Race for Top-Two

RACE FOR TOP-TWO:

HOW THE RACIAL MAKEUP OF A DISTRICT INFLUENCES

SAME-PARTY GENERAL ELECTIONS

A Thesis

Presented to the faculty of the Department of Political Science

California State University, Sacramento

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Government

Rana B. McReynolds

SUMMER 2018

Rana B. McReynolds

RACE FOR TOP-TWO:

HOW THE RACIAL MAKEUP OF A DISTRICT INFLUENCES

SAME-PARTY GENERAL ELECTIONS

A Thesis

Rana B. McReynolds

Approved by:

______, Committee Chair Professor Danielle Martin

______, Second Reader Professor Kimberly Nalder

______, Third Reader Professor Brian DiSarro

______Date

iii

Student: Rana B. McReynolds

I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the

University format manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to be awarded for the thesis.

______, Graduate Coordinator ______Professor Brian DiSarro Date

Department of Political Science

Abstract

RACE FOR TOP-TWO:

HOW THE RACIAL MAKEUP OF A DISTRICT INFLUENCES

SAME-PARTY GENERAL ELECTIONS

Rana B. McReynolds

A large body of research has examined the advantages and disadvantages of

California’s top-two primary system. Initial research indicates that voters, parties and candidates are still adjusting to the new system. However, few research studies examine why some primaries produce two candidates of the same party. This research set out to determine the relationship between same party general elections and the population of minority groups in a district. The findings of this study indicate a significant relationship between a district’s minority population and the probability of same party general elections, but only in certain types of districts.

______, Committee Chair Professor Danielle Martin

______Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the support of my family, friends, and professors.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Danielle Martin for not only her guidance, patience and thorough editing of my many thesis drafts, but also for playing a fundamental role in my academic career.

I would also like to thank the rest of my thesis committee and the entire

Sacramento State Government faculty for their support throughout my undergraduate and master’s program. I am grateful for the tools, knowledge, and relationships I gained. These skills will travel with me as I continue my graduate career.

Lastly, I would like to thank my parents for teaching me to shoot for the moon, showing me that all things are possible, and reminding me to do my best every day.

Also, to my siblings, thank you for continuously cheering me on and for your unquestionable belief in me even when I doubted my path. Finally, thank you to those who came before me. Without your sacrifice, I would not be where I am today. To those who will come after me, you were my ongoing motivation throughout this long and arduous journey. This is for you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

Acknowledgements ...... vi

List of Tables ...... ix

List of Figures ...... x

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1.1 History of California’s Electoral System ...... 1

1.2 Aftermath of Jones ...... 7

1.3 California’s Political Districts ...... 15

1.4 Overview of Thesis ...... 17

2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 19

2.1 Introduction ...... 19

2.2 Polarization and Top-Two Primaries ...... 19

2.3 Electoral Competitiveness and Top-Two Primaries ...... 26

2.4 Turnout and Top-Two Primaries ...... 28

2.5 Minor Parties and Top-Two Primaries ...... 30

2.6 Top-Two Primaries and Registration Advantage ...... 32

2.7 Conclusion ...... 33

3. RESEARCH QUESTION AND THEORY ...... 34

3.1 Introduction ...... 38

vii

3.2 Hypothesis ...... 38

4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY ...... 39

4.1 Introduction ...... 39

4.2 Dependent Variable ...... 39

4.3 Independent Variable ...... 40

4.4 Control Variables ...... 42

4.5 Methodology ...... 47

5. RESULTS ...... 49

6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH ...... 56

Appendix A. American Community Survey Layout ...... 60

Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics for Black, Asian, and Latino Population ...... 62

Appendix C. State Senate and State Assembly Logistic Regression Results ...... 64

Bibliography ...... 66

viii

LIST OF TABLES Tables Page

4.1 Number of Same-Party General Elections by District Type in 2016 ...... 40

4.2 Minority Population in Percent for Districts in 2016 ...... 42

4.3 Registration Advantage in Percent for Districts in 2016 ...... 44

4.4 Minor Party Registration in Percent for Districts in 2016 ...... 46

5.1 Minority Population in Congressional, State Senate, and State Assembly

Districts and Same-Party General Elections ...... 49

5.2 Minority Population in Congressional Districts and Same-Party General

Elections ...... 51

5.3 Black, Asian and Latino Populations in Congressional Districts and

Same-Party General Elections...... 53

LIST OF FIGURES Figures Page

2.1 The State Legislative Polarization in 2015...... 21

5.1 The Predicted Probability of Same-Party General Elections, given the

Percentage of the Minority Population in Congressional, State Senate,

and State Assembly Districts ...... 50

5.2 The Predicted Probability of Same-Party General Elections, given the

Percentage of the Minority Population in a Congressional District ...... 52

5.3 The Predicted Probability of Same-Party General Elections, given the

Percentage of the Latino Population in a Congressional District ...... 54

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 History of California’s Electoral System

California’s primary election system has a complex history and has evolved over the course the 20th century. When Theodore Roosevelt, a leader in the progressive movement, assumed the presidency following the assassination of President William

McKinley in September of 1901, he brought progressivism to a national stage. The

Progressive movement arose as a response to the negative effects of industrialization.

Progressive reformers sought to harness the power of the federal government to regulate private industry, strengthen protections for workers and consumers, expose corruption in both government and big business, and generally improve society (McGerr, 2005).

In the mid-1900s the progressive movement took roots in California. At this time, California politics was dominated by the Southern Pacific Railroad and in 1907,

San Francisco Mayor Eugene Schmitz (who was elected by the so-called machine) was indicted on 27 counts of graft and bribery. The prosecuting attorney was an up and coming progressive, Hiram Johnson. This incident was a spark in California’s progressive movement. Thus began California’s trend of experimentation with its electoral system, and over the next century various factions of government (including the legislative branch, the executive branch, political parties and voters) have attempted to further reform California’s electoral system.

The first move in California’s progressive development came in 1909 when the

California legislature enacted the Direct Primary Law. This law established a direct closed primary system which contained many restrictions on voters and candidates.

Under this closed primary system, only party members could vote on a party’s ballot while voters who declined to state a party preference received a ballot containing only non-partisan offices. Furthermore, candidates seeking nomination had to pledge loyalty to the party, by declaring under oath that they had voted for a majority of the candidates of that party (or had not voted at all), and that they intended to vote for the candidates of that party in subsequent elections (Pitchell, 1959). While this reform made it easy for partisan Democrats and Republicans to get nominated, it became very difficult for candidates who leaned independent since independents were not always loyal to one party.

The Progressive movement won another important victory in 1910 when Hiram

Johnson, now a progressive leader in California, won the gubernatorial election.

Johnson pushed aggressive reform and under his leadership his supporters spearheaded many Progressive ideas through the legislature. For example, in order to diffuse party domination, especially that of the Southern Pacific Railroad machine, in 1913 the progressive legislature enacted cross-filing as an amendment to the Direct Primary Law.

Cross-filing abolished the party test for candidates and allowed candidates to be listed on either party’s primary ballot. The Progressive ideal behind cross-filing was to move away from strict party affiliation and to make California’s elections nonpartisan. The assumption was that cross-filing would allow parties to nominate a worthy candidate

3 regardless of the candidate’s party affiliation. While the Progressive party considered cross-filing a positive step toward better government, the Democrats and Republicans condemned the practice for the same reason Progressives supported it – they thought it would destroy partisanship and party responsibility.

Cross-filing had unintended consequences as it became a strategic tool for candidates to guarantee electoral success. Since a candidate could run in both their own party’s primary and the other party’s primary, clever candidates straddled the ideological fence in order to “raid” the opposing party’s primary. If successful in both primaries, the candidate would face the general election unopposed. Candidates who used this tactic were further aided by the State Non-Partisan bill which passed the legislature in 1915. The new law removed party designations for all statewide contests.

Statewide contests include the State legislative races, Congressional races, and all executive offices in California.

From 1914 to 1956, approximately 47 percent of all candidates used the cross- filing tactic (Pitchell, 1959). One famous example is Earl Warren’s 1938 bid for attorney general. Warren was a dedicated Republican politician who held several positions in the Republican Party such as the Republican State Chairman, a Republican

National Committee member, and as the head of the Republican delegation to the 1936 presidential convention. Yet when Warren ran for attorney general he cross-filed on the

Republican, Democrat and Progressive ballots. Warren won all three nominations by making non-partisan appeals to voters.

In 1917, the Hawson Amendment to the Direct Primary Act presented the first of many complications with the cross-filing system. This amendment provided that a cross-filing candidate would not be entitled to the nomination of any other party unless they received the highest number of votes in the primary of the party in which he was registered. The effect of this amendment was seen in the next year when

James Rolph, Jr., a Republican, won the Democratic nomination and lost the

Republican nomination to Governor Stephens. This caused the Democratic Party to not have an official candidate for Governor. A subsequent amendment to the Direct

Primary Act in 1919 resolved the problem created by the Hawson Amendment by giving the state central committee or the appropriate county central committee(s) of the party the power to fill vacancies with a registered member of that party.

The system of cross-filing arose to a boil in 1952. During its use many people

(Democrats in particular) believed that the cross-filing system benefited Republicans more than Democrats1. In 1952, Republicans held 111 of the 162 elective partisan offices in the state, although the majority of California voters were registered

Democrats. Furthermore, between 1899 and 1952 there had been only one Democrat governor (Gov. Culbert L. Olson). The final blow to Democrats arose when Republican

U.S. Senator William Knowland won the nomination of both party’s election in 1952.

Many Democrats concluded that there were great disadvantages with cross- filing, and in 1952 Democrats, with funding from Democratic oil millionaire Edwin

1 Research later showed that Republicans and Democrats both benefitted from cross-filing, yet a at different time periods. Those who benefitted the most were incumbents (Pitchell, 1959).

Pauley and the support of labor groups, filed a ballot initiative (Proposition 13) to abolish cross-filing. Republicans (due to their electoral success) became defenders of the cross-filing system and in an attempt to defeat the Democrats’ initiative, the

Republican-controlled legislature submitted an alternative measure (Proposition 7) to retain cross-filing but require candidates to list their party affiliation on all ballots

(Boyarsky, 2008). Proposition 7 passed with 72.8 percent of the vote and the

Democrat’s initiative barely failed with 49.96 percent. As a consequence of

Proposition 7 defeating Proposition 13, Republicans were now put at a great disadvantage as they would be labeled as Republicans when running in a Democratic primary.

As a result of Proposition 7 requiring party designations on the ballot, the total number of cross-filings began to decline. The percentage of candidates for statewide offices decreased from 72 percent in 1950 to 65 percent in 1954. After Proposition 7 there was also a decrease in the success rate of cross-filing. Between 1940 and 1952,

68 percent of all offices in California were won in the primary by cross-filing. After the

1952 initiative the proportion of successful cross-filers dropped to 26.2 percent in 1954, and this dropped further to 24.4 percent in 1956 (Pitchell, 1959). This change marked the beginning of the end of cross-filing.

In 1958, California Democrats swept the elections, delivering unified

Democratic control of California for the first time in the 20th century. Governor Pat

Brown, backed with support from the legislature, wasted little time in abolishing cross-

6 filing. On February 24, 1959, the Assembly passed AB 118 with 45 Democrats and four Republicans voting in favor against one Democrat and 28 Republicans (one

Democrat and one Republican abstained). In the Senate, the bill passed 22 to 15, with

21 Democrats and one Republican defeating four Democrats and 11 Republicans (two

Democrats and one Republican abstained) (Cain, 2002).

The next change to California’s election system took place in 1996 when voters approved Proposition 198, the Open Primary Act. Prop. 198 changed the system to an open primary, also known as a blanket format. The Open Primary Act would allow all candidates to appear on the same ballot and all properly registered voters could vote for their choice of candidate for each office, regardless of political affiliation and without a declaration of political faith or adherence on the part of the voter (SOS, 1996). Under an open primary system, citizens could vote for a candidate of one party for one office, and then vote for a candidate of another party for the next office; they could engage in cross-over voting or ticket splitting. Supporters of California’s Prop. 198 argued that the then current closed primary system produces candidates at the ideological extreme who spend more time fighting with each other than addressing the state's most pressing problems. They claimed that an open primary would increase voter participation and force candidates to focus on issues rather than on partisanship.

Political parties in California disapproved of Prop. 198 because candidates could identify with a party who did not endorse them. Political parties were also concerned that outsider candidates and voters could influence their party primaries. Political

7 parties thought the open-primary was an invitation for political mischief and would allow politicians, special interests and political consultants to manipulate the system through the use of “sophisticated targeting methods” (SOS, 1996). For example, if a district routinely elects a Democrat, Republican voters may attempt to swing the

Democratic primary election toward a more conservative nominee. There were also concerns about sabotage, or "party crashing," which involves partisans strategically voting for a weaker candidate in another party's primary in the hope that the opposition party will nominate a candidate who is easier to defeat in the general election.

Ultimately, Prop. 198 was approved by a vote of 59.51 percent to 40.49 percent and the system was in effect for the primary elections of June 1998 and March 2000.

Yet in 1997, California's Democratic, Republican, Libertarian, and Peace and

Freedom parties brought a case to the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California, challenging Prop. 198. The parties alleged that Prop. 198 was an infringement upon the parties' associational rights as guaranteed by the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case went all the way to the United

States Supreme Court. In 2000, in a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court agreed with the parties and held that California's blanket primary violated a political party's First Amendment right of association. Scalia wrote for the majority that

"proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival" (California Democratic

Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 2000).

1.2 Aftermath of Jones

Since the U.S. Supreme Court declared Prop. 198 (California’s blanket primary) unconstitutional, the California legislature enacted Senate Bill 28 (SB 28). SB 28 established a modified closed primary where registered voters of a party received only the ballot of that party, as was the case with California's earlier closed primary law.

However, unaffiliated or decline to state voters may choose a party ballot, but only if the party has authorized unaffiliated voters to participate in its primary. SB 28 took effect on January 1, 2001. The Democratic and Republican parties allowed such participation in the 2002 and 2004 primaries, but in the 2008 Presidential Primary the

Republican Party closed their primary to allow only registered members to participate.

The Jones decision, which ruled the blanket primary system unconstitutional, had far reaching effects in not only California but also in Washington State. Since

1935, the state of Washington had a blanket primary system similar to the system

Prop. 198 set up in California. However, following the Jones decision Washington

State’s Democratic, Republican, and Libertarian parties challenged the constitutionality of Washington’s blanket primary system in the Federal District Court in Washington.

The Federal District Court upheld Washington’s blanket primary as constitutional. The

Parties appealed the decision and the case was referred to the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. In September 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated

Washington’s primary stating it was “materially indistinguishable from the California scheme” (Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, 2003).

The state of Washington petitioned the United States Supreme Court in

November of 2003, to review the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.

Washington’s petition was denied by the United States Supreme Court on

February 23, 2004. This left the Ninth Circuit opinion declaring Washington’s blanket primary unconstitutional standing, meaning Washington had to come up with a new election system (Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004).

2004 was an eventful year where several actors in both Washington and in

California proposed various forms of a primary system. One such example is the

Washington State Grange (a non-profit, non-partisan organization). The Grange started a petition to institute a nonpartisan blanket primary system, also known as a Louisiana primary. Louisiana does not have a traditional primary and general election. Instead it has an election on are near Election Day (in November) where all candidates for the same office appear on the ballot together. The candidate who receives at least 50 percent of the vote wins the election. If no candidate receives a simple majority, a runoff between the top two vote-getters takes place a month later.

The Grange’s proposal would set-up a system similar to Louisiana, with two differences. Candidates would not have their party affiliation listed on the ballot, instead candidates would state their party “preference.” The word “preference” was intentionally chosen to work within the legal confines of the Jones decision and to avoid any subsequent legal challenges. The thought was by using the term “preference” parties would not be forced to affiliate with candidates and thus their right to free

10 association would not be violated. The second difference between the Grange’s proposal and Louisiana’s system would be the timing. The Grange’s proposal would follow the typical primary and general election cycle, where the primary takes place in the spring and the general election would take place in the fall. This is unlike

Louisiana’s system where the primary and general election are the same and take place in November.

Supporters of the Grange proposal believed the system would give voters more choices in the primary election which they believed would lead to better choices in the general. Supporters also thought that the proposal would “protect Washington’s tradition as a state that elects people over party labels” (WA SOS, 2004). On January 8,

2004, after gathering enough signatures, a representative of the Washington State

Grange filed the petition with the Office of the Secretary of State of Washington. The initiative appeared on the general election ballot as Initiative 872 in November 2004.

At the same time, the Washington State Legislature was also moving towards a solution to enact a primary system. On March 10, 2004, the Washington State

Legislature passed a bill which provided for two alternative primary systems. The first alternative would establish a top-two style primary system. This alternative was identical to Initiative 872. Anticipating that the political parties would probably challenge the constitutionality of the top two system, the legislature also included a clause which stated that if the top-two system is declared unconstitutional, the second alternative would be in implemented.

The second alternative was a pick-a-party primary, also referred to as a

Montana-style primary. Under the pick-a-party primary the voter momentarily picks a party to affiliate with and then receives that party’s ballot. (There is no party registration, but the voter is required to momentarily affiliate with a party and can only vote for candidates of that party.) The pick-a-party primary is a traditional nominating primary in which one candidate from each party advances to the general election.

Minor party and independent candidates would not appear in the primary but instead would hold nominating conventions in the spring and advance directly to the general election. The bill was passed by the House by a margin of 51 to 46 and the Senate by a margin of 36 to 12.

On April 1, 2004, Washington’s Governor Gary Locke vetoed part 1 of the bill, the part enacting the Louisiana top-two style system. He also vetoed the sections which would established the Montana primary as an alternative if the Louisiana top-two system was found unconstitutional. The result was that the remaining, post-veto legislation enacted only the Montana style pick-a-party primary. The pick-a-party primary was in effect for the September 2004 primary election.

In a speech Governor Locke gave about his veto, he cited several reasons for his decision. First, he sought to provide broader voter choice in the general election by choosing the system that he thought would allow for more candidates in the general election. In addition, he worried that the top-two primary system would result in instances where two candidates of the same party would advance to the general election,

12 disenfranchising voters of other parties. He also expressed concern that the top-two primary system would effectively deny minority and independent candidates access to the general election ballot because those candidates would almost never be one of the top-two vote getters in a primary election. The governor also speculated that the political parties would ultimately block the top-two primary in federal court (Locke,

2004).

Like Washington, in 2004 in California, there were several attempts to modify the State’s primary system. For example, for the 2004 general election there were two competing measures placed on the ballot, Proposition 62 and Proposition 60.

Proposition 62 was placed on the ballot by an initiative campaign led by a coalition of corporations, business executives and politicians. It would have restored a version of the blanket primary where voters would have been allowed to vote for any candidate in a primary election regardless of the political affiliation of the voter or candidates. The top-two vote-getters would later appear on the general election ballot.

Proposition 60 began as a bi-partisan Senate Bill (SCA-18) authored by Senators

Ross Johnson (R-Irvine) and Deirdre Albert (D-San Diego). Proposition 60 would insert a provision into the state constitution giving all political parties participating in a primary election the right to advance their top vote-getting candidate(s) to the general election. This provision was slightly different than Proposition 62. With Proposition

60, a candidate who received the most votes from among a party's candidates in the primary election cannot be denied placement on general election ballot. In June 2004,

SCA-18 passed the California Assembly by a vote of 55 to 21 and the California State

Senate by a vote of 28 to 3 and it was then legislatively referred to the voters on the

November general election ballot.

Proposition 62 and 60 contained two conflicting provisions. When two conflicting provisions are placed on the same ballot, the California Constitution provides that only the provisions of the measure with the higher number of "yes" votes will take effect. If both had passed, the one with the most votes would have taken precedence.

November 2, 2004, (the day of general election) was a significant day for primary systems. In Washington, Initiative 872 appeared on the general election ballot and is approved by the voters by nearly 60 percent. However, in California, voters narrowly rejected Proposition 62, by a vote of 46.1 percent for and 53.9 percent against.

Proposition 60 passed by vote of 67.6 percent for and 32.4 percent against. This means that Washington voters expressed support and approved a top-two primary system, while California voters, rejected top-two and voted to maintain a partisan primary system.

Following the approval of Initiative 872 in Washington, on May 19, 2005, the

Democratic, Republican and Libertarian Parties of Washington filed a lawsuit in the

United States District Court for the Western District of Washington against the new law. The lawsuit challenged Initiative 872 on the basis that it compelled a political party to associate with unaffiliated voters and members of other political parties and

14 therefore it violated the political parties’ right to free association. The Washington

State Democratic Central Committee and the Washington State Libertarian Party intervened as Plaintiffs and the State of Washington and the Grange intervened as

Defendants.

On July 15, 2005, the U.S. District Court sided with the parties ruling that the top-two primary established from Initiative 872 violated the political parties’ First

Amendment right of free association by allowing any voter, regardless of his or her affiliation to the party, to choose the party’s nominee, and allowing any candidate, regardless of party affiliation or relationship to the party, to self-identify as a member of that party and appear on the primary and general election ballot as a candidate for that party. The Court struck down Initiative 872 in its entirety and specifically stated that

Washington returns to a pick-a-party primary. (Washington State Republican Party v.

Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907. W.D. Wash., 2005).

The State of Washington and the Washington State Grange appealed the district court’s decision and on August 22, 2006, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that Initiative 872 was unconstitutional (Washington State Republican Party v.

Washington, 460 F.3d 1108. 9th Cir., 2006). The case was appealed again, and on

October 1, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the constitutionality of a top-two primary (Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, et al. and State of Washington v. Washington State Republican Party, et al., Nos. 06-

713 and 06-730 respectively).

On March 18, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision and upholds the constitutionality of Initiative 872. The Court rules that, on its face, I-872 does not impose a severe burden on the political parties’ associational rights (Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, et al., 552 U.S. 442, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 170 L. Ed. 2d 151, 2008). On August 19, 2008,

Washington conducts the first top-two primary in the country.

After the 2008 U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding Washington State’s nonpartisan top-two primary system, the door reopened for California to enact a top-two primary system. In 2008, the Independent Voter Project drafted a top-two primary proposal. IVP’s purpose was to create an environment by which voters and citizens, who had become “increasingly disenfranchised and disillusioned by the public decision- making process,” could become active participants (Independent Voter Project, 2017).

Proponents of top-two primaries such as IVP claim that top-two primary systems reduce the historic levels of polarization by helping produce candidates that are more moderate, more accurately reflect the median voter’s preferences, and encourage more citizen participation (SOS, 2010).

The proposal followed a nonpartisan blanket primary format. Voters will receive one ballot, which will list all candidates. They may vote for any candidate regardless of political party affiliation. The two candidates with the highest number of votes will advance to the general election. The proposal would modify the closed primary with a top-two open primary system for all statewide elections in California.

Senator Abel Maldonado used IVP’s proposal as a base for the Senate bill he authored (SCA-4) and in February 2009, SCA-4 passed the California Assembly by a vote of 54 to 20 and the California State Senate by a vote of 27 to 12. The bill was then legislatively referred to the voters on the June 2010 primary election ballot a given the name Proposition 14. The proposition was publicly backed by Governor Arnold

Schwarzenegger, as part of a deal in which Maldonado agreed to support his proposed

2009–2010 state budget. On June 8, 2010, voters approved Prop. 14 by 54 percent.

The new system took effect in the February 15, 2011, for the special election for State

Senate District 28, and statewide in 2012.

1.3 California’s Political Districts

California is divided into several over-lapping regions, or districts, for various political and administrative purposes. For this thesis, I examine California’s three main types of electoral districts. These include U.S. Congressional districts, State Senate districts, and State Assembly districts.

California’s U.S. Congressional districts are apportioned based on population.

The total number of U.S. Congressional districts in the nation is currently set at 435, and based on the 2010 Census apportionment, the target population of each U.S.

Congressional district is 710,767 people. Yet California has several districts above the

U.S. target population of 710,767 people. California, as the most populous state, has the most Congressional districts in the U.S. at 53 districts.

California’s State Legislature is composed of a Senate, the upper house, and an

Assembly, the lower house. Assembly and Senate districts are also apportioned based on population. The State Assembly is made up of 80 districts, whose members who are elected to two-year terms. While the State Senate is made up of 40 districts, whose members who are elected to four-year terms, with one-half reelected every two years.

Each Senate district’s population is within 1 percent of 931,349 residents with an average absolute deviation of 0.449 percent and is about twice the size of an Assembly district (Citizen’s Redistricting Commission, 2011). Each Assembly district’s population is within 1 percent of 465,674 residents with an average absolute deviation of 0.506 percent.

California’s Congressional, Senate, and Assembly electoral districts are drawn by the Citizens Redistricting Commission. The Commission is made up of 14-membrs, five Republicans, five Democrats, and four not affiliated with either of those two parties but registered with another party or as decline-to-state. The Citizen’s Redistricting

Commission must draw the district lines in strict conformity with nonpartisan rules.

The criteria for the Commission is laid out as follows: Districts must be of equal population to comply with the U.S. Constitution and the districts must be in compliance with the Voting Rights Act to ensure that minorities have an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. Districts must have geographic contiguity and they must be geographically compact, meaning all parts of the district must be connected to each and they must have a fairly regular shape. Districts must also maintain geographic integrity and respect the boundaries of cities, counties, neighborhoods and communities

18 of interest, and minimize their division, to the extent possible and where feasible. Also, districts should not be drawn to favor or discriminate against an incumbent, candidate, or political party (Citizens Redistricting Commission, 2018). These rules were designed to create districts of relatively equal population that will provide fair representation for all Californians.

1.4 Overview of Thesis

The following chapters will explore the relationship between districts’ racial makeup and same-party primaries. Chapter Two presents a literature review summarizing prior academic studies related to top-two primaries. Chapter Three describes my research question, theory and hypotheses. Chapter Four includes a description of the dependent and independent variables, the expected influence of each variable, as well as the expected causal relationships. Chapter Four also provides details on the data used in the logistic regression model and gives an overview the methodology used in analysis. Chapter Five provides results of the logistic regression analyses along with the possible errors in the analysis and the steps to remediate and reduce errors. Chapter Six, the conclusion, will address the implications of the findings on race and same-party primaries, and offer suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Examining the advantages and disadvantages of top-two primaries in California has been of recent interest of researchers. This chapter examines and discusses several studies covering a broad range of effects of top-two. The chapter is divided into five sections and each section discusses a consequence of top-two primaries. The next section highlights the issue of polarization; how polarization has led to top-two and the effects of top-two on polarization. In the following section, electoral competitiveness between primary candidates is discussed. Subsequently, studies analyzing the impact that top-two has on voter turnout is reviewed. The two proceeding sections lay out some of the criticisms top-two primaries have faced since its inception and the final section provides an outline of how the research discussed throughout the chapter influences the theory and methodology of this thesis.

2.2 Polarization and Top-Two Primaries

Scholars agree that national political elites have polarized, whether measured by interest group ratings (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984), NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006), or measures of party vote percentages and party unity scores (Fleisher and Bond, 2000; Stonecash,

Brewer and Mariani, 2003). Research has also examined the extent to which the mass public has polarized in its political attitudes and ideology. Fiorina and Abrams

(2008) argue that the mass public is not polarizing, while Abramowitz and Saunders

(2008) argue that the electorate has sorted itself so that ideology better explains citizens’ party identification than it did in the 1970s, creating more homogeneity within the parties.

Many scholars believe that polarization is the source of many problems in

American government, including legislative gridlock and public dissatisfaction.

One of the frequently cited causes for the increase in polarization in the legislature is a decline in moderates who can work across party lines. However, the lack of moderates is also believed to be the cause for the increase in polarization. It is unclear which way causality goes, and it seems as though both could be causing each other.

Polarization causes gridlock as it prevents legislators from finding moderate solutions to the state’s problems. California’s chambers are the most polarized in the nation as seen in the Shor and McCarty study of all 99 state legislative chambers (2015). Figure 2.1 shows legislative polarization in each state, averaging across all the years of their data (approximately 1996-2015).

Polarization in California has often stymied efforts to pass key legislation.

An example is the passage of California’s state budget. Prior to a 2010 proposition

(Proposition 25), the legislature was required to pass the budget by a two-thirds supermajority vote in each of the chambers. California was one of only three states that required two-thirds vote pass the budget. Although California’s legislature has always been majority Democrat, between 1996 and 2010 Democrats never achieved

21 a supermajority in either chamber. This means that Democrats had to work with enough Republicans to get them on their side. Yet as the number of Republican moderates in the legislature has declined, this task has become increasingly more difficult and from 1950 to 2008 the budget was adopted late 44 percent of the time.

Figure 2.1: The State Legislative Polarization in 2015

Note: Plot of Mean Levels of State Legislative Polarization (Measured by Distance between Party Medians) over the Full Time Period Available for Each State, Averaged between Both Chambers (Shor and McCarty, 2015)

Reformers point to election reforms such as top-two primaries as a cure for polarization. In theory, primary rules that allow unaffiliated voters to participate in the election should allow for the nomination of more moderate officeholders. The reasoning is that voters with no party preference are prevented from casting ballots

22 under a closed system of partisan primaries, while open primaries allow Decline to

State voters (DTS) to participate in the nominating process, which will broaden the pool of potential voters. By opening the primaries of both parties to voters from all parties, candidates would have an incentive to campaign closer to the middle of the ideological spectrum.

California has seen a tremendous increase in DTS voters and DTS voters are the fastest-growing segment of the electorate (Stewart, 2017). As of June 2016,

23.6 percent of registered voters said they had no party preference, up from 20.4 percent in 2011, which was up from 14 percent in 2000. With top-two, all voters, including DTS voters, would able to choose from candidates across party lines, thus encouraging DTS voters to participate in the process. This would potentially increase the odds that more moderate candidates will be nominated to run in the general election. Furthermore, extreme candidates will have more of an incentive to move towards the center to seek those moderate votes.

California’s polarized environment has made top-two appealing to both voters and politicians. For example, in an op-ed published in The New York Times in July 2014, Senator Charles Schumer of New York, endorsed California’s top-two primary system stating that California was, “racked by polarization until voters approved a constitutional amendment in 2010 that adopted a ‘top-two’ primary system.” Schumer claims that California’s move to top-two primaries has had a moderating influence on both parties and a positive effect on the political system

23 and its ability to govern. Schumer called for an end to partisan primaries with the implementation of a top-two primary system nationwide, asserting that such a change would lessen the historic level of polarization between Democrats and

Republicans. Supporters such as Schumer also say that the top-two system would weaken party ties and reduce the hold special interest groups have on the nomination process.

Yet, research has shown that voters in California’s top-two primary system are not moderating candidates. Ahler et al. (2013) conducted an individual-level experiment with 2,839 registered voters in districts where moderate candidates faced extreme candidates. They randomly assigned the voters to either the new nonpartisan top-two ballot or on the partisan ballot that they would have received prior to top-two. Voter were asked about their vote choice, and Ahler et al. found that voters failed to shift towards ideologically proximate candidates on the top-two ballot. They also found that there was limited crossover voting; not many

Republicans voted for Democrats and vice versa.

In a separate study it was found that voters who do cross party lines do so for several strategic reasons (Nagler, 2015). Nagler conducted a survey of about 2,500 registered voters in California. The survey was conducted in two waves. The first wave followed the primary and the second wave immediately followed the general election. The survey asked respondents about their behavior and candidate preferences. Nagler found that voters cross party lines for four strategic reasons,

24 including sincere crossover voting, impact voting, hegding, or raiding. Sincere crossover voting is when a person votes for a candidate from the opposing party because they prefer that candidate to all alternatives. Impact voting is similar to crossover voting but happens in districts without inter-party competition. A voter chooses to cast a vote in the primary of the dominant party because they realize that the primary will actually determine the winner of the general election. Hedge voting is like hedging a bet. In a district where the primary election is not competitive a voter might crossover to the other party’s primary to try to influence that winner.

This is because the winner of the opposing primary may end up winning the general election and serving in office. Raiding occurs when a voter attempts to increase their party’s candidate’s chances of winning a general election by crossing over in the primary election and voting for a who they perceive as the other party’s weak candidate. The other party’s weak candidate would then go against the voter’s true party’s candidate. All of these strategic voting patterns have one thing in common: a voter is attempting to prevent an unfavorable outcome.

In a follow-up study conducted by Ahler et al. (2015) it was found that voters could not correctly identify who were the moderate candidates. The study included

4,599 registered California voters recruited through Survey Sampling International in the 10 days before the 2012 primary. The experiment was conducted in 34 of

California’s 53 congressional districts and followed Ahler et al.’s previous study where respondents were randomly assigned to either the new nonpartisan top-two ballot or on the partisan ballot that they would have received prior to top-two.

Respondents were then asked to place themselves on a 7-point ideological scale.

The researchers mapped the candidates in the examined districts on the same 7-point ideological scale. It was discovered that there was general confusion among voters about the ideological positioning of the candidates; voters were ignorant about the ideological orientation of candidates, including moderates. When asked, participants in the study from the 24th District failed to identify Abel Maldonado

(the moderate Republican who championed the top-two reform) as more centrist than his Tea Party opponent, Chris Mitchum. Moreover, voters assigned to the top- two ballot tend to select candidates who are more ideologically distant from themselves.

Despite having the option of voting for the more moderate candidate. The authors stated that sheer ignorance is one of the reasons that proximity voting2 was undermined. If such low levels of crossover voting continue, the impact of the top- two primary on candidate ideology will likely be small.

Furthermore, when McGhee et al. (2014) examined the link between the openness of a primary system and the ideology of the state legislators elected under it, they found that open primaries are not associated with reduced legislative polarization at the state level. McGhee et al. analyzed state legislators’ roll call votes from 1996-2006 using a data set of legislator ideal point estimates and the most thorough accounting of primary systems available. The results suggested that primary systems have little consistent effect on legislator ideology and that most of the effects

2 Proximity voting is the theory that voters will choose the candidate who is least distant from them. The median position is most likely to win votes according to this theory Downs (1957).

26 tend to be the opposite of those that are typically expected: the more open the primary system, the more liberal the Democrat and the more conservative the Republican.

Research to date has indicated open primaries, like top-two, has not assisted in reducing legislative polarization. Candidate moderation has also not taken place under the top-two primary system and top-two has not increased crossover voting. Although only in its fourth election cycle, so far the top-two primary system has had nominal initial effects on polarization, moderation, and crossover voting.

2.3 Electoral Competitiveness and Top-Two Primaries

There has been conflicting research on whether top-two primary elections are associated with having greater competitiveness. Competitiveness in elections can be examined in two ways: the closeness of the race and number of candidates who entered the race.

The Public Policy Institute of California reported in November 2012 that among Congressional races between candidates of opposing parties, 18 percent had a margin of victory of less than 10 points. This was up from the 7 percent average from 2002 to 2012. However, it is possible that most of this change may be attributed to redistricting. The Top-Two Primary Act and the Voters First Act, which created the California Citizens Redistricting Commission, were passed at the same time and both were in place by the 2012 elections. When Kogan and McGhee

(2012) published an evaluation of the Citizens Commission final plans, they showed that the commission-drawn districts would create several highly competitive districts

(six in the Assembly, three in the State Senate, and four in the U.S. House delegation). It is plausible that the new district plans created more districts that were potentially competitive between the two major parties. However, since both top-two and redistricting happened at the same time, independent causation between these two reforms and electoral competitiveness is unknown.

Research also indicates that top-two shapes the field of candidates who entered the primary and the partisan ballot designations that they chose (Kousser,

2015). Kousser analyzed three contests in 2014, the races for Governor, Secretary of State, and Controller. He relied upon polling data as well as interviews with the candidates themselves. Kousser found that under top-two, some candidates strategically picked their ballot designation based on what they thought would appeal to voters who were not registered to a major party. Kousser also found that based on the top-two primary structure, there is the potential incentive for the major political parties to limit the number of primary candidates representing their party to increase their likelihood of having at least one candidate in the general election. An example of this is the 2014 Controller’s race. Three Democrats, two Republicans and one Green Party candidate were on the primary ballot. Due to the crowded field and the closeness of the race, results seemed to indicate that the two Republicans would advance to the primary for several days after the primary election. This outcome would speak volumes because Democrats would be denied a space on the general election for a statewide office in astate where the Democrats hold a significant registration advantage. Ultimately, one of the Democrats, Betty Yee

28 pulled ahead and advanced to the general election which she later won. This lesson shows that political parties could benefit from limiting the number of primary candidates representing their party.

However, political parties in California have a difficult time coordinating candidates. The Democratic party has a system of endorsing their preferred candidates. They hold a convention to vote on endorsements, but they cannot force anyone to not run. The 2018 primary election provides an example of the difficulty a party has in limiting the number of candidates. Due in part to the anti-Trump fervor, California had an uncharacteristically large group of Democratic candidates running across the state. The 2018 governor’s race had 27 candidates from five different parties, 12 of those candidates were Democrats and the Democratic Party chose not to endorse a candidate. The U.S. Senate race was equally as crowded with

32 candidates, 10 of which were Democrats. Incumbent Diane Feinstien was running for her sixth term in office, yet the Democratic Party did not endorse her or any other candidate.

Candidates and political parties employ numerous strategies to remain competitive in elections and the the top-two primary system has affected these strategies. The top-two primary system has influenced the candidates’ strategy when listing their designation on the ballot. Also, since under the top-two system two members of the same party can advance to the general election, races are becoming crowded with candidates who see no need to stand down. Furthermore,

29 political parties are finding it difficult to control who enters the race under their party designation.

2.4 Turnout and Top-Two Primaries

Research has also indicated a relationship with top-two primaries and voter turnout. Since top-two passed in California, voter turnout hit 40-year lows. The

June 2014 primary election turnout was 25.2 percent (SOS, 2015), which was the lowest turnout in California history (SOS, 2015). The November 4, 2014 general election brought a record low turnout for a regularly scheduled general election:

42.2 percent of registered voters (SOS, 2015). Decrease in voter turnout after the adoption of open primaries can also been seen in Washington State. After

Washington implemented top-two primaries in 2004, there was a decrease in voter turnout in their 2008 primary elections (WA SOS, 2008).

Research has also shown that top-two primaries has affected turnout for down ballot races. Highton et al. (2016) examined elections from California’s

Congressional, State Senate and Assembly races from 2002 through 2014. When analyzing voter-turn out they looked at voter roll-off, which is the difference in turnout at the top of ballot and turnout for a lower ballot contest. They found substantial roll-off in same-party elections as compared to cross-party elections.

Same-party general elections are when two-candidates of the same party advance to the general election. In the 53 same-party elections the average roll-off was

7.2 percentage points compared to 2.8 percentage points in cross-party elections.

This is difference of 4.4 percent.

Top-two was touted as way to increase voter turnout. In general, high voter turnout ensures that the elected officials are held accountable and are an accurate reflection of the will of the people. This is even more important for down-ballot races, which are typically state representatives. State representatives act in the interest of citizens at the local level. If top-two is contributing to roll-off, then the majority of people are not voting for the people who represent their interest at the local level. For responsible public policy, it is important to examine whether top- two is preforming as it was expected, to increase turnout.

One plausible reason turnout may have decreased after implementation of the top-two primary is because voters who are faced with two candidates of the opposing party at the general election stage may have chosen to simply abstain from such races. Some voters may feel orphaned in the general election: there may not be candidate from their party on the ballot and therefore they chose to abstain thereby decreasing voter turnout. This means that democrats could stay at home in solid red areas of the state instead of being forced to choose between the lesser-of-two evils candidate of a party they did not belong to, and Republicans do the same in solid blue regions.

In some cases, the opposite may be true as well. Instead of citizens not voting because they feel orphaned, they may not vote because they feel secure that their interest will be represented when both nominees are from their party. For some voters, it may not matter who wins the general election as long as the winner is from the party.

2.5 Minor Parties and Top-Two Primaries

Opponents of the top-two primary system state that top-two primaries impose more difficulties for minor party candidates, in particular remaining qualified as a recognized political party. Only qualified political parties are permitted to participate in elections and political parties have three ways of staying qualified for the ballot. First, a party must have at least as many registered members as 1 percent of the previous total gubernatorial vote (SOS, 2018). In the governor’s race in November 2010, about 10.3 million people turned out to vote. Therefore, a party needed about 103,000 registered voters to qualify for the 2012 races (SOS, 2018). The American Independent and Green parties met that threshold, but the Libertarian and Peace and Freedom parties did not.

The second way parties can stay qualified for the ballot is to have 2 percent of the vote for any statewide race in a nonpresidential general election (SOS, 2016).

However, lately minor parties have had little or no presence on general-election ballots, making this option difficult to achieve. The third way statewide candidates could qualify is that they could submit the number of signatures equivalent to 10 percent of all registered voters (SOS, 2018). This has been difficult for minor parties to achieve as it takes a lot of money and resources to gather petition signatures. Minor parties tend not to have the infrastructure or backing like major parties, this makes it nearly impossible for minor parties have a presence on the ballot. This has a negative impact on

California political system as a whole. Often minor party candidates expose voters and major party candidates to novel approaches that counter to mainstream. These new ideas are beneficial are as they influence the political discourse.

While third-party support in California is higher than some states, it is still low compared to the major parties. In just a few years, this progression may make it harder for small parties to remain in existence in California. In 2012, no Green Party,

Libertarian Party or American Independent Party candidate qualified for the November ballot in California. The State of Washington is experiencing similar consequences. In

2014, Steven Nielson was the first Libertarian candidate to succeed in advancing through a contested primary following the passage of Initiative 872 in 2004

(Washington Secretary of State, 2014).

Minor parties also state that a system of top-two primaries reduce voter choice in the general election. Since top-two primaries allow for top candidates of the same party to face off at the general election, minor parties believe that their voice is being silenced. Many third-party advocates argue that their rights and the rights of their voters are violated because third-party candidates are not guaranteed a spot on the general election ballot.

2.6 Top-Two Primaries and Registration Advantage

Limited research has been done to examine the effect of a top-two primary system on the likelihood of same-party general elections. The research that has been done examined the effect of a party’s registration advantage. When examining elections from California’s Congressional, State Senate and Assembly races from

2002 through 2014 Highton et al. (2016) found that as a party’s registration advantage increases, so does the likelihood of a same party general election. In the

2012 and 2014 election cycles, about one in six state legislative and congressional

33 primary elections resulted in a Democrat against a Democrat or a Republican against a Republican in the general election (Highton, 2016). Where the party advantage ranged from five to 20 percentage points, 12 percent of general elections were same party elections. When a party’s registration advantage ranged from 20 to 40 points,

20 percent of elections were between candidates of the same party (Highton, 2016).

Highton also found that uncontested general elections (those where only one candidate entered the primary) and elections between a major party candidate and a minor party candidate were more common in districts with a greater party registration advantage, increasing from zero percent where the registration advantage was less than 5 points to 18 percent where the advantage exceeded 40 points (Highton, 2016).

One consequence of the top-two primary system is that two candidates of the same party advance to the general election leading to a same-party general election.

This type of outcomes essentially shuts out other parties from the general election ballot. A districts registration advantage is one predictor of same-party general elections. The higher the registration advantage is in a district, the more likely the district will have a same-party general election.

2.7 Conclusion

Research has examined consequences of the top-two primary system in

California elections and has indicated a relationship between top-two primaries, greater polarization and electoral competitiveness, voter turnout, and minor parties. However,

34 beyond party registration advantage there has not been an examination of why some primaries produce two candidates of the same party for the general election.

This thesis focuses on one possible cause of same party general elections: the racial makeup of the district. It is unknown how the racial makeup of a district is associated with top-two general elections. The purpose of this research is to identify if the population of minorities in a district influence whether a district produces a general election with two candidates of the same party.

Chapter 3

RESEARCH QUESTION AND THEORY 3.1 Introduction

While a large amount of research has examined the effect top-two has on parties, candidates and voters, there is little research on how minority voters effect top-two primary outcomes, specifically, the chance of two candidates of the same party advancing to the general election.

California is growing more racially and ethnically diverse. After the

2000 Census, California became the first majority-minority state (Baldassare et al.,

2017). According to the U.S. Census, Latinos accounted for 38 percent of the state’s total population in 2017. Together with Asian Americans (14 percent) and

African Americans (6 percent), the three largest racial/ethnic minority groups comprise of over half the state’s population, and as such, are especially important in elections.

A larger size of minority population provides better electoral opportunity for the group. For example, among minority groups turnout is often higher in districts where their racial or ethnic group represents the majority of the citizen voting-age population (CVAP), regardless of the race of the candidates listed on the ballot

(Fraga, 2015). Fraga (2015) examined congressional primary and general elections across the nation from 2006, 2008, and 2010. Using a nationwide database of over

185 million individual registration records which included estimates for the race of every voter, he was able to determine the turnout for Whites, Latinos, Asians, and

Black Americans. He found that Black and Latino citizens are more likely to vote in both the primary and general election as their share of the population increases, regardless of the race of the candidate (Fraga, 2015). Fraga found that when shifting the Latino CVAP population from 10 percent to 50 percent, the Latino primary turnout is about 5-points higher on average. When considering general elections, shifting the district from 10 percent Latino CVAP to 50 percent Latino CVAP results in a 6.4-point average increase in Latino turnout, even in the absence of a

Latino candidate (Fraga, 2015). Asian American primary election turnout also experiences an increase when comparing districts that are zero percent Asian to those that are 20 percent Asian. However, for Asian American voters there appears to be a reduction in general election turnout in heavily Asian districts (Fraga, 2015).

For Black Americans, primary turnout has an altogether different pattern.

The relationship between Black population size and electoral participation most often appears as an interaction with Black candidates. It is unclear whether there is a difference in turnout with primary elections. However, for general elections, on average there is a 40 percent Black turnout in a district where Blacks make up

10 percent of the CVAP. This increases to 49.3 percent Black turnout when Black

Americans are 50 percent of the CVAP when no Black American congressional candidate is on the general election ballot (Fraga, 2015). Overall, Fraga offers evidence that the relative size of racial/ethnic groups within a Congressional district has a positive effect on turnout.

Yet, in districts where the minority population is high (given the increase in turnout), does this increase in turnout change the primary election outcome under a top- two election system? One theory that might provide insight to this question is the theory of linked fate. Linked fate is defined as an acute sense of awareness (or recognition) that what happens to the group will also affect the individual and that individual life chances are inextricably tied to the race as a whole (Simien, 2005). In more practical terms, black voters prioritize the well-being of the group over their individual interests and consider what’s best for the group as a whole. For decades, scholars have attributed Black Americans’ unified political and policy views, despite growing internal class and status differences, to a strong perception of linked fate.

Dawson (1995) theorized that Black political unity remains consistent due in part to the shared historical experience of oppression and that it is much more efficient for Black

Americans to use the status of the group as a substitution for individual utility. When first theorized, the concept of linked fate was limited to Black Americans, yet recently there have been extensions of this theory to other racial and ethnic groups, such as

Latinos and Asian Americans.

The concept of linked fate has manifested as Black Americans historically identifying with the Democratic Party and over recent years, trends in party affiliation among Black voters have remained fairly homogenous and largely stable. Between

1996 and 2016 the percent of black voters who identify with the Democratic Party has ranged from 82 to 87 percent (Pew Research, 2016). In California, an overwhelming majority of Black American likely voters (76 percent) are registered as Democrats.

Under the traditional closed primary system, the theory of linked fate would play out by the minority group coalescing around the candidate who would maximize the benefits of the entire group. At its simplest form, the candidate who would maximize the benefits of the entire group would be the candidate with the best chance of advancing to the general election and winning. The question then remains does linked fate play smaller role under the top-two primary system?

Under the top-two primary system, when more than one candidate of the same party can advance to the general election, the theory may play out differently. When minority voters are aware that more than one of their party’s candidate can advance to the general election does that change the minority voter’s behavior and thus the primary outcome? In other words, does the top-two primary system allow minority voters to maintain a sense of linked fate (via party loyalty) while also providing a venue for minority voters to prioritize their individual preferences? I theorize that the answer to these questions is yes: the top-two primary system provides minority voters flexibility to vote consistent with their individual preferences, while also voting consistent with their party preferences (and sense of linked fate). Yet this only likely is true in districts with high minority populations.

I hypothesize that districts with higher racial/ethnic minority populations are more likely to have same-party general elections than districts with a lower minority population. Minority populations are fairly homogeneous in their party affiliation preferences and are likely to feel a sense of linked fate under a closed primary system,

39 incentivizing minority populations to vote for one party candidate who would serve their group interests and has the best chance of advancing to the general election.

Under a top-two primary system party affiliation will still remain an important voting factor, yet minority voters are more likely feel secure enough in the ultimate outcome of the general election to prioritize their individual preferences over that of the minority group. In other words, when minority groups feel confident a candidate from their party will advance to the general election, they may not coalesce around one party candidate.

Instead, minority voters may support multiple candidates of the same party, leading to a same-party general election.

3.2 Hypothesis

I will investigate my theory using the 2016 general election in U.S.

Congressional districts in California, California Senate districts, and California

Assembly districts. I hypothesize there is a relationship between the size of the minority population and the likelihood of a same-party general election.

HA: In a comparison of U.S. Congressional districts in California, California

Senate districts and California Assembly districts, those having a higher racial/ethnic minority population will be more likely to produce same-party general election candidates than will those having a lower minority population.

H0: There is no relationship between a district’s minority population size and the likelihood of same-party general election candidates in a district.

Chapter 4

DATA AND METHODOLOGY 4.1 Introduction

This section provides information on the data and the methods used to test my hypothesis. The chapter provides a description of the dataset, including the dependent variables and explanatory variables. It also offers a description and the reasoning of the anticipated relationship between the dependent variables and explanatory variables and the logistic model applied in this thesis.

The evaluation of how districts’ racial makeup influence top-two general elections relies on a dataset that includes observations for 153 of the 173 U.S.

Congressional, State Assembly and State Senate districts in California in 2016. In the

2016 election year only odd number State Senate districts were up for election, so only odd number State Senate districts are included in the dataset. Demographic characteristic data used for the analysis was collected from a 5-year data profile (2011-

2015) estimate of each district. Information was gathered from the American

Community Survey (ACS), which is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. Election data was collected from the California Secretary of State (SOS) 2016 Statewide

Election Results.

4.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable measures whether or not a district had same-party general election candidates in 2016. This variable is a dummy variable coded zero (0) for cross-party general elections and one (1) for same-party general elections. The

41 mode of the dependent variable is zero (cross-party election). In 2016, voters elected 53 candidates to serve in the U.S. House, one from each of the state's 53 congressional districts. Seven of the 53 seats had general election candidates from the same party and all seven were between Democrats. In 2016, a total of 20 seats out of the 40 seats in the

California State Senate were up for election. Of those 20 seats, five had general election candidates of the same party, all were Democrats. All 80 seats in the California

State Assembly were up for election in 2016, 15 of which had general election candidates of the same party. Of these 15 contests, 11 were between two Democrats and 4 were between two Republicans.

Table 4.1: Number of Same-Party General Elections by District Type in 2016. Districts Seats up for Election Same Party (Percent)

U.S. House 53 7 (13.2%) State Senate 20 5 (25%) State Assembly 80 15 (18.75%) Source: California Secretary of State

4.3 Independent Variable

The main independent variable is the percent of voting age citizens (CVAP)

(18 years of age or older) in Congressional and state legislative districts grouped by race. This information was collected from the 2012-2016 American Community Survey

(ACS), a 5-year data profile estimate of each district. Survey respondents were asked to self-identify their race or races with which they most closely identify. Categories are:

(1) Not Hispanic or Latino (2) American Indian or Alaska Native Alone (3) Asian

Alone (4) Black or African American Alone (5) Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific

Islander Alone (6) White Alone (7) American Indian or Alaska Native and White (8)

Asian and White (9) Black or African American and White (10) American Indian or

Alaska Native and Black or African American (11) Remainder of Two or More Race

Responses (12) Hispanic or Latino3. The percentage was calculated by dividing the voting age population of the racial groups by the entire voting age population. High percentages indicate more individuals of the specified race in a district and low values indicate less individuals of the specified race. In this thesis different percentages are used in different models. One percentage used is the overall percent of all minority categories aggregated together (variable labeled Minority Percent). This percentage is used in models one and two. The second percentage is the percent of each of the three largest minority groups: Latino, Asian, and Black. This percentage is used in the third model.

When examining all district types, the minority percent ranged from

14.62 percent in Assembly District 1 to 94.52 percent in Assembly District 64 (the range is the same when examining Assembly districts separately). When examining all district types, the median minority percent registration is 49.56 percent. The median for

Assembly districts is 50.66 percent. When examining Congressional districts separately, the minority percent ranged from 17.29 percent in Congressional District 1 to 91.26 percent in Congressional District 40. The median for Congressional districts is

50.53 percent. For Senate districts, the minority percent ranged from 16.78 percent in

3 Note: race groups under “Not Hispanic or Latino” only include people who are not Hispanic or Latino, so “Asian and white” includes non-Hispanic Asians and whites

Senate District 1 to 84.08 percent in Senate District 35 and the median is 47.44 percent.

Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for the Minority Percent variable for each district type and for all districts aggregated together. Separate tables illustrating the descriptive statistics for the Black CVAP, Latino CVAP and Asian CVAP are available in Appendix B.

Table 4.2: Minority Population in Percent for Districts in 2016 Minority All Districts Congressional Senate Assembly Population Range 79.90 73.29 67.30 79.90 Median 49.56 50.53 47.44 50.66 Mean 52.36 52.71 49.43 52.85 Interquartile Range 28.04 27.27 21.46 30.24 Standard Deviation 18.56 18.35 16.04 19.41 Variance 344.48 336.90 257.37 376.64 N 153 53 20 80 Source: 2010 U.S. Census

4.4 Control Variables

The control variables used were included to minimize the influence of several known and suspected antecedent or intervening factors. The first control variable is party registration advantage. According to Highton et al. (2016), districts in which the majority of voters overwhelmingly favor a single political party are more likely to produce same party general elections. The Party Registration variable measured the absolute value of the difference between registered Republicans and registered

Democrats in each district in percent. Higher values indicate one of the parties has a

44 larger advantage while low values indicate that one of the parties has a smaller advantage. I expect that in districts which have a higher registration advantage, the likelihood of same-party general elections increases.

When examining all districts in 2016, the registration advantage ranged from

0.46 percent in Assembly District 40 to 60.68 percent in Assembly District 59.

Assembly District 40 leans slightly Republican while Assembly District 59 leans heavily Democrat (the range is the same when examining Assembly districts separately). The median of all districts is 18.19 percent and the median for Assembly districts is 18.75 percent when examined separately.

When examining Congressional districts separately, in 2016 the registration advantage ranged from 0.58 percent in Congressional District 25 to 56.03 percent in

Congressional District 13. Congressional District 25 leans slightly Republican while

Congressional District 13 leans heavily Democrat. The median for Congressional districts is 16.71 percent. For Senate districts, the registration advantage ranged from

1.35 percent in Senate District 21 to 55.5 percent in Senate District 9. Both Senate

District 21 and nine lean Democrat. The median for Senate districts is 14.30 percent

When examining Assembly districts separately, in 2016 the registration advantage ranged from 0.58 percent in Congressional District 25 to 56.03 percent in Congressional

District 13. Congressional District 25 leans slightly Republican while Congressional

District 13 leans heavily Democrat. Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for each district type and for all districts aggregated together.

Table 4.3: Registration Advantage in Percent for Districts in 2016 Registration All Districts Congressional Senate Assembly Advantage Range 60.68 55.45 54.15 60.68 Median 18.19 16.71 14.30 18.75 Mean 21.30 21.15 19.37 21.90 Interquartile Range 54.15 15.86 19.24 19.19 Standard Deviation 14.63 14.20 16.23 14.65 Variance 214.16 201.75 263.31 214.61 N 153 53 20 80 Source: 2010 U.S. Census

The second control variable is the number of voters registered to a minor party.

The Minor Party variable is measured as the percentage of registered voters who are not registered as a Democrat or Republican. Minor parties include the American

Independent, Green, Libertarian, and Peace and Freedom Party. This variable also includes voters that are registered as No Party Preference. I expect that in districts with a higher number of minor party registration there will be a higher chance of same-party general elections.

Minor party registration could affect the probability of same-party general elections. The idea behind top-two primaries was to allow more moderation and to provide minor parties more choice. Following this logic, same-party general elections would, on average, take place in districts will a higher percentage of people registered to a minor party. For example, in a district in which one party is dominate, minor party voters or voters registered as no party preference, might participate in impact voting.

Impacting voting is similar to crossover voting but happens in districts without inter- party competition. Knowing that their party has little chance of advancing to the general election, a voter might choose to cast a vote for the more moderate candidate of the dominant party. This would increase the chances of same-party general elections.

When examining all district types, in 2016 the minor party registration ranged from 21.3 percent in Assembly District 32 to 37.76 percent in Assembly District 49 (the range is the same when examining Assembly districts separately). When examining all district types, the median minor party registration is 28.82 percent. The median for

Assembly districts is 28.79 percent. When examining Congressional districts separately, in 2016 the minor party registration from 22.54 percent in Congressional

District 21 to 37.68 percent in Congressional District 17. The median is 29.18 percent.

For Senate districts, the minor party registration ranged from 24 percent in Senate

District 5 to 36.47 percent in Senate District 11 and the median is 28.84 percent. In all cases the minor party group with the highest registration was No Party Preference.

Table 4.4 presents descriptive statistics for each district type and for all districts aggregated together.

Table 4.4: Minor Party Registration in Percent for Districts in 2016 Minor Party All Districts Congressional Senate Assembly Registration Range 16.46 15.14 12.47 16.46 Median 28.82 29.18 28.84 28.79 Mean 29.16 29.15 29.24 29.15 Interquartile Range 4.13 4.01 2.34 4.15 Standard Deviation 3.19 3.17 2.98 3.31 Variance 10.22 10.04 8.86 10.93 N 153 53 20 80 Source: 2010 U.S. Census

The third control variable is the presence of an open seat. An open seat is defined as any office where the incumbent did not seek reelection. The open seat variable is a dummy variable coded zero (0) for an incumbent seat and one (1) for an open seat. The mode of the open seat variable is zero (incumbent seat). In 2016, there were no open seats in the U.S. House. There were nine open seats in the State Senate, two of which were held by retiring Republicans. In the State Assembly, there were 17 open seats, nine were held by outgoing Democrats and eight were held by Republicans.

Since incumbents generally have more structural advantages over challengers during elections, I controlled for whether the contest was an open seat or not. This could influence my dependent variable because races with an incumbent are less likely to be challenged by members of the same party and are more likely to be challenged by members of an opposing party. I expect districts with an incumbent to have a lower chance of same party general elections.

4.5 Methodology

The statistical method used to test this hypothesis is logistic regression. In the model, the outcome variable (same-party primary) is a dichotomous outcome and regressed on the district level demographic characteristics.

I applied three models in my thesis. All models are logistic regressions predicting same-party general election, where the key term of interest is a district’s population of minorities, in percent. The logistic regression equation used in the analysis is:

-1 Pr (Same-Party General Election) = logit {β0 + β1 (Minority Percent) + β2

(Third Party Registration) + β3 (Registration Advantage) + β4 (Open Seat) + е

The first model examines Congressional, State Senate, and State Assembly districts. The second model examines only Congressional districts. Districts are examined separately to account for the fact that districts may have overlapping boundaries and are not completely nested within each other. Here I present results for

Congressional districts. Separate results for State Senate and State Assembly are available in Appendix C.

The third model examines only Congressional districts, but disaggregates the racial demographic variable into the three largest minority populations (Black, Latino and Asian). The racial demographic variable is disaggregated into the three largest minority populations in order to examine whether each racial population behaves differently from each other.

The results section is organized as follows: First I present the predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the minority population in Congressional, State Senate, and State Assembly districts. I then present the predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the minority population in a U.S. Congressional district. Finally, I present the predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the Black, Asian and Latino population in Congressional districts and same-party general elections.

Chapter 5

RESULTS

First, I used the logistic model to predict the likelihood of same-party general elections in the U.S. House, State Senate, and State Assembly districts. Table 5.1 presents the results for these 153 districts aggregated together. It appears that when the political composition of the district and populace demographics are controlled, the minority citizen’s voting age population (CVAP) has no impact on whether or not a district has same-party general elections. Districts having a higher minority CVAP will be no more or less likely to produce same-party general election candidates than districts with low minority populations. Figure 5.1 visualizes these results. Predicted probabilities are generated by holding all variables in the model at their means, but varying the percentage of the minority CVAP. Again we see there is no relationship between the size of the minority population and predicted probability of same-party general election.

Table 5.1: Minority population in Congressional, State Senate, and State Assembly districts and same-party general elections. Same Party Odds Ratio Standard p-value 95% CI General Election Error Minority Percent 1.01 0.01 0.38 [0.99, 1.04] Minor Party 1.08 0.07 0.27 [0.94, 1.24] Registration Registration 1.04 0.02 0.03* [1.00, 1.07] Advantage Open Seat 1.54 0.85 0.42 [0.53, 4.53] Constant 0.00 0.01 0.01 [0.00, 0.31] N 153 Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

Of note is the positive and significant Registration Advantage variable in the model. After holding all variable constant, for each 1 percent increase in registration advantage the odds of a same party election increase by 4 percent. This aligns with

Highton’s research showing that districts with high registration advantage for one party are more likely to have a same-party general election (Highton, 2016).

Figure 5.1: The predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the minority population in Congressional, State Senate, and State Assembly districts.

Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

Next, I use the logistic regression model to examine each type of district separately. Table 5.2 presents the results for Congressional districts, showing that when only Congressional districts are examined, the racial demographic variable has a positive relationship that is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. Additionally,

Registration Advantage is no longer significant. After holding all variables constant, for every one percent increase in the minority population the odds of having a same

53 party general election increases by 10 percent. These results indicate that with higher

CVAP of minorities in Congressional districts, general elections with candidates of the same party are more likely to occur. When examining Senate Districts and Assembly

Districts separately, none of the variables were statistically significant. Results for

Senate and Assembly districts available in Appendix C.

Table 5.2: Minority population in Congressional districts and same-party general elections. Same Party Odds Ratio Standard p-value 95% CI General Election Error Minority Percent 1.10 0.47 0.02* [1.01, 1.20] Minor Party 1.22 0.19 0.21 [0.90, 1.64] Registration Registration 1.04 0.04 0.34 [0.96, 1.12] Advantage Open Seat 2.17 4.71 0.72 [0.03, 153.40] Constant 0.00 0.00 0.02 [0.00, 0.06] N 53 Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

Figure 5.2 shows the predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the minority CVAP in a Congressional district. Looking across the range of the minority population percentage, the predicted probability of a same- party general election moves from 0.00 when the minority CVAP is at approximately

10 percent, to 0.58 probability of a same-party general election when the minority CVAP is 90 percent. It is important to note that few Congressional districts have such a high minority population, even in California. In 2016, there was only one

Congressional district (Congressional District 40) with a minority CVAP over

90 percent. This district also has the highest Latino population in the nation at

86.5 percent and the highest Latino CVAP at 78.98 percent. The district includes parts of East and South Los Angeles, as well as surrounding areas (U.S. Census).

Figure 5.2: The predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the minority population in a Congressional district.

Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

Finally, I disaggregate the minority percentage variable into the three largest minority groups (Black, Asian, and Latino) and estimate the likelihood of same-party general election in Congressional districts. I disaggregated the minority groups to examine if same-party primaries are more likely because of the mix of the minority population in a district or if there is one particular minority group driving same-party primaries.

When examining minority percentage separately, in 2016 the percent of the

Black CVAP ranged from 1.27 percent in Congressional District 48 to 29.46 percent in

Congressional District 37 and the median was 4.85 percent. For the Asian CVAP, the range was from 2.12 percent in Congressional District 1 to 44.84 percent in

Congressional District 17 and the median is 10.45 percent. The percent of the Latino

CVAP ranges from 9.12 percent in Congressional District 4 to 78.98 percent in

Congressional District 40 and the median is 24.72 percent. It is important to note that

Congressional District 40 is the same district with the highest aggregated minority

CVAP. Table 5.3 shows the results for Congressional districts when the minority population variable is disaggregated.

Table 5.3: Black, Asian and Latino populations in Congressional districts and same- party general elections. Same Party Odds Ratio Standard p-value 95% CI General Election Error Percent Black 1.12 0.13 0.33 [0.89, 1.41] Percent Asian 1.20 0.12 0.07 [0.99, 1.48] Percent Latino 1.12 0.06 0.03* [1.01, 1.23] Minor Party 1.05 0.27 0.85 [0.63 1.74] Registration Registration 1.05 0.06 0.42 [0.93, 1.18] Advantage Open Seat 2.89 7.97 0.70 [0.13, 642.12 Constant 0.00 0.00 0.10 [0.00, 12.77] N 53 Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

There is a positive relationship between the likelihood of same party general elections and the percent of voting age Latinos, and it is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. This indicates that same-party general elections are more likely to occur in Congressional districts when the Latino CVAP is high. After holding all variables

56 constant, for every one percent increase in the Latino CVAP the odds of having a same- party general election increase by 12 percent. This may be because out of the three districts with the highest Latino CVAP in California, two had same-party general elections. Also, out of the three largest minority population groups Latinos have the highest CVAP concentrated in any one district. It is possible that the reason the Latino

CVAP is the only variable that was significant is because the other racial groups do not have a high enough CVAP in any one district to have any effect. Figure 5.3 shows the predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the Latino CVAP in a

Congressional district. As illustrated in the figure, the predicted probability of a same- party general election is above 0.5 when the Latino CVAP is over 85 percent.

However, it is important to note that it is extremely rare for a district to have a Latino

CVAP over 85 percent, even in California.

Figure 5.3: The predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the Latino population in a Congressional district.

Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

Overall, I found in model one that there is no support for my hypothesis. There is no impact on the districts’ probability of having a same-party general election when the aggregate minority CVAP in a district increases. I found in model two that there is support for my hypothesis. In Congressional districts with a higher CVAP of minorities, same party general elections are more likely to occur. The third model also has support for my hypothesis. I found that when the Latino CVAP in a district increases, so do the odds of that district having a same-party general election.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Throughout this research one overall hypothesis was presented and the results observed from the 2016 primary election support this claim in some instances.

Regarding the overarching hypothesis: “in a comparison of Congressional districts in

California, California Senate districts and California Assembly districts, those having a higher minority population will be more likely to produce same-party general election candidates than will those having a lower minority population”, this claim generally was not supported. Evidence presented in Table 5.1 demonstrates that when the aggregate minority CVAP in a district increases, there is no impact on the districts’ probability of having a same-party general election.

However, further analysis of the hypothesis shows that when Congressional districts are examined independently of State Senate and State Assembly Districts, there is support for the overall hypothesis. Table 5.2 illustrates that same-party general elections are more likely to occur in Congressional districts with higher CVAP of minorities. In addition, when the minority population variable is disaggregated evidence suggest that Latinos are the driving force behind this phenomenon.

Information presented in Tables 5.3 demonstrates that when the Latino CVAP in a district increases, so do the odds of that district having a same-party general election.

Future research is needed to determine why Latinos are the only minority group to display significant results, but one possible explanation could be the difference in

59 turnout rates. As Fraga (2016) concludes, Latinos experience an increase in turnout in both primary and general elections regardless of if a Latino candidate is on the ballot.

Whereas for African Americans it is unclear whether there is a difference in turnout for primary races, and Asian Americans display an increase only when comparing districts that are 0 percent Asian to those that are 20 percent Asian.

Another important aspect that should be examined when comparing participation rates of minorities is the possible difference between federal and state elections. Minority groups may participate at different levels for federal elections than they do for state elections. Reasons for this may be due to better visibility of candidate choices since often more money is spent on congressional races. Another reason may be because of down-ballot roll-off which is what happens when voters cast a vote for higher offices and not for lower offices. Since on the California ballot selections for

Congressional races are listed before State Senate and State Assembly races, voters may get fatigued and simply not vote for those races.

Also, it is still unknown if higher minority turnout in a district increases the likelihood of same party general elections. Although turnout increases in majority minority districts (Fraga, 2015), top-two has shown to decrease turnout in California overall. A suggestion for future research would be to add a minority turnout percentage variable to the model. Turnout is an important factor in determining the probability of same-party general elections since turnout is what drives candidate selections.

Also, this research analyzes the citizen voting-age population (CVAP) of minorities in comparison to same party general elections. It would be negligent not to point out that the CVAP is not the same as the registered voter population or even the voting eligible population. Many people of age are barred from voting due to being a non-citizen, a felon, or having a disability. Furthermore, even if data was collected for all registered voters by ethic group, registration does not equal participation therefore there will always be some discrepancy.

One limitation of this study is the small sample size. In total there were only

153 districts to examine and in 2016, there were only 27 districts which had a same- party general election. When looking at congressional districts in isolation, just seven out of 53 primary elections resulted in a same-party general election. State Senate elections resulted in five out of 20 same party general elections while State Assembly elections resulted in 15 out of 80. Adding multiple election years would help decrease the margin of error. Another important reason to add more elections to the study would be to evaluate the results of a midterm year. There are measurable differences between the types of people and the amount of people who turn out in midterm years versus those who turn out for presidential years, and data for past elections and future elections would assist in determining whether these differences effect the results of this study.

Results of this study confirm previous research regarding party registration advantage. However, party registration advantage does not entirely account for why some primaries produce two candidates of the same party and others do not. The two-

61 top primary reform was proposed as fix for California’s election system and the full ramifications, such as same-party general elections, has yet to be understood. It is important examine the causes and effects of same-party general elections, especially in the wake of further reform efforts. Further research is needed to determine if there are other possible district level characteristics that determine whether a district has two candidates of the same party in the general election.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: American Community Survey Layout

The American Community Survey (ACS) (U.S. Census, 2010) includes people living in both housing units (HUs) and group quarters (GQs). A HU is a house, an apartment, a mobile home, a group of rooms, or a single room occupied or intended for occupancy as separate living quarters. Separate living quarters are those in which the occupants live separately from any other people in the building and that are directly accessible from outside the building or through a common hall. GQs are places where people live or stay, in a group living arrangement that is owned or managed by an entity or organization providing housing and/or services for the residents. These services may include custodial or medical care, as well as other types of assistance, and residency is commonly restricted to those receiving these services.

The data collection operation for housing units (HUs) consists of four modes:

Internet, mail, telephone, and personal visit. For most HUs, the first phase includes a mailed request to respond via Internet, followed later by an option to complete a paper questionnaire and return it by mail. The last phase of ACS data collection is the personal visit phase.

The GQ data collection operation is conducted in two phases. First, U.S. Census

Bureau Field Representatives (FRs) conduct interviews with the GQ facility contact person or the administrator of the selected GQ (referred to as the GQ level interview), and second, the FR conducts interviews with a sample of individuals from the facility

(referred to as the person- or resident-level interview). Prior to the resident-level interview a Group Quarters Facility Questionnaire (GQFQ) is sent to the GQ facility contact. Information collected by the FR using the GQFQ during the GQ-level interview is used to determine or verify the type of facility, population size, and to draw a random sample of residents to be interviewed. The FR may conduct a telephone interview with the sample residents using CAPI QI, conduct a face to-face CAPI proxy interview with a relative, guardian, or GQ contact; or leave a paper questionnaire with the resident to complete; or leave the questionnaires with the GQ contact to distribute to sampled residents and collect them when completed.

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Black, Asian, and Latino Population.

Table B.1: Black CVAP in Percent for Districts in 2016 Black All Districts Congressional Senate Assembly Population Range 32.82 28.19 24.47 32.87 Median 4.85 5.44 5.51 4.28 Mean 6.92 6.85 7.22 6.92 Interquartile Range 4.73 5.24 6.32 6.96 Standard Deviation 6.61 6.14 6.34 7.03 Variance 43.64 37.70 40.14 49.47 N 153 53 20 80 Source: 2010 U.S. Census

Table B.2: Asian CVAP in Percent for Districts in 2016 Asian All Districts Congressional Senate Assembly Population Range 50.76 42.73 31.72 51.75 Median 10.45 10.47 12.20 9.34 Mean 12.20 13.06 12.99 13.10 Interquartile Range 11.55 11.55 11.08 11.64 Standard Deviation 9.93 9.38 8.90 10.60 Variance 98.43 87.89 79.15 112.31 N 153 53 20 80 Source: 2010 U.S. Census

Table B.3: Latino CVAP in Percent for Districts in 2016 Latino All Districts Congressional Senate Assembly Population Range 71.71 69.89 49.08 57.56 Median 24.72 26.58 21.53 24.97 Mean 29.04 29.64 24.93 29.68 Interquartile Range 9.28 18.82 18.56 26.14 Standard Deviation 16.20 16.72 12.53 16.68 Variance 262.47 279.60 156.88 278.29 N 153 53 20 80 Source: 2010 U.S. Census

Appendix C: State Senate and State Assembly Logistic Regression Results

Table C.1: Minority population in Senate districts and same-party general elections. Same Party Odds Ratio Standard p-value 95% CI General Election Error Minority Percent 0.94 0.08 0.46 [0.78, 1.11] Minor Party 1.54 0.62 0.29 [0.69, 3.46] Registration Registration 1.27 0.21 0.15 [0.92, 1.76] Advantage Open Seat 0.00 0.05 0.32 [0.00, 93.23] Constant 0.00 0.00 0.21 [0.00, 0.06] N 20 Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

Figure C.1: The predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the minority population in a Senate district.

Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

Table C.2: Minority population in Assembly districts and same-party general elections. Same Party Odds Ratio Standard p-value 95% CI General Election Error Minority Percent 0.99 0.17 0.69 [0.96, 1.03] Minor Party 1.04 0.10 0.67 [0.87, 1.25] Registration Registration 1.02 0.02 0.43 [0.97, 1.07] Advantage Open Seat 2.03 1.36 0.29 [0.55, 7.53] Constant 0.06 0.15 0.30 [0.00, 13.11] N 80 Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

Figure C.2: The predicted probability of same-party general elections, given the percentage of the minority population in an Assembly district.

Note: Odds ratio estimated using logistic regression

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