Unclassified Usawc Military Studies Program Paper

UNCLASSIFIED

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open pUblication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE ROLE OF THE F-117 STEALTH FIGHTER IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS

by Lieutenant Colonel Gregory T. Gonyea united States Air Force Dr. Douglas v. J~hnson II Project Advisor

A roved for public: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: PP d release~ distribution is unltmlte •

U. S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

UNCLASSIFIED

1'" --~OUCEOBY:--N'l"iS.I l u.s. Department of Commerce _0_- l National Technical Information Service r Sprlngrield, Virginia 22161

'------~ ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Gregory T. Gonyea, Lt Col, USAF

TITLE: The Role of the F-117 Stealth Fighter in special Operations

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 43 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Special operations, as the name implies, are not routine or normal. Neither is the F-117 Stealth Fighter. This paper discusses special operations doctrine, Air Force special operations doctrine, and the applicability of the F-117 to special operations. The capabilities, unit training programs, combat Rerformance, and future developments of the aircraft are used to justify increased integration of the F-117 and special operations communities. The F-117 can offer significant capabilities to the special operations arena. However, many limitations apply. This paper recommends F-117 representation on special operations staff and increased joint exercises to implement F-117 integration in limited special operations activities. '

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ii

CHAPTER I• 1 INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER II •••••• 3 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

CHAPTER III..•••••..••..•.• 7 AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE CHAPTER IV ••••.••.••.••• 11 F-117 STEALTH FIGHTER CAPABILITIES CHAPTER V••..•..•. 17 UNIT TRAINING PROGRAMS

CHAPTER VI ...••.. 22 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

CHAPTER VII•.•.••••.•...... •.• 28 SPECIAL OPERATIONS APPLICATION OF THE F-117

CHAPTER VIII •.•. 35 RECOMMENDATIONS ENDNOTES 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY 41

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5

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THE ROLE OF F-117 STEALTH FIGHTER IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The original purpose of this paper was to explore the realignment of USAF forces under the Major Command structure. My initial premise was to align the F-117 Stealth Fighter assets under AF special operations Command (AFSOC). I intended to use personal experience, Special Operations doctrine, F-117 capabilities and combat performance, and unit training programs to justify this realignment. Having been an F-117 squadron commander, I was intimately familiar with F-117 capabilities, training programs, tactics, and performance characteristics. Combat experience in Operation DESERT STORM and participation in numerous exercises made me acutely aware of the capabilities the F-117 could offer the Special Operations community. However, I greatly misunderstood Special Operations doctrine, force structure, and missions. After limited research it became apparent that it would be lUdicrous, and irrelevant, to advocate moving the F-117 from Air Combat Command to AFSOC. It also became apparent that the Stealth Fighter was perfectly suited to perform limited aspects of the Special Operations (SO) mission and was in complete alignment with corresponding portions of SO doctrine. This paper will explore Joint so doctrine and missions, Air Force SO doctrine, F-117 Stealth Fighter capabilities and

l missions, discuss F-117 use in SO scenarios, and make - recommendations for the composition of future SO planning staffs and SO exercise participation.

2 CHAPTER II SPECIAL OPERATIONS Special operations are defined as: operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Politico-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. 1 special operations may be executed!as independent activities or in coordination with conventional military operations. Special Operations: 1. May be covert, clandestine, or low-visibility in nature. 2. May be employed when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible for military or political reasons. 3. Rely on surprise, security, and boldness for success and frequently employ deception to achieve each. 4. May be conducted at great distances from support bases, requiring sophisticat~d communications and means of infiltration and exfiltration.

3 5. Require precise use of force and highly specialized kinds of military technology and equipment not standard to other DOD forces. 6. ;Are conducted primarily by specially trained ·personnel in small units tailored for specific missions or environments.... 2 To be more specific Title 10 lists SO activities as: 1. Direct Action 2. Strategic Reconnaissance 3. Unconventional Warfare 4. Foreign Internal Defense 5. civil Affairs 6. Psychological Operations 7. Counterterrorism 8. Humanitarian Assistance 9. Theater Search and Rescue 10. Such other activities as may be specified by the President or

SecDef. 3 Title 10 also states that "special operations forces of the Armed Forces provide the United States with the immediate and primary (underline added) capability to respond to terrorism."4 This paper will address only the direct action, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and psychological operations aspects of SO doctrine and missions in which the F-117 can playa productive part. Future improvements in the F-117, discussed later, will significantly increase the capabilities of this system in support of SO scenarios.

4 Although u.s. strategy clearly recognizes that indirect application of military force, primarily through security assistance, is the most appropriate means to help foreign military institutions protect their citizens and governments,S direct action using force may be necessary to protect u.s. and allied interests. Direct action operations are normally limited in scope and duration. They are designed to achieve specific, well defined, and often time sensitive results of critical importance. The political implications often far exceed the military advantages to be gained through such actions. These can include attacks on critical targets, interdiction of critical LOCs or other target systems, and destruction or neutralization of critical facilities \ in support, or advance, of other actions. Specific activities can include standoff attacks by fire, terminal guidance for precision guided munitions, and conduct of independent sabotage. The objectives range from sabotage of major installations to

hostage rescues or counterinsurgency operations. 6,7 Special operations forces offer the National Command Authority and defense policy makers a low-cost, relatively low risk capability for expressing us interests and resolve in every region of the World. 8 The decision to employ SOF will likely be based on a requirement for a rapid, low visibility response of limited size. OPSEC, COMSEC, cover stories, deception, and compartment~tion must be integrated from the first stage of operational planning. 9

5 Ground SO defy tidy classification. They are usually located on the far side of the Forward Edge of the Battle, or in an undefined area. They involve lightly equipped forces and use concealment and covert infiltration to achieve surprise and to control the time and place of action. SOF have also played a leading role in assisting host nation forces in combating threats to internal stability.1O Peacetime reprisals, although often politically unfavored, have been accomplished by the u.s. at least fifty times. 1I This mission is often within the realm of SOF. Most peacetime reprisals are of limited scope with a well defined objective. Specific results, against a specific regime or individual source of aggravation, are the norm. Only rarely is a larger force involved against a broader group of targets. The January 1993 raid on Iraq for non-compliance with U.N. directives is the most recent example of peacetime reprisal and it was of the latter type.

6 CHAPTER III AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

Use of airpower during SO against insurgent forces can be traced as far back as 1916 when the 1st Aero Squadron under General John J. Pershing flew against the guerrillas of Pancho Villa. u Although most SO actions are on land, the assassination of Admiral Yamamoto and the raids by RAF Mosquito bombers against Gestapo assets in Europe are early SO type air operations. Most SO rely on surprise. It was difficult to achieve surprise by earlier generation air assets because conventional aircraft are almost impossible to conceal. Once surprise is lost, large numbers of support aircraft are required. 13 Surprise is now aerospace power's strongest advantage. The psychological effect of bombing is greatly enhanced by surprise. Although sensor technologies may seem to mitigate a capability for surprise, stealth technologies retain that advantage. 14 surprise depends on initiative and is more attainable due to aerospace power's versatility, flexibility and speed. Where, when, and how an enemy is attacked is independent of where and how forces are postured. Choice of time and place always rests with the commander of the superior air forces. Compared to land or sea assets, terrain and distance are not inhibiting factors. ls Aerospace power can provide the deciding leverage through speed and mobility.

7 Aerospace power can be employed independently, or in conjunction with surface operations. As the strikes against Libya and the January 1993 strikes against southern Iraq demonstrated, ,there may be times when the goals of national (and international) policy may best be achieved without the conduct of integrated land-sea-air campaigns. 16 Aircraft can attack the full spectrum of enemy capabilities. stealth assets, in particular, do not need a carrier for support nor large support packages for diversion or protection. staging bases can be great distances from the target area, assets can be hidden until the actual strike occurs, and the risk of discovery of in-place ground forces is eliminated. The use of stealth aircraft during strategic attacks against the enemy centers of gravity should produce effects well beyond· the proportion of effort expended in execution. The extenstve use of precision:we~ponry has greatly increased the accuracy, lethality, and efficiency of strategic attacks. If necessary after the air attacks,. gaining maximum benefit could then depend on the ability of surface forces to exploit the enemy's disruption. 17 In a more intense or prolonged conflict environment, Close Air Support (CAS) and interdiction are extremely effective means of destroying enemy forces, especially when these forces have been fixed in place or trapped by SO actions. This is also true of forces "holed up" in a reinforced stronghold or extensive defensive formations and fortifications. Our new systems prevent

8 the enemy from using these fortifications or the night to gather an advantage or as refuge. Force enhancement, or the threat of such in a show of force, may also be a major contribution to a campaign or specific action. A pUblic movement of stealth aircraft, or announcement of the intended movement, to a hostile or politically sensitive arena may be enough to deter or influence enemy action. The political objective may be gained without a requirement to fight and risk the lives of SO personnel. The nature of SO requires discretion in the use of air-to ground armament. Overuse and indiscriminate application of force can have devastating results. As Maj Gen Harry C. Aderholt, USAF (Ret), clearly stated, "A misplaced 250 pounder may create more revolutionaries than it kills insurgents." 18 The misapplication of air power in an SO situation may exacerbate the problem. In SO scenarios, the rapier-like thrusts designed to keep forces dispersed, distracted and harassed, demonstrating the ability of friendly forces to go anywhere at anytime, are far more effective than the clumsy blows of the broad ax. Massive amounts of firepower can be counterproductive. 19 The tremendous destructive capabilities of modern weapons can mUltiply the destructive power and second order effects of the 250 pounder that Gen Aderholt discussed. There is no room for indiscriminate action. Collateral damage at the low end of the conflict spectrum carries significantly greater potential for

9 political and psYchological damage than mistakes at the upper levels. The misplaced bomb, into the Iraqi apartment building during the January 1993 attack, may cause the coalition effort more political difficulties with the Arab people than all that was gained through destruction of the missile sites. Another consideration is that the loss of a high tech asset in a low tech environment can significantly bolster the prestige and will of an adversary. Although many aircraft can carry precision guided munitions and demonstrate exceptional accuracy, only the F-117 has a reasonable expectation of survival in many of the present threat environments throughout the world (pyong Yang, Baghdad, Tripoli). It is apparent that platform survivability and delivery accuracy are keys to successful aerospace operations in so.

10 CHAPTER IV F-117 STEALTH FIGHTER CAPABILITIES

The Stealth Fighte~ brings unique operational abilities to· the SO environment. The F-117 was designed to address seven types of observable signatures: radar, infrared, visual, contrails, engine smoke, acoustic, and electromagnetic. The unique shape provides the major protection in the radar spectrum. This protection is optimized against long wavelength detection and early warning systems (the lookers). The radar absorbent material coating the aircraft enhances the radar stealthiness and is optimized against the shorter wavelengths of weapons employment radars (the shooters). Surface-to-air missiles with internal radar guidance and the fuzes employed by surface-to-air missiles are also shorter wavelength systems. Infrared protection against ground systems is provided by the unique placement of the F-117 exhaust manifolds for the GE

404 (the same engine as an F-18 Hornet minus afterburn~r) jet turbine engines. The exhaust is vented across the top of the aircraft, approximately three feet inside the trailing edge, to dissipate the heat signature prior to reaching an area observable by ground detection systems. The shape of the exhaust reduces gas temperatures to a level significantly below those of conventionally nozzled aircraft. This exhaust system is also the primary reason for the reduced acoustic signature.

11 contrails, engine smoke, and visual detection are primarily countered through exclusively night operations. The engines do not smoke in,day flying, however. The flat black color of the aircraft is extremely effective in preventing visual detection, even under full moon conditions, or the use of night vision devices of all types. The electromagnetic spectrum is countered through still classified means and the composite materials. of the skin. The F-117 is virtually undetectable to most air defense systems deployed throughout the world. The systems that have detection ability have an almost insurmountable difficulty . coordinating a successful attack on the aircraft while it is within lethal weapon range. Survivability was clearly demonstrated in Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) when it was the only piloted vehicle to be targeted inside the sophisticated Baghdad threat ring of over 60 surface-to-air missile sites and 3000 anti-aircraft artillery pieces. Baghdad operated seven times the density of defenses as Hanoi deployed during Linebacker II and defenses denser than the most heavily defended Eastern European targets at the height of the Cold War. 20 The F-117 flew into this intense threat environment almost every night, was exposed to these threats for a relatively long time, and not one aircraft was hit by enemy fire during the 43 nights of intense attacks. It was used by planners to strike the most heavily defended targets in the most populated areas. n

12 The precision and surgical strike capability was also clearly demonstrated in ODS. (If there is such a thing as surgical strike using 2000 pound, high explosive weapons). The F-117 was able to accomplish more destruction in a shorter period of time, with greater accuracy, than ever imagined in the history of aerial warfare. Less than two percent of the coalition air assets destroyed 45 percent of the strategic target list. The F-117 was the only aircraft to attack targets in all 12 target categories. 22 Pilot weapons delivery accuracy exceeded 93 percent, assessed against the specific "desired mean point of impact" rather than an entire structure or target set. n Precision guided munitions (PGM) routinely hit impact points of only a few feet in size. If the F-117 pilot hit the buildings or shelters, but not the particular spot, the delivery counted as a miss.~ However, a production series of defective fuzes causing the "smart" bombs to go "stupid" and weather interference during the terminal guidance phase reduced overall hit rate to approximately 83 per cent. The average time deviation from desired impact time was less than 2 seconds. ~ In the January 1993 attacks on Iraq, the F-117 was the only aircraft to score a direct hit on the targeted missile sites. However, weather severely degraded the effectiveness of the F-117s during the initial strike. u Target discrimination capabilities are even recognized by Iraqi civilians living in Baghdad. Approaching the end of ODS,

13 when queried by Peter Arnett of CNN on the attacks to their city, they stated they would rather be attacked by the Stealth Fighter than Tomahawks because the Stealth Fighter never missed its target and only hit military facilities. The Iraqis expressed their feelings that a person would not be harmed by a bomb from a Stealth Fighter if they avoided militarily or politically significant targets. The F-117 was about ten times more accurate than the TLAM, due to the "man in the loop" weapons control.v The combination of mission planning capabilities, reduced radar cross section, and innovative employment concepts requires significantly reduced mission and logistic support to achieve operational objectives. In ODS the only support aircraft tasked to support the F-117 were tankers. F-117s typically used little or no direct electronic combat or fighter support. 28 Jammers, suppression, command and control, and air superiority assets were committed to the support of "non stealthy" assets. The ability of the F-117 to act independently is unique to the aviation community because of very little need to coordinate support. The internal unit intelligence and communications assets provide an even greater force mUltiplier. During ODS, many specific examples of the autonomy and value of stealth were demonstrated. On one attack against an airfield, four A-6Es and four Tornadoes striking an airfield were protected by four F-4G wild Weasels, five EA-6B radar jammers, and twenty one F/A-18C Hornets carrying anti-radar missiles. Thirty eight

14 aircraft and sixty five men were needed to ensure· that eight aircraft could hit one target with a reasonable expectation for success and survival. The ratio of support to strike aircraft was 5 to 1 and aircraft to target ratio of 38 to 1. At the same time, twenty one F-117 aircraft were striking thirty seven targets, by themselves.~ standard operating procedures in the F-117 are easily focused toward so. pilots routinely practice nocturnal, autonomous, communications silent missions, without backup, where failure would alert both target and all enemy defenses. Almost every ODS mission was of this type. Title 10 clearly recognizes the contributions and sensitivity of the F-117. The location of the aircraft during ODS, and present operating location, has been removed from all maps within the pUblication. The system's unique status is clearly stated in the following: The revolutionary combination of stealth aircraft and PGMs allowed nearly simultaneous attack against scores of targets across the theater. They enabled a relatively small number of offensive assets to attack effectively many more targets than would have been possible without stealth (which requires little airborne support) and PGMs (which require few munitions to achieve the desired effect) •. Without these capabilities, the attacks would have required many more sorties, and would have been much more costly. Many attacks would have been impractical (because they would have caused too much collateral damage or would have required too many assets) or impossible (because the desired level of damage against pinpoint or hardened targets could not have been achieved with conventional munitions).~

15 President Bush clearly described the performance of the F-117 in a speech to the Air Force Academy after the War, "The F-117 proved itself by doing more, doing it better, doing it for less, and targeting soldiers, not civilians. It....carried a revolution in warfare on its wings~"31

16 CHAPTER V UNIT TRAINING PROGRAMS

Throughout the history of the F-117, the unit flying the aircraft (now the 49th Fighter Wing, formerly the 37th Fighter Wing and 4450th Tactical Group) has routinely operated in a mode

, conducive to covert or clandestine operations. For over eight years, 1981 to 1989, the existence of the aircraft, and the unit function, was classified and not acknowledged by the Air Force or Department of Defense. The base of operations was classified and required special security clearance to get within 40 miles. All operations were limited to night activities. Hangar doors were not opened until complete darkness (30 minutes after civil twilight) and were never opened with interior lights on. All vehicles operated without headlights or illumination devices around the aircraft. Unlike most stateside military duties requiring a daily commute from home, unit members deployed to work on a weekly basis. The "standard" pilot would drive to Nellis AFB, Nevada, on Monday morning, commute to Tonopah Test Range via charter air, and return home on Friday afternoon. Families were accustomed to the military member being deployed without explanation and often being out of communication for extended periods. The unit routinely practiced covert deployments, compartmentalized operations, and deception plans. It was common

17 practice for small groups to go TOY without explanation. Most operations were conducted without the knowledge of squadron members or workers in the same office. Almost all activities were on a "need to know" basis. Personnel are selected from a highly qualified group displaying increased maturity and experience. Pilots are

required to have 1000 hours of fighter time, or 750 hours if certified as an instructor. The selection process is extensive and-any minor breach of discipline or limitation in flying ability is cause for elimination. The ability to operate autonomously, displaying sound jUdgment and maturity, is the focus for acceptance. The requirement for extensive experience fulfills two roles

in the selection process. Since the F-117 flies primarily at night, and exclusively at night in combat, the increased flying ) ,experience is used to overcome the significantly greater difficulty of night operations. Spatial disorientation is much greater and the accident rate is much higher than day operations. In addition, any breaches of discipline or operations close to the "edge of the envelope", are significantly greater during the early years of a pilot's flying career. The requirement for greater flying time allows the pilot a much longer opportunity to fill up his "bag of skill" before his "bag of luck" is emptied. An experienced pilot is much less likely to tempt fate and much more likely to survive an unplanned encounter.

18 Throughout the history of the program, the unit training has stressed discipline, high levels of proficiency, and the ability to operate autonomously and covertly. The initial qualification syllabus emphasizes specific events that highlight the F-117s ability to operate throughout the SO spectrum. Proficiency is required in hitting very small (as small as a square meter) targets in both urban environments and environments with very few discernible characteristics. 32 Training can simulate destroying a specific structure hiding terrorist activity within a large urban area or any type of small encampment in an area with no buildings or geographically isolated. Techniques using identifiable offsets, to help identify extremely small or ambiguous target areas, are stressed throughout the qualification program. Weapons training to identify and employ the proper weapon to minimize collateral damage, cause area destruction, or penetrate hardened facilities, is an integral element of all training.~ After initial qualification, each squadron has a training plan to ensure the entire unit maintains a high degree of prOficiency in all areas of operations. This plan is optimized to maintain a high level of performance at all times to enable each unit to respond to an immediate crisis. covert activities are integral to all aspects of this plan. Communication silent procedures are standard for most missions. Training plans emphasize a recurring cycle of training scenarios and exercises to emphasize activities related to the

19 most difficult and sensitive aspects of the mission. Ae~ial refueling, secure communication practice, and covert departures and recoveries are practiced routinely by all pilots. Aviators consistently hone their skills on coordinated attacks emphasizing maximum effectiveness in minimum time. Each month the squadron exercises the mission planning and employment considerations for a covert operation to a different area of the world.~ Facilities, environmental considerations, employment specifics, and covert plans of action are all briefed in detail~ The mission is flown as closely as possible to an actual operation in a hostile theater of operation. Coordination with all support agencies and functions, to include tankers, electronic support, intelligence assets, and threat suppression assets, are an integral part of the mission planning and execution process.

20 Rules of engagement emphasizing elimination of collateral damage and conservative jUdgment during operations have always been a major focus during exercises and daily training. The decision not to drop a weapon due to inability to positively identify the target for weather, or any other factor, is treated fundamentally different than dropping a weapon and missing. Dropping on the wrong target is penalized far more than not finding a target or not dropping due to questionable environmental conditions where the bomb will be unable to guide after release. The unit practices covert deployment exercises on a routine basis. The unit actually plans, deploys, operates, and redeploys under covert conditions. This tasks all aspects of possible SO tasking. Maintenance, intelligence, mission planning, communications, medical, and administrative concerns are all tested in a realistic environment. Monthly competition keeps weapon delivery skills honed to a sharp edge. Competition among crew chiefs and systems specialists achieves the same objective for the maintenance personnel. Although the F-117 community has demonstrated its capabilities in total combat, many aspects of Special Operations are more difficult than full combat employment. The unit understands the difficulties and trains to the most demanding scenarios. "Train like we're going to fight" is the common theme throughout the training programs.

21 CHAPTER VI FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Although extremely successful during ODS, significant F-117 employment limitations were evident. The system is late 1970s technology and suffers the fifteen year technological gap. Most obvious during ODS was the system inability to deliver ordnance through the weather or to be assigned against moving targets. These limitations, and many others, were recognized long before ODS and modifications are already in progress to enhance the systems ability to operate in a high threat environment. Most of these improvements directly effect performance in an SO scenario. Although the hit rate for the F-117 was over 80 per cent during ODS, the effect of adverse weather was greater than the 20 per cent of bombs that missed the target. Of the 20 per cent misses, approximately one third of those were lost because of weather. Generally, clouds interfered during the terminal guidance phase and the aircraft was unable to illuminate the target with the laser. Additionally, approximately 20 per cent of all sorties were unable to drop the weapons due to weather either completely obscuring the target or causing interference 1 with laser ranging for release. 35 These sorties are not factored into the hit rate of the F-117. During sorties in which the F-117 was unable to deliver ordnance, the pilot "and aircraft were still SUbject to the

22 threats in the target area and still accomplished all actions in the combat arena other than releasing ordnance. The risk level was not decreased but the mission was totally unsuccessful. MUltiple options are being explored to overcome this deficiency in the weapons system. An enhanced infrared system has been developed to increase the performance of the sensor system under marginal conditions. This will greatly improve the ability to operate in very high humidity areas of the world, such as Central America, South America, Europe, or Southwest Asia. Presently the system provides laser designation for only its own weapons and requires its own laser to guide the weapon. The capability to modify the system to permit ground lasing (possibly \ by SOF in the target area) has recently been demonstrated. A modification already integrated into the aircraft autopilot system allows a stealthier and more secret approach to the target. Previously, every route into the target area was modified from the optimum route to reduce human workload. Coupled with other mission requirements, the pilot was unable to fly the route as perfectly as required. Each route was "humanized" by rounding corners, eliminating altitude or heading changes, or other similar actions. This increased probability of detection by enemy radars or interceptors. The Offensive Combat Improvement Program (OCIP) modification has eliminated the need to humanize the route. Although some of the modification is classified, OCIP has coupled the autopilot to the preprogrammed route in all dimensions, plus speed, to

23 significantly reduce pilot workload while enhancing precision and decreasing risk.~

An additional gain from this modification is the ability to increase th~ number of aircraft simultaneously attacking a single target. The safety factor required between aircraft flight paths can be significantly reduced in both altitude and timing. If the defense budget can support the cost, third generation stealth technology can further reduce the aircraft radar cross section by large margins. This is a very.low risk modification proven ~uring development and testing of the much larger B-2 Stealth Bomber. This modification would greatly improve the probability of surprise,particularly in the dense coastal ! defense networks of most foreseeable adversaries. Improvements in computer and digital technology, manifested in upgrades to mission planning capabilities, will provide a major improvement in system capabilities. Presently only one mission can be loaded into the electronic data module of the aircraft. The result is the inability to.~hange mission profile after the aircraft is airborne. If the initial mission is modified, the pilot is unable to make the changes while airborne without very large amounts of time in a non-threatening environment. An ongoing modification allows for mUltiple missions to be loaded allowing post takeoff flexibility in targeting. Also, mUltiple routing options would be available should known threat emitters move or suspected emitters become active.

24 The greatest improvement to both survival and mission accomplishment is a direct result of B-2 Stealth Bomber research. The most significant restriction to the present version of the F-117 is its inability to receive or transmit any form of communication while stealthy. This physical limitation is due to the inherent radar reflectivity of radio antennas. When the aircraft was designed, technology was unable to produce an antenna that did not have a radar cross section mUltiples larger than the actual aircraft. To counteract this problem, the communications antennae were designed to retract into the airframe. A warning light indicating retraction failure was incorporated into the display system. Retraction failure was a "no go" item for combat and caused the largest number of post takeoff maintenance aborts during ODS. Prior to entering enemy radar coverage, the pilot retracts the antennas, effectively isolating the system from any communication. After the "stealth check" which includes antennae retraction, the pilot is isolated from any form of recall or update. This significantly complicates short term command and control (pilots were effectively isolated for 2-3 hours during each ODS mission). In addition, any attempt to attack moving assets is an exercise in futility since updates on target positioning are physically impossible. Emergency communication, in the case of battle damage or system problems, requires the additional time necessary to extend the antennae. The ensuing increase in radar cross section may

25 prove fatal, even if the original problem was not. . Conformal antennae, molded into the surface of the wing with negligible effect on radar reflectivity, have opened significant combat scenarios for the F-117 .. Although still lacking the flexibility of most modern fighter aircraft due to its operations in extremely high threat areas and reliance on threat avoidance, the strengths of the system accuracy, reliability, and ability to surprise can be exploited across the spectrum of combat or so. The major implication is the ability to receive information and update threats, target information, and route changes while in enemy territory. The system can attack moving targets, .adjust routing to avoid mobile threats, or completely change the target area due to changing tactical or strategic scenario. Changes could be highlighted on the moving map display to alert the pilot to either acknowledge with a microburst transmission (preserving stealth) or departure from the target area to receive new mission tasking. Although most fighter aircraft are already equipped with global positioning systems (GPS) that include update capability while airborne, the lack of reception ability has limited the F 117 to inertial navigation only. Despite the extremely accurate inertial system, it does not compare to the 6 meter accuracy of GPS. This accuracy would allow blind bombing with dumb bombs in the weather on larger targets, or precision guided munitions delivery in the weather if a ground illuminator was available.

26 The ability to attack ships, previously disregarded due to target movement limitations, now becomes a realistic objective. Seaborne formations are generally very heavily defended and the F-117 is the only system that could expect to survive an attack on a large group of ships. The inability to use terrain masking effectively eliminates attack by standard aircraft. Antennae also allow the F-117 to gather electronic intelligence while transitting the battle area. In SO situations, the ability to confirm the target at the last seconds prior to release and the ability to be recalled should the mission be cancelled are often essential. The mission commander, on scene, could give final approval just prior to weapon release. A microburst acknowledgement would preserve the integrity of the mission and still allow the F-117 to safely complete the mission and egress.

27 CHAPTER VII SPECIAL OPERATIONS APPLICATION OF THE F-117

u.S. forces have long depended on advanced technology to provide the maximum warfighting potential from smaller forces. In the late 1970s through the 1980s, the u.s. invested heavily in stealth technologies. We are now starting to reap the benefits. These technologies will provide the u.s. forces decisive 'capabilities against potentially well equipped foes at minimum cost in casualties -- increasingly important in an era in which we believe the American people will have a low tolerance for prolonged combat operations or mounting casualties. TI DESERT STORM has become the standard upon which the American pUblic bases its expectations. In weapons delivery, using "dumb" bombs, a unit with a 50 per cent hit rate \is considered extremely proficient. Precision munitions have increased that percentage a great deal. It was obvious that pUblic expectations had been significantly inflated· when CNN was announcing severe disappointment in a 66 per cent hit rate using a combination of weapons, highly weighted toward dumb Dombs, in the January 1993 attack on southern Iraq.

The application of the F-117 has fueled the ~maginations of many adventure writers. Not inhibited by international law or political realities, they can postulate scenarios that are unrealistic in the international climate. Tom Clancy , in Clear

28 and Present Danger uses his expectations of the then classified F-117 type aircraft to eliminate the leader, and major corporate body, of a ruthless drug cartel located in Columbia. Using a "soft exterior case" weapon that left no traceable residue, the F-117 eliminated a very nasty "enemy." The F-117 is obviously in existence, the "soft exterior case" weapon is still speculation. Although this instance is extreme, "The Air Force is committed and postured to employ surveillance assets and other capabilities (underline added) to help stem the flow of narcotics threatening the fabric of our society."n The stealth Fighter is a prime asset for use in support of law officials in counternarcotic operations. Even if the intent was not lethal, the F-117 could very effectively employ munitions to enhance suppression, shock, and intimidation. This was the primary mission during Operation JUST CAUSE when two F-117s initiated the primary attack. The aircraft were tasked to drop their ordnance in open fields near the major barracks to stun, disorient and confuse the Panamanian , soldiers.~ It was felt that the large explosions would cause them to surrender without major loss of life for either side. They were not to hit any buildings or structures. Due to weather, target confusion caused by last minute changes, and other complications, one of the pilots dropped his weapon on the wrong open field in the immediate target area. Both weapons were close to the barracks but the Panamanian soldiers were apparently not stunned, disoriented, and confused into surrender.

29 The Stealth Fighter can quickly, thoroughly, and without warning, disable early warning (EW), threat, and communications systems for both their own, and other friendly asset's protection. This was demonstrated clearly in ODS, during both the initiation of hostilities and throughout the air and ground battle. In conjunction with SOF, the F-117s took out the entire air defense net and communication networks that enabled the 1000 plus attack aircraft to enter Iraq prior to detection for the initial attack. This allowed destruction of a major portion of the Scud forces oriented toward Israel before they could be employed or moved. Saddam Hussein, without his eyes or ears, was led to believe the initial attacks would be on the Republican Guard Forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. The field commanders were quickly isolated from the decision makers in Baghdad and were completely unable to determine the intent of the air campaign. 40 Even at the end of the conflict, communications between Baghdad and the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation were so bad that field commanders could not report the true magnitude of the battlefield defeat. 41 As "Stonewall" Jackson clearly stated, we must "Mystify, Mislead, surprise." The use of the F-117 can allow deception to be a powerful weapon and force multiplier. The effective use of deception began with the initial phases of the Air campaign and continued throughout ODS.. The F-117 brings further credibility and possibilities to Winston Churchill's famous quote, "In war

30 time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." The F-117s subsequently removed a significant physical and potential psychological weapon from the Iraqi arsenal when they struck and destroyed the oil pumping stations used by the Iraqis to feed the fire trenches~~ Although not used, the F-117 was considered for very sensitive tasking of an SO nature during ODS. The Iraqi Air Force had moved many of its assets away from airfields to protect them from certain destruction. Although in violation of the rules of modern warfare, combat assets were parked next to mosques, hospitals, and other culturally and religiously sensitive facilities. Any type of explosive ordnance would undoubtably destroy both the target and the adjacent structure. The F-117 was considered for delivering laser guided inert ordnance to destroy these sensitive assets. The targets could have been destroyed through direct hit. This would display to the Iraqi leadership the inability to hide assets using protected facilities and would also destroy potential threats. This concept was abandoned due to the lack of aggressiveness by the Iraqi Air Force in attempting combat and the approaching end of the war. Colonel Douglas W. Craft, the former Chief, Policy and strategy Division, J-S, us Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, clearly recognizes the political and psychological implications of stealth technology in the Gulf War:

31 The success of the stealth systems and precision bombing capabilities projected some of the same physical and psychological aspects as weapons of mass destruction without the liabilities of these type of weapons. Operations that could target Saddam and his war-making potential without causing widespread, indiscriminate destruction provided a counter to Saddam's attempts at influencing world opinion. Such precision would prevent Saddam from painting coalition actions as war on the Iraqi people and the Arab nation.~

The narcotraffickers in the Clancy scenario can be replaced with terrorists and the scenario becomes much more realistic. In the Iran hostage situation during the Carter administration, the F-117 could have played a pivbtalrole in combatting the terrorist actions. During the Iranian crisis, the EW and communications systems could have been neutralized, allowing the rescuers significantly greater latitude of operation during ingress. The difficulties required by low level ingress, which were exacerbated by the tremendous low altitude dust storm, could have been minimized or eliminated. The terrorists would not have received any warning that would have led them to move or harm the hostages. At SOF arrival the electrical grid, and local support infrastructure, could have been disabled further decreasing the effectiveness of the terrorist defensive capabilities. Air defense systems could have been eliminated prior to egress, ensuring safe recovery. If necessary, a large force of F-117s could have been employed without evidence of a major airborne formation.

32 The hostage crisis in Lebanon, in which a Navy A-6 was shot down and the crew held for ransom, could have been prevented through the Stealth Fighter's capabilities to evade or effectively neutralize enemy air defense systems. Also, the A-6s were unable to carry precision guided munitions with the resulting degradation in accuracy. The probability of target destruction would have been increased by over a factor of ten using two F-117s instead of four A-6s. The Cuban missile crisis is another scenario perfectly suited to stealth employment. Without endangering a ground force, or large numbers of aerospace assets, the F-117 can eliminate a missile system threatening the U.S., an ally, or sea lines of communication. The F-117 was the only system to hit the targeted missile sites in the January 1993 Iraq strike. Another example would be the Iranian Silkworm systems threatening the straits of Hormuz. Within three seconds the entire delivery system, support network, storage capability and maintenance facilities could be rendered permanently nonfunctional. Although the u.s. does not interfere in internal affairs of other countries, such as a coup d'etat, the F-117 could be employed to neutralize television, radio, C3, and political centers without leaving' evidence that the coup leaders did not solely accomplish the mission. In addition, the risk of collateral damage would be negligible. The above scenarios are illustrative of the F-117 capabilities under SO tasking. Lebanon, Iran, and the Cuban

33 situations occurred prior to the fielding of stealth technology. However, it is interesting to note the decline in terrorist activities since the demonstration of the lethality, accuracy, and limited vulnerability of stealth assets during ODS. Even Qhaddafi has maintained an uncharacteristic silence, not displayed even after the attack on Libya by the F-llls in the mid-1980s. Should Qhaddafi show signs of unrestrained terrorist support a preemptive strike to eliminate chemical warfare assets could prove to be the key. Another option would be a preemptive strike to eliminate the Libyan AWACS, virtually blinding the non-coastal air defense" network. The F-117 is different from other assets. Escort and other support aircraft are not required. It could be deployed discreetly, bedded down covertly (or aerial refueled), allowing deniability by host government. It could approach and attack the target undetected with minimal chance of intercept. The F-117 provides its own terminal guidance for precision munitions, eliminating the need for SOF in the target area to provide terminal guidance. There would be no evidence that u.S. aircraft had been in the region and less risk for the ground forces. The F-117 has the ability to be the "smokeless gun" with very little probability of collateral damage.

34 CHAPTER VIII RECOMMENDATIONS

The F-117 entered service in 1983, over seven years before it went to war. Since that time, and for the foreseeable future - at least to the year 2000 - there is no equivalent system elsewhere in the world. However, nowhere have I been able to find Stealth representation in AFSOF or in So exercises or planning cells. There is no universal formula for the proper employment of aerospace power, to include the F-117, in a campaign or operation. Education and awareness by the senior planners and commanders is essential to derive maximum benefit from aerospace assets. Integration of the Stealth into the internal planning processes of special operations staffs cannot begin any sooner. without extensive familiarity of strengths, limitations; and critical employment needs, the F-117 will be a wasted resource in situations where it could provide the greatest leverage. If the United States should choose to intervene in a low intensity conflict or So scenario, we must be fully prepared to intervene with a totally integrated, well-trained, and sharply honed team. This team must have a fully operational and well conceived command and 'control structure. There may not be time to slowly assemble a force and command structure that could learn on the job.~ ODS is not the model for smaller scale SO.

35 A well educated and thoroughly integrated planning staff is as important as a knowledgeable command and control structure. The F-117, despite an extremely successful combat record, has severe limitations and absolutely critical planning needs. If the aircraft is to be used, these limitations and needs must be integrated from the very beginning of any proposed operation. In many cases, the mission planning requirements may preclude operations in a time-critical situation. Most of the limitations cannot be resolved on a no-notice basis. To optimize the potential for success in future SO, an educated Stealth representative is essential to the staff of any AFSOCC or JFSOCC. In any major operation, it is assumed the JFACC or air component representative will be familiar with the basic performance capabilities of the aircraft. Smaller operations may not have that luxury due to political sensitivities or compartmentalization. As a minimum, the USAF Air Combat Command representative to AFSOC must be intimately familiar with the F-117. A former F-117 pilot would be the most logical individual to fill this position. Without practice, any attempt to integrate the F-117 into SO will most likely be frustrating and unsuccessful. The F-117 was used in Just Cause, in conjunction with SOF, but the results were less than spectacular. The Gulf War proved the dictum "Train like YOQ are going to fight." and the only way to train for this type of activity is a joint exercise integrating the F-117 and SO staff. The opportunity for coordination would be invaluable for

36 both the F-117 and SO communities. This would be an excellent introduction for the SO staff to familiarize themselves with the capabilities and limitations of one of their potentially most valuable tools. The F-117 capabilities and limitations should be integral to SO contingency operations. Significant advantage could be gained in joint operations by exercising the F-117 in any SO planning scenario requiring direct action, aerospace unconventional warfare, or anti-terrorist actions.

37 ENDNOTES

I U.S. Special Operations Command. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Joint Pub 3-05 (TEST PUB). Washington D.C: October 1990.p. GL-20.

2 united States Special Operations Command. Special Operations Forces Status Report, Washington D.C: March 1991. p. 1.

3 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Title 10. United states Code Armed Forces. 102d Congress, 1st Session, 1991. Sect.167.

4 Ibid., Sect~1453.

5 Lewis B. Ware, Low Intensity Conflict in the Third World. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1988. p. 168

6 Bill Sweetman and James Goodall, Lockheed F-117a Operation and Development of the Stealth Fighter., Osceola: Motorbooks International, 1990, p. 24.

7 U.S. Special Operations Command. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Joint Pub 3-05. (Test Pub). October 1990. p. 11-5.

8 Carl W. stiner, "US Special Operations Forces: A strategic Perspective" Parameters, Summer 1992.

9 Ibid., p. D-1.

10 John R. Moulton, "Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense." CADRE Paper. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press .. September 1991. p. 1.

11 Richard J. Erickson, Legitimate Use of Military Force Against state-Sponsored International Terrorism, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1989. p. 168.

12 Ibid., p. 8.

13 Bill Sweetman and James Goodall, Lockheed F-117A Operation and Development of the Stealth Fighter. p. 24.

14 U.S. Department of the Air Force. Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the united States Air Force. Vol II, Washington D.C: U.S. Government printing Office, March 1992. p. 158.

15 Ibid. p ..16. 38 16 Harold R. Winton, "Reflections on the Air Force's New Manual." Military Review. LXXII, no. 11, (Nov 92), p. 23.

17 Price T. Bingham, "The Air Force's New Doctrine." Military Review. LXXII, no. 11, (Nov 92), p. 18.

18 John R. Moulton, "Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense." p. 4,8.

19 Dennis M. Drew, "Insurgency and counterinsurgency American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals." CADRE Paper. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press. Mar 1988. p. 42-43.

W Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq Air Power In the Gulf War, Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992, p. 169.

21 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Title 10. United States Code Armed Forces, 102d Congress, 1st Session, 1991. p. T-74.

22 Ibid. n U.S. Department of the Air Force. operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (August 1990 - March 1991), Fact Sheet. 37th Tactical Fighter Wing Public Affairs Office, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, April 1991.

U Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq Air Power in the Gulf War, p. 177.

25 Ibid.

26 Charles Fenyvesic, "Off Target", U.S. News and World Report, 25 Jan 1993, p. 28. i n Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq Air Power in the Gulf War, p. 250.

28 U.S. Congress. House of {representatives. Armed Forces Committee. Title 10. United States Code Armed Forces. p. T-74.

29 Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq Air Power in the Gulf War, p. 249.

30 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Title 10. United States Code Armed Forces. p. 244.

39 31 Transcript of speech by Pres. George Bush at the commencement of the Air Force Academy, May 29, 1991, reprinted in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, no. 22, p. 684. n U.S. Department of the Air Force, F-117A Mission Qualification TraininaProgram, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M: p. 5-7.

33 U.S. Department of the Air Force. F-117A Phase Manual, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M: pp. 6-1 to 6-4. ~ U.S. Department of the Air Force. 416 Fighter Squadron six Month Training Plan Jan -Jun 1991, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M: pp. 16-21.

35 Harold P. Myers, Nighthawks Over Iraq: A Chronology of the F-117A Stealth Fighter in Operations Desert Shield and DESERT STORM, Special Study: 37 FW/HO-91-1, Tonopah Test Range, Nv. ~ U.S. Department of the Air Force. USAF Offensive Combat Improvement Program (OCIP) Upgrade Training Program, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M: October 1992.

n U.S. Department of the Air Force. The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global Power, White Paper. Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office. June 1990, p. 3.

38 Ibid. , p. 11.

39 Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq Air Power in the Gulf War, p. 114. ~ U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces. p. T-73.

41 Douglas W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 1992. p. 38.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., pp. 12-13.

44 Dennis M. Drew, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals". CADRE Paper. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press. March 1988, p. 42.

40. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bingham, Price T. Lt Col (Ret), USAF. "The Air Force's New Doctrine". Military Review, LXXII, no. 11, (November 1992).

Bush, George, H. "Commencement Speech to the Air Force Academy, May 29, 1991, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 27, no. 22.

Craft, Douglas W. An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, August 1992.

Drew, Dennis M. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals". CADRE Paper. Maxwell Air Force Base, Air University Press. March 1988. Erickson, Richard J. Lt Col, USAF, Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-Sponsored International Terrorism, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1989.

Fenyvesic, Charles, "Off Target". U.S. News and World Report, Jan 25, 1993, p. 28.

Hallion, Richard P. Storm Over Iraq Air Power in the Gulf War, Washington: smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.

Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (FM 100-20, AFP 3-20), Washington D.C: US Government Printing office, 1990.

Lynch, David J. "How the Skunk Works Fielded Stealth". AIR FORCE, 75, no. 11 (November 1992).

Macy, Melinda, Destination Baghdad, Las Vegas: M&M Graphics, 1991.

Moulton, John R. "Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense." CADRE Paper. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1991.

Myers~ Harold P. SMSgt, USAF. "History and Lineage of the F-117 Stealth Fighter Organizations." Special Study, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada: 1990.

Myers, Harold P. SMSgt, USAF. "Nighthawks Over Iraq: A Chronology of the F-117 Stealth Fighter in operations Desert Shield and DESERT STORM." Special Study 37 FW/HO-91-1, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada: Office of History, HQ 37th Fighter Wing, USAF.

41 Richardson, Doug, Stealth Deception, Evasion, and Concealment -in the Air. New York: Salamander Books Ltd. 1989. Shaw, Robert L. Fighter Combat, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985. Stiner, Carl W. "US Special operations Forces: A Strategic Perspective" Parameters, Summer 1992. Sweetman, Bill and James Goodall, Lockheed F-117 Operation and Development of the Stealth Fighter, Osceola: Motorbooks International, 1990, U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces. 102d Congress, 1st Session, 1991. U.S. Department of the Air Force. The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global Power, White Paper. Washington D.C: U.S. Government printing Office, June 1990. U.S. Department of the Air Force. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Volume 1. Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992. U.S. Department of the Air Force. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Volume II. Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992. U.S. Department of the Air Force. USAF Mission Qualification Training Program F-117, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M: October 1992. U.S. Department of the Air Force. USAF Offensive Combat Improvement Program (OCIP) Upgrade Training Program, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M: October 1992. U.S. Department of the Air Force. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (August 1990-March 1991), Fact Sheet. 37th Tactical Fighter Wing Public Affairs Office, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, April 1991. U.S. Department of the Air Force. Phase Manual USAF Operational Training Courses F-117TXOPA and F-117IOOAA, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M: December 1992. U.S. Department of the Air Force, 416th Fighter Squadron six Month Training Plan, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M: Jan-June 1993. United States Special Operations Command. Doctrine For Joint Special Operations Joint Pub 3-05 (Test Pub). Washington D.C: October 1990. 42 United States Special Operations Command. Special Operations Forces Status Report. Washington D.C: March 1991. Warden, John A. III, The Air Campaign, Washington D.C: National Defense University Press, 1988. Ware, Lewis B. Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1988. Werrell, Kenneth P. "Air War Victorious: The Gulf War vs. Vietnam", Parameters, Summer 1992. winton, Harold R. "Reflections on The Air Force's New Manual". Military Review, LXXII, no. 11, (November 1992). INTERVIEWS OR PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS Boyd, Jon Major: former Assistant Operations Officer, 416th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 37th Fighter Wing, u.S. Air Force. Fieldstad, Kimble Major: former Operations Officer, 416th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 37th Fighter Wing; Program Director F-117, Air Combat Command, U.S. Air Force. Klause, Klause Colonel: former Deputy Commander for Operations, 37th Tactical Fighter Wing, U.S. Air Force. Lewis, Rick Lieutenant Colonel: former DESERT STORM planning cell, U.S. Air Force. Treadway, C.G.R. Major: former Flight Commander, 416th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 37th Tactical Fighter Wing, u.S. Air Force.

UNCLASSIFIED

,,,CURITY- CLASSIFICA rIO,N OF nilS PAG"~ .I Form Aoproved j REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OM8 No. 0704.0188 , i > la. i{E?ORT SE.CURITY CLASSIFICATION I:b. RESTr:ICIVE ,MARKINGS ~ Unclassified I None j 2a. SE.CURITY CLASSIFICATIO,'J AUTHORln 3 . ,2.!,S~~TiON / AVAILABILITY OF ~E"ORT N/A .f\pproved· fori public release. 2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE ------N/A BistriR~~~o~\is unlimited. <2, PEr:FORMING ORGANIZATION i(E?ORT ,'JUM6E,i{(SI 5, MONITORING ORGA,NIZATiON',:,"O,U ,'JUMBER(S)

6a. NAME OF ?ER~ORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFiC::: SYMBOL J 7a, ,\JAME OF ,'v10NITORING Or:GA,\JIZ",TION U.S. Army War College (If applicable)

6e. ADDRESS (City, Stare, and ZIP Code) 7b. ADDF~!:SS (City, State. and ZIP Cace) FORBES AVE, ROOT HALL, BLDG 122 CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050

8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING 8b. OFFIe.:;: SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INST,WMENT IOEilJT:FiCATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (If applicable) STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUT~ AWCI Be. AOORESS (City, Stare, and ZIP Code) '0, SOURC:: OF FUNDING NUMBE,i{S FORBES AVE, ROOT HALL, BLDG 122 ,'ROGRAM PROJECT 7~Si< WORK UNIT

ELEMENlT NO. NO. ,NO, ACCESSION NO. / CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050 r

11. TITLE (Include Secunty Classdicarion)

; The Role of the Fl17 Stealth Fighter in Special Operations

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) GreQOrv T. Gonvea 13a, TYPE OF REPORT r3b. TIME COVEil.ED 1<2. DATE OF ,'lEPORT (Year, Monti" Day) 1'5, PAGE COUNT FROM TO 93/02/23 43 ; 16. SU~PLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI COOE5 IB, SUBJECT TERMS (Cormnue on rever;e if necessary and Idennfy by block number) FIELD G"OUP SUB-GROUP Special Operations, Stealth, Fl17, Gulf War, Desert Storm, . Just Cause, Smart Munitions

19, ABSTRACT (Continue on revene if necessdry and idenrlfy by blo<1< number)

See reverse.

. 20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY ClJl.SSIFICATION - f4] UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED o SAME AS RPT. o OTIC USERS Unclassi·fied 22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Cocie) 1 22e. OFFICE SYMBOL tor. DOUGLAS v. JOHNSON II (717) 245-4057 AWCI DO Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obso/ere. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED Special operations, as the name implies, are not routine or normal. Neither is the F-117 Stealth Fighter. This' paper discusses special operations doctrine, Air Force special operations doctrine, and the applicability of the F-117 to special operations. The capabilities, unit training programs, combat performance, and future developments of the aircraft are used to justify increased integration of the F-117 and special operations communities. The F-l17 can offer significant capabilities to the special operations arena. However, many limitations apply. This paper recommends F-117 representation on special operations staff and increased joint exercises to implement F-117 integration in limited special operations activities.