Ideas, Bureaucratic , and the Crafting of Foreign Author(s): Daniel W. Drezner Source: American Journal of , Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 733-749 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669278 Accessed: 10/09/2010 23:21

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http://www.jstor.org Ideas,Bureaucratic Politics, and theCrafting of Foreign Policy

DanielW. Drezner Universityof Chicago

There are several mechanisms Jdeas have taken on a renewedprominence in theinternational rela- throughwhich ideas are supposed to tionsliterature. There are severalmechanisms through which ideas are influencepreferences and outcomes, supposedto influencepreferences and outcomes,but one of themost but one of the most importantis that importantis thatthey are implanted into institutions. Scholars that empha- ideas are embedded intoinstitutions. size constructivism(Finnemore 1996; Checkel 1997), epistemiccommu- This presumes thatonce idea-infused nities (Hall 1989; Haas 1992), or other approaches (Goldstein 1993; institutionsare created, theywill sur- Goldsteinand Keohane 1993) have highlightedthe role of institutionsin vive and thrive.Bureaucratic politics pursuingideational agendas. suggests thisoutcome is farfrom While thisis a plausibleexplanation for how ideas persistand deter- certain.This articletakes a firstcut at mine foreignpolicy, it is incomplete.Nothing is said about the strategies examininghow idea-infused,or 'mis- theseinstitutions must pursue in orderto surviveand thrivein a worldof sionary"institutions, survive and competingideas and institutions.Such an explanationassumes that once thrivein a worldof bureaucraticpoli- idea-infusedinstitutions are created,the storyis over.The bureaucratic- tics. It suggests thatmissionary insti- politicsparadigm suggests that the storyis just starting.Bloomfield notes, tutionsface a tradeoffbetween sur- "Forit is thenthat an idea,however morally powerful and howeverauthen- vivingand thriving.Agencies thatare ticallygrounded in the nationalpolitical epistemology, encounters the in- insulatedfrom other struments,the forces, and thefallible (or obstreperous)human beings who have a betterchance of surviving,but implement(or thwart)... foreignpolicy programs" (1982, 2). are unlikelyto influencethe broad How do idea-infusedinstitutions survive and thrive?How successful contoursof policy.The reverse is also arethey at promotingtheir ideas aftertheir political sponsors pass fromthe true;embedded agencies have a scene?This articlewill arguethat the placementof institutionsin the for- much lowerchance of keeping their eign-policystructure helps to determinetheir ability to surviveand thrive, ideationalmission intact, but ifthey but in contradictoryways. Idea-infused or "missionary"institutions pos- do survive,their odds of thrivingare sessingstructural insulation from the influenceof otherorganizations are greater.These hypotheses are exam- morelikely to survivein a mannerconsistent with their founding ideas. In- ined by comparingthe evolutionof sulationpermits the agency to developan organizationalculture dedicated the Peace Corps and the De- to the foundingidea, preventingthe introductionof competingideas or partmentBureau of Human Rights tactics.However, this insulation also lessensthe missionary institution's in- and HumanitarianAffairs. fluenceover the craftingof foreignpolicy. Preexisting bureaucracies will automaticallyresist the introduction of new actorsinto the policy mix and

DanielW. Drezner is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, 5828 SouthUniversity Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637([email protected]). Previousversions of thisarticle were presented at the1999 International Studies Asso- ciationannual meeting, Washington, D.C. and at thePIPES workshopat theUniversity of Chicago.I am gratefulto JennyKehl and especiallyMelanie Kay Anderson for their researchassistance. I thank Delia Boylan,Don Moon,Roland Paris, James M. Scott,Amy Searight,Sven Steinmo, Alexander Wendt, Greg Caldeira, and threeanonymous referees fortheir comments and suggestions.The usualcaveat applies. AmericanJournal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, October2000, Pp. 733-749 ?2000 bythe Midwest Political Science Association

733 734 DANIEL W. DREZNER impose constraints.The developmentof a strongorga- will meet cognitiveresistance from long-held beliefs nizationalculture will prevent the new missionaryinsti- (Jervis1976; Lebow 1981). One of the issuesthis article tutionfrom compromising with other agencies. An in- can addressis how missionaryinstitutions survive in a sulated institutionwill be hard-pressedto overcome bureaucraticjungle where other actors will resistthe in- bureaucraticdivisions in spreadingits ideas. jectionof new ideas. In contrast,idea-infused institutionsembedded This articlealso fillsseveral gaps in thebureaucratic withina morepowerful have a lowerprob- politicsliterature. Since Allison's (1971) Essenceof Deci- abilityof survivalin theiroriginal form. They must cope sion,the studyof bureaucraticpolitics literature has fo- withgreater pressures than insulatedagencies and are cused on thedescription of organizationalinteraction as preventedfrom developing a strongorganizational cul- a separatelevel of analysis (Welch 1992; Hudson and ture.Embedded institutions are less immuneto compet- Vose 1995;Stern and Verbeek1998) ratherthan develop- ing ideas. However,if theydo survive,embedded insti- ing positivetheories of action. The resulthas been an tutions have a greaterchance of thrivingover time. endless seriesof debates about the salience of bureau- Close interactionwith otherbureaucracies can lead to craticpolitics in contrastto the powerof sharedimages an increasein sharedideas and sharedunderstandings. (Krasner 1972; Art 1973; Khong 1992; Rhodes 1994), This may alterthe goals of the institution,but it also presidential dominance, (Moe 1985; Bendor and transformsthe identityof the otherbureaucratic units Hammond 1992), legislativedominance (Weingast and by convertingthem to theirfounding idea. Ideational Moran 1983), or all of the above (Hammond and Knott entrepreneursthus facea tradeoffin establishinginsti- 1996). The modifiedideational approach developed here tutionsthat embody dearly held ideas.They can increase is not a generaltheory of bureaucraticpolitics. However, the odds forsurvival at the cost of greaterinfluence, or it does suggestthe originsof bureaucraticpreferences, theycan gamble at enhancingtheir influence but risk strategiesto maximizeorganizational utility, and likely extinction. outcomes.In particular,the abilityof bureaucraciesto To testthis modified ideational approach, I develop use organizationalculture as a means of propagating two case studiesof missionaryinstitutions with different ideas is crucialto determiningoutcomes. The approach placementsin the federalgovernment. Both institutions used here is consistentwith recent rationalist (Bendor, are imbued witha set of ideas distinctfrom the restof Taylor,and Van Gaalen 1987; Brehmand Gates 1997) the foreignpolicy bureaucracy: the UnitedStates Peace and constructivistwork (Legro 1996) emphasizingthe Corps and the State Department'sBureau of Human role of organizationalculture as an importantfactor in Rightsand HumanitarianAffairs (HA).' bureaucraticpolitics. This articleis intendedto contributeand critique The casespresented here also correctsome empirical boththe ideas and thebureaucratic politics literature and deficiencies.The bureaucraticpolitics approach has fo- to begina dialoguebetween the two. The ideas literature cused exclusivelyon crisisdecision makingin security has been unable to disentanglethe effectof ideas from bureaucracies(Allison 1971; Lebow 1981) at theexpense theeffect of materialinterests (Jacobsen 1995). Previous of longitudinal analyses of "routine" foreignpolicy, studiesof foreignpolicy ideas, such as thecult of the of- whichis odd sincethis is thepolicy category that bureau- fensive (Van Evera 1984) or strategictrade theory craticpolitics should mattermost (Rosati 1981). Other (Goldstein 1993), have been unable to separatethe in- foreignpolicy agencies have been neglected.Expanding trinsiceffect of new ideas fromthe influenceof interest the rangeof cases can help to broaden the explanatory groupsthat materially benefited from those ideas. The powerof bureaucratic politics in foreignpolicy. casespresented here are selectedto separatethose effects. The restof thisarticle is organizedas follows.The Anotherproblem with the ideas literaturehas been nextsection surveys the obstacles missionary institutions its failureto examinehow foreignpolicy is craftedwhen facein pursuingtheir agendas. Section two developshy- competingideas coexist.Too oftenin thisliterature, cases potheseson thelikelihood of theseinstitutions surviving are presentedwhere powerful ideas simplyoverwhelm and thriving.The thirdsection motivates the case selec- preexistingbeliefs or values,leading to a changein policy tion of the Peace Corps and the HA Bureau.The fourth (Rohrlich1987). Common sensesuggests that new ideas sectionlooks at theperformance of the Peace Corpsfrom its originsin the Kennedyadministration to the end of the Ford administration.The followingsection looks at 'In 1994the HA bureauwas renamedthe Bureau of , HumanRights, and Laborto reflectthe Clinton administration's the HA's performanceunder the Carterand Reagan ad- expandeddefinition of human rights. ministrations.The finalsection concludes. IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 735

Ideas, BureaucraticPolitics, cal organizations,the bureaucraticpolitics paradigm, and ForeignPolicy and studiesof organizationalculture suggest that the in- sertionof ideas intoinstitutions is not thatsimple.4 the An ideational approach to foreignpolicy argues that Scholars of political organizationsnote diffi- ideas intoinstitutions. Agencies that ideas can be sustainedthrough their institutionalization cultyof embedding quo or fearlosing power will resistthe and the organizationalculture bred withinthe institu- preferthe status introductionof any new ideas into the policymix and tion.Once established,missionary institutions are an im- means at theirdisposal to avoid unpalatable portantcausal mechanismfor the conversionof ideas use any ideas. These means could includeagenda manipulation, into . Sikkinkobserves: "Rarely do new ideas withholdinginformation, excluding new agenciesfrom thrivein the modernworld outside of institutionalnet- consultation,or psychological pressure to conform. works.Ideas withinan institutionbecome embodiedin Politicianswill often structure organizations so thatthey its statementof purpose,its self-definition,and its re- can retaintheir influence even afterlosing office(Moe searchor trainingprogram, which in turntends to per- 1990). Establishedbureaucracies may sabotage the new petuate and extend the ideas" (1991, 2). (See also institutionsby lobbyingovertly political agents, such as Goldsteinand Keohane 1993,13.) legislatorsor interestgroups. A bureaucracywith many All institutionshave some foundingidea or ideas. its mission However,the "missionary" institutions described in the masterscould findit difficultto carryout ideationalliterature are distinctin two ways.First, mis- withoutoutside interference. In foreignaffairs, bureaucratic politics is particularly sionaryinstitutions have a coherentset of preferences salientfor two reasons. First, actors important to domes- overmeans and ends.In a missionaryinstitution, there is littledisagreement within the agencyover the desired tic politicshave less power and influencein foreignaf- a thin interest-groupenviron- goal or theways in whichthat goal is achieved.2Second, fairs.Foreign policy is ment.While interest are an importantactor in missionaryinstitutions try to preventthe introduction of groups most models of domesticpolicy making, foreign policy additionalnormative or materialgoals in orderto avoid interestgroups are smaller,less organized,less wealthy, value conflictsor tradeoffs(Bendor, Taylor,and Van and extensionless influential (Zegart 1999, chapter 1). Gaalen 1987).This allowsmembers of a missionaryinsti- by Similarly,Congress and congressmenhave little electoral tution to maintaintheir intensity of preferencesover incentiveto take an interestin foreignaffairs and have means and ends; it also preventsthe organizationfrom less informationand fewtools withwhich to influence engagingin tradeoffsover competing goals.3 most arenas of foreignaffairs. This raisesthe profileof Implicitin the ideas literatureare the reasonsmis- otheractors, including other bureaucracies. Second, in sionaryinstitutions are likelyto surviveand thrive.Pow- contrastto manyarenas of domesticpolicy making, for- erfulideas can createa set of compellingbeliefs that fuse eign policy institutionsrarely have monopoly control togetherthe preferences of managers(agency heads) and overan issue.Agencies must cooperate with each otherin operators(lower-level bureaucrats). If these ideas are orderto implementpolicy (Zegart 1999). Classic works embracedby operators,the preferencesof thisgroup of on bureaucraticpolitics (Allison 1971; Destler 1972; individualswill more closelymatch those of managers, Allisonand Halperin1972; Halperin 1974) havemodeled reducingthe need formonitoring. Idea-infused organi- foreignpolicy as theoutcome of bargaining among mul- zationsdevelop a unique senseof organizationalmission, tipleorganizations with different agendas. Any new mis- overcomingintraorganizational principal-agent difficul- sionaryinstitution must negotiate with preexisting bu- ties(Wilson 1989). reaucraticactors. Whileintuitively appealing, this causal mechanismis Establishedagencies have an advantageover newly highlyproblematic when applied to foreign-policybu- createdinstitutions. Older agencieswill possess more re- reaucracies.The new institutionalistapproach to politi- sources,information, skill, and expertisein the bureau- 2 This distinguishesmissionary institutions from organizations cratictrenches. Newly established missionary institutions likethe Central Intelligence Agency, for example, which is an insti- will certainlypossess a strongsense of organizational tutionthat has a clearlydefined end (to acquireas muchsignifi- cantinformation about other countries as possible)but multiple methodsof achieving that end. 4Structuralrealism has also critiquedthe ideational approach, but 3I am talkinghere about ideal types. All politicalinstitutions em- thesecritiques are somewhattangential to thecases discussedin bodythis missionary zeal to someextent, and as willbe shown,all thisarticle. See Posen (1984) and Krasner(1993) forthe realist missionaryinstitutions must cope with the prospect of new ideas. take. 736 DANIEL W. DREZNER mission,but may lack the otherresources necessary to was dissolvedon the firstday of the Clintonadministra- achievetheir policies. When created,these institutions tion.A missionaryinstitution thrives if the agency'ses- mighthave the backing of morepowerful actors that can poused normsand principlesclosely correlate with the shepherdthe bureaucratic unit through its infancy. How- state'sobserved policy outcomes.5For example,in the ever,as politicalfortunes change, these protectors can fall late fortiesthe StateDepartment's Policy Planning Staff frompower. effectivelypushed U.S. foreignpolicy towardsa grand The existenceof strongorganizational cultures can strategyof containment.Both surviving and thrivingare furtherimpede the implementationof ideas in foreign continuousvariables. An agencycan partiallysurvive if it policy.Foreign-policy agencies are likelyto have strong retainsits organizational form but has some ofits found- organizationalcultures because theyfall into the cat- ingideas alteredover time. egoryof "procedural"organizations (Wilson 1989,164), Thereare multiplecauses of survivingand thriving, in whichoutputs can be observedbut outcomescannot. includingthe balance of materialinterests, the prefer- In these typesof bureaucracies,strong organizational encesof politicalleaders, and feedbackby external actors culturesfocus less on ends and more on means. In for- to policyoutcomes. However, the placement of mission- eign affairs,the link between the outputs of foreign ary institutionsalso mattersbecause it constrainsthe policyagencies-demarches, treaties, sanctions, induce- strategyset of the new agency.Missionary institutions ments,diplomatic entreaties, and so on-and the out- can be createdas autonomousagencies that are horizon- comesthose outputs are designedto influenceis vagueor tallyequivalent to establishedinstitutions. Such agencies indirect.Frequently the outcomeis not evenobservable. have independentaccess to resourcessuch as staffand Strongorganizational cultures have been observed in equipment.These institutionsdevelop their own hierar- diplomaticcorps (Destler 1972) as well as the U.S. mili- chicalstructure as well as criteriafor promotion within tary(Wilson 1989). theranks. The U.S. TradeRepresentative is an exampleof Proceduralorganizations produce culturesthat so- thiskind of placement.New missionaryinstitutions can ciallyconstruct an ethosfocusing on methodslinked to also be establishedas a subunitof a largerorganization. foundingideals. If these organizations are constrainedby These agencieshave a clearmission but relyon thelarger newtasks that require different skills, an existingculture bureaucracyfor rules and resources.As such,these insti- can be dilutedwith the influxof new personnelor new tutionshave less choiceover personnel, promotion crite- tasks.Established organizational cultures will resistor ria,and hierarchicalstructure. An exampleof this kind of subvertnew tasksthat are assignedthem, for fear that agencyis the Bureauof RefugeeAffairs, which is located theywill lose their cohesion and abilityto function withinthe larger organizational unit of theState Depart- (Derthick1990). This problemwill be particularlyacute ment.I willcall theformer insulated agencies and thelat- withforeign-policy bureaucracies. terembedded agencies.6 The politicsof bureaucraticstructure can bluntthe At firstglance, it would appear thatinsulated agen- abilityof an institutionto propagateits foundingidea. cies would have a higherprobability of survivingand However,the ideational entrepreneursthat createand thriving.Insulated agencies have the advantagesof au- staffnew missionaryinstitutions are not oblivious to tonomyand resourceallocation. An insulatedagency has thesepitfalls. What strategies can theleaders of mission- greatercontrol over its own staffand budget,preventing aryinstitutions use to surviveand thrive? otheragencies from manipulating those resources. This increasesthe abilityof a missionaryinstitution to fend offefforts to constrainits activities. The mostimportant advantage to an insulatedmis- sionaryinstitution is the agencyhead's abilityto use the WhenWill Missionary Institutions foundingideas to generatea strongand cohesiveorgani- Surviveand Thrive? zation culture.Organizational culture, as definedin the rationalchoice literature (Kreps 1990; Miller 1992), con- For the purposesof thisarticle, a missionaryinstitution sists of the method throughwhich desired ends and survivesif it maintainsits organizationalintegrity and continuesto advanceits initialset of ideas even afterits 5 Thisdoes not mean that the policy succeeds, just that it is imple- politicalpatrons lose power.For example,the U.S. Coun- mented.This goes to thedistinction between policy outputs and cil on Competitiveness,created by the Bush administra- outcomes. tion to advance the goal of governmentpromotion of 6 These definitionscorrespond closely to Kaarbo's(1998) termi- high-techsectors of theU.S. economy,did not survive;it nologyof vertical agencies and horizontalagencies. IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 737 means are communicatedfrom managers to operators agency'schances for survival while decreasing its chances and outsiders.Establishing a clear set of decisionrules of thriving.8 empowersbureaucrats to act under uncertainty.Under Embeddedagencies possess a differentset of disad- such conditions,ideas can providea road map to solu- vantagesand advantagesin propagatingideas. Embed- tions (Garrettand Weingast1993). Furthermore,estab- ded agenciesare located within a largerand morepower- lishingan organizationalculture based upon founding fulbureaucracy. This typeof agencyshould, potentially, ideas makesit easierto solveadverse selection problems have greateraccess to the informationand resourcesof in hiring.New hiresare quickerto conformto thenorms the largerentity. A new agencycan manipulateagendas and practicesof the restof the bureaucracyif thereis and routinesto harnessthe power of the whole organiza- littlevariation among the preferencesof individualop- tion by introducingnew practices and procedures. erators (Brehm and Gates 1997; Carpenter 1998). Kaarbo (1998, 81) notesthat if a minorityfaction can se- Foundingideas helpto narrowthat variance. Culture en- cure a decision rule of unanimityinstead of majority suresthat the desired principles and causalbeliefs sustain rule,it can use itsveto power to blockinitiatives. themselvesover time. The most importanttool of an embedded agency, Despitethese apparent advantages, there are reasons however,is itsability to proselytizeits norms and values, to believe thatinsulated agencies face tougherodds of initiatingothers in thelarger organization to itspoint of thriving.The verystrategies that increase the likelihood view overtime. This is perhapsthe mostdistinct advan- of survivingreduce the chancesof thriving.Insulation tageof an idea-basedbureaucracy over an interest-based and the concomitantdevelopment of a strongorganiza- bureaucracy.Interest-based bureaucracies can push their tional culturelimit the influenceof new ideas upon the endsthrough bargaining and theaccumulation of power. otherbureaucratic actors in foreignpolicy. Insulation is Idea-based bureaucraciescan push theirends through analogous to quarantine;it makes it difficultfor other thepersuasion of othergroups to theirprincipled beliefs, ideas to "infect"a missionaryinstitution, but it also particularlyif they communicate the psychic or material makesit moredifficult for the missionaryinstitution to benefitsof usingtheir ideas. Both constructivistsand ra- spreadits ideas to otheragencies. The existenceof dif- tional-choicetheorists argue that if staffers are capableof ferentorganizational cultures will furtherimpede the expressingtheir principled beliefs in a way thatis con- exchangeof differentideas. Justas separatepolitical en- ceptuallyamenable to otherindividuals' roles and beliefs, titieswill quicklyestablish within-group and without- theirability to minglewith other bureaucrats encourages group identities,so will bureaucratic units (Mercer a broadershift in preferences(Brehm and Gates 1997; 1995; Kaarbo and Gruenfeld1998). Sufficientdiffer- Johnston1999). In Rhodes' (1994) studyof the U.S. ences in bureaucraticculture lead agencies to distrust Navy,he foundthat Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas ofnaval the abilityof otherinstitutions to make any contribu- warfaretrumped the narrower parochial interests among tion to foreignpolicy. It also encourages existingbu- the submariners,airmen, and surfacesailors in explain- reaucraciesto act likecompetitors, providing alternative ing weapons procurement.Ideas that resonate with policy outputs as a way of limiting the missionary broadervalues or goalscan spreadacross the larger orga- institution'sinfluence.7 nizationalentity. A missionaryinstitution's organizational culture also Of course,embedded agencies also facesignificant makeslogrolling difficult. Compromise implies the accep- problemsin theirability to spreadtheir ideas. Unlikean tanceof otherbeliefs and values,which can proveanath- insulatedagency, embedded agencies are unable to fash- ema to bureaucratswho genuinelybelieve that their ideas ion a separateorganizational culture. They must draw are superior.Agency heads must weigh the benefits of any theirpersonnel from the larger organizational entity, one policycompromise against the coststo moraleif such a thathas a previouslyestablished bureaucratic culture. compromiseviolates the agency's norms and beliefs.Op- This puts the new missionaryinstitution at a significant eratorsmay shirk and/or sabotage compromises they dis- disadvantage;agency heads cannot createan organiza- like(Brehm and Gates1997). The distrustbetween agen- tional cultureconsistent with their founding ideas if a cies with differentorganizational cultures raises the strongculture already exists within the largerbureau- transactioncosts of reaching a compromise,impairing in- cracy.The absenceof a distinctiveorganizational culture sulatedagencies' ability to logroll.The developmentof a increasesthe likelihood of an embeddedagency thriving, unifyingorganizational culture can increasean insulated 8Ironically,this external conflict will often serve to strengthenin- 7SeeBendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1987) on theeffect of outside tra-groupcohesion through a reinforcedorganizational culture. competitionon bureaucraticoutcomes. See't Hart(1994). 738 DANIEL W. DREZNER but it simultaneouslyreduces the chancesof the agency missionaryinstitution is supposed to encourage.Only survivingskirmishes with other subunits. when theseprincipled beliefs are acceptedby the larger Embeddedagencies must also cope withless control organizationalunit does the embedded agencyhave a over resourcesthan insulated agencies. Superiors can chanceof influencingthe largercontours of policy.The choose to denymaterial, informational, or human re- problem,of course,is thatthe act of persuasion takes sourcesto thenew agency,cut it out fromorganizational time,during which an embeddedagency could faceex- decisionmaking, or simplycoerce bureaucrats into con- tinction.Even if successful,the resultis likelyto be a hy- formingwith the organizations'status quo ante goals. brid of theentrenched ideas of thepreexisting organiza- Embedded agencies also face an acute problem of ad- tionand thenew ideas ofthe missionary institution. verseselection; they cannot be sure if new staffwill act Table1 summarizesthe contrast between the success- in a mannerconsistent with the foundingideas. Over fulstrategies and outcomespursued by the different types time,this can lead to an absorptioninto the largeren- ofmissionary institutions. The placementof the mission- tity,extinguishing (or at the veryleast, mutating)the aryinstitution within the larger bureaucracy is theinde- foundingideas. pendentvariable, because it stronglyaffects the interven- Insulated and embedded agencies face a tradeoff. ingvariable, organizational strategy. It shouldbe stressed Embeddedagencies have thebetter chance of spreading thatthis modified ideational approach is farfrom a com- theirideas over time across a significantsection of the pletetheory of ideas and bureaucraticpolitics; it ignores foreignpolicy bureaucracy, but theyalso have a better therole of material interests as wellas otherfactors. How- chanceof beingideologically absorbed by the largeror- ever,its parsimony has advantages.As Lijphart(1971) ob- ganizationalunit. Insulated agencies have a betterchance serves,parsimonious theories permit scholars to draw of implementingtheir desired policies, but over time causal inferencesfrom fewer observations. The nextsec- must cope with countervailingpolicies establishedby tionexplains the case selectionand testingmethodology. otheragencies and hostileexecutives. Giventhese tradeoffs, how should missionaryinsti- tutionsbe expectedto perform?Insulated agencies that maximizethe advantagesof autonomyensure survival. Case Selectionand Prediction This means establishinga strongbureaucratic culture thatcan sustainthe foundingideals of theinstitution. A Because of the difficultyin quantifyingthe independent strongculture can also thwarthostile executives or legis- and dependentvariables, case studieswill be used. The latures. Although politicians can weaken agencies subsequent sections conduct a plausibility probe throughbudget cuts and personnelshifts, a strongbu- (Eckstein1974) of the hypothesesdelineated in thepre- reaucraticculture can encourage operatorsto pursue vious sectionby examiningthe Peace Corps under the goalsthat might run contraryto a hostilemonitor. Such Kennedy/Johnsonand Nixon/Fordadministrations, and a strongculture will also makeit moredifficult for that theState Department Bureau of Human Rightsand Hu- agencyto convertother parts of the foreignpolicy ma- manitarianAffairs (HA) under the Carterand Reagan chineryto its setof principledbeliefs, or to logrollother administrations.These cases wereselected on the inde- bureaucracies.Thus, an insulatedagency should succeed pendentvariable to allowvariation in agencyplacement.9 in implantingstrong norms within its staff, sustaining its Such an approach reducesthe chance of selectionbias organizationalmission. On the otherhand, it shouldbe that is ever present in qualitative research (King, expectedto haveless influence over the broader contours Keohane,and Verba1994, chapter 4). of foreignpolicy, and itspolicy outputs will be dilutedby The Peace Corps is nominallyunder the controlof thepolicies of otheragencies. the State Department,but it has much greaterinstitu- Embeddedagencies face a differentset of incentives tionalautonomy than the HA Bureau.The Corps'budget to propagatetheir ideas. They will be unableto developa is a separateline item from the State Department; its staff strongorganizational culture, making them more vulner- does not come fromthe Foreign Service. The Peace able to absorptionby the largerorganizational entity. CorpsAct of 1961 explicitlystated that its operators were These agenciesface an immediatethreat to theirsurvival not obligatedto agreewith or defendU.S. foreignpolicy fromhostile bureaucrats and superiors.Their overriding (Schwartz1991, 19). It meetsthe definitionof an insu- goal must be to encouragepractices and routinesthat spreadideas to the restof the largerorganization. This 9Sincethe modified ideational approach has only one independent couldbe done throughtraining regimens or newstandard variable,two cases generates sufficient degrees of freedomto pre- operatingprocedures that expose othersto the ideas the ventunderdetermination. IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 739

TABLE I A Comparisonof Insulatedand EmbeddedAgencies

Typeof Resources at PredictedOrganizational Agency Disposal Strategy PredictedOutcome Insulated Controlover Generationof a strong Survivallikely; not agency personnel,budget, organizationalculture to likelyto thrive promotioncriteria ensuresurvival Embedded Greateraccess to Attemptto change practices Survivalless likely; agency otherbureaucracies and proceduresto persuade ifsurvival, then otherbureaucrats thrivinglikely lated agency.The HumanitarianAffairs Bureau, in con- fortsto controlor alterits mission.At the same time, trast,was establishedwithin the State Departmentbu- however,the ideas thatprompted its creationshould be reaucracy.Nonpolitical staff came fromthe ForeignSer- limitedin theireffect on Americanforeign policy. With vice. The head of HA was an AssistantSecretary in the the HA bureau,we should expectany attempt to forgea StateDepartment bureaucracy. In contrastto the Peace separatebureaucratic culture fail, due to the inevitable Corps,HA had to operatewithin the confines of a preex- clash withthe bureaucraticculture of the ForeignSer- istingbureaucracy and organizationalculture. It meets vice.Over time, however, one would expectto see HA ei- thedefinition of an embeddedagency. therco-opted by the StateDepartment, or, if it survives, The cases havethe added advantageof holdingcon- convertingthe Foreign Service to itsfounding ideas. stantvariables importantin alternativeexplanations. Althoughthe case selectioncontrols for some alterna- First,the effectof materialinterests on policyoutcomes tiveexplanations, other approaches would producea set is controlledfor in thatno domesticinterests materially of predictionscontrasting with the modifiedideational benefitedfrom either the Peace Corps or theHA bureau. approach,as Table 2 demonstrates.A presidentialdomi- Historiesof theseorganizations demonstrate that these nanceapproach (Moe 1985;Bendor and Hammond1992, agencies embodyprincipled beliefs-ideas that deter- 313-317) argues thatthe chiefexecutive, through ap- mine whichpolicy ends are rightand whichare wrong pointmentand selectiveincentives, can overcomeany bu- (Goldsteinand Keohane 1993).10Although it is impos- reaucraticresistance to his preferredoutcomes. This ap- sible (and undesirable)to separatecompletely the effect proach would predict the missionaryinstitutions to of ideas fromthe effectof interests,these two agencies surviveand thrivein supportiveadministrations, but come veryclose. witherand die in unfriendlyadministrations. In both of Second,the internationaldistribution of powerre- the cases, an administrationwith hostileto mainedreasonably constant throughout the time period theseinstitutions' founding ideas came to powerwithin studied. Systemictheorists (Waltz 1979) argue that tenyears of theircreation. Furthermore, both theNixon changesin theexternal policy environment are theprin- and Reaganadministrations placed a greatdeal ofempha- cipal cause of anychanges in foreignpolicy. The bipolar- sison politicalcontrol over the bureaucracy and werethus ity of the Cold remained essentiallyunchanged quiteconscious of theneed to controlorganizations with throughoutboth cases. Structuralrealism would there- views antitheticalto theirideas (Reeves 1988; Nathan forebe unable to explain any variationin U.S. foreign 1983).11 Predictingoutcomes based solelyon materialre- policy towardsglobal developmentor human rights. sourceallocations would predicta betterchance for the Thus,both systemic and pluralistapproaches would pre- Peace Corpsto surviveand thrivethan the HA bureau,as dictthat the new missionaryinstitutions should have no its initialstaff size (250 to 20 initialstaffers) and budget effecton foreignpolicy. Any observed variation in policy weremuch larger. outputswould haveto come fromthe conscious effort of theseinstitutions. 1"Anapproach based on theindividual presidential style of man- From the argumentsmade in the previoussection, agement(Rosati 1981; Hermann and Preston1994) would predict we should expectto see thePeace Corps successfullyde- neitheragency to surviveor thrivein all periods.The missionary institutionswould face the difficulties of beingminority voices in velop a strongorganizational culture in orderto resistef- administrations(Johnson and Carter)that valued bureaucratic consensus.With presidents that preferred more centralized de- "0ForHA, see Bloomfield(1982), Drew (1977), and Sikkink cision-making(Nixon and Reagan),they would lose out because (1993); on thePeace Corps, see Hoopes 1965,Rice (1985),Reeves they were promotingideas that differedfrom presidential (1988),and Schwartz(1991). preferences. 740 DANIEL W. DREZNER

TABLE 2 PredictedOutcomes

Predictedperformance Predictedperformance Predictedperformance Predictedperformance ofPeace Corps under ofPeace Corps ofHA ofHA Approach Kennedy/Johnson underNixon underCarter underReagan Modified Highprobability of Highprobability of Lowprobability of Lowprobability of ideational surviving;low probability surviving; low probability surviving and thriving surviving;ifsurvival, ofthriving ofthriving highprobability of thriving Presidential Highprobability of Lowprobability of Highprobability of Lowprobability of dominance survivingand thriving survivingorthriving survivingand thriving survivingorthriving Material Highprobability of Highprobability of Lowprobability of Lowprobability of resources survivingand thriving survivingand thriving survivingorthriving survivingorthriving

Becauseof theacute interest in boththe Peace Corps velopmentand in theprocess create allies among the mass and humanrights in general,I relyon secondarysources of newlydecolonized states.Memos betweenKennedy in buildingthe case studies.This inevitablyleads to ques- and the firstPeace Corps director,R. SargentShriver, in tionsof codingreliability of qualitativevariables. Space 1961 stressedthe foreign-policyadvantages that would constraintsprevent an exhaustivedetailing of minute accrueto the UnitedStates from the goodwillgenerated disagreementsamong the sources about theoutcomes in by thePeace Corps,particularly with respect to the Cold each case. However,a reviewof theliterature has revealed Warcompetition with the (Cobbs 1996,90- a surprisingdegree of consensuson most of the points 94; Cobbs Hoffman1998,29). Shriver's first trip abroad to coveredin the case studies.In each case, plausiblealter- sellthe Peace Corpsto hostcountries specifically targeted nativeexplanations are discussed,and significantdis- strategicthird-world countries, including Nigeria, India, agreementsamong secondary sources are also noted. Pakistan,and the Philippines(Amin 1992,40).12 How- ever,the Peace Corps'creators were also awareof thefact thatthe only way to obtainthat advantage was to denude U.S. policyof blatantanti-communism, since this would ThePeace Corps:1961-1976 conflictwith the revolutionaryideology of these new countries.In short,the founders of the Peace Corpshad a Therewere two foundingideas of thePeace Corps.First, causal beliefthat by focusingon development,the U.S. the way to alleviatepoverty and promotedevelopment would build up goodwillamong the decolonizedstates. was throughthe direct action of thePeace CorpsVolun- Throughsuch idealpolitik,the UnitedStates would help teers(PCVs). This was the quality throughwhich the stemcommunism (Shriver 1964,72). Peace Corpsdistinguished itself from more technical U.S. Despitepressure from AID to place thenew mission- aid organizationssuch as theAgency for International aryinstitution within its organizational purview, Kennedy Developmentor PointFour. Unlike those agencies, which establishedthe Peace Corps as an insulatedagency.'3 The dispatchedaid, the Peace Corpswas designedto puta hu- firstPeace Corps stafferswere conscious thattheir au- man faceto thataid (Anderson1998; Shriver 1964,71-72; tonomousstatus permitted a strongorganizational cul- Ashabranner1971,44-45). One quasi-officialguide to the turethat would perpetuatethe foundingideals. Shriver Peace Corps observedin 1965: "the Peace Corps saysto observed,"The organizationalcharts would havelooked theworld as no privateagency or technicalassistance or- betterif we had become a box in a single foreignaid ganizationcould sayit, that the American people them- agency.But the thrust of a newidea wouldhave been lost. selveswant to help the people of the emergingnations fightthe poverty,disease, and ignorancewhich are the greatestobstacles to progress....This concept of the doer, '2Aftera June1961 trip to Guinea,Shriver wrote in a memoran- dum:"Here we havean opportunityto movea countryfrom an as opposed to theadvisor or teacher,is thedistinguishing apparentlyclear Bloc orientation to a positionof neutrality or even featureof the Peace Corps"(Hoopes 1965,82, 100). one oforientation to theWest. This is thefirst such opportunity I Second,the Peace Corpswas designedto reorientU.S. knowof in thedeveloping world" (quoted in Amin1992, 44). foreignpolicy in thethird world towards problems of de- "3SeeAshabranner (1971, 44-47) formore on thisdecision. IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 741

The newwine needed a newbottle" (1964, 15).Vice Presi- led to the spreadof the foundingideas of development, dentJohnson warned Shriver, "this town is fullof folks directaction, and person-to-persondiplomacy. More fa- who believethe onlyway to do somethingis theirway. vorableattitudes towards the U.S. by third-worldelites That's especiallytrue in diplomacyand thingslike that, werereported throughout and (Amin 1992, because theywork with foreign .... You put 163-178;Cobbs Hoffman1998, 157-182; Rice 1985,280; the Peace Corps into the ForeignService and they'llput Searles1997, 12). stripedpants on yourpeople" (quoted in Rice 1985,67). The Peace Corps was also successfulin encouraging The staffand volunteersquickly acquired the culture policyemulation among othercountries in theWest. In of a missionaryinstitution. The numberof applications October 1962, the Peace Corps held an "International to be Peace Corps Volunteers(PCVs) in 1961 outnum- Conferenceon Middle-LevelManpower" in PuertoRico beredapplications to all otherdepartments of thefederal to encourage other countriesin the west to establish .The firstfew cohorts of PCVs consistedpri- Peace-Corps-typeprograms. At the conference,twelve marily of BA generalistswho signed up because of countriesannounced plans to establishsimilar programs, Kennedy'scall forservice. Once placed in the field,they and thenumber increased in theyears thereafter. By 1965, establisheda strongsubculture that reflected the found- sixteenwestern countries including France, Germany, and ing ideals of the agency:independence from other for- GreatBritain had startedsimilar volunteer programs. eignpolicy agencies, a sensitivityto othercultures, and a These initialsuccesses occurred without much sup- desireto be "doers."'14The organizationalculture was so port fromthe rest of the foreign-policybureaucracy. strongthat longitudinal studies of PCVs indicatethat Therewere repeated clashes with the StateDepartment. theircareer paths were dramatically affected by their ser- Relationsbetween the Peace Corps and AID were de- vice in thePeace Corps (Starr1994). scribedas "dismal."Relations with the Department of the The exceptionalesprit de corpsof the Peace Corps Interior"nearly regressed into a brawl"(Carey 1970,180- administratorshas also been documentedin organiza- 185). The Civil Service Commission was reluctantto tionalhistories (Ashabranner 1971; Rice 1985; Schwartz workwith the new missionaryinstitution. As a wayof ex- 1991; Cobbs Hoffman1998). The amount of overtime ertingpower, other foreign policy bureaucrats refrained hoursthey were willing to devoteto the cause reflected fromtransmitting information to the Peace Corps Staff. theircommitment to the mission of the Peace Corps. Rice quotes one officialcomplaining, "Can anyoneex- The forty-hourworkweek did not existfor the staffany plainto me whywe neverappear to see Stateor AID mes- more than it did forthe volunteersin the field(Clute sagesinvolving major decisions on issuesinvolving coun- 1962, 165). Ashabrannerobserved: "Almost everyone triesin whichwe haveprograms?" (1985, 130). who servesfor any length of timein the Peace Corps ... Partof thistension was due to differencesin organi- developsan emotionalattachment to thePeace Corps,or zationalculture that developed between the Peace Corps at leastto thePeace Corps idea,that I cannotconceive of and otherorganizations. More establisheddepartments anyonedeveloping for the CommerceDepartment, the thoughtthe PCVs werenaive, untrained, and an impedi- Bureauof Standards,or theAgency for International De- mentto the conductof foreignpolicy. Wofford quotes a velopment"(1971, 3).15 careerdiplomat in the Statedepartment disparagingly The Peace Corps' emphasison fosteringa strongor- describingthe Peace Corps mottoas: "Yoo-hoo,yoo-hoo. ganizationalculture led to some foreign-policysuccesses Let'sgo out and wreaksome good on thenatives" (1980, in thesixties. Shriver and his staffdecided at theoutset to 274). The Peace Corps was partlyresponsible for these place as manyvolunteers as possible in the field.The conflictsbecause of their strategy of developinga distinct growthof the programwas impressive.In 1961 there organizationalculture. In one memorandum,Shriver or- were750 PCVs; by 1966 therewere 15,556in morethan deredthat PCVs refrainfrom spending time at U.S. em- fiftycountries, including nations traditionallyaligned bassycompounds or consortwith the embassystaff. He with the Soviet Union such as Tanzania and India. noted,"Separateness from other overseas operations of Shriver'ssuccess at creatinga large,insulated agency also the U.S. is importantto achievingthe desired image" (Rice 1985,130; see also Carey1970, chapter nine). The differencesin organizationalculture were exac- 14See in particularSchwartz (1991), chapterone; Rice (1985), erbatedby the perceivedloss of powerfelt by otherfor- chapterten. eignpolicy agencies. Rice quotes Bill Moyersobserving: 15 Thisdoes notmean that there were not conflictswithin the or- "The old-line employeesof State and AID covetedthe ganization.Rice notes "Once overseas, the Volunteers formed their ownexclusive 'subculture' and mostpreferred to haveas littleto do Peace Corpsgreedily. It was a naturalinstinct; established withPeace Corps/Washington as possible" (1985, 221-222). bureaucraciesdo not likecompetition from new people" 742 DANIEL W. DREZNER

(1985, 61). Searlesquotes a USAID bureaucratgrousing mous niche,but as a resultit had littleto no influence to a Peace Corps volunteer,"Peace Corps is afraidthat overother foreign-policy agencies. someone else mightget a littlecredit for trying to help The Peace Corps faceda hostilePresident in Rich- people,too" (1997,98). In one interagencymeeting, State ard Nixon.Nixon embraceda realpolitikforeign policy. departmentofficials expressed bitterness with the Peace The ideals and the independence of the Peace Corps Corps formuscling in on educationalaid policies.Other clashed with Nixon's preferenceson foreignpolicy. officialsat State felt that Shriver needed "a gentle Cobbs Hoffmannotes, "Richard Nixon ... saw little straighteningout" so thatthe Peace Corps could better place in his plans for a warm and fuzzyPeace Corps serveState. They opposed the 1962 internationalconfer- spreadinggoodwill throughout the world. If it could not ence held bythe Peace Corps,fearing that Shriver would fulfilla specificforeign policy function that gained the unwittinglydeliver the Soviets a propaganda coup an advantagein the world,it should be (Cobbs 1996). There was particularresentment that 'chopped"' (1998, 222-223). This was also emblematic Shriverrefused to send PCVs to unstablebut strategic of ,Nixon's national securityadvisor countriessuch as Vietnamor Algeria (Schwartz1991, and foreignpolicy architect. 74). Despite thisantagonism, the Peace Corps partially Afterconsultations with his staff,Nixon concluded thrivedduring the Kennedy/Johnsonyears. Its statusas thatabolishing the agencyoutright would be too politi- PresidentKennedy's pet projectprotected it fromthreats callycostly. He decidedinstead on a stealthcampaign to to itssurvival, lending some supportto thepresidential- destroyit. In March 1970,a WhiteHouse staffmemo to dominancethesis. JohnErlichman and HenryKissinger argued for "a quiet Afterits promisingstart, other outputs of U.S. for- phasingout of thePeace Corps,"through appropriations eign policybegan to overwhelmthe Peace Corps' suc- cuts (Schwartz1991, 161). In Julyof thatyear, Nixon's cesses.Shriver's strategy of focusingon developmentin chiefof staff,H. R. Halderman, recordedin his diary orderto woo third-worldcountries was overshadowedby thatthe president wanted to cutthe Peace Corps budget, the policy externalitiesof Vietnam.The stridentanti- "farenough to decimatethem" (Halderman 1994, 191). communismof the war effort led severalcountries to ex- He was reasonably successfulin this goal, as Table 3 pel the Peace Corps; some nationsclaimed it was simply demonstrates. a coverfor U.S. intelligence(Schwartz 1991). Differences JosephBlatchford, Nixon's first Peace Corpsdirector, in organizationalculture made anyattempt to influence launcheda set of policies,called New Directions,which otheragencies futile. Rice notes,"the power brokers sur- placed greateremphasis on meetingthe specific develop- roundingKennedy regarded the Peace Corps' leadersas' mentneeds of thehost countries (Blatchford 1970). The boy scouts,'and the geopoliticiansof the NationalSecu- rityCouncil viewed them and thePeace Corps as periph- eral at best" (1985, 302). Simplyput, the Peace Corps' TABLE3 Appropriationsand Staffof abilityto promotethe ideas of developmentand cultural the Peace Corps exchangewas drownedout by the foreign-policyimpli- cationsof Vietnam. Appropriations Numberof Peace Corps It could be arguedthat the Peace Corps was simply Year (in1963 dollars) Volunteersand Trainees too small and narrowan institutionto affectVietnam. 1963 59,000,000 6,646 However,the evidence suggests that the Peace Corpswas 1964 94,552,000 10,078 also unableto alterU.S. policyon developmentalaid, an 1965 100,596,000 13,248 1966 107,116,000 15,556 issue area firmlywithin its bailiwick. In the firstten 1967 100,159,000 14,698 yearsof thePeace Corps' existence,development aid was 1968 93,810,000 13,823 uncorrelatedwith the degree of povertyin recipient 1969 85,012,000 12,131 countries,a prime considerationfor the Peace Corps 1970 77,907,000 9,513 (Lumsdaine1993, 91-92). This occurredat a timewhen 1971 67,711,000 7,066 1972 demandoutstripped supply in extremelypoor countries 52,325,000 6,894 1973 55,346,000 7,341 forPeace Corps education programs(Rice 1981, 13). 1974 48,278,000 8,044 Furthermore,the general trend was one of professionali- 1975 44,519,000 7,015 zation of aid provision,eschewing the philosophy of di- 1976 43,999,000 5,752 rectaction embodied by the Peace Corps (Lumsdaine 2000 51,850,000 7,000 1993,232). Consistentwith the theorydeveloped here, Source:Cobbs Hoffman (1998, 262); http://www.peacecorps.gov/about/ thePeace Corps was able to carveout a separateautono- facts/index.html . IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 743 - main thrustof New Directions was the recruitingof Balzano took steps to alterthe organizationalcul- older,more skilled personnel as opposed to theBA gen- ture.He removedthe Peace Corps' recruitmentbureau eraliststhat dominated the Peace Corps duringthe six- and placed it in ACTION. He was determinedto eradi- ties.There were intrinsically sound reasonsfor this shift, cate the Peace Corps' cultureof directaction; he de- but Blatchfordjustified it in a memo to HenryKissinger scribedthe existing Peace Corpsprogramming as "totally by sayingthat these new personnelwould "emphasize inadequate"(Balzano 1978,3). To changeit, he setup six technicalassistance more than simply good will"(quoted programminginstitutes designed to convince Peace in Cobbs Hoffman1998, 222-223). This emphasiscon- Corps staffersthat community action was outdatedand tradictedthe founding ideals of thePeace Corps,clashing differentmethods had to be promulgated.Attendance at withthe causal beliefsof directaction and movingthe theseinstitutes was mandatoryfor staffers. Peace Corps missioncloser to AID. Severalstaffers con- DespiteNixon's preferences, the budget cuts, the bu- cluded thatBlatchford's actions were designed to trans- reaucraticshake-up, and the Balzano appointment,the formthe Peace Corps froma missionaryinstitution to a foundingideas ofthe Peace Corpsdid notdisappear. Sur- juniorUSAID (Schwartz1991; Reeves 1988). veystaken of staffersbefore and afterBalzano's program- Blatchfordtook othersteps to alterthe agency'sor- minginstitutes showed no realchange in theideas held by ganizationalculture. He cut the amountof trainingand Peace Corpsstaffers. Bureaucrats who triedto implement indoctrinationPCVs receivedbefore going into the field, thenew programsfound themselves ostracized (Balzano reducingthe socialization component of the Peace Corps 1977, 12-22; Reeves 1988,83-85). Balzano's inabilityto (Cobbs Hoffman1998, 223). He also alteredthe mix of alterthe founding ideals of the institution was largelydue rolesPCVs playedin the field.In the Kennedy/Johnson to the robustorganizational culture of the Peace Corps. years,25 percentof all PCVs weredevoted to "commu- All of the Peace Corps directorsunder Balzano wereso- nitydevelopment" as a wayof placingvolunteers directly cialized intothe agency'sculture and refusedto alterit. into communities.Blatchford phased thisout; by 1972, For example,John Dellenback, who became the Peace only4.2 percentof PCVs engagedin communitydevel- Corps directorin 1975,commented: "I helpedwrite the opment.Instead, large numbers of PCVs wereplaced di- legislationthat created ACTION ... whenI becamePeace rectlyin hostcountry bureaucracies, another move that Corps DirectorI changedmy mind and concludedthat triedto push the Peace Corps towardsthe AID format. we ... had made a legislativemistake .... I becameabso- However,his mostserious organizational move was the lutelyconvinced of the uniquenessof the Peace Corps' strictenforcement of the"five-year rule." This barred any mission" (Searles 1997, 166). Balzano, ratherbitterly, Peace Corps stafferfrom serving in the agencyfor more came to the same conclusion:"There are manypeople than fiveyears.16 In 1971, Blatchfordused this rule to employedby the Peace Corps at presentwho have been flushout 10 percentof theWashington staff, and 49 per- withthe Peace Corps sinceits inception. Such revolving- cent of the overseascountry directors (Schwartz 1991; door employmentfosters intellectual in-breeding: all new Cobbs Hoffman1998). ideas arejuxtaposed against the standard of thepast. This These stepswere insufficient for Nixon, and he soon is perhapsat theroot of Peace Corps programming inflex- took more drasticaction. In 1971, Nixon consolidated ibility"(1978, 16). the Peace Corps and other volunteeragencies into a The ideals implantedin 1961 remainedfirmly in singlebureaucratic unit called ACTION. As partof the place in 1976;the Peace Corpssurvived. As Table3 shows, bureaucraticshake-up, the Peace Corps was renamed;it budgetaryauthority and manpowerhave risenfrom the was now the InternationalOperations Division of AC- mid-seventiesnadir. President Clinton expressed a goal or TION. To head theagency, Nixon told his chiefof staffhe raisingthe numberof PCVs to 10,000,a level not seen wanteda "toughguy" who would could clamp down on sincethe sixties. However, the Peace Corpsdid notthrive; the agency.Finding Blatchford unsatisfactory, in 1972 as an insulatedagency, it could not influenceother agen- Nixonappointed Michael Balzano to be thehead ofAC- cies craftingforeign policy or even the subsetof foreign TION.17 Balzano was publicly quoted as vowing to policydealing with development issues. changethe direction of thePeace Corps and otheragen- cies withinACTION, even if it meant"bringing tanks rightup to theagency's front door" (Searles1997, 168). TheHA Bureau, 1976-1988 16Ironically,Shriver proposed this 1965 amendment to thePeace CorpsAct as a wayof preventing bureaucratic sclerosis. In October 1977,the Bureau of Human Rightsand Hu- '7Balzano'sprevious position was as an aide to CharlesColson. manitarianAffairs was established.Created by congres- 744 DANIEL W. DREZNER sional mandate,the new bureauwas embracedby Presi- of Human Rightshad onlythirteen FSOs, and each bu- dent Carter,who had pledgedin his inauguraladdress: reaucrathad both regionaland functionalduties. There "Our commitmentto human rightsmust be absolute." was onlyone officialin chargeof all HA policytowards Carter'spolitical appointeesto the bureau came from bilateraland multilateraleconomic assistance,in addi- civil rightsbackgrounds; the nonpolitical appointees tion to the Latin American region.HA faced chronic wereForeign Service Officers (FSOs). The firstassistant manpowershortages and highturnover rates (Maynard secretaryof statefor human rights and humanitarianaf- 1989,182, 193). fairs,Patricia Derian, was the founderof the Mississippi The bestway to measurewhether HA's ideas thrived Civil LibertiesUnion. Derian triedto fostera bureau- would be whethergovernment aid was withheldfrom craticculture that valued human rightsabove standard countriesthought to be human rightsviolators, as this diplomatic practices (Warshawsky 1980, 198-205; was mandated by HA's enactinglegislation (Drezner Morrison1987, 82; Drezner1999, 88-89). 1999,88). An interagencygroup on Human Rightsand HA's relationshipswith the other bureaus of the ForeignAssistance (called the ChristopherCommittee StateDepartment were highly conflictual. The strainwas becauseit was headed by DeputySecretary of StateWar- caused bytwo factors.First, FSOs bitterlyresisted the in- ren Christopher)consisted of participantsfrom Hu- troductionof a new and inherentlyconfrontational mis- manitarianAffairs, the regionalbureaus, AID, the Ex- sion. Confrontingstates on theirhuman rights practices port-ImportBank, Treasury, Defense, and the National cut againstthe grain of an organizationalculture that SecurityCouncil. This was a venuewhere HA was able to stressedthe smoothingover of conflict.Second, Carter's influenceforeign policy. political appointees, coming from civil rightsback- By all accounts,HA had minimalinfluence in the grounds,were used to organizationalcultures of con- ChristopherCommittee. The Carter administration frontationand publicprotest. Derian was unsuccessfulin neverdeclared anyone a grossviolator of human rights, implantingthis culture in HA, as it was alien to a State whichwould have mandatedsanctions. Other bureau- Departmentbureaucracy that valued comity(Morrison craticactors, including the Agriculture Department and 1987,54). theExport-Import Bank, succeeded in gettingtheir pro- FSOs in the regionalbureaus reactedto the intro- gramsexempted from any aid cutoff.The biggestconflict ductionof HA by protectingtheir turf. The regionalbu- withinthe Christopher Committee was betweenHA and reaus possessed significantassets, in the formof infor- theother State department bureaus, in particularthe re- mation,control over promotion, and access to overseas gionaldesks. Drew quotes one StateDepartment official staff.They used theircontrol over resources to blockany on the decision-makingprocess: "What happened was HA initiative.Cable trafficand classifiedinformation thatif anyone,including one of the regionalAssistant were withheldfrom Humanitarian Affairs (Maynard Secretaries... put up a strongargument against zapping 1989,187).When information was transmitted,itwas of- anyof thesecountries, he won" (1977, 43).18 The Under- ten distorted. The East Asian bureau downplayed secretaryof State forSecurity Assistance threatened to Indonesia'sabuses in East Timor despitereputable re- resignunless militaryaid and other securitysupport portsto the contrary.The Near East bureau exaggerated wereexempted from human rights sanctions. The threat theShah's program of liberalization in Iran (Cohen 1982, succeeded.Multiple econometric studies show no corre- 261-262). The inabilityof FSO's servingin Humanitar- lation betweenAmerican aid and the human rightsre- ian Affairsto receivepromotions drove away capable bu- gimes in recipientcountries during this time period reaucratsworried about theircareers. The denial of re- (Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1991; Stohl, Carleton, and sourcesand elitebureaucrats led to a viciouscircle. One Johnson1984; Apodaca and Stohl1999). Expectationsof regionalbureau deskofficer described the problem: "It's survivalpast 1980were minimal. [HA] not directlyin thepolicy loop, so theydon't get the The Reaganadministration came intopower trum- best people, and the factthat theydon't get the best petinga differentset of ideas regardingthe relationship people means thatthe workthey do isn'ttop notchei- betweenhuman rightsand foreignpolicy (Kirkpatrick ther,which means thatthey are less in the policy loop 1979). Reagan'sapproach to humanrights was predomi- whichmeans thatthey get less good people" (quoted in nantlyshaped by the Cold War strugglebetween the Morrison1987,76). United States and the Soviet Union; he expected U.S. HumanitarianAffairs had fewweapons to combat policy on human rightsto be subordinated to that thiskind of bureaucraticconflict. In 1979,two yearsaf- struggle. ter its creation,HA was stilltiny by State Department standards,with only twenty people on itsstaff. Its Office 18See also Cohen(1982) and Mower(1987, 72-82, 103-106). IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 745

Reagan took a numberof steps to weakenthe HA Second, under the Reagan administrationseveral bureauand modifyits foundingideas to suithis foreign studieshave founda statisticalcorrelation between the policypreferences. Reagan's first nominee to head HA, amount of U.S. aid and the human rightsconditions ErnestLefever, had previouslyargued thatthe human withinthe potential recipient countries (Cingranelli and rightsreports be eliminatedand thatall legislationtying Pasquarello 1985; Poe and Sirirangsi1993). Indeed,the aid to human rightsbe revoked.The Senate rejected majorityof thesestudies find that the significance of the Lefever'snomination, but the signal of disdain forHA statisticalrelationship increased from Carter to Reagan was evident. Until Elliot Abrams was nominated in (Hofrenning1990; Poe 1991, 1992; Apodaca and Stohl Lefever'splace, HA was lookedat as the"laughing stock" 1999). Buttressingthe statisticalfindings are clearcases, of State,according to one FSO (Maynard1989, 182-183). such as Haiti or Chile,where the State departmentin- Secretaryof StateAlexander Haig pointedlyexcluded the sistedon includinghuman rights on the agendain deal- actingHA directorfrom staff meetings. ing with a particularcountry (Shultz 1993, 621, 971). The Reagan administrationsuccessfully altered the Furthermore,the same human rightsexperts that argue definitionof humanrights established under Carter. The HA was tamedunder Reagan also acknowledgedthat the previousadministration had establishedthree broad cat- qualityof the annual human rightsreports significantly egoriesof humanrights: freedom from torture and other improvedwith each passingyear of the administration. personalviolations, civil and politicalliberties, and eco- Indeed,statistical tests comparing the State Department's nomic rightsto food, shelter,and health care. Under human rightsreports with those of AmnestyInterna- Reagan,the Statedepartment harmonized the definition tionaland FreedomHouse founda highdegree of corre- to be consistentwith overall foreign policy by eliminat- lation (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Innes de ing the economicrights category. Communist countries Neufville1986). had used theeconomic component of thedefinition as a One possibleexplanation for this turnaround would wayof deflectingcriticism. This changepermitted using be a sea change in American public opinion towards thehuman rights agenda against communist countries.19 placing human rightsat the top of the foreign-policy Finally,there were several high profile cases, such as agenda. Commentatorsat the time suggestedthat the El Salvador,where the Reagan administrationignored Reaganadministration changed course because of rising blatanthuman rightsviolations and increasedaid; by public supportfor human rights(Jacoby 1986). How- 1982,El Salvadorwas receiving27 percentof all U.S. bi- ever,polling data showsno increasein thesalience of hu- lateral aid to (Donnelly 1998, 99; man rightsfrom 1976 onwardsand littlechange in pub- Cingranelliand Pasquarello1985, 544). Most commenta- lic supportfor emphasizing human rightsin bilateral torsthen and now declaredthat human rightsconcerns relations(Geyer and Shapiro 1988,392-393).21 Analyz- were moribund under the Reagan administration,in ing the data, Geyerand Shapiro conclude: "There has largepart because "HA has been co-opted into the bu- been littleindication of changein publicopinion toward reaucraticmilieu of the State Department"(Morrison human rightsas a foreignpolicy goal duringthe Carter 1987,219). and Reaganyears" (1988, 387). HA mightnot havesurvived in itsoriginal form, but There are threereasons for Reagan's reversal. First, thereis significantevidence that it thrivedin theReagan the Assistant Secretaries for Human Rights under years.First, there was a noticeableshift in human rights Reagan,Elliott Abrams and thenRichard Schifter, were rhetoricafter Reagan's first year in office.In 1981,U.N. betterat playingthe game of bureaucraticpolitics than ambassadorJeane Kirkpatrick, wrote, "not onlyshould Derian and in so doing furtheredHA's agenda.Abrams humanrights play a centralrole in U.S. foreignpolicy, no ensuredthat Foreign Service officers assigned to HA were U.S. foreignpolicy can possiblesucceed that does not ac- not slightedfor promotions in thefuture. As a result,the cord thema major role" (1981, 42). Haig also reversed caliberof FSOs willingto workin HA improved,a fact course,declaring human rights would be a "majorfocus" acknowledgedby the other bureaus (Morrison 1987, 89). of Reagan'sforeign policy (Maynard 1989, 183).20 Second, the proceduresof the Reagan administra- tion'sinteragency working group differed from the Chris- topherCommittee. Under Carter,the differentbureaus 19Forexample, the Carter administration used humanrights to voteagainst multilateral development assistance to leftistcountries 21 34 percentof the timeand rightistcountries 31 percentof the The exceptionto unchangingattitudes was public opinion about time.The Reaganadministration figures were 31 percentand 4 apartheidin SouthAfrica (Geyer and Shapiro1988, 387). Thisex- percent,respectively (Maynard 1989, 214). ceptionproves the rule, however; Reagan resisted any change in his policyof constructiveengagement until Congress overrode his 20Seealso Mower(1987, 33-37). vetoof the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act. 746 DANIEL W. DREZNER arguedthe case out in thegroup; under Reagan, the State Conclusions Departmenthashed out a commonposition prior to the workinggroup meeting.State departmentbureaucrats The internationalrelations literature has failedto exam- dislikedairing intradepartmental disputes in frontof ine thecausal mechanismsthrough which ideas are con- otherdepartments, in part because such an approach vertedinto policies. It has been unclearhow missionary clashedwith State's organizational culture of comity.By institutionssurvive and thrivein a worldof bureaucratic workingout a commonposition beforehand, HA did not politics.This arti'cle argues that the placement of the mis- alwaysget its way, but whenit did, it had thebacking of sionaryinstitution vis-a-vis the rest of theforeign policy the entireState department (Maynard 1989, 212-215). organizationsdetermines the ability of theseinstitutions Underthe Cartersystem HA was a persistentbut small to surviveand thrive.Insulated agencies can createorga- advocate.Under the Reagan system,HA's voice was less nizationalcultures wedded to theirfounding ideas. This frequentlyheard but was considerablylouder. makesinsulated agencies robust to challengesfrom other Third,as the clash of culturesdiminished, FSO's organizationsand increasesthe odds of survival.Such a provedmore receptive to the idea of human rights.The strongculture decreases its abilityto influenceother primarymechanism through which this idea was trans- agencies,restricting its ability to manipulatethe broader mittedwas thehuman rights reports. The annualexercise foreign-policyagenda. Embedded agencies are con- to gauge human rightsconditions forced embassy staffs strainedfrom crafting a separateorganizational culture, to assignhuman rights officers to writethe reports. To do makingthem more vulnerableto manipulationby the this,the FSOs establishedcontacts and networksamong largerbureaucracy. If theydo survive,however, they are human rightsactivists in theircountry. The act of data morelikely to thrive.Altering routines and practicesbe- collectionand reportwriting socialized FSOs outsideHA comesa wayof spreading their ideas to thelarger organi- intothe importanceof humanrights ideals. By the early zation.Comparing the ability of thePeace Corps and the eighties,a surveyof FSO's in foreignpostings revealed StateDepartment's Humanitarian Affairs bureau to sus- surprisinglystrong support for the reporting exercise. As taintheir ideational agendas tested this hypothesis. thereports circulated with the Statedepartment, aware- Thereare severallimitations to thisstudy. The cases ness of humanrights increased in officialWashington as wereselected using a "most-similarsystems" (Przeworski well (Innes de Neufville1986, 689-693). Participantsin and Teune 1970) in orderto show the existenceof the theprocess have confirmedthis effect. Richard Schifter, causal mechanisms.These cases controlledfor the effect Reagan'ssecond AssistantSecretary for Human Rights, of materialinterests and the structuraldistribution of notedafter leaving office: power.Most missionaryinstitutions will have sincereor from Diplomatsare used to reportingpromptly on devel- strategicsupport materialinterests; the relationship further.Later work opmentsin theareas of their responsibility, and hu- betweenthe two needs to be explored needsto use a most-different in order manrights officers were not exceptionsto thisgen- systemsapproach of the modi- eral rule.Thus, once embassieshad been staffed to estimatethe relativeexplanatory power fied ideational approach. Other empiricalavenues in- with human rightsofficers, a flow of messages clude potentiallydisconfirming cases, such as the U.S. startednotifying Washington of human rights con- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,and non- ditionsin problemcountries. These messages began, Americancases. in thefirst instance, to informthe State Department Theoretically,the resultssuggest a need forthe bu- ofhuman rights problems .... Thus,once Washing- reaucraticpolitics paradigm to movebeyond description ton became awareof the detailsof humanrights of action. theo- violations,we began to thinkof ways of dealing with towardspositive theories Organizational can borrowfrom the ideas in thoseissues. (1992, 47-48) ries approach formulating the originsof bureaucraticpreferences, as well as the The Reaganadministration made significantchanges strategyset availableto organizations.Similarly, bureau- to the HumanitarianAffairs bureau. These changesal- craticpolitics is a crucial interveningvariable forthe teredthe founding ideas of theHA bureau,changing the ideas approach and should be integratedinto that re- verydefinition of human rights. In thisaltered form, how- searchprogram. The resultsalso suggestthe fruitfulness ever,the ideas promotedby HA spreadto the restof the of combiningrationalist and constructivistmodes of Statedepartment bureaucracy. By the end ofReagan's sec- analysis.The cases demonstratethe effectof organiza- ond term,human rightswere accepted as an important tionalnorms as wellas thestrategic calculations made by componentof the Amlerican national interest. actorsto spreadthose norms. IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 747

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