consciously as 'total war'. ignored,arena. Its theme is the dialecticbetween Depressinglyfew scientistsresisted the call to geographyand war in theperiod from1914 to 1919 arms in 1914. Those who did, such as Bertrand as revealed by the activitiesof the Royal Geo- Russell in Britainand G F Nicolai in Germany, graphical Society (RGS), Britain's oldest and, at were subjected to merciless campaigns of vilifi- thattime, most prestigiouscentre of geographical cationand abuse.4Faced withthis kind of pressure, expertise. My concern is not with the broader the vast majorityof academics threw their full intellectualimpact of the GreatWar on geographi- weightbehind the war effort.5A sense of patriotic cal theory(which will be considered elsewhere) duty and a firmbelief in their nation's cause but ratherwith the practicaland technicalrole of were powerfulmotives but less elevated personal the discipline,particularly in the fieldof cartogra- ambitions also influencedthe behaviour of aca- phy, and with the connections which were demics.Many enteredthe fraywith an enthusiasm establishedbetween the Britishgeographical com- and belligerencewhich embarrassedrather than munityand the intelligenceservices. By exploring gratifiedthe political leadership. Throughoutthe this specificrelationship in a particularhistorical summer of 1915, for example, some of Britain's and geographicalcontext, I want to emphasize the most distinguished scientists waged a spirited importanceof consideringthe full range of dif- campaign, initiatedby H G Wells, to force the ferent,and often rival, geographies in both the government to increase funding for scientific past and the present.What follows,then, is one of researchof relevanceto the war effort.6This theme the 'unfamiliar'histories of geography.Although was echoed by the zoologist E B Poulton in his rarelyconsidered in conventionalaccounts, such 1915Romanes lecture at Oxford.7The message was historiesraise the most profoundmoral, ideologi- simple:knowledge is power and whateverGerman cal and intellectualdilemmas which reverberate scientistscould do, Britonscould do better,pro- across the decades frompast to present.12 vided the necessary resources were made avail- able. F H Royce, the engineeringgenius behind wentso faras to in Rolls-Royce, propose, language Geography and militaryintelligence chillinglyprescient of laterdecades, thatthe British governmentshould offera 'substantial'cash prize The historiesof geography and militaryintelli- to the scientistwho devised the most efficient gence in Britain are closely interwoven. As means 'to destroy... German, Austrian, and ChristopherAndrew has demonstrated,explora- Turkish combatants in the greatest possible tion, map-making and cartography were the number in the shortestpossible time'.8Scientists centralelements of early intelligence-gathering.'3 whose research was stimulated by war needs The firstBritish intelligence agency, the earliest revealed more than a hint of euphoria at their ancestorof MI5 and MI6, was theDepot of Military newly acquired power. The words of JA Fleming, Knowledge, established during the Napoleonic professorof electricalengineering at University wars by the QuartermasterGeneral's Department College, London, are characteristic: of the War Office.Its responsibilitywas to collect foreign maps and related informationon the theoutcome of the present war must be an entirelynew chapterin humanhistory and a pointof freshdepar- militaryresources and topographyof othercoun- turein social,economic and intellectuallife ... It is tries.This activitybecame virtuallymoribund after beyondany doubt that this war is a warof engineers 1815 despite attempts to revive intelligence- and chemistsquite as muchas ofsoldiers.9 gatheringto facilitateBritish imperial expansion around the world. The most tirelessadvocate of Several studies have examined the role of betterintelligence was Major Thomas BestJervis, a scientistsand academics during the First World senior officeron the Survey of India during the This content downloaded from 194.128.227.202 on Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:01:28 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 506 MichaelHeffernan 1830s and an active Fellow of both the Royal 5500 volumes per year).Significantly, it was one of Societyand the RGS. Jervisforesaw a centralgov- the first British libraries to adopt the Dewey ernmentagency which would collectand compile Decimal classificationsystem. Its effectivenesswas accurate maps and othergeographical material; a hampered,however,