Soviet Military Politics

Dale R. Herspring

YOSEF AVIDAR. The Party and Allen & Unwin, 1984. party's primary concern is to control the Army in the Soviet Union. the military, with the result that there DAVID HOLLOWAY. The Soviet Jerusalem, Magnes, 1983. is constant tension between the two Union and the Arms Race. 2nd ed. institutions. A unitary approach, ad- PAULJ. MURPHY, Ed. New Haven, Yale University 2 vocated by William Odom, sees The Soviet Air Forces. Press, 1984. Soviet military officers, just like party Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 1984. JONATHAN ADELMAN. cadres, as executants of party poli- ELLEN JONES. Red Army and The Revolutionary Armies. cy, and maintains that the former Society. London and Boston, Allen Westport, CT, Greenwood share a common orientation with the & Unwin, 1985. Press, 1980. latter. Conflict, to the degree it oc- curs, is largely intra-institutional, JIRI VALENTA and WILLIAM JONATHAN ALFORD, Ed that is, it pits lower levels of the bu- POTTER, Eds. Soviet The Soviet Union: Security reaucracy against higher ones. Fi- Decisionmaking for National Policies and Constraints. nally, Timothy Colton has advocat- Security. London and Boston, New York, St. Martin's, 1985. ed a "participatory" model which, while it sees the military as an institu- tion having its own interests, argues RECENT events such as the Rea- funds away from the military? Fur- that so far the party has satisfied the 3 gan-Gorbachev summit, the subse- ther, to what degree is the military, military's core interests. Conse- quent limited warming in US-Soviet as a distinct institution, likely to op- quently, conflict has been minimal. relations, as well as the 27th CPSU pose Moscow's new leader on such The most profitable way to look at Congress all serve to focus attention issues?Finally, whatwillbethe long- civil-military relations, Colton ar- anew on the Soviet military and its term impact on military politics in the gues, is to focus on the degree of role in the politics of the USSR. With USSR of the ouster of a dynamic pro- military participation in national se- regard to foreign policy, what is like- fessional soldier of the stature of curity decisionmaking. All of the au- ly to be the Soviet military's re- Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov from his thors reviewed here rely to varying sponse to improved US-Soviet rela- posts as chief of the general staff degrees on one or another of these tions? On the home front, how will and first deputy minister of defense? three models. the marshals and admirals respond The answers to these questions will to Mikhail Gorbachev's effort to have important implications for the YOSEF AVIDAR in his study of Sovi- modernize the economy if it should course of Soviet domestic politics as et civil-military relations focuses on turn out to involve reallocating well as US-Soviet relations. the decade from the death of Stalin Three general conceptual ap-

proaches have been suggested for 'Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Dale R. Herspring, a Foreign Service Officer analyzing civil-military relations in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in with the US Department of State, is the author the USSR. Roman Kolkowicz has Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Eds., of numerous works on communist militaries, advocated an interest-group mod- Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, including The Soviet Union and Strategic Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, pp. 9-25. el, in which Soviet military politics 2William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Arms, (1984, co-authored with Robbin Laird). are characterized by constant con- Connection: A Critique," in ibid., pp. 27-52. The views expressed are those of the author 3Timothy J. Colton, "The Party-Military and do not necessarily represent the official flict between two definable dichoto- 1 Connection: A Participatory Model," in ibid., position of the US Government. mous institutions. In this view, the pp. 53-75.

93

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Book Reviews

(1953) to the ouster of Nikita Khru- cause the educational level of all So- nally, the party has provided capa- shchev (1964). Avidar devotes par- viet youth, including those from mi- ble and cautious leadership (with ticular attention to the Zhukov affair nority nationalities, is rising), of the some glaring exceptions) in foreign and to the impact on party-military demographic problems represent- policy, avoiding risky adventures relations of KhrCtshchev's efforts to ed bytheshrinkingnumberof young that might provoke war. (p. 158) cut back on the Soviet armed forces people (for which she suggests a in the early 1960's. Conceptually, number of viable solutions), and of The result, according to Holloway, Avidar relies on the interest-group the importance of the armed forces has been a smoother relationship model. The key to Soviet military for political socialization, she ar- than either Avidar or Cohen recog- politics during this period, in his gues that rather than being antago- nizes, but one that carries the poten- opinion, isthe degree to which Khru- nistic, the relationship between the tial for more conflict than Jones shchev satisfied the military's inter- party and the military is symbiotic. seems to foresee. ests. Thus, when party and military And, she adds, interdependence Those who accept the Golton ap- interests coincided, as during the between civilian and military offi- proach (implicitly or explicitly) rec- period from 1953 to 1957, relations cials is likely to grow in coming years ognize thatthe relationship between were tranquil. However, with the as the military's social role in- the two institutions has not always ouster of Marshal Georgiy Zhukov creases. She concludes that "the in- been conflict-free. Jonathan Adel- and the reassert'ion of party control terdependence of military and civil- man.forexample, in his outstanding through the Central Committee res- ian institutions is based on much comparative study of the impact of olution of October 1957, relations more than shared values" (p. 220). the early developmental period on worsened. A further deterioration Jones adopts a similar approach Chinese and Soviet civil-military re- occurred in subsequent years as a in her article on military research lations, notes that the Red Army dif- result of the U-2 affair of May 1960, and development in the book edited fered radically from the People's the forced withdrawal of Soviet mis- by Jiri Valenta and William Potter. In Liberation Army (PLA) because the siles from Cuba in 1962, and contrast to those who maintain that former was initially viewed by party Khrushchev's efforts to cut the mili- institutional (that is, bureaucratic) leaders as a hostile organiza- tary both in size and budget. The re- factors contribute significantly to re- tion—to be subverted and then con- sult was increasing alienation of the search and development, Jones ar- trolled—whereas in China, the party military, which, Avidar maintains, gues that the process is primarily and army were one. contributed significantly to Khru- driven by the party's military policy Analysts in the third group focus shchev's ouster in 1964. and the country's military doctrine. on determining the area and extent The book edited by Paul Murphy Her views closely resemble those of of military influence (or "participa- contains a number of worthwhile ar- William Odom. tion," to use Colton's term) in deci- ticles tracing the development of the The third group of authors re- sionmaking. They agree on a num- Soviet Air Forces since the 1917 rev- viewed here utilize a framework ber of things. First, the Politburo is olution.4 For example, the first arti- closer to Colton's. David Holloway, the key decisionmaking body; the cle, by Stuart Cohen, addresses the for example, in his updated study of military as an institution is clearly overall question of civil-military rela- the role of military power in the Sovi- subordinate to it. For example, Da- tions and employs a conceptual et Union from 1917 to the present, vid Fewtrell, in an article in the col- framework similar to that utilized by most clearly articulates the Colton lection of essays edited by Jonathan Avidar. Party-military relations (or in position when he states: Alford, notes that although the De- this case party-air force relations) fense Council certainly plays a role are seen as antagonistic. Thus the ... the party, by stressing the impor- in matters affecting the allocation of primary task of the party-political tance of conflict between states and apparatus is to control the military. the need for cohesion and solidarity "Of particular interest is the article by Philip Ellen Jones, in her excellent study at home, has provided an ideology Peterson in the Murphy book, entitled of Soviet manpower issues, adopts that gives clear purpose to the "Reorganization Trends," which discusses a different conceptual approach. Armed Forces' existence. Party poli- developments not only in the Air Forces, but in the Soviet military in general. Peterson's assertion After a lengthy discussion of prob- cy has given the officer corps a that "the Soviets are reorganizing their services to lems presented by the increasing good standard of living and high more effectively insure the capacity to conduct number of minority recruits in the So- status, and has furthered their pro- combined-arms actions at each echelon of strategic and operational leadership" (p. 277) viet military (the impact of which she fessional interests by allocating has serious implications for Western planners and sees as meliorated somewhat be- generous resources to defense. Fi- strategists.

94

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Problems of Communism March-April 1986

A second area of general agree- making leading to the 1968 invasion particular. For example, at a time ment is that the Soviet military's pri- of Czechoslovakia is particularly when the political leadership contin- mary source of authority in national noteworthy. It illustrates the com- ued to support detente and im- security decisionmaking is its mo- plexity of the decisionmaking proc- proved US-Soviet relations, Ogar- nopoly over expertise and informa- cess and shows the limitations of the kov publicly questioned the utility of security decision-making is its mo- "rational decision-maker" mode of both.5This difference of opinion was nopoly over expertise and informa- analysis of this process. Since no particularly evident in the respective tion. As Dimitri Simes puts it in his ar- one in the Soviet Union would dare books published by Ogarkov and ticle on the Brezhnev period in the override a Politburo decision, the Ustinov in 1982.6 In his volume, Valenta and Potter book, "the ab- key question is to ascertain the ex- Ogarkov adopted a much harder sence of alternative sources of ex- tent to which the military as an insti- line on topics such as the nature of pertise in a position to challenge the tution is able to influence decisions the threat facing the USSR (he saw uniformed military leaves the Polit- before they get to the Politburo. the nature of imperialism as being buro no choice but to rely heavily on A final point, on which all the writ- unchanged, aggressive, and pred- the judgments of marshals and ad- ers reviewed here agree, is the im- atory); the value of detente (he mirals" (p. 83). Likewise, Raymond portance that both political and mili- stressed military force, not detente, Garthoff, writing in the same volume, tary leaders of the Soviet Union as the key to the USSR's security); notes that the Soviet military has a ascribe to military power as a means and the danger of a conflict (he ac- strong voice in SALT matters, "not of furthering the foreign policy inter- cused the United States of prepar- only owing to its responsibilities for ests of the USSR. For example, from ing for war). Ustinov's positions on security, but also owing to a near his reading of Soviet writings, all of these questions were more up- monopoly of expertise and relevant Holloway argues that military power beat. He saw detente as having pos- information. Soviet military leaders, is seen as fulfilling three major func- itive as well as negative aspects; he well aware of this advantage, will not tions: first, to deter a nuclear attack viewed military force as important, easily share this source of power" on the Soviet Union; second, to de- but only as one of a number of tools (p. 155). In essence, regardless of fend the socialist community; and to protect Soviet national security in- who makes the ultimate decision on third, to aid national liberation move- terests; and although he felt that the military matters, it is the military that ments (p. 82). There would appear international situation was serious, provides data on which such deci- to be a proclivity on the part of Soviet he avoided suggestions that the sions are based. political leaders to be responsive to United States was preparing for war. A third area of agreement is that the military's requests for funds, In addition, Ogarkov also was more the bureaucracy plays an important equipment, and manpowerwhen such outspoken regarding the military's role in decisions affecting weapons requests are framed in the context of views on broader issues of national development programs, although furthering these objectives, particu- security decisionmaking and long- 7 there remains disagreement over larly the first two. term economic planning. how important this role is. Arthur Al- For purposes of this essay, it is exander, in his now classic study of THE MATERIAL reviewed here worth noting that at no time during the weapons procurement process, deals primarily with events prior to the early 1980's did the Soviet mili- which is reproduced in the Alford 1980. A review of developments in tary as an institution adopt indepen- volume, assigns greater weight to the area of Soviet military politics dent positions in public. During the the bureaucratic process. Hollo- since that time would be useful as a entire time when Ogarkov was pub- way, by contrast, argues that both means both of evaluating the three the bureaucratic process andpolicy approaches represented here and 5I discuss this problem in greater depth in an decisions by political organs play of looking at the likely course of unpublished manuscript, "Marshal Ogarkov and important roles. In Holloway's events in coming months and years. the Structure of Soviet Military Politics: 1980-1985." words, "the build-up of military pow- The most notable development in 6Cf. N.V. Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k er since the late 1950s must be seen Soviet military politics during the zashchite otechestva (Always in Readiness for as the product of conscious political early 1980's was Marshal Ogarkov's the Defense of the Fatherland), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982; and D.F. Ustinov, Sluzhim choices, and not only as the result of open defiance of the Soviet political rodine, delu kommunizma (We Serve the pressure from a military-industrial leadership. Beginning in 1981, he Country and the Communist Cause), Moscow, complex" (p. 160). In this regard, feuded with the leadership in gener- Voyenizdat, 1982. 7 Valenta's article in the Valenta/ See my article "Nikolay Ogarkov and the al and with the USSR Minister of De- Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Potter volume on Soviet decision- fense, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, in Affairs," forthcoming in Comparative Strategy.

95

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Book Reviews

licly feuding with Ustinov, none of sive? Probably not. The defensive 10 years leaves the reader with the the Chief of the General Staff's col-' tone of Ustinov's speeches during impression that Sokolov has spent leagues openly supported him on the 1980's to military officers, and most of his life as an apparatchik (his any of the issues mentioned above. expressions of concern by Ogarkov primary area of responsibility prior If anything, the overwhelming ma- and others over the size of the mili- to becoming defense minister ap- jority of professional soldiers ap- tary budget (Ogarkov called pears to have been logistics). Unlike pear to have looked not to their chief strengthening the country's defen- Ogarkov, he does not appear to of staff, but to their defense minister sive capabilities "a vital necessity" have authored a single major doc- and to the political leadership for in his 1985 book),9 suggest that trinal or operational concept guidance on policy-related matters. there are at least some in the military throughout his career. In Sokolov, An extensive search of Soviet mili- who are not satisfied with the party then, Gorbachev is probably deal- tary writings revealed not a single ci- leadership's views on these sub- ing with a person of less presence, tation from Ogarkov on the subject jects. Therefore, any attempt by one who is less likely to oppose him of East-West relations in the pub- Gorbachev to reallocate funds at the highest level on domestic or lished writings of any of his principal away from the defense budget is foreign policies. Although Ogar- subordinates. likely to result in grumbling from the kov's successor as chief of the gen- This failure of the Soviet military to military, as might hints at further eral staff and first deputy minister of line up along institutional lines in jux- steps toward warmer relations with defense, Sergey Akhromeyev, is taposition to the party is particularly the United States. bright and is thought by some to be significant given the uncertainties of an Ogarkov protege, he has for political leadership in the USSR dur- EVENTS of the 1980's would tend to now—at least—hewed more closely 10 ing the early 1980's. The ossified di- support the conceptual approach to the party line. rection of an ailing Brezhnev, fol- adopted by Holloway and others. All of this could change, however. lowed by the brief tenures of Yuriy Ogarkov did not view himself as a Sokolov is thought by many to be at Andropov and Konstantin Chernen- mere executant of party policy, yet most an interim leader. Given his ko, meant the absence of a strong the military as a whole did not be- age (he will be 75 in July), he is likely political leader to counter the hard- have as an interest group. While to leave the Soviet political scene in charging, aggressive Chief of Staff. Ogarkov doubtless saw himself as a the not-too-distant future. This could Based on the framework suggested loyal party member, he clearly be- bring Akhromeyev to the top military by Avidar, one might have expected lieved it appropriate for a senior mili- post, and conceivably the promo- senior military officers—many of tary officer to participate in the for- tion might make this talented officer whom probably privately supported mulation of policy in sensitive areas. more assertive. Sokolov's departure Ogarkov—to back him up. The re- Ogarkov's ouster is bound to have could also conceivably open the sult could have been an expansion an important impact on civil-military door for Ogarkov himself to become of military influence in both foreign relations. His "assignment to other defense minister, a possibility that and domestic policies. But they held duties" deprives the military of an ar- has been rumored in some circles.11 back. Why? ticulate and technically sophisticat- In view of Ogarkov's strong will and One is tempted to point to the ed spokesman in the country's high- good living standards enjoyed by est political-military councils and is 9N.V. Ogarkov, Istoriya uchit bditel'nost' the Soviet officer corps and the all the more significant if, as one sus- (History Teaches Vigilance), Moscow, Voyenizdat, availability of budget resources in pects, he was even more aggres- 1985, p. 80. sufficient amounts to construct a sive in defending military interests 10See, e.g., S. Akhromeyev, "On Guard of 8 (as he saw them) in private. Al- Peace and Socialism," Krasnaya Zvezda modern military machine. Could (Moscow), Feb. 22, 1985; idem, "The the military leaders feel they were al- though it could be argued that the Superiority of Soviet Military Science and Soviet ready getting everything they want- replacement of the deceased Usti- Military Art—One of the Most Important Factors of Victory in the Great Fatherland War," Kommunist ed, and hence considered Ogar- nov, basically a civilian, by Marshal (Moscow), No. 3, 1985, pp. 49-63; idem, "The kov's comments/demands exces- Sergey Sokolov, a career soldier, ABM Treaty—An Obstacle on the Path to the should provide for stronger military Strategic Arms Race," Pravda (Moscow), June 4, 1985; and idem, "The Great Victory and the influence at the highest levels of the Lessons of History," Novyy Mir (Moscow), 8See, e.g., the articles in the Murphy book, political-military decisionmaking No. 5, 1985, pp. 3-20. which chronicle the continued improvement in the process, Sokolov's background "See, e.g., Robert Hutchinson, "Ogarkov capabilities of the Soviet Air Forces; also, John would suggest otherwise. A review Tipped as Next Soviet Defense Minister," Collins, US-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985, Jane's Defense Weekly (London), Oct. 25, Washington, DC, Pergamon-Brassey, 1985. of Sokolov's writings over the past 1985, pp. 929-33.

96

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Problems of Communism March-April 1986 intellect, such a development would play a key role at the highest levels of ets as well as a review of Soviet writ- have important implications for So- the Soviet political spectrum. But ings suggest that under normal viet military politics. While Gorba- their impact within the bureaucracy circumstances, the bureaucratic chev undoubtedly recognizes the is more modest. process often has a life of its own. importance of Ogarkov's talents for It is not that the bureaucracy is un- Most likely, the military's monopo- the creation of a modern, efficient responsive to policy choices from ly of expertise will combine with the military, the party chief would want above. Indeed, individual decisions systemic secrecy prevalent in the to make sure that he had sufficient can be enforced in particular areas, Soviet Union to ensure that the mili- strength within the upper ranks of as Jones's analysis of Moscow's re- tary as an institution will retain its piv- the Soviet political leadership to sponse to demographic problems otal position in areas directly rele- control Ogarkov's strong personal- illustrates. Furthermore, a forthcom- vant to national security. ity before bringing him back to cen- ing study on Soviet military policy by On broader policy issues, there tral responsibilities. Michael MccGwire shows that major are some signs that senior Soviet changes have occurred in Soviet military officers may be concerned AS ALMOST all of the authors re- military doctrine and forces as a re- over aspects of Gorbachev's arms viewed here have noted, however, sult of conscious decisions by the control policies as well as his efforts only a small part of the interaction political-military leadership.12 Nev- to cut back on military spending.13 between the military and civilian or- ertheless, conversations with Sovi- However, they currently appear to ganizations occurs at the level of the lack the strong dynamic leader nec- chief of staff or defense minister. essary to challenge the country's

What then of the bureaucracy? Will 12 top political leader. This could Michael MccGwire, Soviet Military anything change here as a result of Objectives, Washington, DC, Brookings, change were Gorbachev to run into Ogarkov's ouster? Briefly, the an- forthcoming. This book, which explores the serious domestic problems or if US- impact of external influences on Soviet military Soviet relations deteriorate further. swer is no. The bureaucratic proc- doctrine and force structure, will doubtless ess appears to be too strongly em- elicit considerable interest in both academic and For the present, the role of the Soviet bedded for the departure of even an government communities. military at the highest level of deci- 13 individual like Ogarkov to change it See Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet Military sionmaking can best be described in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," radically. Personalities and policies forthcoming in Orbis. as subdued, but restive.

97

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome down by the Federal Consti- prevent totalitarian elements DKP, which quickly ab- to comment on matters tutional Court on August 17, from being able to exploit to sorbed much of the member- discussed in this journal. 1956. The party appealed to their benefit principles rec- ship of the outlawed KPD, Letters should be addressed to the Human Rights Commis- ognized by the Convention, has been allowed to operate The Editors, sion of the Council of Europe, i.e., to invoke the rights of in the Federal Republic of Problems of Communism alleging that this sentence vi- freedom to suppress the Germany as a legal organiza- US Information Agency, olated Articles 9 (freedom of rights of man. I expressed tion ever since. (On this de- 4th Street, SW, thought), 10 (freedom of ex- this last point of view in a foot- velopment, see Richard F. Washington, DC 20547, USA pression), and 11 (freedom note to page 48 of my essay Staar, Ed., Yearbook on Inter- of association) of the Euro- "Central America Between national Communist Affairs, pean Convention on the Hu- the White House and Revolu- 1969, Stanford, CA, Hoover DKP LEGALITY man Rights of Man of Novem- tionary War," published in the Institution Press, 1970, ber 4, 1950. This complaint spring of 1980 during the pp. 349-57.) TO THE EDITORS: In the was submitted as number Carter presidency. March-April 1985 issue of 250-57 before the Commis- When I see the Communist THE EDITORS Problems of Communism sion against the Federal Re- Party of West Germany clas- sified as "legal" in your there is an interesting and public of Germany. ON SHABASHNIKI well-documented article enti- The demand was declared "Checklist," I presume that tled "Checklist of Communist inadmissible by the Com- the situation has changed. If TO THE EDITORS: Patrick Parties in 1984." A reading of mission. The Commission this is the case, could you Murphy in his etymological the "Checklist" did, however, deemed that the Federal please furnish me with the explanation of the word sha- raise one question on which Constitutional Court was cor- particulars concerning when bashniki ("Soviet Shabash- I would appreciate further rect in having declared that and how this change took niki: Material Incentives at clarification. the German Communist Par- place? Work," Problems of Commu- On page 97, entry number ty was unconstitutional and nism, November-December 52 refers to the existence of a thus deserved to be dis- DR. EMILIO MAZA 1985) neglects to mention Communist Party in West solved. It is to be recalled Guatemala City that the word actually comes Germany, which has 50,842 that the Fundamental Law of from the Jewish day of rest members, is led by Herbert the Federal Republic of Ger- THE EDITORS RESPOND: —Shabbes in Yiddish, or Mies, and enjoys the right to many (Article 21, paragraph Dr. Maza correctly notes the shabash as it appears in function as a legal organiza- 2) declared unconstitutional August 1956 decision of Ozhegov's dictionary of the tion. However, the informa- those parties that, by virtue of West Germany's Federal Russian language (Moscow, tion at my disposal indicates their program or the activity Constitutional Court to outlaw Russkiyyazyk, 1983, p. 790). that the Communist Party is of their members, tend to the Communist Party of Ger- At the same time, I would banned in the Federal Re- threaten the free and demo- many. That party, the Kom- like to take this opportunity to public of Germany. I would cratic constitutional order or munistische Partei Deutsch- let you know how much I ap- appreciate learning from the to overthrow or endanger the lands (KPD), was never re- preciate your journal. analysts of the "Checklist" existence of the Federal Re- legalized. whether or not the informa- public of Germany. However, in September tion I have is correct. Perhaps the most impor- 1968 a new, legal German ISABELLET. KREINDLER In the FRG, the Communist tant ofthe arguments used by Communist Party (Deutsche Department of English Party was dissolved as the re- the Commission was that Kommunistische Partei— University of Haifa sult of a sentence handed which stated: The aim is to DKP) was constituted. The Israel

98

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED