Download Download

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Download Download INTERPOL: A Primer INTERPOL: A Primer Felix LoStracco Introduction Since its formation, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) has remained steadfast in its mission and objectives. Interpol has always been a non-governmental organization that promotes law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing among member countries. Interpol does not have authority to investigate violations of law, and it does not intervene in activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character. In the post-9/11 environment, law enforcement agencies from across the globe have come to increasingly rely on Interpol as a repository of intelligence. Interpol is able to succeed as an organization in part because of its relatively narrow focus. The organization is able to avoid the significant political and ideological differences between member countries, such as between the United States and China, by having a single goal of combating crime. Brief History and Organizational Structure Interpol was created in part to respond to the need to combat criminals who were crossing country borders to evade capture and prosecution. In 1923, 14 European countries created the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) to share intelligence. The ICPC was an organization created to support law enforcement in member countries; the ICPC was not intended to be an agency that enforced laws. The ICPC created a reporting structure where each of the member counties would have a single point of contact for all of its law enforcement agencies. Each country was then responsible for disseminating intelligence to its own agencies as it deemed appropriate. ICPC placed special attention on sharing criminal records and information on counterfeit currency and travel documents Felix LoStracco works for the federal government in Washington, DC. He graduated from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst and earned a Masters degree from George Washington University. His other publications are on public budgeting at the federal level. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be interpreted as those of any federal agency. 82 Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Summer 2007, Vol. 2, No. 2, p82-95 INTERPOL: A Primer The US did not join the ICPC until 1938. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was designated as the central point of contact in the US for the ICPC. Shortly after the US joined the ICPC, Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime annexed Austria, the country where the ICPC was headquartered. Hitler’s Gestapo, the organization charged with investigating “all tendencies dangerous to the State,” took control of the ICPC. Most countries ceased membership in the Gestapo-controlled ICPC. Following the conclusion of World War II, the countries who were former members of the ICPC resurrected the organization and renamed it Interpol. A new headquarters was set up in Paris, France. The rules of governance for Interpol were established, and most of those policies and procedures are still followed today. Interpol is governed by a General Assembly that meets annually to decide on policy. Each member country appoints a delegate to the General Assembly; each delegate’s vote is weighted equally. Once decisions are made by the General Assembly, an Executive Committee implements the decisions. The Executive Committee is comprised of 13 positions: one president, three vice-presidents, and nine delegates. The General Assembly elects personnel to sit on the Executive Committee. The president serves a four-year term, and the vice-president serves a three-year term. Each member of the Executive Committee is expected to represent the interests of their region, not just their country. Interpol’s full-time chief executive is the Secretary General, who serves a five-year term. Since 1989, the Secretary General is located at Interpol’s headquarters in Lyon, France. The Executive Committee nominates a candidate for Secretary General and the General Assembly confirms the candidate by a two-thirds majority. The current Secretary General is Ronald K. Noble, who formerly was the chief law enforcement officer at the US Department of the Treasury. Noble is the first Secretary General from the US. In addition to its headquarters, also known as the General Secretariat, Interpol has five regional bureaus—Abidjan, Cote D’ Ivoire; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Harare, Zimbabwe; Nairobi, Kenya; and San Salvador, El Salvador. Although the five regional bureaus are geographically clustered, their responsibilities are spread to cover each member country. Each member country maintains its own National Central Bureau (NCB) and staffs it with its own law Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Summer 2007, Vol. 2, No. 2, p82-95 83 INTERPOL: A Primer enforcement officers. While Interpol does not have any authority to enforce laws, the law enforcement officers working out of each country’s NCB is where Interpol’s intelligence can be implemented into action. The NCB in the US, managed jointly by the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, is located in Washington DC. The major functions of the NCB in the US are to1: a) Transmit information of a criminal justice, humanitarian, or other law enforcement related nature between NCBs and the law enforcement agencies of the US, b) Respond to requests by law enforcement agencies, legitimate organizations, institutions, and individuals when in agreement with the Interpol constitution, and c) Coordinate and integrate information for investigations of an international nature and identify those involving patterns and trends of criminal activities Participating agencies include the FBI, the US Marshals Service, US Fish and Wildlife Service, US Secret Service, US Postal Inspections Service, Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the Food and Drug Administration. In 1984, China joined Interpol; its NCB is located in Beijing. Zhu Entao, Assistant Minister of Public Security and I-Class Police Commissioner is director of the NCB in China. By the beginning of 2007, Interpol had 186 member countries, which are listed in table 1. As the table indicates, diplomatic relations do not exist between many of the countries. By design, Interpol does not intervene in a country’s political, military, religious, or racial issues. Interpol’s relatively narrow focus—to assist in international police co-operation—allows the organization to function effectively where bodies with broader goals are paralyzed with inaction. The table also indicates that countries historically known for their inability to police its laws, countries that have widespread corruption in their law enforcement, and countries that use law enforcement for political ends are allowed to join Interpol. 1 United States Code Title 22, Section 263A 84 Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Summer 2007, Vol. 2, No. 2, p82-95 INTERPOL: A Primer 2 Table 1. Interpol’s 186 Member Countries (as of 06/01/2007) Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua Argentina Armenia Aruba Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia - Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burkina - Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Central African Cape Verde Chad Chile Republic Colombia Comoros Congo Costa Rica Côte d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Democratic Republic of Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Congo Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova Monaco Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands Netherlands Antilles New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan People's Republic of Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay China Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Republic of Qatar Romania Russia Macedonia Rwanda St. Kitts St. Lucia St. Vincent San Marino Sao Tome Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore 2 Interpol member countries, http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/Members/default.asp Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Summer 2007, Vol. 2, No. 2, p82-95 85 INTERPOL: A Primer Table 1. Interpol’s 186 Member Countries (as of 06/01/2007)- -continued Slovakia Slovenia Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor - Leste Togo Tonga Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine United Arab United Kingdom United States Uruguay Emirates Uzbekistan Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe Core Functions Communications: Technological advances in the 1990s enabled Interpol to become an organization that can rapidly provide support to member countries. In 1990, the X.400 communication system launched, enabling NCBs to send electronic messages to each other and to the General Secretariat. Two years later, an automated search facility for remote searches of Interpol databases was introduced. In 2003, Interpol launched a secure, web-based global communications system, known as I-24/7, which significantly improved
Recommended publications
  • Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq
    Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq An Analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data Linus Gustafsson Magnus Ranstorp Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq An analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq An analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data Authors: Linus Gustafsson Magnus Ranstorp Swedish Defence University 2017 Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: An analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data Linus Gustafsson & Magnus Ranstorp © Swedish Defence University, Linus Gustafsson & Magnus Ranstorp 2017 No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. Swedish material law is applied to this book. The contents of the book has been reviewed and authorized by the Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership. Printed by: Arkitektkopia AB, Bromma 2017 ISBN 978-91-86137-64-9 For information regarding publications published by the Swedish Defence University, call +46 8 553 42 500, or visit our home page www.fhs.se/en/research/internet-bookstore/. Summary Summary The conflict in Syria and Iraq has resulted in an increase in the number of violent Islamist extremists in Sweden, and a significant increase of people from Sweden travelling to join terrorist groups abroad. Since 2012 it is estimated that about 300 people from Sweden have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and, to a lesser extent, al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. Even though the foreign fighter issue has been on the political agenda for several years and received considerable media attention, very little is known about the Swedish contingent.
    [Show full text]
  • Beurope and Eurasia Overview ______
    bEurope and Eurasia Overview ________________________________________________________________________ “It is important . that those engaged in terrorism realize that our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people in a desire to impose extremism on the world. It is our determination that they will never succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and in other civilized nations throughout the world.” Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom BBC News July 8, 2005 __________________________________________________________________ Two terrorist attacks in London on July 7 and July 21 further focused European countries on the terrorist threat and prompted increased cooperation and efforts to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. The year was also marked by successes as terrorist networks were broken up by arrests in countries ranging from Denmark to Italy. European nations continued to work in close partnership with the United States in the global counterterrorism campaign and continued to enhance their abilities, both individually and collectively, to deal with a terrorist threat increasingly seen as an internal one. The contributions of European countries in sharing intelligence, arresting members of terrorist cells, and interdicting terrorist financing and logistics were vital elements in the war on terrorism. European Union (EU) member states remained strong and reliable partners. International judicial cooperation advanced as EU members continued to enact and implement legislation for U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. The United 83 States and EU states developed more comprehensive, efficient border security processes to ensure close cooperation among law enforcement agencies and to improve information- sharing capabilities.
    [Show full text]
  • OUSSAMA ABDULLAH KASSIR, A/K/A "Abu Abdullah," A/K/A "Abu Khadi Ja, "
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -X UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -v. - INDICTMENT MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA, S2 04 Cr. 356 (JFK) a/k/a "Abu Hamza, " a/k/a "Abu Hamza al-Masri , " a/k/a "Mustafa Kamel," a/k/a "Mostafa Kamel Mostafa, ": OUSSAMA ABDULLAH KASSIR, a/k/a "Abu Abdullah," a/k/a "Abu Khadi ja, " and HAROON RASHID ASWAT, a/k/a "Haroon, " a/k/a "Haroon Aswat, " Defendants. COUNT ONE CONSPIRACY TO TAKE HOSTAGES (THE ATTACK IN YEMEN) The Grand Jury charges: 1. ~romon or about December 23, 1998, up to and including on or about December 29, 1998, in an offense begun out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA, a/k/a "Abu Hamza, " a/k/a "Abu Hamza al-Masri, " a/k/a "Mustafa Karnel," a/k/a "Mostafa Karnel Mostafa," the defendant, and others known and unknown, at least one of whom'was first brought to - -- ,' and arrested in the Southern District of New York, unlawfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Section 1203 of Title 18, United States Code. 2. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA, the defendant, and others known and unknown, - : would and did, inside and outside the United States, unlawfully and knowingly seize and detain and threaten to kill, to injure, and to continue to detain other persons, including two U.S. nationals, in - order compel a third person and a governmental organization, wit, the government of Yemen, to do and abstain fxom doing any act explicit and implicit condition for the release the persons detained.
    [Show full text]
  • The European Angle to the U.S. Terror Threat Robin Simcox | Emily Dyer
    AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES THE EUROPEAN ANGLE TO THE U.S. TERROR THREAT Robin Simcox | Emily Dyer THE EUROPEAN ANGLE TO THE U.S. TERROR THREAT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Nineteen individuals (11% of the overall total) who committed al-Qaeda related offenses (AQROs) in the U.S. between 1997 and 2011 were either European citizens or had previously lived in Europe. • The threat to America from those linked to Europe has remained reasonably constant – with European- linked individuals committing AQROs in ten of the fifteen years studied. • The majority (63%) of the nineteen European-linked individuals were unemployed, including all individuals who committed AQROs between 1998 and 2001, and from 2007 onwards. • 42% of individuals had some level of college education. Half of these individuals committed an AQRO between 1998 and 2001, while the remaining two individuals committed offenses in 2009. • 16% of offenders with European links were converts to Islam. Between 1998 and 2001, and between 2003 and 2009, there were no offenses committed by European-linked converts. • Over two thirds (68%) of European-linked offenders had received terrorist training, primarily in Afghanistan. However, nine of the ten individuals who had received training in Afghanistan committed their AQRO before 2002. Only one individual committed an AQRO afterwards (Oussama Kassir, whose charges were filed in 2006). • Among all trained individuals, 92% committed an AQRO between 1998 and 2006. • 16% of individuals had combat experience. However, there were no European-linked individuals with combat experience who committed an AQRO after 2005. • Active Participants – individuals who committed or were imminently about to commit acts of terrorism, or were formal members of al-Qaeda – committed thirteen AQROs (62%).
    [Show full text]
  • Stepford Four” Operation: How the 2005 London Bombings Turned E
    The 7/7 London Bombings and MI5’s “Stepford Four” Operation: How the 2005 London Bombings Turned every Muslim into a “Terror Suspect” By Karin Brothers Global Research, May 26, 2017 Global Research This article first published on July 12, 2014 provides a historical understanding of the wave of Islamophobia sweeping across the United Kingdom since 7/7. This article is of particular relevance in understanding the May 2017 Manchester bombing and its tragic aftermath. (M. Ch. GR Editor) Nine Years Ago, the 7/7 London Bombing This article is dedicated to former South Yorkshire terror analyst Tony Farrell who lost his job but kept his integrity, and with thanks to the documentation provided by the July 7th Truth Campaign “:One intriguing aspect of the London Bombing report is the fact that the MI5 codename for the event is “Stepford”. The four “bombers” are referred to as the “Stepford four”. Why is this the case? … the MI5 codename is very revealing in that it suggests the operation was a carefully coordinated and controlled one with four compliant and malleable patsies following direct orders. Now if MI5 has no idea who was behind the operation or whether there were any orders coming from a mastermind, why would they give the event the codename “Stepford”? ” (Steve Watson, January 30, 2006 Prison Planet) Background The word was out that there was easy money to be made by Muslims taking part in an emergency- preparedness operation. Mohammad Sidique Khan — better known by his western nickname “Sid” — had been approached by his contact, probably Haroon Rashid Aswat who was in town, about a big emergency preparedness operation that was looking for local Pakistanis who might take the part of pretend “suicide bombers” for the enactment.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Creating an "Arc of Crisis": the Destabilization of The
    “MUNDO ÁRABE CONJUNTURA ATUAL E ANÁLISE DE CENÁRIOS”- 2011 Creating an "Arc of Crisis": The Destabilization of the Middle East and Central Asia The Mumbai Attacks and the “Strategy of Tension” By Andrew Gavin Marshall Global Research , December 7, 2008 Introduction The recent attacks in Mumbai, while largely blamed on Pakistan’s state-sponsored militant groups, represent the latest phase in a far more complex and long-term “strategy of tension” in the region; being employed by the Anglo- American-Israeli Axis to ultimately divide and conquer the Middle East and Central Asia. The aim is destabilization of the region, subversion and acquiescence of the region’s countries, and control of its economies, all in the name of preserving the West’s hegemony over the “Arc of Crisis.” The attacks in India are not an isolated event, unrelated to growing tensions in the region. They are part of a processof unfolding chaos that threatens to engulf an entire region, stretching from the Horn of Africa to India: the “Arc of Crisis,” as it has been known in the past. The motives and modus operandi of the attackers must be examined and questioned, and before quickly asserting blame to Pakistan, it is necessary to step back and review: Who benefits? Who had the means? Who had to motive? In whose interest is it to destabilize the region? Ultimately, the roles of the United States, Israel and Great Britain must be submitted to closer scrutiny. The Mumbai Attacks: 11/26/08 On November 26, 2008, a number of coordinated terrorist attacks occurred across India’s main commercial city of Mumbai, which lasted until November 29.
    [Show full text]
  • Swedish Citizen Oussama Kassir Found Guilty of Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda
    United States Attorney Southern District of New York FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE May 12, 2009 YUSILL SCRIBNER REBEKAH CARMICHAEL JANICE OH PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (212) 637-2600 SWEDISH CITIZEN OUSSAMA KASSIR FOUND GUILTY OF PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO AL QAEDA LEV L. DASSIN, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that OUSSAMA ABDULLAH KASSIR, a/k/a "Abu Abdullah," a/k/a "Abu Khadija," was found guilty today of charges relating to his participation in an effort to establish a jihad training camp in Bly, Oregon, and his operation of several terrorist websites. KASSIR was found guilty of all eleven counts against him -- including, conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists; providing material support to terrorists; conspiracy to provide material support to al Qaeda; providing material support to al Qaeda; conspiracy to kill or maim persons overseas; and distributing information relating to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction -- following a four-week jury trial before United States District Judge JOHN F. KEENAN in Manhattan federal court. According to the superseding Indictment and the evidence presented at trial: KASSIR conspired with MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA, a/k/a "Abu Hamza" (hereafter "ABU HAMZA"), HAROON RASHID ASWAT, and others, to establish a jihad training camp on a parcel of property located in Bly, Oregon. As used by the conspirators in this case, the term "jihad" meant defending Islam against its enemies through violence and armed aggression, including, if necessary, through murder to expel non-believers from Muslim holy lands. The Bly jihad training camp was established as a site where Muslims could receive various types of training, including military-style jihad training, in preparation to fight jihad in Afghanistan or to continue with additional jihad training in Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Bombing Mastermind Aswat Works for MI-6
    Bombing Mastermind Aswat Works for MI-6 By Kurt Nimmo Region: Europe Global Research, August 03, 2005 Theme: Terrorism One Day in the Empire 3 August 2005 As Fox News tells it, at the very moment the British police were supposedly looking high and low for Dewsbury resident Haroon Rashid Aswat, pegged as the London bombing “mastermind,” MI-6 was quietly stowing him away for safe keeping. In fact, they were protecting him as an asset, although we should not expect Fox News to admit this “embarrassing” fact (watch this Fox video). “The Times said Aswat was believed to have had a ten-year association with militant groups, and met Osama bin Laden at [a CIA-ISI built] al- Qaida training camp in Afghanistan,” Breaking News reported almost two weeks ago. “The newspaper said it had obtained FBI documents indicating he was sent to America in 1999 where he had firearms and poison training.” According to MI-5 counter-intelligence whistleblower David Shayler, “MI-6 is in bed with al Qaeda,” which of course makes perfect sense since al-Qaeda is a masterfully engineered intelligence contrivance (a fake terrorist front organization created through a collaboration between the CIA, ISI, and MI-6) designed to discredit Islam, sow violence and chaos, and bury any possibility of pan-Arab nationalism—or, as the Grand Chessboard master Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, “to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.” In 2002, “Tony Blair … ordered a D-Notice [an institutionalized method of censorship, short for short for Defense Notices] on British media reporting government officials signing court gag orders.
    [Show full text]
  • The US/UK Extradition Treaty: Requests by US
    The US/UK Extradition Treaty: requests by US Standard Note: SN/HA/4980 Last updated: 31 July 2009 Author: Sally Broadbridge Section Home Affairs Section This note is part of a series of standard notes dealing with extradition issues. Others in this series describe extradition generally,1 how the European arrest warrant (EAW) was introduced,2 the EAW in practice,3 the history of the UK/US Extradition Treaty,4 and the case of Abu Hamza.5 1 SN/HA/4168 2 SN/HA/1703 3 SN/HA/4979 4 SN/HA/2204 5 SN/HA/2895 This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is required. This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public. Contents 1 New extradition arrangements (January 2004) 2 2 Requests received under the new arrangements 3 2.1 Abu Hamza 3 2.2 Enron fraud charges 4 2.3 Babar Ahmad 6 2.4 Ian Norris 10 2.5 Gary McKinnon 12 2.6 Haroon Rashid Aswat 17 2.7 Alex Stone 17 2.8 Brian and Kerry-Ann Howes 19 2.9 Jeffrey Tesler and Wojciech Chodan 19 3 Requests initiated before 2004 20 3.1 Giles Carlyle-Clarke 20 3.2 Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Eidarous 20 3.3 Stanley and Beatrice Tollman 21 1 New extradition arrangements (January 2004) The US has, since January 2004, been included in a list, set out in an order made under the Extradition Act 2003, of “designated” countries which do not have to include prima facie evidence when making requests for a person’s extradition from the UK.
    [Show full text]
  • Britain Now Faces Its Own Blowback
    Britain now faces its own blowback Intelligence interests in Britain may thwart the July 7/7 bombings investigation By Michael Meacher Region: Europe Global Research, September 11, 2005 Theme: Terrorism The Guardian 11 September 2005 In-depth Report: London 7/7 The videotape of the suicide bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan has switched the focus of the London bombings away from the establishment view of brainwashed, murderous individuals and highlighted a starker political reality. While there can be no justification for horrific killings of this kind, they need to be understood against the ferment of the last decade radicalising Muslim youth of Pakistani origin living in Europe. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the US funded large numbers of jihadists through Pakistan’s secret intelligence service, the ISI. Later the US wanted to raise another jihadi corps, again using proxies, to help Bosnian Muslims fight to weaken the Serb government’s hold on Yugoslavia. Those they turned to included Pakistanis in Britain. According to a recent report by the Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, a contingent was also sent by the Pakistani government, then led by Benazir Bhutto, at the request of the Clinton administration. This contingent was formed from the Harkat-ul- Ansar (HUA) terrorist group and trained by the ISI. The report estimates that about 200 Pakistani Muslims living in the UK went to Pakistan, trained in HUA camps and joined the HUA’s contingent in Bosnia. Most significantly, this was “with the full knowledge and complicity of the British and American intelligence agencies”. As the 2002 Dutch government report on Bosnia makes clear, the US provided a green light to groups on the state department list of terrorist organisations, including the Lebanese- based Hizbullah, to operate in Bosnia – an episode that calls into question the credibility of the subsequent “war on terror”.
    [Show full text]
  • Evidence from US Experts to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Extradition Law
    Evidence from US experts to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Extradition Law 1. We are academics, researchers and legal experts who have studied the US system for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes. Our academic and legal research on the US system has appeared in peer-reviewed journals, books and congressional and legal testimony. 2. We have become increasingly concerned in recent years at the human rights issues raised by the extradition of persons from the UK to the US to face terrorism-related charges. Moreover, we believe that the evidence already submitted to the committee on the nature of the US system conveys an inaccurate picture of how terrorism prosecutions in the US are conducted. In particular, we have deep concerns about the pattern of rights abuses in these cases and the conditions of imprisonment that terrorist suspects face in the US both before and after their trial or sentencing hearing. 3. Given the significant proportion of US extradition requests that involve federal terrorism-related charges and the particular concerns that exist in relation to these, we believe that specific attention to this category of extradition is warranted. In our submission, we have restricted our comments to terrorism- related cases and make no claims about cases involving other kinds of charges, although we believe much of our evidence would apply more widely. 4. We are familiar with a number of terrorism-related cases involving extradition requests to the US from the UK since 9/11: Babar Ahmad, Syed Talha Ahsan, Haroon Rashid Aswat, Adel Abdel Bari, Khaled Al-Fawwaz, Syed Fahad Hashmi, Mustafa Kamal Mustafa (commonly known as Abu Hamza) and Lotfi Raissi.
    [Show full text]
  • Inside the Crevice
    Inside the Crevice Islamist terror networks and the 7/7 intelligence failure PARLIAMENTARY BRIEFING PAPER Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed August 2007 © INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT Suite 301, 20 Harewood Avenue, London, NW1 6JX www.globalcrisis.org.uk Sponsored by Garden Court Chambers 57- 60 Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London WC2A www.gardencourtchambers.co.uk THE IPRD The Institute for Policy Research & Development (IPRD) is an independent think- tank for interdisciplinary security studies, analyzing international terrorism, military interventions, as well as national and international conflicts, in the context of global ecological, energy and economic crises. Founded in April 2001 in Brighton, a UN “Peace Messenger” City for 20 years, the Institute now runs from the heart of London as an informal, non-profit international network of specialist scholars, experts and analysts. The opinions published by the Institute do not necessarily represent those of the members of the IPRD Board. IPRD International Academic Advisory Board Dr M Shahid Alam , Professor, Department of Economics, Northeastern University, Boston Dr Ruth Blakeley , Lecturer, Department of Politics & International Relations, University of Kent Dr Brett Bowden , Research Fellow, Centre for International Governance & Justice, Australian National University; former Lecturer in Political Science, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales Dr Johan Galtung , Professor of Peace Studies, University of Hawaii; founder, Journal of Peace Research and International
    [Show full text]