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Peirce Project Newsletter PEIRCE PROJECT NEWSLETTER Fall 2000 INDIANA UNIVERSITY-PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS Volume 3, No. 2 WILL NEH DISOWN SCHOLARLY EDITIONS? Scholarly editions have been in trouble six years, there might be another six years CHARLES since 1996, when Congress slashed fund- of dollar-for-dollar matching awards and HARTSHORNE ing for the national endowments. a final six years of two-for-one matching In Memoriam Although small annual budget increases awards (if two are raised, NEH gives Charles Hartshorne have restored some of that cut, NEH con- one). But there would be no outright died on 9 Octo- tinues to be severely underfunded, and funding after six years. ber 2000 at 103 Chairman William Ferris is feeling the For those who understand how much years of age. He pinch. time and funding are required to complete was a monument to philosophy, always Ferris, a folklorist from Mississippi, scholarly editions, it is evident that this bringing to mind the rare qualities of would like to leave his mark on the new policy would force many editions to wonder and insight one attributes to the humanities programs his agency funds shut down. Major editions of fifteen or philosophers of ancient Greece. Hart- and wants to support more short-term, more volumes would no longer be viable. shorne’s achievements and honors are popular-culture projects. Without addi- Even minor editions cannot be completed many and well-known, and volume 21 tional support from Congress, Ferris in six years—and how NEH supposes an in the Library of Living Philosophers knows he will have to fund these projects edition could continue to operate after six series is devoted to him. In addition to with dollars taken from other NEH pro- years on matching awards alone is hard to being a great philosopher in his own grams. The scholarly editions stand out as understand, because without some out- right, he was perhaps the greatest inter- easy targets because they take time, and a right funding, staff cannot be kept in place preter of the thought of Alfred North commitment to a new edition is likely to while matching funds are raised. Whitehead, whose process philosophy be long-lasting. Although the scholarly As word of this proposed policy he developed and applied so astutely to editions program has been a major part of spread, opposition began to grow. On 6 theological questions. Hartshorne was the NEH profile since the endowment was October 2000 an article titled “Scholars also a great Peirce scholar and, with first established in 1965, Ferris believes it Fear Humanities Endowment Is Being Paul Weiss, edited the first six volumes is time to cut the editions loose—or at Dumbed Down” appeared in the Chroni- of the classic Harvard edition of Peirce’s least to begin doing so. cle of Higher Education. That article, by writings. Were it not for that work, After considering this matter over a Ron Southwick, although not entirely Peirce’s thought might have been all but period of several months, the President’s critical of Ferris’s leadership, reported lost to present thought. Hartshorne Council reached a tentative conclusion that “to many scholars, the idea that the served as a member of the Peirce Edi- that long-term projects (principally the endowment supports barn photography tion Project’s advisory board until after scholarly editions) should have outright with enthusiasm while it considers cutting his 100th birthday. funding limited to six years. After the first Continued on page 2 CAROLYN EISELE of Peirce’s mathematical and philosophi- of Charles S. Peirce (edited by Richard In Memoriam cal works. Martin). Eisele’s unwavering recognition Carolyn Eisele, member of the Board of Professor Eisele was known world- of Peirce’s importance and her unstinting Advisors and friend of the Peirce Edi- wide as a mathematician, a historian of devotion to the advancement of Peirce tion Project, died on 15 January 2000. nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholarship were little short of prophetic. Born in New York in 1902, Eisele was mathematics and science, and as a leading Eisele’s papers and library have been educated at Hunter College and did expert on the thought of Charles Peirce. deposited at IUPUI in the care of the graduate work in mathematics at Colum- She served as president of the Charles S. Peirce Edition Project. bia University and the University of Chi- Peirce Society. Her editions of Peirce’s cago. She taught mathematics at Hunter mathematical writings, The New Elements College for nearly fifty years and retired of Mathematics, and his writings on the as professor in 1972. In 1980, she was history of science, Historical Perspec- awarded a Doctor of Humanities degree tives on Peirce’s Logic of Science, are by Texas Tech University and two years monumental achievements. She almost later received an honorary Doctorate of single-handedly brought Peirce’s mathe- Science from Lehigh University. In matical ideas to the serious attention of 1985, the New York Academy of Sci- historians of mathematics and science. ences recognized Eisele for her seminal Eisele’s principal studies of Peirce’s contributions to the history and philoso- thought are collected in her Studies in the phy of science through her publication Scientific and Mathematical Philosophy PEIRCE PROJECT NEWSLETTER 2 Volume 3, No. 2, Fall 2000 Continued from page 1 scholarly projects represents a terrible well-argued letters ended up on the desks THE CAROLYN EISELE shift in priorities” and “there isn’t any of Roberts and Ferris. The weight of con- COLLECTION doubt that the academic-research commu- cern increased on 21 October when the nity is not thrilled with the way Bill Ferris New York Times published a lead editorial On 15 January 2000, Carolyn Eisele has been running the agency.” This last titled “Scholarly Editions in Jeopardy.” passed away in her Manhattan apartment comment, attributed to Stanley Katz, con- The Times editorial concluded with this at the age of 98. The real tragedy, how- tinued: “[Ferris has] no strategic view of paragraph: ever, occurred much earlier, in 1992, the humanities. He doesn’t have a vision Nothing the N.E.H. can do is more central when a severe stroke greatly incapacitated of what the academic humanities are or to its mission than fostering the kind of her. She spent the last eight years of her research and historical enlightenment where they fit.” Overall, the gist of the life in bed in her small apartment sur- criticism and concern was that Ferris’s these editions provide. They preserve and make public this country’s intellectual, rounded by her books and papers, almost shift of priorities to folklore involved a political and cultural monuments. The entirely unable to communicate, and clear move from the more traditional irony is that by trying to kill off funding as under the constant care of a professional humanities programs the endowment had an expression of conservative ire, Con- nurse. gress and the endowment’s critics have been established to foster and support. The stiff Manhattan rents forced a The council’s decision to reduce and made the task of preserving, editing and disseminating “the best that is known and quick evacuation of the apartment. So, at eventually cut off support for major edi- thought in the world” nearly impossible. It the request of the executor of her estate, tions, notwithstanding the fact that they is time to put these editions on a solid Arthur Kaufman, Nathan Houser and I are prized for their use in research and as footing, to give them the encouragement left for New York City to collect her they so clearly deserve. monuments to America’s genius, is an library and papers, which had been given incontrovertible sign of what Ferris is up When the President’s Council met on to the Peirce Edition Project. to. 17 November, the council members took Carolyn Eisele lived in a one-bedroom Criticism of Ferris’s plan mounted to a account of the criticisms of Ferris’s plan. apartment on the 27th floor of an apart- sufficient level to raise some second The council seemed more reluctant to ment building in midtown Manhattan. thoughts at NEH. On 25 September John abandon or severely cut back the editions, What the apartment lacked in size was and concluded its discussion by adopting Roberts, deputy chairman, issued a letter amply compensated for by its location a proposal to create a separate scholarly outlining the proposed policy and inviting and its most magnificent view of the Man- editions budget and to construct new comment. Roberts gave interested parties hattan skyline, especially at night. The guidelines for editions. The guidelines are until 16 October (twenty-one days) to apartment was literally filled with books still expected to strongly favor projects respond. This would give the President’s and papers. She must never have thrown that can be completed within a limited Council, assembling in November (pre- anything away. Books and journals were time frame, but they will probably be less sumably to adopt the proposed policy), found everywhere, as were the remnants restrictive than the earlier six-year plan. the benefit of responses arriving by the of her extensive travels, and the hall clos- The council plans to take up this matter sixteenth. Twenty-one days was not much ets were filled more than knee-high with again in March. time to inform friends of the editions of shopping bags stuffed with correspon- Now with a new Republican adminis- the present danger, but somehow word got dence. Her complete financial records, tration at the nation’s helm, it is unclear out, and a surprising number of strong, including all check stubs, tax returns, what is in store for Ferris and for his revi- phone bills, etc.
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