october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Field Notes on Iraq’s Tribal

FEATURE ARTICLE Revolt Against Al-Qa`ida 1 Field Notes on Iraq’s Tribal Revolt By David J. Kilcullen Against Al-Qa`ida By David J. Kilcullen

Reports 5 Islamic State of Iraq Commemorates its Two-Year Anniversary By Pascale Combelles Siegel 7 British Muslims Providing Foot Soldiers for the Global Jihad By James Brandon 10 Anatomy of Spain’s 28 Disrupted Jihadist Networks By Javier Jordan 12 The Impact of Global Youth Bulges on Islamist Radicalization and Violence By Colleen McCue and Kathryn Haahr 15 Jama`at al-Fuqara’: An Overblown Threat? By Farhana Ali and William Rosenau 18 The Threat of Terrorism to the 2010 Soccer World Cup in South Africa By Anneli Botha 20 Iraq as the Focus for Apocalyptic A Sons of Iraq fighter guards a checkpoint in Baghdad. - Photo by Tom A. Peter/The Christian Science Monitor/Getty Images Scenarios ne of the most striking By David Cook part of the war, only to turn against the aspects of operations in Iraq terrorists in 2007. during the “surge” of 2007 was 22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity the growing tribal uprising 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts To understand what follows, it is Oagainst al-Qa`ida. In late 2006 and necessary to realize that Iraqi tribes are 2007, this uprising began to transform not somehow separate, out in the desert, the war. I spent considerable time on or remote; rather, they are powerful the ground throughout May and June interest groups that overlap with and 2007 in Baghdad and the surrounding permeate all parts of Iraqi society. About the CTC Sentinel districts working with U.S. and Iraqi More than 85% of Iraqis claim some units, tribal and community leaders The Combating Terrorism Center is an form of tribal affiliation. Iraqi tribal and fighters engaged in the uprising. independent educational and research leaders represent a competing power Listening to them talk, watching their institution based in the Department of Social center with the formal institutions of operations and participating in planning Sciences at the United States Military Academy, the state, and the tribes themselves and execution alongside American West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses are a parallel hierarchy that overlaps commanders supporting them provided the Center’s global network of scholars and with formal government structures insight into their motivations and practitioners to understand and confront and political allegiances at every level. thought processes. Moreover, during contemporary threats posed by terrorism and For most Iraqis, tribal affiliation exists this process of participant observation other forms of political violence. alongside other strands of identity— I was able to gather some field data religious, ethnic, regional and socio- on the relationship between globally- economic—that interact in complex The views expressed in this report are those of oriented terrorists in Iraq (primarily ways, rendering meaningless the facile the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, al-Qa`ida) and the locally-focused division into Sunni, Shi`a and Kurd. the Department of the Army, or any other agency militants who found themselves fighting The reality of Iraqi national character of the U.S. Government. as “accidental” guerrillas in the early is much more complex, and tribal

1 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 identity plays an extremely important The rebellion against AQI was they were not giving any role to part in it, even for urbanized Iraqis. motivated, according to informants,1 by tribal custom, and were giving it all Therefore, the tribal revolt was not a backlash against al-Qa`ida’s exclusive to religion. a remote riot on a reservation: it was emphasis on religion and disregard of a major social movement with the custom. One key informant explained: Then the al-Qa`ida killed a tribal potential to significantly influence most leader because of an argument Iraqis wherever they live. This article What you have to remember is that over this. Then the tribes turned tentatively examines some of the reasons there are two things in Iraq, custom against them because they believed for the tribal revolt against al-Qa`ida, (adat) and religion (din). Sometimes they were trying to rule over them explores why certain tribes worked they go hand in hand, sometimes and tell them what to do. The with coalition forces, and highlights they clash. When they go hand Qa`ida killed a shaykh’s sons, and key lessons learned during the process. in hand all is well, but when they killed other people and attacked the clash they create discord (fitna). fuel smuggling that the tribes use to The Tribal Rebellion Against Al-Qa`ida When you think about tribes, you make money. Then more and more In 2007, Iraq experienced a spreading almost take the religion out of it. leaders turned against the takfiriyun social movement, expanding along The tribes care about adat. For and now the tribes are fighting al- kinship lines that could best be described example, if you ask a Shammari Qa`ida.2 as a tribal rebellion against al-Qa`ida in “what religion are you?” he will Iraq (AQI) by a large body of accidental say “I am a Shammari.” The Zobai tribe mentioned here has guerrillas who had formerly allowed been closely associated with the 1920 themselves to be exploited by the takfiris In Anbar, the tribes are Dulaim Revolution Brigades and the Islamic (takfiriyun). It would be naïve, or perhaps and Zobai. The Zobai are an `ashira Army in Iraq. Zobai tribal leaders reflect a lack of awareness of the history of the Shammari [confederation]. have fought against the coalition since of disappointed expectations with The Zobai did not support Saddam 2003, and the tribe has often shown Iraqi tribes since 2003, to interpret 100%, though they got lots of a high degree of unity. By mid-2007, money from him. He paid them however, the Zobai appeared to be to guard the roads and the oil turning against AQI in most of its tribal “What you have to pipelines. But they went their own area. Indeed, there often seemed to be a remember is that there are way when they wanted to. When “Zobai connection” somewhere in tribal you [Americans] invaded, the groups opposing AQI. For example, two things in Iraq, custom Qa`ida came to the tribes and said one rural farming district in the (adat) and religion (din). “We are Sunni, you are Sunni. The southern belts of Baghdad experienced Americans are helping the Shi`a, constant low-level warfare between Sometimes they go hand let’s fight them together.” And so Zobai and AQI fighters, with AQI or in hand, sometimes they the tribes fought the occupation Zobai corpses turning up in the canals forces alongside the Qa`ida. Now, most mornings.3 The conflict oscillated clash. When they go hand after a while, the tribes fell out with in terms of who had the upper hand. in hand all is well, but the Qa`ida. They began to argue over The Zobai did not directly approach their women. The Qa`ida would come coalition commanders for support, but when they clash they create to the shaykh and say “give me your local shaykhs requested permission discord (fitna).” daughter” or “give me your sister.” to raise an armed neighborhood watch I mean in marriage. The shaykh and began policing their own area would say no, because in the tribal against AQI and sought to cooperate custom they protect their women with coalition forces.4 Similarly, one this rebellion as necessarily indicating and do not give them to outsiders. group of fighters in an urban district support for the Iraqi government or I mean, sometimes two tribes in Baghdad was non-tribal, with for coalition forces. The tribes were exchange their women as wives leadership provided by imams of local not pro-coalition, much less pro- to settle a dispute, but they don’t mosques opposed to AQI. These imams government but, rather, anti-al-Qa`ida. just let outsiders, who are not of drew on local urban youth to police their Nevertheless, our experience showed the tribe, marry their women. The streets and fight the terrorists, but their that, if correctly handled, the tribes Qa`ida started arguing with them, military advisor and “technical expert” could often be brought to see that their saying “you must give me your was a Zobai clan leader with previous best interests lay in supporting the daughter because this is sanctioned insurgent experience. His assistance government and cooperating with the by religion, and in the Qur’an it says was called in by one of the local imams security architecture of the new Iraq. that tribal customs are ignorant.” Yet this was not an integral part of their So the shaykhs became angry and 2 This informant quote is drawn from Fieldnote I3/ original motivation and required time, clashed with the Qa`ida because MN1/20070605. careful negotiation and confidence- 3 Personal communication, company commander re- building. 1 All Iraqi informants gave their prior informed consent sponsible for Sadr al-Yusufiyya, company patrol base to the use and publication of their comments, and infor- south of Baghdad, May 28, 2007. mant material did not derive from detainee interroga- 4 Fieldnotes, combat advising in AO Commando, Sadr tion. al-Yusufiyya district, May-June 2007.

2 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 who was related to him through a tribal police force, legitimately employed district’s youth,9 the 2/7 Marines under connection.5 Likewise, Zobai tribesmen under the Iraqi government but the energetic and insightful Lieutenant- in Abu Ghurayb district, west of responsible for security in their own Colonel Joe L’Etoile found themselves Baghdad, were fighting AQI for most districts. in the middle of a complex inter-tribal of 2007 and demonstrated increasing conflict. Local tribes backed the 1920 willingness to cooperate with coalition - Some leaders requested that Iraqi Revolution Brigades, a Sunni secular forces, although not initially with the police and army units, regarded as nationalist insurgent movement, in a sectarian, stay out of their area. In fight against extremists from AQI. Each “The rebellion against some cases, they were willing to accept group fought both each other and the Iraqi security forces provided they were coalition, dispersing when confronted AQI was motivated, accompanied by coalition forces.7 by superior coalition firepower and according to informants, contracting to confront each other.10 In most areas where local groups began The violence between the two groups by a backlash against working with coalition forces, they was exceptionally bloody throughout al-Qa`ida’s exclusive behaved responsibly. In one incident the first half of 2007 but, through a in Sadr al-Yusufiyya, a southern belt skillful series of political maneuvers emphasis on religion and district, the local neighborhood watch and careful targeting, Lt. Col. L’Etoile disregard of custom.” discovered two terrorists (thought to be successfully played the two groups off AQI) in the act of emplacing a roadside against each other, devising a strategy IED. They forced the terrorists to dig of “fighting AQI to the last 1920s guy.”11 up the IED, and then handed them After a period of time in which AQI so Iraqi government.6 Tribal fighters who over to coalition forces for questioning. eroded and damaged the 1920 Revolution negotiated or engaged with coalition In this area, IED incidents dropped Brigades that the local insurgents were commanders in 2007 tended to make precipitously over several months from desperate, expecting annihilation and similar requests. In one case, these several per day along the main road willing to ally with almost anyone in included the following set of demands: (through a farming community in canal order to get back at al-Qa`ida, Lt. Col. country) in 2006 and early 2007, to zero L’Etoile approached them through a local - Local security must be led by local incidents by the middle of the year. This tribal intermediary—again, a Zobai— forces who reserve the right to run their period coincided with the development in partnership with the local Iraqi own checkpoints and neighborhood of a close working relationship with local Army battalion.12 This joint Iraqi-U.S. watch organizations. shaykhs on the part of Captain Palmer approach immediately brought the 1920s Phillips, an extremely energetic and insurgents to a cease-fire agreement, - Local leaders must have a role in capable local U.S. company commander and they ultimately partnered with U.S. deciding who is to be detained, including who was given solid support by his and Iraqi forces, joined local security the power to detain and question battalion and brigade commander, and force units and cooperated to defend suspects themselves, and the power benefited from a highly capable group their communities against both Shi`a to give amnesty to individuals who of platoon commanders and senior sectarian militias and AQI extremists. promise not to fight for the terrorists non-commissioned officers whose This brought a remarkable turnaround any longer. application of counter-insurgency in the Zaydun situation over only a few techniques was exemplary. This also months in mid-2007.13 - Coalition forces are requested to help led to the formation of a neighborhood smooth any issues of deconfliction watch to guard local villages, roads and Another example of local leaders’ with Iraqi security forces. In some bridges. The main issue in this area was responsible attitude could be seen areas, locals asked for some form of that the tribes wished to be recognized in their approach to amnesty and recognition symbol so that they would as a Provisional Police Unit (PPU) and parole. Community leaders tended to not be mistaken for terrorists. provided with recognition symbols that draw a distinction between terrorist would allow them to work against local leaders and the rank-and-file. As one - Some leaders asked for logistical terrorist groups without being mistaken respondent pointed out, “they want support (typically, food, fuel and for insurgents and accidentally fired the terrorist leaders gone, but the propane for cooking) from coalition upon by coalition forces.8 followers and ordinary fighters are forces. their own children, so they want them In Zaydun district, a farming and canal freed of terrorist leaders, not killed or - Local leaders and their forces almost area west of Baghdad that had long always wanted to be integrated into the been noted for the presence of extremist Iraqi government structure as a local groups that had dispossessed the tribal 9 Personal interview, Dr. Mary Habeck, Washington, establishment and radicalized the D.C., May 2008. 5 Personal conversations, officers of 1/5 Cavalry Regi- 10 Personal interview, Lieutenant-Colonel Joe L’Etoile, ment, and personal participant observation, Amiriyya, 7 Lieutenant-Colonel Dale Kuehl, “Ameriya Freedom Washington, D.C., April 2008 Baghdad, June 2007. Fighters: Meeting with Dr. Kilcullen MNF-I Senior 11 Ibid. 6 Personal communication, Colonel J.B. Burton, com- Counterinsurgency Advisor,” briefing, June 2007. 12 Ibid. mander of TF Dagger BCT, Northwest Baghdad, April 8 Fieldnotes, combat advising in AO Commando, Sadr 13 This information is drawn from an unclassified brief- 2008. al-Yusufiyya district, May-June 2007. ing with Lieutenant-Colonel Joe L’Etoile.

3 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 driven away.”14 This, indeed, is a classic initial attempts to de-escalate the Sunni - Expect leaders to act primarily in statement of the distinction between insurgency. Moreover, the existence accordance with their group’s interests, accidental guerrillas and globally- of an armed local movement of Sunnis not their formal undertakings. focused extremists. Therefore, local created a “balance of power” effect: it leaders who captured rank-and-file deterred Shi`a extremist groups such - Expect overlapping and sometimes terrorists originating from the local as Jaysh al-Mahdi that might otherwise conflicting spheres of authority within district typically held them in custody have thought of “cleansing” Sunni tribal groups, rather than a military- until they agreed to sign an undertaking communities, and reduced the fear of style chain of command. One group may never to work with AQI again. The local permanent victimization that had caused respond to several different shaykhs to leaders then summoned their parents Sunni leaders to avoid involvement in different degrees. to collect them, and they were released into their parents’ custody, with their “The Shi`a-dominated - Look for leaders who occupy positions clan or tribe undertaking to enforce the of authority within several local power agreement and ensure they never again government, for instance, networks (tribe, mosque, business, worked with the terrorists.15 was and remains governance). These are likely to be survivors who can influence others. This tribal process involved clear suspicious of a movement political dangers. The Shi`a-dominated that has so far largely - Be wary of non-tribal Iraqis looking government, for one, was and remains down on tribal shaykhs and treating suspicious of a movement that has so far occurred within Sunni- them as ignorant or of no account. largely occurred within Sunni-majority majority districts.” districts, and sees local fighters as - Avoid pushing a shaykh to make temporary allies at best, tomorrow’s commitments until he is sure his tribal enemies at worst. Second, the tribes group will support him. themselves (particularly the Zobai the new Iraq. It also contradicted the leaders) sometimes talk as if they see al-Qa`ida propaganda claim that AQI - Channel assistance to a tribal group their actions as a precursor to expanding was all that stood between Iraqi Sunnis through the local shaykh to cement their influence to regain control of and a Shi`a-led genocide. These factors, his patronage power and increase his formerly Sunni-majority districts in correctly handled, made local security authority, thus making it easier for him Baghdad.16 Third, at least some (though forces a key element in a balanced, self- to make agreements “stick.” as yet undetected) human rights abuses regulating, self-sustaining local security are probably occurring and might be laid architecture that could potentially - Develop coordination mechanisms, at our door if we cooperated with local survive without coalition supervision. and communications channels, to forces but then failed to act adequately Moreover, a mechanism to enroll tribal local leaders that enable deconfliction to prevent abuse. Finally, the existence fighters into legitimate security forces between local “neighborhood watch” of armed security forces, however as local police—which is, after all, organizations and coalition forces. informal, operating outside the Iraqi what the tribes most wanted—had the government chain of command might be potential to bring these forces under - Work to persuade local leaders of seen as a precursor to warlordism, or as government control, thus preventing the benefits of supporting the Iraqi compromising Iraq’s sovereignty. the development of non-state forces that government—we found we could not could undermine sovereignty. expect support for the government to be In my judgment, as of early June part of their initial motivation, which 2007, these concerns were real but Key lessons for coalition forces and was opposition to al-Qa`ida. manageable. An armed and organized commanders emerged from this process. Sunni population was not necessarily We found that we had to: - Expect a degree of mistrust of Iraqi a destabilizing political factor. It army and police forces on the part of created an informal authority structure - Treat local tribal irregular fighters as tribal leaders, and be prepared to act that helped build political unity and local allies, or a local “coalition of the in the role of an “honest broker” in social coherence within the Sunni willing,” not as “our new employees.” promoting cooperation between local community, moving away from the They began this rebellion because al- fighters and Iraqi forces. situation of hundreds of fragmented Qa`ida tried to push them around; the and independent insurgent groups, and coalition needs to ensure that it does not - Develop mechanisms for handing community leaders unable to control make the same mistake. Local fighters over locals who have been detained by them, which plagued the coalition’s were not under our command; instead, neighborhood watch groups, including we approached them with “tribal requiring clear standards of evidence 14 This quote is drawn from an Iraqi tribal leader’s con- diplomacy.” and compliance with human rights versation with a U.S. battalion commander in central before an individual is accepted into the Baghdad in July 2007. - Build a personal partnership Iraqi or coalition judicial system. 15 Personal communication, Lieutenant-Colonel Dale relationship, based on honor and trust, Kuehl, Baghdad, June 2007. with local leaders. 16 Personal conversation, former insurgent leader, Bagh- dad, June 2007.

4 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

Tentative Conclusions Islamic State of Iraq for establishing an emirate.2 Rival Although the requirements for counter- insurgents appealed to Usama bin Ladin insurgency in a tribal environment may Commemorates its Two- to rein in al-Qa`ida’s Iraqi franchise, not be written down in the classical- Year Anniversary and they openly fought AQI fighters on era field manuals, building local allies the ground.3 and forging partnerships and trusted By Pascale Combelles Siegel networks with at-risk communities seems In the face of this unfavorable context, to be one of the keys to success. Indeed, it has been a difficult year for the it was incumbent upon Abu Hamza al- perhaps this is what T.E. Lawrence had Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Created in Muhajir,4 the ISI’s minister of war and in mind when he wrote that the art of October 2006 as al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s AQI’s amir, to defend the Islamic state. guerrilla warfare with Arab tribes rests (AQI) emirate, the ISI was intended to In an hour-long speech, al-Muhajir on setting up “ladders of tribes” to the be a precursor for the restoration of a chose to cast the difficulties aside and objective.17 Marine and Army units Taliban-like caliphate over the Middle reframe the debate by focusing on the that have sought to understand tribal East. Since its inception, however, ISI’s legitimacy. His argument was behavior in its own terms, to follow the ISI has been rebuffed by rival clear: the ISI is “related to the concept norms of proper behavior as expected insurgent groups, battered by coalition of the state of the Prophet,”5 referring to by tribal communities, and to build their operations and undermined by local the time when the Prophet Muhammad own confederations of local partners Sunni tribes. Yet, during the end of established his rule in Medina after have done extremely well in this fight. September, the ISI’s leaders celebrated the migration of 622 AD. As part of Nevertheless, this uprising against the state’s two-year anniversary. The this argument, since one should not extremism was the Iraqi people’s idea; celebration came well in advance of the question the legitimacy of Medina, then they started it, they are leading it, and it actual anniversary, as the “state” was one should not question the legitimacy is continuing on their timeline. The role established on October 15, 2006. The ISI of the Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Muhajir of the U.S.-led coalition should be to released Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s “State argued that the situations in Medina and support these initiatives when needed, of the Prophet” speech on September 19, Iraq are comparable. As Medina was a ensure that proper political safeguards while the al-Furqan Institute for Media battleground where a pious minority and human rights standards are in Production released its commemorative faced a larger, better-equipped enemy, place, and recognize and be prepared for video on September 22 and Abu `Umar so is Iraq. As Medina was plagued by a number of unpredictable outcomes. al-Baghdadi’s “Promise to Allah” disease, hunger and insecurity, so is speech appeared on September 24. By Iraq. Dr. David J. Kilcullen is Special Adviser for releasing its messages well in advance Counterinsurgency to the U.S. Secretary of of October 15, the ISI avoided the fate Equalizing the circumstances in Medina State. In 2007, he served in Iraq as Senior of al-Qa`ida’s delayed 9/11 celebration.1 and Iraq allows al-Muhajir to justify Counterinsurgency Adviser, Multi-National The ISI’s technical success, however, the ISI’s current tactics and policies. Force Iraq. During 2005-2006, he was Chief does not overshadow the challenges During the Prophet’s time, surveillance Strategist in the State Department’s Office the group has faced in its two-year of others was necessary to ensure the of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. In existence. The setbacks of the past year Prophet’s safety, the Prophet and his 2005, he served in the Office of the Secretary have made the glorification of the ISI a companions carried weapons to defend of Defense, writing the “Irregular Warfare” tough sell. To mitigate that difficulty, themselves, looting helped weaken sections of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense the ISI released a three-prong argument the Prophet’s enemies, and coercing Review, and served on the writing team for defending its legitimacy, celebrating its community leaders into supporting Australia’s counter-terrorism white paper past accomplishments and vowing to the Prophet was justified. All of these in 2004. Since 9/11, he has served in every achieve final victory. circumstances, according to the ISI, theater of the war on terrorism including Iraq, apply today. This comparison serves Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa Defending the ISI’s Legitimacy three purposes. First, it is designed and Southeast Asia. He is a former Australian The transformation of AQI into an to end the controversy over the ISI’s Army officer with 25 years of experience in light “emirate” proved a controversial move. legitimacy by appealing to what most infantry operations, with combat experience in As the ISI tried to coerce other rival Muslims consider sacred: the time of East Timor, the Pacific Islands and the Middle groups into coming under its fold and East. He completed his doctoral dissertation (a as it imposed strict rules in the areas it 2 “Prominent Islamist Kuwaiti Sheikh Questions Reli- study of the effects of insurgency and terrorism controlled, discontent grew and it led to gious Legitimacy of the Islamic State of Iraq, Calls to Dis- on traditional societies in Indonesia and East a serious reversal in the ISI’s fortunes. solve it,” Middle East Media Research Institute, April 27, Timor) in 2000. By spring 2007, pundits and rival 2007. insurgents made their disagreements 3 For a detailed description of the ISI’s rivalry with other This article contains no material derived public. Salafi-jihadi commentators insurgent groups, see Evan Kohlmann, “State of the Sun- from detainee interrogation or other classified argued that the state declaration ni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007,” The NEFA Foun- sources. All Iraqi informants gave their prior did not meet jurisprudential criteria dation, August 2007. informed consent to the use and publication of 4 Abu Hamza al-Muhajir has been identified as an Egyp- their comments. 1 On September 10, the first tier of al-Qa`ida’s websites tian known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri. went down for a full week, preventing al-Sahab from 5 Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, “A Lecture Entitled: The State 17 T.E. Lawrence, “The Science of Guerrilla Warfare,” disseminating its 9/11 anniversary video in a timely and of the Prophet,” al-Furqan Institute for Media Produc- in Encyclopedia Britannica, XIVth Edition (1929). orderly fashion. tion, September 19, 2008.

5 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 the Prophet Muhammad. Second, it the occupation and its tails,”7 helped manufacturing rockets with chemical allows al-Muhajir to promote the ISI as shrink Iranian influence in Iraq, and warheads. This part of the video was the embryo of great accomplishments to protected “the Muslims who pray our anti-climactic with a paltry staging come, just as Medina was the precursor way.”8 that undercut the rather dramatic to a larger and more powerful Islamic announcement. Nothing indicated state. Third, it helps al-Muhajir The video also vaunted the fact that the that the device shown contained any downplay the significance of the ISI’s ISI has been able to restore Shari`a on chemicals. Unsurprisingly, the video lost grounds and de-link the question “acts and individuals, committees and also boasted that the ISI was developing customs, regimes and everything.”9 The a long-range missile capable of reaching video explained that the restoration of Tel Aviv. The ISI has long claimed that it “As the ISI tried to coerce Shari`a was accomplished in an orderly is an “advanced post to be the gate to the other rival groups into fashion and implemented implacably. conquest of Jerusalem from the Jews.”11 To support its claim, the video showed Advertising a new weapon capable of coming under its fold and the sentencing and execution of people reaching Tel Aviv is designed to show as it imposed strict rules declared “apostates.” This framing supporters that the ISI is working to will, no doubt, satisfy the Salafi-jihadis “liberate Jerusalem.”12 The ISI and al- in the areas it controlled, who feel that maintaining the purity Qa`ida’s leaders have repeatedly argued discontent grew and it led of the faith is the most important duty that Iraq is a “stepping stone” for the for Muslims. It was, however, the liberation of Jerusalem. to a serious reversal in the ISI’s (and before that AQI’s) ruthless ISI’s fortunes.” implementation of its extremely strict The most surprising claim made in the interpretation of Shari`a that helped video regards the assassination of Shaykh turn locals and tribes against it. The Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, a founder of ISI’s draconian interpretation of the Anbar Awakening Council, who was of the ISI’s eventual success from its Islam appeals only to a small minority partially responsible for driving the tactical and operational successes. of Muslims, its unwillingness to ISI out of Anbar Province. The shaykh Although he acknowledged that the compromise makes it harder to find was killed on September 13, 2007 in a ISI lost territory during the past year, reliable partners, and the unflinching high-profile attack just a few days after al-Muhajir argued that the modern implementation of its principles publicly meeting with President George statehood standard of territorial control generates hostility and opposition. W. Bush. The video clip showed a man, is not the correct yardstick to measure with his face blurred, reading in front either the ISI’s legitimacy or strength. The video then analyzed the ISI’s of a camera. The ISI claimed that he This argument is likely to please military achievements. Although the was the suicide bomber who killed Abu jihadists who commonly rail against ISI routinely releases substantial Risha. The claim is unverifiable, but the the nation-states that have divided the accounts of “successful” attacks against video spells a different account from Muslim umma. Yet, the argument goes coalition forces,10 the commemorative the official version. At the time, the ISI in part against what the ISI boasted video chose to ignore these fates and did not release details of the operation two years ago when it made a point to focused on the development of military citing operational security needs.13 U.S. showcase the size of its geographical technology. For example, with footage and Iraqi sources, however, reported control.6 of men working on various devices and that a roadside bomb, not a suicide ammunitions as background, a caption bomber, killed Shaykh Abu Risha, and Reframing the ISI’s Achievements indicated that an individual was nothing to date has contradicted those After addressing the issue of legitimacy, reports. By portraying the attack as a the ISI’s al-Furqan media group released 7 To drive the point more convincingly, the video uses suicide bombing, the ISI may be seeking an hour-long video on September 22 external “experts” to discuss the toll that the “resistance” to aggrandize its role and capabilities. showcasing the state’s achievements. has inflicted on U.S. forces. These experts do not neces- The video was a montage of previously sarily distinguish between the various branches of the in- Predicting Final Victory released footage and speech excerpts. It surgency, yet it appears that they are specifically speak- After justifying the legitimacy of the contained graphic content (such as the ing about the ISI. state and boasting of its achievements extrajudicial executions of Iraqi security 8 This is a veiled reference to the fact that the ISI intends forces) but stayed away from the most to support those Sunnis who accept the basic tenets of 11 “Remarkable Release: Two Years With the Islamic gruesome clips that established the its ideology (Salafism and jihadism). It can be construed State.” reputation of AQI under the leadership from this euphemism that the ISI’s protection extends to 12 For more details on this issue, see Pascale Combelles of Abu Mu`sab al-Zarqawi. Instead, the a small portion of the Sunni population. Siegel, “Looking to the Levant: Internationalizing the video touted the ISI’s “achievements.” 9 “Remarkable Release: Two Years With the Islamic Iraqi Insurgency,” Terrorism Monitor 6:5 (2008). Some claims were expected, such as the State,” al-Furqan Institute for Media Production, Sep- 13 The original claim said: “Your brothers in the Min- assertions that the ISI has “exhausted tember 22, 2008. istry of Security [were able] to trace and assassinate… 10 For example, in mid-September 2008 the ISI released Abdul Setar Abu Rica…in a heroic operation which was two summaries of military operations it claimed to have prepared for more than one month.” See Islamic State of 6 “The Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq: Announcing conducted in August 2008. In the two statements, the Iraq, “Eliminating the Grandson of Abu Regal, Abdul the Establishment of the State of Iraq,” al-Fajr Media ISI took credit for conducting 755 military operations, for Setar Abu Rica,” al-Fajr Media Center, September 14, Center, October 15, 2006. killing 1,701 “enemies” and for wounding 608 more. 2007.

6 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 and capabilities, the pinnacle of the by calling on all Muslims who have British Muslims Providing celebration is a lengthy statement from strayed to come back to the path of jihad ISI leader Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi or face dire consequences. “If you refuse Foot Soldiers for the Global making the case, once again, why jihad to repent before defeat over you,” he Jihad against the United States is absolutely warned, “then by Allah the killing of an necessary and a personal obligation apostate is dearer to me than 100 heads By James Brandon that no self-respecting Muslim can of Crusaders.”16 skirt. Al-Baghdadi did not address any the united kingdom faces a number of of the complex issues; instead, he gave Conclusion terrorist threats. It is often portrayed as a general “pep talk” designed to entice Contrary to al-Qa`ida, the Islamic State a target for jihadist groups worldwide; as many Muslims as possible to support of Iraq managed the technical release of a “factory” for producing homegrown the jihad. He did not discuss the crisis its commemorative speeches and videos terrorists seeking to attack the country of legitimacy, the grounds lost to the without glitches. Nevertheless, the in which they were born and raised; coalition and to the Awakening Councils, technical success cannot overshadow and a haven for Middle Eastern Islamist or the controversial tactics that have the fact that the setbacks of the past year ideologues and militants. Although turned many Iraqis against it; instead, have made glorifying the “state” a tough these depictions are accurate, they have al-Baghdadi refocused the debate on sell. The commemoration messages eclipsed the extent to which British the necessity to undertake jihad against highlight some of these difficulties, Muslims are also playing an important the Americans. His speech was general forcing the ISI into a defensive position. role in jihadist violence globally by and inclusive. Al-Baghdadi defined the The fallback line of defense serves two providing funding, foot soldiers and struggle in Iraq as a defensive jihad, purposes: first, it unsurprisingly uses technical expertise to jihadist groups. whereby the United States is attacking the Prophet and his era to justify the In recent years, British jihadists have Islam and the Muslim nation and ISI’s current actions; second, it tries to been recorded fighting not only in Iraq imposing “injustice and tyranny.” In refocus the debate on the need for every and Afghanistan, but also in Chechnya, this context, al-Baghdadi argued that all Muslim to engage in what is a justified Israel and Somalia. British jihadists able Muslims are obligated to undertake defensive jihad. There is no doubt that involved in these conflicts have been jihad to defend “religion and creed.” the ISI’s celebration is overshadowed of all ages and backgrounds; some have Quoting from the Qur’an, al-Baghdadi by its current difficulties, but it been experienced fighters, while others said: “Permission to fight is given to does not mean that its appeal will go traveled to war zones with no military those who are fought against because unanswered. training or obvious involvement in they have been wronged.”14 radical activities. This article will look Pascale Combelles Siegel is president of at the involvement of British Muslims As if to provide further incentive, al- Insight Through Analysis, an independent in Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflicts Baghdadi emphasized the inevitability consultancy company based in McLean, such as Somalia. of the mujahidin’s success since VA. Her research focuses on information their fight takes place under God’s operations (mainly public affairs, Iraq auspices. With victory all but certain, psychological operations, military-media Since 2003, many prominent British al-Baghdadi offered all Muslims a relations and public diplomacy) and Islamist leaders have supported chance to participate in the successful civil-military relations. Mrs. Combelles jihadist attacks against foreign troops defense of Islam. To those who may Siegel is currently involved in analyzing in Iraq. Their endorsements of the doubt the final victory considering the the information dimension of terrorism Iraqi resistance, joined by similar current setbacks, al-Baghdadi offered and counter-terrorism strategies and in exhortations from more radical reassurance. God, he said, works in monitoring Iraqi insurgents’ propaganda. preachers and jihadist websites, have mysterious ways and “fulfills His She has conducted numerous post- led to a stream of British Muslims promise when He wants and according conflict analyses, including a review of traveling to Iraq to carry out attacks on to His desires.”15 How and when victory the Pentagon’s embedding policy and coalition troops. By mid-2005 alone, the will come remains a mystery that man information operations during Iraqi British security services estimated that cannot pierce. The subtext of this claim Freedom (2004) and an analysis of around 70 British Muslims had gone is two-fold: it is not worth discussing the American sensitivities toward military to Iraq to fight for al-Qa`ida and other setbacks because only God can explain casualties (2002). jihadist organizations.1 them, and no matter what the coalition and its allies try it will not have any These volunteers have come from all bearing on the ultimate victory. backgrounds. In November 2003, for example, Wail al-Dhaleai, a 22-year- Al-Baghdadi closed his appeal by old British Yemeni, died while carrying celebrating the mujahidin who have out a suicide attack on U.S. troops taken “the path to righteousness” and in Iraq.2 Al-Dhaleai had arrived in

14 Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, “The Promise of Allah,” al- 1 David Leppard and Hala Jaber, “70 British Muslims Furqan Institute for Media Production, September 24, Join Iraq fighters,”The Times, June 26, 2005. 2008. 2 Nick Pelham, “British Olympic Hope ‘Was Iraq Suicide 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. Bomber,’” Guardian, November 16, 2003.

7 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 the United Kingdom only a few years received rudimentary conventional In August 2008, Brigadier Ed Butler, earlier from Aden, Yemen, settling in military training from Jaysh al-Mahdi who recently commanded British Sheffield where he had quickly become before being deployed in Najaf. Their forces in Afghanistan, told the Daily involved with Salafist groups, marrying present whereabouts are unknown. Telegraph that it was “likely” that British a white British convert to Islam who Muslims were fighting alongside the similarly followed an extreme brand of Many of the British jihadists known to Taliban, saying, “there are British the religion. Al-Dhaleai went to Iraq have fought in Iraq are of Arab descent. passport holders who live in the UK indirectly, traveling from the United This points to an important wider trend who are being found in places like Kingdom to the United Arab Emirates of British jihadists generally heading Kandahar.”9 Earlier in the year, several and then heading to Syria from where to parts of the world where they will be newspapers had reported that Royal Air he entered Iraq. His father, who lives most likely to speak the language and to Force spy planes in Afghanistan had in Yemen, was informed of his son’s blend in with locals. For example, most picked up Taliban radio conversations death by a militant in Iraq who phoned British jihadists of Pakistani origin have conducted in English regional accents. him with the news. Al-Dhaleai, a recent In April 2008, the British security immigrant to the United Kingdom, is services estimated that 4,000 British not necessarily typical of UK-based “It would make sense Muslims had visited training camps in jihadists who traveled to Iraq. For for Afghan fighters to Afghanistan.10 example, Mobeen Muneef, a 25-year- old Muslim of Pakistani origin who delegate communication British militants have been involved was raised in South London, is another responsibilities to in Afghanistan since at least the early young British jihadist who joined Iraqi 1990s when substantial numbers of insurgents before being captured by comparatively well- British Muslims attended training U.S. Marines in Ramadi in December educated British jihadists.” camps in Taliban-ruled areas. Following 2004.3 Muneef was reported to have the U.S. invasion in 2001, small groups been involved with the British al- of British Muslims affiliated with Muhajiroun group while in London British extremist groups traveled to and to have entered Iraq from Syria gone to Afghanistan and Pakistan while Afghanistan to join al-Qa`ida and the where he had been studying Arabic. In those of Arab origin have tended to go Taliban. At least five were reportedly 2006, he was jailed for 15 years by an to Iraq. Moreover, given the difficulties killed soon afterwards.11 Since then, Iraqi court for possessing a fake Iraqi that even experienced foreign jihadists however, there is surprisingly little ID.4 Other UK-based jihadists active in have had in operating in Iraq’s hard evidence of British Muslims Iraq have been experienced mujahidin. politically fragmented and internally actively fighting in Afghanistan. It In February 2005, for example, Idris divided society, it is unsurprising that does not appear that jihadist websites Bazis, a 41-year-old French-Algerian some British jihadists seem to have have reported the deaths of any British living in Manchester, died in a suicide decided that rather than traveling to jihadists in Afghanistan and neither attack on U.S. troops in Iraq.5 Bazis had Iraq to carry out attacks, it is easier Western armies nor the Afghan security previously fought in the Balkans and to simply attack British soldiers in the forces have reported capturing or Afghanistan in the 1990s, settling in the United Kingdom itself. In December killing any British fighters there. This is United Kingdom only in 2004. 2005, Abu Baker Mansha, a 21-year- despite widespread evidence of radical old of Pakistani origin, was jailed for preachers in the United Kingdom Not all British jihadists active in Iraq planning to attack a British soldier encouraging Muslims to fight in are Sunni. Some British Shi`a Muslims living in the United Kingdom who had Afghanistan as well as numerous cases have also taken part in the violence. For been recently decorated for bravery in of British Muslims being put on trial for example, in August 2004 a reporter from Iraq.7 Separately, in February 2008, heading to Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Guardian interviewed two British five British Muslims from Birmingham receive military training. One possible men who had joined Muqtada al-Sadr’s (mostly of Pakistani origin) were reason for this apparent discrepancy Jaysh al-Mahdi in Najaf.6 Both men, convicted of planning to kidnap and is that, as in Iraq, jihadist groups then in their early 20s, had been born in behead a local British Muslim soldier in have decided that British volunteers, Iraq but moved to the United Kingdom an attempt to dissuade other Muslims however enthusiastic, are of limited use as children, before returning to Iraq from joining the British army.8 on the front lines. Instead, they seem to specifically to join al-Sadr’s forces and have recognized that such volunteers fight U.S. troops. They said they had Afghanistan are more useful in either returning to During the past year, there have been the United Kingdom to conduct attacks 3 Paul Lewis, “15 Years for Briton Convicted in Iraq,” increased reports in the UK media there, or to raise funds and buy hi- Guardian, April 21, 2006. of British Muslims fighting with the 4 Daniel McGrory, “Briton is Jailed for 15 Years in Iraq Taliban and al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan. 9 Con Coughlin, “British Muslims ‘Fighting with the Tal- as a Warning to Foreign Insurgents,” The Times, April iban in Afghanistan,’” Daily Telegraph, August 2, 2008. 20, 2006. 7 “Man Convicted Under Terrorism Act,” BBC, Decem- 10 Ben Leapman, “4,000 in UK Trained at Terror 5 Daniel McGrory and Michael Evans, “The Deadly Trail ber 22, 2005. Camps,” Sunday Telegraph, April 19, 2008. of a Mystery Bomber,” The Times, June 23, 2005. 8 “Five Men Sentenced Over Terrorism Offences Con- 11 Paul Harris, Martin Bright and Burhan Wazir, “Five 6 Rory McCarthy, “From London to Iraq - The Latest Re- nected to the Birmingham Beheading Plot,” Crown Pros- Britons Killed in ‘Jihad Brigade,’” Observer, October 29, cruits to the Mahdi Army,” Guardian, August 11, 2004. ecution Service, February 18, 2008. 2001.

8 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 tech equipment for fighters already in a hub for British radicals in the early fought in Somalia with the Islamic Afghanistan. One recent example of 1990s and early 2000s. Courts Union.19 In France, five Muslims this trend is Sohail Anjum Qureshi, a were put on trial in March 2008 for Muslim of Pakistani origin from East It also seems likely that some members of sending French Muslims to fight in London, who was jailed in early 2008 Britain’s nearly 80,000-strong Somali Iraq,20 while numerous other French for trying to board a flight to Pakistan community have been involved with the Muslims are believed to have taken part with £9,000 in cash, sleeping bags, Islamic Courts Union, Somalia’s largest in attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 In night-vision equipment and combat jihadist group. In January 2007, for Germany, police arrested two German- manuals downloaded from the internet, example, Ethiopia reported that seven Somalis in September 2008 as they were which police believe were destined British citizens were wounded in a preparing to fly to Pakistan where they for militant groups in Afghanistan were believed to be planning to attend or Pakistan.12 Although Qureshi told “All the evidence suggests militant training camps.22 Der Spiegel friends in the United Kingdom that he has reported that the German security was going abroad to carry out a “14- that the United Kingdom services believe that “over the past few 20 day operation” in which he hoped is presently producing years 50 extremists have slipped out to “kill many,” it seems more likely of Germany with the aim of going into that the foreign militants regarded him more jihadists than many hiding in the Afghan-Pakistani border as little more than a useful source of Muslim-majority states region and learning the trade at terrorist cash, hi-tech equipment and Western training camps.”23 knowledge.13 Similar decisions by such as Malaysia, Nigeria experienced militants may also explain or Oman.” Nevertheless, it seems clear that these the recent reports of British Muslims figures are dwarfed by the number of being heard communicating on Taliban British jihadists heading not only to radio. It would make sense for Afghan Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but to fighters to delegate communication U.S. airstrike in southern Somalia and other conflict zones such as Chechnya responsibilities to comparatively well- were later captured near the Kenyan and Somalia. All the evidence suggests educated British jihadists—rather than border.16 The previous month Ethiopia that the United Kingdom is presently entrusting them with front line combat claimed to have captured three other producing more jihadists than many duties where their lack of military British passport holders. The British Muslim-majority states such as Malaysia, training could endanger not only their government has not publicly confirmed Nigeria or Oman and indeed perhaps own lives but also those of others. these reports and the men’s present even more than countries traditionally whereabouts are unknown. In the United thought of as “exporting” terrorism such Other Conflicts Kingdom itself, prominent British as Lebanon, Somalia or Sudan. This As well as becoming involved with Muslim groups have helped the Islamic trend starkly indicates how the United militants in Iraq and Afghanistan, Courts Union to raise funds and rally Kingdom’s failure to adequately counter British Muslims have also been involved support for their cause. For example, the flow of homegrown jihadists—or to in other jihadist conflicts around in late 2006 the Muslim Association of reverse decades of failed government the world. The most famous incident Britain (MAB), the UK’s largest Muslim integration policies—presents serious occurred when two British Muslims Brotherhood-linked group, hosted security challenges not only for the attempted to carry out a suicide attack senior leaders of the Islamic Courts United Kingdom, but also for its allies in a bar in Tel Aviv in May 2003. Only in London’s Finsbury Park Mosque around the world. one man’s bomb detonated successfully, (run by the MAB since the arrest of killing three people, while the other’s Abu Hamza), while the delegation also James Brandon is the deputy-director of the malfunctioned, forcing him to flee the held a fundraising meeting at a nearby Centre for Social Cohesion in London. He is a scene.14 Other UK-based militants have school.17 former journalist who has reported on Islamic also reportedly been active in Chechnya. movements in Europe, the Middle East For example, in 2004 Osman Larussi Conclusion and Africa for a wide variety of print and and Yacine Benalia, two Algerians Muslims from other European countries broadcast media. He has a master’s degree based in London, took part in the Beslan have also carried out jihadist attacks in Middle Eastern Studies from the School of school siege and were later killed.15 A abroad. At least two Belgian Muslims Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). third British-Algerian, Kamel Rabat (including a woman convert) are Bouralha, who had also been involved in believed to have died while carrying the siege, was later captured by Russian out attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.18 security forces. All three men attended Somalis living in Scandinavia have 19 “Swedes Reported Dead in Somalia,” The Local, Janu- Abu Hamza’s mosque in Finsbury Park, ary 30, 2007. 16 Julian Borger and Xan Rice, “UK Tries to Identify 20 Angela Charlton, “French Extremists Dream of Jihad 12 “Man Jailed Over Terrorism Charges,” BBC, January British Fighters Injured in Somalia,” Guardian, January in Iraq,” Associated Press, March 31, 2008. 8, 2008. 11, 2007. 21 See, for example, “France Tries Militant Islamist Net- 13 “Terrorist and the Shop Girl,” BBC, January 8, 2008. 17 Jeevan Vasagar, “Somali Islamists Held UK Meeting work,” Agence France-Presse, October 1, 2008. 14 “Suicide Bomber ‘Was British,’” BBC, May 1, 2003. to Raise Funds,” Guardian, January 13, 2007. 22 “From the Rhine River to the Jihad,” Der Spiegel, Sep- 15 Jason Burke, “London Mosque Link to Beslan,” Guard- 18 Anouar Boukhars, “Iraqi Terror Trial Exposes Bel- tember 29, 2008. ian, October 3, 2004. gium’s Muslim Dilemma,” Terrorism Focus 4:35 (2007). 23 Ibid.

9 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

Anatomy of Spain’s Although 14 of the 19 Spaniards suspicious activity undertaken in 2004 arrested were born in the Spanish cities by individuals with links to jihadist 28 Disrupted Jihadist of Ceuta and Melilla, their parents were groups: the video recording of important Networks of Moroccan origin and they were raised buildings in Barcelona by members as Muslims. Only five are Spanish of a Pakistani cell, and the detention By Javier Jordan converts to Islam. of two Moroccans in possession of a camera near a nuclear power station in since the march 11, 2004 terrorist attacks Logistics Functions and Preparations for Guadalajara near Madrid. Almost all of in Madrid, Spanish security forces New Attacks in Spain these plans involved attacks on various have carried out 28 operations against Most Spanish police operations have civilian targets with the intention to jihadist networks. The amount of focused on networks that performed cause mass indiscriminate death. Of all jihadist activity in Spain demonstrates logistics tasks. Logistics work is the the Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona how it has become a structural main task of cells that have settled were the most frequently listed targets. phenomenon and poses a threat to in Spain since the beginning of the This again demonstrates the interest to Spanish and European security. This 1990s. In recent years, this work has carry out attacks in cities that guarantee article analyzes the main characteristics included the recruitment and sending the attention of the global media. of the 28 foiled networks: their origin, of volunteers to fight in Iraq. This The information available suggests functions and potential links to wider role corresponds to eight networks that beyond the typical rationale of terrorist organizations. It finds that the uncovered by Spanish security services. a struggle against infidels, the plans majority of those involved in Spanish There are also the cases of three cells that were driven by a desire for revenge in terrorist plots are of Algerian and were apprehended in 2007 for sending response to Spanish counter-terrorist Moroccan descent, their primary role volunteers to Algeria with the intention activities and the presence of Spanish is logistics work, and the majority of of later entering Iraq. Unfortunately, troops in Afghanistan. In four cases, the cells have been linked to wider terrorist there is no concrete data available on the terrorists sought to acquire explosives organizations. exact number of individuals recruited by buying them from criminals (such as and sent from Spain. Some specific in the Madrid bombings), and in three Primarily Maghrebian Origins cases are known, such as the Algerian cases they supposedly sought to use The first discernible fact is that 70% of Belgacem Bellil, originally recruited by homemade explosives. those arrested come from Algeria and a network in Catalonia; he later became Morocco.1 This is not surprising because involved in an attack against an Italian Subordination to Regional Organizations the majority of Muslim immigrants Carabinieri command in Nasiriyya, Iraq A third important aspect regarding in Spain are Moroccans, followed by in November 2003. Overall, however, a jihadist militancy in Spain is that Algerians. The overwhelming tendency remarkable lack of information exists most of the cells were linked to wider of jihadist networks in Spain to be on this issue. organizations, mainly the GSPC/ composed of Moroccans and Algerians AQIM. There have also been cases is unlikely to change in the future. In addition to recruitment and sending of autonomous grassroots jihadist The third predominant nationality is fighters to theaters of jihad, other networks, but their numbers are Pakistani. Twenty-three Pakistanis logistics tasks include providing false significantly lower. One individual even have been arrested since 2004. Most documentation or money to established operated alone, on a supposedly “lone of them belonged to two cells that jihadist groups. Spanish security forces wolf” basis. These three types of cells— presumably were preparing terrorist arrested five of these cells, and they were subordinates to wider organizations, attacks in Barcelona (one in September tied to the Salafist Group for Preaching grassroots networks and “lone wolf” 2004 and another in January 2008). and Combat (GSPC)—now known as operatives—will be explored in this The Pakistani community in Spain is al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb section. not very open, and security forces find (AQIM). In all five cells, financing was it particularly difficult to infiltrate it or managed via the fraudulent use of credit Of the 28 cells analyzed, 22 form part obtain cooperation from its members. cards, domestic burglaries or selling of wider organizations. Overall, two Pakistani residents in Spain also travel counterfeit clothing. There is also one main criteria needed to be fulfilled frequently to their home country.2 case that escapes common parameters to consider a cell as part of a wider involving a GSPC cell that invested in organization: communication and Spaniards represent the fourth most a prostitution house in Malaga with the coordinated action. The cell would need prominent nationality among those intention of passing on funds on a long- to maintain regular contact with other arrested in the 28 counter-terrorist term basis to Algeria. members of the superior organization operations since the Madrid bombings. and carry out coordinated efforts with After the Madrid bombings, the number other cells of the group.3 Figure 1 shows 1 This fact, along with most of the information in this of groups that have tried to commit report, is based on the author’s study of the 28 Spanish attacks in Spain has increased. Certainty 3 Examples of communication and coordinated action counter-terrorist operations that have occurred since the of at least seven terrorist plans of this include recruiting and placing volunteers, transferring 2004 Madrid attacks. type exists. Fortunately, most of these money and shipping false documents, and preparing at- 2 In fact, many are currently petitioning for direct flights plans were foiled in the early phases tacks following the directives of a superior organization. between Barcelona and Pakistan—at present, they use of preparation. In addition to these These criteria are thus merely functional, not formal. For indirect flights via the United Kingdom. seven plots, there were also two cases of example, it is not required as formal criteria that the cell

10 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 the organizations to which the cells All of the grassroots jihadist networks exert over jihadist cells, but also the belonged. In at least three of the cases, that prepared attacks in Spain lacked degree of implantation of jihadist cells simultaneously communicated professionalism and were too open to elements on Spanish soil. and coordinated their activities with their social surroundings, making them their original organization (the GSPC or vulnerable to authorities. The terrorist Although the Islamic community in the GICM) and with al-Qa`ida in Iraq. plot that came closest to success was Spain has generally displayed a firm For this reason, they have been noted to be executed by a cell tied to a wider rejection of the Madrid terrorist attacks, twice in the data as linked to those organization. That plan involved a in the long-term jihadists could benefit organizations. series of attacks on the Barcelona from the wide diffusion of non-violent metro from a cell composed of trained Islamist movements within Spain’s TTP, 1 JeM, 1 Pakistanis under the subordination of Muslim immigrant community. Some Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The of these groups indirectly pose the AQ Iraq, 7 cell and its plan were detected and question of how best to integrate Muslim uncovered by an undercover agent from immigrants into Spanish society, and in the French intelligence services who exceptional cases these groups may even

GICM, 4 GSPC/AQIM, 13 had infiltrated it. The cell possessed act as a step toward radical socialization. enough knowledge to build homemade In Spain, groups of concern include explosives, had already selected six the Moroccan movement al-`adl wa’l- Figure 1. Organizations to which foiled terrorist networks in suicide bomber candidates and chose `adl Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality), Spain belong. the targets to attack. After the attacks, numerous Salafist Wahhabist preachers Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the who control nearly 30 oratories (of the Five of the 28 cells were grassroots TTP, planned to release a statement more than 200 mosques and oratories) jihadist networks. This is defined as demanding the withdrawal of European in Catalonia, Tablighi Jama`at and, groups of militants who act completely troops from Afghanistan.5 to a lesser extent, Hizb al-Tahrir. autonomously, without subordination Additionally, the radicalization of or coordination to a superior group, Among the 28 cases examined, there Muslim inmates in Spanish prisons must although they could possibly be in is one that falls into the category of also be considered, with serious problems contact with members of other networks a “lone wolf.” In September 2007, in the control of visits, dissemination of or organizations. It is possible that some the Mossos d’Esquadra (Catalonian books and religious preaching inside the of these cells were in fact dependent on Police) arrested a French individual of penitentiary facilities.6 a superior organization; however, based Moroccan origin in Girona, traveling by on the current open source data, that is car from Toulouse in France. He had in This evidence guarantees that dozens impossible to verify. his car two gas canisters, firecrackers, a of militants will arise in the future. leaflet of the Islamic Army in Iraq that Fortunately, almost all of the attempts to Cross sectioning the data above praised acts of martyrdom and, most target Spain after the Madrid attacks in provides interesting results regarding surprisingly, a Ninja sword situated 2004 have been carried out by networks cell categories and functions. Of the behind the driver’s seat. The presence that are mostly unprofessional and 22 local cells that coordinated with a of the sword in the back seat, aimed at vulnerable. Yet, the risk of new attacks superior organization, only three cells his body, is perhaps proof of his suicide on Spanish soil remains high. Some of were preparing attacks in Spain (two intentions. The individual was possibly the grassroots networks might achieve of them performed both logistical and inspired by the attack in June 2007 success in the future, such as the group preparatory tasks). Of the five grassroots that took place in Glasgow when two that executed the Madrid attacks. jihadist networks, however, four cells individuals crashed a car into the city The degree of threat would also rise if focused on the preparation of attacks in airport. Perhaps to avoid being burnt AQIM actually modifies its strategy7 Spain and the fifth cell was committed to death, the sword was placed behind and instructs its logistics cells to attack to the development and distribution of the driver so as to kill him rapidly upon targets in Spain and France. propaganda via the internet. Although impact. not part of this study, the network that Dr. Javier Jordan is Senior Lecturer in executed the 2004 attacks in Madrid Conclusion Political Science at the University of Granada also corresponds, given the available The presence of jihadist networks in Spain, and Director of Athena Intelligence information, to the category of a in Spain has become a structural Foundation, a Spanish think-tank that 4 grassroots jihadist network. phenomenon. The majority of cells specializes in the study of Terrorism and consisted of individuals from Algeria Armed Conflicts. and Morocco, and many were linked leader pledge an oath of loyalty to the amir of the supe- to the GSPC/AQIM. The 28 police 6 José Antonio Gutiérrez, Javier Jordán and Humberto rior organization or that the other cell members, except operations conducted following the Trujillo, “Prevention of Jihadist Radicalization in Span- the leader, consider themselves as members of the wider attacks in Madrid demonstrate the ish Prisons. Current Situation, Challenges and Dysfunc- organization. pressure that Spanish security forces tions of the Penitentiary System,” Athena Intelligence 4 Javier Jordán, Fernando M. Mañas and Nicola Hors- Journal 3:1 (2008): pp. 7-16. burgh, “Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroots Jihad- 5 Antonio Baquero and Jordi Corachán, “Los 14 deteni- 7 Although AQIM has issued incendiary statements ist Networks: The Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict dos en BCN planeaban atentados en España y en Fran- toward France and Spain, it does not appear to have and Terrorism 31:1 (2008): pp. 17-39. cia,” El Periódico de Catalunya, January 20, 2008. changed its targeting strategy to Europe.

11 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

The Impact of Global NIC’s prediction, as well as insight and years from the initiation of conflict guidance about possible approaches to in Iraq and Afghanistan, effectively Youth Bulges on Islamist addressing recruitment, radicalization, paralleling the constellation of social Radicalization and homegrown terrorism, and the and environmental factors correlated Violence predicted “youth bulge” of radical with the emergence of “super predators” Islamists. Approximately a decade in the United States. Not only will there By Colleen McCue and Kathryn Haahr ago, Dr. James Fox predicted a pending be more young people in Arab states, but increase in youth violence in the United they may be qualitatively worse given global developments and trends States based on a similar demographic their exposure to conflict and violence 2 in violent radicalization, domestic “bulge.” Similar to the NIC 2020 during critical phases of emotional and recruitment and homegrown terrorism estimate, Dr. Fox predicted that moral development. While the nature, present growing challenges to U.S. growing numbers of young people in severity, frequency and proximity to and foreign local, state, and federal their “crime prone” years were expected violence are significant, the impact of law enforcement agencies. Blending to account for an increased prevalence the community response and attitudes what is known from youth violence of youth violence in the United States. toward violence cannot be understated. research in the United States with what While it is unclear whether these In many ways, while the direct exposure has been projected foretells a rough predictions were entirely accurate, to violence might be significant, direct scenario: a large number of “super there is little doubt that the nature exposure to violence within the context predators” with a radicalized ideology and severity of youth crime changed, of community apathy, tolerance, support and agenda. The implications of this often dramatically, during that period. or even glamorization may profoundly scenario for combating terrorism are Examination of the crimes perpetrated alter development. A review of youth significant. The National Intelligence by this demographic revealed a level of violence trends in the United States and Council’s 2020 Project (NIC 2020)1 violence, brutality and remorselessness the demographic group described by report notes pending “youth bulges” that prompted some to refer to this the NIC 2020 report has revealed two in many Arab states as contributing to particular demographic group as specific parallels: community response 3 a “perfect storm” for conflict in certain “super predators.” In particular, to violence, and the normalization and 6 regions, specifically stating that “most direct exposure to urban violence glamorization of violence. of the regions that will experience gains presented multiple opportunities for in religious ‘activists’ also have youth social learning and modeling. This The Community Response to Violence bulges, which experts have correlated was especially true with drug-related Field-based research on behavior at with high numbers of radical adherents, violence given the propensity to crime scenes in the United States has including Muslim extremists.” Given perpetrate public, extremely brutal or revealed that some community violence what the local, state and federal law degrading violence as a means by which is perceived as being not only acceptable, enforcement community understands to control behavior and enforce the rules but even appropriate or helpful if the about changes in the nature and and norms associated with illegal drug victim is known to be involved in illegal 4 severity of youth violence, the “youth markets. Related to the perception of a or otherwise undesirable behavior. bulge” predicted by the NIC 2020 and diminished life expectancy is an increased Similarly, sectarian violence has the relationship with radical Islam is prevalence of adolescent parenting that represented a unique challenge in post- 5 concerning, especially since it will affect further compounds the problem. conflict communities given the tension Muslim diaspora communities in areas between violence perpetrated against such as Western Europe. The European These findings on violent radicalization victims perceived as being “less than radicalization experience is relevant and youth violence in the United States innocent”—including those involved in to U.S. law enforcement analysts and cause even greater concern regarding the former repressive regimes or insurgent operators because individuals in both “youth bulge” described in the NIC 2020 groups—and the need to enforce the the United States and Europe are report precisely because this particular rule of law. The increased prevalence radicalizing due to the same global cohort will come of age roughly 20 of street justice and the erosion, or even factors, albeit not to the same degrees. outright absence of the rule of law in 2 James Fox, Trends in Juvenile Violence: A Report to the post-conflict communities are expected Violent Radicalization and Youth Violence in United States Attorney General on Current and Future Rates to have profound implications for young the United States of Juvenile Offending (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice people given what is known about how The anticipated increase in the number Statistics, 1996). children learn appropriate moral and of young radicals in many Arab states 3 William Bennett, John Dilulio and John Walters, Body ethical behavior. Experience in the may represent only part of the challenge Count (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 21-34. United States underscores the fact that associated with this type of anticipated 4 “Homicide,” in John Douglas et al., Crime Classification each violent act that is endorsed or even demographic group. Previous research Manual (New York: Lexington Books, 1992), pp. 17-161; permitted effectively erodes the ability on youth violence in the United States Paul Goldstein, “The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripar- of the “legal” enforcement elements to provides additional insight regarding tite Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Drug Issues 15 uphold the rule of law and protect the the true challenge embodied in the (1985): pp. 493-506. 5 Colleen McLaughlin, Scott Reiner, Patricia Reams and 6 Jerry Oliver and Colleen McLaughlin, “Focusing on Timothy Joost, “Intentional Injury and Adolescent Par- the Other Side of the Crime Scene Tape: What Happens 1 “Mapping the Global Future,” Report of the National enting Among Incarcerated Juvenile Offenders,” Adoles- When ‘Normal’ is the Problem?” The Police Chief 65:11 Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, December 2004. cence 34 (1999): pp. 665-70. (1998): pp. 50-53.

12 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 community, regardless of the victim’s as both victim and perpetrator. Photos and carried out the 2004 Madrid train status, perceived innocence or role in have circulated of small children posing station bombings,12 and predominantly the conflict. Developmental research as suicide bombers, wearing tiny yet South Asian émigrés (mostly Pakistani) underscores the fact that children look realistic bomb vests. Whether real or committed the 2005 and 2007 terrorist to the adults in their lives as models for staged, the implications of these images operations in the United Kingdom. what is appropriate and ethical behavior; and their potential impact on the youth European radicalization networks are approval from significant people in a in those communities are staggering. similar to those in the United States child’s life, particularly parents and in that Islamist recruiters leverage other adults in the community, is critical “violence networks”—prisons, criminal to developing an understanding of and “Not only will there be and gang cells, mosques and the appreciation for what is right and what more young people in Arab internet—to recruit predominantly is wrong.7 young, male Muslims for activities in states, but they may be support of terrorist operations.13 What As the tension between the “legal” and qualitatively worse given was once local violence has transformed “illegal” enforcement elements becomes into global violence—Usama bin Ladin’s blurred, the decision to support the rule their exposure to conflict strategic agenda to mobilize local of law becomes increasingly difficult. and violence during critical actors to violently carry out global Perhaps one of the more graphic missions, usually against the “far displays of public acceptance and even phases of emotional and enemy.” Previously contained Islamist endorsement of violence involved the moral development.” communities in Algeria and Morocco, American contractors killed, mutilated for example, are now represented in and publicly displayed in Falluja, Iraq.8 various European countries via a violent Like the brutal violence and post-mortem diaspora micro-community within the mutilation associated with some drug- Monetary awards and support provided larger diaspora community. related homicides,9 the overt public to the families of suicide bombers and nature and “messaging” associated with other martyrs serves to reinforce the The path from delinquent and criminal the brutality of these incidents cannot value and even glamor of this behavior. activity, often coupled with violence, be overstated. Over time, this failure can Again, if moral development includes the sets the socio-cultural stage for the result in passive acceptance of ongoing acquisition of behaviors and judgments radicalization process: at some point, the violence and conflict, and significantly relating to the value of human life, individual makes a rational decision to diminish the ability of a community to social responsibility, and the ethics of move beyond local violent behavior into enforce social norms and prohibitions harming others,10 then poor behavior a space that condones physical violence against violence, including the rule of promoted and modeled by adults against unknown and unfamiliar law. threatens to profoundly stunt the moral targets. In Spain, for example, most of growth and development of the children the radicalized Spanish Muslims are Normalization and Glamorization of Violence watching and learning. Ultimately, the predominantly young, first generation One of the most challenging problems view of violence as normal, expected adult males who have been involved relates to the normalization and even or even glamorous threatens to erode in some type of delinquent crime, not glamorization of violence. A significant the social norms and values regarding always involving violence. There is challenge to law enforcement and the value of human life, and diminish scant information, however, as to their health care professionals alike, a child’s perception of his or her own involvement in violent activity in their the normalization, expectation and value to the larger community.11 home countries prior to coming to Spain. glamorization of violence significantly In the Netherlands, the murder of Theo erodes the social norms supporting The Diaspora: The International Experience van Gogh involved young Muslims who social order and the rule of law, and The NIC report also references the seemed to be well-integrated into their compromises the ability to effectively increasing Muslim diaspora, noting societies prior to their involvement in reduce violent crime. Similarly, reports that “the spread of radical Islam violent activity. In Europe, the diaspora of celebrations and praise for violent will have a significant global impact Muslims, almost always young males, attacks in radicalized segments have leading to 2020, rallying disparate emerged, further supporting the ethnic and national groups and 12 Kathryn Haahr, “Assessing Spain’s al-Qaeda Net- glamorization of involvement in violence perhaps even creating an authority that work,” Terrorism Monitor 3:13 (2005). transcends national boundaries.” Other 13 “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming 7 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Moral Charac- countries have already experienced the in US Cell Blocks?” testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo, direc- ter and Moral Ideology (New York: Russell Sage Founda- consequences of local radicalization, tor of the Homeland Security Policy Institute, George tion, 1964). recruitment and homegrown terrorism, Washington University, September 19, 2006; Alain 8 Cited as an expression of anti-American sentiment, particularly among youth. Muslim Bauer, “La Experiencia Francesa ante el Terrorismo In- the assembled crowd cheered and dragged the bod- émigrés from North Africa planned ternacional,” Real Instituto Elcano, October 3, 2007; Jose ies through the street, finally suspending them from a Antonio Gutierrez, Javier Jordan and Humberto Trujillo, bridge. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Enraged Mob in Falluja Kills 10 Guy Lefrancois, Of Children: An Introduction to Child “Prevencion de la Radicalizacion yihadista en las pri- 4 American Contractors,” New York Times, March 31, Development (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989). siones espanolas. Situacion actual, retos y disfunciones 2004. 11 Oliver and McLaughlin, “Focusing on the Other Side del sistema penitenciario,” Athena Intelligence Journal 3:1 9 Douglas et al., “Homicide.” of the Crime Scene Tape.” (2008).

13 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 have experienced violence either in terrorist activities. For most of the approaches to prevention and mitigation directly through a family involved in radicalizing male Muslims, their social/ of the impact that these trends pose. Islamist activity (who grew up in Algeria ethnic/cultural/political personas are These information-based solutions and Morocco) or indirectly (are second fused with their religious views—this may come from successful approaches or third generation immigrants living in nexus predisposes some Muslims to identified in community policing. For Europe) through family members who engage in violence, be it petty crime in example, shifting the balance from the directly experienced violent uprisings support of financing radical Islamist “illegal” enforcement elements in favor against a European or national power. propaganda, proselytizing, or actual of “legal” components in a community For those individuals who indirectly planning to commit a terrorist attack. represents an important first step in experienced violence, the impact of ethnic supporting social norms—including and religious violence formed part of Conclusion prohibitions against violence—and their political and social landscape. These The profound impact of community the rule of law. Similar to successes diaspora Muslims are quietly radicalizing violence on development cannot associated with community policing in by embracing violence as a way to act on be understated. Earlier challenges the United States, efforts specifically their transnational grievances. associated with the cohort that was seeking to enhance the ability of born during the crack cocaine “war” in local communities to support local Most of the recruits to jihadist operations the United States foretell a challenging governance and the rule of law show in Europe seem to be driven by two future given the many unique parallels promise in reducing sectarian violence motivations: professional (to serve the to the anticipated “youth bulge.” and may reduce the long-term costs global jihad), and spiritual and personal Moreover, increasing numbers of and consequences associated with this (a belief in martyrdom). What is clear is second, third and fourth generation particular challenge. Finally, recent that the majority of recruits upheld an individuals from micro-diaspora approaches using “streetcraft to inform extreme religiosity. What is not clear is communities, which includes the special tradecraft”16 designed to transcend what kind of Muslim becomes a target situation of converts, are attracted to traditional jurisdictional boundaries for jihadist recruiters, although the and are turning to radical Islamism as a and functional domains in support of a majority of recruits have come into conduit for political activism in support comprehensive, coordinated approach contact with the recruiters in shared of religious beliefs. The vast majority to combating terrorism offer the religious and social networks. Available of individuals who take the step from opportunity for creative, information- information indicates that jihadist Islamist to jihadist, based on the based solutions to the prevention and recruiters have been successful in religious-political ideology of Islamism, mitigation of radicalization, recruitment exploiting cultural variables in distinct are young males from Muslim countries and homegrown terrorism, particularly micro-diaspora communities to recruit in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. on the domestic front in the fight against Muslims in support of operations in Iraq, The Muslim demographic bulge in terrorism. Afghanistan, Spain, North Africa and Europe could become more radicalized elsewhere in Europe.14 There are several if certain variables continue to exert a Dr. Colleen McLaughlin McCue is a Senior contributing factors to an increased strong pull on the largely disaffected Research Associate at Innovative Analytics and attraction to radical Islamism among young, male immigrants living in Training. She has worked with law enforcement European micro-diaspora communities: Europe—exposure to critical phases and health care professionals in the study of lethal the importation of Salafist Islamist of the radicalization process while in and non-lethal violence. Dr. McCue’s major ideologies via virtual and physical prison, in their ethnic community, or area of research interest includes the behavioral social networks (which includes the other social environments. The Muslim analysis of crime, with a particular focus on the powerful influence of foreign and some diaspora community in the United use of advanced analytics to surface, characterize local imams); the allure of defending the States, however, is less concerning and anticipate violent crime and terrorism in plight of the global umma, a sentiment compared to Europe due to its higher support of novel approaches to prevention and that motivates many young, mostly levels of diversity, access to education response. She received her doctorate degree in male Muslims to engage in political- and economic success. psychology from Dartmouth College. religious activism in their European home country; and the religio-political Underscoring the importance of Kathryn Haahr is a Senior Research Associate national identity phenomenon of this emerging challenge, violent at Innovative Analytics and Training. She is a demographic Islamism. Radical Islamist radicalization currently is the focus national security consultant to public and private political activism occurs in three of pending legislation in the United sector clients on a range of issues in the areas of overlapping areas: criminal activities States.15 The proposed legislation international security and regional threats. She knowingly or unknowingly in support of promises to target radicalization, focuses on the intersection of cultural influences jihadist terrorism planning operations; recruitment and homegrown terrorism and terrorism dynamics, energy security, proselytization and other religious by improving the understanding of these and WMD. Ms. Haahr received a master’s activities knowingly or unknowingly challenges. The legislation also supports degree in International Public Policy from the supporting jihadist terrorism planning the development of information-based Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced operations; and active participation International Studies. 15 The pending legislation is HR. 1955: Violent Radical- 14 Kathryn Haahr, “The Growth of Militant Islamist Mi- ization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 16 Kathleen Kiernan, “Hidden in Plain Sight - Intel- cro-Diaspora Communities: Observations from Spain,” 2007, and S.195: Violent Radicalization and Homegrown ligence Against Terrorism: Tradecraft or Streetcraft?” CTC Sentinel 1:4 (2008). Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007. Crime and Justice International July-August (2006).

14 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

Jama`at al-Fuqara’: MOA’s rural compounds, and the a society it deems sinful and corrupt organization’s ongoing evolution. In is hardly unique within the American An Overblown Threat? addition, the article will touch on the religious tradition. Other Muslims, as relatively unexplored subject of group well as Christians and members of other By Farhana Ali and William Rosenau leader Shaykh Mubarak Ali Gilani’s faiths, have engaged in various forms of activities in Pakistan, drawing on intentional separation from American although jama`at al-fuqara’ (jf) is interviews conducted by one of the society. As early as 1938, Muhammad virtually unknown to the general public, authors in that country in the spring Ezaldeen, leader of the Addeynu the group has periodically generated and summer of 2008. The article will Allahe-Universal Arabic Association concern within U.S. intelligence and conclude with a reframing of JF/MOA (AAUAA), established the community law enforcement circles. A Muslim sect that positions the organization as a of Jabul Arabiyya in West Valley, New with a long criminal past and extensive public-safety rather than a counter- international connections, including terrorism challenge. “From Gilani’s perspective, ties to Pakistan’s political and religious fringes, JF’s activities have received JF/MOA Compounds JF/MOA’s most important heightened official and media scrutiny The organization maintains an feature could be its ability since 9/11. The organization has been estimated 20-30 compounds (known as described as a “terrorist outfit” with jama`ats), primarily in the northeastern, to raise financial resources 1 extensive links to al-Qa`ida; as “one mid-Atlantic, and southeastern regions for the Pakistani leader, of the most elusive terrorist groups of the United States. Compounds also 2 resident in the U.S.”; and as “perhaps reportedly exist in Canada, and in who is alleged to support the most dangerous fundamentalist sect Trinidad and Tobago and other countries 3 armed groups such as operating in the United States.” In 1999, in the Caribbean basin, an important the U.S. Department of State categorized region for JF/MOA proselytizing.7 Hizb al-Mujahidin (HM) in 4 JF as a “terrorist group,” and more A jama`at can house as many as 300 Indian-occupied Kashmir.” recently, in his important CTC Sentinel members, according to one source.8 article on the organization, terrorism The percentage of JF/MOA’s overall analyst Christopher Heffelfinger membership (estimated at 1,000- categorized JF as “a high risk for U.S. 3,000)9 that lives in these compounds York. The creation of autonomous, 5 security.” is unknown. The camps are physically self-sufficient rural communities was isolated and not particularly welcoming for Ezaldeen and his followers an This article will offer some additional to outsiders. Members of the Red House, expression of the doctrine of the hijra, perspective on JF, or as the organization Virginia jama`at have been convicted of a a concept from seventh century Arabia prefers to call itself, Muslims of the variety of weapons-related offenses, and that refers to a physical migration, 6 Americas (MOA). It will develop a reports of gunfire and “military-style dating back to the time when the Prophet deeper understanding of the group by training” at the Islamberg compound in Muhammad and the early Muslims fled exploring some particularly salient remote Tompkins, New York have drawn persecution in their homeland in Mecca issues, such as the nature of the JF/ the attention of local authorities.10 to seek refuge in Medina. Moreover, the AAUAA argued that the right to 1 “Jamaat ul-Fuqra,” MilitantIslamMonitor.org, March Nevertheless, there is no evidence that establish such religious communities 12 27, 2006. these or other jama`ats have functioned was constitutionally guaranteed. 2 John Kane and April Wall, Identifying the Links Between as “covert paramilitary training This position is echoed in an MOA White-Collar Crime and Terrorism (Glen Allen, VA: Na- compounds,” as the Colorado Attorney press release, which describes how the tional White Collar Crime Center, 2004), p. 17. General’s office alleged in December followers of “El Sheikh” have “left the 11 3 Sean Hill, Extremist Groups: An International Compila- 2001. It should also be mentioned that decadence of the inner cities to practice tion of Terrorist Organizations, Violent Political Groups, and neither the presence of weapons (or the religious freedoms guaranteed by 13 Issue-Oriented Militant Movements (Huntsville, TX: Sam even arsenals), nor weapons training the Constitution.” Houston University, 2002), p. 750. are particularly unusual phenomena in 4 “1999 Patterns of Global Terrorism,” U.S. Department rural America. It must also be noted that An Organizational Rebranding? of State, 2000. It should be noted, however, that the State JF/MOA’s self-imposed isolation from Given the group’s secrecy, and the Department dropped JF from subsequent editions of scarcity of primary sources, any “Patterns of Global Terrorism.” Moreover, the secretary 7 Chris Zambelis, “The Threat of Islamic Radicalism in conclusions about JF/MOA are of state has never designated JF as a “foreign terrorist Suriname,” Terrorism Monitor 4:21 (2006). necessarily preliminary and tentative. organization,” which unlike the “terrorist group” appel- 8 Stewart Bell, “Extremists Train at Communes,” Na- What can be said with some degree lation carries with it a variety of criminal sanctions. See tional Post, June 22, 2006. of confidence is that the group is “Jamaat ul-Fuqra Designated a Foreign Terrorist Orga- 9 “Group Profile: Al-Fuqra,” MIPT Terrorism Knowl- working to present a more respectable nization?” U.S. Department of State, January 31, 2001. edge Base, accessed June 6, 2006. 5 Christopher Heffelfinger, “Jama`at al-Fuqara’: A Do- 10 “Authorities Eye Catskills Commune,” United Press 12 Robert Dannin, Black Pilgrimage to Islam (Oxford and mestic Terrorist Threat to the United States?” CTC Sen- International, June 4, 2007. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 34. tinel 1:9 (2008). 11 “Information Regarding Colorado’s Investigation and 13 “Muslims of the Americas Initial Press Release,” No- 6 Members also sometimes identify the organization as Prosecution of Members of Jamaat Ul Fuqra,” Colorado vember 28, 2002, previously available at www.holyis- the International Qur’anic Open University. Attorney General’s Office, December 10, 2001. lamville.org.

15 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 appearance to the outside world. As service activities, such as its Hand to for the Pakistani leader, who is alleged noted by Heffelfinger and other analysts, Hands Social Service Agency, which to support armed groups such as Hizb JF/MOA earned a notorious reputation according to the group’s website provides al-Mujahidin (HM) in Indian-occupied in law enforcement circles during the assistance to victims of natural disasters Kashmir.22 According to one former JF/ 1980s and 1990s when members were and other services, could represent MOA member, members “used to send convicted for crimes ranging from fraud either an attempt at “mainstreaming”— 10% of all their earnings to the shaykh to conspiracy to commit murder. Clement taking part in charitable activities is a and then it got bumped up from 10% to Rodney Hampton-El, an alleged JF/ religious obligation for all Muslims—or 30%.”23 Transfers to Gilani went “in cash MOA member, was the lone American continued deceit.19 Further complicating through elders who frequently visited among the conspirators convicted in the any assessment is the possibility that Pakistan.”24 A dramatic reduction in so-called “landmarks plot” to attack the such measures could simultaneously such remittances—and in JF/MOA- UN headquarters and other prominent signify normalization and deception. associated crime—would represent targets in New York.14 Group members Given the scarcity of credible data on an important development that could Barry Adams (alias Tyrone Cole) and the group, it is currently impossible to signal the increasing normalization of Wali Muhamad (alias Robert Johnson) reach any firm conclusions about its the group. were prosecuted successfully in 1994 development. for conspiring to bomb a Hindu temple The Pakistani Connection in Toronto.15 JF/MOA members have Looking ahead, one indicator that Gilani earned international notoriety also been implicated in attacks on could help analysts determine whether in connection with the kidnapping and Laotian and Hari Krishna temples, and JF/MOA is in fact moving toward the murder of Daniel Pearl, a Wall Street on members of a rival Muslim sect, the mainstream is the trend in the group’s Journal reporter who was abducted Ahmadiyya.16 More recently, JF/MOA criminal behavior. Violent criminality while on his way to interview the has been offering a more benign public was a notorious feature of JF/MOA shaykh in early 2002. Khalid Khawaja, face. “We abide by the constitution,” a a former intelligence officer allegedly member told a reporter in 2002. “We “It is unlikely, however, tied to Gilani, was Pearl’s guide in do support our government, and we are Pakistan, according to a respected local peace lovers.”17 that JF/MOA will become journalist.25 Why Pearl was seeking a terrorist threat, or serve an interview remains uncertain, as Whether such statements reflect a does Gilani’s role in the case. Gilani genuine move toward the religious as a U.S. platform for al- was detained briefly by Pakistani and political mainstream is difficult to Qa`ida.” authorities, and he has insisted publicly determine. JF/MOA, facing increased that he had nothing to do with the Pearl and unwanted scrutiny, may be case, al-Qa`ida, or Usama bin Ladin. He attempting to obscure ongoing illicit also denies any connection with Richard operations. The group’s preference for during the 1980s and 1990s, as noted Reid, the so-called “shoe bomber” who the names MOA and the International above. As even opponents of the is alleged to have been a Gilani disciple. Qur’anic Open University (IQOU), and group concede, however, JF/MOA has “I’m a reformer, educationist,” he told its denial that JF exists, may reflect a not engaged in that sort of criminal an American television reporter in desire to “rebrand” and reposition the behavior since the early 1990s.20 Since March 2002.26 organization, or possibly an effort at its founding in 1980, JF/MOA has deception.18 Similarly, JF/MOA’s public also engaged extensively in revenue- Since then, Gilani has slipped back into generating crime, such as fraudulent obscurity. Interviews with government 14 As Heffelfinger noted, the subject of Hampton-El’s claims for workers’ compensation. officials, analysts, and journalists in alleged membership never emerged during the trial. The Although firm evidence is difficult to Pakistan this year suggested that Gilani closest evidence of a JF/MOA connection is a June 1993 find, investigations into alleged fraud at was no longer receiving any extensive New York Times article, whose author reports that un- a JF/MOA charter school near Fresno, scrutiny. A high-ranking official in named New York City police detectives said that Hamp- California suggest that the organization the Ministry of the Interior and a 21 ton-El “worked closely with al-Fuqra.” See Craig Wolff, continues to generate illicit revenue. “Police Link Suspect to a Radical Sect,” New York Times, Indeed, from Gilani’s perspective, JF/ 22 See, for example, “Guide to Wahhabi Organizations in June 27, 1993. MOA’s most important feature could be North America,” Center for Policing Terrorism, undated. 15 Dominic Kalipersad, “Trinis Deported for Terror its ability to raise financial resources According to one source, Pakistani intelligence provided Links,” Trinidad Guardian, April 8, 2006. much of HM’s initial funding. Daniel Byman, Deadly Con- 16 Dannin, pp. 35-37. The attacks on the Ahmadiyya is 19 The website of Hand to Hands Social Service Agency nections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge and an irony, given the central role Ahmadiyya missionaries can be accessed at www.handtohands.org. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 165. from South Asia played in introducing African-Ameri- 20 See, for example, Zachary Crowley, “Jamaat al-Fuqra 23 Quoted in Catherine Herridge, “Muslim-American cans to Islam in the early decades of the 20th century. Dossier,” Center for Policing Terrorism, March 16, Group Suspected of Channelling Money to Radical Paki- 17 Quoted in Jim Puzzanghera, “Muslim Group Denies 2005. stani Cleric,” Fox News, June 22, 2007. Involvement in Terrorist Activities,” San Jose Mercury 21 Sean Webby and Brandon Bailey, “The Mysterious 24 Ibid. News, January 10, 2002. Saga of Sister Khadijah,” San Jose Mercury News, Febru- 25 Personal communication, Khalid Khawaja, Septem- 18 See, for example, Khadija A. Ghafur v. Jonathan Bern- ary 11, 2007; Organized Crime in California: Annual Report ber 2008. stein et al., First Appellate District of the California Court to the California Legislature 2004 (Sacramento: California 26 “Sheik Gilani: CBS’ Man in Pakistan Tracks Him of Appeal, 2005. Department of Justice, 2005), p. 24. Down,” 60 Minutes, March 13, 2002.

16 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 senior military officer both dismissed Kashmir, with North America serving primarily as a cult.32 Only a tiny Gilani as irrelevant. According to one merely as a financial means to an end. handful of cults have engaged in acts of respected reporter, “Shaykh Gilani now To the extent that U.S. national security “collective implosion.”33 Yet, given JF/ keeps a low public profile,” adding that policy aims to cut off funding for armed MOA’s history of violence, its access to Gilani operates at two levels: politically groups such as the ones that operate weapons, and the physical isolation of (through figures such as Khawaja), in Kashmir, and to the extent that JF/ its members, law enforcement and social and militarily, through his support MOA is helping to fund those groups service agencies should remain alert to for extremist groups in Kashmir.27 via Gilani, the organization poses a any indications that the organization According to another Pakistani counter-terrorism challenge. Within is on a violently self-destructive journalist, “There is no doubt that he the United States, however, JF/MOA trajectory. is still supporting the jihad in Kashmir should be framed in law enforcement and Afghanistan, but so is every other Farhana Ali, a former U.S. government jihadist leader...Gilani is not important “Within the United analyst, is an international policy analyst to the Pakistani security services right at RAND, where she looks at conflicts in the now. He is not on their terrorists’ watch States, however, JF/MOA Muslim world, including Iraq, Kashmir, list.”28 should be framed in law and the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. She has lectured and published During the 1980s and 1990s, JF/MOA enforcement rather than widely on the motivations of suicide reportedly sent more than 100 of its counter-terrorism terms.” bombers, particularly women in Iraq, and members to Pakistan. According to JF/ faith-based extremist groups in the Islamic MOA, they went solely for religious world. study, but U.S. sources cited in press accounts claimed that the real purpose rather than counter-terrorism terms. Dr. William Rosenau, a former policy was to receive military training, with For American Muslims, the challenge advisor in the State Department’s counter- dozens of individuals going on to the will be to help the group (or, perhaps, terrorism office, is a political scientist at “fields of jihad” in Kashmir, Chechnya, individual members) move away from RAND’s Washington office, and an adjunct and Afghanistan.29 Whether JF/MOA the wilder shores of extremism that professor in the Security Studies Program continues to send its members to have been fostered by isolation. at Georgetown University. His RAND Pakistan for religious instruction or research has focused on counter-terrorism other purposes is uncertain; however, For researchers, JF/MOA is likely strategy, terrorist recruitment, and the the high-profile prosecution of members to remain an analytical conundrum. ideological underpinnings of terrorism. of the so-called “Virginia Jihad Network” Much of the available information on for traveling to Pakistan to receive the group is dated or questionable. The The views expressed in this article are terrorist training, and heightened law group’s membership is often described those of the authors, and do not necessarily enforcement and intelligence scrutiny, as primarily African-American, and reflect those of RAND or its research may have dampened enthusiasm for made up largely of converts.30 To sponsors. such ventures. what extent these factors have shaped JF/MOA merits additional study, as Conclusion does the question of the group’s place JF/MOA’s long history of criminality, (if any) within the American black- and its apparent role as Gilani’s North nationalist movement. Moreover, little American “back office,” makes the group is known about the organization’s North a proper subject for official interest and American structure, decision-making attention. It is unlikely, however, that practices, or recruitment strategy. JF/ JF/MOA will become a terrorist threat, MOA, with its charismatic leadership, or serve as a U.S. platform for al- secrecy, and physical isolation, would Qa`ida, as some sources have alleged. seem to resemble other religious cults, Heightened scrutiny of JF/MOA since or as sociologists of religion prefer to 9/11 makes it an improbable operating term them, New Religious Movements.31 partner for al-Qa`ida. Moreover, as Indeed, one federal investigator said Heffelfinger observed, Gilani and Bin that the group’s behavior and self- Ladin are best understood as rivals imposed isolation has led government rather than as confederates. In addition, officials to characterize the group Gilani’s attention has always been directed principally at Pakistan and 30 See, for example, Chris Zambelis, “Radical Trends in African-American Islam,” Terrorism Monitor 4:16 32 Personal interview, anonymous federal investigator, 27 Personal e-mail communication, anonymous journal- (2006). Washington, D.C., June 2008. ist, September 2008. 31 Alternatively, JF/MOA might be understood as a po- 33 J. Gordon Melton and David G. Bromley, “Challenging 28 Personal interview, anonymous Pakistani journalist, litical cult. For more on this concept, see Dennis Tour- Misconceptions About New Religions-Violence Connec- April 2008. ish and Tim Wohlforth, On the Edge: Political Cults Right tions,” in David G. Bromley and J. Gordon Melton eds., 29 David E. Kaplan, “Made in the U.S.A.,” U.S. News & and Left (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Cults, Religion, and Violence (Cambridge and New York: World Report, June 10, 2002. 2000). Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 48.

17 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

The Threat of Terrorism to People Against Gangsterism and Drugs foreign representatives, as manifested (PAGAD). This latter group initiated a in the attack on Planet Hollywood the 2010 Soccer World Cup campaign of urban terrorism in Cape on August 25, 1998, their target in South Africa Town that lasted until 2000. selection was predominately domestic. Irrespective of the fact that the violent By Anneli Botha Right-Wing Extremism activities of PAGAD came to a standstill Politically, South Africa is currently in 2000—as a result of a number of in 2010, south africa will host the FIFA confronted with a number of challenges, successful operations executed by South World Cup, a major international most notably the sudden resignation of African security forces—the threat sporting event. Although South Africa President Thabo Mbeki in September. from domestic Islamist extremists has previously hosted a number of Fear that leadership changes in the might come in the form of small cell international sports events1 and large country might also contribute to a structures, motivated by strong anti- gatherings2 that attracted regional change in political direction could Western sentiments and fueled by U.S. and international attention, hosting prompt right-wing extremists to act in involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. the soccer World Cup is a markedly conjunction with existing motivating The underlying reasons and sentiment different security scenario. The factors such as affirmative action, land that led to the structure or changes in amount of domestic and international reform, and cultural marginalization. PAGAD’s target selection still exist. In attention focused on each World Cup The Boeremag, or Boer Force, was addition to the fact that local community is tremendous. In anticipation of this the last right-wing group that raised members have called for a return of coming event, it is important to assess concern, yet the manifestation of right- PAGAD as an answer to the criminal the terrorism risks that could threaten wing extremism sporadically comes and and drug problem in the Western Cape, the competition. South Africa is not goes and often involves a core group members of the Muslim community were on the same level of alertness toward of people who plan and execute their previously extremely vocal against the terrorism than other countries in the activities in a clandestine fashion. This West, in particular the United States region, and it is this degree of comfort makes it extremely challenging to come and its “war on terrorism.” Although that contributes to the country’s to an accurate assessment of the future demonstrating against the war in Iraq, vulnerability as a potential target. structure, reach and activities of right- Afghanistan and the Israeli occupation South Africa has experienced domestic wing extremist groups. of Palestine should not be categorized terrorist attacks in the past, and during as a security threat, it is still significant the last decade a number of high- Since 1994, these groups have tended as a manifestation of sentiment. profile al-Qa`ida operatives and other to use explosive devices directed at transnational Islamist terrorists have the broader infrastructure, including Furthermore, like many countries, traveled through its borders. These bridges, railway lines and dams. They South Africa faces the threat from factors demonstrate that South Africa have also, however, previously planned possible homegrown terrorists who and the 2010 games could be at risk. attacks on soccer games, such as the could become attracted to al-Qa`ida’s foiled plot in December 2002 in which ideology and download military training Domestic Terrorism Boeremag member Herman van Rooyen manuals from the internet. Countering There are a number of domestic terrorist rigged a car bomb with 384 kilograms the threat from radicalized small cells is threats facing South Africa in the of explosives, together with two bags a daunting task. lead-up to the 2010 games. Although of nuts and bolts. The car bomb was active or dormant domestic terrorist apparently meant for a game between Transnational Terrorism organizations might have previously Kaizer Chiefs and the Sundowns at South Africa has not been victim to a focused their attention on exclusively Loftus Versfeld.3 Despite these concerns, transnational terrorist attack on its domestic grievances and targets, prior however, it is still debatable whether soil. Nevertheless, South Africa is experience indicates that domestic right-wing groups would broaden their often categorized as a “safe haven” for terrorist groups might capitalize on the target selection to include non-South transnational terrorists since a number international attention the games offer African nationals.4 of them have traveled through the in an attempt to achieve recognition country. These individuals include: for their grievances. Although South People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) Africa’s domestic terrorist groups are and Associated Organizations - Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian currently dormant, the country has Although PAGAD and the Muslims national and al-Qa`ida operative been confronted with periodic incidents Against Global Oppression (MAGO) who fled to Cape Town in 1999 in the of right-wing extremism since 1994, indicated a prior willingness to target aftermath of the August 1998 bombings and also with an Islamic-oriented in Kenya and Tanzania.5 pressure or vigilante group known as 3 “Boeremag Planned to Detonate 384kg Bomb,” Inde- pendent Online [Cape Town], December 15, 2002. - Saud Memon, a Pakistani with 1 Among these events were the Rugby World Cup in 4 The focus of planned and executed attacks perpetrated suspected al-Qa`ida connections 1995, African Cup of Nations in 1996, the All Africa by right-wing extremists was to date exclusively directed who, according to media reports, was Games in 1999 and the Cricket World Cup in 2003. at the government and the black community in South Af- 2 These include the World Summit on Sustainable De- rica. Although soccer is associated with the black com- 5 Jean le May and Andre Koopman, “How South Af- velopment in 2002 and the Non-Aligned Movement munity, targeting an international sports event would be rica Nabbed Embassy ‘Bomber,’” Cape Argus, October 8, summit in 1998. a new trend. 1999.

18 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 allegedly “picked up” by U.S. officials Availability and Protection of Selected Targets January 1, 2008 and July 12, 2008.10 in South Africa on March 7, 2003.6 FIFA will be responsible for the security Although the motivation is purely at the World Cup in partnership with criminal, the possibility exists that an - In April 2004, the national police the South African Police Service. In individual or small group of terrorists commissioner announced that three addition to activity at the stadiums, the might buy commercial grade explosives suspected al-Qa`ida operatives of Syrian organizers as well as private businesses from criminal elements on the black and Jordanian origin were arrested in will make provisions for additional market. Driven by financial gain, South Africa, after they had stayed in entertainment, including: exhibition criminals with access to commercial the country for almost a year.7 halls at each venue, big screen viewing explosives might not have a moral facilities close to the stadium, big objection to selling them, especially - Haroon Rashid Aswat was implicated when the ultimate aims of the buyer are in the July 7, 2005 London bombings concealed. The Madrid train bombings and for setting up a terrorist training “Terrorists who hope to served as an example of the link between camp in Oregon in 1999. He was arrested attract media attention terrorism and crime. in Zambia on July 20, 2005, but prior to his arrest he had lived in Johannesburg might consider an In addressing this vulnerability, for five months.8 attack directed at a large countering rising crime should be seen as part of an all inclusive holistic strategy. - Mohammed Gulzar was a suspect in concentration of people Although considerable efforts are taken the UK trial of eight men accused of where the traditional to counter specific trends—for example, plotting to blow up airliners using liquid the theft of commercial explosives used explosives as they traveled between the security measures are not in ATM bombings—the potential use of United Kingdom, the United States and in place.” commercial explosives acquired through Canada in 2006. British authorities criminal activities should be factored alleged that he entered Britain on a into security calculations. flight from South Africa via Mauritius under the name of Altaf Ravat on July screen facilities that fall outside the Operating Undetected 18, 2006 after he had lived in South responsibility of FIFA, and sports A key concern is the ease in which Africa for a few years. His fake passport cafés that will attract spectators. These potential terrorists can enter or exit also showed a one-day trip to Swaziland additional activities and venues bring South Africa. The protection and on July 13, 2006. Gulzar, however, was their own unique security challenges. monitoring of formal and informal acquitted in September 2008.9 Terrorists who hope to attract media points of entry are areas of concern. attention might consider an attack Although counter-measures were put These examples have raised concern that directed at a large concentration of in place at international airports to there could be undetected al-Qa`ida- people where the traditional security address this vulnerability, South Africa affiliated terrorists in South Africa. measures are not in place. is confronted with long porous borders Since the announcement that South that are difficult to monitor and control. Africa would host the 2010 World Cup Although hardening potential targets is The possibility of terrorists using was made in 2004, the possibility exists a clear necessity, it will also be important informal points of entry, also used by that a “sleeper cell” could be preparing to inform South African citizens of their illegal immigrants from neighboring for a terrorist attack on the upcoming responsibilities in acting as the “eyes countries, was confirmed by Haroon games. and ears” of the police. There is already Rashid Aswat, who was eventually a police hotline, but it may be prudent arrested in Zambia. A sub-regional Security Challenges to establish a dedicated open line of approach and cooperation between There are a number of factors that communication for suspicious activities police agencies and immigration in terrorists could exploit to target the 2010 in relation to the World Cup. securing land borders is vital. The World Cup. The following includes a list Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs of these factors, in addition to suggested Access to Weaponry and/or Explosives Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO), steps that the South African government The ability to acquire military or the sub-regional bureau of Interpol, has should take to mitigate the risks. commercial grade explosives in South already committed itself to assisting Africa increases the danger that South Africa. terrorists might pose. South Africa is experiencing an alarming increase Corruption also plays a role, in Automated Teller Machine (ATM) particularly in relation to the ability of 6 Azaz Syed and Abbas Naqvi, “Saud Memon Dies in bombings in which commercial non-South African nationals to acquire Hospital,” Daily Times, May 19, 2007. explosives are used. To place this South African identity documents 7 “South African Police Say Key Landmarks Targeted by threat in context, ATM bombings have and passports. It is particularly the Al-Qa’idah,” BBC, August 4, 2004. increased by 3,000% in the past three latter that has led to growing concern 8 “SA-Linked Terror Suspect Detained in Zambia,” Daily years. Using explosives stolen from within the international community. News, July 28, 2005. mines, an estimated 292 ATMs were 9 Ian MacLeod, “Al-Qaeda’s Central Leadership Active, blown up across the country between 10 “ATM Bombings up 3000%” News24.com, July 12, Experts Say,” Ottawa Citizen, April 30, 2008. 2008.

19 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

In contrast to the falsification of these Iraq as the Focus for al-Mahdi or al-Qa’im), who from a documents, criminals and potential historical point of view was occulted terrorists have access to blank official Apocalyptic Scenarios from human sight in 874 AD, and will passports and have even managed to be revealed at the end of the world to get passports issued under fraudulent By David Cook usher in a messianic age. His primary names. For example, in August 2004 enemies are those opponents of the security personnel in London recovered iraq has a long history of being the Prophet Muhammad’s family, mainly hundreds of South African passports.11 center of the Muslim world. Specifically, Despite whistle-blowing initiatives and there are numerous prophecies about “Both the Sunni and Shi`a better salaries for government officials, the fighting due to take place in Iraq at corruption can only be countered the end of time—fighting that will herald have a coherent messianic through initiatives to rebuild essential the revelation of the Muslim messianic framework in which values and encourage professionalism. figure, the Mahdi. These traditions and their contemporary interpretation, on to place contemporary Ability to be Incorporated in the Local Community both a popular level (throughout the events.” How well terrorists can fit into the Muslim world) and on a more specific local community often determines level (by radical Sunni and Shi`a groups their success. This is accomplished either fighting or supporting warfare in primarily through two methods. The Iraq), are important for comprehending descendents of Mu`awiyya bin Abi first is marriage with a local national, the conflict and its ramifications. Sufyan,2 who fought against `Ali bin which also includes getting formally Visualizing the ideological field that Abi Talib, the ancestor of the Mahdi. married by fraudulent means. The is attracting and keeping fighters and Mu`awiyya’s descendent is a figure second is through pockets of support “martyrs” is critical for counteracting called the Sufyani who for the Muslims among immigrant communities (legal or the dangerous appeal that violent of Syria was a messianic figure (because illegal). The lack of trust and communal apocalyptic groups, such as Jund al- of their veneration for Mu`awiyya), but responsibility that exists in South Africa Sama’, have among the larger population for Shi`a is the equivalent of the Dajjal. makes this an area for concern. in Iraq. In this way, history will repeat itself, with the Mahdi fighting against the Conclusion Iraq in Classical Muslim Apocalyptic Literature Sufyani in Iraq and defeating him, and Preparing and hosting the FIFA and Today then establishing the messianic state World Cup in 2010 brings tremendous Apocalyptic traditions in Islam with its capital in Kufa (today, south of opportunities to South Africa, from occur in both the Sunni and the Shi`a Najaf). awakening a sense of patriotism, traditions. In general, the Sunni to the creation of new employment traditions emphasize the fighting with Both the Sunni and Shi`a have a coherent opportunities and the building the Byzantine Christians that is to take messianic framework in which to place and revamping of infrastructure. place in the region of northern Syria contemporary events. For Sunnis, Nevertheless, the 2010 World Cup also and Iraq, culminating in the taking of this fact has led to a huge growth in creates opportunities for criminals and the Byzantine capital of Constantinople popular apocalyptic literature. This terrorists to achieve their objectives. It (which historically occurred in type of literature, however, is not is essential that security forces take this 1453 AD). This fighting will then be useful for radical Muslims because it risk seriously so that they can mitigate interrupted by the appearance of the promotes a sense of fatalism. If God any potential terrorist threats or Muslim anti-Christ figure, the Dajjal, has already foreordained destruction security weaknesses that arise during who will lead the entire world astray for the United States and its allies, the next two years. (with the exception of those Muslims then what is the point of going out and 1 known as al-ta’ifa al-mansura), and will fighting them? The most useful form of Anneli Botha has been a senior researcher on only be defeated with the aid of Jesus, apocalypse for radicals, therefore, is terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies who will return from the heavens to one in which fighting is portrayed as an (ISS) in Pretoria since 2003. After completing the city of Jerusalem or to Damascus. open-ended process that will continue an honors degree in International Politics, she At approximately the same time, the until either victory or martyrdom are joined the South African Police Service, Crime messianic figure will arise, and together obtained. Probably the most useful Intelligence, in 1993 during which she inter alia with Jesus usher in a messianic state tradition conveying this message is focused on terrorism and religious extremism. with its capital in Jerusalem. the following: “A group (ta’ifa) of my She earned a master’s degree in Political community will continue, fighting for Studies from the Rand-Afrikaans University in In contrast, the Shi`a traditions do not the truth, victorious over those who 1999 that focused on the historical development emphasize fighting against external oppose them, until the last of them of terrorism, religious extremism and PAGAD. enemies such as the Byzantines, but face the Dajjal (or in variants: until the She has a specific interest in research on the against Sunnis. Apocalyptic prophecies Hour of Judgment).” Needless to say, underlying causes of terrorism, radicalization for the Shi`a center around the figure this tradition is featured frequently in and counter-terrorism strategies. of the Twelfth Imam (called either

11 “South African Police Say Key Landmarks Targeted 1 See, for instance, the Ansar al-Sunna magazine from 2 Mu`awiyya bin Abi Sufyan was the caliph from 661- by Al-Qa’idah.” September 2005. 80 AD.

20 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 jihadist journals from Iraq.3 prophecies cited by them. In fact, until material promotes a mindset that is not the end of 2001 major radical Muslim calculated to win the neutral over, and With the rise of radical Islam, the most thinkers such as Abu Mus`ab al- can alienate even strong supporters of common apocalyptic prophecy was Suri ridiculed the use of apocalyptic the cause because of its excesses (mass a general one used to emphasize the prophecies on a popular level. Since suicide attacks and destruction of idea that the entire non-Muslim world that time, Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al- society). is involved in a conspiracy to destroy Zawahiri and other senior al-Qa`ida Islam: leaders have not employed clear-cut Two dangers that al-Zarqawi avoided apocalyptic prophecies, probably might yet occur in the future use of The Messenger of God said: The fearing their divisive nature. apocalyptic materials: one is that some nations are about to flock against you [the Muslims] from every With the rise of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, “Through his writings, horizon, just as hungry people flock however, this changed. Through his to a kettle. We said: O Messenger writings, al-Zarqawi pioneered the al-Zarqawi pioneered of God, will we be few on that day? identification of U.S. forces with the the identification of U.S. He said: No, you will be many as Byzantines, and positioned himself far as your number goes, but you as one who was fighting on behalf of forces with the Byzantines, will be scum, like the scum of the entire Muslim community in the and positioned himself the flash-flood, since fear will be apocalyptic wars (for which he used the removed from the hearts of your classical term malahim). He made little as one who was fighting enemies, and weakness (wahn) will use of formal apocalyptic traditions on behalf of the entire be placed in your hearts. We said: until the sieges of Falluja in 2004 and O Messenger of God, what does the 2005, but for the last two years of his Muslim community in the word wahn mean? He said: Love of life his attitudes changed.5 Apocalyptic apocalyptic wars.” this world and fear of death.4 traditions for al-Zarqawi supplied the framework for a landscape of warfare With such a tradition, any weakness of enabling him to portray the conflict the Muslim community that occurs in as an absolute life or death scenario. figure might actually proclaim himself the future is due to the abandonment of There is no doubt that this portrayal to be the Mahdi, and the second is that jihad. With the added idea of the world was controversial and ultimately led people or groups might make specific falling upon the Muslims like “hungry to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and prophecies using dates. Specific people,” one has a worldwide conspiracy al-Zawahiri both remonstrating with proclamations or predictions of this and a justification to use any method to him. Nevertheless, with the strategy of type can lead to divisions within a group defend Islam. demonizing the Shi`a population and or ridicule of it by the larger Muslim employing frequent suicide attacks world. Both of these problematic issues Radical Sunni Muslim Development of against both it and its holiest locations, have not been avoided by other groups Apocalyptic Materials it is difficult to see what else al-Zarqawi (such as the Jund al-Sama’ group that Attitudes of radical Muslims toward could have done. proclaimed a Mahdi). One foresees the the apocalyptic heritage of Islam proclamation of other Mahdis in the vary. On the one hand, this material Use of apocalyptic materials in Iraq Sunni world as the Islamic year 1500 contains many apparent foreshadowing represents a sea-change for radical (approximately 2076) approaches. prophecies of current events. These Muslims, and constitutes an as-yet are developed in popular literature untapped source of energy;6 however, The Shi`a Respond sold on the streets in the Arabic and it is also a weapon that might be used Since the Shi`a messianic figure is Urdu speaking worlds and translated against them (as it was against al- tied to a historical (or semi-historical) into other languages (English, French, Zarqawi). On the benefits side for personality, there are few Mahdi Indonesian and Uzbek). Although al- radical Muslims, there is nothing quite appearances documented among them. Qa`ida and its ideological affiliates like the exhilaration and exaltation With the election of President Mahmoud made use of apocalyptic language, it is that a fighter feels when he is certain Ahmadinejad in Iran in 2005, however, comparatively rare to find any specific he is fulfilling prophecy or is part of there has been a heightened profile for the “saved group” (al-ta’ifa al-mansura). the Mahdi, and occasionally attempts 3 For example, see page three of the al-Fursan jihadist Among the disadvantages for radical to predict his appearance, utilizing the magazine from November 2005, which can be accessed Muslims, however, is the fact that such cultic center at Jamkaran (near Qom at www.e-prism.org/images/Fursan_-_mag6.pdf, and in Iran) where he is said to be hiding. page four of the Dhurwat al-Sanam jihadist magazine, 5 David Cook, “Abu Musa`b al-Suri and Abu Musa`b al- Yet the conflict in Iraq has provided which can be accessed at www.e-prism.org/images/ Zarqawi: The Apocalyptic Theorist and the Apocalyptic most of the messianic excitement in thurwat_assanam.pdf. Practitioner,” forthcoming paper. contemporary Shi’ism, best illustrated 4 Al-Silfi, al-Fawa’id al-hisan fi hadith Thawban (Casa- 6 For example, notice how the September 2005 issue of by the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al- blanca: Dar Ibn `Affan, 2001), pp. 7-14. This was alluded the journal al-Jami` linked the Iraq conflict with that of Sadr. to by Usama bin Ladin in his 1998 fatwa, in Bruce Law- Palestine using the apocalyptic interpretation of Qur’an rence et al., Messages to the World (London: Verso, 2005), 17:4-8. A copy of the journal can be downloaded at Contemporary Shi`a apocalyptic p. 59. www.e-prism.org/images/mag01_1_.pdf. literature outside of Iraq responds to

21 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

Sunni radicals. While he was alive, many world religions.10 Islam is no Recent Highlights in al-Zarqawi personified the figure of exception to this rule. The use of the Sufyani (ironically, he was even apocalyptic prophecies, however, Terrorist Activity from the area of Jordan from which is a matter that needs to be handled the Sufyani was supposed to appear) delicately in order for it to successfully September 16, 2008 (UNITED STATES): through his activities.7 Today, the Shi`a hoist a revolutionary group into power. Central Intelligence Agency Director apocalyptic prophecies are more focused Traditionally, the more common use of Michael Hayden said that “there is no against the United States and are closer apocalyptic prophecies has been made greater national security threat facing to mainstream Sunni materials than by weak, marginal and even desperate the United States than al-Qaida and its they were three to four years ago. This groups who have an exaggerated sense associates,” warning that al-Qa`ida is fact has also led to the appearance of of their divinely ordained position. the CIA’s top nuclear concern because Such a group is al-Qa`ida, including it has the intent to use a nuclear weapon its ideological affiliates. It has been should it be able to acquire one. Hayden “The Shi`a, on the other significantly weakened during the also said that his agency does not believe hand, are in a much more recent past, and could turn once again that Usama bin Ladin is still the head to the use of apocalypse, not seeing of al-Qa`ida’s day-to-day operations as dominant position in that it has anything to lose. The Shi`a, the jihadist leader “is spending a great Iraq and have a great on the other hand, are in a much more deal of his energy merely surviving.” dominant position in Iraq and have Hayden does believe, however, that deal to lose by embracing a great deal to lose by embracing killing or capturing Bin Ladin would apocalyptic prophecies.” apocalyptic prophecies. As a result, have a powerful impact on al-Qa`ida. fatawa by al-Sistani do not mention – AP, September 16 them at all,11 while messianic beliefs are utilized by up-and-coming Shi`a September 16, 2008 (PAKISTAN): apocalyptic groups that bridge the gap groups such as that of Muqtada al-Sadr, Three Pakistani soldiers were killed between Sunnism and Shi’ism, not or those entirely outside the power after Taliban fighters attacked their easy in the context of Iraq. Jund al- structure such as Jund al-Sama’. checkpoint in the Swat Valley of the Sama’ in southern Iraq (active during North-West Frontier Province. The January 2007 and January 2008) is an Dr. David Cook is associate professor attack began when a suicide car bomber example of such a group, with a specific of religious studies at Rice University detonated his explosives as security proclamation of Ahmad al-Hasan as the specializing in Islam. He completed his personnel approached his vehicle at Mahdi.8 The full story of this group has undergraduate degrees at Hebrew University the checkpoint. After the explosion, a yet to be told, but according to reports in Jerusalem, and received his Ph.D. from the group of militants engaged the rest of in which the Mahdi intended to kill University of Chicago in 2001. His areas of the soldiers. – AFP, September 16 the religious leadership of the Shi`a specialization include early Islamic history (including Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani) and development, Muslim apocalyptic September 16, 2008 (THAILAND): fulfillment of prophecy is clear. Several literature and movements (classical and Muslim separatist insurgents in of the traditions concerning the Mahdi contemporary), radical Islam, historical southern Thailand shot dead two from the classical period say specifically astronomy and Judeo-Arabic literature. His Muslim rubber tappers who worked that he will kill the Muslim religious first book, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, as village defense volunteers in Yala leadership (because of their betrayal was published by Darwin Press in the series Province. When police and villagers of the truth). Other methods used by Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam. arrived at the scene after the killings, apocalyptic groups (most probably al- Two further books, Understanding Jihad the insurgents detonated a 20 kilogram Qa`ida and its associates), such as the and Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic bomb, wounding five policemen and destruction of mosques, can also be Literature, were published during three villagers. – Reuters, September 16 found in the traditions.9 2005. Martyrdom in Islam as well as Understanding and Addressing Suicide September 17, 2008 (IRAQ): Twin car Conflicts and Apocalyptic Prophecies Attacks (with Olivia Allison) have been bombs ripped through the al-Khark Wars and apocalyptic upheaval have completed recently. Dr. Cook is continuing district in western Baghdad, killing traditionally been tied together in to work on contemporary Muslim apocalyptic eight people. – AFP, September 17 literature, with a focus upon Shi`a materials, September 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 7 Abd al-Karim al-Zabidi, `Asr al-Sufyani (Beirut: Dar as well as preparing manuscripts on jihadist A roadside bomb exploded in eastern al-Hadi, 2006), pp. 222-23; Ibrahim Surur, al-Mahdi groups and Western African Muslim history. Afghanistan, killing four international al-muntazar wa-ahdath al-zuhur (Beirut: Dar al-Safwa, soldiers and one Afghan national. 2006), pp. 246-64; Mansur `Abd al-Hakim, al-`Iraq: Ard Authorities did not identify the exact al-nabu’at wa-l-fitan (Damascus: Dar al-Kitab al-`Arabi, location of the incident. – AP, September 16 2005), pp. 75-76. 8 Other alternative names given in the news sources are 10 Arthur Mendel, Vision and Violence (Ann Arbor, MI: September 17, 2008 (YEMEN): A group Mahmud al-Hasani, or that his original name was Samir University of Michigan Press, 1999). calling itself Islamic Jihad in Yemen Abu Qammar. 11 Note his Ahdath al-istifta’at al-`aqa’idiyya (Beirut: Dar launched a multipronged attack on the 9 David Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic (Princeton: al-Jawadayn, 2007), p. 97, in which he avoids any an- U.S. Embassy in Sana`a, leaving 11 people Darwin Press, 2002), pp. 17-18, 248-50, 343. swers about the coming of the Mahdi.

22 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 dead, in addition to six of the attackers. individuals who were planning attacks September 21, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): “The attack involved multiple vehicle- on non-Muslims. Munshi is now 18-years- More than 140 workers involved in the borne devices and armed personnel on old. – dailyrecord.co.uk, September 20 construction of a military base were foot, seemingly in an attempt to try to kidnapped by suspected Taliban gunmen breach the embassy’s perimeter, enter September 19, 2008 (GERMANY): in Farah Province. The workers were the compound and inflict further damage German authorities arrested two men abducted while traveling in three buses and loss of life,” stated an Associated on terrorism charges, alleging that they in the province. – Reuters, September 22 Press report. Analysts suspect that were involved in a cell that was planning the attackers were linked to al-Qa`ida. mass bombing attacks on U.S. targets September 21, 2008 (PAKISTAN/ None of those killed or wounded were in Germany in 2007. The suspects, a AFGHANISTAN): Pakistani security U.S. diplomats or embassy employees. Turkish national and a German citizen, forces claimed that they opened fire – AP, September 18 allegedly traveled to Pakistan in 2007 on two U.S. helicopter gunships after with the goal of receiving military they “violated Pakistan’s airspace.” September 17, 2008 (PAKISTAN): training at camps run by the al- The alleged incident occurred near North According to security officials, Qa`ida-affiliated Islamic Jihad Union. Waziristan Agency on the Afghanistan- Pakistani fighter jets bombed a series – Washington Post, September 20 Pakistan border area. The U.S. Department of militant hideouts in Bajaur Agency of Defense denied the Pakistani account. of the Federally Administered Tribal September 19, 2008 (SOMALIA): – AFP, September 22; AP, September 23 Areas, killing at least 19 fighters. – AFP, Islamist militants exchanged intense September 18 gunfire with Somali Transitional Federal September 21, 2008 (NORTH AFRICA): Government forces and Ethiopian troops The leader of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic September 18, 2008 (GLOBAL): A new in Mogadishu, causing the deaths of an Maghreb appeared in a new videotape survey released by the Pew Research estimated 15 civilians. The fighting came blasting a “new colonial offensive” by Center found that the number of after an African Union military aircraft the West in North Africa. The leader, Muslims around the world who think defied an al-Shabab ban on planes using Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud (also suicide attacks are acceptable has fallen Mogadishu’s airport. The plane landed known as Abdelmalek Droukdel), railed significantly in the past six years. – AFP, successfully, yet under fire. – Reuters, against the Algerian government and September 19 September 19 warned Muslims not to support the local “regimes of apostasy and treason.” He September 18, 2008 (PAKISTAN): September 20, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A also made a veiled reference to France’s Taliban militants in Swat District of the suicide bomber detonated a truck loaded territorial security. – AP, September 22 North-West Frontier Province released with approximately 590 kilograms of eight policemen who had been held explosives outside the Marriott Hotel in September 21, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): captive since July 29. – Dawn, September 19 Islamabad. The huge bomb blast caused Two Abu Sayyaf Group members who significant damage to the hotel and claimed to have met with wanted Jemaah September 19, 2008 (GLOBAL): An al- led to the deaths of at least 53 people; Islamiyah members Dulmatin and Qa`ida video marking the anniversary hundreds more were wounded. The Umar Patek surrendered to authorities. of the September 11, 2001 attacks bombing killed the Czech ambassador to – Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 23 appeared on the internet. The video’s Pakistan, in addition to two American release was apparently delayed due to officials with the U.S. Department September 22, 2008 (FRANCE): The technical problems, as a number of al- of Defense. A group calling itself the French parliament voted to maintain Qa`ida’s main websites went offline. “Islam Commandos” took credit for its military role in Afghanistan and In the video, al-Qa`ida’s commander the operation; little is known about announced that it would be reinforced for Afghanistan, Shaykh Sa`id Mustafa the group, and authorities suspect that with helicopters, intelligence drones and Abu’l-Yazid, promised “more large- the attack was actually conducted by 100 more soldiers. – AFP, September 25 scale attacks” in Afghanistan and called either al-Qa`ida- or Taliban-affiliated on militants in Pakistan to “strike the militants. – AP, September 21; AP, September September 22, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): interests of Crusader [Western] allies 25; AFP, September 21 A roadside bomb killed the governor of in Pakistan.” The video is titled, “The Registan district in Kandahar Province. Results of Seven Years of Crusades.” September 20, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A The district governor’s police chief was – Reuters, September 20; AP, September 20 suicide bomber attacked a security also killed in the blast. The Taliban claimed force convoy near Mir Ali in North responsibility. – AFP, September 22 September 19, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): Waziristan Agency of the Federally Hammad Munshi was sentenced to two Administered Tribal Areas, killing six September 22, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A years in jail after being convicted of people, three of whom were soldiers. senior Afghan diplomat was abducted making a record of information likely to – Reuters, September 20 in Peshawar in Pakistan’s North-West provide practical assistance to a person Frontier Province. The diplomat, Abdul committing an act of terrorism. Munshi, September 20, 2008 (YEMEN): Yemen’s Khaliq Farahi, was a candidate to become who committed the crime when he foreign minister said that the September Afghanistan’s next ambassador to was 16-years-old, downloaded jihadist 17 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sana`a Pakistan. His driver was killed during military manuals from the internet, and “has the markings of al-Qa`ida.” – AP, the ambush. – AP, September 22; New York then passed the information to two other September 20 Times, September 22

23 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

September 23, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): citizen and convert to Islam, and internal affairs which is the job of the A suicide car bomber targeted a convoy Houssain al-Malla, 23-years-old and (Hamas) security services.” – Reuters, of German and Afghan troops in Kunduz a native of Lebanon. – Washington Post, September 26 Province. There were no casualties other September 27 than the life of the bomber. – Deutsche September 27, 2008 (SYRIA): A car Welle, September 23 September 25, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN/ bomb exploded outside Syrian security PAKISTAN): NATO officials said offices in Damascus, killing 17 people. September 23, 2008 (PAKISTAN): that Pakistani troops fired on ISAF No group claimed responsibility, Pakistani security forces claimed they helicopters in Afghanistan’s Khost although Syrian authorities believe that killed 10 suspected insurgents during Province. Pakistani officials claim that Sunni jihadists were responsible. – AP, an offensive in Bajaur Agency of the the coalition helicopters crossed into September 27; Jerusalem Post, October 1 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Pakistani territory; NATO, however, – AP, September 23 responded that “at no time did ISAF September 28, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): helicopters cross into Pakistani Taliban gunmen shot dead Malalai September 24, 2008 (GERMANY): A airspace.” – Voice of America, September 25 Kakar, the head of the city of Kandahar’s German court convicted a 25-year- department of crimes against women old Moroccan man, Abdelali Miftah, September 26, 2008 (GERMANY): and the country’s most high-profile of supporting a foreign terrorist Authorities pulled two suspected policewoman. Her teenage son was organization and helping to found a terrorists from a plane in Cologne. The wounded. – AFP, September 28 terrorist cell. Miftah, who was sentenced Somali-born men had left notes in their to four years in jail, was accused of apartments near Cologne that suggested September 28, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): helping to recruit supporters for al- they intended to carry out a suicide A suicide bomber on a motorbike blew Qa`ida to fight in Iraq. Prosecutors mission. Their travel agenda showed himself up near two police vehicles in claim that he was a “communications that they planned to fly to Uganda via Spin Boldak of Kandahar Province. Six facilitator” for a Europe-based group Amsterdam, and then from Uganda to people were killed. – The Age, September 29 that assisted al-Qa`ida. – AP, September Pakistan. One of the men was a Somali 24 national, while the other was a German September 28, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): citizen born in Mogadishu. – Washington Gunmen attempted to assassinate September 24, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen Post, September 27 Mohammad Hashim, the provincial ambushed and killed 12 policemen council chief for Zabul Province. and eight anti-al-Qa`ida fighters in September 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Although the attack, which occurred the village of al-Dulaimat in Diyala Most of the 140 civilian laborers who in Kandahar Province, failed to kill Province. Some reports state that an were abducted by Taliban fighters Hashim, four of his bodyguards died additional 15 policemen were killed, on September 21 were freed. After after exchanging gunfire with the bringing the total number of dead to 35. mediation between tribal elders and assailants. – AP, September 29 – AFP, September 24; AFP, September 25 the Taliban, a Taliban spokesman said, “We have released 118 of these workers September 28, 2008 (ALGERIA): A September 24, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A and the rest will be freed soon.” – BBC, suicide car bomber attacked a military suicide bomber attacked a Frontier September 26 checkpoint in Boumerdes Province, Corps convoy in Quetta in Balochistan killing three people. One of the two Province, resulting in the death of a September 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): militants involved in the attack jumped teenage female student. Twenty-two A suicide bomber targeted a militia out of the explosives-laden vehicle others were injured in the blast. – Daily commander working for U.S. forces in before it reached its target and was Times, September 25 Khost Province. The commander was apprehended by authorities. Al-Qa`ida wounded, and five other people were in the Islamic Maghreb later claimed September 24, 2008 (SOMALIA): killed in the blast. – AP, September 26 credit for the operation. – AP, September Islamist militants and African Union 29; Reuters, October 1 peacekeepers engaged in intense fighting September 26, 2008 (ISRAEL): Pro-al- in Mogadishu. According to reports, at Qa`ida Palestinian group Jaysh al-Islam September 28, 2008 (THAILAND): least 17 civilians were killed during the (Army of Islam) vowed to avenge the Suspected separatist militants killed violence. – CNN, September 24 deaths of nine of its members who were two Muslim village chiefs in southern killed in clashes with Hamas policemen Thailand. One of the chiefs was killed September 25, 2008 (GERMANY): on September 16. In the group’s in Narathiwat Province, while the other Federal prosecutors issued a public statement, it claimed that “revenge is in Pattani Province. – AFP, September 29 alert seeking information on the a right that must be fulfilled,” and that locations of two suspected terrorists the only reason it would forgive Hamas September 29, 2008 (GLOBAL): A new who had recently returned to Germany would be if the latter group declared an purported al-Qa`ida video appeared after attending terrorist training Islamic state in the Gaza Strip. A Hamas on Islamist web forums in which camps in Pakistan. The men, who are spokesman was unconcerned about the an unidentified narrator speaking allegedly involved with the Islamic threats, and said, “The Army of Islam Urdu criticizes Pakistan’s current Jihad Union group, were identified as is allowed to act against the Israeli and previous leaders. The video tells Eric Breininger, 21-years-old, a German occupation but it must stay away from Pakistani Muslims to prepare for a holy

24 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11 war against corrupt governments. – AP, main city of Nazran. Although the October 2, 2008 (SUDAN): The U.S. September 29 explosion damaged Medov’s vehicle, he Embassy in Khartoum released a warden was not injured. – Reuters, September 30 message warning that an al-Qa`ida- September 29, 2008 (PAKISTAN): affiliated group had threatened the U.S. Military statistics released today found October 1, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): government in addition to Americans in that suicide attacks have killed almost The Australian Special Operations Sudan. The group that issued the threat 1,200 Pakistanis since July 2007. The Task Group apprehended Mullah Saqi identified itself as al-Qa`ida in the Land majority of those killed were civilians. Dad, a Taliban commander responsible of the Two Niles. – AFP, October 11 – AP, September 29 for attacks in Uruzgan Province and believed tied to senior Taliban leaders October 2, 2008 (INDIA): Bombs September 29, 2008 (LEBANON): A such as Mullah Omar. – The Age, October 6 ripped through shopping markets and remotely-detonated car bomb ripped a bus station in Agartala, the capital of through a military bus near Tripoli, October 1, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Various Tripura state. At least five people were killing seven people, four of whom were Pakistani media agencies have reported killed. Indian authorities believe that soldiers. – news.com.au, September 30 that Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Baitullah the Indian Mujahidin group was behind Mehsud has died of kidney failure. the attacks. – The Australian, October 3 September 30, 2008 (UNITED STATES): Taliban spokesmen, however, have Director of the Central Intelligence denied the claim, and they state that October 3, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S. forces Agency Michael Hayden told reporters Mehsud is “fine and healthy.” – Reuters, killed a senior leader of al-Qa`ida in that “all of the [terrorist] threats about October 1 Iraq, Mahir Ahmad Mahmud Zubaydi, which we are aware have threads that in Baghdad. The U.S. military believes take them back into that Afghan/ October 1, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A that Zubaydi, also known as Abu Pakistan border region, either in terms suspected U.S. aerial drone strike killed Rami, was responsible for “all terrorist of command and control, or training, at least six people in North Waziristan operations” in east Baghdad. – Los Angeles and direction.” – Fox News, September 30 Agency of the Federally Administered Times, October 5 Tribal Areas. Pakistani media sources September 30, 2008 (UNITED STATES): said that foreign militants were among October 3, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A A U.S. district court sentenced Derrick the dead. – Guardian, October 1 suspected U.S. aerial drone fired missiles Shareef to 35-years in jail for plotting at a home in North Waziristan Agency a grenade attack at a mall filled with October 2, 2008 (UNITED STATES): of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Christmas shoppers in Rockford, Illinois A federal appeals court overturned the Tribal Areas. Pakistani authorities in 2006. Although at the time Shareef convictions of Yemeni cleric Shaykh said at least nine people were killed was an admirer of Usama bin Ladin, Mohammed Ali al-Moayad and his in the explosion, including foreigners. authorities found that he acted alone in deputy, Mohammed Mohsen Zayed. The – Reuters, October 3 the plot except for a paid government two men were convicted of supporting informant. – Chicago Tribune, October 1; AP, terrorists in early 2005. The court found October 4, 2008 (GLOBAL): American al- September 30 that the men’s case was prejudiced by Qa`ida member Adam Gadahn appeared inflammatory testimony about unrelated in a new video posted on Islamist web September 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): terrorism links. The court ruled that the forums. The video, which references Afghan President Hamid Karzai men can have new trials. – AP, October 2 the recent U.S. economic downturn and revealed that he has asked the Saudi fighting in Kashmir, proved that Gadahn Arabian government to help broker peace October 2, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide was still alive, nixing speculation that talks between Kabul and the Taliban car bomber detonated his explosives he may have been killed in February. leadership, led by Mullah Omar. An outside a Shi`a mosque in Zafaraniyya Gadahn attempted to link the financial article in the Financial Times asserted that in southern Baghdad, killing 14 people. turmoil in the United States to proof “according to a person familiar with the – AP, October 2 that “the enemies of Islam” face defeat. talks, the Saudis have been involved since “The enemies of Islam are facing a July, when they were first approached October 2, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide crushing defeat, which is beginning to by Pakistan-based Taliban clerics. The bomber detonated his explosives manifest itself in the expanding crisis Saudis sent an envoy to Kabul and started belt outside the Shi`a Rasul mosque their economy is experiencing,” Gadahn shuttling between the two sides.” Karzai in Baghdad, killing 10 people. – AP, asserted. “A crisis whose primary also made a direct appeal to Mullah Omar, October 2 cause, in addition to the abortive and stating that he would protect the Taliban unsustainable crusades they are waging chief from U.S.-led coalition forces if he October 2, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, returned to Afghanistan to “work for the suicide bomber attempted to assassinate is their turning their backs on Allah’s peace and good of your people.” – Financial Asfandyar Wali Khan, the head of the revealed laws, which forbid interest- Times, October 1 Awami National Party, which controls bearing transactions, exploitation, Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province. greed and injustice in all its forms.” September 30, 2008 (RUSSIA): A The attack occurred in Charsadda at the – CNN, October 4; AP, October 4 suicide car bomber attempted to political leader’s home. Four people were assassinate Ingushetia’s interior killed in the blast, but Asfandyar Wali October 4, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen minister, Mussa Medov, in the region’s escaped injury. – Daily Telegraph, October 2 attacked a police station near Ramadi,

25 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

Anbar Province, and killed two blast. The attack took place in Punjab the convoy were set on fire by Taliban policemen. – Reuters, October 5 Province. – Los Angeles Times, October 7 troops. – Reuters, October 10

October 4, 2008 (SOMALIA): The October 7, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi forces October 9, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Islamist faction that retains control of arrested a woman suspected of leading U.S.-led and Afghan forces killed 12 Somalia’s southern port city of Kismayo efforts to recruit female suicide bombers Taliban militants in Uruzgan Province. renamed the airport after Imam Ahmed for al-Qa`ida in Iraq. The suspect, – Reuters, October 9 Gurey, a 16th century Somali holy identified as Ibitisma Odwan or “Mother warrior. They also called on commercial Fatima,” was arrested in Ba`quba, October 9, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A airlines to use the airport. Somalia’s Diyala Province. – AFP, October 7 suicide bomber penetrated one of the Islamists retook control of Kismayo in most heavily secured police facilities in August. – AFP, October 4 October 7, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen killed Islamabad. Once inside the building— two Christian men in Mosul, Ninawa which housed Pakistan’s anti-terrorism October 4, 2008 (THAILAND): Suspected Province. – Reuters, October 7 police—the bomber detonated his Muslim separatists killed two explosives. At least six officers were government soldiers who were traveling October 7, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen injured, and the building was largely on a motorcycle in Pattani Province. stormed into a pharmacy in Mosul, destroyed. The attack occurred in – AP, October 4 Ninawa Province, and killed the Islamabad’s heavily guarded Red Zone. pharmacist, who was a Christian. There were conflicting reports on October 5, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S. forces – Reuters, October 7 the incident, as the International Herald killed the second-in-command of al- Tribune claimed that the attack may have Qa`ida in Iraq, identified as Abu October 7, 2008 (IRAQ): During a involved a car bomb. – International Herald Qaswarah, a Moroccan native also known gunfight between coalition forces and Tribune, October 9; The Australian, October 10 as Abu Sara. He was killed in Mosul, insurgents in Mosul, Ninawa Province, Ninawa Province. Later investigation one U.S. soldier, one Iraqi policeman October 9, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. revealed that Abu Qaswarah had and one insurgent gunman were killed. missile strike targeted an area in North Swedish citizenship. – Reuters, October 15; Four insurgents were arrested. – Reuters, Waziristan Agency of the Federally TimesOnline, October 16 October 7 Administered Tribal Areas. Pakistani intelligence officials claim that at least October 5, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide October 8, 2008 (IRAQ): A female nine people were killed. Some of those bomber detonated his explosives after suicide bomber detonated her explosives killed were believed to be foreigners. U.S. forces stormed the building in outside a courthouse in Ba`quba, Diyala According to a security official speaking which he was in. Ten people were killed Province, killing 11 people. A male with Agence France-Presse, “There in the resultant blast, at least six of suicide bomber was apprehended at was a meeting of around 30 foreign Al- whom were civilians. – Los Angeles Times, the scene, as he failed to detonate his Qaeda and local Taliban commanders October 6 explosives vest. – AP, October 9 in the house of Hafiz Sahar Gul but the majority of them left the building October 5, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Suspected October 8, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): ten minutes before the missile struck. Taliban militants fired rockets at the Afghan and international troops killed The six Arabs who were killed are all home of Amir Haider Khan Hoti, the at least six Taliban fighters during believed to be lower level operatives.” North-West Frontier Province’s chief a sweep of Bakwa district in Farah – AP, October 10; AFP, October 10 minister. There were no casualties from Province. – Reuters, October 9 the attacks. – AP, October 6 October 9, 2008 (SOMALIA): Witnesses October 9, 2008 (IRAQ): A member of told reporters that an unidentified October 6, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen killed the al-Sadr bloc in the Iraqi parliament, aircraft bombed an Islamist rebel an off-duty member of Iraq’s special Salih al-Ugaili, was killed by a bomb in stronghold 18 miles southeast of Baidoa. forces in Babil Province. – Reuters, eastern Baghdad. Two of his bodyguards According to one witness, “We heard a October 6 were also killed in the blast. – Reuters, big crash after something like a plane October 9 had roared over us. I think they targeted October 6, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): al-Shabaab because we knew many of Afghanistan began registering voters October 9, 2008 (IRAQ): A “sticky their battle-wagons were passing.” It for the fall 2009 presidential polls. A bomb” attached to a vehicle carrying was not clear whether there were any Taliban spokesman responded to the employees of the Karbala governing casualties, or to which country the drive, stating, “It is clear that it will be council exploded, killing one of the aircraft belonged. – Reuters, October 9 fraudulent and this is all the work of the employees and wounding two others. United States.” – AP, October 6 – Reuters, October 9 October 10, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber killed a provincial October 6, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide October 9, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): intelligence officer for Khost Province. bomber detonated his explosives at the Taliban fighters ambushed a convoy Three policemen were wounded. home of a lawmaker, killing at least 20 belonging to USPI, a U.S. security firm, – Reuters, October 10 people. The Shi`a lawmaker, Rashid in Farah Province. Two of the company’s Akbar Khan Nawani, was injured in the guards were killed, and 11 trucks part of

26 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

October 10, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A male. – Reuters, October 13 October 14, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen suicide car bomber attacked a meeting opened fire on a U.S. military patrol of pro-government tribesmen in Orakzai October 12, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen in western Baghdad, killing one U.S. Agency of the Federally Administered stormed the house of a policeman and soldier. According to the Associated Tribal Areas, killing at least 30 people. killed him in Mosul, Ninawa Province. Press, “It was the first combat death The bomber apparently drove his – Reuters, October 13 suffered by American forces in the explosives-laden vehicle directly into capital since September 30, when the a crowd of 500 tribesmen, and then October 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): military said a soldier was killed by detonated it. – Voice of America, October 10; Approximately 60 Taliban fighters were small arms fire in northern Baghdad.” AP, October 11 killed when they attempted to launch – AP, October 15 a surprise attack on Afghan forces October 10, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province. October 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Authorities on Jolo Island in the Hundreds of Taliban fighters attacked Kai Eide, the top UN representative for southern Philippines killed an Abu Lashkar Gah from three sides, but they Afghanistan, warned that insurgents Sayyaf Group member and captured were repelled by NATO airstrikes. were likely to increase the number of three of his comrades. – AFP, October 11 – Guardian, October 12 attacks in the coming weeks before the onset of winter. Eide also said that October 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suspected October 12, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The despite some recent setbacks, he would U.S. missile strike killed at least three Frontier Corps claimed to have killed “caution against the kind of gloom-and- people in Miran Shah, North Waziristan 27 Taliban fighters in an airstrike doom statements we’ve seen recently” Agency of the Federally Administered in Orakzai Agency of the Federally about Afghanistan. – Washington Post, Tribal Areas. – AP, October 12 Administered Tribal Areas. – Daily Times, October 15 October 13 October 11, 2008 (TURKEY): Authorities October 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): apprehended a suspected Kurdish October 12, 2008 (LEBANON): Security The head of Kandahar Province’s female militant who was possibly officials arrested a group of alleged Social Affairs Department was shot to planning to launch a suicide bomb extremists—some of whom tied to Fatah death by two unidentified gunmen on attack in Istanbul. According to al-Islam—involved in recent attacks a motorcycle. According to one report, authorities, “The suspect—a woman in against the Lebanese Army. Officials the attack, which occurred in Kandahar her 30s posing as pregnant—carried 8.8 claimed the cell was involved in the city, was “conducted in the same manner kilograms (19 pounds) of explosives, September 29 attack on a military bus in as the September 28 assassination of 15 detonators and a manual button in Tripoli. The group was also blamed for Lt.-Col. Malalai Kakar, Kandahar’s first her bag when she was arrested in the an August 13 bus bombing, along with female police detective and the highest- downtown district of Sisli after a police another attack in May. – BBC, October 13 ranking policewoman in southern pursuit.” – AFP, October 11 Afghanistan.” – Canadian Press, October 14 October 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): October 11, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Coalition forces killed five militants October 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Authorities arrested a member of the during an operation targeting a foreign A roadside bomb destroyed a vehicle Abu Sayyaf Group who was believed fighter network in Ghazni Province. carrying NATO soldiers in eastern to be involved in the June kidnapping – Reuters, October 14 Afghanistan, killing three of them. of journalist Ces Drilon. The operative, – AFP, October 14 identified as Marcial Totoh Jabarot (also October 13, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A known as Abu Cesar), was arrested on government official announced that October 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Jolo Island in the southern Philippines. an estimated 15 people were killed Nine civilians were killed after a bomb – Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 12 in clashes between Taliban fighters ripped through a bus in Uruzgan and pro-government tribesmen and Province. It is believed that the bomb October 12, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide government security forces. Two of was intended for Afghan or international car bomber targeted an Iraqi patrol in the dead were tribesmen. The clashes security forces. The Taliban denied Mosul, Ninawa Province, killing five occurred on October 12 and 13 in Bajaur involvement. – AFP, October 14 civilians and injuring 35. A second Agency of the Federally Administered suicide car bomber struck the same area Tribal Areas. – AP, October 13 October 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): An approximately 20 minutes after the first Afghan official claimed that international blast. The second blast injured at least October 13, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A forces killed approximately 70 Taliban 25 more people. – Bloomberg, October 13 remote-controlled bomb exploded fighters in airstrikes in Helmand near the vehicle of Shamin Khan, a Province. Afghan officials allege that October 12, 2008 (IRAQ): A sniper killed secular Pakistani political leader. most of the killed were foreign fighters, two Iraqi soldiers in Mansur district of Khan, a member of the Awami National including Arabs and Pakistanis. – Reuters, Baghdad. – Reuters, October 12 Party, was injured in the blast, October 15; AFP, October 15 which occurred in the North-West October 12, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen burst Frontier Province. – CNN, October 13 October 14, 2008 (SOMALIA): into a shop in Mosul, Ninawa Province, Burundi’s spokesman for the army and killed the shop’s owner, a Christian told reporters that the country had

27 october 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 11

completed an additional deployment of October 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A CTC Sentinel Staff 850 soldiers to Somalia. The soldiers, roadside bomb killed three policemen in part of an African Union peacekeeping Logar Province. – Reuters, October 15 Editor-in-Chief mission, will join another group of Erich Marquardt 850 soldiers previously deployed to October 15, 2008 (THAILAND): Senior Editor, CTC the country, raising Burundi’s total Authorities surrounded five members contribution to 1,700 troops. There of the Runda Kumpulan Kecil insurgent Editorial Board are now approximately 3,400 AU group in southern Thailand’s Yala COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. peacekeepers in Somalia, still short of Province. A gunfight ensued, and three Department Head the 8,000 planned commitment. – AFP, of the five escaped, while the other Department of Social Sciences (West Point) October 14 two were apprehended. – Bangkok Post, October 15 COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. October 14, 2008 (THAILAND): Deputy Department Head Thailand extended the emergency Department of Social Sciences (West Point) decree imposed on its three southern- most provinces of Yala, Pattani and MAJ Reid Sawyer Narathiwat for an additional three Director, CTC months. The extended decree is now set to expire on January 19, 2009. – TNA, Brian Fishman October 14 Director of Research, CTC October 14, 2008 (RUSSIA): Russia’s Christopher Heffelfinger Federal Security Service claimed that FBI Fellow, CTC it foiled an al-Qa`ida-related attack on Sochi, the site for the 2014 Winter Olympics, during the summer. The attack was allegedly planned by Doku Contact Umarov, a Chechen separatist warlord. Combating Terrorism Center – Bloomberg, October 14 U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall October 15, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): West Point, NY 10996 Nicky Reilly, a 22-year-old male Muslim Phone: (202) 425-8578 convert from Plymouth, pleaded guilty Email: [email protected] to a failed suicide bomb attack on a Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ busy restaurant in Devon on May 22. According to a press report about * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 the May 22 incident, Reilly “used the internet to research how to make bombs using caustic soda, kerosene, drain cleaner and nails...He had received support from two unidentified people support who contacted him on an extremist The Combating Terrorism Center would website. Police said Reilly had been like to express its gratitude to its financial ‘preyed upon, radicalised and taken supporters, for without their support and advantage of.’” Reilly will be sentenced shared vision of the Center products like on November 21. – Reuters, October 15 the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about October 15, 2008 (IRAQ): Major-General how to support the Combating Terrorism Ali al-Hamdani, the intelligence chief Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. for three of Iraq’s southern provinces, edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at was injured in a roadside bomb blast in West Point’s Association of Graduates at Karbala Province. – Reuters, October 15 845-446-1553. October 15, 2008 (IRAQ): Mortar rounds landed near the Sunni Abu Hanifa shrine in Adhamiyya district of Baghdad. Two people were killed. – Reuters, October 15

The views expressed in this report are those of October 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): An the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, estimated 18 Taliban fighters were killed the Department of the Army, or any other agency after a four hour battle in Lashkar Gah of the U.S. Government. in Helmand Province. – Reuters, October 15

28