WHO COUNTRY OFFICE LIBYA ANNUAL REPORT WHO Country Offce (Tripoli, Libya) Elizabeth Hoff, WHO Representative 2020 [email protected]
WHO Country Offce (Tripoli, Libya) Yahya Bouzo, Communications Offcer [email protected]
WHO Regional Offce for the Eastern Mediterranean (Cairo, Egypt) Inas Hamam, Communications Offcer [email protected] WHOWHO LibraryLibrary CataloguingCataloguing inin PublicationPublication DataData
WorldNames: Health World Organization.Health Organization. Regional Regional Office Office for thefor theEastern Eastern Mediterranean Mediterranean WorldTitle: WHO Health country Organization office Libya: Syrian annual Arab report Republic 2020 / annual World Healthreport Organization.2018 / World Regional Health Organization.Office for the Eastern Regional Office forMediterranean the Eastern Mediterranean p.Description: Cairo: World Health Organization. Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, [2021] ISBN:Identifier: 978-92-9022-254-5 ISBN 978-92-9022-595-9 (pbk.) | ISBN 978-92-9022-597-3 (online) ISBN:Subjects: 978-92-9022-255-2 Health Status | COVID-19 (online) - prevention & control | Betacoronavirus | Disease Outbreaks | Delivery of Health Care | 1.Emergency Health Status Medical - Syria Services 2. |Health Communicable Services diseasesAccessibility – prevention - Syria &3. control Delivery | Noncommunicable of Health Care diseases4. Emergency – prevention Medical & Servicescontrol | Libya 5. Health | Annual Information Reports Systems 6. Nutritional Status 7. Annual Reports I. Title II. Regional Office for the EasternClassification: Mediterranean NLM WA 300 (NLM Classification: WA 300)
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Foreword 4 TABLE OF Overview 6 Political developments 6 CONTENTS COVID-19 8 People in need of humanitarian health assistance 9 Status of health care services 9 Health care workforce 11 Attacks on health care 11 WHO’s response 14 Delivering emergency supplies 16 Deploying emergency medical teams 17 Training health care workers 18 Public health areas of work 20 COVID-19 20 Primary health care 24 Communicable diseases 26 Childhood vaccination 26 Tuberculosis 27 Leishmaniasis 29 Disease surveillance and response 30 Noncommunicable diseases 31 Mental health 32 Reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health 32 Gender-based violence 33 Health information system 34 Leading the health sector 36 Accountability to benefciaries 37 Advocacy 38 WCO structure, internal oversight and management 40 Structure 40 Internal oversight 40 Internal audit 40 Country functional review 41 Operational constraints and mitigating measures 42 Looking ahead 45 Planned activities in 2021 46 Annex 1 Voluntary contributions received in 2020 48 Annex 2 Funds required in 2021 49 Annex 3 Main assessments conducted reports published in 2020 51
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The year 2020 was marked by two major events. immediate and longer-term response. WHO had Throughout the frst half of the year, the fght to reassign many of its staff and divert other FOREWORD for control over the country’s considerable resources to meet the extraordinary challenges resources continued between the UN-recognized posed by the pandemic. Working on three Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west fronts, WHO supported the COVID-19 response, and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east. continued its humanitarian operations, and In June 2020, decisive gains by the GNA led to a delivered medicines, equipment and supplies cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the to keep essential health services running. The LNA from the western part of the country. Organization worked with leaders on both sides of the political divide to help ensure that people The year was also indelibly marked by the in all parts of the country received humanitarian COVID-19 pandemic. On 24 March 2020, Libya assistance. reported its frst confrmed case of the disease. By the end of the year, almost 100 000 people WHO continued its advocacy efforts on behalf of had been infected with the virus. COVID-19 laid the health sector. WHO and UNICEF drew attention bare the country’s devastated infrastructure and to repeated vaccine shortages that led to tens of governance vacuum. Libya faced a pandemic thousands of children missing their scheduled on top of divided governance, widespread vaccinations. Following WHO’s direct intervention, corruption, a collapsing economy, an armed the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya released confict and a severely disrupted health system. immediate funds to replenish the country’s vaccine Border closures and national lockdowns disrupted supplies. WHO was also instrumental in securing trade and livelihoods, and the price of basic items the release of funds to pay Libyan health care rose steeply. Up to 90% of PHC centres were closed workers who had not received their salaries for in some areas, and several hospitals were forced several months. to suspend services. Health care staff refused to report for duty because they had no personal ecently, the GNA and LNA took a signifcant step protection equipment (PPE) and had not been towards negotiating a political solution to the paid for several months. Confict, COVID-19 and hostilities. On 2 October 2020, military offcers economic collapse threatened to plunge hundreds from both sides signed a countrywide, permanent of thousands of civilians deeper into chaos. ceasefre agreement in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya The extraordinarily complex political and security (UNSMIL). The agreement calls for the withdrawal environment hampered efforts to contain the of all military units and armed troops from confict spread of the pandemic. The absence of national frontlines and the departure of all mercenaries leadership led to unrealistic expectations being and foreign fghters within 90 days. In December placed on WHO and the health sector. However, 2021, Libyans will hold national elections to elect a the main factors preventing an effective response government of national unity. These developments are beyond WHO’s control and can only be resolved offer the best hope in several years for a peaceful through a negotiated political settlement that sets end to the confict. Libya on the path to stability and democracy.
As the lead agency for health in Libya, WHO was at the forefront of efforts to stem the spread of COVID-19 and support the government’s
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OVERVIEW
The confict in Libya continued in 2020, fuelled surrounding areas. In mid-April, LNA-controlled by external powers that channelled money and towns along the western coastal road were seized Political developments weapons to factions inside the country. The by the GNA. The town of Tarhouna, a strategic country’s porous borders, especially in the south, stronghold of the LNA, became a fashpoint and National TB Programme (NTP) - Tuberculosis health facilities in Libya allowed the smuggling of migrants, foreign was attacked and besieged the same month. In Tunisia Tunisia fghters and weapons to continue unabated. June, GNA forces retook Tarhouna and other cities !Tripoli Derna Two competing governments – the Government Zwara Al JabalAl Akhdar ! on the coastal road and then regained full control Tunisia Aljfara Almargeb! Misrata Azzawya of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and the rival ! Almarj Tobruk Derna of Tripoli and nearby areas. The subsequent Nalut Tarhouna Benghazi ! ! ! ! Benghazi Azzintan government in the east backed by the Libyan discovery of several mass graves, most of them in · Misrata Sirt National Army (LNA) continued to fght for power ! Tarhouna, prompted calls from the UN Secretary- West !Ejdabia and resources. The situation was exacerbated by Tobruk General for a thorough investigation and for the Nalut Sirt local conficts between various factions and ethnic perpetrators to be brought to justice. r groups that laid bare the country’s deep tribal and !Aljufra political divides. Although Libya has the largest Water and electricity cuts were used as instruments Ejdabia oil reserves in Africa, the continuing blockade of of war. In April 2020, more than two million people Aljufra Wadi Ashshati the oil sector devastated its economy. In addition, in Tripoli and surrounding areas were left without the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic water for more than a week. In the spring of 2020, Sebha Algeria ! Sebha Egypt led to national lockdowns, rocketing food prices military activity around Tripoli disrupted hospitals’ Ubari ! South and signifcant loss of livelihoods, especially East electricity supplies and damaged the only factory Ghat Ubari for the refugees and migrants who make up producing oxygen tanks, just when oxygen was approximately 9% of Libya’s population. critically needed for the COVID-19 response. At !Ghat Murzuq the height of the summer, when temperatures At the beginning of the year, international !Alkufra reached well over 40 C, continued fghting in u r diplomatic initiatives seeking to end the confict the west cut off water and electricity supplies for were short-lived. In January 2020, the Berlin prolonged periods. By July 2020, daily blackouts Conference on Libya emphasized the need were averaging 12 hours per day. for a political solution to end the confict. The Legend following month, the United Nations Security In October 2020, prospects for lasting peace ! Main cities Council unanimously endorsed the conclusions of improved when military offcers from the LNA and Niger the conference and called for a lasting ceasefre. Main Road Chad GNA signed a permanent ceasefre agreement in Sudan Despite this, skirmishes between the GNA and LNA Districts Geneva under the auspices of UN MIL. By the end continued, with control of key locations passing of the year, the agreement had been breached Regions 0 25 50 100 150 200 back and forth between them. The LNA continued several times. Neighbouring countries Miles WHO Libya Office 15 /03/ 2021 its prolonged attempt to gain control of Tripoli and
Libya’s three regions and 22 districts
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People in need of humanitarian health assistance Beset by confict and insecurity, almost 900 000 particularly in the areas around southern Tripoli. COVID-19 people in the country needed humanitarian By the end of the year, the number of displaced assistance, including close to 400 000 Libyans people had fallen to around 392 000. However, the On 14 March 2020, in the face of the threat posed GNA in the west and the LNA in the east. Both (about 6% of the population) who had been presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance by the virus, Libya declared a state of emergency governments attempted to make political capital displaced. ollowing the LNA’s failed military posed a signifcant threat to returnees. and closed all its air and sea ports. Ten days later, out of the COVID-19 crisis by discrediting their offensive, people slowly began returning home, it reported its frst confrmed case of the disease. opponents and claiming they had the capacity to By the end of the year, almost 100 000 people respond on their own. The lack of accountability had been infected with the virus. The pandemic and internal tensions within and between exposed the country’s inequalities and placed a different government departments delayed huge strain on its already severely disrupted health critical decisions about releasing urgently needed system. Many households were plunged into funds to procure vaccines or support the COVID-19 Status of health care poverty. Border closures, movement restrictions response. In Tripoli, the position of Minister of and curfews imposed to reduce the spread of the Health remained vacant for most of the year, and services virus drove up the cost of food and essential items the deputy Minister was wanted on corruption More than half of Libya’s health care facilities that addition, many of them were reluctant to report by 20%. Many of the country’s more than half charges. By the end of the year, the COVID-19 were functioning in 2019 were forced to close for duty for fear of being infected with the SARS- million migrants and refugees no longer had access national preparedness and response plan, drafted in 2020. Closures were especially severe in rural CoV-2 virus. Between January and August 2020, to the informal work opportunities they once had. at the beginning of the pandemic, had still not areas, mainly because of security threats and lack only 70% of disease alerts were investigated and Because of their displacement or legal status, they been formally endorsed. of national and health sector funding. Those that responded to within 72 hours. had limited access to health care services. Those remained open suffered frequent electricity cuts who tried to return home found they could no The health system, already severely damaged by that were exacerbated by shortages of fuel to run In 2020, WHO assessed the health situation and longer do so because travel was extremely diffcult years of under-investment, struggled to cope with back-up generators. Repeated stockouts of critical health needs in 9 Libyan communities (comprising and their sources of income had disappeared. the additional demands brought by COVID-19. At vaccines disrupted immunization schedules and over 850 000 people) in 111 of Libya’s 22 districts. the start of the pandemic, reports indicated that put children at risk of life-threatening diseases Over 90% of these communities were in areas The extraordinarily complex political and security in some areas, up to 90% of primary health care such as measles and polio. WHO and UNICEF ranked as 3 or above on the severity scale2. The environment in Libya hampered efforts to contain (PHC) centres had closed and several hospitals had estimated that more than a quarter of a million assessment found that although hypertension the spread of the pandemic. Unequal access to been forced to suspend services because health children had missed their doses of essential and diabetes were the most commonly reported health care put the most vulnerable, particularly care staff refused to report for duty without PPE. vaccines. Nationwide, over two thirds of PHC diseases, medicines to treat them were widely refugees and migrants, at a disadvantage. Health care workers were paid only sporadically centres had no antibiotics, analgesics, insulin, unavailable. The nearest health care facility There was very little coordination between the and many were no longer reporting for duty. blood pressure medication or any of Libya’s other for patients was on average 14 km away, and top 20 essential medicines. Most health care staff this meant that they were inaccessible for many had to wait months to receive their salaries. In people.
1 East Libya E dabia. West Libya Al Jabal Al Gharbi, Al Jufra, Azzawya, Misrata, irt, Ubari, wara. outh Libya Al ufra, Ghat, Murzuq. 2 For information on the severity scale, see the section on WHO’s response.
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An assessment of the availability of fve essential health care services in the historically underserved Health care workforce south revealed that only 12% of primary health care (PHC) facilities had all fve services. Moreover, Libya has acute shortages of medical specialists, to grow Libya’s health workforce, especially only 3% of facilities had stocks of all top 20 midwives and nurses and huge gaps in coverage in priority areas such as primary health care, essential medicines, and almost one third had due to the uneven distribution of general nursing and mental health. Achieving this will no essential medicines at all. Three quarters of physicians, most of whom work in urban areas. require more training, greater recruitment, better communities had no antenatal care services or WHO’s 2020 assessment of health facilities in 11 retention and more fexibility and incentives to health care services for children under fve years districts showed there were six nurses for every improve the equitable distribution of the health of age. physician. The country continues to rely heavily workforce across the country. on foreign health care workers, even though the overseas workforce has steadily dwindled since In 2020, WHO was actively involved in the 2011 when the confict began. development of a United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) strategy to strengthen Libya’s nursing The Ministry of Health’s (MoH) plans to conduct a and midwifery workforce. The strategy will be A ailability o f e essential ealt care ser ices in detailed analysis of the health workforce in 2020 implemented in 2021. WHO is also in discussions acilities in sout ibya had to be put on hold because of the COVID-19 with the World Bank on a three-year World pandemic. If the analysis goes ahead as planned in Bank-funded project to strengthen Libya’s health 2021, it will form the basis of a long-term strategy workforce. Surgical services
NCD treatments
Children under 5 Attacks on health care
In 2020, there were confrmed attacks on health airstrikes. In April 2020, Al Khadra hospital in Vaccination care in Libya that killed nine people and in ured 2 Tripoli came under sustained shelling for more others. In addition, military activity around Tripoli than two days. The United Nations Secretary- Antenatal care in the spring of 2020 disrupted hospitals’ electricity General issued a strongly worded statement 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% supplies and damaged the only factory producing reminding all parties that medical personnel, oxygen tanks ust as shortages of oxygen to treat hospitals and medical facilities were protected COVID-19 patients were beginning to be reported. under international humanitarian law and that A ailable ot a ailable attacks on them might constitute war crimes. The forced closure of health facilities following In early May 2020, an armed group opened fre attacks has an obvious immediate impact. People inside the intensive care unit of Al-Jalla hospital Trauma care and disability services were available and Sebha. However, referrals were hampered by who need health care, including some who may in Benghazi. Doctors and nurses were assaulted, only in Libya’s main cities, and mental health the lack of reliable ways to transfer patients for have COVID-19, are no longer able to obtain it and life-saving medical equipment was damaged, services were almost non-existent. Immunization secondary or tertiary level care. Moreover, many some of them may die. In the long run, the cost and critically ill patients had to be transferred to services experienced repeated vaccine stockouts. hospitals were forced to suspend their services due of rebuilding hospitals and clinics and retraining Benghazi Medical Centre. Later that month, the COVID-19 lockdowns and curfews further reduced to the high rates of COVID-19 infection among health staff can run into hundreds of millions of Director-General of WHO and heads of other UN 3 people’s access to PHC services. patients and staff, further exacerbating gaps in dollars. agencies issued a joint statement expressing their the health system. Many people were forced to alarm over the continuing attacks on health care. Patients were increasingly referred for treatment seek private health care, diverting resources from In January 2020, two health workers in irt were Despite their appeal, another 19 attacks occurred to the main cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata overstretched family budgets. killed and another fve were in ured following between mid-May and 31 December 2020.
3 United Nations Offce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICE , International Organization for Migration, United Nations efugee Agency, United Nations Population Fund and the World Food Programme.
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A Ministry of Health Tripoli Tajoura Ain ara Abu Sali (5 !( (! warehouse lies in ruins (!!( !( !(!( (! !( Sabratha (1) Garabolli Shahhat (1) 36 Total Attacks following an attack. )! (! !( Misrata 9 Deaths Injuries Yefren !( Benghazi (2) Bani Waleed !( Credit WHO !( Abu Qurayn (3) Sirt (1) (! !( Ejdabia Attacks Impacted Albrayga (1) Health facilities 20
Attacks Impacted Transport 7 Attacks Impacted Personnel The year 2020 was also marked by the abduction of requests went unanswered. In December 2020, an 20 Attacks Impacted health care staff and the diversion of aid supplies. ambulance procured by WHO was hijacked near Patients In April, two doctors, a nurse and an administrative Misrata on its way to Benghazi for delivery to the 1 Attacks Impacted assistant in a hospital in Sirt were kidnapped by health authorities in east Libya. Although it was !( Supplies an armed group. They were released after several released a few days later, it remains in Misrata Algatroun 1 weeks. In September, a professor of surgery at Al- until WHO receives assurances from the authorities Khadra General Hospital in Tripoli was abducted in west Libya guaranteeing its safe passage to Type of A ack Total Violence with Heavy Weapons 14 on his way to work and released a few days later. Benghazi. Violence with Individual Weapons 9 In December, a prominent orthopaedic surgeon Assault 5 Number of attacks (municipalities) Number of attacks per district Abduc on/Arrest/Deten on of 16 who was also the deputy head of a major hospital WHO’s mandate is to deliver aid to all who !( health personnel or pa ents 3 1 14 14 Unexploded ordnance (UXBs), in Tripoli was kidnapped by an armed group and require it, regardless of their political or (! 12 2 explosive remnants of war (ERW) 1 10 8 released after four days. religious affliations. Attacks on health care and !( 3 8 Obstruc on 1 6 Se ng re 1 interference by militia and other armed groups (! 4 - 5 4 4 22 Removal of assets 1 In August, in a new and worrying development, are against all humanitarian aid principles and are District 2 111111 other 1 0 Tripoli Misrata Ejdabia Benghazi Azzawya Sirt Al Jabal Al Almargeb Zwara Murzuq Al Jabal Al 05010015020025 Akhdar Gharbi Data source: Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA) militia near the town of Al Zawya (western wholly unacceptable. Health workers throughout Miles For more details please visit http:\\ssa.who.int Libya) intercepted a truck on its way to east Libya must be allowed to do their obs in a safe Libya to deliver WHO humanitarian supplies. The and secure environment. They are already putting driver was detained overnight and instructed their own lives at risk to care for others during to deliver the supplies to a nearby health care the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of them lack PPE facility the following morning. WHO repeatedly and are paid only sporadically, yet they continue asked the national authorities in Tripoli to to come to work every day knowing they run the intervene and ensure the supplies were restored risk of coming under attack, being kidnapped or to the Organization for delivery to the east. Its contracting COVID-19.
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In May 2020, the town of Tarhouna, 65 kilometres withdrawal from Tripoli in June 2020, the focus southeast of Tripoli, was the scene of intense of the confict turned to irt. Military forces on WHO’S fghting between LNA and GNA forces. More than both sides mobilized over the summer. There were 000 people fed their homes, and humanitarian serious concerns over the likely signifcant impact agencies had very limited access to 200 000 of an attempt by the GNA to regain control of Sirt. RESPONSE civilians trapped inside the town and surrounding Humanitarian needs in the town were reported areas. The humanitarian situation was reportedly to be acute approximately 12 000 people living dire electricity and water supplies had been cut, in the area were at signifcant risk. WHO led the most health care facilities had been forced to development of a health sector contingency plan suspend their services, and the town was running to deliver supplies and equipment and deploy As the lead agency for health in Libya, WHO was By the end of 2020, WHO’s emergency operations out of life-saving medicines. Trucks bound for medical teams to Sirt. At the end of the year, the at the forefront of efforts to stem the spread had reached all 22 districts in the country, including Tarhouna carrying essential supplies were bombed threat of an escalation in the hostilities remained. of COVID-19 and support the government’s areas classifed as level or above on the severity by drones several times, leaving the town and immediate and longer-term response. WHO scale. The WHO country offce (WCO) supported almost 150 000 people in nearby Baniwaleed Emergency Operations Centres reassigned many of its staff and diverted other 196 health care facilities with equipment and facing acute shortages of food, medicine and fuel. In February 2020, the WHO-supported emergency resources to meet the extraordinary challenges supplies, and deployed 1 emergency medical WHO deployed a team of six surgeons to support operations centre in Benghazi offcially opened. posed by the pandemic, while also continuing to teams to strengthen health care services across the emergency operations, and successfully delivered It is the second EOC to be opened in Libya with run its life-saving humanitarian operations. WHO country, mainly in areas where people had acute life-saving supplies to both Tarhouna and support from WHO and donors. (The frst EOC in continuously advocated for the need to maintain humanitarian needs. WHO’s network of feld Baniwaleed in three separate shipments – the only Tripoli was in augurated in late 2019.) other critical health care services while tackling coordinators worked with local health authorities agency to do so. Other UN agencies subsequently the COVID-19 crisis. At the Organization’s request, and communities to assess health needs, agree solicited WHO’s assistance in negotiating access to The EOCs in Benghazi and Tripoli act as central the national authorities added a ninth pillar to on priorities, monitor the delivery of supplies the area to deliver their own supplies. points for emergency planning and for gathering, the COVID-19 national preparedness and response and report back to WHO’s offce in Tripoli. WHO’s analysing and disseminating information on the plan that addressed the need to keep essential humanitarian assistance accounted for almost Continuing insecurity forced WHO to postpone – impact of the ongoing emergency on the health health services running during the pandemic. 40% of all medical procedures and consultations twice – a critical humanitarian mission to the coastal system and health care facilities. At the time . supported by the health sector. Over two thirds of town of Sirt. Sirt lies halfway between Tripoli and of writing this report, the EOCs were acting as the standard health kits distributed in 2020 were Benghazi and is a strategic gateway to ma or command centres for the coordination of the provided by WHO. oil facilities. At the beginning of 2020, the LNA emergency response to COVID-19. gained control of the town. ollowing the LNA’s
The health sector severity scale
The health sector in Libya prioritizes its response At the end of 2020, over one million people in 72 The frst meeting of the incident management team based on the humanitarian severity scale. of Libya’s 100 municipalities were living in areas at the Emergency Operations Centre in Benghazi. “Severity” expresses the degree of unmet needs ranked and above on the severity scale for people in different geographical areas. Credit WHO Classifying the severity of humanitarian conditions is a standard component of humanitarian needs 58 municipalities had severe needs analyses. 12 municipalities had extreme needs Humanitarian health needs in different geographic WHO’s operations are governed by the its backing for the immediate release of supplies locations are classifed based on a scale from 0 to 2 municipalities had catastrophic needs humanitarian imperative of saving lives and and the distribution of urgently needed funds. . People in areas ranked , 4 and are classifed reducing suffering regardless of political divides or Other UN agencies are following WHO’s example as being in severe, extreme and catastrophic need where people happen to live. It is one of the few and strengthening their presence in the east. of humanitarian assistance, respectively. agencies that is operational and visible in eastern WHO will continue to expand its presence in both Libya, and the only UN agency that has actively the east and south, where needs are also severe. engaged with the leadership of the LNA to secure
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Delivering emergency supplies
In 2020, WHO delivered enough kits, medicines WHO supplies are delivered and supplies to treat more than 1.8 million people to a PHC centre in Tripoli. throughout Libya. Credit WHO
Tripoli 37 278 Derna Zwara 25 10 64 Almargeb Misrata 121 Al Jabal 5 363 Al Akhdar 78 Benghazi West 70 Almarj Tobruk 28 Sirt Deploying emergency 52 20 Al Jabal · Al Gharbi Nalut 104 19 medical teams
Ejdabia
Aljufra WHO supported 13 emergency medical teams that Wadi Ashshati 11 15 provided services in 27 health care facilities across Sebha East the country. Between 1 January and 31 December 191 37 South 2020, they carried out more than 133 550 medical 7 Ubari procedures, including 24 813 trauma and surgical Ghat interventions.
44 Murzuq
Alkufra 16 Region Health Severity Score 2 rea o n o ser ices ro i e by e er ency e ical tea s 3 4 5- 11% 0 250 500 Kits 19% Kilometers 10% Dermatological Gynaecology & obstetrics Paediatric Internal medicine 24% 36% Surgical Interventions
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Training health care workers
WHO trained a total of 1939 health care workers • 469 people who were trained on topics r r u r r throughout the country, a 46% increase compared including vaccine-preventable diseases, COORDINATION Areas reached by WHO 60 52 Municipality in with 2019. This number included: noncommunicable diseases, mental health Coordination meetings with authorities conducted (COVID-19) District Municipality Weekly Epidemiological Bulletins produced severity score > 3 r qu r 17 12 r qu r and psychosocial support, the integrated Coordination meetings with partners conducted (COVID-19) Health Sector Bulletins produced 12 Monthly 4W health sector reports produced • 1470 people who were trained on topics management of childhood illnesses, Daily and biweekly COVID-19 situation updates disseminated 24 22/22 72/100 36/72 r r 3 WHO biweekly operational updates produced related to COVID-19 including laboratory reproductive health care and emergency and Transmission classification and capacity assessments conducted 12 diagnosis, case defnition and contact tracing, trauma care. 36 Health-sector biweekly operational updates produced Reports on attacks on health care produced 15 100% 72% 44% 196 131 Health facilities supported with Health needs assessments conducted EWARN sentinel sites supported infection prevention and control, and risk health services and commodities communication. Because of COVID-19 travel restrictions and SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTED 2 25 u u Emergency Operations Centres laboratories supported national lockdowns, WHO switched to virtual 727,570 activated 10,000 37,440 Masks Gowns Surgical caps (including 4,150 Sterile Gowns) 13 training for many of its planned workshops. (including 120,970 Respirators N95) 4,568,839 10 Emergency 256,900 People reached with messages on COVID-19 preventive Medical Teams 13,785 7,546 measures and access to health care Field coordinators deployed Goggles Gloves Coveralls (including 30,000 Surgical Gloves) STANDARD HEALTH KITS r u r r r
1,666 10,200 49,900 334,181 Disinfecting materials Aprons People engaged on COVID-19 through RCCE actions 474 Face shields Tr
po A
NCD kits Z A
ara