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Unclassified Usawc Military Studies Program Paper UNCLASSIFIED USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open pUblication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency. THE ROLE OF THE F-117 STEALTH FIGHTER IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS by Lieutenant Colonel Gregory T. Gonyea united States Air Force Dr. Douglas v. J~hnson II Project Advisor A roved for public: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: PP d release~ distribution is unltmlte • U. S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013 UNCLASSIFIED 1'" --~OUCEOBY:--N'l"iS.I l u.s. Department of Commerce _0_- l National Technical Information Service r Sprlngrield, Virginia 22161 '-----------~ ABSTRACT AUTHOR: Gregory T. Gonyea, Lt Col, USAF TITLE: The Role of the F-117 Stealth Fighter in special Operations FORMAT: Individual Study Project DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 43 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified Special operations, as the name implies, are not routine or normal. Neither is the F-117 Stealth Fighter. This paper discusses special operations doctrine, Air Force special operations doctrine, and the applicability of the F-117 to special operations. The capabilities, unit training programs, combat Rerformance, and future developments of the aircraft are used to justify increased integration of the F-117 and special operations communities. The F-117 can offer significant capabilities to the special operations arena. However, many limitations apply. This paper recommends F-117 representation on special operations staff and increased joint exercises to implement F-117 integration in limited special operations activities. ' ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii CHAPTER I• 1 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER II •••••• 3 SPECIAL OPERATIONS CHAPTER III..•••••..••..•.• 7 AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE CHAPTER IV ••••.••.••.••• 11 F-117 STEALTH FIGHTER CAPABILITIES CHAPTER V••..•..•. 17 UNIT TRAINING PROGRAMS CHAPTER VI ...••.. 22 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS CHAPTER VII•.•.••••.•......•.• 28 SPECIAL OPERATIONS APPLICATION OF THE F-117 CHAPTER VIII •.•. 35 RECOMMENDATIONS ENDNOTES 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY 41 DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5 ~;,'~~ L_ i 1(1089510D 'OJ' ~- N'rIS ORA&! OTIC TA"6 0 UnannoWlced 0 Justification - By Distributi_on! Availability CodaS !Avall and/or iii D~: \\spoor THE ROLE OF F-117 STEALTH FIGHTER IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The original purpose of this paper was to explore the realignment of USAF forces under the Major Command structure. My initial premise was to align the F-117 Stealth Fighter assets under AF special operations Command (AFSOC). I intended to use personal experience, Special Operations doctrine, F-117 capabilities and combat performance, and unit training programs to justify this realignment. Having been an F-117 squadron commander, I was intimately familiar with F-117 capabilities, training programs, tactics, and performance characteristics. Combat experience in Operation DESERT STORM and participation in numerous exercises made me acutely aware of the capabilities the F-117 could offer the Special Operations community. However, I greatly misunderstood Special Operations doctrine, force structure, and missions. After limited research it became apparent that it would be lUdicrous, and irrelevant, to advocate moving the F-117 from Air Combat Command to AFSOC. It also became apparent that the Stealth Fighter was perfectly suited to perform limited aspects of the Special Operations (SO) mission and was in complete alignment with corresponding portions of SO doctrine. This paper will explore Joint so doctrine and missions, Air Force SO doctrine, F-117 Stealth Fighter capabilities and l missions, discuss F-117 use in SO scenarios, and make - recommendations for the composition of future SO planning staffs and SO exercise participation. 2 CHAPTER II SPECIAL OPERATIONS Special operations are defined as: operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Politico-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. 1 special operations may be executed!as independent activities or in coordination with conventional military operations. Special Operations: 1. May be covert, clandestine, or low-visibility in nature. 2. May be employed when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible for military or political reasons. 3. Rely on surprise, security, and boldness for success and frequently employ deception to achieve each. 4. May be conducted at great distances from support bases, requiring sophisticat~d communications and means of infiltration and exfiltration. 3 5. Require precise use of force and highly specialized kinds of military technology and equipment not standard to other DOD forces. 6. ;Are conducted primarily by specially trained ·personnel in small units tailored for specific missions or environments.... 2 To be more specific Title 10 lists SO activities as: 1. Direct Action 2. Strategic Reconnaissance 3. Unconventional Warfare 4. Foreign Internal Defense 5. civil Affairs 6. Psychological Operations 7. Counterterrorism 8. Humanitarian Assistance 9. Theater Search and Rescue 10. Such other activities as may be specified by the President or SecDef. 3 Title 10 also states that "special operations forces of the Armed Forces provide the United States with the immediate and primary (underline added) capability to respond to terrorism."4 This paper will address only the direct action, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and psychological operations aspects of SO doctrine and missions in which the F-117 can playa productive part. Future improvements in the F-117, discussed later, will significantly increase the capabilities of this system in support of SO scenarios. 4 Although u.s. strategy clearly recognizes that indirect application of military force, primarily through security assistance, is the most appropriate means to help foreign military institutions protect their citizens and governments,S direct action using force may be necessary to protect u.s. and allied interests. Direct action operations are normally limited in scope and duration. They are designed to achieve specific, well defined, and often time sensitive results of critical importance. The political implications often far exceed the military advantages to be gained through such actions. These can include attacks on critical targets, interdiction of critical LOCs or other target systems, and destruction or neutralization of critical facilities \ in support, or advance, of other actions. Specific activities can include standoff attacks by fire, terminal guidance for precision guided munitions, and conduct of independent sabotage. The objectives range from sabotage of major installations to hostage rescues or counterinsurgency operations. 6,7 Special operations forces offer the National Command Authority and defense policy makers a low-cost, relatively low­ risk capability for expressing us interests and resolve in every region of the World. 8 The decision to employ SOF will likely be based on a requirement for a rapid, low visibility response of limited size. OPSEC, COMSEC, cover stories, deception, and compartment~tion must be integrated from the first stage of operational planning. 9 5 Ground SO defy tidy classification. They are usually located on the far side of the Forward Edge of the Battle, or in an undefined area. They involve lightly equipped forces and use concealment and covert infiltration to achieve surprise and to control the time and place of action. SOF have also played a leading role in assisting host nation forces in combating threats to internal stability.1O Peacetime reprisals, although often politically unfavored, have been accomplished by the u.s. at least fifty times. 1I This mission is often within the realm of SOF. Most peacetime reprisals are of limited scope with a well defined objective. Specific results, against a specific regime or individual source of aggravation, are the norm. Only rarely is a larger force involved against a broader group of targets. The January 1993 raid on Iraq for non-compliance with U.N. directives is the most recent example of peacetime reprisal and it was of the latter type. 6 CHAPTER III AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE Use of airpower during SO against insurgent forces can be traced as far back as 1916 when the 1st Aero Squadron under General John J. Pershing flew against the guerrillas of Pancho Villa. u Although most SO actions are on land, the assassination of Admiral Yamamoto and the raids by RAF Mosquito bombers against Gestapo assets in Europe are early SO type air operations. Most SO rely on surprise. It was difficult to achieve surprise by earlier generation air assets because conventional aircraft are almost impossible
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