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THE NINETEENTH ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS: LACKLUSTER ELECTION, SIGNIFICANT RESULTS by Jonathan Spyer*

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THE NINETEENTH ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS: LACKLUSTER ELECTION, SIGNIFICANT RESULTS by Jonathan Spyer* THE NINETEENTH ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS: LACKLUSTER ELECTION, SIGNIFICANT RESULTS By Jonathan Spyer* For the first time since the 1970s, there was no serious dispute as to who would emerge as prime minister from the 2013 Israeli elections campaign. Despite the lackluster campaign, the election results and the government that emerged from them do represent a certain change. Most notably, the election campaign focused on internal issues. This is because a core, centrist consensus on external and national security affairs now exists among a critical mass of Israeli Jews. This is also reflected in the new government. The governing coalition consists of the entire center, right and national religious bloc (with the exception of the rump Kadima party, with 2 seats, which has not entered). Labor, the largest opposition party, is centering its criticism of the government on internal, socioeconomic issues, on which it (rightly) perceives the new government to have a fairly united and coherent identity. The nineteenth Israeli Knesset elections vicissitudes of Israeli politics had produced a came at the end of a period of relative political situation in which none of the parties with a stability in Israeli terms. The government of realistic chance of challenging the Likud were Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, formed led by an individual deemed to have the in 2009 after a closely contested election, was necessary qualities and/or experience at that the first since the mid-1990s to come close to time to present a plausible candidacy for the serving out its four year term. Elections prime ministership. became necessary after the government’s This situation emerged because of a variety failure to reach agreement on the budget for of circumstances. Former Prime Minister the 2013 fiscal year.1 Political instability had Ehud Olmert, who was widely regarded by the been brewing throughout 2012, however, with Israeli center and center-left as the individual early elections narrowly being avoided when best placed to unite their forces and present a the centrist Kadima party briefly joined the plausible leadership alternative to Netanyahu, government in early 2012. Disputes over the was prevented from re-entering politics budget led to elections being called for because of his legal travails.2 Defense Minister January 2013, some months in advance of Ehud Barak, Former Foreign Minister Tsipi when they would in any case have been Livni, and former IDF Chief of Staff and required. Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz were the other As the election campaign began, the individuals with a level of experience that political map was most noteworthy for the fact might have made them plausible alternative that the outcome of the elections was in no candidates. Yet for varying political reasons, serious doubt. For the first time since the days none of these individuals were at the head of a of Labor hegemony in Israel in the 1970s, list able to mount a serious challenge to there was only one plausible candidate for the Netanyahu’s Likud in 2013. prime ministership. On this occasion, that Barak had effectively terminated his own candidate was Netanyahu, the incumbent. This political career by breaking from the Labor circumstance derived not from universal Party in 2010, in order to continue in his role enthusiasm or satisfaction with Netanyahu’s as defense minister. His five-member performance since 2009. Rather, the “Independence” list was not predicted to 92 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) The Nineteenth Israeli Knesset Elections: Lackluster Election, Significant Results achieve even a single seat after the elections minister Yosef “Tommy” Lapid, was a (and indeed did not gain a single seat), and newcomer to the political scene. His party Barak announced his intention to retire from stressed socioeconomic issues and what it politics before the polls. Livni had retired perceived as the unfair division of the from politics after losing leadership elections “burden” in Israeli society between secular to Mofaz in the Kadima party. She then and ultra-orthodox Israelis (on such issues as returned as the head of a new party--the military service, taxation, and housing prices). Movement (Hatnua). The new party was not Lapid’s appeal was self-consciously “centrist” predicted to make major gains in the polls, and rather than leftist, in common with Kadima in the event gained six seats. and Livni’s party. Unlike these lists, Lapid Mofaz, heading the remains of Kadima, focused on internal, rather than national and was heavily disadvantaged by the fact that he security questions in his messages. had agreed to enter Netanyahu’s government As a result of this profusion of parties on in 2012, and had then abruptly withdrawn the center and left, and the absence of a single from it. This compounded a reputation for authoritative leader around whom they could political indecisiveness, which attached to the rally, Netanyahu was acknowledged as the Kadima leader. This reputation derived from near-certain next prime minister. Mofaz’s decision to join Kadima at the time of There were also significant developments its foundation, in 2005, shortly after having on the right-wing side of Israeli politics in the made a ringing declaration that he would be months preceding the elections. Of primary staying in Likud. While generally considered importance was the decision, announced on to have performed adequately in the October 25, 2012, by Netanyahu and Foreign ministerial positions he had held, Mofaz failed Minister Avigdor Lieberman--leader of the to set out a clear idea of what Kadima stood Yisrael Beiteinu party--to merge their two for in contrast to Likud. As a result, Kadima parties into a single list for the elections.3 In was plummeting in the polls even prior to the the eighteenth Knesset (2009-2013), the Likud announcement of the election (and received a held 27 seats and Yisrael Beiteinu 15. Due to derisory two seats). the split and decline in Kadima, which held The problems faced by the opposition in the largest number of seats in the outgoing offering a credible alternative to Netanyahu Knesset (28), and other reasons stated above, were compounded by the presence of two Likud in any case appeared to have no serious other center-left lists, neither of which fielded rival as the largest single party. a candidate able to pose a credible alternative At the time of writing, the rationale behind to Netanyahu as prime minister. Labor, headed the merger of the two lists remains unclear. It by former journalist Shelly Yachimovich, was was criticized within the Likud almost the only one of the various opposition lists to immediately following the announcement, declare her unwillingness to serve in a with one official predicting that it would lead government headed by Netanyahu, and by so to a decline in the Likud’s support. The doing to present herself as an alternative official quoted suggested that the differing candidate for prime minister. However, natures of these two parties and their support Yachimovich, who entered politics only in bases would cancel each other out rather than 2006, lacked any ministerial experience and complement one another.4 Both parties regard was not accepted as the natural leader of the themselves as part of the nationalist right. center-left by other prominent figures within Lieberman was a Likud activist for a number this camp, still less as a potential prime of years and first rose to prominence as a minister. member of the party (and as Netanyahu’s chief An additional list competing for the votes of staff). However, Yisrael Beiteinu’s electoral of center-left Israelis was the Yesh Atid party base rested largely on the support of Russian of another journalist-turned-politician, Yair immigrants, while Likud enjoys considerable Lapid. Lapid, the son of former justice support from observant and partially observant Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 93 Jonathan Spyer Jews, including many of Middle Eastern party of Dr. Ahmad Tibi--a well-known origin. These are publics with quite different activist for Israel’s Arabs and former adviser views regarding the place of religion in public to PLO leader Yasir Arafat--with the United life. Arab List, a party dominated by members of In a significant development in another part the southern branch of Israel’s Islamic of right-of-center Israeli politics, businessman Movement. and former Special Forces officer Naphtali Among the ultra-orthodox, the Ashkenazi Bennett defeated veteran politician Zevulun United Torah Judaism (UTJ) and the Sephardi Orlev on November 6, 2012, in leadership Shas party were the two significant lists. UTJ primaries in the Bayit Hayehudi (Jewish brings together the Hassidic Agudat Yisrael Home) party. Bayit Hayehudi was formed and the Degel Hatorah party, which represents from a 2008 union between the National ultra-orthodox Jews of the non-Hassidic Religious Party--the party of Israel’s national Lithuanian tradition. Shas, whose support religious sector--and two radical right parties, base is mainly among disadvantaged Israeli Moledet and Tkuma. Moledet subsequently Jews of North African origin, brought back left the new list and stood with the rightist former leader Aryeh Deri, who had served a National Union list in the 2009 elections. prison term for corruption. Deri was not Bayit Hayehudi achieved only three seats in brought back as the undisputed leader of the these elections.5 party. Rather, he was part of a leadership The election of Bennett led to renewed triumvirate which also included former leader interest in the party. Bennett, 40, was a former Eli Yishai and Rabbi Ariel Attias.7 chief of staff to Netanyahu, and a prominent Two smaller Haredi parties also stood in activist on behalf of Jewish communities in the elections.
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