Pathologies of Centralized State-Building by Jennifer Murtazashvili
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Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan
172 THE CORNWALLIS GROUP XII: ANALYSIS FOR MULTI-AGENCY SUPPORT 3-D Soviet Style: Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan Anton Minkov, Ph.D. Gregory Smolynec. Ph.D. Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Ottawa, Canada. e-mails: [email protected] [email protected] Dr. Gregory Smolynec and Dr. Anton Minkov are Defence Scientists / Strategic Analysts with the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA), part of Defence Research & Development Canada (DRDC). Currently, Anton is assigned to the Directorate of Strategic Analysis and Gregory is with the Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence. Anton has a PhD in Islamic History (McGill University) and is also a lecturer in medieval and modern Middle Eastern history at Carleton University. His book Conversion to Islam in the Balkans was published in 2004 by Brill Academic Publishers (Leiden). Gregory Smolynec has a PhD in History (Duke University) and a Master of Arts in Russian and East European Studies (Carleton University). His doctoral dissertation is titled Multicultural Cold War: Liberal Anti-Totalitarianism and National Identity in the United States and Canada. ABSTRACT 3-D Soviet Style examines the evolution of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan from the initial invasion to the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces in 1989. The paper analyzes Soviet efforts in building Afghan security forces. It includes information on Soviet counter- insurgency practices in Afghanistan and on the adjustments the Soviets made to their force structure and equipment in response to the exigencies of the operational situations they faced. It examines the Soviet approach to civil affairs in their Afghan operations, and outlines the state-building efforts the Soviets undertook in Afghanistan as well as their social and economic policies. -
"The Architecture of the Book": El Lissitzky's Works on Paper, 1919-1937
"The Architecture of the Book": El Lissitzky's Works on Paper, 1919-1937 The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Johnson, Samuel. 2015. "The Architecture of the Book": El Lissitzky's Works on Paper, 1919-1937. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17463124 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA “The Architecture of the Book”: El Lissitzky’s Works on Paper, 1919-1937 A dissertation presented by Samuel Johnson to The Department of History of Art and Architecture in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of History of Art and Architecture Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts May 2015 © 2015 Samuel Johnson All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Professor Maria Gough Samuel Johnson “The Architecture of the Book”: El Lissitzky’s Works on Paper, 1919-1937 Abstract Although widely respected as an abstract painter, the Russian Jewish artist and architect El Lissitzky produced more works on paper than in any other medium during his twenty year career. Both a highly competent lithographer and a pioneer in the application of modernist principles to letterpress typography, Lissitzky advocated for works of art issued in “thousands of identical originals” even before the avant-garde embraced photography and film. -
Works’ (Just Not in Moderation)
Repression ‘Works’ (just not in moderation) Yuri M. Zhukov University of Michigan Abstract Why does government violence deter political challengers in one con- text, but inflame them in the next? This paper argues that repression increases opposition activity at low and moderate levels, but decreases it in the extreme. There is a threshold level of violence, where the op- position becomes unable to recruit new members, and the rebellion unravels – even if the government kills more innocents. We show this result logically, with a mathematical model of coercion, and empir- ically, with micro-level data from Chechnya and a meta-analysis of sub-national conflict dynamics in 156 countries. The data suggest that a threshold exists, but the level of violence needed to reach it varies. Many governments, thankfully, are unable or unwilling to go that far. We explore conditions under which this threshold may be higher or lower, and highlight a fundamental trade-off between reducing gov- ernment violence and preserving civil liberties. Keywords: repression, political violence, mass killing, conflict, meta-analysis, threshold effect Word count: 11,869 DRAFT This version: November, 2018 1 Repression is violence that governments use to stay in power. When confronting behavioral challenges to their authority, governments often respond by threatening, detaining and killing suspected dissidents and rebels. The coercive purpose of these actions is to compel challengers to stop their fight, and to deter others from joining it. The intensity of repres- sion can vary greatly. To reestablish control in Chechnya after 1999, for example, the Russian government used a range of methods, from targeted killings to shelling and indiscriminate sweeps. -
The Blind Leading the Blind
WORKING PAPER #60 The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan By Artemy Kalinovsky, January 2010 COLD War INTernaTionaL HISTorY ProjecT Working Paper No. 60 The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan By Artemy Kalinovsky THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F. Ostermann and Mircea Munteanu Series Editors This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communist bloc” with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history. Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a periodic BULLETIN to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for young historians from the former Communist bloc to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars; and publications. -
The Kgb in Afghanistan
THE KGB IN AFGHANISTAN RALPH PICKARD Figure 1: A display case of a KGB officer’s grouping showing his known Soviet and Afghanistan medals and award booklets earned during his service in the KGB. There has been much written over the years about the intent of stabilizing the Afghan government from the history of the Soviet forces occupation of Afghanistan deterioration that was occurring throughout the region and during the Cold War. However, less has been written especially the souring relationship with the government from the collecting community perspective about the prior to December 1979. The Soviet forces’ intent was Afghanistan medals and award booklets that were earned to seize all important Afghan government facilities and by Soviet personnel during that same time period. The other important areas.1 Within days after the Soviet forces intent of this article is to shed a little light on a few of invasion into Afghanistan and occupation of the capital the Afghanistan medals that were awarded during the of Kabul, the Afghanistan President was assassinated Cold War through a unique group that belonged to a and replaced with the more pro-Soviet government of KGB officer (Figure 1). This grouping provides strong President, Babrak Karmal, who had promised his loyalty indications that this officer served multiple tours and earlier to the Soviet government. 2,3,4 continued to operate in Afghanistan even after February 1989. However, prior to illustrating more about the group Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets the in this article, a brief overview of the Soviet invasion and two governments had an ongoing relationship dating back available history of the KGB in Afghanistan during the to the early 1920s with Soviet advisors and technicians Cold War will be presented. -
1 Waarom Het Khad/WAD-Ambtsbericht Van 29
Waarom het KhAD/WAD-ambtsbericht van 29 februari 2000 onjuist is en onbetrouwbaar (uitgebreide versie) dr. ir. Joost Brouwer & mr. drs. Pieter Bogaers1 Dit webartikel is een uitgebreide versie, met veel meer details, van het artikel dat verschenen is in NJB 2018/ 750, afl. 16, 20 april 2018 Samenvatting Het ambtsbericht van 29 februari 2000, over de Afghaanse geheime diensten AGSA, KAM, KhAD en WAD tijdens de communistische regimes in de periode 1978-1982, zorgt al achttien jaar voor controverse. Nog niet eerder is in detail gekeken naar wat de samenstellers van het ambtsbericht gedaan hebben met de informatie die hen destijds ter beschikking stond. In dit artikel bespreken wij allereerst de kritiek tot nog toe op het ambtsbericht en de argumenten van de Raad van State en Buitenlandse Zaken om het ambtsbericht toch te handhaven (par. 1); een weerlegging van het ambtsbericht volgens een nieuwe benadering die die argumenten van de Raad van State en Buitenlandse Zaken omzeilt (par. 2); de eerste reactie van Buitenlandse Zaken op deze nieuwe weerlegging van het ambtsbericht (par. 3); en een overzicht van hoe op die reactie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Justitie ingegaan kan worden (par. 4). Ons hier samengevatte onderzoek toont uitputtend aan: dat beschuldigingen tegen alle KhAD/WAD-officieren en onderofficieren onterecht zijn, zoals in feite ook de IND al op twee manieren erkend heeft (par. 5); dat de anonieme bronnen voor de beschuldigingen tegen alle KhAD/WAD-officieren en onderofficieren, en/of hun informanten en/of de vertrouwenspersoon of tolk van de ambassade in Islamabad onbetrouwbaar waren (par. 6); dat de samenstellers van het ambtsbericht de talrijke informatie in hun eigen openbare bronnen die de conclusies van de anonieme bronnen en van het ambtsbericht tegenspreekt, stelselmatig hebben weggelaten; dat de samenstellers misleidend zijn geweest met betrekking tot de (in feite niet bestaande) internationale steun voor de conclusies van het ambtsbericht; en dat de samenstellers en/of hun bronnen informatie verdraaid hebben (par. -
Soviet Counterinsurgency
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1990-06 Soviet counterinsurgency Johnson, David Ray Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37523 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS SOVIET COUNTERZNSE'GENCY by David Ray Johnson June 1990 Thesis Advisor: ~ikhailTsypkin Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited UNCLASSIFIED CURlTY CLASSIFICATION OF ThlS *AGE REPORT-. DOCUMENTATION PAGE 3. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIF8CATION I 1 b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UN a SECURITY cLAmuoRITY 3 DlsTRlBuTloN /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; D DECLASSIFICATIONI DOWNGRADING SCHEDLYE distribution is unlinited I PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBEVS) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER6) I a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFF!CE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION (Ifapplicable) onterey, California 93943-5000 I Monterey, California 93943-5000 I PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER a. NAME OF FUNDING 1 SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9. ORGANIZATION (If apphcable) 1 r ADDRESS (C8ty. State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM TASK NO ACCESSION NO 1 TITLE (Include Securlry Classrf~afronJ SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY 2. PERSONAL AUTHOR(5) (Year, Month, DayJ 15 PAGE COUNT 135 6 SUPPLEMENTARYNOTA-IOI rhe views exuressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the officidl rdentrf~by blwk number) FIELD ( GROUP I SUB-GROUP Soviet Counterinsurgency; Anti-Soviet Insurgency I I I I I 19 ABSTRACT (Confmue on reverse rf necessary and ~dennfyby block number) The aim of this paper is to determine the presence or absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The thesis examines the place of counterinsurgency in Soviet military thought and compares the Swiet counterinsurgent campaigns in Soviet Central Asia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Afghanistan. -
Centralization, Decentralization and Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa
Middle East Centralization, and Decentralization North Africa and Confl ict in the Middle East Working Paper and North Africa Series No. 51 October 2008 by The World Bank Mehmet Serkan Tosun Produced by the Serdar Yilmaz Offi ce of the Chief Economist Summaries in Arabic and French Middle East and North Africa Working Paper Series No. 51 Centralization, Decentralization and Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa By Mehmet Serkan Tosun∗ University of Nevada, Reno and Serdar Yilmaz• World Bank October 2008 Discussion papers are not formal publications of the World Bank. They represent preliminary and often unpolished results of country analysis and research. Circulation is intended to encourage discussion and comments; citation and the use of the paper should take account of its provisional character. The findings and conclusions of the paper are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The authors thank Lyn Squire, Blanca Moreno-Dodson Jennifer Keller and Robert Beschel for helpful comments and suggestions, Dilek Uz and Omid Harraf for excellent research assistance. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of authors, and do not represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent. Corresponding author: Serdar Yilmaz. * Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, Mail Stop 0030. Nevada 89557; [email protected]; phone: +1-775-7846678. • Social Development Department, World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington D.C. -
Soviet Afghanistan Draft
DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR NUMBER 153 SOVIET AFGHANISTAN Henry s. Bradsher Colloquium May 27, 1981 The future is bleak for the Afghanistan that has through the centuries proudly fought to maintain its independence and its separate ways. At a cost in human lives that probably will never be counted, and at a cost in crushing individual freedoms that cannot be measured statistically, Afghanistan might in the future achieve faster material progress than it was set to attain on its own. That will, however, be a distant future, beyond the deaths and destruction of the present resistance to Soviet control. The Soviet military occupation in late December 1979 and early January 1980 have led to policies of a new colonialism in Afghanistan- but not so new for Russians who have practiced it before in other places. The immediate situation that led to the beginning of Soviet colonialism in Afghanistan was a choice that faced the Kremlin leadership in the autumn of 1979. It could abandon its support for a regime that under Amin was intractable and unsuccessful, cut its losses to prevent the disgrace of going down with him and the possible loss of thousands of Soviet lives if the guer rillas overwhelmed Kabul. Or it could plunge deeper into the developing Afghan quagmire. It is doubtful that pulling out was ever any more of a real option than it was for the United States in Vietnam around 1964 or 1965. Except for Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946 and Chinese Sinkiang in 1943, the Soviets had never pulled out of a country under similar circumstances. -
How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: the Causes of Mexico's Drug War
How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The causes of Mexico's Drug War The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Rios Contreras, Viridiana. 2013. How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The causes of Mexico's Drug War. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11156675 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA c 2012—Viridiana Rios All rights reserved. ProfessorJorgeI.Dom´ınguez ViridianaRiosContreras How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The Causes of Mexico’s Drug War Abstract This work advances a theory about corruption, criminal organizations, and violence to show how political institutions set incentives and constraints that lead criminal organi- zations behave, organize, compromise or fight one another. It is my argument that the propensity of criminal groups to deploy violence increases when formal or informal polit- ical institutions are decentralized because violent criminal organizations are less likely to be punished. Under decentralized institutional environments, understood here as those in which different levels of government fail to act cohesively as a single decision-making body, corruption agreements with one government inhibit law enforcement operations conducted by another. As a result, belligerent criminal organizations that would other- wise be punished remain untouched. My argument sheds light on why many criminal organizations are able to operate profitably without major episodes of violence, and illu- minates the causes of Mexico’s large increases in drug–related violence. -
Decentralized Forms of Government
A Practical Guide to Constitution Building: Decentralized Forms of Government Markus Böckenförde This paper appears as chapter 7 of International IDEA’s publication A Practical Guide to Constitution Building. The full Guide is available in PDF and as an e-book at <http://www.idea.int> and includes an introductory chapter (chapter 1) and chapters on principles and cross-cutting themes in constitution building (chapter 2), building a culture of human rights (chapter 3), and constitution building and the design of the executive branch, the legislature and the judiciary (chapters 4, 5 and 6). International IDEA resources on Constitution Building A Practical Guide to Constitution Building: Decentralized Forms of Government © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2011 This publication is independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council of Member States, or those of the donors. Applications for permission to reproduce all or any part of this publication should be made to: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) Strömsborg SE -103 34 Stockholm Sweden Tel: +46-8-698 37 00 Fax: +46-8-20 24 22 Email: [email protected] Website: www.idea.int Design and layout by: Turbo Design, Ramallah Printed by: Bulls Graphics, Sweden Cover design by: Turbo Design, Ramallah Cover illustration by: Sharif Sarhan ISBN: 978-91-86565-34-3 This publication is produced as part of the Constitution Building Programme implemented by International IDEA with funding from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. -
LJN: AZ9365, Gerechtshof 'S-Gravenhage , 09-751004-04 En 09-750006-05
LJN: AZ9365, Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage , 09-751004-04 en 09-750006-05 Datum uitspraak: 29-01-2007 Datum publicatie: 27-02-2007 Rechtsgebied: Straf Soort procedure: Hoger beroep Inhoudsindicatie: Vertaling in de Engelse taal van de Afghaanse zaak, nr. AZ7143. In the period of the end of 1983 to the end of 1990 the accused was in Kabul, in Afghanistan, at the time of the communist regime supported by the Soviets, head of the military intelligence service, the KhAD-e- Nezami, and deputy minister of the Ministry of State Security (WAD). In performing these duty/duties the accused, as can be proven, has in respect of three victims been guilty of very grave offences: being a co-perpetrator to torture and the breach of the laws and practices of war. Article 1 (old) of the “Uitvoeringswet folteringverdrag” UWF [Convention on Torture Implementation Act] and the Articles 8 (old) and 9 (old) of the “Wet oorlogsmisdrijven” [War Crimes Act]. Uitspraak Page 1 of 17 LJN: AZ7143, The Hague Court of Appeal, 2200613105 Date of judgment : 29-01-2007 Date of publication : 29-01-2007 Legal area : Criminal Kind of procedure : Appeal Indication of contents : In the period of the end of 1983 to the end of 1990 the accused was in Kabul, in Afghanistan, at the time of the communist regime supported by the Soviets, head of the military intelligence service, the KhAD-e-Nezami, and deputy minister of the Ministry of State Security (WAD). In performing these duty/duties the accused, as can be proven, has in respect of three victims been guilty of very grave offences: being a co-perpetrator to torture and the breach of the laws and practices of war.