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Is Theopolitics an Antipolitics? 65 Stipulate That the Purpose of Politics Is to Maintain the State, It Refusestoallow Politics Its Autonomous Existence

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Is Theopolitics an Antipolitics? 65 Stipulate That the Purpose of Politics Is to Maintain the State, It Refusestoallow Politics Its Autonomous Existence Samuel HayimBrody Is TheopoliticsanAntipolitics? Martin Buber,Anarchism, and the Ideaofthe Political We havecome to recognize that the political is the total, and as aresult we know that any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision... – Carl Schmitt, “Preface to the Second Edition” of Political Theology (1934) Hereisthe serpent in the fullness of its power! – Martin Buber, “Letter to Gandhi” (1939) Introduction:The Shape of the Theopolitical Problem “Antipolitics,” writes Michael Walzer, “is akind of politics.”¹ Thispuzzling state- ment occurs in Walzer’srecent discussion of the Bible, which he calls “apolitical book,” but one that has “no political theory” in it; its writers are “engaged with politics” but are “not very interested in politics,” although he admits that “writ- ers who are uninterested in politics nonetheless have alot to saythat is politi- callyinteresting.” Walzerhas always been aclear writer,and if this series of statements seems convoluted, this maybedue to the subject matter itself. Close examination of the relationship of religion and politics has away of calling into question our very understanding of the natureofboth “religion” and “pol- itics” as distinct and separate spheres that can each be described according to its own special set of characteristics. This, of course, is an inconvenient state of af- fairs for university departments like PoliticalScience and Religion, which would like to assume thatthe objects of their studydoinfact exist. This essayexcavates and explicates the potential contribution of Martin Buber to the contemporary resurgence of interest in the borders between religion and politics, through an examination of the category “theopolitics” in Buber’s mature work, particularly Königtum Gottes (1932), as well as his later biblical writings.² Interest in Buber,both during and after his lifetime, has centered on Michael Walzer, In God’sShadow:Politics in the HebrewBible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), xiii. The essayispart of alargerproject on Buber’stheopolitics. That project addresses manytop- ics beyond what spaceallows here,including the historical contextoftheopoliticsinWeimar Germanyand its manifestation in aunique form of Zionism. What follows,however,will DOI 10.1515/9783110402223-005, © 2018 Samuel Hayim Brody, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 62 Samuel HayimBrody his introduction of Hasidism to Western audiences,aswellashis “philosophyof dialogue” as represented by Ich und Du (1923). During the vogueof“religious ex- istentialism” in the 1950s and 60s Buber was abest-seller; the waning of this trend dimmed his star somewhat,and he settled into his current position: an im- portant figure in Jewish ethics, who is stillread in Protestant seminaries and lib- eral rabbinical schools as an exemplar of modernJewishthought outside the strictures of halakha.³ Fewscholars have focused on Buber’spolitical thought, and thosewho do often complain about theirlack of company. Robert Weltsch, for example, writes: “To manyitmay appear that Martin Buber is not apolitical scientist. He is regarded as areligious thinker and as asocial philosopher,not as aman of politics. Such aclassification, however,would be afallacy.”⁴ Twenty years later,Steven Schwarzschild remarks thatlittle has changed: Much has been written about virtuallyall the vast and diverse aspects of the life and works of Martin Buber.His political philosophyand activities areastrikingexception to this state of affairs,although socio-political matters wereclearlyoffundamental importance to him… In at least some instances this exception is made tendentiously: Buber’sreputation is to be used for institutional and political self-advancement,but the natureofhis political thought and programme would resist such purposes.⁵ Whether for the reason Weltsch suggests, that scholars simply do not see Buber as apolitical writer,orfor the more insidious reason proposed by Schwarzschild, that they find the topic dangerous,itremains the casetwo more decades later that thereisnodefinitive treatment of Buber’spolitics.⁶ focus primarilyonthe theoretical tenets of theopoliticsasitrelates to other discourses that ex- amine the border between religion and politics. One could further speculateonthe reception of Buber’s “successors” as applesofthe schol- arlyeye in the 1970sand 80s:Scholem’sseeminglyhard-headed and scientific interpretation of Jewish mysticism displaced Buber’s “romantic” vision of Hasidism, while Levinas’sontologyof alterity came into fashion for those whowereattracted to the “philosophyofdialogue.” Levi- nas’spopularity,sometimes mediated through the prism of Jacques Derrida, in turn contributed to the “stayingpower” of Heideggerand Rosenzweig,both acknowledgedinfluencesonLevinas, as the discourse of “existentialism” faded into that of “postmodernism.” Robert Weltsch, “Buber’sPolitical Philosophy,” ThePhilosophy of MartinBuber,The Library of LivingPhilosophers Volume XII, eds.PaulArthur Schilpp and MauriceFriedman (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press,1967), 435 – 449. Steven Schwarzschild, “ACritiqueofMartin Buber’sPolitical Philosophy: An AffectionateReap- praisal,” ThePursuit of the Ideal: JewishWritings of Steven Schwarzschild,ed. MenachemKellner (Al- bany: SUNY Press, 1990),185 – 207. Originally publishedas“ACritiqueofM.Buber’sPolitical Philos- ophy—An AffectionateReappraisal,” LeoBaeck Institute Yearbook XXXI,1986, 355– 388. Some scholars denythat he has apolitics at all: “…[T]he two poles of Jewish life that would hold [Buber’s] primary interest [were] the cultural and the spiritual.With the exception of his Is TheopoliticsanAntipolitics? 63 Weltschisright that scholars and the general publicalike have simplybeen more interested in other aspects of Buber’swork. But surelyitisnot that Buber just happens to be seen as anon-political writer,but that something about his work actively encourages the formationofsuch aperception. Politics seems to be consistentlysubordinatedtoother elements in his thought,lacking the proper independent treatment it receivesinwriters we recognize as belonging to the po- litical theory canon. The latter insight has been articulatedmost explicitlyby those who treat Buber as aphilosopher.Evenwhen Buber is recognized as hav- ing apolitics,and even when this politics is investigated with respect,itischar- acterized as an adjunct to his philosophy: the political utopia Buber soughtis related to his existential meditations on the I-Thou relation.⁷ Thisstance makes eminent sense if we takeontology (or ethics) to be first philosophy, and read the philosophyofdialogue as Buber’sontology (or ethics). From the dialogical perspective,Utopia is that configuration of society with the fewest possibleobstaclestothe fundamental human desire for acommunity based on recognition and mutual concern. Social structures thatdiscouragesuch re- gard, and demand subservience to laws of instrumentality,such as the state and the market, obstruct I-Thou encounters, although they maystill take place under these conditions.Such social structureswould be transformed in utopia, and would constituteadirect connection between Buber’sphilosophyand his politics. Bernard Susser sums up this approach: “[F]ederalism as Buber under- stands it is the principle of dialogue writ large and socialized.”⁸ Thus, it would seem that one could achieveamore political readingofBuber simplybybracketingphilosophyand attemptingtoisolate apolitical doctrine. However,significant disciplinary tendencies still militate in the direction of clas- sifying Buber as “really” an ethicist or “really” atheologian. Foremost among these is the idea that if politics is to be treated as asubjectinits ownright, later efforts on behalf of Brit Shalom,agroup committed to the reconciliation of Zionism and Arab nationalism, Buber was not particularlyinterested in politics and so did not himself pro- duce abodyofliteratureonthe topic, although he wroteoccasionallyonpolitical matters.” Gilya Gerda Schmidt, MartinBuber’sFormativeYears: From German CulturetoJewishRenewal, 1897– 1909 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1995), 118. Schmidtexcludes Brit Shalom from her judgement that Buber is non-political, but Howard M. Sachar,whomshe cites, includes them within this judgement: “The Brit Shalom was an ideological, not apolitical, group.” Sa- char, AHistoryofIsrael, From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Knopf, 1986), 180. Paul Mendes-Flohr, “The Desert Within and Social Renewal—Martin Buber’sVision of Uto- pia,” New Perspectives on Martin Buber,ed. Michael Zank (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 219–230, 220. BernardSusser, “The Anarcho-Federalism of Martin Buber,” Publius 9.4(Autumn 1979),103– 116,104. 64 Samuel HayimBrody then one must focus aboveall on the special rules or laws that are inherent to politics as adistinct sphere of life, what Max Weber called its Eigengesetzlichkeit or autonomy. The idea that politics is acraft demanding special knowledge is as old as Plato’sinquiry into the areté or excellence of the statesman. But the idea of the autonomy of politics,the claim that politics issues its own laws to itself, maybemuch younger.⁹ When Machiavelli is cited as the founder of modern po- litical science,itisusually because he is said to have emancipated politics from its subordination to ethics or religion, enablingittobestudied as an autono- mous realm.Politicaltheorists maythen be defined as those who follow in Ma- chiavelli’sfootsteps,placing
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