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Struggling for peace : understanding Polish-Ukrainian coexistence in southeast Poland (1943-2007)

Lehmann, R.N.M.

Publication date 2009 Document Version Final published version

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Citation for published version (APA): Lehmann, R. N. M. (2009). Struggling for peace : understanding Polish-Ukrainian coexistence in southeast Poland (1943-2007).

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Download date:28 Sep 2021 6 Ethno-nationalism and the socialist heritage The case of the Lemkos in Poland*

Introduction

From a recent Polish newspaper clipping:

The regional court in Gorlice, civic department, the third floor. Witnesses enter and leave the courtroom as they are called up to testify in the case at hand. The plaintiff is the Union of Lemkos in Poland. The defendant is the Regional Museum of Nowy Scz. At stake is the identity of Nikifor Krynicki, an artist who lived and worked in Krynica and who died more than thirty years ago. The Union of Lemkos calls for a post-mortem change of Nikifor’s name Krynicki into his supposed real name Drowniak in the exhibit information, as the latter name reveals that the artist was of Lemko descent.

For an outsider this news item is as curious as it is incomprehensible. Who are the Lemkos and why did they start a case at court? Why bother at all about the name of a dead artist who does not even have a chance to speak up in the case at hand? On closer investigation, the attempt by the Union of Lemkos to rehabilitate the late artist Nikifor Krynicki, an artist who, perhaps more than anyone else, symbolizes Poland’s Lemko cultural heritage, coincides with the quest for emancipation by the Lemko minority in Poland since the 1990 election of Poland's first postwar democratic government. The introduction of new political liberties has inspired Lemko activists to bring to the fore their political and cultural claims. What makes these claims interesting is that they are formulated in direct response to decades of political and cultural suppression by the Polish socialist state. Moreover, they reflect the political divisions not just between Poles and Lemkos, but also, and especially, within the Lemko minority group. The chapter begins with a short introduction of the Lemko minority in Poland and discusses the origin of the group and the problem of ethno-national identity. The subsequent two sections explore how socialism set the conditions that shaped current relations within the Lemko community. Two types of conditions will be distinguished: the infra-structural conditions (including changes in demography, habitat, and social cohesion)

* This is a revised version of an article published in Focaal no 33, 1999: pp. 59-73. 98 Struggling for peace and the economy of shortage in socialist systems. Following Verdery’s (1993) analysis for post-socialist Romania, it is argued that the strong emphasis on nationalist ideologies by Poland’s Lemko activists, rather than a mere revival of ancient, pre-socialist political traditions, can partly be explained as a remnant of (good old) socialist rhetoric. The final section discusses the implications of the socialist heritage for the current position of the Lemko minority in Poland.

Introducing the Lemkos

The Lemkos form a tiny minority in Poland. Their numbers are estimated to be between 50,000 and 100,000 (Rieger 1995; odziski 1999).1 The native territory of the Lemkos is situated in southeast Poland (see Map 6.1), but the most numerous concentrations of Lemkos today are in the northeast (Olsztyn and Elblg), northwest (Supsk and Koszalin) and southwest of Poland (Legnica and Wrocaw) (odziski 1999). There are little visible criteria that distinguish the Lemkos from the Poles: they dress the same, visit the same schools and are active in a wide variety of professions. But there are also differences: Lemkos and Poles visit different churches (respectively Greek Catholic/Orthodox and Roman Catholic), they speak a different native tongue (respectively Lemko and Polish), and they maintain different networks of social and cultural communication through clubs, festivals, newspapers, and historical memory. In other words, there is a clear perception of cultural distinctiveness among Lemkos and Poles, as they perceive of themselves and each other as people with different origins and backgrounds. In this chapter the term Lemko is used in much the same way that it is presently used by the Lemko inhabitants of Poland and in the current Polish public debates: as a term identifying geographic origin and cultural heritage. It should be noted that the term Lemko bears certain assumptions that are present in most writings about the group. One such assumption is the idea of a pre-existing localized community with a more or less fixed culture. The ethnographic maps assigning to the Lemko people a Lemko homeland (Lemkovina, in Polish
emkowszczyzna) are examples of this kind of thinking (cf. Czajkowski 1994; Reinfuss 1998). Another assumption is the idea of a consolidated identity that is commonly accepted and agreed upon. However, the fact that the term Lemko is used complementary with other terms that make explicit statements of a particular national identity (for example, Rusyn, Ukrainian, or Pole) points to the situation

1 Nationality and language did not figure in Poland’s postwar censuses. Although since the 1990s Poland’s Central Statistical Office published several works on religious and ethnic groups in Poland, the variables nationality and language have as yet not been included in the national censuses (cf. Adamczuk and Zdaniewicz 1994; Adamczuk 1995, 1997).

Ethno-nationalism and the socialist heritage 99

Map 6.1 Southeast Poland

where identity is essentially a contested category that is uncertain and in flux.2 Consider the following statement by a contemporary Lemko ethnographer and historian from the Presóv region (Slovakia):

My roots are in Ukraine […] I am a Rusyn, but the language I speak belongs to the Lemko people, Therefore, I can say that I am a Lemko [...] I am a Rusyn, but this does not stop me from being an outspoken Ukrainian as well (Myko
aj Muszynka quoted in Kowalczyk 1997: 9).

It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the origins of the Lemko people at length, but it is useful to address a few key issues in the debate. Twentieth-century scholarship has advanced two alternative hypotheses concerning the origins of the Lemkos. The first hypothesis, advocated mostly by Ukrainian academics (including those based in North American universities), link Lemko settlement in the southwest Carpathians (modern southeast Poland) with the initial settlement of Rus enclaves (remnants of the former Kievan Rus federation) during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The second hypothesis, supported mostly by Polish scholars, links Lemko

2 For an extensive enumeration of ethnic names that over the past two centuries have been used to address the ‘Eastern Slavs’ inhabiting the Carpathian mountain range (stretching from present- day Poland, to Ukraine and Romania) see the work of Magocsi (1978). For a discussion on the processes of identity formation of the Lemkos in socialist and post-socialist Poland see Michna (1995b; 1995a) and Duc-Fajfer (1993).

100 Struggling for peace settlement with the early migrations of the Vlachs (pastoral nomads originating from the Balkan) in the Middle Ages (Mach 1993). While the first hypothesis establishes the Eastern Slav origin of the Lemko population, the second hypothesis establishes the Western Slav origin (albeit mixed with undeniable Eastern Slav influences) of the group (Hann 1985). The two theories are as much historical as they are political and ideological in content. While some use the first hypothesis to claim Ukrainian national identity for the Lemkos, others use it to claim Rusyn national identity. The mixed Wallachian-Polish thesis establishes a non-Ukrainian identity (that is, a Polish or Rusyn identity) for the Lemkos. It is no coincidence that the current name of the people discussed in this chapter (Lemko) and their assumed homeland (Lemkovina) was in fact a “Polish academic invention”, to quote Hann (1985: 29). Polish ethnographers carried out comprehensive academic research on Poland’s Rus populations in the early twentieth century (cf. Falkowski and Pasznycki 1935; Reinfuss 1936; Pieradzka 1939). By demarcating the linguistic and ethnographic boundaries of the Lemkos and other Rus subgroups on Polish territory (such as the Boikos and Hutsuls) the ethnographic studies conveniently served the political objective set by the interwar Polish government: the nominal ‘de-Ukrainization’ of the Eastern Slav populations in the western and eastern territories of southern Poland (cf. Hann 1995). Consistent with this objective, the terms ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Ukrainian’ were entirely banned from Polish bureaucratic language during the interwar period. Poland’s eastern territories, inhabited largely by Ukrainians, were referred to as Little Poland (Ma
o Polska) and the official name given to its inhabitants was Rusyns (Rusini). Accordingly, the 1921 census (GUS 1924) registered four main “nationalities” in the Lwów voivodeship, which included parts of the Lemko, Boiko, and Hutsul territories: Poles, Rusyns, Jews, and Germans. Most significantly, the 1921 survey does not list Ukrainians as a separate national category for the region. It does, however, list Japanese as a separate category (of which there were none in the Lwów voivodeship), which hints at a peculiar form of political incorrectness of the interwar Polish government (GUS 1924: Tablica Wojewódzka VIII-XIII). In line with this political trend, the term ‘Rusyn’ became increasingly used as a synonym for ‘Ukrainian’ in popular as well as in academic publications, as in for example the work of Romer (1919). Without belittling the role that Lemkos themselves have played in the identification and the labeling of their own group, political manipulations by outsiders have had, and continue to have, major consequences for the Lemkos as a group. An example of such manipulation, mentioned already above, concerns the attempt by the prewar Polish government to detach Lemkos from the much more politically assertive Ukrainians in the east. Other political incentives have led the postwar communist government to do the reverse: it started a campaign during which Lemkos were branded as Ukrainians. The Ethno-nationalism and the socialist heritage 101 impact of this labeling was considerable and eventually led to the massive expulsion and deportation of Lemkos from southeast Poland to the Soviet Union and to the northern and western parts of Poland as Ukrainian terrorists.

The infra-structural conditions: the implications of the policy of ethnic cleansing

The dramatic turning point in Poland’s postwar Lemko history was the military Operation Vistula (Akcja “Wis
a”). Between April and August 1947 some 150 thousand Lemkos and Ukrainians were deported from southeast Poland to the newly acquired German territories in west and northwest Poland (see Map 3.1). The official reason for operation Vistula was “military necessity” (Misi
o 1993). By removing the entire civilian population from the territories in which the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was active, the state authorities hoped to deprive the UPA from its wider societal base of support (Pud
o 1987; Misi
o 1993). However, by applying the standard of collective responsibility, and by uprooting tens of thousands civilian Lemkos and Ukrainians, the state authorities willfully pushed for the elimination of the Lemko and Ukrainian communities (not the people) in Poland (cf. Tomaszewski 1991; Misi
o 1993). The operation had a major impact on the position of the Lemko minority in the wider Polish society: disconnected from their native villages and towns and widely dispersed all over Poland the Lemko minority formed a very vulnerable group of displaced people with little potential for unified political action. An effective method to destroy the cohesion of a people is to break the bonds between its individual members. This was one of the purposes of Operation Vistula. Labeled as “security risks” the Lemko deportees were scattered over many settlements (located at a minimal distance of 30 km from Poland’s western state borders and 20 km from the main provincial cities) throughout north and northwest Poland (Misi
o 1993). Village communities were split into nuclear families that, in turn, were placed in exclusively Polish environments. The number of deportees per village was not allowed to exceed ten percent of the total village population. This usually meant that no more than two or three families were placed in a single village, while local security officials made sure that these families would not occupy adjacent farms (Pud
o 1987; Misi
o 1993). Further restrictions involved the prohibition to return to one’s family grounds at the risk of being imprisoned as well as the prohibition to leave one’s place of residence without the permission of the security organs (Pud
o 1987; Misi
o 1993). The nationalization of the vacant properties in the Lublin, Rzeszów and Kraków provinces in July 1949 legalized the outcome of Operation Vistula. As the Lemko deportees were now formally dispossessed of their land, houses and forests they literally had no place to return to. Operation Vistula also effectively disrupted religious life for the vast majority of Greek Catholic Lemkos. In the spring of 1947 the Greek Catholic priests, whose numbers had 102 Struggling for peace already been reduced by state expulsion policies and political persecutions in 1946, were deported along with their Greek Catholic parishioners. A decree from July 1947 that regulated the dispossession of the deported civilians also stipulated the impropriation of Greek Catholic church properties. The lack of priests and churches plus the scattered settlement of the deportees made it next to impossible to establish new Greek Catholic parishes after Operation Vistula. Those who wished to worship in church had to turn to the Roman Catholic or Orthodox churches (chapter 5). Indeed, the Vatican had appointed the Polish Roman Catholic primate as special delegate for Eastern Rite Catholics, while the Polish state had assigned the pastoral care of the Greek Catholics to the Orthodox church (Urban 1996). Whereas a large majority of the Greek Catholic clergy chose to blend in with the Roman Catholic hierarchy, given the fact that this was the only way in which they could fulfill their vocation, a large number of parishioners turned to Orthodoxy, given the similarities between the eastern Catholic and Orthodox rituals and the state-supported Orthodox mission among the Greek Catholics (Sorokowski 1986; Urban 1996). Ethnic minorities never had formal political representation in the Polish People’s Republic. The state sponsored socio-cultural associations, formed during Poland’s political thaw in 1956 and 1957, came close but not quite. Even though each minority had one socio-cultural organization, one periodical in the native language, some folklore groups and some schools, the minority organizations and institutions merely served as instruments for state control (chapter 3). Since an ethno-national Lemko or Rusyn identity was not recognized, nor accorded legal status by the Polish state authorities, the Lemkos were left with no other option but to participate in Poland’s Ukrainian cultural and social life. Although the state authorities denied the Lemko minority any organizational base, they did allow for the preservation of the Lemko cultural heritage in museums and on folk festivals, thereby encouraging a Lemko ‘culture of artifacts’. Pressure towards assimilation in Polish schools, Polish churches and Polish neighborhoods, and simultaneously, pressure towards accepting a Ukrainian identification, resulted in the significant weakening of the Lemko identity (Kwilecki 1974; Pudo 1987). During the late 1950s a considerable number of Lemkos returned to Poland’s southeastern territories while overcoming intense discouragement by government agencies.3 However, no return, no matter how massive, could repair the damage done by Operation Vistula.

3 The number of Ukrainians and Lemkos that returned to southeastern Poland is estimated by Lerelik (1997) at some 20 thousand persons. The number of Lemkos that since 1956 returned to their homeland (
emkowsczyzna) is estimated between five and six thousand persons (Rieger 1995; urko 1997). It should be noted that an unspecified number of Lemkos and Ukrainians already ventured (illegal) returns during the early 1950s.

Ethno-nationalism and the socialist heritage 103

After the regime change in 1990 a significant number of Poland’s Lemkos continued to stay with the successor of the Ukrainian socio-cultural association (the Organization of Ukrainians in Poland). In addition, a large number of new organizations and institutions representing sections of the Lemko minority were founded. Political dissension and shifts in orientation and support within the Lemko community caused a high turnover of Lemko minority organizations since the early 1990s. Overall, two main political groupings can be distinguished representing historically competing ‘ideological’ camps on the question of Lemko ethno-national identity: the Union of Lemkos (pro-Ukrainian orientation) and the Lemko Association (pro-Rusyn orientation) (Kowalczyk 1997; Mihalasky 1997). But even when these political orientations have long historical roots in the Lemko community, it is inaccurate to explain current orientations in terms of their predecessors half a century earlier.4 Firstly, two recent developments have spurred the debate over Lemko ethno-national identity in Poland: the post 1989 resurgence of a (largely American based) Rusyn movement advocating the idea of a distinct Rusyn ethno-national identity and the 1991 normalization of the status of the Byzantine Ukrainian (Greek Catholic) church within Poland. While the Rusyn movement actively engages in promoting a distinct Rusyn ethno- national identity among the Lemkos (among others by organizing conferences in the Rusyn ‘homelands’, such as in Poland and Slovakia5), the Greek Catholic church seeks political engagement and support for the development of a Ukrainian ethno-national identity among the Lemkos. The establishment of an independent Ukraine in 1991 certainly spurred the latter trend, as it gave new perspectives on a renewed bond between the Polish and the Ukrainian branches of the Greek Catholic church. Secondly, postwar history altered the political objectives of the Lemko community. Irrespective of their ideological preferences, Lemko activists spend the bulk of their energy demanding compensation for the victims of Operation Vistula. Meanwhile, a number of the claims formulated by Lemko organizations have reached the Polish parliament through the arbitration of representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland (Kaczynski 1991). Thirdly, the shift of the geographical centers of Lemko political activity from east to west and from south to north, plus the still scattered settlement of the Lemkos in Poland, significantly impacted the political needs and incentives as well as the strategies of ethnic

4 For an extensive analysis of the political and religious orientations among the Lemkos during the inter-war period see the comprehensive study by Moklak (1997). 5 The first Rusyn World Congress on site was held in Medzilaborec (Slovakia, March 1991); the second in Krynica (Poland, May 1993). One of the resolutions voted by the participants of the second Rusyn World included a call for Lemko-Rusyns to be recognized and accorded legal status within Poland as an ethnic minority distinct from the Ukrainian minority (Mihalasky 1997).

104 Struggling for peace mobilization. Finally, the forced Ukrainization and Polonization of the Lemko minority over the past four decades have significantly changed the political meaning of past dividing lines. Pro-Ukrainian and pro-Rusyn voices can still be heard, but the political motivations and programs of those who profess these national ideologies are different from those of their prewar brethren. An example of a division dating back to the prewar times but that experienced a transformation during the socialist era is the conflict between Greek Catholic (Uniate) and Orthodox sections of the Lemko community.6 The Polish socialist state positively sanctioned Orthodoxy at the cost of Greek Catholicism, which constituted the major religion in southeast Poland during the interwar years. This resulted in a renewed power struggle between Lemko Orthodox and Lemko Greek Catholics after the regime change. At stake is the control over formerly Greek Catholic church property that had been confiscated by the Polish state and appropriated by the Orthodox church after Operation Vistula (cf. Gazeta Wyborcza 1991a, 1991b). At stake is also the support of the laymen whose dedication to community life is crucial for the maintenance and building of old and new religious communities (chapter 5). Thus, far from being products of old traditions Lemko activists operate in a dynamic, constantly changing political field. Their identities (as well as their political agenda’s and political alliances) are highly dependent on the contexts and the fields in which they operate. This is also what Mihalasky (1997) found when exploring the different terms that are currently being used to denote the Lemkos. Varied usage of the terms do not just reflect ethno-nationalist preference; they also reflect fields of activity and power relations:

In writing on matters of broader national interest, such as the “Vistula” Operation resettlement or the question of compensation for the involuntarily resettled populations, there was an observable tendency to use the “Ukrainian” ethnonym, whereas in dealing with local level activities and concerns (such as language schools, religious relations within a village, or holiday traditions), there was a tendency to favor the term “Lemko” […] This pattern of terminology usage also reflects the success with which the Ukrainian community has managed to forward a coherent, unified agenda in Warsaw. Conversely, the decentralized, loosely organized Rusyn orientation favors grassroots community activity (Mihalasky 1997: 46).

6 The conflict dates back as far as the Union of Brest-Litovsk in 1596, which established the unification of several millions of Ukrainian and Byelorussian Orthodox Christians living under Polish rule with the Roman Catholic church.

Ethno-nationalism and the socialist heritage 105

The condition of the socialist economy of shortage: contests over representativeness

Verdery (1993) gives examples from Romania, but her thesis that socialist systems have a predisposition to use national ideology and that this predisposition is perpetuated in post- socialist politics, is also instructive for the case of Poland. Verdery bases her argument on the main characteristic of socialist systems, namely the nature of bureaucratic competition ruled by processes of horizontal redistribution. In socialist systems competition was for allocations from the central budget. Since claims upon the state budget were usually much bigger than the central budget could support, groups and persons would compete for the attention of central planners. Groups or persons seeking such allocation from the centre had more chances of success if they formulated their appeal in a language compatible to that of the central distributors. With a party leadership whose main objective was to ‘homogenize’ the society at large, appeals to national values became a valuable means of building budgets. The outcome was what Verdery (1993: 180) calls contests over representativeness, meaning that the different applicants justified their claim by saying that their project was more representative of the true national value than someone else’s project or version. In post-socialist Poland the economy of shortage is undergoing a rapid transformation toward an economy of affluence, that is, a capitalist market economy. Still, the funds and resources available for Poland’s minority populations are fairly limited. Also, even when decentralized forms of governance are increasingly taking over from centralized forms of government, funds and resources are still redistributed from the top down. Especially claims of restitution of properties to their former Lemko owners involve the higher levels of decision makers. Once claims could be made for wrongs done in the past and once funds and resources became available for the development of a Lemko culture, language and education, the question that arose was: by whom are the claims made and who will share in the profits? The arguments that are being used to enhance the reasonable opportunity to have claims heard and decided are remarkably similar to the ones put forward by the ‘chief fashioners’ of social ideologies (intelligentsia, agents of certain bureaucratic segments) during socialist times: the minority elites engage in a contest over which project or claim is more representative of the true national (read: Lemko) value than other projects or claims. In any contest over representativeness the chances of success are bigger if the applicant is able to effectively differentiate him or herself from those who make similar claims. Applicants thus tend to advance arguments that ensure them a considerable allocation at the expense of their competitors. This, in turn, requires that the applicant take an intolerant stance against any other (and especially towards identical) claimants: whereas I do, you don’t represent the true cultural, religious, or national values of the group. This mechanism, at least in part, may account for the exclusivist ethno-nationalisms that divide

106 Struggling for peace the Lemko community today (cf. Sidorowicz 1993). Moreover, it may explain the extremely compliant and mild attitudes of the Lemkos vis-à-vis the Poles. The applicant, being still a member of an ethnic minority, should make sure that he or she does not alienate him or herself from the majority population, as this would significantly reduce the reasonable opportunity to have his or her claims heard and decided. It is therefore of utmost importance that the applicant shows his or her goodwill and formulates his or her appeal in a language compatible to that of the central distributors. Consider the following fragment of an interview with a pro-Rusyn Lemko spokesman:

Interviewee: We [the ‘Hospodar’ Citizens’ Circle of Lemkos] seek to stand up for our rights as citizens. Why bother with [issues of] national belonging or regional specifics? We consider such issues of minor importance in the current situation of the Polish Republic. Truth be told, we are loyal citizens of the [Polish] Republic. Our roots are within her boundaries. As for the recognition of our rights, we intend to proceed peacefully, as this—and I mean the avoidance of conflict—is already deeply rooted in our mentality.

Interviewer: Is that possible? To speak up for the farmer’s right, when new generations of Polish settlers still live in former Lemko farms? They obtained these lands as part of the agricultural reform, and they took it in good faith, and—this is of crucial importance—they should not be the ones to be burdened with the responsibility of Operation Vistula.

Interviewee: That is exactly the reason why we do not claim the farms of private Polish settlers. The whole philosophy of our movement is based on the belief that pain cannot be relieved by inflicting pain on others. Nevertheless, we do insist that the state owned forests be returned to their legitimate owners. By privatizing these state forests […] the interests of no single inhabitant of former Lemkovina will be harmed (Semprich 1990).

... and the following fragment of an interview with a pro-Ukrainian Lemko spokesman:

As the Union [of Lemkos] we belief that the Lemkos […] should refrain from launching political goals of the sort that endanger the integrity of the Polish state. As the Union [of Lemkos] we say openly, that we do not seek a new Ukraine in Lemkovina. We only want to guard our language, our customs, and practice the Greek Catholic or Orthodox religion in freedom (Koprowski 1991).

While the above statements by the Lemko spokesmen seem reasonable and fair, the two organizations, which compete in the same political and cultural field, in fact play for high stakes. An example of the consequences of fierce internal competition is the prolonged

Ethno-nationalism and the socialist heritage 107 fight over a former Rusyn boarding school in Gorlice that started in 1989, but that after eight years of struggle has not yet found an end (see Map 6.1). The example illustrates how excessive internal competition impedes cooperation within the Lemko community. In November 1989 the ‘Hospodar’ Citizens’ Circle of Lemkos plead for the return of the building that from 1923 until its confiscation by the state in 1949 had belonged to the Society of the Rusyn Boarding School (Towarzystwo Ruskaja Bursa) in Gorlice. This claim was followed by similar claims by four other Lemko organizations: the Union of Lemkos (in October 1990), the Association of Lemkos (December 1990), the Folk Group ‘Lemkowyna’ (January 1991), and the newly erected Association in support of the ‘Rusyn Boarding School’ (December 1991 and September 1995). In the petitions, which were handed to the highest state institutions (including the chancellery of the President), the claimants explained why the return of the former boarding school was needed and why one organization, and not the other, was the legitimate successor of the prewar Society of the Rusyn Boarding School (Sobolewski 1996). After years of unsuccessful petitioning, all organizations, with the exception of the Union of Lemkos, withdrew their claim in favor of the Association in support of the ‘Rusyn Boarding School’. By this means the pro-Rusyn organizations created a platform against the pro-Ukrainian Union of Lemkos. What the organizations did not like about the Union of Lemkos was that it petitioned for a boarding school that would serve the education of the Ukrainian language (defined as “mother tongue”) and Ukrainian history (so called “native traditions”) to the Lemko youth (referred to as “Rusyn youth from all over Lemkovina”) (Sobolewski 1996). The four organizations unmasked the representatives of the Union of Lemkos as former “members of the elite of the [communist] Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Association”. To claim that the Ukrainian language is the mother tongue of all Lemkos, so they argued, is a “sheer violation of the historical truth”. They therefore appointed the Association in support of the ‘Rusyn Boarding School’ as the “heir apparent” of the prewar Society of the Rusyn Boarding School (Sobolewski 1996). In 1995 the head of the Regional Department in Gorlice, on behalf of the Polish state, assigned the (meanwhile empty) building to the Association in support of the ‘Rusyn Boarding School’ to be used by “all Lemko organizations represented by the Boarding School”. The contract did not contain a clause regarding legal ownership, but it allowed the Association in support of the ‘Rusyn Boarding School’ to use the building for as long as it lasts, and, as was hinted by the head of the Regional Department, “maybe forever”. Today, an outside doorplate informs in two languages (Polish and Lemko) that in the building are seated the ‘Rusyn Boarding School’, ‘Lemkowyna’ and ‘Hospoda’. In order to make good and “accommodative” use of the building, the Union of Lemkos has also been invited to take part in the boarding school’s activities. But the Union has not accepted 108 Struggling for peace the offer to date. Instead it continues to petition for the handing over of the property to the one and only Lemko organization “that truly has the same goals and duties as had the former company”: the Union of Lemkos (Sobolewski 1996).

Conclusions: the socialist heritage and the Lemko emancipation movement

Despite the oppression of ethnic minorities during the socialist era, there has always been limited room for cultural expression in Poland (chapter 3). A plausible explanation for the perseverance of a minimal level of ethnic organization in former socialist Poland is given by Verdery (1993) and lies in a central characteristic of socialist systems, namely the ‘economy of shortage’. In such an economy, shortage is organized and therefore endemic and competition is for resources that are in short supply. In the competition for scarce resources ethnic identity is relevant on at least two levels. Firstly, in the absence of other socio-political organizations or groups, ethno-national mobilization was the only form of political interest-group activity that could be employed with some legitimacy, even if within certain strict limits. Secondly, whether or not an ethno-national group had a meaningful political life as a group, in circumstances of severe shortage ethnic identities served like personalistic ties: when goods were in short supply they preferably went to members of one’s own group (Verdery 1993: 175). As Verdery (1993) convincingly shows, the institutional history of former socialist countries can be held responsible for the fact that their societies are strongly predisposed toward ethno-national conflict. If it is true, as Verdery suggests, that national ideology and national sentiments not just persisted but were even intensified by the political economy of socialism (and not by ‘age-old enmities’ or by ethno-nationalisms of the 1930s), how can we explain the peacefulness of the Lemko emancipation movement today? One explanation, I would suggest, is that ethnic cleansing has worked. The Polish socialist authorities had done away with Ukrainian and Lemko enclaves right from the start through expulsion and deportation. Without belittling the brutal consequences of forced resettlement, the policy that significantly reduced the number of ethnic minority members and that enforced the assimilation and the dispersion of the remainder, has contributed to a decrease of ethno-national threats that ensues from situations where ethnic minorities constitute a significant power in local or semi-local politics. Low population numbers and strong internal political divisions impede Poland’s Lemkos and Ukrainians from mobilizing effectively for collective action. More than that, competition and intolerance is fiercest within these minority groups, which inevitably relieves tension between Poland’s Lemkos and Poland’s Poles. Another explanation for the absence of ethno-national conflict lays not so much in Poland’s socialist heritage, as in the political features of post-socialist Polish society. Ethno-nationalism and the socialist heritage 109

Poland has quickly come to terms with the new social realities following the political transformation of 1989 through the establishment of new institutions responding to the needs of a new democratic society and a decentralization of power. This situation is different in, for example, Romania. The situation in Romania has led Verdery (1993) to conclude that ethno-national resentments in Eastern Europe flare up in an environment that is not equipped to managing them. Since socialist systems tended to spur the destruction of resources and organizations outside the control of the party bureaucracy, it means that former socialist societies are devoid of intermediate institutions for channeling ethnic sentiments, for settling disagreements peacefully, or for offering alternative means of expressing one’s grievances (Verdery 1993: 183). In Poland ethnic mobilization as well as state policies supporting the emancipation of ethno-national minorities smoothly filled up the gap after 1989. This has led to the situation where ethno-national groups make subtle use of a new democratic infrastructure: they found relief-committees in support of their cause, they get representatives of Poland’s ethnic minorities in parliament to do a good job for them, they hand in petitions to the government, they play on the media when needed, and they start a case at court as the final resort. The case of the rehabilitation of the Lemko artist Nikifor that I gave at the outset of this chapter, and the case of the Rusyn boarding school that I dealt with later on, support the notion that Polish society has reached a certain level of institutionalization of ethnicity, to paraphrase Verdery (1993: 183), which for one important thing has helped to prevent ethnic violence of the sort that has occurred in a number of other former socialist countries.