Freudian Theory and Somatic Markers

Journal of Physiology - Paris 104 (2010) 272–278

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Physiology - Paris

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jphysparis

The homeostatic psyche: Freudian theory and somatic markers ⇑ ⇑⇑ Mathieu Arminjon a, François Ansermet a, , Pierre Magistretti b, a Service de Psychiatrie de l’enfant et de l’adolescent, Hôpitaux universitaires de Genève, Switzerland b Brain Mind Institute, Lausanne and Center for Psychiatric Neuroscience, CHUV-UNIL, Lausanne, Switzerland article info abstract

Keywords: After years of reciprocal lack of interest, if not opposition, neuroscience and psychoanalysis are poised for Neuronal plasticity a renewed dialogue. This article discusses some aspects of the Freudian metapsychology and its link with Psychoanalysis speciﬁc biological mechanisms. It highlights in particular how the physiological concept of homeostasis Homeostasis resonates with certain fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. Similarly, the authors underline how the Somatic markers Freud and Damasio theories of brain functioning display remarkable complementarities, especially Traces Discontinuity through their common reference to Meynert and James. Furthermore, the Freudian theory of drives is discussed in the light of current neurobiological evidences of neural plasticity and trace formation and of their relationships with the processes of homeostasis. The ensuing dynamics between traces and homeostasis opens novel avenues to consider inner life in reference to the establishment of fantasies unique to each subject. The lack of determinism, within a context of determinism, implied by plasticity and reconsolidation participates in the emergence of singularity, the creation of uniqueness and the unpredictable future of the subject. There is a gap in determinism inherent to biology itself. Uniqueness and discontinuity: this should today be the focus of the questions raised in neuroscience. Neuroscience needs to establish the new bases of a ‘‘discontinuous” biology. Psychoanalysis can offer to neuroscience the pos- sibility to think of discontinuity. Neuroscience and psychoanalysis meet thus in an unexpected way with regard to discontinuity and this is a new point of convergence between them. Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The aim of this article is to discuss the Freudian theory in the perspective of physiological processes of homeostasis and somatic After a few decades of isolation, psychoanalysis is subject to a markers. In addition we will provide an historical perspective of renewed interest from scientists engaged in experimental research the notions of homeostasis and somatic states as it can be detected in the field of brain and mind relationships, a sort of ‘‘Freudian re- emerging from Cannon’s, James’ and Freud’s works. Interestingly turn” (Solms, 2004; Kandel, 1999; Ansermet and Magistretti, some aspects of these theories can be related to the cortico-centric 2007). Indeed, the Freudian ‘‘oeuvre” has also the purpose of pro- theory of Meynert. posing a global theory of mind. In this light, Freud can also be seen as an early neuroscientist and physiologist. Furthermore, certain 2. Homeostasis aspects of the Freudian theory find a renewed interest in the context of what are now called ‘‘affective neurosciences” in particular 2.1. Claude Bernard and the «internal milieu» in relation to the work of neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio and his somatic marker theory (Damasio, 1994). Through his work, It is generally admitted that the first truly physiological theori- Damasio also proposes an integrated brain/mind theory connecting zation on auto-regulated mechanisms is Claude Bernard’s ‘‘milieu brain function to physiological processes that underlie bodily intérieur”. Bernard is considered as the father of scientific physiol- homeostasis. ogy. Inspired by his research on the capacity of the liver to balance body’s glucose availability, the notion of ‘‘milieu intérieur” appears as an ideal concept, giving the experimentally founded reasons to ⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Service de Psychiatrie de l’enfant et de distinguish life matter from the physical one. He came to admit l’adolescent, Hôpitaux universitaires de Genève – 41 ch. des Crêts de Champel, that organisms are ruled by norms that allow organs to keep con- CH-1206 Genève, Switzerland. Tel.: +41 22 382 89 55. stant their level of functionality. According to Bernard, these re- ⇑⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Brain Mind Institute, EPFL, SV 2511, Station 19, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. Tel.: +41 21 6939502. sults extend the notions put forward by Bichat regarding vitality. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (F. Ansermet), Pierre.magistretti@ Bichat defined life as the forces resisting to death. While of interest, epfl.ch (P. Magistretti). this theory lacked the experimental evidences to explain the

0928-4257/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2010.08.006 M. Arminjon et al. / Journal of Physiology - Paris 104 (2010) 272–278 273 nature of such forces. Bernard tried to naturalize them, by reveal- 2.2. Homeodynamism and homeostasis ing their physiological bases: ‘‘Far from seeing, as physicists and chemists, the type of vital actions in the inanimate world phenom- As seen previously, the dynamism that characterizes the con- ena, we profess on the contrary, that the expression is particular, cept of ‘‘milieu intérieur” is quite restrictive. Thus, Steven Rose’s that the mechanism is special, that the agent is specific, though term of homeodynamism may be a better one: ‘‘The thermostat the result is identical. No chemical phenomenon occurs within temperature control is set such that if temperature falls below its body as outside of it.” (Bernard, 1879, p. 201). Bernard positioned set point, the heating system comes on and the temperature rises; himself at mid-point between vitality and physical reductionism. as it increases above the set point, the system is switch off.” (Rose, In his own words (Bernard, 1879), he defends the concept of ‘‘vit- 1997, p. 155). Rose notes that this kind of system is only able to alité physique” (physical vitality). oscillate around a fixed point. Even the more recent heating sys- The definition of different types of life forms is a necessary tems are built to fit more parameters; it can be programmed to second step to identify the physiological regulations necessary warm a room according to the hour, the day, the season, the inhab- to sustain life. Three types can be distinguished. Latent life: vege- itants’ preferences, etc.: ‘‘viewed on a longer scale, even a room tal, seeds etc.; oscillating life: invertebrates, hibernates, and cold- thermostat does not display homeostasis in the sense of ‘staying blooded vertebrates and lastly, constant life: superior mammals. the same’, but incorporates a range of cycles and hypercycles.” Each one is characterized by a gain in autonomy from the outer (Rose, 1997, p. 156). world. Constant life would represent the highest capacity to Consequently, homeostasis might not be understood as the abil- maintain an inner world (milieu intérieur) in optimal conditions. ity to stay the same, but as norm plasticity. Hence, what is true for Each organ or cell can function properly if its local environment is artificial systems is even truer for biological ones. As Monod and maintained constant, in spite of the ever ending changing of outer Jacob have shown, some bacteria cannot synthesize the enzyme world. permitting lactose metabolism. However, when placed in an envi- Nevertheless, in his lessons, constancy appears as a rather com- ronment composed of nothing but sugar, bacteria reactivate genet- plex notion, calling for more explanation. Did it mean that the ic sequences responsible for the ad hoc enzyme production. Thus, destruction is the key question of auto-regulations? Truly, each even in the framework of the genetic program, and its hypothetical physiological phenomenon induces destructions calling for auto- invariability, plasticity is possible. This capacity relates to the gen- repairing: tissue damage in muscular works or caloric consump- eral pressure for adaptation to the outer world: «outside the organ- tion, etc. Could one insist on auto-repairing to denominate the ism, change is virtually the only constancy» and consequently, for key process of auto-regulation? But would there be any reason life matter, «stasis is death» (Rose, 1997, p. 140). The term ‘‘Homeo- for privileging one on the other? Finally, after hesitations, Bernard stasis” was the main topic of Cannon’s monograph: The Wisdom of posits epigenesis as the master auto-regulated phenomena of life the body in 1932. Bernard is obviously cited in Cannon’s works. including the two others. As a matter of fact, organs harmonically However, Cannon reverses the Bernard conservative model and develop themselves but no explanation can be drawn without claims that instability, instead of norm and fixity, is the most assuming finalism! Bernard lacks of a real theory of heredity to ac- important feature of living matter: ‘‘One of the most striking fea- count for this regulated ontogenesis. With no scientific explanation tures of our bodily structure and chemical composition (...) is ex- at his disposal, he proposes a metaphysical one, the Lebnitzian treme instability.” (Cannon, 1932, p. 268). ‘‘harmonie pré-établie”: ‘‘Vital morphology, we can hardly do more Following Richet, Cannon focuses his attention on the apparent than contemplate it, because its essential factor, heredity, is not an contradiction that the instability of life matter becomes the neces- element we are (...) masters of as we are of physical conditions of sary condition of stability: ‘‘[Life being] is stable because it is mod- vital manifestations: the vital phenomenology, a contrary, we can ifiable (...) the slight stability is the necessary condition for the control it.” (Bernard, 1879, p. 342). true stability of the organism.” (Cannon, 1932, p. 21). Thus, morphogenetic dynamism is repressed to metaphysics Hence, Cannon’s definition of homeostasis is centered on the and this failure explains why the Bernard ‘‘milieu intérieur” cannot concept of instability. Homeo does not mean an identity, but a sim- be viewed as a truly dynamic theory of life matter. If scientific ilarity. Stasis does not refer to immobility, but to static: forces in physiology can only access to life phenomenology, it is limited to tension. Through this dynamic process, stability emerges from a isolated processes, time and space restricted. According to Pichot: plurality of conflicting forces. Thus, stability is a creative result in- ‘‘Life beings’ temporal dimension is not denied, but separated from stead of a done reality life matter has to return to. life beings’ physico-chemical organization characterized by regu- The contemporary definitions of homeostasis often neglect this lated stability” (Pichot, 1993, p. 752). distinction. For instance: ‘‘The relative stability of the internal Bernard has proposed one of the best conceptualization of reg- environment of a normal organism which is preserved through ulated systems. Derived from the reflex model, internal milieu feedback mechanisms despite the presence of influences capable conceptualizes a new kind of stimuli: those originating from in- of causing profound changes” (Lovell Becker, 1991, p. 870). Homeo- side the body. This leads to more autonomy to life. Nevertheless, stasis is here implicitly referred to an ‘‘internal environment”, in a regulations are identified as the capacity to maintain steady con- ‘‘normal” organism, similar to the Bernard ‘‘milieu interne”; and its ditions, without giving any explanation on the origins of vital fully opposite significance of dynamism. However, between the norms. In French ‘‘milieu” means ‘‘surrounding”, but refers also two concepts the same paradigm shift has occurred as in physics. to a geometrical ‘‘midpoint”. Thus, the Bernard constancy appears Internal milieu refers to ideal norms alike Newtonian reversible as a normative midpoint between setting points in a range of rules of attraction. With homeostasis we enter in Prigogine’s ther- vital values. In order to maintain optimal conditions for life, modynamics of non-linear irreversible phenomena: ‘‘The thermo- organisms must perpetually balance disequilibrium. In another dynamics of irreversible process has discovered that flux passing words, the living matter must always return to an ideal level. through certain physico-chemical systems and move them away Canguilhem (1991) has identified the limits of the Bernard mod- from equilibrium, can feed spontaneous auto-organized phenom- el, namely that the origins of these ideal and abstract norms can- ena, symmetry breakings, evolutions to complexity and increasing not be identified, moreover that such a conservative model diversity.” (Prigogine and Stengers, 1986, p. 360). reduced dynamism to an automatic and necessary return to Taken all of that together, the new paradigm leads physics to fit norm. From this angle the Bernard theory pertains to the classical life specificities, even more than dynamics do. Thus, it realizes bet- reflex model. ter the Bernard ‘‘physical vitality” project, conceived as a midpoint 274 M. Arminjon et al. / Journal of Physiology - Paris 104 (2010) 272–278 between mechanism and vitality. Homeostasis appears as the most According to Damasio, somatotopic maps lead to a new under- appropriate notion to account for life, referring to: (1) a regulated standing of the mind–body problem. The neural self” and the ‘‘so- and more or less steady mechanism stemmed from dynamic and matic markers” hypotheses are deduced from the brain mapping of conflicting forces. (2) From which emerges organism’s inner limits the somatic states in order to explain the identity and stability of and, consequently, an outer world. (3) The latter is then defined in the self. function of what can be extracted to balance inner disequilibrium. Seeking biological roots of the self-stability leads Damasio to (4) So, normativity or norm plasticity appears as an idiosyncratic the notion of homeostasis as described above: ‘‘The unwitting physical midpoint or conciliation state between inner and outer and unconscious urge to stay alive betrays itself inside a simple cell stimulations. in a complicated operation that requires ‘sensing’ the state of the chemical profile inside the boundary, and that requires unwitting ‘unconscious knowledge’ of what to do, chemically speaking, when 2.3. The implications of homeostasis the sensing reveals too little ore too much of some ingredient at some place or time within the cell.” (Damasio, 1999, p. 138). These We have mentioned that Canguilhem has shown how the model capacities induce inner and outer world delimitations as a prere- of the ‘‘milieu interne” is reminiscent on the arc reflex theory. Even quisite to self-emergence. The unconscious capacity to ‘‘feel” and if the reflex model, as a rigid connection between sensory and mo- ‘‘know” what must be consequently done to maintain life, can be tor systems, has been criticized by physiologists such as Pflüger, it generalized to even more complex organisms. Accordingly, the has nevertheless dominated until the 1950s. The Goldstein’s critics body is a composition of such regulated mechanisms. First, Dama- can testify of this hegemony, especially concerning the surprising sio posits that if we seek a stability indicator, body might the best conception on life it leads to. candidate.1 Second, if we can represent cells and bodies as regulated First, Goldstein reported that the reflex model tightly depends systems, brain might be the homeostatic ‘‘master organ”. The ‘‘dou- on the experimental conditions. Alike the ‘‘milieu interne”, reflex ble body” theory refers to this brain capacity to ‘‘repeat” body by the can only be hold in artificial conditions, i.e. in isolation from the means of its representation: ‘‘Internal milieu, viscera, and musculo- rest of the organism. Life becomes, as strange as it may appear, a skeletal frame produce a continuous representation, dynamic but of resting process: ‘‘Actually, authors who adhere strictly to the reflex narrow range, while the world around us changes dramatically, pro- theory see the organism as merely a system of regulations that foundly, and often unpredictably. Moment by moment, the brain has compensate the changes that arise by restoring the organism’s available a dynamic representation of an entity with a limited range equilibrium. According to this view, everything seems to be made of possible states – the body.”(Damasio, 1999, p. 142). for the preservation of the equilibrium state of the organism.” The body plays a role of frame, such that its stability does not (Goldstein, 1995, p. 84). result from particular somatic states, even from its structure: If an organism was only driven by a ‘‘will” for resting, a fully sat- ‘‘Throughout development, adulthood, and even senescence, the isfying environment might lead it to death (stasis is death). It is design of the body remains largely unchanged.” (Damasio, 1999, why Goldstein concludes with the following sentence: ‘‘If the life p. 141). The ‘‘design” might constitute what Damasio calls the of the organism consisted merely of an interplay of elementary fac- ‘‘proto-self” or the ‘‘neural self”. Somatotopic maps elaborated by tors that kept each other in check, how could any movement, any the brain2, might be determinant for the subjective emergence of dynamics, enter into the situation to give direction to behavior?” affective aspects of life. Damasio describes out how emotionally rel- (Goldstein, 1995, p. 84). Goldstein shows how the reflex theory, evant situations automatically activate related somatic markers. Pre- while it can explain isolated regulatory functions, it is nevertheless frontal representations activate emotionally laden states previously unable to account for the autonomous activity of the organism. associated to it via the amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex. Environmental stimuli would be the only reason for organisms to Through the autonomic nervous system, chemical messages are sent be active and such an action should be more precisely called reac- to the periphery: motility of viscera, levels of chemical messages tion. For Goldstein the normativity of the organism leads to an such as hormones are modified. ‘‘Feelings” might result from the opposite approach. In a homeostatic way, steady states of the mapping of these peripheral reactions. Emotion would thus proceed organism result from inner tensions that lead it to find in the outer from a ‘‘combination” or ‘‘superposition” of the representations that world the objects of its needs. Hence, environment is determined have been triggered by the situations, and the somatic states that by the inner world, as pathologies clearly attest it: ‘‘The fact that they have activated. In other words, somatic reactions superposed the milieu is determined by the particular characteristics of the to cognitive representations, would add to the latter their qualitative organism becomes especially clear in the diseased. For this altered dimension. Emotions might more generally participate to self-feeling organism, to whom the formerly normal environment has now as a ‘‘background state”, yielding to self-stability and qualitative become strange and disturbing, the basic prerequisite of existence consistency. is capability to shape once again an adequate environment.” Psychologically speaking, these processes question the artificial (Goldstein, 1995, p. 85). distinction between emotions and rationality. The ‘‘gamble task” The reflex model cannot explain how norms arise and, conse- shows how emotions play a preselecting role within an infinite quently, how a stimulus is meaningful for a specific organism. repertoire of possible strategies. For instance, subjects with pre- Pathologies reflect a new equilibrium that cannot cope with the frontal lesions manifest ‘‘emotional myopia” caused by affectivity external milieu. Thus, homeostatic structures are normative, lead- impairments. They systematically fail to choose the suitable strat- ing to an active and autonomous agency, instead of passive reactiv- egies. According to Damasio this inability is induced by the pa- ity to the outer world stimulations. In summary, physiology, via tients’ incapacity to generate the ad hoc somatic markers. With homeostasis, fosters autonomy.

3. Physiology and cerebral self 1 According to Damasio an organism is characterized by instability, more precisely, by a relative instability. If every thing can occur in outer world, body as a limited 3.1. Somatotopic maps and ‘‘double body” thesis action field. These variability limits play an important role in inner world and thus self delimitation. 2 Brainstem and hypothalamus, involved in regulations and somatic mapping in Understanding how representations are tied to physiological insular cortex and the right somatosensory cortex. Damasio has been the first to processes is one of the main issues of the work of Antonio Damasio. nuance its Cartesian caricatured reference. M. Arminjon et al. / Journal of Physiology - Paris 104 (2010) 272–278 275 this perspective, rationality may not be understood anymore as a an object-simply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt. No ‘‘logic circuit” or a ‘‘cold” computation impermeable to affectivity. new principles have to be invoked, nothing postulated beyond the Furthermore, Damasio hypothesizes that the mapping of the ordinary reflex circuits, and the local centres admitted in one shape body might have played a key role in the development of psychol- or another by all to exist.” (James, 1910, p. 474). ogy: ‘‘I believe images of the body state to the ‘‘proto-self” or ‘‘neu- James clearly distinguishes the perception and the reflex it trig- ral-self” were indispensable, as building blocks and scaffolding, for gers. So, emotion is not reduced to the somatic states, but proceeds what exists now.” (Damasio, 1994, p. 234). from the addition of perception to the somatic effects it has in- As certain archaic photosensitive organisms prefigure the visual duced. Reflex mechanisms are the perception’s aftermaths. Accord- system, somatic representations could have been mental precur- ing Damasio, the most important fact is the affective value sors. From a homeostatic point of view, psychological mechanisms combined to perception via somatic afferents. In this respect Sher- might be in continuity with the body’s general attention for its rington’s view that James does not include any kind of cerebral conservation. Accordingly, the Damasio innovation consists in processes at the perception step may be debatable.3 extending and integrating the biological functioning to the psycho- Nevertheless, James, in ‘‘The physical basis of emotion”, has logical level. Thus, cognition is a regulation operator, but is also ru- admitted having poorly formulated its position: ‘‘I think that all led by homeostasis. the force of such objections lies in the slapdash brevity of the language used of which I admit that my own text set a bad example 3.2. The misinterpreted James theory when it said ‘we are frightened because we run.’” (James, 1994, p. 2). In spite of its erratum, the James theory of emotion is still Concerning the views of James and Freud on the mind–body associated to the sole and late perception of a purely somatic phe- relations, there seems to be an apparent historical opposition. nomenon, without any room left for the perceptual processing. Actually, the so called divergence comes from the sole Freudian Mind would passively ‘‘notice” somatic reactions. judgment on the James theory of emotions: ‘‘What you may gather about affects from psychology – the James-Lange theory, for exam- 3.3. James and Freud, is there a common thesis? ple – is quite beyond understanding or discussion to us psychoan- alysts.” (Freud, 1963, p. 397). In our view, the Freudian rejection of the James theory is based We first would like to show how this impossible debate could on this misinterpretation. If this communication problem is over- be due to a misinterpretation between James and its contemporar- come, a common background between James and Freud may be ies, including Freud. Secondly, James has acknowledged that his perceptible. The point is that they both refer to the same nervous position may have been subject to confusion. However a closer system theory. For example, the James theory is based on the fol- look to historical documents shows in fact a real compatibility be- lowing heuristic hypothesis: ‘‘Supposing the cortex contains parts, tween the James and Freud theories. liable to be excited by changes in each special sense-organ, in each In 1900, Sherrington reduced the debates concerning affectivity portion of the skin, in each muscle, each joint, and each viscus, and and its physiological roots to three positions: ‘‘Does (1) the psychi- to contain absolutely nothing else, we still have a scheme capable cal part of emotion arise and its correlate nervous action excite the of representing the process of the emotions.” (James, 1910, p. 473). viscera? Or (2) does the same stimulus which excites the mind ex- He explicitly wrote how Theodore Meynert, influenced him: cite concurrently and per se the nervous centers ruling the viscera? ‘‘Meynert (...) calls the cortex of the hemispheres the surface of Or (3) does the stimulus which is the exciting cause of the emotion projection for every muscle and every sensitive point of the body. act first on the nervous centers ruling the viscera, and their action The muscles and the sensitive points are represented each by a cor- then generate visceral sensations; and do these latter, laden with tical point, and the brain is nothing but the sum of all these cortical affective quality as we know they will be, induce the emotion of points, to which, on the mental side, as many ideas correspond.” the mind.” (Sherrington, 1900, p. 329). (James, 1910, p. 30). The first solution is rejected in view of the spiritualism it in- Thus, body’s parts are represented within the brain by the duces. If Sherrington considers the second, James is clearly identi- means of neural projections. It is important to note how notions fied as the leader of the third one. The latter option is described as are used in a geometrical significance that is to say as a ‘‘point to direct viscera activation. More precisely, activation concerns the point” correspondence between organs and sensations or ideas. nervous system ‘‘lowest” part, then, the reaction is propagated to James explicitly adopts the Meynert cortico-centric theory. We body, before triggering the cerebral ‘‘higher” part. In these condi- can read similar considerations in Freud’s work: ‘‘The ego is first tions, the stimulus activates first a ‘‘mindless” part of the brain, and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but sketching emotional mechanisms as automatic or reflex is itself the projection of a surface. If we wish to find an anatomical mechanisms. analogy for it we can best identify it with the ‘cortical homunculus’ While this description is not incorrect, it is neither exact. James of the anatomists, which stands on its hand in the cortex, sticks up has often summarized his position with the following famous for- its heels, face backwards, and as we know, has its speech-area on mula: ‘‘facing a bear, we are not running because we are afraid, we the left-hand side.” (Freud, 1961, p. 26); ‘‘I.e. the ego is ultimately are rather afraid because we are running”. However, if emotions derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from were only reducible to such an automatic somatic reaction, solely the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projec- involving perception at the end of the process, the Freudian incre- tion of the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen above, rep- dulity would be understandable; what could a psychoanalyst really resenting the superficies of the mental apparatus.”4 say about a perceptual mechanism that would not involve the psy- Freud, inaugurating its second topic, finds the ‘‘ego” on a similar che? Yet, the James theory, in the Principle of psychology, appears structure: a body mental representation generated from the parts much more subtle: ‘‘An object falls on a sense-organ, affects a cor- of the body. Then, we can consider a real common neurological tical part, and is perceived; [p. 474] or else the latter, excited in- wardly, gives rise to an idea of the same object. Quick as a flash, 3 the reflex currents pass down through their preordained channels, Of course this argument depends on Sherrington reflex theory. It is admitted that he has favored a soft reflex theory. This comment simply shows how his point of view alter the condition of muscle, skin, and viscus; and these altera- on Jamesian approach appears to exclude the mind. tions, perceived, like the original object, in as many portions of 4 This note has been added to the 1927 English translation, with the agreement of the cortex, combine with it in consciousness and transform it from Freud. 276 M. Arminjon et al. / Journal of Physiology - Paris 104 (2010) 272–278 model, even if Freud has entertained stormy relationships with These absurd consequences have been previously identified in the Meynert. traditional reflex theory. The same paradoxical life inactivity has Indeed, Meynert appointed Freud at the Vienna psychiatric ser- been revealed in the Bernard internal milieu, in spite of the inner vice in 1883. According to Freud, Meynert was the most brilliant origin of the stimulations. Freud’s aims consist in avoiding such a person he had ever met. Its pre-psychoanalytic opus on aphasia at- consequence without rejecting the reflex model that guarantees tests to it. In spite of the few critics, Freud adopts the main Meyn- the scientific basis of its project. He subsequently proposes to con- ert hypotheses. As a matter of fact, behind Freud’s arguments sider a hypothetical pluricellular organism for the which, intracel- against Wernicke’s theory on aphasia, the real target of the critic lular stimulations induce new kinds of regulatory needs. As a is the Meynert cortico-centrism and its correlated association. matter of fact, a pluricellular organism cannot avoid inner excita- The main point is the tripartite division in motor, sensorial and tions except by splitting itself. Hence, keeping energy constant, conduction aphasia. The last one would be characterized by word i.e. to a lowest level, appears as the optimal solution. The main uncertainty in spite of preserved understanding and articulation points are that first, stimuli are endogenous, second, that con- abilities. According to Freud, a conduction circuit might be in- stancy appears as a result of the response to inner conflicting stim- volved in repetitive learning. Even so, he notes that in case of ulations. Assoun has proposed to name such constancy the 0+ level ‘‘paraphasis”, this learning mode is still operational. And Freud to (Assoun, 1981, p. 163). As a consequence of the homeostatic frame- conclude that the theory of the language centers and their associa- work that founds Freudism, constancy refers more to the never- tive connections should be reevaluated. ending necessity for life matter to regulate itself, than to an In contrast to sensory and motor areas, which have their spe- unchanging resting state. Thus, constancy appears as the life mat- cific localizations in sensory or motor organ projections, language ter ‘‘default mode” activity.5 association areas have no bodily referents. Hence, representations In spite of their speculative aspects, these considerations on (ideas), especially related to language, might be understood as pro- living matter by Freud associate him with the proponents of cesses: ‘‘What then is the physiological correlate of the simple idea homeostasis as defined above, even though he has never used this emerging or re-emerging? Obviously nothing static, but something notion. Produced in a pre-psychoanalysis context, this text, like the in the nature of a process.” (Freud, 1978, p. 56). Thus, Freud pro- monograph on aphasia, has had a profound influence on the devel- poses that: ‘‘The association area of speech, into which visual, audi- opment of psychoanalysis, particularly concerning the pleasure– tory, and motor (or kinaesthetic) elements enter, extends for that displeasure principle, and the theory of drives. very reason between the cortical areas of those sensory nerves First, these biological speculations are the prototype of what and the motor regions concerned with speech. If we now imagine will be defined more precisely in the Freudian theory of dream a movable lesion of constant size within this association area, its as pleasure–displeasure principle. The pluricellular organism, be- effect will be the greater the more it approaches one of these cor- cause of its impossibility to fully discharge itself, is coerced to tical fields, i.e., the more peripherally it is situated within the stand inner tensions. The solution consists therefore in lowering speech-area.” (Freud, 1978, p. 63). it until the conditions of discharge occur. The Freudian economy The point is that in spite of their contrasting views, Freud is then related to homeostatic system. In Metapsychology, drive is proves to have an in-depth knowledge of the Meynert theory: introduced and clearly defined as the elementary component of ‘‘The spinal cord derives from the cerebral cortex by way of a dou- the homeostatic function of psyche: ‘‘An instinctual stimulus [a ble origin which a cross section in the region of the cerebral pedun- drive] does not arise from the external world but from within cles reveals. The so-called pes pendicunli contains the fibre tracks the organism itself. For this reason it operates differently upon which convey motor impulses from the cerebral cortex to the the mind and different actions are necessary in order to remove periphery as well as the tracts which serve the reception of sensory it. Further, all that is essential in a stimulus is covered if we assume stimuli in the cortex. In the pes pendiculi, therefore, there is a pro- that it operates with a single impact, so that it can be disposed of jection of the body insofar as the latter is functionally dependent by a single expedient action.” (Freud, 1957, p. 118). This notion on the cortex.” (Freud, 1978, p. 47). goes beyond the traditional arc reflex model: However he only shares the Meynert view of point-to-point ‘‘An instinct [a drive], on the other hand, never operates as a projections of body on the pes pedicunli. Thus, the monograph on force giving momentary impact but always as a constant one.” aphasia can be seen as an acknowledgement, under conditions, of (Freud, 1957, p. 118). the Meynert cortico-centric theory. Furthermore, it lends credence to the thesis in favor of a real similarity rather than a radical incommensurability between Jamesian and Freudian models. They share views on the role of a given cerebral structure and a rather 4.2. The misinterpreted theory of drives similar vocabulary. As mentioned above, the Freudian biology can be understood in reference to the biological dilemma that it tries to solve. Freud 4. The ‘‘drive’’ theory revisited faced the challenge of reconciling the impossibility to explain autonomy through the reflex framework, while avoiding finalist 4.1. Energy and drives or vitality explanations. The Freudian concept of energy is not one of free elements ‘‘running” in a hydraulic system, ‘‘rambling” Since its initial work, Freud’s main issue has been to formulate a until it meets representations to activate. Freudian metapsychol- psychological model based on autonomy to compensate the heter- ogy is not reflected in such energy, as the following definition of onymous life activity held by the reflex model. Its Project for a sci- drive demonstrates: ‘‘as the psychical representative of the entific psychology (Freud, 1950) is rooted on a biological speculation. He imagines a unique cell activity that has to face an 5 It is particularly interesting to note that the 0+ level is similar to Marcus Raichle outer stimulation. In accordance with the reflex model, the cell and Abraham Snyder’s definition of brain ‘‘default mode”. At rest, intrinsic brain restitutes in action – running away, for example – the proportional activity shows high energy consumption that the authors hypothesize to be tied with homeostatic functioning: ‘‘It may be that in the normal brain, a balance of opposing energy quantum that the stimulus has caused. Paradoxically, the forces enhances the precision of a wide range of processes. Thus ‘balance’ might be Freudian isolated cell appears as an unenergetic organism. Resting, viewed as a necessary enabling, but costly, element of brain function” (Raichle and in this case, is, for such a cell, equivalent to death (stasis is death). Snyder, 2007, p. 1087). M. Arminjon et al. / Journal of Physiology - Paris 104 (2010) 272–278 277 stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the 4.3. Plasticity mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body.” (Freud, 1957,p. 4.3.1. Drive and plasticity 122). Ansermet and Magistretti have extensively discussed the role of Energy is defined as a «measure of the demand» of the homeo- neuronal plasticity in trace formation and how, the notion of plas- static processes. Hence, it refers more to differences between ticity provides a bridge between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. states, or as the work necessary to balance disequilibrium, than They also discuss how the trace-associations and re-associations to energy reification. Assoun relates this idea to the Freudian inter- can result in a new set of traces which are associated with specific est in Mach’s theories, who defined energy as: ‘‘this is something somatic states (Ansermet and Magistretti, 2007). Hence, plasticity indestructible that characterizes the difference between two phys- allows thinking brain homeostatic modifications: ‘‘The tension ical states, and whose measurement is the mechanical work pro- linked to the somatic state is perceived as unpleasant, for it dis- vided during the transition from one state to another.” (Assoun, turbs the homeostasis of physiological states. This tension should 1981, p.181) be able to be discharged, either by an action in direct relation to Assoun refuses to qualify Freudism as an ‘‘energetism”, in favor the disturbed state or by an action determined by what is inscribed of a qualification of a Freudian energetics. Energy is more akin to a in the fantasy scenario. Thus, to discharge the tension linked to this process such as the one that converts the movement of molecules somatic state, the person can mobilize an action with no direct into heat. Thus, the Freudian energy has to be conceived in accor- relation to the initial stimulus.” (Ansermet and Magistretti, 2007, dance with the first principle of thermodynamics; energy conser- p. 137). vation. The drive is not a piece of energy, but a theoretical This model brings a novel insight into the Freudian notion of concept that denominates, in a homeostatic framework, the fantasy. Developmentally speaking, fantasy emerges from a primi- strength leading from one particular biological state to another tive childhood mechanism. Babies, unable to satisfy their physio- one. Freud complements the concept of drive as a: ‘‘concept on logical needs might hallucinate satisfaction, i.e. the conditions the frontier between the mental and the somatic.” (Freud, 1957, that may have previously led to their satisfaction. As adults, new p. 121). constraints (social, economical, moral) bring new causes for frus- Actually, this provides some evidence that the concept of drive trations. As a vestige of childhood hallucinations, fantasy appears does not imply only a biological aspect aimed at contributing to the to be a sort of an idiosyncratic affective/cognitive mechanism that homeostatic process, but also to approach the mind–body ques- regulates behavior in accordance with the past experiences that re- tion. This epistemological purpose is clearly posited in one of the sulted in the re-establishment of homeostasis. Thus, fantasy would latest Freudian texts on the theoretical evolution of psychoanaly- be at the crossroads of drives and cognitive processes as a dynamic sis: ‘‘we know two kinds of things about what we call psyche (or association of mnesic traces and given somatic markers. Action mon- mental life): firstly, its bodily organ and scene of action, the brain itoring in accordance with the somatic markers hypothesis might (or nervous system) and, on the other hand, our acts of conscious- yield a framework to test such a hypothesis: ‘‘the goal of an action ness, which are immediate data and cannot be further explained by includes an internal representation of both the external object to- any sort of description. Everything that lies between is unknown to ward which the action is directed, and the final state of the organ- us, and the data do not include any direct relation between these ism when this object has been reached.” (Jeannerod, 1994, p. 32). two terminal points of our knowledge. If it would existed, it would Such a mechanism has already been conceived by Freud. Thought at the most afford an exact localization of the processes of con- may be the inner simulation of the state that might result from sciousness and would give us no help towards understanding re-establishing homeostasis. However, the Freudian specificity them” (Freud, 1964, p. 144). consists in adding an affective dimension to such a model. The rep- The apparent dualism of such a formula does not contradict the resenting process, which Freud called the secondary process, aims well-known Freudian naturalism (Assoun, 1981, p. 42). While to reach a lower energetic level. Thus, the cognitive activity can be Freud has position in favor of the reducibility of the psychological seen as a homeostatic process that dampens the strength of drives. descriptions to the physical ones, he nevertheless appreciates the Such a hypothesis could bring a new perspective on the somatic independence of the psychological level claiming that it gives ac- markers hypothesis. cess to a knowledge that cannot be solely apprehended from the physical level of description. In the modern language of the philos- 4.3.2. Discontinuity: plasticity and reconsolidation ophy of mind, one could say that a prudent use of the psychological Reconsolidation refers to the phenomenon that each time a language remains necessary. Accordingly, as expressed in its memory is recalled in consciousness, the trace becomes malleable monograph on aphasia, the two levels must not be mixed. Thus, and subject to new associations. The term ‘‘reconsolidation” is thus the psyche representative theory is justified by the epistemological misleading and it would be better to speak of ‘‘de-consolidation”. attempt to avoid the Meynert confusions between cerebral repre- The memory trace will thus be marked by its discontinuity. The sentations and mental representations. Drive presents a genuine trace reveals that which happened in the past as well as that which physiological fact, and not a psychological one, because there is can be added in the future. The traces associate to each other. The no direct relation between the mapping of the body by the brain initial trace persists (as Freud proposed in 1929, nothing is lost in and the mental representations of the body. As a matter of fact, the mind) but can become inaccessible, lost in the course of its des- since the Meynert conceptions, James and Damasio still refer to tiny: from trace to trace, through reconsolidation and plasticity, the notion of ‘‘representation” indistinctly for the cerebral repre- the link to the initial trace and that which initially provoked the sentation of the body (mapping) and its mental representation. traces creation is lost. This is the paradox of plasticity. The plastic- The body is represented at a cerebral level by means of neuronal ity allows experiences to be coded in the form of memory traces. projections. Mental representations would correspond to them. However, these traces, associating with each other, lead to the for- The Freudian theory of drive is quite useful to distinguish the neu- mation of new traces, which have lost the connection with those rological from the psychological level. If the term ‘‘drive represen- very experiences from which they arose. Thus, we have the ingre- tation” vorstellungrepresäntanz might be heuristically used in the dients of the paradox in which experiences stored in traces, analytic cure, one should use the term of ‘‘drive” or ‘‘drive presen- re-associated with other traces, lead to become distinct from the tation” to account for the genuine homeostatic need it refers to at a original experiences. This plasticity leads to discontinuity. Each biological level. use of memory, through the phenomenon of plasticity, leads 278 M. Arminjon et al. / Journal of Physiology - Paris 104 (2010) 272–278 inevitably to this discontinuity. Thus, the individual must work emerging from the disequilibrium that characterized life at the bio- with regard to temporality, to constantly recreate a continuity, ret- logical and psychological levels. Freud has in common with the roactively, based on the fundamental discontinuity introduced by Bernard regulation theory, the will to account for inner activity. reconsolidation and plasticity: it is this continuity ‘‘constructed” But its choice for the homeostatic model appears as the solution on a basis of discontinuity that forms subjective temporality. The to auto-organization and self agency, without leaving the reflex question of the origin and the destiny of the memory trace can thus model that justifies scientific criteria. Thus, pressures on living be raised. Through plasticity and reconsolidation, the trace results matter, namely drives are the determining factors that exceed from the subject’s acts rather than contributing to make the sub- the automaticity of the reflex organization. It can be said that Freud ject. One must distinguish the causes and effects. The subject pro- belongs to a theoretical stream that starts with Meynert and reap- duces memory traces rather than being produced by them. Thus, pears with the Damasian ‘‘double body” theory. Thus, Freudian plasticity appears as a paradoxical phenomenon, in one sense all epistemology allows us to consider psychic life both as a biological is registered but all can evolve and change. Everything is kept process and as a psychological reality. The double aspect of the but everything is transformed: we never use twice the same brain. drive theory resonates with the double project of psychoanalysis––to study psychic life and to reconcile the naturalization of 4.3.3. Designed not to be deterministic mental life with the hermeneutics of its productions. Thus, we have a new paradox: through plasticity and reconsolidation we are to a certain degree designed not to be deterministic, References biologically designed not to be totally biologically deterministic, Ansermet, A., Magistretti, P., 2007. Biology of Freedom: Neural Plasticity, and thus receptive to the impact of others. Not only to receive it Experience, and the Unconscious. Other Press, New York. but also to produce it. In synchrony, the re-association of traces – Assoun, P.-L., 1981. Introduction à l’épistémologie freudienne. Payot, Science de in the instantaneous re-association of traces through plasticity – l’Homme, Paris. Bernard, C., 1879. Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie communs aux animaux et opens to novelty, to the impossibility to predict, impossibility to aux végétaux. J.B. Baillière, Paris. deduce that which results from that which existed. There is a Canguilhem, G., 1991. The Normal and the Pathological. Zone Books, New York. gap in determinism, inherent to biology itself: this is a new point Cannon, W.B., 1932. The Wisdom of the Body. W.W. Norton, cop., New York. Damasio, A., 1994. Descartes’ Error, Emotion, Reason, and The Human Brain. A. of convergence between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. This Grosset/Putnam Book, New York. point of convergence might be also of interest for the use that psy- Damasio, A., 1999. The Felling of What Happens, Body and Emotion in the Making of choanalysis can make of neuroscience. Neuroscience and psycho- Consciousness. Harcourt Brace, New York. Freud, S., 1950. Project for a Scientific Psychology. In: Stratchey, J. (Ed.), The analysis are here brought together to question the classical Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 1. determinism specific to natural causality in the 19th century view. The Hogarth Press, London. The lack of determinism, within a context of determinism, implied Freud, S., 1957. Instincts and Their Vicissitudes. In: Stratchey, J. (Ed.), The Standard by plasticity and reconsolidation participates in the emergence of Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. VIV. The Hogarth Press, London. singularity, the creation of uniqueness and the unpredictable fu- Freud, S., 1961. The Ego and the ID. In: Stratchey, J. (Ed.), The Standard Edition of the ture of the subject. Uniqueness and discontinuity: this should to- Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIX. The Hogarth Press, London. day be the focus of the questions raised in neuroscience. Freud, S., 1963. Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis Part III. In: Stratchey, J. (Ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XVI. Neuroscience needs to establish the new bases of a ‘‘discontinu- The Hogarth Press, London. ous” biology. Psychoanalysis can offer to neuroscience the possibil- Freud, S., 1964. An Outline of Psycho-analysis. In: Stratchey, J. (Ed.), The Standard ity to think of discontinuity. Neuroscience and psychoanalysis Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XXIII. The Hogarth Press, London. meet thus in an unexpected way with regard to discontinuity, Freud, S., 1978. On Aphasia, A Critical Study. International Universities Press, Inc., which allows putting into play the subject’s act, the emergence New York. of his/her response, in the unpredictable space which offers life. Goldstein, K., 1995. The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man. Zone Books, New York. James, W., 1894. Physical basis of emotion. Psychol. Rev. 1, 516–529. Reprinted 1994, Psychol. Rev. 101, 205–210. 5. Conclusion James, W., 1910. The Principles of Psychology, vol. II. Macmillan and co., London. Jeannerod, M., 1994. The representing brain. Neural correlates of motor intention This article highlights the interest in establishing a dialogue be- and imagery. Behav. Brain Sci. 17, 187–245. Kandel, E.R., 1999. Biology and the future of psychoanalysis: a new intellectual tween psychoanalysis and neuroscience. Historical perspectives framework for psychiatry revisited. Am. J. Psychiatr. 156, 505–524. provide an additional link between them. Thus, the Freudian the- Lovell Becker, E., 1991. Homeostasy, 3rd ed.. Churchill’s Medical Dictionary ory expands outside the psychological field in which it has often Churchill Livingstone Inc., New York. been reduced to and extents its pertinence to neuroscience and Pichot, A., 1993. Histoire de la notion de vie. Gallimard, Tel, Paris. Prigogine, I., Stengers, I., 1986. La nouvelle alliance: métamorphose de la science, 2e philosophy of mind. Current data in neuroscience are not evoked ed. GallimardFolio Essais, Paris. to prove or disprove psychoanalysis. If Freud has proposed an inte- Raichle, M.E., Snyder, A.Z., 2007. A default mode of brain function: a brief history of grated theory of psyche that finds, today, a particular echo, the rea- an evolving idea. Neuroimage 37 (4), 1083–1090. Rose, S., 1997. Lifelines: Biology Freedom, Determinism. Allen Lane the Penguin son is that he has promoted a certain theory of life, characterized Press, London. by conflicting tensions. Thus, Freud belongs to a homeostatic tradi- Sherrington, C.S., 1900. Experimentation on Emotion. Nature 62 (1605), 328–331. tion, for which stability is not a given reality, but a resulting state Solms, M., 2004. Freud returns. Sci. Am. 290 (5), 82–88.