DOCSLIB.ORG

Eastern Europe

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Eastern Europe Eastern Europe Soviet Union Domestic Affairs URII ANDROPOV, WHO had succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as head of both the Communist party and the state, fell gravely ill during the first half of 1983 and died on February 9, 1984. Andropov, who was 69 years old at the time of his death, had been in power for some 15 months. He was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko, a 72-year-old Kremlin veteran. During his period in power, party chief Andropov had initiated important changes in the ruling structure of the Soviet Union by advancing the careers of somewhat younger men. Thus, Vitaly Vorotnikov was appointed to the Politburo; Igor Ligachev became one of the secretaries of the Communist party; and Mikhail Gorbachev, the youngest member of the Politburo, was given new responsibilities. It was reported that more than a quarter of all regional party heads were replaced. Party chief Andropov had sought to counter the apathy that was evident through- out the Soviet bureaucracy and to restore discipline to the workplace. He was not afraid to apply strong measures in the fight against corruption. Thus, Iurii Shmelia- kov and V. Petrov, chairman and director, respectively, of a technical export agency in Moscow, were sentenced to death for gross corruption. A death sentence was also imposed on the director of a Moscow food store supplying the Soviet elite. About 100 individuals in high posts in Latvia were dismissed from the Communist party because of alleged illegal actions. There were reports of plans to introduce some experimentation into the manage- ment of the industrial structure, even permitting a degree of decentralization. At present, Soviet industry was unable to keep up with demand. This was equally true in the agricultural sector. In 1983 there was another disappointing harvest, and the Kremlin was forced to conclude a new five-year agreement with Washington, whereby the United States would supply the Soviet Union with at least nine million tons of grain annually. Party chief Andropov had attempted to improve the Soviet railroad system. He also initiated reforms in education, particularly with regard to vocational training for children unsuited for university work. 242 SOVIET UNION / 243 Dissidence In 1983 the authorities reinforced the policy of rigid control, seeking to eliminate all forms of independent expression. In September Soviet prison camp administra- tors were given the power to extend by three to five years the completed terms of inmates who engaged in "bad behavior." Roy Medvedev, the dissident Marxist historian, was warned by officials to halt his anti-party writings. Georgii Vladimov, well-known author of Faithful Ruslan, was forced to leave the Soviet Union for Cologne, Wes,t Germany. Valerii Senderov, founder of the Free International Orga- nization of Labor, was sentenced to 12 years in a labor camp. Oleg Radzinski was sentenced to a year in prison for trying to promote better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. A number of Soviet Pentecostals, who had spent several years in the American embassy in Moscow, returned to their homes in Siberia; some of them eventually went abroad. In Lvov, two Catholic priests of the eastern rite, Vasilii Katziv and Roman Esip, received five-year prison sentences for "illegal religious activities." The Soviet press continued its campaign against the Hare Krishna movement. Sergei Khodorovich, a representative of the Solzhenitsyn Fund that aided politi- cal prisoners, was rearrested in April and sentenced to three years in prison. This occurred after Valerii Repin, another representative of the Solzhenitsyn Fund, and his wife Elena appeared on Leningrad television in a staged KGB broadcast and "confessed" their ties to the American CIA. Nobel prize-winning scientist Andreii Sakharov remained in exile in Gorky, isolated from friends and family. There were reports that he and his wife Elena Bonner were sick and were being denied specialized medical care. In the summer, Sakharov was denounced by four of his colleagues in the Academy of Science as a person "who does not belong to our country." At the same time, the Soviet authori- ties refused to allow Sakharov to go abroad. The human rights group that he had founded was no longer functioning. Amnesty International reported that at least 300 individuals, arrested for political activities since 1969, had been forcibly treated with drugs in Soviet mental hospitals. In response to sharp criticism of the Kremlin's use of psychiatry as a weapon of punishment, the Soviet Union withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association. Pravda repeatedly complained about an "exaggerated use" of Western materials in Soviet plays and movies. The well-known Taganka Theater in Moscow, directed by Iurii Lubimov, was forced to halt performances of Pushkin's "Boris Godunov" that were being presented in an experimental manner. Lubimov, abroad at the time, refused to return to the Soviet Union. Alfred Shnitke, a composer in the modern mode, had great difficulty in arranging performances of his work. Abstract art was regarded as anti-Soviet and could only be shown in private homes or, on occasion, in the basements of official institutions. While strong measures by the KGB sharply curtailed open dissent, some protests did occur. In Narva, a small city in Estonia, transportation workers went on strike. 244 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1985 In factories in Voronezh, worker-activists spread an appeal for a half-hour silent protest. In Moscow the authorities discovered a flyer calling on workers to abstain from special "voluntary" jobs they were expected to carry out during free time. Oleg Bitov, an editor of Literaturnaia Gazeta, refused to return to the Soviet Union after completing an official trip abroad. Nationalities While the Soviet constitution formally recognized the equality of the various peoples comprising the Soviet Union, the Kremlin authorities were busy imposing a policy of russification on many small nationality groups. Russian cultural imperi- alism was greatly resented in many areas, especially Armenia, Georgia, the Baltic states, and among Moslem peoples. National sentiment was voiced by writers in Estonia, Lithuania, Georgia, and the Ukraine. Underground appeals for the libera- tion of Estonia were put forward in the name of the Estonian government-in-exile. In Tbilisi underground leaflets were distributed, calling on Georgians to demon- strate against the annexation of their land by Russia; three Georgians, Zakharii Lashkarashvili, Tariel Gvimashvili, and Guram Gogopaidze, were sent to prison for protest actions. A Crimean Tatar leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, was imprisoned for the sixth time for his part in the struggle to establish a Tatar republic. Foreign Affairs There was no thaw in Soviet-American relations in 1983. Likewise, Sino-Soviet ties did not improve. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan continued, but the superior Russian forces, despite the use of brutal tactics, were unable to put an end to local resistance. The Kremlin continued to dominate the countries of Eastern Europe, but it was clear that the Soviet bloc was becoming more variegated. The destruction of a South Korean airliner by a Soviet fighter plane—resulting in the death of 269 passengers—created a storm of protest in the West. The Madrid meeting, convened to review the Helsinki accords, became hopelessly deadlocked. Relations with Israel The Soviet Union unleashed a propaganda barrage against the multinational force that was attempting to separate the warring factions in Lebanon. Izvestiia claimed that United States troops had been sent to Lebanon to help the Israelis control it, Lebanon being the latest victim of "the Camp David conspiracy." The Kremlin insisted on a complete withdrawal of both Israeli and multinational troops. At the time, Moscow wanted the Syrian army and the Palestinian fighters to remain in place, since they had come to "protect Lebanon's sovereignty." SOVIET UNION / 245 Moscow was greatly troubled by the split between Syria and PLO chief Yasir Arafat, and sought to bring the two sides together. Foreign Minister Andreii Gromyko, in a meeting with visiting Syrian foreign minister Abdel Halim Khad- dam, stressed the importance of the unity of all Palestinian factions for a successful struggle against Israel. To aid in the struggle, the Kremlin sent Syria massive supplies of weapons, including advanced missiles. Notwithstanding vitriolic anti-Israel propaganda, the Soviet authorities did not object to so-called "private contacts" between Israelis and authorized Soviet organi- zations. Thus, an Israeli delegation visited Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Peace Committee; delegation members included Shulamit Aloni and Mattityahu Peled. In the spring a Soviet delegation, headed by Iurii Barabach, editor of Sovet- skaia Kultura, went to Israel. The visiting Soviets stated that Moscow would reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel if the latter changed its policies, including withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza. JEWISH COMMUNITY Demography The 1979 Soviet census put the Jewish population of the Soviet Union at about 1,810,000. Of late some sources had cited a figure of 1,700,000. As a way of dealing with the relative decrease of the Slavic population and the growth of the Moslem element, Soviet authorities were encouraging Jews to "pass" into the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian nationality groups. A more accurate estimate of the actual Jewish population, therefore, would be about 2,620,000. (See the discussion in AJYB, Vol. 82, 1982, p. 233.) Emigration The emigration of Soviet Jews came to a near halt in 1983, with only 1,314 leaving the country. The authorities placed ever-increasing obstacles in the way of those wishing to depart. Thus, not only parents and former spouses, but also brothers and sisters had to give written consent to individuals seeking to leave the Soviet Union; additionally, persons giving such consent had to state that they themselves would never express a desire to leave the USSR.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan
    172 THE CORNWALLIS GROUP XII: ANALYSIS FOR MULTI-AGENCY SUPPORT 3-D Soviet Style: Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan Anton Minkov, Ph.D. Gregory Smolynec. Ph.D. Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Ottawa, Canada. e-mails: [email protected] [email protected] Dr. Gregory Smolynec and Dr. Anton Minkov are Defence Scientists / Strategic Analysts with the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA), part of Defence Research & Development Canada (DRDC). Currently, Anton is assigned to the Directorate of Strategic Analysis and Gregory is with the Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence. Anton has a PhD in Islamic History (McGill University) and is also a lecturer in medieval and modern Middle Eastern history at Carleton University. His book Conversion to Islam in the Balkans was published in 2004 by Brill Academic Publishers (Leiden). Gregory Smolynec has a PhD in History (Duke University) and a Master of Arts in Russian and East European Studies (Carleton University). His doctoral dissertation is titled Multicultural Cold War: Liberal Anti-Totalitarianism and National Identity in the United States and Canada. ABSTRACT 3-D Soviet Style examines the evolution of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan from the initial invasion to the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces in 1989. The paper analyzes Soviet efforts in building Afghan security forces. It includes information on Soviet counter- insurgency practices in Afghanistan and on the adjustments the Soviets made to their force structure and equipment in response to the exigencies of the operational situations they faced. It examines the Soviet approach to civil affairs in their Afghan operations, and outlines the state-building efforts the Soviets undertook in Afghanistan as well as their social and economic policies.
    [Show full text]
  • Pathologies of Centralized State-Building by Jennifer Murtazashvili
    In 2011, Afghan government and International Security Assistance Force officials take part in a shura with elders in Zabul province, Afghanistan. The Zabul Provincial Reconstruction Team visited the village to talk with elders and help Afghan National Security Forces distribute winter supplies. (U.S. Air Force/Brian Ferguson) 54 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2 Pathologies of Centralized State-Building By Jennifer Murtazashvili he international community, led by the United States, has invested trillions of dollars in state-build- ing efforts during the past two decades. Yet despite this commitment of substantial resources, conflict and violence remain a challenge in fragile states. It therefore seems especially important to Tconsider the reasons why state-building has not lived up to its expectations. Past state-building efforts were predicated on the belief that a centralized government would improve prospects for political order and economic development. These efforts therefore have typically empha- sized powerful national governments and centralized bureaucratic administration as the keys to generating improvements in the state’s provision of public goods, including rule of law and collective security. This article challenges the underlying assumptions to that approach, arguing that centralization actu- ally undermines efforts to stabilize and rebuild fragile states. It describes several risks centralization poses for effective state-building. For example, many highly centralized governments prey on their own citizens and are therefore prone to civil unrest, conflict, and collapse.1 Most of the countries that have experienced pro- longed civil conflict over the past several decades—including Afghanistan, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—had extremely centralized governments prior to the outbreak of conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • "The Architecture of the Book": El Lissitzky's Works on Paper, 1919-1937
    "The Architecture of the Book": El Lissitzky's Works on Paper, 1919-1937 The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Johnson, Samuel. 2015. "The Architecture of the Book": El Lissitzky's Works on Paper, 1919-1937. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17463124 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA “The Architecture of the Book”: El Lissitzky’s Works on Paper, 1919-1937 A dissertation presented by Samuel Johnson to The Department of History of Art and Architecture in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of History of Art and Architecture Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts May 2015 © 2015 Samuel Johnson All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Professor Maria Gough Samuel Johnson “The Architecture of the Book”: El Lissitzky’s Works on Paper, 1919-1937 Abstract Although widely respected as an abstract painter, the Russian Jewish artist and architect El Lissitzky produced more works on paper than in any other medium during his twenty year career. Both a highly competent lithographer and a pioneer in the application of modernist principles to letterpress typography, Lissitzky advocated for works of art issued in “thousands of identical originals” even before the avant-garde embraced photography and film.
    [Show full text]
  • Works’ (Just Not in Moderation)
    Repression ‘Works’ (just not in moderation) Yuri M. Zhukov University of Michigan Abstract Why does government violence deter political challengers in one con- text, but inflame them in the next? This paper argues that repression increases opposition activity at low and moderate levels, but decreases it in the extreme. There is a threshold level of violence, where the op- position becomes unable to recruit new members, and the rebellion unravels – even if the government kills more innocents. We show this result logically, with a mathematical model of coercion, and empir- ically, with micro-level data from Chechnya and a meta-analysis of sub-national conflict dynamics in 156 countries. The data suggest that a threshold exists, but the level of violence needed to reach it varies. Many governments, thankfully, are unable or unwilling to go that far. We explore conditions under which this threshold may be higher or lower, and highlight a fundamental trade-off between reducing gov- ernment violence and preserving civil liberties. Keywords: repression, political violence, mass killing, conflict, meta-analysis, threshold effect Word count: 11,869 DRAFT This version: November, 2018 1 Repression is violence that governments use to stay in power. When confronting behavioral challenges to their authority, governments often respond by threatening, detaining and killing suspected dissidents and rebels. The coercive purpose of these actions is to compel challengers to stop their fight, and to deter others from joining it. The intensity of repres- sion can vary greatly. To reestablish control in Chechnya after 1999, for example, the Russian government used a range of methods, from targeted killings to shelling and indiscriminate sweeps.
    [Show full text]
  • The Blind Leading the Blind
    WORKING PAPER #60 The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan By Artemy Kalinovsky, January 2010 COLD War INTernaTionaL HISTorY ProjecT Working Paper No. 60 The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan By Artemy Kalinovsky THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F. Ostermann and Mircea Munteanu Series Editors This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communist bloc” with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history. Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a periodic BULLETIN to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for young historians from the former Communist bloc to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars; and publications.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kgb in Afghanistan
    THE KGB IN AFGHANISTAN RALPH PICKARD Figure 1: A display case of a KGB officer’s grouping showing his known Soviet and Afghanistan medals and award booklets earned during his service in the KGB. There has been much written over the years about the intent of stabilizing the Afghan government from the history of the Soviet forces occupation of Afghanistan deterioration that was occurring throughout the region and during the Cold War. However, less has been written especially the souring relationship with the government from the collecting community perspective about the prior to December 1979. The Soviet forces’ intent was Afghanistan medals and award booklets that were earned to seize all important Afghan government facilities and by Soviet personnel during that same time period. The other important areas.1 Within days after the Soviet forces intent of this article is to shed a little light on a few of invasion into Afghanistan and occupation of the capital the Afghanistan medals that were awarded during the of Kabul, the Afghanistan President was assassinated Cold War through a unique group that belonged to a and replaced with the more pro-Soviet government of KGB officer (Figure 1). This grouping provides strong President, Babrak Karmal, who had promised his loyalty indications that this officer served multiple tours and earlier to the Soviet government. 2,3,4 continued to operate in Afghanistan even after February 1989. However, prior to illustrating more about the group Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets the in this article, a brief overview of the Soviet invasion and two governments had an ongoing relationship dating back available history of the KGB in Afghanistan during the to the early 1920s with Soviet advisors and technicians Cold War will be presented.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Waarom Het Khad/WAD-Ambtsbericht Van 29
    Waarom het KhAD/WAD-ambtsbericht van 29 februari 2000 onjuist is en onbetrouwbaar (uitgebreide versie) dr. ir. Joost Brouwer & mr. drs. Pieter Bogaers1 Dit webartikel is een uitgebreide versie, met veel meer details, van het artikel dat verschenen is in NJB 2018/ 750, afl. 16, 20 april 2018 Samenvatting Het ambtsbericht van 29 februari 2000, over de Afghaanse geheime diensten AGSA, KAM, KhAD en WAD tijdens de communistische regimes in de periode 1978-1982, zorgt al achttien jaar voor controverse. Nog niet eerder is in detail gekeken naar wat de samenstellers van het ambtsbericht gedaan hebben met de informatie die hen destijds ter beschikking stond. In dit artikel bespreken wij allereerst de kritiek tot nog toe op het ambtsbericht en de argumenten van de Raad van State en Buitenlandse Zaken om het ambtsbericht toch te handhaven (par. 1); een weerlegging van het ambtsbericht volgens een nieuwe benadering die die argumenten van de Raad van State en Buitenlandse Zaken omzeilt (par. 2); de eerste reactie van Buitenlandse Zaken op deze nieuwe weerlegging van het ambtsbericht (par. 3); en een overzicht van hoe op die reactie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Justitie ingegaan kan worden (par. 4). Ons hier samengevatte onderzoek toont uitputtend aan: dat beschuldigingen tegen alle KhAD/WAD-officieren en onderofficieren onterecht zijn, zoals in feite ook de IND al op twee manieren erkend heeft (par. 5); dat de anonieme bronnen voor de beschuldigingen tegen alle KhAD/WAD-officieren en onderofficieren, en/of hun informanten en/of de vertrouwenspersoon of tolk van de ambassade in Islamabad onbetrouwbaar waren (par. 6); dat de samenstellers van het ambtsbericht de talrijke informatie in hun eigen openbare bronnen die de conclusies van de anonieme bronnen en van het ambtsbericht tegenspreekt, stelselmatig hebben weggelaten; dat de samenstellers misleidend zijn geweest met betrekking tot de (in feite niet bestaande) internationale steun voor de conclusies van het ambtsbericht; en dat de samenstellers en/of hun bronnen informatie verdraaid hebben (par.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Counterinsurgency
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1990-06 Soviet counterinsurgency Johnson, David Ray Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37523 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS SOVIET COUNTERZNSE'GENCY by David Ray Johnson June 1990 Thesis Advisor: ~ikhailTsypkin Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited UNCLASSIFIED CURlTY CLASSIFICATION OF ThlS *AGE REPORT-. DOCUMENTATION PAGE 3. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIF8CATION I 1 b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UN a SECURITY cLAmuoRITY 3 DlsTRlBuTloN /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; D DECLASSIFICATIONI DOWNGRADING SCHEDLYE distribution is unlinited I PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBEVS) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER6) I a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFF!CE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION (Ifapplicable) onterey, California 93943-5000 I Monterey, California 93943-5000 I PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER a. NAME OF FUNDING 1 SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9. ORGANIZATION (If apphcable) 1 r ADDRESS (C8ty. State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM TASK NO ACCESSION NO 1 TITLE (Include Securlry Classrf~afronJ SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY 2. PERSONAL AUTHOR(5) (Year, Month, DayJ 15 PAGE COUNT 135 6 SUPPLEMENTARYNOTA-IOI rhe views exuressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the officidl rdentrf~by blwk number) FIELD ( GROUP I SUB-GROUP Soviet Counterinsurgency; Anti-Soviet Insurgency I I I I I 19 ABSTRACT (Confmue on reverse rf necessary and ~dennfyby block number) The aim of this paper is to determine the presence or absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The thesis examines the place of counterinsurgency in Soviet military thought and compares the Swiet counterinsurgent campaigns in Soviet Central Asia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Afghanistan Draft
    DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR NUMBER 153 SOVIET AFGHANISTAN Henry s. Bradsher Colloquium May 27, 1981 The future is bleak for the Afghanistan that has through the centuries proudly fought to maintain its independence and its separate ways. At a cost in human lives that probably will never be counted, and at a cost in crushing individual freedoms that cannot be measured statistically, Afghanistan might in the future achieve faster material progress than it was set to attain on its own. That will, however, be a distant future, beyond the deaths and destruction of the present resistance to Soviet control. The Soviet military occupation in late December 1979 and early January 1980 have led to policies of a new colonialism in Afghanistan-­ but not so new for Russians who have practiced it before in other places. The immediate situation that led to the beginning of Soviet colonialism in Afghanistan was a choice that faced the Kremlin leadership in the autumn of 1979. It could abandon its support for a regime that under Amin was intractable and unsuccessful, cut its losses to prevent the disgrace of going down with him and the possible loss of thousands of Soviet lives if the guer­ rillas overwhelmed Kabul. Or it could plunge deeper into the developing Afghan quagmire. It is doubtful that pulling out was ever any more of a real option than it was for the United States in Vietnam around 1964 or 1965. Except for Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946 and Chinese Sinkiang in 1943, the Soviets had never pulled out of a country under similar circumstances.
    [Show full text]
  • LJN: AZ9365, Gerechtshof 'S-Gravenhage , 09-751004-04 En 09-750006-05
    LJN: AZ9365, Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage , 09-751004-04 en 09-750006-05 Datum uitspraak: 29-01-2007 Datum publicatie: 27-02-2007 Rechtsgebied: Straf Soort procedure: Hoger beroep Inhoudsindicatie: Vertaling in de Engelse taal van de Afghaanse zaak, nr. AZ7143. In the period of the end of 1983 to the end of 1990 the accused was in Kabul, in Afghanistan, at the time of the communist regime supported by the Soviets, head of the military intelligence service, the KhAD-e- Nezami, and deputy minister of the Ministry of State Security (WAD). In performing these duty/duties the accused, as can be proven, has in respect of three victims been guilty of very grave offences: being a co-perpetrator to torture and the breach of the laws and practices of war. Article 1 (old) of the “Uitvoeringswet folteringverdrag” UWF [Convention on Torture Implementation Act] and the Articles 8 (old) and 9 (old) of the “Wet oorlogsmisdrijven” [War Crimes Act]. Uitspraak Page 1 of 17 LJN: AZ7143, The Hague Court of Appeal, 2200613105 Date of judgment : 29-01-2007 Date of publication : 29-01-2007 Legal area : Criminal Kind of procedure : Appeal Indication of contents : In the period of the end of 1983 to the end of 1990 the accused was in Kabul, in Afghanistan, at the time of the communist regime supported by the Soviets, head of the military intelligence service, the KhAD-e-Nezami, and deputy minister of the Ministry of State Security (WAD). In performing these duty/duties the accused, as can be proven, has in respect of three victims been guilty of very grave offences: being a co-perpetrator to torture and the breach of the laws and practices of war.
    [Show full text]
  • ASA 11/01/91 Distr: SC/CO No
    EXTERNAL (for general distribution) AI Index: ASA 11/01/91 Distr: SC/CO No. of words: 3078 ------------------------- Amnesty International International Secretariat 1 Easton Street London WC1X 8DJ United Kingdom March 1991 AFGHANISTAN: Reports of Torture and Long-term Detention Without Trial Reports of prolonged incommunicado detention of political prisoners in interrogation centres and prison blocks operated by the Ministry of State Security in Afghanistan are of serious concern to Amnesty International. Hundreds of prisoners have reportedly been held without charge or trial for up to nine years in the centres, including the segregated Blocks 1 and 2 of Pul-e-Charkhi Prison near Kabul, and are denied access to legal counsel and family visits. Amnesty International has received reports that political prisoners in these centres are subject to systematic torture and ill-treatment, and that they are held under conditions that fail to meet the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Pul-e-Charkhi Prison comprises several blocks. Blocks 1 and 2 are reserved for unsentenced prisoners and are operated by the Ministry of State Security. Other blocks hold sentenced prisoners and are run by the Ministry of the Interior. 2 1. Background Soviet troops completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan on 15 February 1989 as was required by the Geneva agreement of 14 April 1988 signed by Afghanistan, the USSR, Pakistan and the USA. The internal armed conflict, however, has continued. The government headed by President Najibullah and supported by the USSR has maintained effective control over the capital, Kabul, and other major cities while the armed opposition groups - the Mujahideen - supported by the USA and Pakistan, effectively control one provincial capital and many rural areas.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan May 2008
    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT AFGHANISTAN 20 MAY 2008 UK Border Agency COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE AFGHANISTAN 20 MAY 2008 Contents Latest News EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 1 MAY TO 20 MAY 2008 REPORTS ON AFGHANISTAN PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE 1 MAY 2008 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY........................................................................................1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.08 2. ECONOMY............................................................................................ 2.01 3. HISTORY.............................................................................................. 3.01 Overview to December 2001........................................................ 3.01 Post-Taliban.................................................................................. 3.02 Presidential election 9 October 2004 and the new Cabinet...... 3.08 Parliamentary and provincial elections 18 September 2005 .... 3.10 Afghanistan Compact 31 January 2006...................................... 3.14 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................... 4.01 5. CONSTITUTION..................................................................................... 5.01 6. POLITICAL SYSTEM .............................................................................. 6.01 Overview ....................................................................................... 6.01 The Executive Branch.................................................................
    [Show full text]