Necessary Illusions: Putative Intersubjective Beliefs During Détente, 1969-1972 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Eric Grynaviski, M.A. Graduate Program in Political Science Ohio State University 2010 Committee: Alexander Wendt, Adviser Randall Schweller Alexander Thompson Copyright by Eric Grynaviski 2010 Abstract Between 1972 and 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into one of the most cooperative phases of the Cold War. During détente, the superpowers reached more than 150 agreements, established consultative committees, regularly held summit meetings, and engaged in crisis management. The turn from enmity to rivalry was so deep that many commentators predicted the Cold War‘s end. Richard Nixon summarized it as a historic shift, from an ―era of confrontation‖ to an ―era of negotiation.‖ Why did U.S.-Soviet relations change so significantly during détente, moving from confrontation to cooperation? Many International Relations (IR) scholars argue that increased information, common norms, or culture explain cooperation. Misperception causes conflict while mutual understanding contributes to peace. Against this received wisdom, the central claim of this dissertation is that cooperation can be enhanced when actors believe that intersubjectivity or common knowledge exists, even when they are wrong. This inaccurate belief that intersubjectivity is shared, which I term putative intersubjective beliefs (PIBs), is in many cases crucial to cooperation. A theory of PIBs provides a novel and understudied route to cooperation. This dissertation is interested cases of imagined intersubjectivity (one of three types of PIBs). Imagined intersubjectivity occurs when actors inaccurately believe that they know what another will do, and also inaccurately believe they know why another ii will do it. It is necessary for cooperation in cases in which revelations of either the future behavior or the reasons for an action in the present would undermine cooperation. The dissertation tests a theory of PIBs against liberal institutionalist and constructivist arguments. The test operates at two levels. First, I analyze the macro changes in the U.S.-Soviet relationship during détente, testing a theory of PIBs against Wendt‘s cultural theory of cooperation. The rules of rivalry during détente were not intersubjective. The superpowers held different principles concerning their relations; Brezhnev believed that the United States had accepted Soviet political parity, while Nixon and Kissinger believed that the superpowers were entering a period of competition for supremacy. This had consequences for their expectations of the behavior of the other. The Nixon administration believed détente meant issue-linkage; the superpowers would exert pressure to obtain dominance, and when negotiations failed, would resort to military threats. The Politburo did not share this prediction; they believed that the era of linkages and threats was over and that the United States accepted Soviet influence in the Third World. Through a structured, focused comparison, I show that these misperceptions promoted cooperation. To show that imagined intersubjectivity plays a role at the micro level, I test imagined intersubjectivity against liberal institutionalism through an analysis of the ABM Treaty negotiations. Using process-tracing and counter-factual analysis, I argue that at three moments of the negotiations—Kissinger‘s decision to offer to negotiate ABMs, the May 20th, and Nixon‘s decision meeting with Brezhnev during an escalation in iii Vietnam—concessions were made because of a lack of mutual understanding. Only because of these mistakes was the ABM Treaty reached. iv For Mara v Acknowledgements In attending graduate school, finishing a dissertation, and growing up in the process, one assumes more debts than one can reasonably repay. This project could never have been completed without the help of other graduate students at the Ohio State University. In particular, I am indebted to Bentley Allan, Burcu Bayram, Austin Carson, Erin Graham, John Oates, and Clement Wyplosz for helpful comments and feedback, along with those who attended a Research in International Politics Workshop where a draft version of chapters two and four were presented. In addition, many faculty provided useful comments on different elements of the dissertation, especially Bear Braumoeller Ted Hopf, Eric MacGilvrey, Jennifer Mitzen, Michael Neblo, and Daniel Verdier. I was fortunate to have an extraordinarily helpful and encouraging dissertation committee. Randy Schweller introduced me to détente—the subject of the dissertation— and provided early encouragement through the OSU Dissertation Workshop. Alexander Thompson was enormously supportive, reading drafts, providing expert comments, encouraging the final organization of most chapters, and giving emotional support. Most of all, one cannot ask for a more generous teacher, mentor, and dissertation adviser than Alex Wendt. Not only did he provide intellectual support, play the role of antagonist, and slowly walk me through the steps of becoming an academic, he also showed enormous trust in allowing me to make my own mistakes and dig my own way out. If all political vi scientists aspire to a fraction of his good nature, our discipline will be a thought- provoking, kind, and spirited place to live, work, and study. Over the years, I have been lucky to be taught by many people to whom I owe an enormous debt. In particular, Timothy Kaine, very early in my education, encouraged me to think clearly. As an undergraduate, I was fortunate to be taught by Medhi Aminrazavi, John Morello, Debra Nails, and especially David Ambuel. And, early in my graduate education, Peter Mandeville and Ming Wan introduced me to Political Science and encouraged me to pursue a Ph.D. Each of these individuals has contributed to this dissertation in ways direct and indirect. Most of all, I would like to acknowledge my family. My parents, Jane and Dan Grynaviski, are a constant source of support. In the final year of dissertation writing, my son Ethan was born. He is always ready with a quick laugh. But, I owe to the most to my partner Mara. Mara read every page of the dissertation, as a copy editor and a proof reader, listened, usually patiently, to long and boring anecdotes about the SALT negotiations, and likely knows more about the Nixon era than she could ever want. She experienced all of my frustrations and was important for any successes. I would never have been able to finish this project without her. vii Vita 1999…………………………………B.A. Philosophy, Mary Washington College 2004…………………………………M.A. Political Science, George Mason University 2005-2010…………………………...Graduate Student Associate, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University Field of Study Major Field: Political Science viii Table of Contents Abstract……………………………………………………………………………......ii Dedication…………………………………………………………………………..….v Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………....vi Vita…………………………………………………………………………...……....viii List of Tables………………………………………………………………………..….x List of Figures………………………………………………………………………….xi Chapter One: Introduction……………………………………………………….….…1 Chapter Two: Putative Intersubjective Beliefs……………………………..................34 Chapter Three: Détente…………………………………………………………….….91 Chapter Four: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty……………………………………..146 Chapter Five: The Decline of Détente………………………………………………..202 Chapter Six: Conclusion……………………………………………………………....245 References…………………………………………………………………………….271 ix List of Tables Table 2.1: Forms of Common Knowledge……………………………………………40 Table 2.2: Typology of Beliefs………………………………………………………..55 Table 2.3: Public Beliefs………………………………………………………………63 Table 3.1: Summary of Beliefs Related to Détente………………………………..…102 Table 3.2: Summary of Beliefs……………………………………………………….118 Table 5.1: Relationship Between Cooperation and Anti-Détente Groups………...….224 Table 5.2: Summary of the Decline of Détente …………………………….……….243 x List of Figures Figure 4.1: Kissinger‘s Perspective on NCA-Only Offer……………………………..184 Figure 4.2: Counterfactual: Kissinger with Information on Soviet Position………….186 Figure 4.3: Nixon‘s Perspective on the 1972 Summit Decision………………………193 Figure 4.4: Counterfactual: Nixon Understands Brezhnev's Preferences……………..194 Figure 5.1: Relative Capabilities………………………………………………………229 xi Chapter One: Introduction ―To be sure, the international order had been founded on a misunderstanding and a misconception…‖ –Henry Kissinger, A World Restored.1 When Captain Cook ―discovered‖ Hawaii at the end of the 18th century, a remarkable case of cooperation began, perhaps one of the most remarkable in world history. As Marshall Sahlins recounts the story of Cook's first contact with Hawaiians, which is not without some controversy, a series of coincidences led the Hawaiians to mistake Cook for Lono, the god of peace, music, and fertility.2 When the Discovery and the Resolution approached Hawaii, they chanced to circumnavigate Hawaii in a clockwise direction that mirrored the mythical process made on land by Lono. Cook's progression around the island occurred in the same direction and on the same days as predicted by the myth. By this accident, the ―islanders knew Captain Cook as ‗Lono‘ before they set eyes on him.‖ When Cook landed at Kealakekua, the Hawaiians dressed him as Lono, wrapping him in a red tapa cloth. Then they offered him a small pig