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PART I. INTRODUCTION A. Overview On October 15, 1996 the UCLA Center for Communication Policy released the second of three annual reports on television violence. Looking at all television sources, but especially broadcast network television, the report found that there had been improvement in the areas of television series, theatrical films shown on television and on-air promotions. The report also found that a new problem regarding reality specials, especially those featuring real footage of animals attacking and in some cases killing people, had emerged. However, despite some new problems, the report found some improvement overall and looked to the third year to see if those improvements represented an aberration or the beginning of a trend. As the second report was released in the middle of a presidential election campaign, the Center offered to brief both candidates, President Bill Clinton and Senator Robert Dole, on the report’s findings. President Clinton held a joint press conference with the director of the Center and praised the findings of the second report. Senator Dole read the report and called it “a study in courage.” In the introduction to last year’s study referring to political developments in the television content area in 1996, the report concluded that “there had never been a year like the last one.” The report went on to predict that 1997 “promises to be just as momentous and contentious.” That prediction proved to be an enormous understatement. At times it has seemed as if a war had broken out between television programmers on one side and advocates, as well as some members of the government, on the other. The past year has been filled with threats to go to court, to enact more restrictive legislation, to boycott advertisers and even to revoke the licenses of some television stations. All sides claimed to have talked to parents and to represent their interests. It was a very difficult year and, while many of the issues now appear settled, at least for the moment, new issues will surely arise over the next few years. Within two months of the report’s release, the two sides in the television content battle became increasingly contentious. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, which was signed by the President in early February 1996, called for a sweeping reform of the nation’s telecommunications business. Significant portions of the bill called for increased or, in some cases, new competition in the telephone and cable industries. For the first time consumers would have choices as to who would provide their local telephone or cable service. The content issues in the television and cable business were most affected, however, by a small provision in the bill requiring television manufacturers to place a V-chip in all television sets larger than 13 inches beginning in the middle of 1998. The V-chip, developed by Professor Tim Collings of Simon Fraser University in Canada, allows a parent to set the television to block out unwanted programming. Television programmers or distributors must embed the code or label in the vertical blanking interval of a television signal. The V-chip then recognizes the code and blocks out programs that have been selectively coded. Although some called the use of the V-chip a restriction on the First Amendment rights of 1 broadcasters, Canada, comfortable with this approach to content issues, began field tests of the V-chip. In his last major act as chairman of the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), longtime anti-violence advocate Keith Spicer called for the installation of V-chips in Canadian television sets as one of the ways to combat television violence. In the United States, the recently enacted V-chip legislation would have no meaning if broadcast and cable programmers did not create a labeling system. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 gave the industry one year to create a system and submit it for approval by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). If the industry did not create a system or if the FCC found it unacceptable, the FCC itself could appoint a panel to develop an independent labeling system. In order to keep the legislation from violating the First Amendment, the FCC could appoint a commission to devise a labeling system, but could not force broadcasters to carry it in their signals. No doubt, a complicated political and legal drama would have been played out if an independent body had created a labeling system and the television industry refused to use it. But such a potential drama was avoided on February 29, 1996 when the television industry met at the White House and voluntarily agreed to develop a labeling system to facilitate the use of the V-chip. All sides of this contentious issue seemed pleased that a court challenge was averted and that the television industry had agreed to create its own content labels. At the White House meeting the industry announced that Jack Valenti, former advisor to President Lyndon Johnson and longtime head of the Motion Picture Association of America, would chair an implementation committee comprised of leaders in the television industry to devise the labeling system. As head of the MPAA, it was Valenti who in 1968 created the ratings system for the motion picture industry. Those ratings were administered by the MPAA itself and advised parents as to the age- appropriateness of a motion picture. Originally using the symbols G, M, R and X, by 1996 the system had evolved into G, PG, PG-13, R and NC-17. From the beginning the television industry sent signals that it was likely to create age-based labels similar to those used by the film industry. Valenti’s chairing of the implementation committee was further evidence that this was the type of code likely to be developed. Canada, meanwhile, seemed to be moving in a different direction. In the V-chip field trials it was experimenting with a very different system than the age-based one used by the MPAA. Although Canada’s entire effort to deal with television content had focused on violence, it was testing a system that dealt not only with violence but also with sex and language. Each of these factors (S,V and L) was rated on a scale of 1 through 5. Therefore a program might have a rating such as V-4, S-2 and L-1. Obviously this was a much more difficult code to administer, although it did provide more specific information for the parent. The question that became paramount in both Canada and the United States was whether the more complicated and information-rich code would mean a more valuable tool for parents, as some believed, or whether it would be so complicated that few would learn or use it. At the February 1996 White House Summit the industry signaled its commitment to deliver the new labeling system by the end of a year as called for in the Telecommunications Bill. It was clear that most of the children’s advocate organizations such as the PTA called for a system similar to Canada’s as opposed to the age-based system used by the movie industry. All sides 2 released supporting polls purporting to represent what parents felt about the issue. During the summer of 1996 many of the advocates and industry critics came to Washington to meet with Jack Valenti and the implementation committee in order to influence the new labeling system. The industry reminded its critics that its commitment to develop a labeling system was voluntary and that no one, neither advocates nor the government, could compel the industry to do anything. Increasingly it appeared that the television industry was moving toward an age-based system while leading members of Congress and most advocacy groups were calling such a system inadequate. Instead they demanded a content descriptor system like what was being developed in Canada. Both sides appeared to be on a collision course. This time a collision was not averted and what seemed like warfare broke out when the industry announced the new labeling system on December 19, 1996. Details of the system had leaked and opponents of the new labeling system were ready. The implementation committee announced that it would adopt a system remarkably similar to the movie ratings system. All programming except for news and sports would be rated. In defining news, the implementation committee used a definition almost identical to that used by the Center in its definition of news (which was excluded from the monitoring process). Network magazine shows were considered news while syndicated tabloid shows such as Hard Copy were not. All programming except children’s would be labeled G, PG, PG-14 or MA (for mature). The major difference from the film ratings was use of a PG-14 label instead of a PG-13 label and no NC-17 label. Children’s television would be labeled either Y (acceptable for all children) or Y-7 (recommended for children 7 or over). Within hours of the industry’s announcement, opponents held their own press conference indicating their intention to fight the new system. Those determined to fight included Congressman Edward Markey (D-Mass.), former Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, longtime critic of television content and the man who moved the V-chip legislation through the House of Representatives. Looming in the background of the impending battle was the fact that the industry’s system needed to be endorsed by the FCC. Critics vowed to take their fight to the FCC while the industry threatened that if its system was not affirmed it would be in court “in a nanosecond.” Even with the criticism, the television industry began using its new labeling system in late December 1996 and early January 1997.

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