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La Guerre Du Donbass

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La Guerre Du Donbass LA GUERRE DU DONBASS : « Du fragile État ukrainien à la Guerre des Scélérats ? » Cosaques Ukrainiens, par Feodosiy Humeniuk . Date inconnue. (Source : Ukrainian Art Gallery) « Si vous saviez, jeunes seigneurs, Si vous saviez où les gens pleurent, Vous n’écririez pas d’élégies, Vous ne loueriez pas Dieu pour rien Tout en vous moquant de nos larmes. » Taras Schevchenko Gauthier TOCHON Sciences Po Strasbourg 4e année « Etudes Européennes et Internationales » Année universitaire 2017 / 2018 Sous la direction de M. Emmanuel DROIT LA GUERRE DU DONBASS : du fragile État ukrainien à la Guerre des Scélérats ? ______________________________________________________________ Remerciements Je tiens pour conclure à saluer toutes les personnes, dont certaines sont des amis qui me sont chers, qui m’ont aidé et accordé de leur temps pour la rédaction de ce mémoire, ou même ayant manifesté un quelconque intérêt. Je remercie Yuri Lukianchuk, agent d’Interpol à Kiev, Vadym, colonel de l’armée ukrainienne, Tanya Andrushko, Lily Chulitska. Maria Varfolomeieva, journaliste et ancienne otage des séparatistes de Lougansk. Merci aux étudiants originaires du Donbass et aux combattants qui m’ont accordé une entrevue : ceux du bataillon Azov, de Pravyi Sektor et autres. Les députés du Parti Radical ukrainien qui ont répondu à mon appel également. Merci à Dimitri Muravsky, journaliste militaire ukrainien, pour son travail de photographe impressionnant sur la ligne de front. Merci à Isabelle Mandraud, correspondante du Monde à Moscou, pour m’avoir aiguillé dans mes recherches de sources côté russe. Merci à Daria Meyer pour ses contacts en Russie. Merci à Julia, mon amie, pour les contacts et la traduction des entretiens. Merci à l’agent du SBU qui a accepté de vérifier mes informations. Remerciements toujours à Erwan Castel, ancien officier de l’armée française et séparatist e à Donetsk, pour les trois heures d’entretien que nous avons eu. Pour terminer, un grand merci à M. Emmanuel Droit, docteur en Histoire contemporaine enseignant à Sciences Po Strasbourg, pour avoi r accepté de diriger ce mémoire, ainsi qu’au lieutenant-colonel Rémy , pour avoir montré de l’intérêt pour ce travail, avoir assisté à sa soutenance, et avoir fait valider mes sources par ses analystes. 2 LA GUERRE DU DONBASS : du fragile État ukrainien à la Guerre des Scélérats ? ______________________________________________________________ SOMMAIRE INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 6 PARTIE I : L’Ukraine, un « État-failli », théâtre d’un conflit aux multiples facettes ..................... 14 Chapitre 1 : l’Ukraine, espace post -impérial « aux confins » de l’Europe et de la Russie ....... 14 A. De la Rus’ de Kiev à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale : un conflit aux racines historiques fortes ..................................................................................................................................... 14 B. Le projet ukrainien d’ancrage à l’Ouest : de la République Modèle à l’Euromaïdan .. 23 C. Un État au cœur du projet russe de restauration de puissance ..................................... 36 Chapitre 2 : le « failed-state » ukrainien : terrau de la Guerre du Donbass .............................. 45 A. Un État kleptocratique et corrompu ............................................................................. 45 B. Un État centralisé et les limites de la fédéralisation ..................................................... 52 C. Un terreau de radicalisation : l’hypernationalisme ukrainien ....................................... 57 Chapitre 3 : la Russie, un État autoritaire qui profite de la faiblesse étatique ukrainienne ...... 64 A. Le projet « Novorossia » contre l’Empire Occidental .................................................. 64 B. Le duel entre une armée de type soviétique et une armée moderne ............................. 68 C. Guerre hybride russe et obsolescence stratégique ukrainienne .................................... 72 PARTIE II : Guerre hybride en Ukraine, du coup d’éclat russe en Crimée à la Rogue War du Donbass, la Guerre de Scélérats ....................................................................................................... 76 Chapitre 4 : D’une guerre hybride à l’autre – César en Crimée, Pyrrhus dans le Donbass ...... 76 A. La Crimée, un triomphe russe à la romaine .................................................................. 76 B. Le Donbass : une victoire à la Pyr-russe, l’avènement de la Rogue War ..................... 81 C. La Rogue War/Guerre de Scélérats : définition et cas du Donbass .............................. 88 Chapitre 5 : l’État fragile ukrainien, vecteur de Rogue War .................................................... 93 A. Maïdan : l’atomisation de la société ukrainienne ......................................................... 93 B. L’État ukrainien face au casse -tête de la Guerre Hybride ............................................ 98 C. Privatisation du conflit et prolifération des factions armées : oligarques, paramilitaires et mercenaires ..................................................................................................................... 103 Chapitre 6 : Le point de vue des Républiques populaires « novorossiennes » ....................... 108 A. De Donetsk à Lougansk : seigneurs de guerre corrompus et querelles d’ego ............ 108 B. Novorossia : projet gelé au soutien économique et moral russe, nationalisme et héritage soviétique.............................................................................................................. 113 C. Novorossia comme parangon (de papier) de la dissidence contre l’Empire Occidental .. ................................................................................................................................... .117 PARTIE III : Le concept de Rogue War, quelles perspectives ? ................................................... 126 Chapitre 7 : La Rogue War, concept du XXIème siècle ........................................................ 126 3 LA GUERRE DU DONBASS : du fragile État ukrainien à la Guerre des Scélérats ? ______________________________________________________________ A. Le risque de « donbassification » des conflits contemporains ................................... 126 B. Au-delà de l’Ukraine : l’adaptabilité de l’exemple ukrainien aux risques actuels ..... 130 C. Le Donbass et la Rogue War : contrecoups cruels du néolibéralisme ? ..................... 133 Chapitre 8 : Pérennité de la Rogue War – l’importance des acteurs extérieurs au conflit ukrainien ................................................................................................................................. 137 A. Acteurs privés et publics américains .......................................................................... 137 B. Acteurs privés et publics européens ........................................................................... 141 C. Autres acteurs et confirmation des diverses implications : un conflit taillé pour durer 145 Chapitre 9 : quelles solutions pour la Rogue War du Donbass ? ........................................... 149 A. Solutions politiques - entre centralisation ou indépendantisme aveugles : la « finlandisation » de l’Ukraine et l’autonomisation des régions du Donbass, vers une république fédérale ukrainienne ? ...................................................................................... 149 B. Solutions diplomatiques et juridiques - de la nécessité de condamner les chefs de guerre et les corrompus en Ukraine .................................................................................... 155 C. Solutions militaires - de la nécessité de palier à la multiplicité des factions et à la privatisation du conflit de façon plus efficace, de réformer durablement l’armée ukrainienne : la création d’une Légion Etrangère ukrainienne comme outil décisif pour la défaite des séparatistes ? .................................................................................................... 159 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 165 PHOTOS EXCLUSIVES DE LA LIGNE DE FRONT DU DONBASS....................................... 173 ANNEXES ..................................................................................................................................... 182 PARTIE I : L’Ukraine, un « État-failli », théâtre d’un conflit aux multiples facettes ............... 182 I. Brève Histoire de la Rus de Kiev ............................................................................... 182 II. L’Hymne national ukrainien et la symbolique des Cosaques .................................... 183 III. L’Hetmanat Cosaque et brève Histoire des Cosaques Zaporogues ........................ 184 IV. L’Histoire impériale russe : un processus complexe .............................................. 186 V. La Figure de Taras Schevchenko et de la dissidence ukrainienne de l’Époque Moderne ............................................................................................................................................ 187 VI. Une Guerre Civile ukrainienne dans la Guerre Civile Russe (1919-1920) ............ 188 VII. Sur la Répression des « nationalistes » Ukrainiens et Polonais ............................. 191 VIII. L’Opération Barbarossa en Ukraine ......................................................................
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