LAW,RECONCILIATION ANDPHILOSOPHY:ATHENIAN DEMOCRACYATTHEEND OFTHEFIFTHCENTURYB.C.

Juin-Lung Huang

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St. Andrews

2008

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This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Law, Reconciliation and Philosophy: Athenian Democracy at

the End of the Fifth Century B.C.

JUIN-LUNG HUANG

This thesis is submitted to the School of International Relations of the University of St. Andrews in fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Submission Date: 18 th September 2007. Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to defend Athenian democracy against a long-established suspicion that the Athenian government, with its radical form of popular participation, was not only incompetent but also dangerous. There are two serious misunderstandings in this traditional view; one is the myth of the decline of Athens after the death of

Pericles, the other being the outright denial of Athenian democracy by its philosophers,

Xenophon and Plato. These two common presumptions about Athenian history and philosophy are therefore examined.

The historical examination focuses on three important events: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates. All of them were conducted by Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C., a period of time that is often cited for the failure of democracy. However, it is found that the democracy demonstrated its excellent ability to manage political conflicts through the laws and the reconciliation. As to the infamous trial of Socrates, there were reasons for the popular suspicion of the

Philosopher’s way of life.

Following what we have learnt in the historical survey, we search for responses to the three events in the works of Xenophon and Plato. There are passages, though often dismissed by scholars, indicate remarkable recognition of the democratic achievements in domestic politics. As regards the trial of Socrates, there are also signs of second thoughts in their works that reveal understandings of the democracy’s condemnation of philosophy.

The works of Socrates’ pupils show mixed evaluation rather than outright denial of

Athenian democracy.

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The traditional suspicion of Athenian democracy is therefore problematic due to its misconception of Athenian history and philosophy.

ii

I, Juin-lung Huang, received particular assistance in the writing of this thesis in respect of matters of style, idiom, grammar, syntax or spelling, which was provided by Roy and Margaret McGregor, Elizabeth Stitt, Pete Field, Neil Wright and Owen Pearse.”

Date …… Signature of Candidate ………

I, Juin-lung Huang, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 100,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

Date …… Signature of Candidate ………

I was admitted as a research student in September 2003 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in September 2004; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2003 and 2007.

Date ………… Signature of Candidate ………

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date ………… Signature of Supervisor ………

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date ………… Signature of Supervisor ………

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In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the

University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration.

Date ………… Signature of Candidate ………

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For a future Taiwan that is proud and independent.

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Preface

It was a foggy night in the early spring of 1988 in Taiwan when I heard of the death of the dictator, Chiang Ching-kuo. I was then a first-year college student in animal science, and was working late at the biological laboratory. ‘The President is dead!’ someone brought in the unexpected news. ‘Great - at last!’ was the first thought in my mind.

However, though it was my secret wish come true, I was at that time too young to realize the obvious fact that all people die, even a dictator who is either loved as a god or feared as a devil due to his seemingly omnipotent power. When we returned to our dormitory, one of our roommates was mourning deeply for the passing away of ‘the Great Leader’.

There was confusion and even a hint of anger in his eyes when he saw that most of us, rather than joining in with his mourning, appeared indifferent to the death of his beloved

Leader. I actually tried hard to keep my joy to myself, fully respectful of his notorious hot temper and gorilla-like build.

Taiwan was a totalitarian country until its slow transformation into a democracy during the 1990s. Before that, Chiang Kai-shek and his Party had firm control over most aspects of people’s lives. A photo of Chiang Kai-shek hung in every classroom throughout the whole country, smiling at you like a most loving grandfather. It was a smile that I found years later again in a photo of Stalin. There was of course no freedom of speech, and people became ignorant of the reality of their situation. I struggled in my school years to put into my head the five thousand years of Chinese history, from its mythical beginnings to the glorious era of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, having not the least idea of the tens of thousands of Taiwanese killed by Chiang’s party only a few decades previously during its

vi suppression of a popular revolt, a memory that Taiwanese parents considered too dangerous to pass on to their children.

In that era of terror when people were educated to be ignorant, western political thought, especially its liberal tradition, was a main ideological weapon against the Party’s systematic and repetitive indoctrination. 1 I took in the words of John Locke, Jean

Jacques Rousseau, John S. Mill and other western liberal thinkers, as if they were the antidote to the Party’s authoritarian doctrine that I had to learn to pass exams and had allowed to poison my soul.

So began my journey into the history of western political thought. An intellectual pursuit like mine brought about by traumatic experience may eventually bring out some relief from pain, or catharsis. Yet, there will be no pleasure of knowledge that might be obtained from detached observation, as in the study of heavenly bodies, the evolution of life and other wonders of Nature. Which one of them is worthier of pursuit? Well, I am a person who often thinks that the grass is greener on the other side. It is also ironical that, in search of freedom in the western intellectual tradition, what I often encountered was a well-established suspicion of popular participation that reminded me of the Party’s anti-democratic rhetoric.

Presented in the thesis is a product of near twenty years’ trial and error. I am happy with the progress I have made in the last four years at St Andrews, and believe that this thesis has something to offer to the study of political ideas.

Ancient Greek political history and thought is probably one of the most difficult subjects for a student from a non-European background. I am grateful for the help I have received

1 Liberalism was tolerated to a limited extent perhaps because of Taiwan’s alliance with the U.S. in the cold war.

vii from many people in both Taiwan and St Andrews. Professors Ying-wen Tsai, Yi-huah

Jiang and Carl K.T. Shaw are leading scholars of western political thought in Taiwan.

My thanks are due to their academic training that introduced me to the theoretical study of politics. The lectures and discussions in their classrooms are memories I will cherish for life. Special thanks are also due to Professors Tsai and Jiang for their financial support when it was most needed. I would also like to thank Dr. Vasileios Vagios for his teaching of ancient Greek language and culture, in particular Aristophanes’ comedies, that opened my eyes to another fascinating aspect of Greek culture than the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. It was my great good fortune to have the help of Professor

Christopher Smith throughout my years at St Andrews. Without his guidance, it would have been impossible for me to manage the often too treacherous field of Athenian history. The supervision of Professor Nick Rengger and Dr. Gabriella Slomp likewise helped me to deal with the philosophical implications of Athenian politics. I am also grateful to Professor Sarah Broadie who very kindly commented on my chapter on Plato.

All of them led by example, showing me the norms of committed scholarship.

I would also like to thank the proofreaders of my English, Roy and Margaret McGregor,

Elizabeth Stitt, Pete Field, Neil Wright and Owen Pearse. My special thanks go in particular to Mr. and Mrs. McGregor for their kindness in revising my English for many years. I am also grateful for the help of Mrs. Fiona Oviatt, especially in my first year in

St. Andrews, when I often behaved like a headless chicken.

Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife for her lovely company in St

Andrews. It has not been easy for her to stay in a foreign country far away from her

viii family. Her understanding and support were indispensable for the completion of my thesis. To her, I owe my warmest gratitude.

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Table of Content

CHAPTER ONE 1

INTRODUCTION 1

I. The Modern Image of Athenian Democracy 6 i. George Grote’s History of Greece in 1846 7 ii. Developments after the mid-1980s 9 iii. Ancient Political Philosophy on Athenian Democracy 17 iv. Political Theory on Athenian Democracy 22

II. Law, Reconciliation and Philosophy at the End of the Fifth Century B.C. 29

III. Xenophon and Plato 35

IV. Primary Sources 38

CHAPTER TWO 40

ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE LAW REFORM, 411/10-399 40

I. The Scale of Reform 42

II. Democracy and Law in the Reform 44 i. The Rule of Law 45 ii. Political Struggle 49

III. The Source Question 52 i. Thucydides’ History vs. Athenian Politeia 52 ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis 55

IV. The Law reform, 411-399 58 i. The Oligarchy of the Four Hundred 58 ii. The Five Thousand and the First Restored Democracy 60 iii. From the Naval Battle of Aegospotami to the Coup of the Thirty 63 iv. The Second Restored Democracy 64

V. Conclusion 67 i 67 ii 69 iii. 70

CHAPTER THREE 74

THE RECONCILIATION OF ATHENS IN 403 B.C. 74

I. Literature review 75 i. Realism 78 1. Traditional view 78

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2. Recent discussions 81 ii.The ‘Anthropological’ Approach 84

II. The Source question 87 i. Xenophon’s Hellenica vs. Athenian Politeia 87 ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis 89

III. Restoration of Democracy and the Reconciliation Agreement 92 i. Democratic Revolt and Restoration 93 ii. The Goals of Reconciliation 94 iii. The Terms of Reconciliation 97 iv.The Success of the Reconciliation 103

IV Conclusion 109 i 109 ii 111 iii. 114 iv 116

Appendix: Athenian Citizenship at the End of the Fifth Century B.C 117 I. The status of foreign soldiers 117 II. Phormisius’ proposition 119 III. Re-confirmation of Pericles’ Law of Citizenship 122

CHAPTER FOUR 123

THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY AND ITS TRIAL OF SOCRATES 123

I. The Socratic Question 124

II. The Trial Process 130 i. The affidavit and the law applied 131 ii. The accusers 132 iii. Selection of the jury 134 iv. The procedure 135

III. Causes of the Trial and the Conviction 136 i. The Classification of Religious and Political Causes 137 ii. The Religious Causes 139 iii. The Political Causes 142

IV. Conclusion 149 i 149 ii 149 iii 150 iv. 151

CHAPTER FIVE 155

XENOPHON AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 155

I. Xenophon’s Oligarchic Tendency 158

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i. Oligarchic values 158 ii. Democratic involvement 160

II. The Law reform 162 i. The Obedience of the Demos 163 1. The dialogue between Socrates and the younger Pericles 163 2. Interpretive issues 166 ii. ‘The Ancestral Laws’ 168

III. The Reconciliation 170 i. Condemnation of the Thirty 171 ii. Praise for the democrats 172 1. Piety and Justice 172 2. Sympathy and Commitment 173

IV. The Trial of Socrates 176 i. The Defence of Socrates 177 1. Religious defence 177 2. Political defence 180 ii. The Death of Socrates 184 1. Glorious defeat 185 2. Justice from higher authorities 186 3. Voluntary death 186

V. Conclusion 191 i 191 ii 192

CHAPTER SIX 196

PLATO AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 196

I. Interpretive Issues 197 i. Main theories of interpretation 199 ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis 204

II. Plato’s Antidemocratic Tendency 207 i. Oligarchic values 208 ii. Recent debates 210

III. The Law reform 216 i. ‘The Ancestral Laws’ 220 1. Archaism 221 2. Common interests 222 3. Civic participation 223 ii. The Written Laws 226 1. Criticism of written laws 228 2. Reconsideration of written laws 229 3. The status of democratic rule with written laws 234 4. The wonder of democratic order 238

IV. The Reconciliation 245 i. The seriousness of Platonic funeral speech 245 ii. The Myth of Autochthony 252

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iii. Responsibilities for the Civil War and the Reconciliation 256

V. The Trial of Socrates 259 i. The Defence of Socrates 261 1. Religious defence 263 2. Political defence 270 ii. The Death of Socrates 285 iii. After the Apology 288 1. Patriotic values 290 2. The corruption of Socratic philosophy 292 3. The sovereignty of law 296

IV. Conclusion 298 i. 298 ii. 301

CHAPTER SEVEN 306

CONCLUSION 306

BIBLIOGRAPHY 324 Abbreviation 324 Primary Texts 324 Plato 324 Xenophon 325 Secondary Literature 325

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Chapter One

Introduction

Athenian democracy, though a regime long gone, holds an important place in our discussion of political ideas. On the one hand, it constitutes an essential background for our understanding of Plato and other ancient Greek political philosophers. It is a reasonable assumption held by many scholars that ancient Greek political thought emerged mainly as a response to its contemporary political experience, especially the

Athenian one. On the other hand, Athenian democracy is still the primary historical source for our understanding of an important type of popular government, this being the direct rule of the citizens. Its culture and institutions once realized the essential democratic values such as freedom, equality and civic participation, all in its own radical style. There is no other historical parallel case available to us. Though few people would like to adopt the Athenian type of government in today’s world, it gives an indispensable historical lesson to our discussion of democratic theories. 1

Classical Athens stands out in human history for its radical form of civic participation, which is still far greater, not only in degree but also in scale, than all the other political communities known to us. The institutional design of Athenian democracy aimed to include as many citizens as practical into its decision-making process. Its assembly required the attendance of six thousand citizens, which was practically the maximum

1 However, it should be noted immediately that my research, thought appreciating certain achievements of Athenian democracy, does not attempt to justify its many enormous moral flaws such as its aggressive imperialism, its exploitation of slavery and the unequal treatment of women. The main purpose of this thesis is to highlight the potential of participatory democracy that was once fulfilled by the Athenians, but continues to be neglected in our discussion of political thoughts.

1 possible number of people for public discussion in ancient times. All the Athenian law courts were full of hundreds or even thousands of citizens selected by lot as jurors. There were more than one thousand positions in the central government, and almost all of them were staffed by common citizens who were selected by lot and then replaced with other citizens after one years’ service. 2 The level of participation in local government might be even higher. 3 Finally, the scale of Athenian civic participation was not limited to the narrowly-defined political sphere; instead it extended to all aspects of civil life. The citizens did not only participate in the Assembly and other governmental institutes, but also attended actively various kinds of public gatherings such as religious festivals, cultural events and military campaigns. 4

The radical institutional arrangements and culture of the Athenian democracy have been received with almost universal disapproval in the history of political thought since ancient times. As shown in the next section, the Athenian direct democracy was simply taken as one of the most notorious cases of mob rule until the mid-nineteenth century.

Even today, when its achievements in culture, philosophy and imperialism have been widely appreciated, the Athenian form of popular government is still viewed with deep suspicion. It has frequently been said that the demos was not competent in governing a

2 It is hard to exaggerate the intensity and extensiveness of popular participation in the Athenian society. For a concise summary of the Athenians’ participation in their central government, see Morgens H. Hansen (1999: 313): ‘an Assembly meeting was normally attended by 6000 citizens, on a normal court day some 2000 citizens were selected by lot, and besides the 500 members of the Council there were 700 other magistrates; and those figures must be taken in conjunction with the fact that there were no more than 30,000 male citizens over eighteen, and of those no more than 20,000 were over thirty. The Assembly met thirty or forty times a year; the courts were summoned on about 200 days; the Council met on at least 250 days; and some boards of magistrates, such as the archons, the market-inspectors and the Eleven, were on duty every day all year round. Most notable of all in comparison with modern democracy is the level at which ordinary folk took part: they were not confined to choosing the decision-makers but , in their hundreds and thousands, prepared decisions, made them, and administered them in person.’ 3 Whitehead 1986: 226 ff. 4 Sinclair 1988: ch.3; B. Strauss 1996.

2 society in person, since the people were not properly trained and equipped with the necessary knowledge for such sophisticated tasks. Many scholars also consider this type of popular government dangerous, for the reason that the demos is liable to reckless behaviour under the urge of passion or demagogy.

In the realm of ancient political thought the story of Athenian democracy, generally speaking, is the myth of the decline of Athens based on passages selected from the works of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle. Thucydides reported a series of moral and political mistakes committed by the democracy: the moral destruction during the plague in 430, 5 the imperial arrogance in their invasion of Melos, the vanity of the Sicilian expedition in 413 and the overthrow of the democracy by the oligarchs in 411. 6

Xenophon reported the rash way in which the Athenians had rejected the legal procedure during an infamous trial in 406, where the mob had shouted that no law could ever intervene in the people’s decision. 7 The climax of this drama for students of philosophy is undoubtedly the trial of Socrates in 399 reported by Xenophon and Plato. It is generally believed that the people put to death a most righteous philosopher because of their ignorance.

Furthermore, a famous section in Plato’s Republic describes the democracy as the second worst kind of regime in allowing its people to live as they liked under extreme equality and absolute freedom, liable to be deceived by demagogues and falling naturally into the worst regime of tyranny. 8 Democracy received better treatment in Aristotle’s Politics

5 All dates of Athenian times are B.C. 6 Thuc. 2.52, 5.84 ff and Books 6-8. 7 Xen. Hell . 1.7.1 ff. 8 Pl. Resp. 560a ff.

3 where it was considered not as bad as oligarchy and tyranny because of its advantage of popular cooperation. However, scholars often emphasise another Aristotelian passage in which democracy was a corrupt regime that pursued partisan rather than common interests. 9

Following these selected passages, it is natural to get the impression that Athens at the end of the fifth century was effectively a lawless society. The morality crisis, caused by the war with Sparta, plague, the success of Athenian democracy and its empire, and other factors, was beyond repair. Passion and egoism, aggravating each other in turn, drove the

Athenians against one another. Those who wanted to help would be condemned by the ignorant people, as shown in the execution of Socrates. Athens was therefore doomed to fall into a vicious circle of suspicion and vengeance as the civil war of Corcyra was portrayed in Thucydides’ description. 10

However, this story of the decline of Athens is far from an accurate account of its actual development. The downfall of Athens from its imperial golden age is not the full story of

Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C. but only the first half of it. The other more neglected half, in contrast, reveals the democracy’s miraculous revival from the ruin of wars. The demos, though in a very difficult situation, won the civil war and soon recovered its authority in 403. Most historians agree that compared with other contemporary political communities, democratic Athens stood out for its domestic stability and harmony in the fourth century B.C.

9 Arist. Pol 1281a40-b20, 1289b1-20. 10 Thuc. 3.81.

4 In regard to the trial of Socrates, the partisan nature of our main sources for this notorious incident, the apologies by Xenophon and Plato, is often neglected. As a result, many scholars too easily presume the innocence of Socrates and the injustice of his execution.

Therefore, before judging Athenian democracy on this trial, there is a need to reconstruct its historicity following the norms of historical studies and to the utmost extent that is allowed by the extant evidence.

There are probably still doubts about the actual achievements of Athenian democracy.

Some might ask why the Athenian writers such as Xenophon and Plato were so critical of the democracy if it was really successful in its lawful and reconciliatory projects. Many scholars believe that these writers’ strict criticism should be the authoritative voice on our evaluation of the Athenian democracy, since they are not only great minds, but also had personal experience with the democracy. 11 This objection can be met in two ways. We may argue that these Athenian writers’ views are biased, since they were all from oligarchic backgrounds and were therefore hostile to the equal rule of the people. The other way, which is adopted in this thesis, is to argue that they are not as critical of the democracy as many scholars tend to believe. It will be proved in chapter five and six that when the works of Xenophon and Plato are examined carefully against the proper historical context of fourth-century Athens, recognition of the democracy’s success in law reform and reconciliation can be found. We will even detect significant compromise in their attitudes towards the democracy’s execution of Socrates. It is therefore problematic to support the negative view of democratic Athens with the words of

Socrates’ pupils.

11 Scholars of this belief are, for example, Schofield 1999: 1-2; Kraut 2000: 228; Wallach 2002: 13; Dunn 2005: 38-50; Saxonhouse 2006: 4-, 48-9, 54.

5 With such reflection on the misconception of history and philosophy in the traditional suspicion of Athenian democracy, I provide a defence for Athenian democracy, focusing on its actual performance at the end of the fifth century B.C. The first part of this thesis is a historical survey of three important events: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates. We then turns to the works of Xenophon and Plato, in search of recognition of democratic Athens, as opposed to their apparent criticism.

As to the discussion of this introductory chapter, it argues at first a need to re-evaluate the actual performance of Athenian democracy through a survey of accounts of Athenian democracy by historians, political philosophers and democratic theorists. It then explains the rationale for selecting the three Athenian events: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates as the focus of research. The third section provides reasons for the discussion of Xenophon and Plato. At the end, a list of primary sources to be used in this thesis is provided.

I. The Modern Image of Athenian Democracy

This section provides a historical survey of the image of Athenian democracy since the middle of the nineteenth century when the idea of democracy started to gain currency. It shows that, though democracy has become one of the predominant ideas in today’s political discourse, the Athenian form of government, which is still the primary historical source for our understanding of direct democracy, still receives serious doubts about its feasibility and desirability. Such established suspicions of Athenian democracy have been challenged by a group of historians in their studies of Athenian history for over two decades. However, as proved in our examination of the responses of scholars to this

6 recent development of historical research, its theoretic implication for our understanding of direct democracy has not yet been properly appreciated by political philosophers and theorists. There is therefore a need to readdress the issue of Athenian democracy. i. George Grote’s History of Greece in 1846

It has been pointed out by many scholars that the fossilized negative image of democracy as mob rule started to decline not as early as the start of the American Revolution in 1775 or of the French Revolution in 1789, but only after another sixty years when the British historian George Grote published the first part of his History of Greece in 1846. 12 Before

Grote, though Athens received some recognition for its achievement in visual art, 13 its democracy was described in most historical and political writings as one of the worst regimes, ‘turbulent, factionalised, irrationally swayed by orators, and inconsistent in respect of public policy and justice.’ 14 Even Pericles was usually portrayed as a wicked politician rather than the greatest popular statesman as Thucydides had praised. 15

A sea change in the public evaluation of the democracy came after the mid-nineteenth century. 16 However, the trend did not go as far as from one extremity of repugnance to the opposite of unconditional admiration. 17 In fact, the suspicion of mob rule is never far

12 See Hartog 1994: 41; Cartledge 1994: 29; Roberts 1994: ch. 9-11; E.M. Wood 1994; Dawson 2000: 187; Rhodes 2003: 32; Dupuis-Deri 2004: 120; Dunn 2005: 72, 92; especially Hansen 1992: 18. Grote’s work is more an indication rather than the cause of this change of the image of democracy. Other political developments at the same period of time, such as the enlargement of party organization and the universal suffrage for adult males in France and the US, probably played a much more important role than Grote’s History . Dupuis-Deri 2004: 125-6. 13 Rhodes 2003: 32. 14 Dawson 2000: 187. 15 Hansen 1994b: 18. 16 There were various reasons for the celebration of Athens other than its democracy, such as its empire, culture and even slavery. Hansen 1992: 19; 1994a: 35; Roberts 1994: 263; Dawson 2000: 190; Millett 2000: 353; Rhodes 2003: 32, 47. The ideological confrontation between liberalism and totalitarianism is another important reason in the twentieth century; See Roberts 1994: 291. 17 For the strategies of resistance against democracy after the days of Grote, see Morris & Raaflaub 1998: 4.

7 away. A distinction between the fifth-century and the fourth-century democracies emerged, or, what we can see as a contrast between the periods under the forceful leadership of Pericles and the subsequent period until its end in 322. According to this distinction, the Periclean age distinguished itself with a magnificent empire following the

Athens-led victory over the Persian invasion, while the later period was marked with the disastrous defeats in the Sicilian expedition and in the Peloponnesian War. It is mainly the Periclean democracy and its empire that won praise and attention after Grote’s

History , while the post-Periclean period was considered a lamentable terminal decline. 18

Paul Millett puts it concisely: 19

In its crudest form, this arrangement has three phases. First, there is the rise of Athens to

the climax of the “Golden Age” under the guiding hand of Perikles, its greatness

exemplified by the power and wealth of the empire. Then comes the climacteric of the

Peloponnesian War, culminating in the defeat of Athens and the loss of empire. The third

stage is downhill all the way, via the so-called ‘crisis of the fourth century’ to Makedonian

domination with the destruction of the democracy and the end of Athens as an

independent polis .

The myth of the Periclean democracy leads to a common conclusion that direct democracy does not necessarily coincide with mob rule, but can be one of the most meritorious forms of government as long as the desire and passion of the people is constrained and guided under great leadership. By contrast, a democracy not blessed with

18 The overwhelming preference of the Periclean or the fifth-century to the fourth-century democracy is well observed among scholars of ancient history. Hansen 1992: 20-21, 1994a: 34; Trite 1997: 3; Dawson 2000: 196; Millett 2000: 352-3, 362n33-35; Rhodes 2003: 39; Ober 2005: 31. 19 Millett 2000: 352.

8 great leaders or other sufficient external restraints is still considered doomed to excess and chaos. 20 Following this line of reasoning, the quality of leadership becomes the central issue in the modern study of the Athenian democracy, responsible for the success or failure of the government, while the majority of the Athenians were silenced into a group of submissive subjects. Thucydides’ famous comment that Athens was led to its apogee by the statesman Pericles and then brought to its destruction under successive demagogues is one of the best illustrations of this mode of explanation. 21 Many ancient and modern writers, following in his steps, also tend to ascribe the collective performance of the demos after Pericles to the leading politicians. 22 For example, it is Theramenes and other so-called moderate politicians who used to be credited with the deeds of the law reform and the reconciliation. 23 ii. Developments after the mid-1980s

Since the mid-1980s there has been a rapid increase of interest in the fourth-century democracy amongst many scholars of ancient history.24 There were, for example, Martin

Ostwald’s From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law in 1986 and Raphael

20 See, for example, Hartog (1994: 41): ‘This special relationship with Athens, or at any rate Athens of the “Perikelan age”, often went together with denunciation of the “excesses” of democracy, meaning the antics of the “demagogues” and the supposed “tyranny” of the people.” 21 Thuc. 2.65. 22 Robin Osborne (1994: 20): ‘But the way in which political writing since the eighteenth century which has invoked either the Athens of Pericles or the Athens of Demosthenes has relentlessly turned its attention on what went on in the Assembly and on the role of political leaders is surely in large part a legacy of Thucydides’ historical agenda.’ 23 See also Paul Cartledge’s observation (1994: 30) of scholars’ ‘desperate search’ for moderate leaders in the Athenian history. For the law reform in this view, see, for example, Ath. Pol. 32-33; HCT V: 252; Hignett 1952: 297. For the reconciliation, see, for example, Ath. Pol. 40; Xen. Hell .2.39- 43; Hignett 1952: 297; Loening 1987: 149; Buck 1998: 81-82. The difference between Thucydides and the author of Athenian Politeia in their evaluation of Theramenes and his group is not a concern here; the point is their common emphasis on the role of leadership. However, for a general survey of the modern approaches to Athenian democracy, see Rhodes 2003. 24 For an insider’s detailed account, see Roberts 1994: 298-301. See also Euben et al. 1994: 9-10; Schwenk 1997: 9; Ober 2003: 11.

9 Sealey’s The Athenian Republic in 1987. Though they did not cover the whole history of the fourth-century democracy, the constitutional stability during that century was taken as the central issue. In their works, fourth-century Athens had completed the development of the rule of law under which the democracy, instead of being in the process of decline, was well-governed. In 1989 Josiah Ober, one of the most innovative American proponents of Athenian democracy, published his first major work, Mass and Elite in

Democratic Athens , arguing that the nearly two hundred years stability of the democracy in the fifth and the fourth centuries constituted ‘one of the original questions that led to the development by the Greeks of self-conscious political theory.’ 25 Another important study appeared in 1991, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes , which is the outcome of twenty years’ work by the eminent Danish scholar, Mogens H. Hansen, who, in addition to his many other important conclusions, urged a focus on the fourth century B.C., the period of time to which many of the extant Athenians sources refer. 26

To be sure, the importance of the fourth-century democracy had been noticed before the

1980s. As early as at the end of the nineteenth century, a German scholar named Adolph

Holm clearly rejected the theme of the decline of the post-Periclean democracy, praising the peace and self-control of the fourth-century democracy. 27 Arnold H.M. Jones in the

1950s and Moses I. Finley in the 1970s also made important efforts to reverse the

25 Ober 1989: 20. This view of Ober is the main inspiration for my research that attempts to put the democratic theories of Xenophon and Plato into their historical contexts. For the difference between this thesis and Ober, see section 3 of this chapter. 26 M. Hansen 1991: 22. 27 Roberts 1994: 252.

10 tendency to focus on the Periclean age. 28 However, it is after the mid-1980s that a substantial change took place.

In the 1990s, along with the celebration of the two thousand and five hundredth anniversary of the birth of democracy, there were numerous journal articles and collections of conference papers by eminent scholars. 29 A trend has emerged that the extraordinary phenomenon of constitutional stability and political harmony, especially in fourth-century Athens, is an important issue that has been neglected for too long and has not yet be provided with satisfactory answers. Just as J. Ober describes in his latest book, the success of Athenian democracy is still a mystery: ‘how did the Athenians manage to go on together as an internally diverse and democratically governed community, one that sought (if never altogether successfully) to promote conditions of justice, in the face of so many circumstances that made going on so very difficult.’ 30 In 1994 R. Osborne urged scholars, instead of carrying on with the Thucydidean approach of leadership, to find out the answers to the political peace in fourth-century Athens by re-discovering the historical values of contemporary material such as Demosthenes’ speeches. 31 P.

Cartledge, observing the complex and dynamic character of the Athenian democracy, suggested that ‘the secret of Athens’ success lay in its multiple forums for , and determined practice of, creative political and social adaptation.’ He continued, ‘The

28 Jones 1957; Finley 1985. For the inspiration of Finley’s work to later scholars, see, for example, Vidal- Naquet 1995: 2-3; Morris & Raaflaub 1998: 4. See also Rhodes 2003: 39-40. For a detailed review of theories before the mid-1980s regarding the stability of the democracy, see Ober 1989: 17-35. 29 For example, articles in an issue of PS: Political Science & Politics in September 1993; articles in 6 issues of the British magazine History Today from January to August 1994. Collections of conference papers: Osborne and Hornblower eds. Ritual, Finance, Politics , 1994; Koumoulides ed. The Good Idea: Democracy and Ancient Greece , 1995; Euben et al. eds. Athenian Political thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy , 1994; Morris and Raaflaub eds. Democracy 2500?: Questions and Challenges , 1998; Cartledge etc. eds. Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens , 1998. 30 Ober 2005: 2. 31 Osborne 1994: 20.

11 highly pressured tensions between conflicting and often contradictory social groups, forces and ideologies were thus channelled positively –again, for the most part—into progressive and above all solidary outlets, principally through the medium of civic ritual.’ 32

As may have been revealed in the suggestions of J. Ober, R. Osborne and P. Cartledge, what is involved in the switch of attention from the Periclean to the post-Periclean age is more than simply adding a detailed account of fourth-century Athens according to the established model of the decline of Athens. Instead, the criteria for the evaluation of

Athenian democracy have changed from imperial power and wealth to domestic peace and harmony. This change of attitudes has raised a different set of questions that demand different approaches and answers. As Jennifer T. Roberts put it succinctly, ‘Prosperous, powerful, culturally rich—these things had often been said about Athens; but it was a new intellectual universe that credited the Athenians with internal peacefulness.’ 33

In addition to the emphasis on the fourth-century democracy and its achievement of stability, the appreciation of its participatory way of life is another noteworthy development of historical research. Compared with the fifth-century democracy which used to be shadowed by the reputations of Pericles and other powerful leaders, the fourth- century democracy had no such powerful politicians and therefore appears to be a better case of autonomous popular government. The citizens of fourth-century Athens are

32 Cartledge 1998: 12. Other recent attempts to answer the democratic stability are, for example, Sinclair 1988; Herman 1994; Browning 1995; Boegehold 1996; Cole 1996. Cf. Meier 1998: 586. 33 Roberts 1994: 298. Her observation suggests irreconcilable disagreement among different theories of the democracy. See also Roberts 1994: 305-6.

12 thought more likely to have been active and independent participants rather than passive followers of great leaders or demagogues.

This participatory aspect of fourth-century Athens stands out for two different reasons.

The first and more historically relevant reason is that civic participation is now considered by a growing number of historians as one of the essential factors for the stability of the democracy. Some scholars argue that active participation not only in the narrowly-defined political realm, but at all levels of public life, helped establish a trustful relationship among the Athenians, form a strong sense of community, and transform social and political tension into positive forces for the well-being of Athens. For example,

J. Ober argues that ‘Service to the polis in the capacity of councillor, magistrate, juror, or solider provided a chance to develop a sense of trust in a broad cross-section of fellow

Athenians… That trust was developed both on the basis of personal knowledge of individual character, and on a recognition of a common loyalty, a shared commitment to advancing the common good of the entire organization.’ 34 The other consideration is the ideological agenda behind the research of ancient history. Many scholars believe in the relevance of the ancient participatory way of civic life to the modern world, 35 and some of them feel no need to disguise their intention of using the ancient democracy as a cure to the problems of apathy and elitism in modern liberal representative democracies that are framed within constitutional limits. 36

34 Ober 2005: 41. See also Osborne 1994: 20; Cartledge 1998: 12. 35 Hansen 1992: 24; Manville 1994: 28-29; Cartledge 1994: 31. Cf. B. Strauss 1998: 141. 36 For example, Roberts 1994: 300; Ober 2005: 1-2. Contr. J. T. Rhodes (2003) who criticizes this use of ancient history, arguing that the study of history makes a greater contribution to today’s world if not being used deliberately for political agendas. For the US political theorists, the cause for participation began earlier with the publication of Hannah Arendt’s Human Condition in 1958. See Campbell 1989: 190-191; Saxonhouse 1996: 22-26.

13 It is one of the central arguments of this thesis that this trend of research discussed in this section draws our attention to the achievement of the fourth-century democracy in which its practice of popular participation played an indispensable part. 37 However, the traditional theme of the decline of fourth-century Athens is still firmly held by many historians, and the positive function of intense participation in establishing and maintaining political order is far from widely accepted, despite Ober’s optimistic observation: 38

The, by now, shopworn notions that a growth in democratic “radicalism” destabilized the

democracy, that political leaders after Pericles abandoned concern for the public good and

treated the public sphere as nothing more than a system of private spoils, and that class

tensions and a growth in selfish individualism among the populace at large undermined

civic solidarity, have been exposed as tendentious fictions by a spate of detailed work on

the fourth- and third-century phases of the democracy.

For example, this trend of favouring the democracy has been most recently criticized by

Loren J. Samons’ What’s Wrong with Democracy? (2004) He complains that ‘Socrates’ death… has been relegated to the classroom of (one suspects increasingly few) philosophy departments, while Pericles’ ideals and “democratic theory” are discussed seriously by historians and political scientists.’ 39 In his opinion:

37 It should be noted here that many historians who are sympathetic with the fourth-century democracy are sceptic about the importance of popular participation. For further discussion, see the literature reviews in section 2 of chapter 2 and section 1.1 of chapter 3. 38 Ober 2003: 11. 39 Samons 2004: 12.

14 The actual history of Athens in the period of its democratic government is

marked by numerous failures, mistakes, and misdeeds—most infamously,

the execution of Socrates—that would seem to discredit the ubiquitous

modern idea that democracy leads to good government… democratic

Athens dominated and made war on the states most like itself, suffered

two internal revolutions, exiled or executed many of its own leaders,

squandered vast public resources, and preserved its autonomy for less

than two centuries. 40

However, though the democracy was undeniably far from perfect, many of L. Samons’ accusations are highly contentious. For example, he seems to suggest that the Athenian politicians should not be punished for whatever they did. His condemnation of the

Athenian slavery is particularly confusing when compared to his other opinion that

Athens’ decision to help Sparta in suppressing the helot revolt was one of its few praiseworthy deeds. 41 Finally, while the survival of the democracy for nearly two hundred years is considered generally as the hard evidence of its stability, he names it as a failure without explanation. Though it is certainly not right to worship the democracy as an ideal regime, it is also wrong to go to the opposite extremity as Samons does.

Besides, as shown by the literature review in later chapters on the law reform and the reconciliation, most historians are still inclined to consider the long-term stability of fourth-century Athens as nothing more than a fortunate but fragile incidence of power balance in the fierce struggles between the self-interested democrats and oligarchs. Of

40 Samons 2004: 6, 50-51. 41 Samons 2004: 50-51.

15 those who recognize the efforts in Athens to maintain the communal harmony, some scholars credit the moderation of politicians, some argue the achievement as a result of the institutionalization of the authority of the laws over the people’s Assembly, and yet others point to the financial arrangement that mitigated the tension between the rich and the poor by making the rich residents, in exchange for prestigious social status, obliged to help their poor fellows. 42 These theories, maybe with the exception of the financial analysis, all revealed a strong belief that popular participation, instead of being an element of communal stability, should be constrained under strong leaders, the laws or other external forces. However, as argued in those chapters on the democracy’s law reform and the reconciliation, in a democratic community such as Athens where most of the public offices were filled with ordinary citizens selected by lot and the few other elected positions were all under strict demotic supervision, civil participation takes the main responsibility for whatever the development of the community turns out to be.

While the stability of Athens in the fourth century B.C. is now hardly deniable, the intense participation of the demos must play a central role in any explanation of the said period of stability.

In summary, though it is still not accepted by all scholars of ancient history, the recent historical approach discussed in this section has produced some paradigm-shifting effects on our understanding of the Athenian democracy. Firstly, there is a different criterion of good governments. Instead of gauging the scale of its imperial power, this approach now judges the democracy according to its capability to maintain domestic peace. Secondly,

42 For the theories stressing the aspects of moderate leadership, legality and the incident balance of power struggle, see the discussion in section 3.2 of chapter 2 and section 5.2 of chapter 3. For the economic explanation, see Millett 2000: 353-4.

16 there are also changes of research focus. The democracy’s performance in the fourth century B.C. has now received much more attention than it used to. The critical importance of popular participation is now acknowledged by many scholars, while in the past it was the quality of leadership that was considered the decisive factor for the performance of the democracy. Finally, there is a re-evaluation of the democracy. It is no more a noisy gathering of a large crowd who were ignorant and impulsive, but is believed by many historians to be a decent government committed to the principles of moderation and constitutionalism. The research question regarding the Athenian democracy has changed. Putting all these trends together, we have a completely different research question regarding the Athenian democracy. It is no longer why the democracy fell from its golden age and lost its empire. The question that should be asked is, as

Josiah Ober said, why and how the Athenians combined the democratic rule with other important political values so effectively, despite many serious difficulties. 43 iii. Ancient Political Philosophy on Athenian Democracy 44

It is one of the central themes of this thesis that the achievements of fourth-century

Athens as mentioned by certain historians since the mid-1980s should be taken on board in our discussion of the Athenian democracy. Though there is still no agreement about the nature of the fourth-century democracy and the causes of its stability and harmony, the fact of its survival under extremely difficult conditions is beyond reasonable doubt and should not be neglected. However, though the challenge posed by this recent trend of historical research has been noticed gradually by some scholars in the fields of ancient

43 See above, footnote 21. 44 This section is a review of the work of scholars who are based at philosophy institutes.

17 political philosophy and democratic theories, its implication has not yet been fully appreciated. The established negative view of the Athenian democracy remains strong.

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the story of Athens for many people is still the terminal decline from its empire to the civil wars via a series of failure committed by its democracy. According to this version of Athenian history, there seems nothing positive to learn from the presumably hopeless reality of Athenian democracy. Scholars of ancient political philosophy therefore justify themselves in their search for political solutions mostly in the theoretical works of great writers such as Plato and Aristotle. The framework of argument in the study of political thought, so to speak, is composed of

Thucydidean problems of internal conflicts and Platonic and Aristotelian solutions.

Following this pattern of explanation, the actual efforts of the democracy in restoring and maintaining political harmony and legal order in the post-war period is often ignored.

For example, Author W. H. Adkins in his book on the Athenian cooperative virtues gives the pessimistic conclusion that ‘[a]fter the political upheavals at Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War, no Greek could overlook the existence of the problem, even if he could neither formulate it clearly to himself nor suggest a solution. A Plato or an Aristotle was needed.’ 45 David Cohen mentions the Thucydidean problem: ‘as

Thucydides shows in his descriptions of stasis and the plague if conflict between groups in society becomes generalized enough, it can lead to the disintegration of the social order, not to its preservation.’ 46 He then switches to the work of Plato and Aristotle:

‘like Thucydides, Aristotle and Plato viewed the problem of stasis as the fundamental

45 Adkins 1972: 147. For similar examples in Continental philosophy, see Friedlander 1958: 18; Gadamer 1980: 3-4. 46 D. Cohen 1995: 28.

18 challenge to political theory. Indeed, in a sense, the underlying goal of Aristotle’s and

Plato’s political works is to analyze the causes of social disintegration so as to develop an institutional framework for social cohesion and hence, political stability.’ 47

Scholars of ancient political philosophy might be said to fall into three groups for their responses to the changing image of Athenian democracy championed by a group of historians. Some scholars did not think the trend a serious challenge to the established view against the democracy. For example, The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman

Political Thought , published in 2000, takes into account little of the recent research of ancient history. Though the editors recognize the methodological differences between philosophers, political theorists and historians, 48 and its contributors include historians such as J. Ober who is the champion of Athenian democracy, the chapters on Socrates,

Plato and Aristotle are essentially theoretical without analysis of the historical context. 49

Besides, Richard Kraut, a leading scholar in the political philosophies of Plato and

Aristotle, though vaguely recognizing in his review of J. Ober’s Political Dissent in

Democratic Athens (1998) that the Athenian people ‘to some degree transform themselves into the just and educated citizenry’, 50 still sticks to the traditional negative

47 D. Cohen 1995: 28. However, Cohen himself (1995: 193-4) does not accept this negative view of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, he recognizes its domestic stability in fourth-century Athens. Recently, he (2001: 343) also recognizes the challenge of the democratic reconciliation and law reform to the traditional understanding of the democracy. 48 Rowe 2000: 3. 49 Rowe, one of the editors, admits (Rowe et al. 2000: 4) that ‘once Plato (and Socrates) and Aristotle have made their appearance in the volume, it is political theory which is privileged over other sorts of political thinking.’ (emphasis added) F. Rosen (2002: 202) comments that those chapters presume that ‘ancient Greek philosophy was the same as modern philosophy and that when words were put into the mouth of Socrates by Plato, they could be assessed and criticized just as any modern philosopher’s arguments could be understood and criticized.’ 50 Kraut 2000: 229.

19 image of the democracy and appears to think that there is hardly anything admirable in the practices of Athenian democracy. 51

Few scholars welcome the change. Paul Woodruff’s First Democracy ,52 a work dedicated to Isidor F. Stone, 53 stands out as an exception among the works of classical philosophy for its enthusiastic defence of Athenian democracy against Plato and other elitist critics. However, this is mainly a popular book rather than academic research.

Malcolm Schofield, one of the editors of the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman

Political Thought , is an example of the third group of scholars who vacillate between the new improved image of the democracy and its traditional view of being a corrupt regime.

On the one hand, he appears to judge philosophy by the performance of the democracy.

Following the theories of historians regarding the stability and civility of the fourth- century democracy, 54 he values the Aristotelian Eudemian Ethics over Nicomachean

Ethics because the less moralistic attitude of the former provides a better explanation of the democratic achievements. 55 He even suggests in his conclusion that the democracy deserves a more positive view than that of Eudemian Ethics .56 However, on the other hand, he still seems to judge the democracy from the traditional height of philosophy and considers Athens a city haunted by civil conflicts. In his Saving the City: Philosopher-

King and Other Classical Paradigms (1999), though claiming that ‘fruitful work on the

51 E.g. Kraut (2000: 228): ‘the Socratic-Platonic idea that knowledge should rule, and that expertise is superior to mere opinion, is still widely accepted in the modern world, and it poses one of the greatest challenges to democratic theory and practice.’ 52 Woodruff 2005. 53 I.F. Stone was a journalist and the author of the Trial of Socrates (1988) which provided a provocative justification of Athens’ trial of Socrates. 54 Schofield 1998: 38-9; 47-8. Two historians that he quotes are P. Millett and G. Hermann. 55 Schofield 1998: 39. 56 Schofield 1998: 51.

20 political thinking of antiquity must be rooted in history and a proper appreciation of its historical context’, he says: ‘It is therefore no wonder that Greek and Roman political theory is above all else the search for a remedy for the malaise of stasis. Like the great

Athenian statesman Solon before them, the philosophers want to save the city from itself , and to create or identify a basis for harmony which will preserve it in unity.’ 57

The tension between history and philosophy remains in M. Schofield’s latest book. 58 He recognizes that the well-known Platonic criticism of the democracy in Plato’s Republic and other works does not square with the democracy’s actual performance. 59 On the other hand, he still largely repeats the interpretive pattern of Thucydidean problems and philosophical solutions, saying that ‘the intensity of [Plato’s] obsession with political rhetoric as an inbred democratic disease is intelligible only against the background of an interpretation of fifth-century Athenian imperialism and its downfall in the Peloponnesian

War that he probably borrowed (not without twist of his own) from the historian

Thucydides.’ 60 Though Schofield is now more cautious about the validity of Plato’s judgement of the democracy, there is still no sufficient explanation as to why the proper historical context for our understanding of Plato should be the infamous failure of the

Athenian democracy in the fifth century B.C. rather than its miraculous success in the fourth century B.C. which is exactly the period of time when Plato wrote his dialogues.

In summary, to my knowledge, there is still no serious academic work by scholars of ancient political philosophy that has fully recognized the paradigm-shifting effects caused

57 Schofield 1999: 1-2. Emphasis added. Another recent example is Howland (2004) who argues that Lysias’ claim of revenge can be refuted by Plato’s philosophical arguments. 58 Schofield 2006 Plato: Political Philosophy , Oxford University Press. 59 Schofield 2006: 120. 60 Schofield 2006: 1. Emphasis added.

21 by the switch of research focus from the fifth-century to the fourth-century democracy.

Some have paid little more than lip service to the successful story of the democracy that disputes their traditional and sceptic view of the democracy. As to those who are more willing to take on board the challenge from the field of ancient history, they have not yet provided satisfactory explanation about the gap between philosophical criticism and the reality of the democracy. Did the ancient great writers understand the Athenian democracy properly or not? Or, is it the later generations who distorted their views on the democracy? These are questions worth asking. In either case, there is now a need to reinvestigate the our traditional understandings of the Athenian democracy that are largely based on certain views of Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle, as well as other ancient writers. iv. Political Theory on Athenian Democracy 61

In the discussion of political theorists, Athenian democracy is mainly thought to be the extreme model of participatory democracy that inspires an alternative way of political life to the dominant form of liberal democracy. 62 The latter, as John Dunn argues, is a mixture of representative institution, modern state and capitalist economy. The majority of its founding theorists, such as Benjamin Constant, James Madison, Jean Bodin and

Adam Smith, sharing the traditional view of Athenian democracy, considered it as one of the wicked regimes that must be kept away. Popular participation in their eyes, if ever acceptable to some extent, needed proper supervision for its imminent threat to individual

61 This section is a review of the work of scholars who are based at institutes of political theory. 62 For Athenian democracy as the model of participatory democracy, see, e.g., Dunn 1992: 264; Euben 1993: 478.

22 rights or constitutional order. 63 While democracy has become the predominant ideology in today’s world, it is mainly the triumph of representative government rather than the victory of popular participation. 64 Therefore, Athenian democracy, though an inspiring idea for solving today’s problems in liberal democracies such as apathy and bureaucracy, is normally rejected as an unfeasible or undesirable substitute for representative democracy. As we will find below, though some theorists praise the people as a needed revolutionary power to re-vitalize the community from various forms of ossified exploitation disguised as the conventions, the laws and the constitution, many scholars, following the main line of the history of political thought, still believe in modern constitutionalism. 65

Political theorists have already noticed the trend of re-evaluating Athenian democracy in the realm of ancient history, 66 and one of them declared a decade ago that ‘the view of

Athenian democracy offered by work building on this recent [historian] scholarship is sophisticated and nuanced. It makes any portrait of Athens as anarchic or ill-governed appear simplistic and outmoded.’ 67 Though this political theorist has pointed out correctly that the evaluation provided a chance to re-examine and deepen our understanding of the democracy and human politics in general, this seems not a general approach adopted in the discussion of democratic theory. Most political theorists, liberal

63 Dunn 1992: 243-251. 64 Dunn 1992: 248. 65 For the pro-participation theorists, see B. Barber 1994. See also Wolin 1993 & 1996; Wood 1996. For the more suspicious view, see Dunn 1992:255-6; Maier 1992: 149; Grofman 1993: 471; Held 1996: 312, 314. 66 For example, introductory articles about the trend appeared in a special issue celebrating the two thousand and five hundredth year of democracy in PS: Political Science & Politics , a Journal sent to all members of American Political Science Association. 67 Grofaman 1993: 471.

23 or radical democrats, still tend to overlook the changing image of the democracy by judging it with the traditional criticism or other preconceptions.

John Wallach’s Platonic Political Art (2001) and Ricky K Green’s Democratic Virtue in the Trial and Death of Socrates (2001) are recent examples of researches that still presume the myth of the fall of fourth-century Athens. 68 J. Wallach also appears to mistake the re-evaluation of the democracy as a cause for building a perfect model against all kinds of criticism. 69 However, what is being challenged is the uncritical presumption of the fairness and plausibility of traditional criticism, a bias which is revealed fully in the following sentence: ‘Platonic philosophy would be radically critical of democracy but on behalf of justice and not necessarily on behalf of any other, extant political order.’ 70

Arlene W. Saxonhouse, like L. Samons in the field of ancient history, wrote a monograph to criticize the trend of making Athenian democracy an admirable model by scholars such as Gorge Grote, John S. Mill, Hannah Arendt, Martin Ostwald and Isidor F. Stone whom she labels as mythmakers. 71 She urges a return to the great Athenian writers for the genuine understanding of the democracy, for these writers, living in that democracy, had no partisan intention but aimed to achieve full understanding of its principles. She claims that these writers ‘draw on democracy’s multifaceted nature and force us to explore the

68 For J. Wallach’s view, see Ober’s review (2002: 151): Wallach ‘endorses a “golden age followed by decline and fall” concept of Athenian history as the primary frame for the historical Plato’s philosophical enterprise: his Plato is profoundly dismayed by Athens’ “fall”. Green (2001: 3) also considers the fourth- century democracy as a decline from ‘the hoplite democracy’ in the fifth century B.C. 69 E.g. Wallach (2002: 12) says that ‘unless one believes that the democratic politeia of Athens always generated morally perfect results, there is room for identifying a “morally” superior position to those authoritatively taken in Athenian politics.’ 70 Wallach 2002: 13. 71 Saxonhouse 1996: 11.

24 underlying assumptions that characterize most regimes we might call democratic.’ 72

However, her uncritical belief in the great writers has been challenged adeptly by J. T.

Roberts. By providing a detailed list of contrasts between Plato’s portrayal and the reality of the democracy, Roberts concludes that it is Plato who is the mythmaker for his invention of a problematic image of the Athenian democracy. 73

A. Saxonhouse’ latest work, Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens (2006), presents a sophisticated and different story from her previous work of Athenian

Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theorists (1996). There is extensive consultation of the literature of ancient history and classics in her new book, and

Saxonhouse now recognizes the admirable political success of the fourth-century democracy. Yet, the core of her argument is still based on the traditional Platonic view that considers Athenian democracy a radical regime of extreme freedom and equality as described in the Republic Book VIII. 74 Following such line of philosophical reasoning, democracy is by definition destructive because of its uncompromised defiance of all kinds of authority. The Athenian democracy’s reconstruction of legal order under the conservative appeal of ‘the ancestral laws’, in her view, was an act against ‘democratic’ values. 75 However, her view is not without serious problems. Firstly, we see no sufficient reason to accept her definition of the democracy as the full realization of

72 Saxonhouse 1996: 1-2, 11. 73 Roberts 1995: 263-5. The debate between Roberts and Saxonhouse is important, for the rare case clearly exposes the difference of methodology between the study of political philosophy and that of ancient history. Saxonhouse’s defence is to separate the study of political philosophy from that of history. She (1995: 275, 273-4) argues that Plato does not describe ‘flesh and blood Athens’, but explores the possible theoretical principles of the democracy and the potential problems rising from them. The same strategy is also used by Schofield (2006: 111) who maintains that Plato’s criticism of the democracy was not a factual description, but ‘articulating the logical consequences of pushing freedom to extremes.’ 74 Saxonhouse 2006: 40, 48-9, 54. 75 Saxonhouse 2006: 54.

25 excessive freedom and equality, a view that she admits is contrary to the actual development of the Athenian democracy. Secondly, her explanation of the democracy’s constitutional stability in the fourth century B.C. actually follows the theories of M.

Ostwald and R. Sealey, and therefore shares their problematic dichotomy between democracy and constitutionalism. 76 In summary, despite her comprehensive use of the recent researches of ancient history, Saxonhouse’s latest work still misses the inspiration that Athenian democracy can make to improve our understanding of democratic politics.

The extraordinary balance among freedom, equality and communal order that the democracy had achieved with its radical form of popular participation remains obscured within the established conceptual framework that Saxonhouse has followed.

J. Dunn, J. Peter Euben and George Kateb, though having more appreciation of the re- evaluation of the democracy, do not use it to test the established views of democracy.

Dunn, though observing the stability and moderation of the democracy as well as its governing ability contrary to traditional criticism, agrees with B. Constant’s view that the age of ancient democracy has gone forever for the reason that in today’s world ‘nothing in principle can or could be done to enable modern citizens to know about, or choose coherently in relation to, the vast bulk of the factors which shape, constrain, or endanger their lives.’ 77 Nevertheless, another reason for his suspicion of Athenian democracy, probably more important than the vast size and complexity of modern state, is his continual acceptance of the negative image of the democracy described in Thucydides,

76 Saxonhouse 2006: 49n27. For further discussion, see chapter 2. 77 Dunn 1992: 244, 250, 257.

26 Plato and Aristotle. 78 Even P. Euben, who is a political theorist and shares J. Ober’s democratic belief in participatory politics, 79 still follows the traditional criticism. Fully in agreement with J. Ober about the exceptional achievements of the fourth-century democracy, he questions its ability to resist the temptation of tyranny or the manipulation of demagogues. 80 G. Kateb, on the other hand, paints the democracy with values of liberal constitutionalism. While explaining the stability of the democracy, he downplays its practices of popular participation, describing them with terms such as consent, election and constitutional limits. 81

Benjamin Barber and Sheldon Wolin, though eminent and enthusiastic proponents of civil participation, do not use the constitutional stability of Athenian democracy as a main support of their theory. B. Barber develops his theory of participation by using various sources in addition to the classical democracy. 82 Though having used M.I. Finley’s

Democracy Ancient and Modern to justify the trial of Socrates in his Strong Democracy

(1984), 83 he pays no particular attention to recent researches of ancient history. The reason might be his belief that a genuine democracy has no need to obsess itself with the past. With great boldness he says, ‘like every political system, democracy too has a birth mother, and thus rests on foundations. Unlike every other political system, however, democracy is necessarily self-orphaned, the child who slays its parent so that it may grow

78 Dunn 2005: 38-50. Dunn is in fact much more sympathetic toward the case for democracy than most political theorists. However, his suspicion still attests S. Wolin’s observation that the true reason for the modern rejection of Athenian democracy, rather than the size and complexity of modern society, is their fear of the mob rule, an opinion which might not be appropriate in the democratic age. Wolin 1993: 475, 477. 79 See Euben 2000: 112 for the closeness of their view. 80 Euben 2000: 129-130. He expresses similar concerns at various places, e.g. Euben 1994: 198, 208; 1996: 51. 81 Kateb 2003: 63. 82 Barber 1983/ 2003: 118; Barber 1994. 83 Barber 1983/2003: 96

27 and flourish autonomously.’ 84 S. Wolin, on the other hand, insisting on preserving the revolutionary characteristic of democracy, does not care for the traditional accusations that the demos was liable to become a mob, and does not appreciate the efforts to promote the Athenian democracy as a stabilized constitutional government, a trend that he worries might tame the ideal of democracy and deprive it of its vivacity. 85

Finally, Blair Campbell and Susan Sara Monoson are among the few political theorists who establish their arguments through the recent research of ancient history. As early as in 1989, Campbell’s ‘Paradigm Lost’ attempted to refute some dominant political myth by using a substantial amount of historical research produced in the mid-1980s. Using the works of R. Sealey and M.H. Hansen, he argues that fourth-century Athens was in fact a model of the rule of law rather than that of public participation, as H. Arendt and other proponents of participation maintain. 86 He also advised political theorists to root classical political concepts and theories in the historical context, an urge which seems to raise little resonance. 87 Monoson’s Plato’s Democratic Entanglement: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy (2000), on the other hand, argues that Plato, borrowing various democratic practices in his philosophical writing, is a loyal critic of the democracy instead of a diehard anti-democratic. 88 Though, as some reviewers comment, what her argument has established is similarities between some of the democratic

84 Barber 1994: 49. 85 Wolin 1994: 36-44. 86 Campbell 1989, esp. p. 208. 87 Campbell 1989: 212. 88 Monoson 2000: 13.

28 practices and the Platonic dialogues rather than Plato’s loyalty or sympathy to the democracy. 89

In summary, we have seen that in political theorists’ discussion of the Athenian democracy, there are concerns along with the development of modern democracies since the mid-nineteenth century, in addition to the Thucydidean/ Platonic view that we have discussed in the previous section. However, both of the theoretic traditions are equally sceptical towards the participatory way of life exemplified in the Athenian democracy.

Political theorists and philosophers who follow these traditional views are therefore unable to appreciate fully the achievements of the democracy, especially in the fourth century B.C., even though some of the scholars have already recognized the serious gap between the established theoretic evaluation and the reality of the democracy. On the other hand, it is something of a surprise that proponents of participatory democracy, such as B. Barber and S. Wolin, do not welcome the recent revaluation of the democracy by J.

Ober and some other historians, either. Yet, whatever the theoretic or practical considerations Barber and Wolin might have, it seems that a closer examination of how the democracy managed the complex situations of the Athenian society would be a great help for their cause of civic participation.

II. Law, Reconciliation and Philosophy at the End of the Fifth Century B.C.

It has been shown that there is a need to readdress the important issue of the Athenian democracy in the realm of political philosophy and theory, following a groundbreaking

89 Schaeffer & Nicholas 2003: 468-9. Cf. Woodruff 2005. Woodruff (2005: 30, 236), though suggesting that Plato borrowed from the democracy its practice of frank speaking and the view of tyranny, still considers Plato a diehard antidemocrat.

29 development in the field of ancient history since the mid-1980s. Now, we have to justify the approaches used in this thesis. There are two issues. The first is why, out of the democracy’s history of nearly two hundred years, we investigate only three events in the years of 411-399: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates. The other issue is why we look for Xenophon’s and Plato’s responses to these events in this thesis.

We start with the first issue.

Here is a brief account of the historical background. The last decade of the fifth century

B.C. is one of the most volatile periods in the classical history of Athens. Within ten years, the democracy suffered two serious military defeats. Its whole expeditionary force was wiped out in Sicily in 413, and then the city of Athens itself capitulated to Sparta in

403. The democracy was overthrown twice following each of the military defeats, and the ensuing partisan conflicts within Athens escalated rapidly into bloody civil wars. As a consequence of these violent years, tens of thousands of Athenians died, in addition to the loss of the Athenian empire. As mentioned in the previous discussion, this decade used to be considered the tragic ending of the Athenian golden age due to the folly of the democracy.

However, along with all these well-known unfortunate incidents, there is another side of the story that is far less recognized. When we examine the democracy’s performance during this period of time, we find that it actually managed many of its military and political crises competently. For example, the democracy responded swiftly to the disastrous consequence of the Sicilian expedition with effective measures of damage

30 limitation. 90 Besides, it came back to power within a very short time after being overthrown by its powerful oligarchic enemies. Even more surprisingly, the democracy was capable of restoring political order and of saving Athens from the chaos left by the short-lived oligarchic regimes, which had essentially done nothing but deepened the crises of Athens to the brink of complete destruction. 91 After all, the democracy steered itself successfully through these difficult years. After its second restoration in 403, while most Greek poleis still suffered from their problems of civil strife, the Athenian democracy enjoyed exceptional stability throughout the fourth century B.C. until conquered by Macedon in 323. The author of Aristotelian Athenian Politeia concluded that the democracy in 403 finally reached its full development, having firmly established the sovereign status of the demos. 92 Considering the level of difficulty that the democracy had faced during this period, the resilience it showed and the long-term stability it created are truly amazing deeds. They in fact constitute some of the most persuasive reasons for the urge of some historians to re-evaluate the Athenian democracy since the mid-1980s.

The three events, the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates, stand out as illuminating examples of how the democracy governed Athens after their imperial age.

Firstly, the law reform was launched in 411 and went through several regimes, but it is the democracy which was responsible for its completion in 399. 93 Several constitutional principles were laid down in this reform. Athens was to be governed under ‘the ancestral constitution’. The laws in force were only those which had been written down and

90 Thuc. 8.1 ff. 91 For the chaos created by the Four Hundred and the Thirty respectively, see 4.2 of ch.2 and 3.1 of ch.3. 92 Ath. Pol. 41. 93 For further discussion, see chapter 2.

31 collected in a central archive through due procedures of legislation. The laws should be applied equally to all the citizens. No decree should violate the laws, and the ruling power of all magistrates must be based on the laws. It is generally agreed that the democracy largely followed these constitutional principles in the fourth century B.C.

Furthermore, the reconciliation refers to the generous act of the democracy towards the oligarchic regime of the Thirty and their collaborators after the return of the victorious democrats to Athens in 403. 94 Having won the civil war in 404/3, the democracy, instead of avenging the brutality of the oligarchs who had killed one thousand and five hundred citizens in a few months of their reign, granted amnesty for their past crimes. Besides, the oligarchs were free to rejoin the Athenian community or to leave for another city prepared by the democracy. While in many other cities the land of the oligarchic classes was confiscated and redistributed, the Athenian oligarchs were allowed to keep their property intact under the democracy, even though part of that had been taken by force from the victims of the oligarchic coup. The democracy honoured the amnesty and other terms of reconciliation faithfully not only in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, but throughout the fourth century B.C. The great efforts that the Athenian democrats made to keep their oligarchic compatriots within Athens are some of the most revealing deeds in the history of Athenian politics.

Nevertheless, beside the two successful stories of law reform and reconciliation, there was the infamous trial of Socrates that occurred during the same period. Socrates was prosecuted by private citizens in 399 with the accusation that he was a source of corruption to the traditional norm of Athenian religion and politics. He was tried and

94 For further discussion, see chapter 3.

32 condemned to death by the majority of the jurors, who were a fair sample of the Athenian citizenry. Because of the trial and the execution, the Athenian demos is said to have been ignorant for reaching the wrong verdict, feeble under the sway of demagogues, irresponsible in making an innocent man the scapegoat for its own mistakes, dangerous in its dogmatic intolerance, and, finally, irredeemable for killing the most benevolent citizen.

However, the democracy did not regret its verdict on the philosopher, as indicated more than fifty years after the trial in the following sentence of a forensic speech that still claimed that the Athenians ‘put to death Socrates the sophist…because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty who put down the democracy’. 95

The three events of law reform, reconciliation and the trial of Socrates are chosen for the following reasons. It is more than likely that the law reform and the reconciliation laid down the foundation of domestic peace for fourth-century Athens. 96 The laws had been a main cause of political disorder in the later part of the fifth century B.C., as shown clearly in the two oligarchic coups. 97 After the comprehensive revision of the laws and their collection in the written form during the law reform, the contents of the laws were now much more clearly defined. As a result of the law reform, the laws, rather than being a cause of political dispute, became the effective governing principle that regulated the decision-making processes of the administrative and judicial sectors. On the other hand, through the reconciliation between the Athenian democrats and oligarchs, the democracy, breaking away from the vicious circle of civil violence and revenge that still plagued many Greek poleis, re-established Athens and consolidated its communal fabric with

95 Aeschin. In Tim . 173. 96 For further discussion, see ch. 2 and 3. 97 See section 4.1 and 4.3 in chapter 2.

33 sympathy, forgiveness and trust. In summary, as the domestic peace of the fourth- century democracy has received growing attention from the mid-1980s onwards, the answers to this surprising achievement lie largely in the democracy’s law reform and its reconciliation with the oligarchs.

These two events present one of the most serious challenges to the traditional suspicion of Athenian democracy. As discussed above, there is a tendency to consider the demos an imminent threat rather than a constructive element in politics. Yet, the success of the law reform and the reconciliation is not what we normally expect following this suspicion.

The gad between the actual performance and the negative view of Athenian democracy therefore needs an explanation.

As to the trial of Socrates, the main function of this infamous incident here is to balance with the favourable account of the democracy that will surely emerge from the successful stories of law reform and reconciliation. The democracy’s trial of Socrates has been the most influential reason for its negative image portrayed since ancient times. Many vices of ochlocracy such as ignorance, impetuosity and the tendency to be manipulated are said to be presented most clearly in this trial. Therefore, there is an apparent inconsistency that requires an explanation. While the demos appeared to be sensible or even generous in the law reform and reconciliation, why were the same group of people at the same time so determined in condemning Socrates, a man whom his philosophical pupils claimed to be not only innocent but also the wisest and most righteous? This is a question that must be addressed in our defence for Athenian democracy.

34 Last but not least, to my knowledge, no research has so far produced a systematic survey of the three events altogether. There are already many discussions about the democracy’s law reform and the reconciliation, mainly by scholars of ancient history, and the trial of

Socrates has been one of the major concerns of political philosophers since ancient times.

However, their discussion often focused only on one of the three events with little attention paid to the other two events. This thesis, by contrast, proposes a comparative approach, exploring the interconnection among the events. This approach will improve our understandings of an important episode in the Athenian history.

III. Xenophon and Plato

The discussion of Xenophon and Plato in this thesis is not a systematic examination of their democratic theories, but to prove the misuse of their works in the established suspicion of Athenian democracy. Plato is arguably the most important philosopher in the history of western civilization. Xenophon’s works remain an indispensable source for our understanding of Athenian culture, though he is now considered a secondary writer far behind Plato and Thucydides. Many scholars believe that they are the authoritative voices in the evaluation of Athenian democracy, since they were not only insightful but also had personal experience with the democracy. Their works, especially those about the trial of Socrates, are cited as hard evidence for the failure of Athenian democracy.

There are two problems in this customary use of Xenophon and Plato. The possibility of distortion due to their oligarchic background is often neglected. Many scholars tend to presume their impartiality without examination against the actual development of

Athenian politics or other ancient sources. Besides, it is problematic to read Xenophon

35 and Plato simply as critics of democracy. As shown later in this thesis, there is also recognition of democratic achievements and sympathetic understandings of the trial of

Socrates in their works. Their views of Athenian democracy are mixed observation rather than outright denial.

Another reason for the discussion of Xenophon is that his view of the democracy provides a valuable comparison to Plato’s. The two writers were contemporaries from similar political backgrounds and were both Socrates’ pupils. However, they chose different ways of life. While Plato withdrew from the public sphere to his academy,

Xenophon continued pursuing a political career in various regimes. Though sharing

Plato’s contempt for common people, Xenophon is often seen struggling for their approval, which was essential for a successful public career in a democratic community.

Xenophon was at the same time a Socratic philosopher and a politician. Through his works and life, we find another approach to the relationship between democracy and philosophy that is more practical than the Platonic theory of philosopher-king.

Thucydides’ and Aristotle’s views of Athenian democracy are not discussed because their works hardly cover the three historical events. The account of Thucydides’ History , which ends around 410, provides no information about the result of law reform and the reconciliation. Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics did not seem to be concerned with

Athenian politics as much as Xenophon and Plato did. Besides, neither Thucydides nor

Aristotle provides an account of the trial of Socrates.

Xenophon’s and Plato’s recognition of Athenian democracy can be proved by situating their works in the historical context of the fourth century when democratic Athens

36 recovered from the destruction of the Peloponnesian war. Scholars often interpret

Xenophon and Plato against the background of Athens’ downfall in the war and the trial of Socrates, and conclude that their works were strict criticism of the democracy.

However, as Josiah Ober argues, the immediate and more proper background should be the revival of democratic Athens in the fourth century B.C. during which their works were written. He wrote:

If we abandon decline and fall [of Athens] as the historical frame, and

focus on democratic Athens’ unexpected recovery during precisely the

period in which Plato was writing, it becomes evident that Plato’s real

problem is with Athenian democracy as such , not with some fallen “age of

iron” version thereof. 98

However, my thesis differs from Ober’s research of Greek political thought on three main points. Firstly, instead of providing a general discussion of Greek political thinkers against the overall historical context of fourth-century Athenian history, my thesis focuses on three important events in the last decade of the fifth century B.C. It provides detailed discussion of the debates surrounding the three historical events, on the one hand, and searches for Xenophon’s and Plato’s responses to them, on the other. Secondly,

Ober did not consider Xenophon as this thesis does. Thirdly, Ober considers Plato a diehard antidemocrat who denied all the merits of the democracy decisively because of its execution of Socrates. 99 By contrast, I argue that Plato (and Xenophon) did show noticeable appreciation of the democracy’s achievements in constitutionalism and

98 Ober 2002a: 152. See also Ober 1989: 20. 99 Ober 1998: 164-165. For his interpretation of Plato, see Ober 1998: 156-247. For a summary of his interpretation of Plato’s major political works, see Ober 2002a:153-155.

37 political harmony, despite their fundamental oligarchic position and the democracy’s execution of Socrates. Their responses to the democratic projects of law reform and reconciliation will be discussed further in chapters five and six.

IV. Primary Sources

The content of this thesis is divided into two parts; the first is a historical survey of the three events conducted by the Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C., and the second part is philosophical discussion of Xenophon’s and Plato’s response to these events. The sources and principles of interpretation for the two parts are different according to their different concerns.

In the first part, we will re-evaluate the Athenian democracy from historical perspectives.

It examines the democracy’s actual performance in three important historical events during a critical period of time: its law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates.

Its discussion is mainly based on researches by historians rather than by political philosophers and theorists. The primary texts used in this part are as follows.

Thucydides’ History , Xenophon’s Hellenica and the Aristotelian Athenian Politeia provide a general framework for our understanding of the three events. The speeches by

Athenian orators such as Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates and Demosthenes, provide useful information about Athenian political life and institutions. The laws and decrees recorded in orator’s speeches and inscriptions are important particularly for the reason that they represent the collective will of the Athenian demos.

Besides, the works by the Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus and the Roman historian

Justin provide alternative accounts of the Athenian reconciliation. As to the trial of

38 Socrates, Xenophon and Plato are our main sources. Aristophanes’ Clouds presents a comical portrayal of Socrates. Aristotle indicates some important aspects of Socrates’ philosophical pursuit. Diogenes Laertius provides a biography of Socrates.

In the second part of this thesis, we explore Xenophon’s and Plato’s philosophical reflections on the three events through a systematic survey of their works. Their views on other political issues will be discussed only when they are relevant to the three events.

In the case of Xenophon, his responses to the democracy’s constitutional achievement are largely revealed in some Socratic dialogues in his Memorabilia . We find his praise of the democracy and its reconciliation in his Hellenica . His view of Socrates and his trial is recorded in his Socratic Memorabilia and Apology . His other works such as Anabasis ,

Cyropaedia , On the Cavalry Commander also provide important information about his political thinking.

Plato’s views of the democracy also spread throughout his whole oeuvre. However, his

Laws and Statesman are the main dialogues for his response to the democracy’s constitutional achievements. The Menexenus is the main source of his attitude towards the reconciliation. While his Apology provides the fullest account of his view on the democracy’s trial of Socrates, there are second thoughts on this issue in his Statesman,

Crito , Protagoras and the Republic .

39 Chapter Two Athenian Democracy and the Law reform, 411/10-399

We examine in this chapter the relationship between Athenian democracy and the law reform 1 that was introduced in Athens about two years after its defeat in Sicily and fully implemented in 399, the year when Socrates was tried. This reform was largely successful, in that it produced a legal framework that was stable until the democracy came to an end in 322. 2 Of the five regimes in those 12 years the Four Hundred, the Five

Thousand and the Thirty survived only a few months, and it was under the two restored democracies that most work of the reform was done. Though it was the Four Hundred who first proposed to reform the constitution, scholars generally agree that there was no constitution in force or constitutional government in their temporary reign of terror.

There is very little information about the government of the Five Thousand, while the government of the Thirty were notorious for their lawlessness. By contrast, the first restored democracy launched a systematic survey of legal documents in 410, and the reform was accomplished in 399 under the second restored democracy with all the laws and practices examined and archived in written form. Thereafter, the democracy

1 Though I consider the law reform from 411/10 to 400/399 as a single event, it does not imply that the project was ever consistent in its intention, or design, from the beginning to its end. Instead of considering that the reform was conducted without interruption, for example, by a group of persistent politicians to cure the defects of the democracy with certain constitutional principles, I suggests that the reform was a chain reaction by different regimes towards the constitutional crisis in 411/10. The crisis was initiated by the Four Hundred when they overthrew the democracy and proclaimed, sincerely or otherwise, a constitutional project in their government. The constitutional proposals of the subsequent regimes, rather than a continuation of the work of the previous one, were more a series of responses to it, positive or negative. 2 Ath. Pol. 41; Hignett 1952: v, 298; Sinclair 1988: 301; Ober 1989, 102-3; Hansen 1991: 175 ff; Cartledge 2002: 162. M. Sundahl (2003) criticizes that the reform failed because it did not demand that the governmental decrees comply with abstract legal principles, but only with the existing laws. However, there is no point to define the rule of law as nothing else but rational construction based on certain abstract principles. Abstract ideas are not necessarily better protection of justice; they might be more vulnerable to manipulation and corruption because of their abstraction and vagueness. Besides, his criticism fails to prove the lawful stability of the fourth-century Athenian politics.

40 observed this constitution and its constraints on the popular government until its end in

322. In a word, the Athenian direct democracy in the fourth century B.C., through founding and maintaining its legal order in a chaotic age, appears to be a model of constitutionalism.

The law reform is important in the discussion of ancient political thought for the reason that its success takes into question the traditional presumption of inherent tension between direct democracy and lawful order. This event has been discussed by scholars of ancient history, especially since the mid-1980s. There are mainly two issues in their discussion. Firstly, though it is generally agreed that the democracy conducted a comprehensive revision of law in this reform, some scholars argue that it was limited in its scale and influence. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, there is the issue of the relationship between the democracy and the laws. Were the laws independent guiding principles that maintained the stability of Athens by putting the democracy under control?

Did the democracy use the laws to reinforce its partisan control of Athens? Or, is it something more complicated than these two views? These two issues will be discussed below.

This chapter also provide a historical account of the law reform. It starts with the

Athenian disaster in Sicily in 413, continues with two oligarchic coups and subsequent restoration of the democracy after each coup, and ends with the completion of the reform in 399. This account will provide the necessary historical context for our understanding of the relationship between the democracy and the laws.

41 I. The Scale of Reform

Different views on the scale of the reform mainly result from different interpretations of the main sources: Lysias’ Against Nicomachus and Andocides’ On the Mysteries . While accepting the accounts of Lysias and Andocides, most scholars tend to believe that there was a thorough investigation and revision by certain professional magistrates, whose work resulted in a general codification and publication of the laws. However, there are some problems with this interpretation. First, Lysias and Andocides were not committing themselves to disinterested description; they were litigants ready to use deceptive words in the law courts. 3 Therefore, their testimonies need very careful examination. A further serious difficulty is that through the fourth century B.C. the extant public speeches only mentioned individual laws; no title of an Athenian law code was mentioned. In other words, beyond Lysias’ and Andocides’ suspicious testimonies, there seems no other evidence supporting the existence of general codification of laws at the end of the fifth century B.C. 4 Some scholars have consequently argued that there was no such project of general law revision, or, indeed, even if there was such a project, it did not produce a substantial outcome and therefore did not amount to a ‘constitutional’ event. 5

Noel Robertson’s ‘The Laws of Athens, 410-399 B.C.’ may be one of the most comprehensive studies of this issue following this sceptic view in recent years. He rejects Andocides’ own words and examines the scale of the reform with the cited

3 E.g. The contradiction between the decrees cited in Andocides’ speeches and the orator’s interpretation was noticed long ago. Hignett 1952: 301; A.R.W. Harrison 1955: 26, 32-33. 4 Robertson 1990:44 5 Greenidge 1902: 212, Robertson 1990: 45.

42 decrees alone. 6 He concludes that there is no evidence for the existence of law reform or systematic review of all laws at that period, but only systematic collections of laws, selective reviews of laws, and temporary displays of new laws. 7

However, what Robertson has successfully questioned are only the publication or inscription of the law code and the legislative power of a)nagrafei=j , the law scribes in

410-404. 8 First, his article does not disprove the existence of a comprehensive project of law reform. It has been widely recognized that there is little evidence that Athens displayed all of its laws permanently and systematically in a public place. The difference is that Robertson claims there was no project of law publication at the outset, while most scholars believe that there was such a project, though it failed before long. 9 Secondly, regarding the power of the a0nagrafei=j , Robertson’s view might be right when he suggests that the main task of these law scribes was to collect legal documents, not to revise and make laws; otherwise, Lysias could not have accused Nicomachus, an a0nagrafeu/j , of inserting new laws. 10 Nevertheless, the point is that there must have been disorder found among the collected legal documents and, therefore, a requirement to make them more coherent. Even though the job of law revision did not fall to the a0nagrafei=j , it was undertaken through other institutions. Robertson himself also

6 This is a major difference between R. Sealey and N. Robertson. Robertson (1990: 46) argues that Andocides’ words are unreliable and we should not accept at all his interpretation of the law documents. Sealey (1994: 48), in contrast, argues that Andocides’ words are reliable to some extent and at some point, for he was addressing an audience familiar with the law reform. Carawan (2002: 2) goes even further than Sealey by preferring Andocides’ testimony to the decrees which he believes were wrongly inserted by ancient editors. 7 Robertson 1990: 45, 49. See also Sickinger 2004: 100. 8 There is confusion as to whether the laws were written down or inscribed. In any event, all scholars agree that the laws should have been collected and, therefore, recorded in some form, though not necessarily inscribed on stone. See Clinton 1982: 36. 9 See, for example, Hansen 1991: 164; Rhodes 1991: 91; Todd 1996: 120. Cf. Harrison 1955: 33; Sealey 1994: 47-9. 10 Contra. M. H. Hansen 1990: 67-8.

43 admits that ‘the [legal] record thus compiled sometimes brought to light contradictions and uncertainties in the existing laws, which were then resolved by the bodies competent to do so, the Council and the Assembly.’ 11 Finally, Robertson claims that the scale of reform revealed by Teisamenus’ decree and the new laws enacted at about the same period was ‘very modest’. However, he should consider the content of these new laws; only written laws had force, the laws applied to all citizens alike, no decree shall override a law, etc. 12 It is hard to believe that the scale of the reform was modest from the evidence. 13 The importance of the reform is also attested from another perspective. Its systematic collection and inscription of legal documents, which was for the first time in

Athenian history, helped make the laws public property rather than private possessions of experts. The consistency of the laws should have also improved, since many contradictions among them would have been exposed and fixed in the process of collection and public display. Contrary to Robertson’s view, both the developments were important steps towards the rule by the laws. 14

II. Democracy and Law in the Reform

In Regard to the relationship between the Athenian democracy and the laws as revealed in the law reform, the theories proposed by scholars can be summarized as the rule of law against a power struggle. 15 The theory of the rule of law is that the law reform represented a triumph for the principle of the rule of law over the arbitrary nature of the democracy. Quoting Martin Ostwald’s book title, the reform transformed Athenian

11 Robertson 1990: 75. 12 Andoc. On the Mysteries 85-87. 13 See also Todd 1996: 128. 14 See also Thomas 1996: 10, 19; Sickinger 2004: 106. 15 Christ: 1998: 22-3.

44 politics from ‘popular sovereignty’ to ‘the sovereignty of law’. 16 This theory argues that the reform set up new institutions of legislation and judiciary which successfully contained the supposedly rash tendency of the democracy. By contrast, the theory of power struggle argues that the demos, based on its partisan calculation, exploited the law reform as a political weapon to protect its democracy against oligarchic citizens. 17 i. The Rule of Law

Mogens H. Hansen, Martin Ostwald and Raphael Sealey are the main proponents of the argument that the law reform was a triumph of constitutionalism. 18 Hansen argues that the reform successfully put the democracy under the control of law by creating new judicial and legislative institutions that were independent of the assembly. He points out that the investigation and revision of the laws were conducted by a group of legislators rather than by the assembly: ‘The Assembly had absolutely no role in the work of legislation.’ 19 The result of the law reform is a revolutionary constitutional framework:

‘The Athenians acquired for themselves a new definition of a “law”, a new organ of legislation, a new legislative procedure, and a new procedure for the scrutiny of the laws.’ 20 These new arrangements served as ‘the organ of control for keeping the

16 Ostwald 1986. Other main proponents of this view are Sealey 1987 and M.H. Hansen 1991. 17 See, for example, Sinclair 1988: 83; Ober 1989: 301; Todd 1996: 126. 18 For a similar view from political scientists who argue that the democracy operated under the rule of law or constitutionalism, see, for example, Mion 1986 and B. Campbell 1986. Campbell also criticizes the elitist prejudice in the discipline of political thought about Athenian democracy and politics in general. 19 M.H. Hansen 1991: 163; see also MacDowell 1962: 194- 5. 20 M.H. Hansen 1991: 165-6.

45 Assembly and the political leaders in their place and for re-establishing respect for the laws.’ 21

M. Ostwald argues that certain Athenian magistrates were responsible for the investigation of all the old and new laws, ‘in an attempt to coordinate scattered legislation into a coherent whole and to prepare and publish authoritative texts of the pa/trioi no/moi , especially those of Solon’. 22 He also notices that the nomoqe/tai who completed this reform in 399 were independent of the Assembly; ‘no part of the new code could be proposed from the floor of the Assembly’. 23 In his view, the outcome of the reform was a complete change in the nature of Athenian democracy; ‘law was to be supreme in the new democracy and that the demos could no longer regard whatever it pleased as valid and binding.’ 24 He considers this development the transference of sovereignty from the demos to the laws, which made Athens an almost ideal political community. He praises that ‘thus the democracy achieved stability, consistency, and continuity when the higher sovereignty of nomos limited the sovereignty of the people.’ 25

Sealey argues that the law reform fulfilled the tradition of the rule of law that was another important Athenian tradition in addition to its democracy. He traces the tradition of law to the age of Solon, even earlier than the birth of democracy, arguing that ‘if the laws of

Solon derived their authority from an oath sworn by all Athenians, they did not derive their authority from the vote of a majority in the Assembly.’ 26 This earlier tradition

21 M. Hansen 1991: 304. 22 Cf. Hansen 1990: 68-9. 23 Ostwald 1986: 511-3, 516-7. 24 Ostwald 1986: 522. 25 Ostwald 1986: 524. 26 Sealey 1987: 48.

46 existed independently and was neither a product nor a servant of the democracy. R.

Sealey argues:

On the one hand, the Athenians had a concept of law as a set of permanent

rules capable of serving as a framework within which resolutions could be

passed by a majority in the assembly; so much is implied by the existence of

the graphe paranomon . On the other hand, the assembly was in the habit of

passing resolutions without regard to any supposed limitations. 27

Sealey maintains that the law reform was meant to be a reinforcement of this legal tradition against the democratic tendency of abusing it, for the laws had been written down and more resistant to political manipulation. 28

The theory of the rule of law has the advantage of drawing attention to the legal stability of fourth-century Athens that used to be neglected by scholars. It also points out the complexity of the Athenian legal system and its dramatic change after the law reform.

However, its claim that the laws were independent and superior to the democracy is problematic, particularly in the case of democratic Athens where the legislative and judicial functions were fulfilled almost always by common citizens in person rather than through independent experts. 29

One of the proponents of the rule of law theory, M.H. Hansen, tries to meet the objection to the distinction between law and democracy. He argues that institutional designs made

27 Sealey 1987: 50. 28 Sealey 1987: 39. See also Mion 1986: 235- 8; Campbell 1986: 253 ff. 29 Many historians already pointed out this problem. Harrison 1955: 35; Sinclair 1988: 84; Ober 1989: 299- 304; Todd 1993: 298-301; Cohen 1995: 52 ff; Christ 1998: 22. For a similar view from a political scientist, see Schwartzberg 2004: 319-20.

47 a difference. For example, The legislative power was transferred from the assembly to the law court in fourth-century Athens. Though both institutions consisted of common citizens, Hansen argues that this institutional change has its advantages: the law court gave equal time to both the defenders and the prosecutors; the jurors swore to vote according to the laws and the principle of justice; they were better informed, since many of them had already heard the case in the Assembly; they also had more time of deliberation about law revision in the court than in the Assembly; the lottery of jurors and secret voting prevent faction, bribery and many other kinds of corruption. Hansen argues that institutional arrangements such as these prevented the laws from being abused as they more likely were in the Assembly. 30

However, even if certain institutional innovation in the legislative and judicial sectors helped establish the authority of law in Athens, there remains the question why the democracy tolerated this constitutional development in the law reform that was supposed to restrain its lawless tendency. As we will see later in this chapter, there was eventually no political group who could stand up to the demos. The democracy was the predominant power that was actually responsible for the law reform and the subsequent lawful stability. Hansen says vaguely that it was the Athenians who decided to ‘place some controls on the unlimited power of the people.’ 31 Sealey refers to the Athenian tradition of constitutionalism in the Athenian society. Their views appear to say that the constitutional achievement relies on the demos’ wisdom and self-control. Ostwald, on the other hand, credits the government of the Five Thousand with the success of the law

30 For a summary of Hansen’s argument, see Sundahl 2003: 133-6. 31 Hansen 1999: 303.

48 reform. 32 However, his view is equally questionable, since the government of the Five

Thousand is merely a short-lived transitional regime in the chaotic period at the end of the fifth century B.C. 33

The unsuccessful search for lawful authority independent from the interference of the people is arguably a reflection of the traditional negative view of Athenian democracy as a regime with an embedded tendency of lawlessness. To explain the lawful stability in line with the traditional distinction between the rule of law and the rule of people, scholars tend to argue that fourth-century Athens was no more a radical democracy, but instead a republic under the sovereignty of law.34 However, this conclusion is hardly compatible with the political reality in Athens at the same period of time. The laws could have little support from political groups other than the demos who remained the predominant power in fourth-century Athens. ii. Political Struggle

The theory of political struggle, on the other hand, provides better understandings of the

Athenian law reform, for it explains why the demos decided to revise the laws as it did.

The main purpose of the law reform was to consolidate the democracy that had been overthrown twice in less than ten years by its oligarchic enemies. Though there had already been some legal restrictions as a safeguard for the democracy, such as ostracism and paranomos , the two oligarchic coups in 411 and 404/3 proved their inadequacy. The demos, therefore, launched a new constitutional project with the aim to consolidate the

32 Ostwald 1986: 405, 409. 33 For further problems of the regime of the Five Thousand as the architect of constitutional order, see below. 34 This is suggested in the book titles of Ostwald 1986 and Sealey 1987.

49 democracy with a more powerful legal mechanism. It deprived the Assembly of the legislative power, in case that this institution would vote the democracy out of existence, as it had done twice in the past. Yet, the power to make law was still in the demos’ hand.

It decided that the laws should have higher authority than decree, because the laws protected its interests. By this view, Athenian government in the fourth century B.C. remained a partisan regime rather than a constitutional government.

This is a widely accepted view among scholars. 35 Alick R. W. Harrison pointed out over

50 years ago that the democracy ‘deliberately invented a perfectly democratic brake’ to prevent the possible disastrous consequences of snap vote in the Assembly. 36 Josiah

Ober observes that ‘the Athenian masses were perfectly capable of maintaining two philosophically contradictory concepts [democracy and the rule of law] when they felt that each was valid and useful.’ 37 David Cohen argues that the laws ‘provided a very powerful “democratic” mechanism for social control and for the regulation of competition among those vying for power, wealth, and influence.’ 38 Mathew Christ says that ‘these reforms are best viewed as practical measures designed to ensure that the laws serve the interests of the demos more effectively rather than to redefine the relationship between the demos and the laws.’ 39

At first glance, the theory of power struggle seems to echo the traditional negative view of Athenian democracy, since both of them consider the democracy a partisan regime

35 E.g. Harrison 1955: 35; Thomas 1996: 19; Christ 1998: 22; Sinclair 1988: 83; Ober 1989: 301; Cohen 1995: 35-6; 52 ff; Schwartzberg 2004: 321. 36 Harrison 1955: 35. 37 Ober 1989: 300. 38 Cohen 1995: 192. 39 Christ 1998: 22.

50 rather than government for the common good. Yet, there is a fine line between these two views. The traditional view tends to believe that the democracy, in its pursuit of egoistic interests, would sooner or later destroy itself and the whole community because of its excess or political incompetence. The other view, by contrast, recognizes the democracy’s exceptional success in maintaining its ruling position. What is suggested in the scholars’ quotations above is a highly competent popular government that learned from its mistakes, foresaw potential political problems, and pre-empted them with sophisticated political manipulation. The fourth-century democracy may remain a partisan regime, but it was a very successful one in terms of its effectiveness and stability.

However, the theory of power struggle tends to neglect two important aspects of the law reform. First, its instrumentalist way of thinking may overlook the possibility that the demos did not only use the laws as a means to certain ends, but also believed in their intrinsic values. The outcome of the law reform arguably reflects core democratic ideas such as equality and participation. Second, it is simplistic to claim that the democracy used the laws for the consolidation of its government or for other partisan interests, without further examining how these political goals were understood by the democracy.

This is a complex issue involving the democracy’s understanding of the relationship among the demos, the oligarchs and the Athenian community as a whole. As we will see in the historical account of the law reform, during the ten years’ time the democracy developed different views of its political interests and strategy in relation to the wider society. There will be further discussion on these issues in the concluding part of this chapter.

51 III. The Source Question i. Thucydides’ History vs. Athenian Politeia

Thucydides’ History and the Aristotelian Athenian Politeia are two main sources for our understanding of the law reform. Though it is generally agreed that they are compatible and even complementary to each other, their reports are contradictory at two points: one is about the sequence of two oligarchic regimes, the Four Hundred and the Five

Thousand, and the other relevant issue is their views of the Athenian politician

Theramenes and the so-called ‘moderate oligarchs’ who are responsible for the overthrow of the democracy and the establishment of the Four Hundred in the year of 411. 40

Firstly, regarding the sequence of the two oligarchic regimes, Thucydides reports that the

Four Hundred existed before the Five Thousand, the former taking control of Athens from the democracy while claiming to set up a government of the Five Thousand in an appropriate time. 41 However, the Four Hundred tried their best to put off the transfer of power to the government of the Five Thousand. By contrast, Athenian Politeia reports that it is the Five Thousand that replaced the democracy and then granted all its responsibilities to the Four Hundred. 42 Their accounts are plainly incompatible at this point.

40 For the view that they are largely compatible, see Rhodes 1981: 363; Harris 1990: 259. For their irreconcilable contradiction on the sequence of the Four Hundred and the Five Thousand, see HCT V 1981: 256; Harris 1990: 260-1. 41 Thuc. 8.67. 42 Ath. Pol. 29-32. For a fuller comparison of the sources, see Hignett 1952: 356 ff; Rhodes 1981: 362 ff; HCT V: 184 ff; Harris 1990.

52 This difference is relevant to their another disagreement over the evaluation of the Four

Hundred. 43 Athenian Politeia is more sympathetic to the Four Hundred than Thucydides.

According to the latter, the Four Hundred used the constitution of the Five Thousand only as a cover for their autocratic ambition, holding political power in their own hands after the overthrow of the democracy, rather than transferring it to the government of the Five

Thousand as they had promised they would. By contrast, the version of Athenian Politeia suggests that at least some of the Four Hundred, that is, Theramenes and his followers, were sincere supporters for the constitution of the Five Thousand, since they put it into practice immediately after they overthrew the democracy. Besides, the two-stage procedure via the democracy and the Five Thousand by which the Four Hundred was established enhanced the legitimate appearance of the Four Hundred, for the regime seems in this light more like a result of thorough and peaceful discussion.

All in all, the images of the Four Hundred by Thucydides and Athenian Politeia are much different from each other. According to the latter, the Four Hundred replaced the democratic government with theirs through a largely lawful procedure. The demos abdicated mainly because they believed in the oligarchs’ ability to secure the alliance of

Persia against Sparta. The democracy passed Pythodorus’ proposal of setting up a constitutional commission, allowed any discussion against the established laws, and finally agreed to be replaced by the government of Five Thousand for the duration of the war against Sparta and Persia. The Five Thousand, in turn, handed over the government to the Four Hundred with the task of tackling the immediate military crisis. Thus, the

Four Hundred was granted with autocratic power not because of their conspiracy and

43 See HCT V: 210-2; Harris 1990: 267 ff.

53 violence, but due to the serious crisis by the folly of the democracy. The sympathy of

Athenian Politeia with the Four Hundred is revealed clearly in its conclusion that the

Four Hundred was distinguished in their rule of Athens, though they soon stepped down for their military and diplomatic failure. 44

Thucydides, on the other hand, shows no such sympathy, reporting that the Four Hundred overthrew the democracy and acquired the autocratic power through crafty conspiracy of murder and terror. The demos submitted to the Four Hundred not because of its trust in the Four Hundred, but due to fear and suspicion among the people spread by the Four

Hundred. Though there were formal consent of the assembly and the promise to set up the government of the Five Thousand in the future, these could not conceal the fact that the Four Hundred pursued their political ambition by killing their fellow Athenians, overthrowing the democracy, and finally betraying their fatherland to its Spartan enemy.

Besides, the short-lived rule of the Four Hundred was a complete failure in all other aspects except their subversion of the democracy. In their diplomacy and warfare, they did not succeed in securing the alliance of Persia or the peace treaty with Sparta.

Defeated by Sparta off Eretria, they lost Euboea, a subject ally more useful to Athens than Attica. Domestically, the Athenian navy at Samos was in revolt. The city of Athens was also divided, many citizens finally marching in arms from Piraeus to the city, demanding the government of the Five Thousand. It is because of the hesitant nature of

Sparta, Thucydides observes, that the Athenian empire barely escaped the fate of destruction that it was led into under the Four Hundred. 45

44 Ath. Pol . 33.1-2. 45 Thuc. 8.47 ff.

54 ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis

In Regard to the temporal sequence of the Four Hundred and the Five Thousand, it is better to follow most scholars’ view that Thucydides is more authoritative than Athenian

Politeia . The latter was written almost a century after the event, hence its narrative is more likely to have been distorted through time than the account of Thucydides, who lived at the end of the fifth century B.C. Historians also doubt the authenticity of the constitutional documents quoted in Athenian Politeia , arguing that they were not likely official documents preserved in the state archive, but unofficial drafts, abridged private notes or, more probably, faked testimonies for the integrity of some conspirators, the so- called ‘moderate oligarchs’ among the Four Hundred.46 Thucydides, by contrast, though relying mainly on his informants’ report while he was in exile at that time, still should not have mistaken obvious facts such as the succession of governments. 47

As to the evaluation of the Four Hundred, however, the implication behind Thucydides’ account that there was nothing but personal interests and ambition in the Four Hundred’s coming to power seems too radical to many historians. The ideal of moderate leadership embodied in the portraits of Theramenes and some other oligarchs by Athenian Politeia seems to be a proper explanation of the law reform and other praiseworthy achievements at this period. While Thucydides claims that there was absolutely no sincere proponent

46 Thuc. 8. 66-7. Ath. Pol. 29 ff; Hignett 1952: 361-2; HCT V: 246-251, 256; Rhodes 1981: 386-7. For a recent view preferring Athenian Politeia , see Harris 1990. He argues that the Four Hundred took over the government in a basically non-violent way, having acquired the consent of the people and the regime of the Five Thousand. However, Harris has to base his interpretation on an unconvincing separation of the regime and constitution of the Five Thousand: the group of the Five Thousand was selected before the establishment of the Four Hundred, but the constitution of the Five Thousand was not then in force. See Harris 1990, esp. p. 263. 47 For problems of Thucydides’ account, see, for example, HCT V: 251-4; Hornblower 2000: 141-3.

55 of law reform among the leaders of the Four Hundred, most historians still tend to accept the defence provided by Athenian Politeia for the so-called moderate politicians such as

Theramenes and his followers. According to Athenian Politeia , this group of politicians went beyond the partisan struggle of democrats and oligarchs and were true supporters of the constitutional idea they proclaimed. For example, it is said in A Historical

Commentary on Thucydides that ‘we should accept Thucydides’ view, with the consequences that flow from it’. One of the consequences should be the conclusion that there was no moderate leader at all among the Four Hundred. 48 However, the

Commentary also questions Thucydides’ view that the proposal of law reform was mere propaganda, arguing that ‘it is unlikely in fact that the original conspirators included no

“moderates”’. 49 The Commentary concludes that these faults of Thucydides might be attributed to the incompleteness of his book and the distortion of his informants. 50

Hignett, on the other hand, was more consistent on this issue. He argues that, once accepting Thucydides’ version, we should abandon the myth of Theramenes that the politician ‘was the recognized leader of the moderates before the revolution of 411, entered into a coalition with the extremists and was then tricked by them.’ 51 Yet, what he rejects is only Theramenes’ own integrity rather than the existence of other moderate politicians. He still relies on a list of Theramenean politicians provided by Athenian

Politeia in explaining the success of the law reform and the reconciliation. 52 The attraction of Athenian Politeia may lie in its tendency to explain the reconstruction of the

Athenian legal order with a theory of moderate leadership without referring to the efforts

48 HCT V: 256. 49 HCT V: 252. 50 HCT V: 253-4. 51 Hignett 1952: 362. 52 Hignett 1952: 297.

56 by the democracy. On the other hand, though most historians prefer Thucydides, his narratives, based on realist approaches and ending up in a chaotic Athens, leaves historians at a loss for an explanation about the resilience of the democracy and its aftermath long-term stability in the fourth century B.C. 53

However, the tendency to consider the moderate leadership of Theramenean politicians as the dominant factor for the law reform and other political achievements after 411 should be avoided, for it may oversimplify the tension and complexity of Athenian politics.

Firstly, the integrity of Theramenes and his group had been questioned as early as in their days. It is risky to put much weight on a contention of such a long history of controversy.

Secondly, most of the politicians were major collaborators of the oligarchies in 411/10 and 404/3. It is unlikely that the restored democracy ever believed in their innocence of the atrocities by the two oligarchies and trusted them with tasks as serious as the constitutional project. Finally, as revealed in the development of the law reform, though its final outcome wins the universal praise of being a product of moderation, the several regimes that the reform had gone through adapted different constitutional measures, most of them contradicted one another because of their partisan nature. There was hardly a persistent element of moderation that could be considered as evidence of the dominance of moderate leadership throughout the whole process of law reform. On the contrary, it is more likely that the success of the law reform relies mainly on the demos and the democracy.

53 Thucydides was also a believer of the paramount of the great leadership as we can see from his admiration of Pericles. However, his History reports no strong leadership persistent throughout this period.

57 IV. The Law reform, 411-399 i. The Oligarchy of the Four Hundred

When the news of defeat at Sicily arrived in Athens in 413, all Athenians realized that they were now facing a crisis of life and death. It was expected that Sicily and Sparta would soon launch a further invasion into Athens and that the allies of Athens would revolt. 54 At this moment, the Athenian people showed great determination and resilience in dealing with the crisis. The democracy remained stable for two years. However, the difficult situation of fighting the alliance of two powerful enemies, Sparta and Persia, finally robbed the Athenians of their confidence. The Athenian demos, at first, was tempted to exchange its democracy for support from Persia. 55 Later on, the oligarchs, by murder and terror, forced the demos to give up the democratic government. An oligarchic government of the Four Hundred was finally established in 411.

It was through legal procedure with the pretext of law reform that the oligarchs overthrew the democracy. They proposed to replace the democracy with the government of the Five

Thousand whose membership qualification was to ‘serve the State either in their own proper persons or financially’. 56 The proposal to replace the democracy with the Five

Thousand was acceptable among many Athenians at least for the period of crisis. Some oligarchs might be sincere supporters of the proposal, but the leading oligarchs’ real purpose seemed to create a much narrower oligarchy for themselves. The democracy was terminated through a legal procedure of constitutional amendment. The oligarchs called

54 Thuc. 8.1. 55 Thuc. 8.53-4. 56 Thuc. 8. 65.

58 for the Assembly and set up a plenipotentiary committee ( suggrafei/v )  with the task of preparing a draft of ‘the best possible government’. When the committee only advised at a later Assembly that the law of para/nomov  be suspended and ‘any Athenian should be allowed to make whatever suggestions he liked with impunity’, the oligarchs proposed that the democracy be replaced with a government of the Four Hundred, which they claimed was a preparation for the government of the Five Thousand.

A rider proposed by one called Cleitophon reveals an important aspect of the Athenian concept of law. He suggested that the constitutional committee should also investigate and consider ‘the ancestral laws’ while preparing its draft of a new constitution. 57 It cannot be sure whether he was trying to promote or to block the oligarchic cause, since a wide range of political agendas could claim support from the ideal of ‘the ancestral constitution’. 58

What was the effect of the Four Hundred on the Athenian law reform of 411 to 399? The conclusion that the constitutional proposal of the Four Hundred was merely a false propaganda for their political ambition does not mean that their coup brought no consequence on the Athenian laws. Though it would be unlikely that the successive regimes followed their project, the Four Hundred might have produced some knock-on effects on the subsequent law reform. Firstly, as the theory of power struggle indicates, it is reasonable for the democrats to protect the democracy with more rigorous legal arrangements after their suffering of the abuses of the laws first by the Four Hundred and, seven years later, by the Thirty. The decree of Demophantus and the deprivation of the

57 Ath. Pol. 29. 3. 58 Rhodes 1981: 376- 7.

59 legislative function of the Assembly would be two examples of such consideration. The decree, granting honour and impunity to murderers if they had killed in the name of democracy, could have the effect of eradicating any anti-democratic proposal and discussion. The institution of Assembly, deprived of the legislative power, could not vote out the democracy again. Secondly, the idea of ‘the ancestral laws’ became an important political issue after the Four Hundred. The Four Hundred used the slogan of the ancestral constitution to defend their autocratic rule, 59 claiming they were following the traditional laws rather than altered them or enacted new ones. 60 Their version of the ancestral laws, obviously, was not compatible with the democrats’ understanding. 61 Given the importance of law in the Athenian society, these disputes over the contents of law needed to be solved. This purpose was arguably one of the main motives behind the law collection and investigation project from 410 to 399. ii. The Five Thousand and the First Restored Democracy

The oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred collapsed a few months later, leaving Athens in chaos. Thucydides gave us a list of the crises facing Athens. Euboea had been lost to

Sparta, a blow which was more deadly than the disaster in Sicily. The city itself was on the brink of civil war; its navy either defeated or in revolt abroad. Furthermore, the great fleet of Sparta was approaching the harbour of Athens. It was in such a dire situation that the Athenian people assembled, overthrew the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, and set up

59 Ath. Pol. 31.2. Thuc. 8.70. 60 Ath. Pol. 31.2. 61 For example, the sailors in Samos claimed that the Four Hundred had betrayed the ancestral tradition. Thuc. 8.76.

60 the government of the Five Thousand. The new government later launched its law project. 62

Though few things are known about the law project of the Five Thousand, M. Ostwald claims that the Five Thousand ‘ushered in a period of law reform that had no precedent in

Athenian history’ with the purpose of constraining the popular sovereignty by the written laws. 63 He also presumes that the constitutional project of the Five Thousand was continued by the restored democracy. However, there is no reason to believe that the democracy followed the direction of the Five Thousand in such a critical matter. Two things are sufficient to illustrate the radical difference between the two regimes. First,

Theramenes, supposedly the major proponent of the government of the Five Thousand, lost the people’s support after the restoration of the democracy. 64 More decisively, the decree of Demophantus, as mentioned below, revealed most clearly the radical character of the restored democracy that was the opposite of the constitutionalist principle that

Ostwald claims to be laid down by the Five Thousand. 65

The democracy, restored ‘in the summer of 410’, 66 assigned the job of law collection to a group of magistrates called syngrapheis .67 Though these magistrates were not guaranteed the mandate to revise the laws, it is generally believed that their work is preparation for a general law revision, about which there is scant information.

62 Thuc. 8. 96-97. For further discussion of the constitution or the regime of the Five Thousand, see Harris 1990 and the bibliography there. 63 Ostwald 1986: 405, 409. 64 See Rhodes 1972: 125- 6; 1991: 89. 65 See below; see also Rhodes 1972: 126. 66 Rhodes 1972: 118. 67 They were also responsible for the publication of Draco’s law on homicide in 409/8. The law is still available to us. CAH V . 485.

61 The performance of the democracy at this period seems to match up the typical image of the tyranny of the majority. It showed no respect for the laws as an independent authority, but made them subject to the demos’ partisan interests or passion, abusing them to punish their enemies. There seemed a series of prosecutions; many suspected supporters of the

Four Hundred were partially deprived of civil rights. 68 There was the infamous trial in which the generals of the naval battle off Arginusae were put to death in 406 through unlawful procedure by the demos who was overwhelmed by anger or politicians’ instigation. 69

Yet, these examples above have not fully described the demos’ ruthless use of the laws, compared with Demophantus’ law against subverting the democracy in 410/09, one of the earliest pieces of legislation by the first restored democracy. This law demanded that any one who plotted to overthrow the democracy was an enemy of Athens whom all citizens were required under oath to kill. The reward of murder was tempting. The murderer in such cases would be rewarded with half of the property of the murdered, and the state promised to care for his descendents if he was killed in his action. The law even overrode religious taboo, claiming that the murderer caused no religious contamination, since the murdered was by definition an enemy of the state and that all oaths were deemed annulled if sworn to overthrown the democracy. 70

The demos at this period of time, as Aristotle criticised, identified itself with the community of Athens and mistook the interests of the democracy for the interests of all

68 Andoc. On the Mysteries , 75-6; CAH V, 484; Hignett 1952: 280 ff. 69 Xen. Hell. , 1.7.12-15. 70 Andoc. On the Mysteries , 96-98.

62 citizens. 71 As Plato criticized, it tried to pre-empt all possible threats to their partisan regime by violent means. 72 Therefore, citizens who attempted to overthrow the democracy were considered enemies of Athens and were no longer fellow citizens. All

Athenian citizens were imposed with the same obligation to protect the democracy by all means, regardless of their political inclinations. The identification of the demos with the

Athenian community became the supreme principle over the whole society, the laws and other social regulation being modified utterly to fit the needs of the democracy.

Demophantus’ law overrode Draco’s law on homicide that was republished at about the same time. The obligation for all Athenians to kill the conspirators and collaborators meant that all social connections, such as family and friendship, could be cut off for political reasons. Even religious conviction was compromised; the oaths sworn in the name of the gods could be annulled, and the action of murder, by defining the murdered as an enemy of Athens, was a deed of purification rather than pollution. iii. From the Naval Battle of Aegospotami to the Coup of the Thirty

Popular opinion started to change after the rout of the Athenian fleet in the naval battle of

Aegospotami in 405, as Patrocleides’ decree suggested. 73 The decree decided that, with the exclusion of certain fugitives, the oligarchs of the Four Hundred and other citizens who had been deprived of civil rights, due to economic or other reasons, should have their full civic rights back. Now they could speak and make propositions freely to the demos. This measure, as expected at that time, was proposed in the name of the ancestral laws. The contemporary orator, Andocides, rightly observed that their restoration of

71 Arist. Pol . 1283a10– 15. 72 Pl. Leg . 832c. 73 Andoc. On the Mysteries , 73-9; Xen. Hell. 2.2.11.

63 citizenship indicated a radical change from civil division to unification. ( o(mo/noia )74 This decree concluded with the hope that ‘the Athenians may live in all security (or with all trust, pisto/tata ) both now and hereafter.’ 75

However, Athens finally surrendered to Sparta, and the oligarchy of the Thirty was set up in 404/3. Once again the Assembly was forced to terminate the democracy, and the law investigation stopped. 76 Though extremely notorious for their lawless behaviour, the

Thirty claimed at the very beginning of their rule to investigate the ancestral constitution, which they promised would be the principle for their rule and revision of the laws. 77

However, several laws were nullified or amended; the laws of Ephialtes were nullified and the sovereign power of the jury men abolished, and the Thirty also revised the

Solonian laws, claiming to stop sycophancy. 78 One interesting thing is that the Thirty seemed to be the only politicians that publicly criticized the Solonian or ancestral laws in this period. iv. The Second Restored Democracy

The oligarchy of the Thirty survived only a few months before the democracy was restored again. An agreement of reconciliation was achieved between the democrats and the oligarchs, including the freedom for all the Athenians to live in either the city of

74 Andoc. On the Mysteries , 73. 75 Andoc. On the Mysteries , 79. 76 Lys. Against Nicomachus 15, 29; Rhodes 1991: 89. 77 Xen. Hell. 2.3.1; Ath. Pol. 35. 78 Ath. Pol. 35. Ath. The author of Athenian Politeia praised these amendments, saying that the city of Athens (not the demos) was pleased, a judgement that reveals his oligarchic sympathy. On the other hand, according to Xenophon, only the council that was appointed by the Thirty welcomed these measures; the general public kept silence. See Ath. Pol. 35. Xen. Hell. 2.3.12.

64 Athens or the self-governing Eleusis, a general amnesty for the past misconduct, and a government according to the ancestral constitution.79

Under the atmosphere of reconciliation the project of law reform, resumed soon after the restoration of democracy, was unlikely to make extremely partisan laws against the oligarchs. On the contrary, the demos tried hard to keep its former enemies within the

Athenian community. The severe law of Demophantus against subversion of the democracy was either suspended or abrogated. 80 The amnesty covered most of the oligarchic supporters for all their misconduct in the days of the Thirty, except for the leaders and those who had committed murder with their own hand. 81 Someone who tried to instigate popular hatred toward the oligarchs was put to death without trial. Finally,

Pericles’ law of citizenship confirmed again that only children of Athenian astoi could be

Athenian citizens. The decree of Thrasybulus that granted Athenian citizenship to the democrats’ non-Athenian comrades was annulled. Accepting their oligarchic enemies with abundant generosity, but rejecting the foreign comrades with little gratitude, the

79 Ath. Pol. 39-40; Xen. Hell. 2.4.38-43; Andoc. On the Mysteries 81 ff. The amnesty will be discussed in the next chapter. It is better to consider the amnesty and the law reform as two different events. Roughly speaking, the amnesty should be seen as a specific enactment whose effect was limited to the past days of the oligarchy, while the ancestral constitution applied to the future. Of the main sources both Athenian Politeia and Xenophon’s Hellenica consider the amnesty and the ancestral constitution different measures of reconciliation. Only Andocides argued that the amnesty led to constitutional amendments, but even Teisamenus’ decree quoted in his speech does not support his argument. Suspension of the force of certain laws for the crimes under the reign of the Thirty should be enough to meet the need of the amnesty; there should be no need to change the substantial content of the laws for the sake of amnesty. Cf. Carawan, 2002. For other recent articles on the interpretation of Teisamenus’ decree, see Robertson 1990, Rhode 1991; Sealey 1994: 45 ff, and Todd 1996:126 ff. 80 Andoc. On the Mysteries 99; Dem. 20.159; Lycurg. 1.124-7. Lycurgus reported that the decree of Demophantus was re-enacted after the overthrow of the Thirty. The stele of that decree was set up again in front of the council house, which must have been a terrifying scene to the oligarchic supporters. However, his testimony is doubtful. First, Andocides proved that it was not in force at the time of his trial, that is, between 403 and 400. Besides, Phormisius could not have dared to propose limitation of citizenship to the propertied class if the law was still valid in the second restored democracy. Dion. Hal. Lys. 32; Lys. 34. H.M. Hansen (1979: 36) believes that the decree of Demophantus ‘must be dated 403/2 or shortly afterward.’ However, Carawan (2002: 19) suggests that it was re-enacted sometime after 403 with a time limitation, that is, it is valid only after the year of Eucleides. 81 Ath. Pol. 39.

65 democracy seemed determined to reconstruct not just a democracy, but a democracy based on a strict principle of ethnicity.

The law reform was finished at 399. The democracy confirmed again the ancestral laws as the principle and substantial content of its constitution. 82 The ancestral constitution was no longer elusive ideas or empty words from politicians, but what Nicomachus and his colleagues had collected and written down since 410. 83 The authority of the laws was well maintained by the following innovative procedural regulations: under no circumstances all magistrates should thereafter enforce an unwritten law, no decree should override a law, and no laws should be applied to individual citizens if not applied to all citizens. 84 Besides, any decree that violated the laws would be annulled through the prosecution of grafai\\ parano/mwn and grafai\ no/mon mh\ e0pith/deion qei=nai .85

In addition to the collection of the ancestral laws, there was a new legislative procedure in Teisamenus’ decree for new laws if necessary. 86 The procedure was divided into two stages and through several institutions. At the first stage, the Council elected a group of legislators to prepare a draft of the new law. The draft was then displayed to the public and then handed over to the responsible officers. At the second stage, the Council and a new group of five hundred legislators elected by the demes examined the draft. All

82 Andoc. On the Mysteries 83. 83 Hignett 1952: 302; MacDowell 1962: 195; Rhodes 1991: 98; Todd: 1996, 128. At any rate, the laws of Solon and Draco mentioned in the decree should not be an empty concept, but something substantial, since all the laws in force after 403, old and new, must be written down. Dem. 24.42. Cf. Finley 1971: 59. 84 Andoc. On the Mysteries 85, 87. 85 Sundahl 2003: 129 ff. 86 Another new legislative procedure soon replaced this one. MacDowell 1975: 62; M.H. Hansen 1991: 167.

66 citizens could also provide their respective advice. If the draft was ratified, the magistrates should apply the new law under the guardianship of the Areopagus council. 87

In summary, only three types of law were in force after 403; the first was ‘the laws that were enacted under democratic government before the archonship of Eucleides’, the second was ‘the laws that were enacted during the archonship of Eucleides and are on record’, and the last type of law was those ‘enacted after the archonship of Eucleides or laws that shall hereafter be enacted’. 88 All the laws that were in force since 403 were to be written down and registered in a newly built official archive called Metroon. 89

The development of Athenian legal system is now completed. According to Athenian

Politeia , the law reform from 403 to 399 was the final constitutional change in the history of Athens. 90 From here until its end in 322, the restored democracy maintained the stability of both its government and the laws.

V. Conclusion i

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are mainly two theories about the achievement of the law reform. One believes that the reform was a triumph of the rule of law over populism, while the other explains it from the perspective of political struggle,

87 Andoc. On the Mysteries , 83- 4. Many details of the procedure are still in dispute, for example, it is not sure what material was used to draw up these legal texts, where they were displayed, and whether their display was temporary or permanent. For these technical issues, see Robertson 1990; Sickinger 2004. 88 Dem. 24. 42. Ostwald 1986: 522-3; Robertson 1990: 45; Carawan 2002: 19-21; Andoc. On the Mysteries 87. The translation of Loeb here is misleading; see MacDowell 1962: 128. 89 The archive centre was once the Athenian Bouleuterion. Hansen 1990: 71; Sickinger 2004: 101- 2. 90 Ath. Pol. 41.2. Rhodes 1981: 483, 488.

67 considering the reform a successful manipulation of the laws by the democracy to its own advantage. It is noteworthy that, though having different views on the law reform, both the theories challenge the traditional negative view of Athenian politics in some ways.

The Athenian constitutional government as argued in the explanation of the rule of law differs from the tradition view of Athens as a disordered society. The theory of political struggle suggests that Athenian democracy was a cunning master of political manoeuvre rather than a mob of common people as it used to be labelled.

The theory of the rule of law argues that the law reform created a legal system independent to some extent of the Athenian partisan politics. The theory gains strong support from both the Athenian legal texts and the stability of Athenian legal order after the reform. The laws quoted in Andocides’ speech attest the independence of law from the demos or the assembly. 91 All the laws had authority over the decrees of the Assembly and the council, and the authority of law came not from the Assembly or the demos, but from the fact that it had been a law in the past or because of the legislation of the council and the elected legislators. The laws had to be written down, so the possibility of the laws being distorted or abused has lessened. It was now more difficult to use the laws against particular political enemies due to their equal appliance to all citizens. Perhaps most importantly, the designs mentioned above for constitutional independence were not only a temporary arrangement; they were observed throughout the fourth century B.C.

The theory of the rule of law gives an explanation for the constitutional stability of

Athens since 403, but has problems in its tendency to play down the role of the democracy. The theory tends to emphasise that the function of the rule of law was to

91 Ostwald 1986: 523-4. Hansen 1991: 175-77.

68 constrain the ruthlessness of the democracy, ignoring the fact that the rule of law was fulfilled and maintained under the direct democracy. Considering the extent of civil participation in Athenian politics, it is hard to believe that the democracy or the demos had nothing positive to do with the establishment of the lawful order.

The theory of political struggle, on the other hand, believes that the democracy successfully exploited the laws to justify its political authority and to control its oligarchic citizens. The theory has the advantage of taking into account the reality of

Athenian politics. It correctly pointed out that the Athenian laws were part of democratic politics rather than an independent authority. As we have seen, the democracy was the architect of the law reform, and in most cases the demos participated intensively in the legislative and judicial activities of the laws. Besides, the law reform was, in a sense, competition for the legitimacy of political power. The democracy was overthrown twice by the oligarchs with the pretext of law revision in the reform. There is good reason to believe that the demos, having learnt from its experience, would take particular care of the laws after its hard-won victory in the competition, to make sure that the laws would not contradict again what it thought were its essential interests. ii

However, the theory of political struggle may miss some important aspects of the law reform. Its instrumental way of thinking that the democracy used the laws mainly as a partisan means tends to deny the intrinsic connection between the democracy and the laws. In fact, there is a possibility that the demos made the laws following its political belief rather than cost-benefit analysis. There should be a conceptual distinction about

69 the relationship between Athenian democracy and its laws. The laws were democratic in two senses; they promoted demotic interests, or they reflected democratic values. It is the second function of the laws that we might overlook when seeing the law reform from the perspective of political struggle.

Some intrinsic connections between democratic values and the laws may be argued as follows. The democratic belief that all citizens were equal members of the community can be found in one of the important results of the law reform that all laws should be applied to all citizens equally. 92 It is also reflected in the principle that all magistrates ruled only by the laws, which means that no citizen should have arbitrary power over others even when he was in charge of the government. There is more evidence for another democratic value of participation. As the democracy restored in 403, Athens went back to the participatory way of life. Ruling officials did not have arbitrary power, but were demanded to rule by the laws. Citizens discussed and decided lawful issues as well as other public affairs. The collection of laws in the state archive and display of legal drafts in public places improved public access to the laws to an unprecedented level.

In a sense, the outcome of the law reform embodied the important democratic value that to be a citizen of Athens was to participate in its public affairs. 93 iii.

Another important aspect of the law reform that is often neglected by scholars is the demos’ ability to learn and adapt their view of politics. Both the perspective of the rule of law and that of power struggle tend to presume that the Athenian demos was a pursuer

92 E.g. Thuc. 2.37. 93 E.g. Thuc. 2.40.

70 of self-interests even at the expense of common interest or the interest of others.

However, the distinction between demotic and other interests are dynamic rather than static. As shown in the history of Athens at the end of the fifth century B.C., the policies of the second restored democracy regarding the laws and other political issues in 403 was much more generous than the first restored democracy in 410, a difference that suggests a dramatic change in the Athenian demos’ understanding of self-interest in relation to other political groups and the whole community.

The last stage of law reform was obviously dominated by the concern of rebuilding the

Athenian community in terms of ethnicity. Athens was defined principally as the exclusive community of Athenians and their offspring. The laws in force were claimed to be the laws of Athenian common ancestors. Athenian oligarchs were not expelled from the community because of their plot against the democracy or other serious crimes while the foreigners could not join the community even when they had sacrificed their lives for the cause of democracy.

This is a great change. Compared with previous stages of law reform, we found that the democracy after 403 continued with the reconciliatory spirit of Patrodeides’ decree in 405 rather than returned to the tyrannical mode of Demophantus’ law in 410. It is of course an exaggeration to claim that the democracy after 403 transformed itself from a partisan regime to an ideal constitutional government, whose only concern was the common good of the whole community. However, we can at least argue that the democracy had learnt to put its partisan interests into the broader context of the whole community. The demos and the democrats, though the predominant part of the Athenian community, were still

71 less than the whole community which also contained many oligarchic citizens. A flourishing Athens relied on the cooperation of both the democrats and the non-democrats.

The democracy would have realized this lesson to its own cost. As we have seen, after all its military and political disasters in the past years, the democracy tried hard to strike a balance between democratic interests and communal harmony, taking into account the non-democratic elements of the community.

In other words, we may say that the democracy after 403 learned the political art of compromise. Some results of the law reform could be interpreted from this perspective.

As we have seen in this chapter, ‘the ancestral laws’ were the dominant principle of

Athenian political order. To alleviate suspicion on all sides, the ancestral laws which would be valid thereafter should be clear and certain. Therefore, the Athenians announced that only the laws enacted in specific times would be valid and that all the valid laws must be written down. A state Archive at Metroon collected all the valid laws and other documents for public reference. The predictability of the future to all citizens was further strengthened by the magistrates’ duty to apply only the written laws, the general appliance of the laws, and the laws’ superiority over the decrees of the Assembly and the council. Furthermore, the legislative procedure in the Teisamenus’ decree could be considered a compromise of the democrats and the oligarchs. Since the superiority of law to decree had been established, the legislative power would be the most fiercely competed target. Monopoly of the legislative power by any particular political group would not be an likely solution. This decree provided an acceptable arrangement by dividing the legislative process into two stages and distributing the legislative power among three institutions. The assembly now lost all its legislative power. Of the three

72 legislative institutions, only the council was appointed by the democratic method of lottery, the other two groups of legislators being elected either by the council or by the demes. The election of legislators did resemble the procedure of oligarchic coups in

411/10 and 404/3. However, while the Four Hundred and the Thirty had become tyrannical by grasping the complete executive and legislative powers at the same time, the two legislative groups elected by the Teisamenus’ decree had only part of the legislative power respectively, and held no executive power at all. Their power was further limited because they were ad hoc rather than standing committees.

73 Chapter Three

The Reconciliation of Athens in 403 B.C.

The democracy decided to reconcile with the oligarchs after its miraculous victory over the Thirty in 403. Among other issues, it was agreed that there would be no prosecution of collaborators of the Thirty in most cases, that oligarchs were free to leave Athens, and that Athens should be ruled by the ancestral laws. The democracy observed these reconciliatory terms faithfully, and civil strife ceased to be a serious problem in Athenian politics in the fourth century B.C.

Given the ferocity of the Athenian civil war, it is surprising that the war finished in a relatively peaceful way, an achievement that was even praised by its contemporary critics. 1 Xenophon described the democrats as pious and generous people in contrast to the ruthless Thirty. 2 Athenian Politeia observed that the people ‘appear both in private and public to have behaved towards the past disasters in the most completely honourable and statesmanlike manner of any people in history’.3 Even Plato wrote that ‘so readily and naturally—so much contrary to the expectations of the other Greeks—did the citizens from the Piraeus [i.e. the democrats in exile] and those from the city [i.e. the oligarchs] deal with each other!’ 4

However, this achievement of Athenian democracy has been largely dismissed in the study of ancient political history and philosophy. Even though the Athenian

1 Mossé 1973: 48. Loening 1987: 13; Ober 1998: 120-1; Wolpert 2002a: xi. 2 Xen. Hell . 2.4.40 ff. 3 Ath. Pol . 40.2 4 Pl. Menex. 243e. As to the interpretation of this Platonic passage, see chapter 5.

74 reconciliation is recently getting more attention, 5 most scholars still tend to downplay its significance or to dispute the demos’ contribution to its achievement.

With knowledge of the law reform in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide a balanced account of the reconciliation. It will also prove that Athenian democracy deserves a better image than it has received from traditional views. It concludes that what the democracy did in the reconciliation is to strike a balance between the goals of democratic consolidation and communal harmony by putting its partisan interests in the broader context of the community. It is not, as suggested by most scholars, that the democracy made an either-or choice between partisan interests and the common good.

Before reaching this conclusion, a historical account will be provided to clarify some important issues about the reconciliation, including its goals, terms and the degree of its success, as well as the role of the democracy in this great event.

I. Literature review

The reconciliation of Athens constitutes a difficult case for scholars of ancient history, for the restoration of domestic peace under Athenian democracy appears to be at odd with the traditional and pessimistic view that Athens was in a process of decline since the death of Pericles. Historians’ vacillation on their assessment of the demos in 403 is clearly demonstrated in Claude Mossé’s Athens in Decline, 404- 386 (1973). Mossé differs from most historians in his insistence that the democrats returned to Athens as the

5 One main reason for the increasing interest in the Athenian reconciliation should be the sprouting out of the issue of transitional justice around the world after the end of the cold war around 1990. Scholars often refer to this contemporary political issue while addressing the Athenian reconciliation, or vice versa. See, for example, Tieman 2002; D. Cohen 2001; Elster 2004.

75 victors. 6 Therefore, in his opinion, pressure from Sparta and the Athenian oligarchs does not account for the moderation of the demos. However, he still hesitates to credit the demos with its achievement. Instead, he promises that ‘an analysis of the material situation of Athens’ could provide the answer. 7 His promise failed; her material analysis leads to the conclusion that the economic conditions, impoverished by the war, do nothing positive but intensified conflicts among the Athenians. While the poor and the city people longed for another war for the opportunities of jobs, booty and imperial glory, the rich and country people disliked sharing the cost and the destructive consequence of war. 8 Therefore, the question of ‘the stability of Athens…which forms so remarkable a contrast with the disturbed state of other parts of the Greek world’ turns out to be unanswered. He finally provides a list of possible causes which are in fact largely irrelevant. 9 His pessimistic view on fourth-century Greece might be the cause of his problem. He argues that ‘the moral confusion, the disloyalty towards the gods of the polis was to increase during the fourth century B.C., in association with that decline of the civic consciousness which reveals the slow break-up of the civic community and heralds the end of the city-state.’ 10 His observation of the long term tendency of Greece might be right, but he has difficulty in explaining the reconciliation.

In any case, there are two main theories about the Athenian reconciliation: realism and

Loraux’s ‘anthropological’ perspective. A common view of the reconciliation is that the demos was simply forced into reconciliation with the oligarchs because of the pressure of

6 However, her belief in the democrats’ victory over Pausanias’ army is simply wrong. Mossé 1973: 11. 7 Mossé 1973: 12. 8 Mossé 1973: 16. 9 Mossé 1973: 16-17. 10 Mossé 1973: 20. Cf. Wolpert 2002b: 112-3. Wolpert suggests that the Athenians reminded ambitious and active politically in the fourth century B.C.

76 Sparta. The vivid reports of Thucydides and Xenophon on the Athenian people’s behaviour in the plague, their invasion of Melos, and the trial of the ten generals in 406 has created the notorious image that the demos was naturally liable to manipulation by passion and partisan interests, having little forethought for the consequences to itself as well as to others. 11 It is generally believed that the democrats would have exacted their revenge on the defeated oligarchs had they been confident in their power over outside constraints. There could be no reconciliation at all without the intervention of Sparta.

The political order was restored not because of the Athenian virtue of dealing with conflict in non-violent ways, but because of an incidental balance of forces among the democrats, the oligarchs, and, most important of all, Sparta. In this chapter, I am going to refer to this line of interpretation as realism. 12

Another approach that might be called ‘anthropological’ perspective refers to the strong sense of community among Athenians. It argues that this communal feeling constitutes one of the main reasons that the democrats gave up their right of revenge on the defeated oligarchs. It also points out the tension between democratic interests and communal unity, arguing that the demos actually sacrificed its democracy for the sake of community.

11 Thuc. 2.52 ff, 5.84 ff; Xen. Hell. 1.7.1ff. 12 This realist perspective refers mainly to a common understanding among historians of Thucydides’ History . This view, most briefly speaking, is as follows: the first and foremost principle of human behaviour is the consideration of one’s own self-interests. A logical conclusion following this principle is that law and morality are nothing but the barely disguised self-interests of the stronger or the cunning ones. However, a society without the support of certain basic moral or communal values is doomed to total destruction while its members are pursuing their self-interests at each other’s cost. One important thing to be noted is that the realist view of human behaviour, adopted by many historians on the democracy, is not based on Thucydides’ statement of his own view on morality or the democracy, but a common interpretation of his History . For the Thucydidean realist tradition and its influence, see M. I. Finley 1971: 46; Murray 1986: 195-7; Harris 1990: 271- 2; Orwin 1994: 8 ff. For the doubt that Thucydides himself believed in the realist view, see Hornblower 2000: 184 ff.

77 In contrast to its egoistic image in the view of realism, Athenian democracy has been portrayed as an altruistic government from this communitarian perspective.

As discussed below, the communitarian approach has an advantage over the realist approach because of its proper recognition of the reconciliatory achievement and the contribution of the democracy in this project. However, neither of the two approaches provides satisfactory explanation of this important event. i. Realism

1. Traditional view

As mentioned above, realism has been the dominant explanation of the reconciliation. It is often argued from this perspective that the democracy did not choose but was forced into reconciliation by certain external factors, especially the attitude of Sparta which was supposedly the guardian of Athenian oligarchs. It is said that, had it been possible, the demos would not have voluntarily given up its revenge on the oligarchs. For example,

Stephen Todd concedes that the reconciliation was successful to a certain extent, but he also stress that ‘the reason for this was not democratic magnanimity, or the existence of an all-powerful ‘moderates’ faction, but the threat of Sparta.’ 13

Thomas C. Loening’s The Reconciliation Agreement of 403/ 402 B.C. in Athens (1987) is an important work on this issue. Though pointing out that the peaceful outcome of the

Athenian civil war was extraordinary, Loening does not argue that the Athenian way of thinking and behaviour were anything different from the way they had been in wartime.

13 Todd 1986: 201.

78 The reconciliation was mainly achieved by the political and military conditions at that moment. All the three parties involved in the negotiation, the democrats, the oligarchs, and the Spartans, made their decisions according to nothing other than their partisan interests. 14 Besides, he concludes that ‘[t]he triumph of the reconciliation treaty must be credited in large part to the leaders of the restored democracy, especially Archinos and

Thrasyboulos, who were far-sighted enough to recognize that the renaissance of Athens depended upon peace and harmony among all its citizens.’ 15

Another recent example is Cynthia Schwenk. Though appreciating the stability and other achievements of the fourth-century Athens, she still argues that Sparta has the credit for the political achievement of Athens, not only because Sparta decided not to destroy

Athens and tolerated the restoration of the democracy, but also because it acted as a powerful constraint on ‘the strongest passions and hatreds created [among Athenians] during the rule of the Thirty’. 16

Barry Strauss summarizes the external factors that are said to force the democrats to reconcile with the oligarchs. He argues that the remaining strength of the oligarchs and the Spartan army were the true foundation for the moderation of the democrats. Another important reason is the decreased population of the demos which was outnumbered by the richer citizens by at least 20 percent because of their greater casualties in the war. 17 B.

Strauss also seems to credit the ‘Theramenean’ or moderate oligarchs with the reconciliation. He concludes:

14 Loening 1987: 13-16. 15 Loening 1987: 149. 16 Schwenk 1997: 11-12. 17 B. Strauss 1986: 80-81.

79 The ranks of the men of the City were not small, for Archinus had limited

the number who could emigrate to Eleusis. They included a general and

secretary of the Council for 403/ 402. Three leaders of Phyle and Piraeus

were former Theramenists: Anytus, Archinus and Phormisius. Add to this

the population problems of the thetes and the watchful eyes of Sparta, and

it is no surprise that the restored democracy avoided radicalism .18

This line of interpretation reflects the strong influence of the traditional suspicion of

Athenian democracy. It tends to dismiss the achievement of reconciliation, considering it merely an accidental event based on precarious checks and balances of power. The

Athenian demos, supposedly still keen on revenge, was seen as a potential threat to the fragile peace agreement, and many policies and decisions by the democracy actually violated the spirit of reconciliation, if not its terms. As to the limited success of the reconciliation, it is often credited to factors other than the demos and its government.

This dominant view of the reconciliation is not without its problems. Firstly, as discussed later in this chapter, the reconciliation is highly successful in terms of the enforcement of reconciliatory regulations and the consequent Athenian internal peace. It is unfair to deny the success of reconciliation, as some scholars did, by applying strict criterions such as complete oblivion and unconditional forgiveness of the past crimes committed by the

Athenian oligarchs. It is equally problematic to describe the exceptional long-term domestic peace of Athens after the civil war as nothing but a precarious balance of power.

Secondly, most factors used in realist explanations are far from being decisive as they appear to be. The role of ‘Theramenist’ or moderate politicians has been highly

18 B. Strauss 1986: 92.

80 controversial since ancient times. Neither their morality nor their political leadership at the end of the fifth century B.C. should be taken for granted. 19 The influence of Sparta, though important at the beginning of the reconciliation, soon faded out a few years later.

Besides, it is likely that Athens was allowed to have complete freedom in the domestic affairs as long as it followed Sparta in its foreign policies. 20 The only remaining factor left in B. Strauss’ list is then the post-war structure of Athenian population, whose diversity arguably prevented the demos from taking revenge on the oligarchs. However, even this is questionable, since the political diversity of Athenian population is more like a result of the reconciliation rather than its condition, as discussed below.

2. Recent discussions

The recent articles in Transactions of the American Philological Association , 2002, show further developments of the realist tradition. These articles were also suspicious of ancient writers’ praise of the demos for the reconciliation, arguing that the demos’ moral character may not constitute an adequate explanation for the achievement of the reconciliation. 21 A realist concept of self-interested human nature is presumed: people

‘make choices in such a way as to optimize the outcome or outcomes that he most desires, given his beliefs.’ 22 Following this assumption, Athens was portrayed as a city of suspicion and fragmentation by which revenge on the oligarchs was suspended. James M.

Quillin argues that the Athenians refused to approve prosecutions of the oligarchs

19 See the discussion in section 3.2 of ch. 2. 20 See the discussion in section 3.3 of this chapter. 21 See the discussions of Tieman, Quillin, Wolpert, and Ober in Tr ansactions of the American Philological Associations 132: 1-2, 2002, pp. 63-137, esp. p. 66. Wolpert’s position in this article is closer to realism than his previous book of Remembering Defeat . 22 Quillin 2002: 77.

81 because they were afraid that the prosecutors ‘would use the power afforded to them by a conviction not to attack the enemies of the demos, but to destroy any who opposed them and to keep everyone else quiet through fear of prosecution.’ 23 On the other hand,

Andrew Wolpert concludes that ‘perhaps the Athenian people were so divided after the civil war that it was impossible for them to revert to a state of civil unrest with the community divided into two (and only two) warring factions.’ 24

The realist theories of J. Quillin and A. Wolpert show some progress compared to their predecessors. The traditional view tends to differentiate the demos from other political groups for the demos’ supposedly vulnerability to egoism and impetuosity. Quillin and

Wolpert do not seem to share such elitist values. Their understanding of the demos as rational pursuer of maximum self-interest seems to be based on a common understanding of human nature that is prevalent in modern social sciences. They are also right in putting aside the doubtful influence of Sparta and the Athenian ‘moderate’ politicians. 25

As a result of their new realist approaches, Athenian democracy receives a more positive image, since the demos is now at least considered to be a group of sensible people following rational calculation.

However, the explanations of Quillin and Wolpert also have their problems. Quillin’s conclusion is highly unlikely. As it was, the Athenian juridical system still relied on voluntary prosecutors in the fourth century B.C. It is hard to believe that an Athenian prosecutor would ever acquire tyrannical power by accumulating a few victories in criminal trials. More importantly, it would be hard to imagine how the institutions of

23 Quillin 2002: 97. 24 Wolpert 2002b: 116-7. 25 Wolpert (2002b: 112) indicates that Sparta was at most a temporary factor in Athenian politics.

82 direct democracy could have been maintained if there had been such deep suspicion against voluntary prosecutors.

Wolpert’s theory is more plausible, but is too simplistic. He is right in pointing out that the heterogeneous composition of citizen population might have created disagreement on punishment of oligarchic citizens. However, it should be pointed out that the diversity of

Athenian civic population in terms of their political spectrum is more like a result of reconciliation rather than its condition. The democracy was the victor in the civil war. It could have axed the number of oligarchic citizens to triviality if it had chosen to do so. 26

In summary, there is nothing elementarily wrong with the realist presumption that the democracy pursued its self-interests even in the laudable project of reconciliation, but it is problematic to conclude that its self-interests necessarily conflicted with the common good. Most realist explanations of the reconciliation so far reflect strong influence of the traditional suspicion of direct democracy. They doubt that the restored democracy had the wisdom or capability to conduct the reconciliatory project, and tend to play down the reconciliation as something built on insecure foundations. Their view neglects the exceptional achievement of Athenian domestic peace after the civil war, on the one hand, and the central role of the democracy in Athenian politics, on the other. Recently, some scholars are able to reject this elitist suspicion of the demos’ intelligence, but they have not yet developed satisfactory explanations for the reconciliation.

One problem with these realist explanations may be their failure to notice the dynamic relationship between democratic and communal interests. As argued in the previous

26 For the view that the democrats were the victor of the civil war, see section 2.2 of this chapter.

83 chapter, there were changes in the democracy’s perception of self-interests from narrow- minded partisan positions to broader nationalistic perspectives after its military crisis in

405. The unity of Athenian community became an essential part in the democracy’s understanding of self-interest. Without this knowledge of historical development, it is hard to understand why the democracy chose to reconcile with the oligarchs rather than taking revenge. ii.The ‘Anthropological’ Approach

Over 60 years ago, Alfred P. Dorjahn noticed that the sense of community was an important cause of the reconciliation. 27 In recent years some historians, presuming that the restoration resulted from genuine virtues on the part of the demos, questioned the validity of realist explanations. Andrew Wolpert’ Remembering Defeat and Nicole

Loraux’s Divided City are the major works of this new approach.

Andrew Wolpert emphasises that nothing except the demos itself could really have prevented their indulgence in revenge. He says:

The Athenians could have simply dismissed pragmatic considerations in

order to obtain private satisfaction for past grievances. Causal

explanations present the reconciliation as a fait accompli, as if there were

only one possible outcome to the civil war. But as Corcyra shows,

27 Dorjahn 1946: 18.

84 pragmatic considerations do not always lead a people to chose the

course of action that best serves its interests. 28

Nicole Loraux’s Divided City is a more profound analysis. She criticizes historian approaches, saying that they concentrate only on the aspect of conflict without considering the other aspect of cooperation. 29 Another approach that she calls the

‘anthropological approach’ is better equipped for explanation of formation and maintenance of community, though its explanation of conflict is less satisfactory. 30

While historians focus on events of military and political conflicts, anthropologists search for what binds the city as a whole through all of these conflicts. The Athens of the historical descriptions was a city of male adults institutionalized with a democratic or oligarchic constitution. It was in fact an organization for war and politics. Its male citizens were obliged to invade and defend against enemies. They lived a political life, i.e., they joined in the assembly and made ‘decisions based on a majority vote.’ 31 Other social aspects like family, economy, and religion are largely dismissed or subordinated behind this image. Anthropologists, on the other hand, in trying to answer how Athens maintains the community as a whole and its cultural identity through the repetitive rituals of family, religion, etc., provide a non-antagonistic static portrait. She argues that this anthropological approach is essential for a proper understanding of Athenian politics after

28 Wolpert 2002a: xii. 29 Loraux 2002: 16 ff. 30 The typical strategy of this anthropological approach, Loraux argues, is to alienate the causes of conflict outside the homogenous community or simply to admit that conflict is destruction of human society. She says (2002: 20): ‘but the difficulty remains: how can one plausibly claim that violence arises from homogeneity except by invoking the regression of men who “return to savagery” somewhere on this side of human, or by raising the figure of tyrant, the wolf man, beast, of god, who is excluded from the city because he weighs to heavily on it.’ For the problem of functionalism in explaining conflict or change, see also Ober 2002b: 134. 31 Loraux 2002: 17. cf. Finley 1983: 52.

85 403, for the issue in question is not only the cause of civil war and its brutality, but also restoration of order and harmony after the ruins of civil war. 32 She concludes:

Because one feature of the Greek city is that it maintained, simultaneously, two competing

and complementary representations of itself—one that “accepts history” and one that “is

loath to do so and prefers not to know it”—we must strive to bring these two figures

together in order to connect them: to think the city of anthropologists historically, but

especially to think the city of historians anthropologically. 33

Approaching from a different angle, Loraux and Wolpert point out correctly that there are in fact two contradictory tasks for the restored democracy: consolidation of democratic sovereignty and concord of city. 34 Scholars usually make no distinction between the two tasks, but use them as basically interchangeable goals. 35 Yet, they are not entirely compatible. Given the existence of substantial numbers of non-democratic citizens in the city, an unlimited reinforcement of democratic sovereignty is itself an obstacle of reconciliation. The democrats’ decision to live with their former enemies means that they had to play down their victory and compromise their sovereignty to a great extent.

The image of Athenian democracy receives great improvement from the

‘anthropological’ perspective. The democracy saved Athens from the tyranny of the

Thirty and then gave up its just share of political interest for the sake of communal harmony. In contrast to the traditional image of being a rash and egoistic regime, it now

32 Loraux 2002: 17-18, 45-62, esp. 58-9, for her summary of methodology. 33 Loraux 2002: 58. 34 Loraux 2002: 258; Wolpert 2002a: 110. For further discussion, see section 3.2 of this chapter. 35 A recent example is D. Allen 2000: 238.

86 becomes an altruistic government that was willing to go to any length to improve the common good.

This perspective is correct in pointing out the central role of the democracy in the reconciliation. It also highlights the scale of difficulty facing the democracy by pointing out the tension between democratic consolidation and communal harmony. The achievement of Athenian reconciliation and the efforts by the democracy is therefore better recognized from this perspective than in the realist view. However, this approach also has its shortcomings. Stressing on the binding elements of a society, this approach may be more convincing in explaining continuity and stability, but it also tends to neglect phenomena of change and conflict. 36 For example, it goes too far in suggesting that the demos sacrificed its democracy in exchange of domestic harmony. 37 If that had been the case, the demos would not have revolted against the Thirty at the beginning. In other words, this approach might provide a better explanation for the stability of fourth-century

Athens, but not for the collapse of the fifth-century Athenian empire and the following civil wars.

II. The Source question i. Xenophon’s Hellenica vs. Athenian Politeia

There are mainly four extant ancient sources: Xenophon’s Hellenika , the Aristotelian

Athenian Politeia , Diodorus’ Bibliotheke, Book 14 , and Justin’s Epitome of the Philippic

36 Ober (2002: 134): ‘If social rules, substantial enough to ensure that action is coextensive with negotiations within the frame they define, are “always and already” pre-existing, then the space left for meaningful social change shrinks to zero.’ 37 For further discussion, see section 3.2 of this chapter.

87 History of Pompeius Trogus .38 The first two are more important than the others.

Athenian Politeia is also the main source for the content of agreement between the democrats and oligarchs, though its chronology is judged by most historians as unreliable when different from others. 39 The following is a comparison of the four texts.

Xen. Hell. 2.4 Ath. Pol. 37-39 Diod. Sic. 14.32-33. Just. 5.9-10 The democrats Thrasybulus occupied Thrasybulus occupied Thrasybulus occupied Thrasybulus occupied started to fight Phyle. Phyle. Phyle. Phyle. back The battle outside Phyle. The battle outside Phyle. The siege of Phyle The democrats failed. defeated the Thirty.

Effects of defeat on The Thirty killed The Thirty killed The Thirty drove The Thirty drove the oligarchs Eleusians. Theramenes. citizens to Piraeus. citizens out of the city. Spartan garrison arrived They killed the More Spartan troops at Athens. Eleusians and came to help the Salaminians. Thirty. The Thirty asked for more Spartan troops. The battle at Acharnae.

The democrats The democrats marched The democrats marched marched toward into Piraeus in Piraeus and Athens Munychia.

The decisive battle The battle at Munychia The battle at Munychia The battle at Munychia The battle at Munychia at Munychia

Effect of defeat on The Thirty was deposed The Thirty deposed. The democrats laid siege The Thirty were the oligarchs and retired to Eleusis. Election of the Ten as to the city. deposed and retired to Election of the Ten, who plenipotentiaries of The Thirty deposed. Eleusis. Election of decided to fight. Extreme negotiation. Election of the Ten as the Ten. disorder and confusion in plenipotentiaries of the city. negotiation.

The mandate and Skirmishes continued The Ten decided to The Ten decided to The Ten ruled Athens actual behaviours between the democrats and fight. Dictatorship of fight. Dictatorship of like the Thirty. of the Ten. oligarchs. the Ten. the Ten. Ask for The Thirty and the Three The Ten deposed. The Sparta’s help. Thousand asked help from second election of the Sparta. Ten, who looked for peace. Pausanias defeated Pausanias defeated the the democrats democrats outside Piraeus.

Negotiation of Pausanias arranged the Pausanias arranged the Pausanias arranged the Pausanias arranged the Pausanias treaty of reconciliation. treaty of reconciliation reconciliation. Athens reconciliation. The He then disbanded his that included the to be governed with its Ten withdrew to army. amnesty. own laws. Eleusis.

38 Rhodes 1981: 416. 39 Rhodes 1981: 422.

88 Reunification of The first post-war Eleusis attacked Athens and Eleusis assembly. The decision Athens. The oligarchic in 401 that Athens was ruled by leaders were killed ancient laws. when going for a Athens attacked Eleusis. parley. Announcement of Unification of Athens amnesty. and Eleusis. Announcement of amnesty.

Adapted from Rhodes 1981: 416-419; Krentz 1982: 1982: 132-3; Wolpert 2002: 17, 22. ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis

Differences between the two main sources, Athenian Politeia and Xenophon’s Hellenica , may give rise to some discussion. The first is about the nature of the Thirty. Is their excessive brutality an inherent characteristic? Or is it an unfortunate reaction to outside pressures? Following the narrative of Xenophon that the Thirty had asked for a Spartan garrison and committed many atrocities before the democrats’ revolts, it might appear that the Thirty had been a truly evil regime from its very beginning, though its level of brutality escalated as the democrats approached. Yet, following the version of Athenian

Politeia that the Spartan garrison and all the most brutal crimes of the Thirty happened after the democrats’ revolts, some scholars form the impression that the Thirty might have been less harsh if the democrats had not revolted.

Regarding this issue, Xenophon is more authoritative, as most scholars agree. 40 Martin

Ostwald and Peter Krentz are among the scholars who prefer Athenian Politeia for the reason that it provides the democrats’ revolt as a reason for the brutality of the Thirty. 41

Krentz even blames the democrats for the cruelty of the Thirty, arguing: ‘the democrats…did not have entirely clean hands… Thrasybulus and other democratic exiles

40 See, for example, Hignett 1952: 384-9; Rhodes 1981: 422; Lintott 1982: 165-6. 41 Krentz 1982: 130; Ostwald 1986: 481-4.

89 began the civil war and precipitated a harsher policy within the city. If Thrasybulus had not acted, one suspected that far, far fewer than 1,500 would have died.’ 42 However, there are absolutely no circumstances that could prove the innocence of the Thirty.

Wolpert does not think that the narratives of Athenian Politeia partially vindicate the

Thirty, pointing to the fact that all sources share the common view that ‘violence and opposition were inextricably linked to the regime.’43

The other debate which is more relevant to our discussion is about the outcome of civil war. Did the outcome turn out to be a victory for the democrats or the result of a compromise among the democrats, the oligarchs, and Sparta? 44 If the democrats were the victors in the civil war, the reconciliation was undertaken freely by them. If, in contrast, the restoration was decided through compromise, the democrats cannot really take the credit. Athenian Politeia puts much more weight on the contribution of the three thousand in negotiation of peace. According to its narrative, they deposed the Thirty and elected the Ten with a clear mandate of negotiation. 45 When the Ten insisted on fighting, the Three Thousand re-elected the Second Ten who made concerted efforts for the termination of civil war. 46 Therefore, we have the impression that the restoration of democracy was not due to military victories of the democrats, but rather to negotiation by

42 Krentz 1982: 130. 43 Wolpert 2002a: 22. 44 The dispute is mainly over the role of the oligarchs. All the sources attest to the important role of the Spartan king Pausanias at the beginning of the reconciliation. However, Sparta seemed to play no role in the reconciliation thereafter, leaving the democracy freely in its internal affairs. In any case, the influence of Sparta died out few years later when Athens revolted from the Spartan alliance. For further discussion, see section 3.3 of this chapter. 45 This has support of Diodorus. Diod. Sic. 14.33.5. Krentz (1982: 9, 93, 97), though generally preferring Athenian Politeia , accepts Xenophon’s version on this issue. He postponed the mandate of negotiation to the second Ten. 46 This report of the second Ten does not look plausible to most scholars. See CAH VI: 36n59; contra. Krentz 1982: 9, 97; for a compromise solution, see Loening 1987: 46.

90 the oligarchs and Sparta. Athenian Politeia praises the democrats for their observance, not their initiation of the reconciliation agreement.

In contrast, Xenophon mentions almost no contribution of the Three Thousand. In his report the reconciliation and restoration of democracy derived from the efforts of the democrats in addition to that of the Spartan king Pausanias. Furthermore, despite his report of the essential role of Pausanias in terminating the civil war, Xenophon seems to accord most of the credit to the democrats. According to Xenophon, Pausanias disbanded his army and left Athens right after the treaty of reconciliation. The democrats then marched into the city of Athens as the victors of civil war. Thrasybulus the leader of democrats addressed the oligarchs at the assembly in a truly contemptuous tone. The oligarchs, he said, just like dogs tied and abandoned, were now at the mercy of the democrats. 47 Therefore, it is all due to the democrats’ own generosity and moderation that the previous supporters of the Thirty, unpunished, remained living in Athens as citizens. 48

Regarding this issue, the version of Xenophon is again preferred. Xenophon himself was a contemporary and is therefore more reliable in most scholars’ view, while the other writers might have been influenced by propaganda that attributed all the responsibility for civil war to the Thirty and the Ten rather than to general oligarchic citizens. Besides, given that Xenophon is the only one who mentioned the democrats’ defeat by Sparta outside Piraeus, his report does not seem biased towards the democrats.

47 Xen. Hell. 2.4.41. 48 Scholars who argue for the democratic victory are Dorjahn (1946: 17), Buck (1998: 81-82) and Loraux (2002: 249). Scholars who argue that there was no victor in the civil war and that the reconciliation was a product of compromise includes Krentz (1982: 107), Todd (1986: 165-6), B. Strauss (1986: 92), Loening (1987: 13-16) and Wolpert (2002a: 27).

91 However, these are only minor differences. All the sources actually give similar descriptions. Firstly, though not reporting the mandate of negotiation as the act of oligarchic citizens, Xenophon mentioned deep dissent and distrust among them, suggesting that at least many of them, if not the majority, were looking for peace after their defeat at Munychia. 49 Secondly, Xenophon does not mention the oligarchs’ efforts on negotiation probably because these were unimportant. If the oligarchic citizens decided to pursue peace, all the sources agree that it only happened after their decisive defeat at Munychia. A proposition of peace at such moments does not refute the democrats’ military superiority. In any case, the oligarchs were defeated and marginalized.

III. Restoration of Democracy and the Reconciliation Agreement

This section provides a general historical account of how Athens was transformed from the chaos of civil war to order and harmony. Instead of providing a story from the reign of the Thirty to the restored democracy, this section focuses on the process leading to the agreements of reconciliation. This story starts with the revolt of the democrats in exile, the oligarchic defeat at Phyle and Munychia, and the intervention of the Spartan King

Pausanias, as a result of whose arrangements the reconciliation agreement was achieved.

After explaining the main contents of this agreement, we will argue for its success according to the fulfilment of its goals, as well as the respect it received from the

Athenians. Also included is their reconfirmation of Pericles’ law of citizenship, which,

49 Xen. Hell. 2.4.24-27.

92 though not an initial provision in the agreements, is essential to an understanding of the meaning of the amnesty and reconciliation and Athenian politics in general. i. Democratic Revolt and Restoration

As argued above, the sources are largely in agreement. They all indicate that, while the

Thirty and the three thousands occupied the city of Athens, the democrats in exile fought back from Phyle via Piraeus under the leadership of Thrasybulus and Anytus. 50

According to Xenophon, there were only about seventy of them at the beginning, but the number grew rapidly to well over a thousand, including foreigners and slaves, in their march towards Athens. The democrats won two decisive battles at Phyle and Munychia.

After their defeat at Phyle the Thirty tried to maintain their power with more murders and terrors inside the city. The result was that more Athenians left the city and joined the opposition. After the battle of Munychia the oligarchy was obviously on the brink of collapse. The Thirty were deposed and many citizens in the city preferred negotiation with the democrats. However, the new elected leaders, with the support of extreme oligarchs and the Spartan General Lysander, continued fighting. 51 Finally, the Spartan

King Pausanias intervened and defeated the democrats outside Piraeus. He was said by

Xenophon to be a political enemy of Lysander and well disposed toward the democrats.

In any case, it is because of his efforts that an agreement of reconciliation between the democrats and oligarchs was achieved. 52 Accordingly, all Athenians returned to Athens, an amnesty was announced, and Eleusis was separated from Athens as an independent city for those oligarchs who did not want to live with the democrats. The democrats took

50 See also CAH VI: 36. 51 Xen. Hell. 2.4.1- 29; Diod. Sic. 14.32.1-33.5. 52 Xen. Hell. 2.4.29- 38; Diod. Sic. 14.33.6; Loening 1987: 14.

93 it back two years later through force as well as persuasion and the amnesty. The democracy also accomplished many important domestic reforms after its restoration. In its foreign policy it followed Sparta until the two poleis broke off in 395. 53 ii. The Goals of Reconciliation

It is necessary to discuss the goals and terms of reconciliation by which the Athenians’ achievement of reconciliation can be assessed. It is a plausible assumption that the goal of the reconciliation was restoration of harmony in Athens as well as consolidation of the democracy. This does not mean that these aims were sincerely supported by every individual Athenian and remained so. What is intended here is to understand the reconciliation and assess its success from a teleological perspective. 54

However, democratic consolidation and political concord are two conflicting tasks.

Consolidation of popular sovereignty could be itself a source of domestic division and bitterness, since there remained many non-democratic or even antidemocratic citizens in post-war Athens. This question has aired recently by two scholars. N. Louraux argues that the two tasks could not coexist, as one would have to be sacrificed for the other. In fact, she argues, the democrats gave up all their rights as the triumphant party. Since the democrats chose to live with their former enemies, they must nullify their victory and give up their sovereign power. She says:

53 B. Strauss 1986: 110 ff. 54 According to the realist perspectives we have seen so far, there was hardly any long-term goal. Loening says (1987: 148) that ‘the agreement had been negotiated in order to resolve the immediate crisis and could not satisfactorily provide for the uncertainties of the future.’ At any rate, Wolpert (2002a: 87ff) argues, the Athenians invented its meanings and goals in their interpretations of the reconciliation project. Ostwald (1986: 510, 537) believes that the reconciliation was a step towards the final aim of the sovereignty of law. He pays no enough attention to the contradictions that the authority of amnesty was established through an illegal execution of a democrat, and that the amnesty was itself a compromise of legal justice.

94 Shall we say that once the people have shown themselves to be the city,

they must espouse the communal life? I would answer that an appeal to

the polis, however, justified it may have been in its time, later became very

effective in neutralizing democratia . Or more precisely: in neutralizing

kratos as an integral part of the word. From then on, Athenian orators, like

Isocrates in the Areopagitiucus , praised the democracy for its ‘mildness’ .55

Wolpert argues that the democracy has to transform from a partisan regime of the poor people to an impartial government shared by all citizens, including the rich and the oligarchs. He borrows a sociological concept called the process of ‘departicularization’, through which ‘historical discourses and practices were emptied of local and concrete meaning to become “the property of all and no one”’. 56 Through this kind of process, the demos was no more the aggregate of only poor citizens, but the abstract image of the citizenry as a whole. Both the scholars argue that, either giving up its power or transforming the meaning of demos, the democracy was sacrificed for the unity of Athens.

Interestingly, the priority of political concord is attested in ancient sources of both public speeches and private teachings. Almost all ancient writers, when referring to the goal of reconciliation, claim that its aim was to achieve political concord, the task of democratic consolidation fading into the background. 57 This phenomenon can be seen in public speeches. For example, Andocides wrote, ‘you [the Athenians] have shown the greatest generosity and wisdom in devoting yourselves, not to revenge, but to the preservation of

55 Loraux 2002: 258. For kratos as superiority over others, see Loraux 2002: 69. 56 Wolpert 2002a: 110. 57 For the Athenian obsession with political harmony, see Wolpert 2002a: 78- 9.

95 your city and the reuniting of its citizens. 58 ( o9mo&noian tw~n politw~n) Lysias wrote in his funeral speech that the democrats ‘revived … the harmony that had been shattered by faction.’ 59 ( o(monoou~san de\ a)nti\ stasiazou/shv a0pe/fhnan ) Isocrates said that the determination shown in the people’s payment of the oligarch’s war debt brought Athens into concord. 60 ( o9mo&noian ) The same emphasis is also found in the writings that did not appeal to the public. Xenophon writes that ‘oaths were sworn that there should be an amnesty for all that had happened in the past, and to this day both parties live together as fellow citizens.’ 61 ( o9mou~ te politeu&ontai ) The author of Athenian Politeia described the payment of the oligarchs’ war debt ‘as the first step to concord’. 62 ( o9mo&noia ) Finally, in a Platonic work of funeral speech, all that is concerned is healing of harm and divisions. ‘The sole cause for all that [reconciliation] was their genuine kinship, which provides them, not in word but in fact, with a firm friendship based on ties of blood. We must also remember those who die at each other’s hands in that war and try to reconcile them in ceremonies such as today’s by what means we have—prayers and sacrifices— praying to the gods below who have power over them, since we ourselves are reconciled as well.’ 63

With these ancient one-sided testimonies, one might think that there was actually only one true aim of reconciliation, this being the unity of Athens. 64 Yet, if this had been the case, the demos would have not fought the civil war in the first place. It is more

58 Andoc. 1.140. 59 Lys. 2.63. 60 Isoc.7.68-69. 61 Xen. Hell. 2.4.43. 62 Ath. Pol. 40.3. 63 Pl. Menex. 244 a-b. 64 For example, Dorjahn believes that the democrats were overwhelmed by their fellow sympathy. Dorjahn 1946: 17. See also Loraux 2002: 42-44.

96 reasonable to believe that the democrats struggled to find some balance between the two tasks rather than sacrificed one for the other. After all, the democracy revived and remained dominant over other internal political groups for eighty years. The author of

Athenian Politeia might exaggerate in saying that the demos returned Athens by its own efforts alone, but with Sparta away and the oligarchs defeated it was, as he said, truly fair for the demos to take the government. 65 iii. The Terms of Reconciliation 66

The following table is a comparison of sources regarding the terms of reconciliation.

Xen. Hell. 2.4.38 Ath. Pol. 39 Diod. Sic. Just. 5.10.7 14.33.6 Peace between the Right to migrate Return of Return of citizens democrats and oligarchs in Eleusis citizens The Ten withdrew to Return of all citizens The amnesty Right to migrate Eleusis in Eleusis Extreme oligarchs Return of debts [The amnesty withdrew to Eleusis. separately Autonomy of announced two years Athens later] Right to migrate in Eleusis

[the amnesty announced two years later]

There is a difference in the date of the amnesty. According to Xenophon and Justin, the amnesty was announced on the reunification of Athens and Eleusis in about 401. 67 That is, there is a gap of two years between the treaty of reconciliation and the amnesty.

65 Ath. Pol. 41. 1. 66 These terms of reconciliation under Pausanias’ arrangement were never transformed into Athenian laws or decrees; however, all Athenians had taken the oath to observe them. See Dorjahn 1946: 21; Loening 1987: 29-30. 67 Cf. Krentz 1982: 104-5.

97 Athenian Politeia , on the other hand, included the amnesty in the treaty of reconciliation in 403. It had support from Andocides, 68 and almost all scholars prefer its version to

Xenophon’s, believing that the Amnesty was one of the initial terms of reconciliation in

403. 69

However, no ancient writer gave a complete account of the terms of reconciliation. 70

Among them Athenian Politeia provides the fullest account, though its account is not without question in its authority and coverage. Peter J. Rhodes suspects that its author consulted only certain political pamphlets instead of original official documents. 71 The source has no report on certain important issues such as the post-war relationship with

Sparta, the constitutional arrangement of Athens, and the solution of controversies over property confiscated by the Thirty. 72

Through examination of the extant sources and related discussion of historians, the terms are reconstructed here around five essential issues: the relationship with Sparta, oligarchs’ migration to Eleusis, the amnesty, the problem of confiscated property, and the constitutional order after the civil war.

The Relationship of Sparta and Athens : Both the restored democracy at Athens and the oligarchs in Eleusis remained subject allies of Sparta. 73 Athens’ capitulation terms of 404 presumably remained valid, meaning that, amongst other terms, the Athenians were obliged to have ‘the same enemies and the same friends as Sparta had’ and followed

68 Andoc. 1.81. 69 Andoc.1.81. Dorjahn 1946: 5; Krentz 1982: 104. For a detailed discussion, see Loening 1987:26-8. 70 Loening 1987: 30. 71 Rhodes 1981: 463- 4. 72 See also Rhodes 1981: 465, 471-472. 73 Rhodes 1981: 466; CAH VI: 37; Mossé 1973: 32; Loening 1987: 118-9; esp. B. Strauss 1986: 104-6.

98 ‘Spartan leadership in any expedition Sparta might make either by land or sea.’ 74 In 403

Pausanias was said to instruct the Athenians to negotiate with Sparta on one of the terms that the democrats and oligarchs remained its allies. 75 Both the democrats and oligarchs had financial and military obligations for Sparta’s military activities 76 Regarding its internal affairs, Diodorus reports that Athens ruled by its own laws. 77 It is not very clear as to what degree of autonomy Athens was granted by Sparta. Charles Hignett believes that Sparta should have learned from the failure of the Thirty that it was better not to intervene in the internal affairs of Athens. 78 Ostwald argues that the Athenians had complete freedom in internal affairs. 79 Stephen Todd, in contrast, believes that its internal autonomy was very limited. 80 However, considering that the Athenians were capable of accomplishing so many fundamental political and military projects, such as law reform, military actions against the oligarchic city of Eleusis, and rejection of a law draft of limited citizenship that had alleged support of Sparta, Athens seemed to enjoy a very high degree of autonomy as long as it followed Sparta in its foreign policy. In any case, it should be noted that Sparta’s dominance over Athens lasted only a few years.

Athens plotted unsuccessfully for an alliance with Persia in 397. Two years later it officially broke away from Sparta. In other words, Sparta was not a decisive factor in the long-term development of Athenian politics.

The Migration of the Oligarchs to Eleusis : While all Athenians were returning to Athens, the oligarchs who feared the revenge of the democrats or who had other considerations in

74 Xen. Hell. 2.2.20. 75 Xen. Hell. 2.4.35. 76 Ath. Pol. 39.2; Xen. Hell. 3.2.25. 77 Diod. Sic. 14.33.6. 78 Hignett 1952: 293. 79 Ostwald 1986: 498. 80 Todd 1986: 183-4.

99 mind were free to migrate to Eleusis. 81 They actually built their own city there, ‘retaining their full rights, and having sovereignty and self-government, and enjoying their own revenues.’ 82 These migrants had the power to decide who amongst the inhabitants of

Eleusis could live with them, not the other way around. Besides, the oligarchic Eleusis and democratic Athens regarded each other as hostile cities. The citizens were not allowed to visit the other city, let alone hold official positions. The celebration of the

Mysteries was the only exception to this rule. 83 However, the separation of Athens and

Eleusis was, according to Athenian Politeia, obstructed by Archinus and then ceased to be in 401when Eleusis went back to Athens.

The Amnesty : This is the most famous term that is often used as an alternative term to the reconciliation. 84 According to Athenian Politeia , the amnesty was expressed in an unequivocal tongue, no one being ever allowed to revenge (mnhsikakei=n ) on any one for the past events. There were, however, two exceptions. The first concerned the cases of murder. 85 Though people who had collaborated with the Thirty in arresting citizens were pardoned, those who had committed assault or murder with their own hand should be put on trial according to traditional laws. Second, certain core oligarchic officers like the

Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten enjoyed the protection of amnesty only after their account

81 Xenophon and Justin report that certain core oligarchs like the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten were ordered to live in Eleusis, but, according to Athenian Politeia and Andocides, they could still live in Athens if their audit submitted and accepted. Xen. Hell. 2.4.37; Just. Epit .5.10.7 Ath. Pol. 39.6; Andoc.1.90. Scholars do not think there is a real contradiction between Xenophon and Athenian Politeia at this point. See Rhodes 1981: 469-470; Loening 1987: 24-5, 42; Krentz 1982: 104-5 82 Ath. Pol . 39. 1. 83 Ath. Pol. 39.1-5. 84 Loening 1987: 20. 85 For the term on trials of murder as a sub-provision of amnesty, see Rhodes 1981: 468.

100 of their past behaviour had been submitted to and accepted by the courts. 86 This most important term should be quoted in full:

[T]hat trials for homicide be in accordance with the ancestral ordinances, if

a man has killed or wounded another with his own hand. And that there

be a universal amnesty for past events, covering everybody except the

Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and those that have been governors of

Piraeus, and that these also be covered by the amnesty if they render

account. And that those who had been governors in Piraeus render

account before the courts held in Piraeus, but those in the city before a

court of persons that can produce ratable property; or that those who will

not render account on these terms do migrate. 87

Solution of Confiscated Property : Many citizens and foreigners living in Athens were deprived of their property by the Thirty, and much of this was then sold or redistributed.

This problem obviously constituted one of the most contentious issues besides the cases of homicide. The situation was much more complex when the property in question turned up in the hands of a seemingly innocent buyer. However, there are only a few existing sentences that inform us of its solution. The principle, scholars agree, is that the original owners had the right to reclaim his immovable property, such as land and buildings, even when it had been sold; while they could only get back the movable

86 For the difference between Athenian Politeia and Andocides in their accounts of the oligarchs who were excluded from the amnesty, see Rhodes 1981: 469-470; Loening 1987: 24-5, 42; Krentz 1982: 104-5. 87 Ath. Pol . 39.5-6.

101 property when it remained unsold. 88 A special office was set up to deal with this issue.

A fair amount of confiscated property, obviously, did not go back to the original owners under this regulation. Many democrats, even powerful generals like Thrasybulus and

Anytus, had to accept permanent loss of their property. 89

The Restored Constitutional Order : Almost all sources agree that the ancestral laws were the principle of post-war constitution, though their meanings needed further investigation even to contemporary Athenians. 90 However, it is unclear whether there was any provision about the form of restored government in the reconciliation agreement. In fact, though it might seem strange, there is nothing about this important issue in reports of the agreement. Athenian Politeia says nothing on this issue in its account of the reconciliation agreement. 91 According to Xenophon and Justin, there was only the return of all the Athenians and their obligation to maintain peace among them. Diodorus reports that Athens was to be governed by its own laws ( toi=v idi/oiv no/moiv), which suggests that Sparta granted Athens autonomy in internal affairs.

According to Xenophon and Justin, it was only later at the first Assembly of the restored democracy that Thrasybulus declared that Athens was to be governed under the ancestral laws. 92 Diodorus reports that Thrasybulus, when contacted by the Thirty earlier, also demanded that all citizens should go back to Athens and the ancestral constitutions be restored. There was no discussion as to whether the government should be democratic or

88 Lys. Fr. 7. Against Hippotherses : 35-45. Rhodes 1981: 465, 471-2; Krentz 1982: 105-6; Loening 1987: 51-52. 89 Isoc. 18.23; cf. Isoc. 16.46; Rhodes 1981: 471; Loening 1987: 52. 90 This constitutional principle is clearly reconfirmed in Teisamenus’ decree, see Andoc. 1. 83. For the debate of ancestral constitution at the end of fifth century B.C., see ch. 2. 91 Rhodes 1981: 472. 92 Xen. Hell. 2.4.42; Just. Epit . 5.10.7.

102 otherwise. Maybe it was taken for granted by these ancient writers that with the return of all the triumphant democrats the Athenian government could be nothing less than democratic. The oligarchy, defeated by the democrats and abandoned by Sparta, had no chance of survival.

On the other hand, though there should be no doubt that democracy be an essential part of the post-war constitutional order in Athens, there would still be controversies over other constitutional issues. Therefore, there is a possibility that, to solve these disputes, the democrats and the oligarchs agreed upon a procedure to decide the content of the ancestral laws, and this might be one of the reasons why another stage of law reform coincided with the reconciliation. This constitutional procedure, if existed, should be a product of compromise like Teisamenus’ decree of law investigation and revision, which, as argued in the previous chapter, took into account not only the demos’ interests, but also oligarchic citizens’ concerns. iv.The Success of the Reconciliation

There are two criteria to evaluate the success of the reconciliation. One is the realization of its goals: communal harmony and democratic consolidation, the other is the

Athenians’ observance of the reconciliation terms. Generally speaking, the reconciliation was a success according to both criteria. Assessed by the realization of its goals, the success is obvious, given the stability of Athens and its democracy in the fourth century

B.C. While considering the Athenians’ observance of the reconciliation, there are some

103 reservations and disputes. However, most scholars agree that the terms of reconciliation were largely respected. 93

The Athenians’ respect for the terms of reconciliation is attested by the following reports of ancient sources. Several former oligarchs held government positions or appeared in the law courts as prosecutors under the democracy. 94 Democratic leaders as powerful as

Thrasybulus and Anytus had to bear their loss of property under the constraint of reconciliation. Besides, the democracy did even more than what the terms required. The authority of the amnesty was secured by making an example of a democrat executed without trial for his open instigation against the oligarchs. According to Isocrates, a legal apparatus called paragrafh/ was passed by which oligarchs could suspend prosecutions by claiming violation of the amnesty. Prosecutors, if found violating the amnesty, were punished with heavy fines. 95 While it had been decided that the oligarchs should pay their own debt of war to Sparta, the democracy paid it through a public fund. 96 Though it cannot be denied that there were many prosecutions in reference to the past misconducts of the oligarchs, there was (as far as we know) at most only one conviction that violated the amnesty. 97 Furthermore, the democracy sent three hundred oligarchic cavalry for the

Spartan expedition in 400/399. Xenophon claimed that the purpose was to get rid of these former enemies of the demos. However, Xenophon’s report is biased and this dispatch, strictly speaking, did not violate the terms of reconciliation. 98 The Athenians’

93 Rhodes 1981: 471-2; Krentz 1982: 119-120; Loening 1987: 149. 94 See, for example, Ath. Pol. 38.4; Lys. 16.8, 26.20; Loening 1987: 116-7; B. Strauss 1986: 97-8. 95 Isoc. 18. 2-3. 96 Some scholars argue that pressure from Sparta was the reason. See Loening 1987: 86. 97 Rhodes and Krentz argue that there was not such a case, while Todd, strongly denying the success of the reconciliation, argues that there was one. See Rhodes 1981: 271; Krentz 1982: 119-120; Todd 1985: 154; Loening 1987: 84. 98 Xen. Hell. :3.1.4; Loening 1987: 117-9; Tuplin 1993: 47.

104 attack on Eleusis in 401/400 may be the most serious attack on the oligarchs, but even this might not be a violation, since all sources report that it was an act of defence. 99 In summary, the terms of reconciliation were largely respected. 100

However, there are doubts about its success due to alleged cases of violation, especially cases against the amnesty, as well as political conflict after the civil war. 101 These disputes are in fact more about the adoption of criteria than identification of historical facts. Scholars, such as Thomas C. Loening, who consider the reconciliation a success do not deny the existence of conflicts and persecutions after the civil wars, but argue that these problems, strictly speaking, did not violate the terms of reconciliation. The others, such as B. Strauss and S. Todd, deny its success with widely extended explanations of the terms, arguing that the existence of conflicts and persecutions violated the spirit of reconciliation. The latter criterion of success presumes a total disappearance of resentments and conflicts, which is neither necessary nor practical.

For example, though analyzing Athenian politics with a typically realist approach, B.

Strauss seems to presume a standard of perfect harmony as his political criterion, arguing that the success of reconciliation was limited for the reason that political conflicts did not completely disappear. 102 Having pointed out conflicts of classes, personal interests, political principles, etc. in post-war Athens, he concludes: ‘Athenian political unity between 403-386 was fragile, at times tenuous. This stands counter to the prominent thesis that once the storm of the Thirty was weathered, only superficial and relatively

99 Loening 198763-4. 100 Contra. Todd 1985; Wolpert 2002a: 48ff. 101 Scholars who question the testimonies of ancient writers: Todd 1986: 29. B. Strauss 1986: 171; Wolpert 2002a:52, 71. 102 B. Strauss 1986: 114.

105 unimportant political divisions existed in Athens.’103 However, it is inadequate to deny the success of reconciliation with the existence of conflicts. All the kinds of conflict which he has listed in fact happen in both times of war and peace. No society in the world could get rid of them completely. The achievement of Athens is that it dealt with them not with violence, but in much more civilized ways.

Todd is one of the most radical critics of the success of reconciliation. He insists that the application of the amnesty should not be limited to only certain kinds of persecution, but extended to all kinds of trials, public policies, official audits, and military actions. 104 In his opinion, there should be no persecutions in any way connected with the oligarchic past. ‘The magistrates at the anakrisis had the right, indeed the duty, to reject an illegal prosecution; but once it came to court it could not simply be quashed on technical grounds. Consequently, a breach of the Amnesty had occurred the moment an illicit prosecution reached the court, whatever the result of the trial.’ 105 This standard is so high that Todd himself admits it is impossible under the democracy. ‘The only way for the

Athenians to have ensured that the Amnesty was kept would have been to force the magistrate to dismiss the case unheard: this however would have reduced unacceptably the democratic sovereignty of the court.’ 106

Loening’s position is the polar opposite of Todd’s. Adopting a literal explanation of the terms of reconciliation, he finds no violation of reconciliation in the events which Todd believes were plain breaches. For example, Athens’ taking back of Eleusis is not a

103 B. Strauss 1986: 114, 117. 104 Todd 1986: 58. 105 Todd 1986: 39. 106 Todd 1986: 40.

106 violation, for the oligarchs in Eleusis broke the peace first. He says, ‘one must assume that once the agreement had been violated by the oligarchs, the Athenians were no longer obliged to respect Eleusinian autonomy and were free to act as if a state of war existed.’ 107 Furthermore, one of the traits of the Athenian legal system is its flexible nature by which many strategic options were available for prosecution of the same crime.

In the cases of homicide, a charge called a0pagwgh/ against a murderer’s presence in sanctuaries and public spaces could be used in circumvention of the amnesty. Since this behaviour of oligarchic killers and collaborators, if they were the perpetrators, happened after the reconciliation, they were not protected by the amnesty. 108 Therefore, the oligarchs were prosecuted without violation of the reconciliation. Similar arguments apply to the dispatch of oligarchic cavalry for a Spartan expedition in 400/ 399, the purpose of which Xenophon believed was to get rid of these ardent supporters of oligarchy. 109 However, Loening argues, ‘there is nothing in the reconciliation agreement of the amnesty provision in particular which forbids dispatching cavalry abroad.’ 110

The criterion of Loening, I believe, is more reasonable than Todd’s. The latter seems to presume nearly unconditional forgiveness and complete obliteration of the oligarchic past as the standard of successful reconciliation, which is unrealistic and undesirable. It is better to understand mhde/na mnhsikakei=n as a struggle for the reconciliation through re- interpretation of the past, rather than complete obliteration and unconditional forgiveness

107 Loening 1987: 64. 108 Loening 1987: 79. 109 Xen. Hell. 3.1.4. 110 Loening 1987: 119.

107 of the oligarchic past. 111 Many scholars have pointed out the importance of character evidence in Athenian politics, and the litigants’ past behaviour must be brought forward because these were an essential part of their characters. 112 In a direct democracy like

Athens, judicial verdicts in the law courts and political decisions in the assembly were made by the citizenry according to their own understanding of the cases in question.

Speakers’ personalities or what they did in the past were essential for the credibility of their apology. It would have been almost impossible for the Athenian audience to make a sensible decision if the knowledge of a speaker’s past had been forbidden. It might be proposed that this dilemma could be solved by setting up an independent professional institution to expel illegal testimonies from public spheres. This suggestion, however, is plainly anachronistic.

To conclude, a reasonable assessment of the success of reconciliation, therefore, should consist of two parts. The first is to examine the Athenians’ observance of the terms of reconciliation according to a strict explanation such as the one Loening adopts. This criterion allows necessary flexibility for everyday political activities. No doubt, there were a number of alleged violations not of the words, but of the spirit of reconciliation.

This problem could be solved by the second criterion of teleological assessments. If the

Athenians achieved both of its goals, political harmony and democratic consolidation, we might be confident in saying that there was no serious violation of the reconciliatory spirit. In fact, according to the standard of Athenian society, political unity alone was

111 For a similar view see D. Cohen 2001: 341. Cf. Wolpert 2002a: 87 ff. This term does not necessarily mean “not recalling the wrongs’ even in its literal sense. Instead, its meaning could be ‘do not injure by recalling’ as well. See Carawan 2002: 2n5. 112 Dorjahn 1946: 32; Rhodes 1981: 472; Loening 1987: 102; Wolpert 2002a: 58. For a more general discussion on the relation of memory and justice, see, for example, Booth 2001.

108 sufficient evidence for the success of reconciliation. Ancient writers praised the reconciliation for its contribution of civil concord. 113 No one considered persecutions in some private cases as serious faults, perhaps with the exception of Plato and his bitter memory of the trial of Socrates. 114

IV Conclusion i

The historical survey above, I hope, has proved some important features of the reconciliation against some inadequate understandings of this important event. The democracy was largely responsible for the achievement of reconciliation, since it had decisively defeated the oligarchs in the civil war, and Sparta did not seem to interfere in the domestic politics of Athens as long as Athens followed it in foreign affairs. There were two main goals that the democracy tried to fulfil in the reconciliation: democratic consolidation and the unity of Athenian community. There was tension between these two goals, since there were many non-democratic or antidemocratic citizens remaining in

Athens. As to the terms of reconciliation, what the democracy did was much more than forgiving the past crimes of Athenian oligarchs. According to the terms of reconciliation, another city was arranged for the oligarchs who did not want to live in Athens under the democracy. The democracy also made concession regarding the property confiscated during the reign of The Thirty. Not all the property returned to its original owner, and even some powerful democratic leaders had to accept their loss. The guideline for the

113 Some scholars, agreeing or not, unnecessarily take these praises as factual descriptions, testing their accuracy against historical facts. For example, Loening 1987: 99; Todd1986: 29; Wolpert 2002a: 71. 114 Pl. Ep. VII 325b-c. That is if we accept the authenticity of the Platonic Seventh Letter.

109 reconstruction of political order after the civil war was not the strictly defined democratic values but the more ambiguous ancestral constitution by which the concerns of oligarchic citizens were taken into account, as revealed in Teisamenus’ decree of law investigation and revision. Last but not least, the reconciliation was successful in terms of the observance of reconciliatory terms and the achievement of the intended goals. It is generally agreed that the democracy respected the amnesty and other agreements of reconciliation. The demos actually did more than that. It paid the Athenian oligarchs’ war loan to Sparta even though it was not required by the reconciliatory agreement. The reconciliation was also successful judged by the consequent democratic stability and domestic harmony in fourth-century Athens. In a word, the reconciliation constitutes one of the most powerful cases against the established negative image of Athenian democracy.

As we have argued above, the reconciliation was successful. Even critics like Barry

Strauss and Stephen Todd do not deny its success.115 The important disagreement among scholars centre around the causes of success. Examining scholars’ explanations on this issue, we find two main types of theory. Realism is the traditional and dominant view, emphasising the role of external pressures in constraining human passion and self interests. The other ‘anthropological’ view argues that a sense of community which acquired much strength from the myth of common ancestors, racial prejudices, and daily interaction held the unity of Athens despite constant political storms of competition and conflicts.

There is certain improvement of the image of Athenian democracy in recent scholarly studies of the reconciliation, a trend similar to what we have found in the researches of

115 B. Strauss 1986: 114; Todd 1986: 201.

110 the Athenian law reform in the previous chapter. Realist explanations used to reflect traditional suspicion of the demos, disregarding the possibility that the common people by themselves could be responsible for great achievements such as the restoration of political harmony from the ruin of civil war. Recent researches, by contrast, are able to resist this elitist presumption and recognize the demos’ rationality. The ‘anthropological’ approach goes much further than that. In its version, the democracy becomes an almost altruistic government, sparing no effort in promoting the common good over its own partisan interests. ii

The realist explanation is that the morality crisis, caused by the war with Sparta, the plague, the success of Athenian democracy and its empire, and other factors, was beyond repair. Passion and egoism, aggravating each other in turn, drove the Athenians against each other. Without external constraints, Athens was doomed to fall into a vicious circle of suspicion and vengeance as the civil war of Corcyra was in Thucydides’ description.

The cause for the success of reconciliation is, therefore, not anyone or anything virtuous, but a coincidental balance of forces amongst the Athenian democrats, oligarchs, and

Sparta. All of them followed their realist considerations. 116

There is nothing categorically wrong with their presumption of self-interested human nature, but the realist theories that we have seen so far fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the reconciliation. As mentioned in the literature review, there are mainly

116 See, for example, Loening 1987: 15-16. Ostwald 1986: 493-4.

111 three factors in the realist model of explanation: moderate politicians, Sparta and the diversity of political groups in Athens.

Firstly, the moderate leadership at the end of the fifth century B.C., as discussed in the previous chapter, is a myth based on the suspicious report of Athenian Politeia . The moral implication of the term ‘moderate’ also seems to be odd with the realist principle of self-interest. Why did a group of politicians stand out for their moderation as opposed to all other egoistic counterparts?117 Besides, this theory seems to exaggerate the influence of the moderate politicians by neglecting their conflict with other political leaders. For example, Thrasybulus was one of the few, if not the sole, politicians who maintained his leadership position throughout this chaotic period of time. He is therefore the most likely candidate for the credit of reconciliation. However, he was actually a rival of the Theramenean or ‘moderate’ politicians. His proposal of rewarding foreign comrades of the democracy with Athenian citizenship was denounced by a Theramenean politician Archinus, for it was contrary to the Theramenean idea of limiting citizenship to oligarchic Athenians.

Secondly, Sparta’s influence in the domestic politics of Athens might not be decisive. It did play a key role at the very beginning, but Athens seemed to enjoy autonomy in its internal affairs afterwards. The determination of Sparta to protect the Athenian oligarchs is questionable as proved by the Athenian military action on Eleusis. The brutality of the

Thirty inflicted great damage on the reputation of Sparta. Furthermore, Xenophon tells

117 E.g. B. Strauss believes in the theory of moderate leadership, but also holds the pessimistic view that both the Athenian politicians and citizens were selfish and keen on revenge, while the tension between the oligarchs and the rest of the citizenry deteriorated. For his view on the ‘moderate oligarchs’, see B. Strauss 1986: 92 ff. For his general observation of Athenian politics, see Strauss 1986: ch 1 & 2.

112 us that there was a conflict in its leadership. Pausanias was not as enthusiastic as

Lysander in supporting the Athenian oligarchs. It might be in the best interests of Sparta that it tolerated the complete autonomy of Athens in its internal affairs, as long as it followed Sparta’s foreign policy. More importantly, the reconciliation in fact greatly outlasted the Spartan influence. The hegemony of Sparta was hit with a heavy blow just six years later when Persia appointed the Athenian general Conon as its admiral in 397.

Two years later, Athens officially revolted from Sparta. 118 However, even at that moment the demos did not break its promise of reconciliation and indulged itself in revenge because of this diplomatic change. Scholars adopting the realist approach are compelled to provide another explanation for the unity of Athens. 119

Thirdly, the heterogeneity of Athenian citizenry in terms of their partisan spectrum is an outcome of reconciliation rather than one of its causes. The reign of the Thirty already polarized the whole population into two hostile groups of oligarchs and democrats. The first group stayed inside the city of Athens, supported the Thirty, and deeply implicated in their crimes during the civil war, while the latter group were killed or exiled by them.

When the democrats and their foreign comrades defeated the oligarchs and returned to

Athens as the victor of the civil war, they had the opportunity to increase their share of the civic population by granting citizenship to their foreign soldiers or by simply not interfering in the emigration of Athenian oligarchs. 120 However, the democrats rejected their foreign comrades and chose the Athenian oligarchs as their fellow citizens. This

118 For a clear example of this problem of realist perspective, see B. Strauss 1986: 106-113. 119 This might be the reason why Todd ends his survey in 395. B. Strauss confronted this question and provides another realist explanation for the unity of Athens after 395. Todd 1986: 165-6; B. Strauss 1986: 173. 120 For the view that the democrats were the victor of the civil war, see the section of source question in this chapter. For the treatment of foreign soldiers, see the Appendix. For the effort to keep the oligarchs in the Athenian community, see the section on the terms of reconciliation.

113 decision of the democracy is the main reason why the oligarchs remained an important voice in Athenian politics. Another problem with the theory of diverse population is that the democracy did not seem to be paralysed because of partisan diversity among citizens.

On the contrary, it successfully conducted many profound political projects such as the law reform, the military action against the oligarchs in Eleusis, and the Athenian alliance with Persia against Sparta. These deeds by the democracy prove that it had the capability to persecute the supporters of the Thirty if it had chosen to do so. iii.

Another important theory of the reconciliation is the ‘anthropological’ approach proposed recently by Loraux and Wolpert. As they have argued, it is more than likely that a strong sense of community was the constant support for the success of the reconciliation project and long-term stability of Athens. 121 There was much evidence for the strength of this nationalistic sentiment. The demos agreed that the ideal constitution was the one created by its ancestors. It confirmed that only children of Athenians could be the fellow citizens, merit or damage to the democracy notwithstanding. These principles stood unchanged until the end of democracy and were obviously not expedient measures.

Besides, the demos gave up the right of revenge, bore the loss of property, and even paid the war debt of their oligarchic enemy. The sentiment of community appears to be the

121 Loraux’s Divided City is maybe the most comprehensive investigation on this Athenian political tradition, though her suggestion that political harmony was achieved in post-war Athens only through complete denial of memory and conflicts may be too one-sided. She seems to regard political harmony as abolishment of anything the oligarchs might have felt disconcerted. The success of the reconciliation means that the demos had to do its best in suppressing its memory of suffering under the Thirty, dismissing its hard-earned victory, and giving up its demokratia . See Loraux 2002: 43, 163, 253, 254 ff. However, if the demos had really abhorred conflict to such an extent that it gave up everything else in exchange of peace, it should not have fought the Thirty at the very beginning. See also section 3.2 of this chapter. See also D. Cohen 2001: 338.

114 key for more consistent understandings for all the decisions and actions that the Athenian people took through the most conflict-laden decade of its democratic history.

Besides, there are persuasive testimonies from two great critics of Athenian democracy,

Xenophon and Plato. Xenophon reported a speech by a democratic soldier in the civil war that most vividly expresses the social bonds among the citizens based on nationalistic myth and communal life in various social and political spheres. 122 It is said clearly in

Plato’s Menenxeus that ‘the sole cause for all that [reconciliation and amnesty] was their genuine kinship, which provided them, not in word but in fact, with a firm friendship based on ties of blood .’ 123 Though these two passages do not necessarily reflect the writers’ true opinions towards the democracy, they are at least reflections of Athenian public sentiments. These passages have proved that the motivation for many citizens to support the reconciliation was their sense of community.

However, this perspective goes too far in suggesting that democratic values were largely sacrificed for domestic harmony during the reconciliation. The demos did not actually go that far as to please the oligarchs by giving up the democratic form of government.

Phormisius’ proposal to limit Athenian citizenship to landowners was rejected. 124

Payment was introduced at about the same time to encourage public participation in the assembly. 125 These developments mean that direct democracy was firmly re-established alongside the reconciliatory project. It should be more reasonable to include both democratic consolidation and communal harmony as goals of the reconciliatory project.

122 Xen. Hell . 2.4.20-22. For further discussion of Xenophon’s view on the reconciliation, see ch. 5. 123 Pl. Menex. 244a with emphasis added. For further discussion of Plato’s view on the reconciliation, see ch. 6. 124 See Appendix A. 125 Ath. Pol. 41:3.

115 iv

The truth of reconciliation might be somewhere between the realist and the anthropological explanations that we have discussed so far. As argued in the previous chapter, there seems to be a communitarian turn in Athenian politics around 405 after the naval battle off Aegospotami. Before that time, Athenian democracy was much like an intolerant regime eager for revenge, as predicted in most realist theories. There was no forgiveness and reconciliation, but persecution and discrimination in its first restoration between 410 and 405. Supporters of the first oligarch coup had been executed, exiled, or deprived of civil rights. However, the demos changed its way of politics after their defeat in the naval battle off Aegospotami. It found its mistake of identifying partisan interests with the common good. With the recognition that oligarchic Athenians were essential for the flourishing of the whole community and the survival of the democracy, the demos started to bring them back by restoring their civil rights and recalling those in exile. The development of Athenian democratic politics then switched to a different direction closer to Loraux’s ‘anthropological’ version, though the demos did not go that far as to sacrifice the democracy for communal harmony, but tried to strike a balance between the two different goals.

116 Appendix: Athenian Citizenship at the End of the Fifth Century

B.C

The development of citizenship in the early years of the restored democracy is a difficult question due to the fragmentary condition of the extant sources, but also because of its complexity. 126 Though, as mentioned above, it was taken for granted among the

Athenians that the democracy was to be restored, and all the democratic exiles were to return to Athens as its citizens, disputes around citizenship had not settled down within this general understanding. Politicians were still struggling to extend or limit citizenship to his respectively preferred group. Besides, the Athenian legislative procedure was changing at those years. Therefore, it is usually unclear by whom and through which procedure propositions of citizenship were made. The discussion of this section will help us to clarify this important issue.

I. The status of foreign soldiers

The first question is the status of those foreigners who supported the return of the democrats. Their contribution seems to be barely recognized with proper reward by the democracy. Thrasybulus proposed to grant them citizenship and the Assembly approved it as a decree. However, Archinus, another democratic leader, abolished this generous act through grafh\ parano/mwn , accusing it of lacking the approval of the council. 127 These foreigners, because they were not citizens, were not even on the list of the Athenian recipients who were honoured for their fight against the Thirty at Phyle with merely

126 For the history of this citizenship issue, my main reference is Rhodes 1981: 474- 476, Ostwald 1986:503-509, and Wolpert 2002a: 42-45. 127 Ath. Pol. 40.2; Aeschin.3.195. [Plut] X orat. 835f-836a.

117 symbolic gifts: a crown of olive and a few drachmas for sacrifices and dedicatory offerings. 128 Furthermore, the sons of foreigners could not expect support from the democracy even if their parents died fighting for its restoration, because a decree proposed by Theozotides in the Assembly had made it clear that only legitimate sons of

Athenians had this privilege. 129 According to this decree, illegitimate and adopted sons of Athens did not have a share, let alone those of foreigners. Those foreign soldiers who died fighting for the democracy at Piraeus did receive public funeral from the Athenians and enjoyed ‘for all time…the same honours as citizens’. 130 Nevertheless, they were always aliens to Athens, having only ‘bravery as their fatherland’. 131

Few of these foreigners were finally granted the Athenian citizenship two years later. In a decree of 401/0 they were rewarded according to the timing they joined the democratic revolt. 132 It is generally agreed that those who joined the democrats at Phyle received full citizenship, others who joined at a latter time at Munychia and Piraeus were granted i0sote/leia or other less privileged prizes. The first group of new citizens was less than a hundred, while the other groups amounted to about nine hundred.

128 Aeschin.3.187-90. This measure was proposed by Archinus. Most scholars believe that only citizens received this honour. See Ostwald 1986: 506; Wolpert 2002a: 44, 158n60. 129 Theozotides’ decree, see R. S. Stroud 1971; Lys. fr. 10. This decree, Stroud (1971: 299) argues, indicates a tendency towards a stricter standard of citizenship. Athenian illegitimate sons used to enjoy full citizenship before this decree was passed. M.H. Hansen (1979: 37) argues that this decree must be made around 403/2 before the introduction of ‘ nomothesia by nomothetai’ , i.e., laws enacted by lawgivers, for this decree should have been enacted as a law under the new differentiation between law and decree. 130 Lys. 2.66. 131 Lys.2.66. 132 Rhodes & Osborne 2003: 27. This decree remains an issue of dispute because of its fragmentary condition. There are still doubts as to the number of the foreign recipients and the prizes they received from the democracy. See Rhodes 1981: 475-476; Ostwald 1986: 508-9, and Wolpert 2002a: 43-4, 157n58.

118 II. Phormisius’ proposition

Not only were foreigners excluded from the democracy, even the citizenship of poor

Athenians was challenged. Phormisius, a man who returned to Athens with the democrats, made the proposition that the full citizenship be limited to those Athenians who owned land. He also proposed the return of the oligarchs in exile. It is not clear to which procedure of enactment his proposition was put. In any case, his proposition failed, though it was said to have the support of Sparta. 133

Phormisius’ motion might look improbable when the Thirty was overthrown not long ago and the democracy restored. 134 However, there must be some reasons for his confidence in his chance of success. First, the propertied class and other people who considered property as an essential condition of political rights were not necessarily in alliance with the Thirty, since many of them were robbed of their property by the Thirty and had gone into exile. Instead of being labelled as enemies of the democracy, they might claim contribution for its victory over the Thirty. Besides, the propertied class was not necessarily a small group in the democracy. It is not clear as to the level of property

133 Dion. Hal. Lys . 32; Lys . 34. 134 It is said by Lycurgus that the decree of Demophantus in 410 was re-enacted after the overthrown of the Thirty. H.M. Hansen (1979: 36) believes that it ‘must be dated 403/2 or shortly afterward.’ Lycurg. 1.124- 125. The fact that the decree was set up again in front of the council house must be frightening to the oligarchic supporters. However, there is a question whether the decree was still in force or re-enacted before Phormisius’ proposition. Lysias did not mention the decree of Demophantus in his extant speech against Phormisius. If the decree was indeed valid at that period, Phormisius would put his life in the greatest danger by merely suggesting in public about depriving the poor Athenians of their citizenship, and Lysias’ client should not have bothered to oppose his proposition with a speech. According to Demophantus’ decree, all Athenians had the obligation under oath to kill Phormisius immediately. Moreover, Andocides proved that this decree was not in force at the end of the fourth century. Andoc. 1.99. Therefore, Carawan (2002: 19) is more convincing in suggesting that this decree was re-enacted sometime after 403 with a time limitation: it is valid only after the year of Eucleides. The decree should also be in force only after Phormisius’ proposal. See also Dem. 20.159; Lycurg. 1.124-7.

119 qualification proposed in Phormisius’ motion. 135 However, there is a possibility that the citizens who reached his qualification of property might be a substantial part, or even the majority of the audience whom he addressed to.

There are three possibilities about whom and what procedure Phormisius’ proposition was put to. First, it could be put to the Assembly by the typical procedure of the fifth- century democracy. In that case, Phormisius addressed directly to the demos. However, not all of the demos would fail the property qualification required in the proposal.

Dionysisus of Halicarnassus says that about five thousand Athenians would have been deprived of their citizenship if the proposal had passed. 136 That is, less than a fourth of the citizenry, given the estimated citizen population ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand. 137 If Dionysisus of Halicarnassus is correct, the status of the most citizens would remain intact. In fact, it was even tempting for the majority to get rid of the burden of financing the poor minority by expelling them out of the democracy.

Furthermore, the multitude of the propertied group is attested in Lysias speech. The addressees of the extant part of his speech titled Preserving the Ancestral Constitution were actually the propertied class. His rhetoric strategy would have been pointless if their number had not been decisive. For example, Lysias wrote, ‘It was the demos that brought these men [those propertied citizens in exile], and gave you back what you have,

135 Todd 2000: 336. 136 Dion. Hal. Lys. 32. 137 Todd 2000: 336. It is interesting to compare Phormisius’ proposal to the constitution of the Five Thousand proposed by the Four Hundred in 411/10 by which nine thousand Athenians were said to be qualified as citizens. Lys. 20.13. Considering the decrease of population after the war and the difference in the number of citizens the two proposal would qualified, the property qualification in Phormisius should be much lower than that in the constitution of the Five Thousand which requires citizens to ‘serve the State either in their own proper persons or financially.’ Thuc. 8.65.

120 but did not itself have the boldness to share in it’, 138 and ‘those who fought for oligarchy, who are nominally making war on the demos but in reality are coveting your property, and they will get possession of this, once they catch you without allies.’ 139 In contrast, the poor citizens seemed to be a minority. To justify their share of the democracy, the speaker was forced to stress their past services for the propertied class, just like an oligarchic politician would do in his public speech.

The second possibility is that Phormisius’ proposition was made as part of law investigation ordered in Teisamenus’ decree in 403. In that case, the audience would not be the demos, but the five hundred councillors and the five hundred nomoqe/tai elected by the demes. 140 The propertied class would be much better represented in the elected nomoqe/tai beyond their proportion of citizenry. Accordingly, Phormisius’ proposition had a better chance of success. Finally, Phormisius might put his proposition to the new procedure of legislation. In that case, his motion had to go through both the Assembly and the nomothetai who were selected by lot and, therefore, a fair sample of the civic population. 141 Though, compared with the first situation above, the audience was largely the same, his chance of success would decrease due to this two-stage procedure of enactment.

138 Lys.34.5. Todd’s translation modified. His translation that ‘…gave you back your city…’ seems unlikely since the object was something the demos did not have a share. ‘Property’ should be a better option. 139 Lys. 34.5. Todd’s translation modified. Todd 2000: 340. 140 Andoc. 1. 83- 84. 141 M.H. Hansen 1991: 167-9.

121 III. Re-confirmation of Pericles’ Law of Citizenship

As mentioned above, Pericles’ law of citizenship finally turned out to be the principle of citizenship after the end of fifth-century Athens, though a few foreigners were awarded later with citizenship for their contribution for the democracy. 142 This Pericles’ law was confirmed in a law of Aristophon around 403 by ordering that ‘anyone not born of an

Athenian mother’ was ‘illegitimate’. 143 Sometime later, another law or decree of

Nicomenes was passed, approving the same principle, but also naturalizing its retroactive force. This law declared that ‘no one of those[coming of age] after the archonship of

Eulkeides, who can not show that both his parents are a0stoi/ should have a share in the city; but those before Eulkeides should be left unexamined.’ 144 From then until the end of the democracy, 145 the Athenian parentage of both the maternal and paternal sides became a necessary, if not the sufficient, requirement for one to be an Athenian citizen, his merits to the democracy or ownership of property notwithstanding. 146

142 Once more, it can not be sure through which procedure Pericles’ law of citizenship was reconfirmed. It might be through the traditional procedure of the fifth-century Democracy, the law investigation ordered in Teisamenus’ decree, or the new two-stage procedure of the Assembly and Nomothetai. Patterson (1981: 145) believes that its reconfirmation was not a new legislation, but part of the project of law investigation. In any case, this reconfirmation did not appear improbable as the proposition of Phormisius was to the political atmosphere at that time. 143 Carystius fr. 2, quoted in Ostwald 1986: 507. 144 Schol. Aeschin. 1.39, quoted in Patterson 1981:145 and Ostwald 1986: 508n37. The ancient editor called it a ‘decree’ ( yh/fisma ), but this might be questionable after the differentiation between laws and decrees in the Athenian legal system. It was not suitable after the law reform in 403 to announce a general principle through a decree. Besides, a decree of Nicomenes certainly could not override the previous law of Aristophon if the latter was really a law . See Andoc. 1.87. 145 Some scholars suggest that it even lasted until the second century. Ogden 1996: 78. 146 Patterson (1981: 146) emphasises that this is only ‘a minimum qualification’ of citizenship. Besides, this qualification was also necessary for one’s right to attend family religious rites. See Ogden 1996: 78. For the view that the citizenship was not limited to the ethnic Athenians, but also open to the long-time alien residents of Athenian society, see E. Cohen 2000: 72.

122 Chapter Four

The Athenian Democracy and its Trial of Socrates

The trial of Socrates is discussed in this thesis because it presents one of the most difficult cases against the competence of Athenian democracy that has been argued in the previous chapters. While the democracy appears to have governed strictly by the written laws following its law reform, the trial of Socrates suggests that the demos still showed no respect for the order of law, and was instead susceptible to demagogic manipulation and ready to commit the killing of innocent people and other outlawed behaviour on a whim. Besides, the trial is often seen as one of the best examples exposing the reality of intolerance in post-war Athens under the surface of reconciliation. The demos’ desire for revenge is said to be so strong that, despite its agreement on the amnesty, it turned on

Socrates, a harmless aged philosopher, with barely disguised excuses and made him a scapegoat for its past sufferings.

The date of the trial creates another difficulty for the defence of Athenian democracy.

Socrates was tried and executed four years after the second democratic restoration.

Therefore, it could not be explained away with the theory, as argued in the previous chapters, that persecution like the trial of Socrates could have happened only before the demos learnt from its mistakes in the naval battle of Aegospotami in 405. In fact, there is no evidence that the Athenian demos ever regretted its execution of the philosopher.

This chapter starts with a discussion of the source issue and then reconstructs the historical procedure of the trial, including its indictment and the verdicts. This chapter

123 then proceeds with a discussion of the central issue: the historical causes for the intolerance of Socrates from the democracy in 399. The accusations against Socrates, divided into six sub-categories of politics and religion, will be evaluated respectively for their possible effects on the jurors.

I. The Socratic Question

Xenophon and Plato, undeniably, provide the fullest, though not necessarily the most consistent, accounts of Socrates’ life and thought among the extant sources. While the former was celebrated as a more truthful writer in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the latter has been preferred by most scholars because of, inter alia, his literary and philosophical talent. 1 Nevertheless, two important caveats should be added. First, scholars who prefer Plato to other Socratic sources do not argue that all of the Platonic dialogues represent the thoughts of Socrates, but only the early dialogues or the so-called

‘Socratic dialogues’, excluding the ‘later’ ones. 2 Second and more importantly, the

Socratic dialogues are considered reliable by the scholars in the sense of being faithful accounts of Socrates’ philosophy , rather than being the exact records of his actual words and deeds. The literary form of dialogue and the dramatic scenes, at many of which Plato

1 See the impressive list of eminent scholars who adopt this position in Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 3n9. See also Ross 1933: 29; Nussbaum 1980: 111n8; Morrison 1987: 119; Vlastos 1988: 138. What concerns the scholars of ancient philosophy is actually the so-called Socratic philosophy in the Platonic dialogue, not the Socrates as he was. For example, Chroust (1945: 48): ‘But the historian’s loss will always be philosophy’s gain: Socrates and the Socratic problem have through their very lack of scientific definiteness become in a much wider sense history of philosophy, philosophia perennis.’ Vlastos (1988: 138): ‘[T]here is the fact that Plato’s understanding of the philosophical issues in his theme has a philosopher’s sureness of touch, while Xenophon’s is no better than could be expected from a gifted litterateur.’ See also Chroust 1945: 43 ff; Graham 1992: 180; Brickhouse & Smith 2003: 111. 2 There is still disagreement over the principle of classification regarding the Platonic dialogues: whether they should be grouped in chronological order or according to textual analysis. Scholars also dispute the suitable categories for certain dialogues. In any case, the Platonic works that are listed by different scholars as the Socratic ones are mostly the same whatever their principles of classification are. See Brickhouse & Smith 2003: 111-5.

124 was obviously absent, are sometimes considered as a convenient tool for exploring the true meanings of the Socratic philosophy. Gregory Vlastos makes it clear that Plato’s

‘overriding concern is always the philosophy’ rather than historical facts. 3 Plato is said to make the Socrates in his Socratic dialogues ‘say whatever he — Plato—thinks at the time of writing would be the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in expounding and defending his own philosophy.’ 4

In addition to the philosophical quality, there are many other reasons proposed by scholars for the historical reliability of Plato’s Socratic dialogues. Plato is said, compared with Aristophanes and Xenophon, to be an inner member of the Socratic circle. 5 Besides, to be successful in defending Socrates, he is supposed to provide a faithful report. 6 His Socratic Apology and other Socratic dialogues would have passed the scrutiny of, and been chosen from many competing versions by, his contemporaries who were familiar with Socrates and his thought. 7 Most important of all, Aristotle’s fragmentary but illuminating testimony that Socrates was not a natural scientist and was not the inventor of theories such as the immortal soul and the ideal of Forms attest the version of Socrates in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, in contrast to the descriptions in

Aristophanes’ Clouds and Plato’s other dialogues. 8

3 Vlastos 1991: 51. 4 Vlastos 1991: 52. His own emphasis. 5 See, for example, Ross 1933: 28-9; Chroust 1945: 43; Vlastos 1988: 138. 6 See, for example, Graham 1992: 181; Vlastos 1991: 51. 7 See, for, example, Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 5-6; 1994: viii. 8 Arist. Met . 987b1; 1078b17-32. Besides, Aristotle also attributes a number of other doctrines to Socrates, such as the impossibility of a)krasi/a , the identification of virtue with knowledge and his profession of ignorance. All of them, Vlastos argues, testify to the reliability of Plato’s early dialogue. See Vlastos 1988: 145-7. For scholars who prefer the account of Plato’s Socratic dialogues, Aristotle’s testimony is the decisive evidence. See Ross 1933: 32; Vlastos 1988: 149.

125 However, none of the reasons mentioned above provide hard evidence for the historical truthfulness of the Socratic dialogues. First, Plato’s dialogues, though great philosophical works, are not necessarily historically accurate. Second, neither Plato’s friendship with

Socrates nor his motive of vindication would bring about a faithful account of the historical Socrates in front of the public; on the contrary, a very likely outcome of these incentives is a deceptive portrait of the person in question, as we would expect in most forensic speeches, ancient and modern. Furthermore, having reputation of being the orthodox account of Socrates among the Socratic circle does not necessarily excuse

Plato’s partisan colour, as the recognition came mainly from a fairly like-minded, and therefore uncritical, audience. This is especially true in the discussion of the trial of

Socrates. Most of the audience of Plato’s account were not commoners, but the leisured class in his academia who tended to assume Socrates’ innocence and the incompetence of the democracy. Therefore, the prejudice or errors in Plato’s account had less chance of being rectified through this academic process. As to Aristotle’s testimony, it might very well indicate certain important differences between the Socratic and Platonic philosophies; however, his brief philosophical remarks provide little information about the tension between Athens and the philosopher.

In light of the above discussion, an attitude of reservation about the historical reliability of Plato is more advisable. 9 It is sometimes described as an agnosticism for its

9 Recent articles of this view, Montuorri 1988: 57; Kahn 1992: 159-160; Beversluis 1993: 212, 218; M.H. Hansen 1995: 4; Millett 2005: 26; esp. Prior (2001: 46) that ‘Nor do I wish to deny that some of the views and arguments put forward by the Socrates of the Apology may very well correspond to those of the historical Socrates; I only wish to argue that we are not in a position to claim that all of them do, or to say with certainty which of them do, or to specify the exactness of the correspondence.’ (His emphasis) However, a slightly different and more sensible position is the one he proposes elsewhere in the same article (Prior 2001: 44): ‘I cannot bring myself to doubt that there was an historical Socrates, that he was a philosopher, that he had many of the physical and psychological characteristics Plato attributes to him, that

126 recognition of the impossibility of separating the factual accounts of Socrates from the fanciful stories in the delicate mixture of the Platonic dialogues, though admittedly Plato might have provided overall a faithful account of Socrates, or even have captured his charisma and philosophy in a way much more illuminating than an exact report could ever do. Nevertheless, the core of this approach is not to accept uncritically Plato’s

Socratic dialogues as factual evidence, insisting that their authority be established by the norms of historical scholarship, as is the case with other historical sources. In other words, a single piece of testimony from either Xenophon or Plato will not be accepted in this thesis; it should be at least in agreement with the testimony from the other writer, or even better supported by other historical evidence.10

This more sceptical approach has now even won the reluctant consent of Thomas

Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, two leading proponents for the Socratic study via Plato’s

Socratic dialogues. They concede that, unless examined and accepted by the norms of historiography, 11 they ‘cannot be sure whether the philosophical views [they] expose and explicate really do belong to the historical Socrates, which is the only concession the anti-historicists [those who doubt the historical accuracy of Plato’s works] can claim their

he was the inspiration for Plato’s portrait of him, that he exposed Plato to the possibility of living a philosophical life and served as Plato’s model for that life. About these matters our sources agree, and where there is agreement among the ancient sources we lack the evidence needed to raise serious doubt.’ (Emphasis added.) 10 It is presumed that at least some of the sources of Plato are different from those of Xenophon. Therefore, the points of agreement in their reports have a better chance of being historically correct. See Hansen 1995: 6-7. 11 Their concession comes with some reluctance. Brickhouse & Smith (2003: 120): ‘The claims of historicist Socratic scholars [those who believe the historical accuracy of Plato’s works], we believe, need to satisfy no more stringent standards of evidence that do other historical claims—standards that must rely substantially on admittedly speculative judgements about what makes the best sense of ‘slim and fragmentary’ evidence.’

127 own arguments merit.’ 12 Their latest position makes a clear-cut distinction between philosophy and history as summarized in their so-called ‘Philosophical Identity Thesis’.

The Philosophical Identity Thesis, which claims only that ‘the philosophy of

Socrates’ or ‘Socratic philosophy’ is identical to the philosophy given to the

character named ‘Socrates’ in the relevant group of Platonic dialogues…

The Philosophical Identity Thesis makes no commitments of any kind

about the historical accuracy of the Platonic portrait of Socrates or

Socratic philosophy. 13

An important implication following this concession is that Plato’s Socratic dialogues should no longer be used as the only evidence in judging the democracy and its trial of

Socrates, since both are historical events rather than philosophical assumptions. Events such as the dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro and the famous conversation in

Plato’s Crito , which are described only by Plato, are not beyond reasonable doubt and therefore should not be used as hard evidence for the innocence, the philanthropy and the

Athenian allegiance of the historical Socrates. 14 This principle is plain and obvious, but might be difficult to adhere to. Though Brickhouse and Smith claim that most scholars who are interested in the Socratic philosophy have been well aware of the essential difference between philosophy and historical judgement, 15 many of them are in fact tempted to judge the democracy and the trial with the Platonic material unexamined. For example, Vlastos was not hesitant in arguing for the political attitude of the historical

12 Brickhouse & Smith 2003: 125-6. 13 Brickhouse & Smith 2003: 111. 14 Even the famous story of the Delphic oracle might not be entirely immune from doubt; see Montuori 1988: 52-6. For the credibility of the conversation in Crito , contra. Vlastos 1991: 51. 15 Brickhouse & Smith 2003: 125.

128 Socrates being the same as in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, especially in his Crito , believing that the dialogue is what the historical Socrates ‘tells his friend in the privacy of his prison cell, where he could have no motive for dissembling’. 16 Even Brickhouse and

Smith themselves adopt a similar methodological presumption to disprove the oligarchic tendency of the historical Socrates, claiming that ‘when other ancient sources conflict with views attributed to Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, we shall accept the version found in the early [Socratic] dialogues.’ 17

In any case, an important methodological agreement has been emerging among Socratic scholars that literary elegance, philosophical insight or personal association do not exempt Plato or Xenophon from scrutiny by the norms of historical research when the issue in question is the historical events of the democracy and its trial of Socrates. This principle, insisting on a distinction between historical narrative and philosophical discourse, would help us to view the elitist theory and the democratic practice of the

Athenian politics from a new perspective.

The demos and its government were an easy target for philosophical criticism from ancient times when they were blamed for their unjust treatment of Socrates. However, the democracy would be put in a more positive light through this critical approach toward

16 Vlastos 1983: 90, 107. For a convincing refutation of Vlastos’ view in his article, see Wood & Wood 1986. 17 Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 157-173. Though they (1994: 157) claim most clearly at the beginning that their concern is only the Platonic attitude toward democracy in the early dialogues, it is so obvious in their argument and conclusion that the Socrates they mention is presumably the historical one, and the one to blame is of course the Athenian democracy. For example, their aim (1994: 157) is to refute the claim that ‘Socrates must be counted among those loyal to the oligarch faction.’ They conclude (1994: 173) that ‘we have shown that neither Socrates’ own views nor his associations support the view that he was a political threat to Athens. This is, however, unfortunately quite compatible with his having been seen as such a threat.’ It is unlikely that ‘the oligarchic faction’, the ‘Athens’ and the ‘Socrates’ in the quotation refer to anything else but the historical ones. One reader, J. Wallach (2002: 94n135), has the impression that their aim is ‘to establish the historical validity of the [Plato’s] Apology .’

129 the works of Plato and Xenophon, as well as by more emphasis on its much-admired success in law reform and reconciliation. Suppose that the democracy has proved itself to be a successful and virtuous regime without Socrates or even partly for that very reason: it should then be the turn of Plato, Xenophon and other Socratics, retracting their accusations toward the demos, to answer why the philosopher should have been tolerated, or even honoured, in the democracy in the face of all the allegations against him. This might not be an easy task.

II. The Trial Process

This section provides a summary of the trial with an account of the indictment, the statute adopted by the accusers, the selection of the jury and the trial procedure. It will be shown that, compared with what is expected in a negative view of the direct democracy that is still prevalent today, 18 there was likely to have been a higher degree of deliberation and legality in the trial because of the law adopted, the preventive designs against abuses of public prosecution, the impartial selection of the jury and one accuser’s reputation of moderation. 19

18 See the discussion of the modern image of Athenian democracy in section 1 of chapter 1. 19 Millett (2005: 41-5) defends the Athenian legal system as a design for the welfare of the community and the democracy, not as a mechanism for abstract principles of justice. He argues that one of the main considerations in the Athenian legal system, though maybe not appearing relevant to the case in question from the views of modern jurisprudence, was the litigants’ contribution or damage to the community and the democracy that they had made or might have made in the future. His argument is based on the following reasons: the openness and nearness of the law courts to the Agora, the institute of supportive speakers who were supposed to hold good public reputation, litigants’ emphasis on their records of public services, and those jurors who voted for Socrates’ acquittal in the first round, but condemned him then to death probably because of his continual rebellion.

130 i. The affidavit and the law applied

At the age of seventy 20 Socrates was charged with impiety and corruption of the young by three Athenians named Meletus, Lycon, and Anytus21 in 399, 22 four years after the initiation of the Reconciliation and the year that the law reform was completed. The affidavit is recorded by Diogenes Laertius as the following:

Under oath Meletos the son of Sophronicskos has brought a public action

(e0gra/yato ) against Sockrates the son of Sophronisko of Alopeke and

charges him with the following offences: Sokrates is guilty of not

acknowledging the gods acknowledged by the state and of introducing

other new divinities. Furthermore, he is guilty of corrupting the young.

Penalty proposed: capital punishment. 23

Regarding the question of legality, it is often believed that Socrates was accused and tried by the decree of Diopeithes that Plutarch says was enacted in the 430s and used to sanction public denunciation ( ei0saggeli/a ) of sophists such as Anaxagoras who did not

‘accept what has to do with the gods or teach theories about what is up in the sky’. 24 One implication of this belief is that the Athenian hostility to philosophers or sophists was so profound that a special enactment had been passed to deal with them long before the trial of Socrates. However, this might be unlikely for the following reasons:. 25 Firstly, the

20 Pl. Ap. 17d; Cri . 52e; Diog. Laert. 2.44. 21 The names of the accusers are mentioned in several sources, for example, Pl. Ap. 23e; Xen. Ap. 29; Diog. Laert. 2.39. See Hansen 1995: 7-8, 16, 33-4. 22 The precise time of the trial is the winter of 399 in the archonship of Laches. Hansen 1995: 16. 23 Diog. Laert 2.40, trans. Hansen 1995: 16. The affidavit is also mentioned by Xenophon and Plato at several occasions. See Hansen 1995: 16n61. 24 Plut. Per . 32.2. trans. Dover 1976: 136. 25 See MacDowell 1962: 201; Dover 1976: 146-7; R. W. Wallace 1994: 137-8; Hansen 1995: 25.

131 existence of the decree is problematic, as it is mentioned by Plutarch alone in his own paraphrase without support from other ancient writers who were concerned with similar religious cases and therefore should have referred to the same decree in some way.

Secondly, it is uncertain whether the decree, if it ever existed, was collected and remained as a valid statute after the law reform. Finally and more decisively, it is clear from the accusers’ indictment that instead of following the judicial procedure of ei0saggeli/a demanded by the decree, they adopted a different procedure of grafh/. The contention that the trial of Socrates was not sanctioned by the decree of Diopeithes, of course, does not disprove the Athenian demos’ suspicion of sophists and philosophers, but at least suggests that that emotion was never strong enough for a systematic prosecution sanctioned by an ad hoc enactment and lasting for generations. ii. The accusers

Among the three accusers, the identities of Meletus and Lycon are uncertain. There were many Athenians at that time named Meletus; some of them were blasphemous themselves, the others were a collaborator of the Thirty, a politician, a tragic poet, etc. However, none of them can be definitely identified with the accuser Meletus who, according to

Plato, was young and unknown to Socrates. 26 Similar is the case of Lycon. According to a scholium on Plato’s Apology 23e, he was the father of Autolykos and therefore the

Lycon in Xenophon’s Symposium who was on friendly terms with Socrates. 27 M. H.

Hansen considers this association unlikely, for had it been true, Xenophon, not renowned for the ironic style, should have mentioned immediately that this Lycon was also an

26 Pl. Euthph . 2b. MacDowell 1962: 208-9. 27 Xen. Symp . 9.1; Hansen 1995: 33-4.

132 accuser of Socrates. 28 Regarding Anytus, by contrast, there is more information about his public life 29 : he was elected a general, and in 409 put to trial for his responsibility for an unsuccessful naval campaign. He was said to have been acquitted by bribing the jury. 30

In the restored democracy after 403 he was an influential politician due to his leadership during the democratic revolt against the Thirty. 31 His defence of the orator Andocides who was also charged with impiety suggests that he was not intractable on religious grounds. 32 Most important of all, though having suffered serious personal loss under the

Thirty, he was well known for his adamant respect for the Amnesty of 403, despite his capability for vengeance as an influential politician. 33

It is noteworthy that the accusers themselves, though accusing rather than being accused, were not free from risk. While voluntary private prosecutors were an essential part of the

Athenian judicial system, there were also mechanisms for preventing abuse of this open access to lawsuits, or merely for controlling the number of trials at a reasonable level. For example, in the case of public prosecution, 34 the accusers would lose part of their civil rights and be liable for a fine of one thousand drachmas -- a huge sum equal nearly to three years’ income of a skilled worker -- if they failed to acquire more than a fifth of the

28 Hansen 1995: 33-4. 29 For the life of Anytus and the relevant sources, see MacDowell 1962: 166; Rhodes 1981: 343-4, 431-2; Hansen 1995: 7-8. 30 Ath. Pol. 27.5; Diod. Sic. 13.64.6. 31 Xen. Hell . 2.3.42 - 44; Lys. 13. 78, Isoc. 18.23. 32 Andoc.1.150; cf. Hansen 1995: 9-10. 33 Isoc. 18.23. 34 The lawsuits in Athens could be divided into public and private ones. Roughly speaking, the public prosecution concerned the public interests and could be initiated by any free adult male, including non- citizens in many cases; while the private suits were filed only by those who claimed to be wronged by the defendants. The litigious procedure and penalty varied accordingly. However, this distinction was vague and flexible. For a further discussion of this complex issue, see Hansen: 1991:191 ff; Todd 1993: 98 ff.

133 votes or dropped their lawsuits unexpectedly, a tactic often used by blackmailers to acquire bribes from the defendants in the name of justice. 35 iii. Selection of the jury

As to the composition of the jury, it is generally agreed that it was a representative sample of the whole citizenry, though there are still minor uncertainties about the procedure for the juror selection, especially in 399. First, only an Athenian male over the age of thirty with full citizenship could seek to be one of the six thousand jurors selected at the beginning of a year. It is unclear how the jurors were selected when the number of applicants was more than six thousand; however, considering the general practice of the democracy in its distribution of government offices, sortition was a likely solution. 36

Besides, it is also uncertain how the five hundred or five hundred and one 37 jurors in the trial of Socrates were selected from the six thousand. While the jurors in the fifth century

B.C. seemed to be allocated to specific courts in advance for the whole year, a further daily selection by lot before the opening of courts was introduced as early as 392. By this institutional change, bribing of the jury and other kinds of corruption would be much less possible, since it was unlikely for a juror to know in advance the court and the cases that he was going to consider, nor would the litigants know the exact composition of the jury before the court opened. 38 This new method of selection might have been introduced as

35 Pl. Ap. 36b; Harrison 1971: 83; MacDowell 1978: 64 36 MacDowell (1978: 34) and Hansen (1991: 181) believe that sortition was used in such cases, while Harrison (1971: 239) and Todd (1993: 83) are more hesitant. 37 Some scholars such as Hansen (1995: 16) and Gregory (983: 106) believe the number of the jury was 501, while others such as Brickhouse & Smith (2002: 2) and Todd (1993: 202) argue for the number of 500. See also MacDowell 1978: 202. 38 Ar. Wasps 1206-7, Eccl. 681-90. Harrison 1971: 239-241; MacDowell 1978: 36-37; Hansen 1991: 181 ff; Todd 1993: 84-85. The selection of jurors was becoming even more sophisticated in the days of Aristotle, see Ath. Pol. 63-70.

134 early as in 403 as part of the law reform 39 and therefore was used in the trial of Socrates.

This might be a reason that the Platonic Socrates in his defence did not complain about the partisan character of the jury. He, like all orators, addressed the jury as if they were general Athenian citizens; it was only after his conviction that he ambiguously suggested the accusers’ embracery of the jury. 40 iv. The procedure

The procedure of the trial, according to the general Athenian juridical procedure, was as follows: 41 indicted for committing impiety and corruption of the young, Socrates was summoned by Meletus 42 or the other accusers in person to appear at the office of the King

Archon at a fixed time. 43 On that day, the official in charge, maybe after a preliminary and general examination of the legality of the case, ordered them to attend a preliminary hearing at another time. 44 The trial started some time after the hearing. After the jury was selected and the court opened, the accusers first made their prosecuting speeches, followed by the defences of Socrates or his co-speakers. 45 In the process they were allowed to attack each other by interrogation. It is unknown how persuasive the

39 Harrison 1971: 240; Hansen 1991: 183. 40 Pl. Ap. 36b: ‘if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him [Meletus] in accusing me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth of the votes.’ Yet, even this sentence does not necessarily refer to the accusers’ embracery and manipulation of jury selection; it might have as well suggested their oratorical ability or other kind of influence on the jury. 41 See Harrison 1971: 85ff; MacDowell 1978:57ff, 200-202; Todd 1993: 128ff; Hansen 1991: 196 ff; 1995: 16-18. 42 Pl. Euthphr . 2b. 43 Pl. Tht . 210d; Ath. Pol. 57.3; Harrison 1971: 9. 44 However, the function of this hearing is unclear. MacDowell (1978: 241-2) suggests that it helped to clarify the cases in question through interrogation by the relevant magistrates and among the litigants themselves. Hansen (1991: 197) believes that its main priority is to reach an agreement among the litigants instead of going to court. This might be true in most private cases, but is questionable in the cases of public accusation. As Harrison (1971: 83, 103-5) argues, accusers in public cases would be fined a huge amount of money or be deprived of part of their civil rights if they withdrew their cases. A possibility is that the accusers were not allowed to evade the liability by dropping the case after the preliminary hearing. 45 Xen. Ap. 22; Hansen 1995: 13-14.

135 prosecuting speeches were, since they are lost to us, while Socrates appeared to irritate the jury several times with his ‘big talk’. 46 The jury, having listened to the cases of both sides, found Socrates guilty with a vote of 280 to 221. While the accusers proposed the penalty to be death, Socrates either refused to propose his own punishment 47 or did so with even greater loftiness and irony. 48 The jury, accordingly, approved the accusers’ proposition by a much larger majority. 49 The trial was then over, but Socrates, though not required by the judicial procedure, launched his third and last speech, insisting on his innocence, the injustice of the verdict and his total disregard for the whole process. 50

However, many of the jurors, as Hansen and Millett suggest, were probably hurrying out to somewhere else and did not pay much attention to it. 51

III. Causes of the Trial and the Conviction

Socrates’ long-term public image presumably played a decisive role in the trial and its outcome, since it would have aroused further suspicion at the end of the fifth century B.C.

Though other factors such as the arrogance of Socrates’ court speeches or the superior rhetoric of the accusers might well have contributed to his conviction and execution, it is almost impossible to know exactly the effects of their court performance on the jury, since the speeches of the accusers are lost, while the substantial part of Socrates apology cannot be reconstructed beyond reasonable doubt from the writings of Xenophon and

Plato. Furthermore, we simply cannot measure precisely in what direction and to what

46 Xen. Ap. 1-2, 14, 31-2; Pl. Ap. 21a, 30c. 47 Xen. Ap. 23. 48 Pl. Ap. 35eff, 38c. 49 Diog. Laert. 2.42. 50 Pl. Ap. 38c ff; Xen. Ap. 24. 51 Hansen 1995: 18; Millett 2005: 26.

136 extent the individual opinions of the jurors changed because of the speeches. By contrast, there are more sources for a sufficient understanding of the political development of

Athens at the end of fifth century B.C., during which public opinion of Socrates was shaped , eventually becoming a decisive element of his fate. Besides, Socrates, rather than being an ordinary private citizen, was a public figure so well known that he was made into a major figure for comedy long before his trial. 52 His name was also often associated with some of the wicked oligarchs. Therefore, it is most likely that, before entering the court, the jurors knew of him and had formed certain judgements from his eccentricity and alleged involvement in the destructive political struggle of the past decade. The public image thus formed, probably too fixed already to be altered by a few speeches in the court, must have played a major part in the jurors’ condemnation, especially in an Athenian court where a litigant’s character was important evidence. i. The Classification of Religious and Political Causes

The causes for the trial and conviction of Socrates discussed by most scholars fall into the two categories of religion and politics: Socrates was condemned because he was considered a religious danger or a political threat. 53 There are two problems with this classification. First, what is meant by “political and religious causes” in the discussions of scholars’ is not always clear and consistent. There are in fact three different references for the religious accusation and another three for the political one. The three specific religious charges are (1) Socrates’ denial of Athenian religious beliefs, (2) his introduction of new divinity and (3) atheism. Political reasons are meanwhile (1) partisan

52 For Aristophane’s Clouds as a demonstration of Socrates’ public reputation, see Millett 2005: 28. 53 For Scholars adopting this distinction, e.g. Hackforth 1933: 12-13; Finley 1985: 129; Stone 1988: 138-9; esp. Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 173.

137 enmity, (2) his criticism of democracy and (3) his threat to the general established orders.

It is better to be more specific in the discussion of these issues as to which of the six causes are mentioned, rather than referring to them generally as the religious and political causes.

The second and more serious problem is the false separation of Athenian politics and religion that seems to be presumed in the classification of the religious and political causes. This is not a proper presumption for understanding the trial. First, there were five hundred and one jurors whose considerations were very likely different from one to another. Some may have made their decisions according to certain political reasons, others may have been persuaded by the religious arguments, and many more may have cast their votes following various combinations of different motives. It is unlikely that the majority of them voted for the same reason, no matter whether religious or political. 54

Second, many scholars have pointed out that, to the Athenians, politics and religion, rather than being separated, were interpenetrated to an indistinguishable level. The state assumed its imperative responsibility to maintain the religious rituals and belief, while religion was considered an essential element for the flourishing or decline of the political community. A religious enemy was, therefore, a political threat, and vice versa. 55

Finally, the accusation of corrupting the young, as we can see in Aristophanes’ Clouds , referred not only specifically to Socrates’ religious or political crimes, but also to their destructive effects on all the basic established orders -- that is, the Athenian norms in the realms of religion, politics, morality, etc.

54 Parker 1996: 151. Burnyeat 1995: 135; McPherran 1996: 165. 55 Finley 1985: 115; Montuori 1988: 82; Parker 1996: 155-6; Wallach 2002: 96; Parker 2005: 89-90; esp. Todd 1993: 307-15.

138 However, as long as we do not make an either-or choice between them, the classification of the six causes is useful for exploring the jurors’ opinions of Socrates. ii. The Religious Causes

The Religious motive is the more obvious reason, since the religious accusation of impiety is the focus of both the accusers’ formal indictment and the defences of Plato and

Xenophon. There were three religious charges against Socrates: the denial of the

Athenian gods, the introduction of new gods and his atheist belief.

The denial of the Athenian gods : This charge might mean specifically Socrates’ lack of respect for the rituals and beliefs of the established religion. 56 The accusation of neglecting the rituals can be surmised from Xenophon’s defence that Socrates offered sacrifices regularly to the gods both at home and at the public altar. 57 Ritual misconduct could sometimes turn out to be one of the most serious public offences, as evidenced by the popular outcry against the mockery of the Eleusinian Mysteries in 415. 58 However,

56 There is a debate whether the accusation of not recognizing the gods means only lack of respect for the religious rituals, or also refers to the denial of the religious belief. For the argument that the charge referred only to the religious practice, see J. Burnet 1924: note on Pl. Ap. 24 c1; for the more convincing view that it includes the both aspects of religion, see Tatt 1936: 3-5; Montuori 1988: 64n116; Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 30-36. In any case, it is more likely that the accusers made a general attack on Socrates’ religious life without constraining themselves by this subtle distinction of religious practice and belief. By the same token, the view of Brickhouse and Smith (1994: 182-186) that atheism is the only religious charge by the accusers seems an overstatement. In addition to their fundamental problem of using freely the defences of Xenophon and Plato as the historical evidence, it would be odd if the accusers had attacked Socrates as an atheist without mentioning his religious misbehaviour as the supporting evidence since, as Brickhouse and Smith themselves argue at another place (1989: 31; cf. 1994: 188-9), ‘practice and belief are inextricably tied together’, that is, one’s attitude toward religious practices reflects one’s religious belief or disbelief. Besides, while assuming the accusers were at least men of average intelligence, (1994: 186) Brickhouse and Smith in fact turn them into a ludicrous group of fools as Plato did in his Socrates’ Apology (26e -27a). They (1994: 183) made the accusers contradict their atheist indictment of Socrates with the insistence that he was also a believer in his private daemon, by saying that ‘the ancient authorities speak in one voice: Plato and Xenophon both clearly identify the charge of innovation as motivated…by his claim to have a private “divine sign”. 57 Xen. Ap. 11, Mem. 1.1.2. 58 Thucy. 6.27 ff; Andoc. On the Mysteries .

139 there seems to be no evidence other than Xenophon’s that suggests the charge of violating the religious rituals. The alleged violation of religious beliefs, on the other hand, might have something to do with Socrates’ philosophical pursuit, which, according to

Aristotle, was a persistent quest for the universal in the ethical realm. 59 As Vlastos argues, when regarding religious affairs, Socrates continued his task with the presumption that the gods must be perfectly moral without any exception. 60 This was an extremely radical concept, for, as Vlastos indicates, to ask the Athenian gods to measure up to this requirement was as good as to destroy their traditional identities. 61

The introduction of new divinities ( daimo/nia ): The accusers’ use of the plural term, daimo/nia , might be a genuine expression of their belief or a prosecuting strategy to exaggerate the systematic scale of his crime. 62 However, most scholars agree, the alleged reference of this charge was Socrates’ daimonion that was perceived by no one else but

Socrates himself. 63 How serious could a charge like this be in a pantheist society such as

Athens? Parker argues that, though less serious than the denial of the gods of the state, private worship would not be tolerated if it turned out to be a challenge to the established

59 Arist. Met . 987b1. 60 Vlastos 1991: 162. 61 Vlastos 1991: 166. For more detailed discussion, see McPherran 1996: 141-167. The Plausibility of Vlastos’ explanation is based upon the radical implication of Socrates’ philosophical activity in the religious realm. It would not be refuted simply because, as Brickhouse and Smith (1994: 182-7) argue, his moralistic concept was not directly mentioned by Aristophanes, Plato and Xenophon. The reports of Plato and Xenophon, almost needless to repeat, were problematic. Aristophanes and the accusers, having their own ways of describing Socrates religious activity, surely would never accuse anyone of making their gods perfectly moral . However, two things are noteworthy. First, this religious concept of Socrates, as Vlastos (1991: 114, 167 n46) admits, had no guarantee of a new religious doctrine, rationalistic or not. That is, his religious idea remained a destructive power rather than a positive one. Therefore, as Nussbaum argues (1980: 102), he was partially liable to his own condemnation. Second, Socrates’ motive behind his moralistic claim of gods was not necessarily altruistic, as Vlastos (1991: 176-7) takes for granted. 62 Cf. Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 35-6. 63 Pl. Ap. 31c, Euthphr 3b; Xen. Ap. 12, Mem. 2-3. Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 34-36. Contra. Burnet 1924: 95. Burnet rejects the worship of the daimonion as part of the religious charge for the reason that two of the witness, Euthyphro and Xenophon, were not philosophically talented. However, there is no need for philosophical sophistication in understanding the public charges of Socrates.

140 political authority. He points out that in principle it was only under the recognition of the demos that the worship of new gods, whether private or public, was introduced into the city. 64 Socrates’ daimonion , by contrast, was by no means recognizable to the demos, since it was revealed to Socrates alone. 65 What was even worse is that in the name of this unrecognized deity Socrates, according to Plato, despised the authority of the Athenian court, 66 or, as reported by Xenophon, dared to exert great influence upon his companions. 67 Both of his pupils’ reports suggest the probability of serious conflict between Socrates’ private deity and the public authority. 68

Atheism : Considering the religious diversity and flexibility in the Athenian society, its citizens seemed capable of expressing their opinions of gods with considerable freedom.

Therefore, some scholars argue that atheism, though not mentioned in the indictment, was likely to have been one of the main reasons for the conviction of Socrates, since the denial of the existence of gods might appear much more irritating than his quarrelling with the mortal kindred over the intention of divinity, and finally must have crossed the boundary of Athenian religious tolerance. 69 Though Plato has pointed out the logical contradiction between the charge of atheism and that of introducing the new deities, 70 it is understandable in the common usage of language to call someone an atheist if he

64 Parker 1996: 156. 65 See also the discussion of Xenophon’s and Plato’s religious defence of Socrates’ religion in chapter 5 and 6. 66 Pl. Ap. 40a-c. 67 Xen. Mem. 1.1.4. 68 McPherran (1996: 135) suggests that Socrates’ personal cult could have constituted a threat to the society in the following ways: ‘(1) the source of the daimonion may be an unlicensed deity to whom Socrates pays unlicensed cult; (2) his characterization of this sign puts him on special, private terms with a deity; and (3) this sign and the deity behind it may be illusory or the deity may have hostile intentions toward Athens.’ 69 See Parker 1996: 152; Brickhouse & Smith 1998: 30-34, 1994: 188; Finley 1985: 129; Chroust 1945: 47- 8. 70 Pl. Ap. 26b ff.

141 substitutes the traditional gods with new ones that are not only strange but also indiscernible to anyone else. 71 How serious could the charge be? Socrates did have a well-established reputation as a natural scientist who doubted the divinity of the natural world through his alleged exploration above the sky and below the earth, 72 an image which reminds us of the prosecution of Anaxagoras as reported by Plutarch. 73 Although, as argued above, the law by which Socrates was accused is unlikely to have been the one in the case of Anaxagoras, it might be true that there was a long-term tendency of popular suspicion towards natural research because of its atheist implication. However, this hostility could not be deadly serious if, as Plato’s Socrates says, the atheist theory of

Anaxagoras was still available on the street at a very low cost. 74 iii. The Political Causes

There are three possible political charges: personal enmity, subversion of the democracy, and corruption of the Athenian tradition. The first is different from the rest in its lack of genuine considerations of ideology or public interests. Compared with the second charge, the charge of corrupting the traditional orders extends the range of crime from the administrative realm to all the basic norms of the Athenian society.

Personal enmity against Socrates : One of the most plausible reasons for bringing

Socrates to the court is the hostility that Socrates had incurred directly out of personal conflicts between him and the accusers or indirectly from rows between his companions

71 See also Stoke (1997: 137): ‘It is amply clear that atheism and a belief in strange gods or novel daimones or superhuman beings could co-exists happily in the popular conception of sceptical intellectuals. Disbelief in the normal gods was for practical purposes atheism.’ 72 Ar. Clouds , 225 ff; Pl. Ap. 18b-c; Xen. Mem. 1.1.5. 73 Plut. Per . 32; 74 Pl. Ap. 26 d-e.

142 and theirs. The accusers were not necessarily ashamed of claiming their personal hostility toward Socrates, for personal enmity by itself was an acceptable reason for bringing a public case to an Athenian court. 75 This kind of enmity is also what Plato and

Xenophon claimed to be the accusers’ true motive and the cause of the jury’s verdict. In

Plato’s version, the accusers were the agents of those reputedly wise men such as poets, craftsmen, politicians and orators who had been publicly humiliated by Socrates’ exposure of their ignorance. Their persistent slander was said to be a more important cause that led the jury to convict and execute Socrates. 76 According to Xenophon,

Anytus indicted Socrates as revenge for Socrates’ bold interference in the education of his son. 77 Finally, the association of Socrates and some notorious oligarchs such as

Critias and Alcibiades might have raised some people’s hatred toward him. 78 Though his oligarchic association appears in the context of the ancient sources mainly as evidence of his danger to Athens and the democracy, it could also stir the memory of many people for their personal sufferings brought about by some of Socrates’ companions.

However, the effect of personal hatred should not be exaggerated. 79 It was far from a sufficient reason for the success of a public suit. Personal hatred was acceptable in the court mainly because it proved that the accuser had a stronger motive than to exact money by blackmailing, which was serious misbehaviour. 80 To win the jury’s approval or merely to avoid the heavy penalty for failing to acquire at least a fifth of the votes, the appeals of ideology or public interests were still essential. Obviously, to claim that the

75 H.M. Hansen 1991: 195. 76 Pl. Ap. 23c-24b. 77 Xen. Ap. 29. 78 Xen. Mem. 12-13; Aesch. 1.173 79 This caution has been argued as early as at the end of the eighteenth century and accepted since then by many scholars. See Zeller 1885: 204-211. 80 Hansen 1991: 195.

143 accusers had no other reasons than their personal hatred toward Socrates, as Plato and

Xenophon did in their defences of Socrates, was a strategy not for justifying, but for discrediting, their accusation. Besides, as mentioned above, the Athenian mechanism of sortition made the jury more or less a fair sample of the citizenry. Though Socrates was notorious, it is unlikely that he had been involved in so many private quarrels that he had become a personal enemy of most Athenians. Even Plato and Xenophon only claimed that the accusers, not the jurors, had direct or indirect personal conflict with Socrates.

The jurors were said to have convicted Socrates not because of their own personal conflicts with Socrates, but because they were deceived by the long-term slander of his enemies who were reputedly wise and therefore by definition a small minority of the citizenry and the jury. Moreover, the effects of the law reform and the reconciliation should be taken into account. Their success, as the previous two chapters argue, strongly suggests a popular commitment to leaving behind the hatred of past partisan conflicts for the future of a law-abiding Athenian community. Finally, the oath all jurors had to take bounded them to cast their votes according to the laws or their sense of justice, instead of indulging their personal enmity. 81 Transgression of this principle, according to the oath, would incur grave misfortune to the wrongdoers themselves and their families. 82 The oath would have carried some extra weight in religion-connected trials such as the one of

Socrates.

81 Hansen (1999: 182) reconstructs the oath as follows: ‘I will cast my vote in consonance with the laws and with the decrees passed by the Assembly and by the Council, but, if there is no law, in consonance with my sense of what is most just, without favour or enmity. I will vote only on the matters raised in the charge, and I will listen impartially to accusers and defenders alike.’ 82 Dem. 24. 149-151. Harrison 1971: 44; MacDowell 1978: 43-44; Hansen 1991: 182-3. cf. Todd 1993: 54- 55, 59-60. Todd points out the difficulty for the jurors to reach a decision following the oath because of the probable confusions among the laws, but his scepticism that there is no evidence for the jurors’ observance of the oath seems to pay little attention to the importance of religion in the Athenian society.

144 Subversion of the democracy : Socrates might have been accused because of his own alleged anti-democratic thought 83 and his social association with the oligarchs who had overthrown the democracy. Though often viewed as a violation of the amnesty of 403, this kind of charge was not necessarily so, since Socrates’ past behaviour could still be used as character evidence after 403. Besides, the philosopher seemed to continue in his old way of life, which in the eyes of some Athenians, according to their experience, was going to cause trouble to the democracy. 84

While it is still an issue of much dispute whether or not the historical Socrates was truly an antidemocrat, 85 there is agreement among most scholars that he did have a public image of being an oligarchic teacher. 86 Plato’s Socratic works are full of Socrates’ severe criticism of the democracy. 87 According to other sources, he was said to be courteous with the upper class, while contemptuous toward the common people. 88 The image was characterized by his criticism of the democratic practice of sortition: that it was extremely foolish to appoint governmental officials not according to their virtue and knowledge, but by lot among the common and uneducated people. 89 The image, which was still firmly

83 One ancient source, Hypereides, claims that Socrates was tried because of his thought. Hansen 1995: 19. 84 See also Hansen 1995: 11-12; Brickhouse & Smith 2002: 7-8. 85 Scholars’ opinions of Socrates’ true political beliefs largely rely upon their interpretation of the Socratic writings of Xenophon and Plato. See, among many, Vlastos 1984; Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 157-166; Yonenzwa 2001. 86 Even Scholars who believe Socrates was not anti-democratic agree with this. Vlastos 1984: 89; Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 160. 87 Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 157-60. 88 Xen. Mem. 1.2.58. Hansen 1995: 8-9. 89 Xen. Mem. 1.2.9. On the other hand, Socrates was once a member of the council and presided over the trial of the generals in 406. Pl. Ap . 32b; Xen. Hell . 1.7.15. Some scholars then argue that Socrates’ participation in democratic politics indicates his acceptance of the democratic practices such as the selection by lot and the majority rule. E.g. Penner 2000: 183; Yonezawa 2001: 103-4. However, the story could also be an example of Socrates’ inconsistence between his words and deeds. Besides, neither Plato nor Xenophon emphasised its democratic implication.

145 attributed to him in the days of Aristotle, 90 would have reminded the jurors of the propaganda that had been involved in the disfranchisement of the commoners and of their other sufferings during the two oligarchic coups in 411 and 404. 91 Even Xenophon did not deny that Socrates held this sort of view, though he was quick to argue that Socrates allowed only the means of peaceful persuasion, and therefore held no responsibility for the oligarchic violence and murders.

The danger of Socrates to the democracy could be further affirmed by his personal friendship with some of the notorious oligarchs, an association which is beyond dispute. 92

Meletus and the other accusers are believed to have used it as a major point of attack to support their case in the court. 93 Plato’s Apology admits that many of Socrates’ audience were rebellious young men from the rich or upper classes. 94 Xenophon conceded that two of the most subversive political criminals, Critias and Alcibiades, were among the audience, 95 a bond that was still firmly remembered and considered to be the reason for the execution of Socrates fifty years later. 96 This political association, rather than the philosophical criticism in itself, may have been more responsible for the conviction of

Socrates. 97

90 Arist. Rh . 1393b. Hansen 1995: 20. 91 For the coup of 411, see Thuc. 8.65 ff; cf. Ath. Pol. 29ff; for the coup of 404, see Xen. Hell . 3 ff, cf. Ath. Pol. 34ff. 92 Wood & Wood (1986: 58ff) and H.M. Hansen (1995: 19ff) provide detailed and persuasive argument for the plausibility of this charge. 93 Xen. Mem. 12. Isoc. 11.4-6. The claim that this political charge is a later invention has been refuted by M.H. Hansen. Hansen 1995: 8ff. contra. Brickhouse & Smith 2002: 5-8. 94 Pl. Ap. 23c. 95 Xen. Mem. 12. 96 Aesch. 1.173. 97 For example, Isocrates was not put on trial by making a similar criticism on the practice of sortition. Vlastos 1984: 106. For the trial of Socrates as a rare exception in the Athenian tradition of free speech, see Dover 1976; R.W. Wallace 1994: Hansen 1995: 19-21; cf. Todd 1993: 310-312.

146 How serious was the charge of oligarchic association? It was easy for the accusers to accuse Socrates with his infamous image, pointing out that he would again corrupt the younger generation and create another Alcibiades or Critias. More importantly, popular suspicion might have been gravely increased, as I.F. Stone points out, by the recent oligarchic revolt in Eleusis in 401. 98 Considering the frequency and intensity of the oligarchic coups in the last decade, the jurors might very well have tended to believe that

Socrates was a dangerous enemy to the fragile democracy at the present and in the future.

Though some scholars argues that one’s personal associations should not be a reason for the conviction of any crime, 99 there is little evidence that the Athenians shared the same belief.

The corrupter of traditional norms : This is the most profound charge against Socrates in terms of scale, referring not only to his behaviour against the democratic values and institution, but also to his corruption of the political order in the broadest sense: the totality of the Athenian norms. It would have been to the accusers’ advantage should they have succeeded in imposing this charge upon Socrates, for it would have drawn more votes of conviction from the non-democratic conservatives by portraying him as an enemy to both the democracy and the traditional way of life.

Though we do not have the accusers’ prosecution speech, Aristophanes’ Clouds demonstrates the corrupting effect of Socrates’ impiety on the young men in misleading them to defy all of the traditional values and practices. In this comedy, initiated into

Socrates’ Thinkery and converting his belief from the traditional religion to Socrates’

98 Stone 1988: 140, 155. 99 Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 166-7.

147 new goddesses -- the Clouds, who were worshipped by sophists and sycophants 100 -- a young man learned the oratorical art of making the wrong arguments the stronger. He successfully defeated his father’s creditors, and found that with this new skill he could deny not only the norms of business contracts, but also all the other established authorities. He was finally corrupted and considered all behaviour possible and perfectly justifiable, including beating up his own parents. 101

This charge was conceivable, since even Plato’s Socrates considered that Aristophanes’ portrayal constituted an essential element of his public image. 102 Furthermore, though

Aristophanes’ portrayal used to be considered an unfounded distortion, 103 some scholars argue with certain plausibility that it was indeed a fair representation of the historical

Socrates because of the basic similarities between the Aristophanic image and the one in

Plato’s Socratic dialogues. 104 It is argued that, considering the accounts of both Plato and

Aristophanes without favour on the philosopher, Socrates appeared to be a radical revolutionary who proposed no alternative at all, that is, a nihilist. In addition, while the charge perhaps had been considered merely ludicrous banter in 434 when the Clouds was staged, there were reasons in 399 that more and more Athenians might have taken it seriously because of the dramatic change of environment. Several events might have altered their concept of Socrates’ influence. Robert Parker suggests that the mutilation of

Hermes and the profanation of the Mysteries in 415 committed by a group of young

100 Ar. Clouds 316-8. 101 Ar. Clouds 1399-1405, 1445. 102 Pl. Ap. 19c. 103 See, for example, Ross 1933: 28; Chroust 1945: 48. 104 See esp. Nussbaum 1980: 92-5, 102; Montuori 1988: 24, 81. Zeller (1885: 234) recognized the destructive effect of Socrates’ philosophy, but argues that the Athenians had destroyed their own norms before Socrates did it. Cf. Lane’s account (2001: 33-41) of similar views of some modern philosophers: Hegel, Nietzsche and Sorel.

148 oligarchs made religion a more sensitive issue in 399. 105 Much more important, as mentioned above, should be Socrates’ association with Alcibiades and the Thirty. These oligarchs, in the eyes of the Athenians, were not only anti-democratic, but also immoral villains, ready to satisfy their unbounded ambition and greed at the cost of other

Athenians, democrats or not. Given the repeated misconduct of those young oligarchs at the end of the fifth century B.C., the comedian’s words would have appeared more like an ominous prophecy than light-hearted jokes.

IV. Conclusion i

The discussion of the trial of Socrates in this chapter is divided into three parts. As to the source issue, it criticizes the common tendency to consider the defensive works of Plato and Xenophon as impartial reports, arguing that an agreement between these two main sources should be a minimal requirement for our historical knowledge of the trial. This methodological position has recently even won concessions from some leading scholars who believe in the historicity of Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues. However, it still needs to be emphasised and applied more strictly, so that the distinction between historical reality and philosophical speculation may be better maintained. ii

Besides, the examination of the trial procedure indicates that the trial, following the regulations of the Athenian laws, was not as hasty as one might have thought. It was not

105 Parker 1996: 146.

149 based on a decree of persecuting scientific research. One of the accusers, Anytus, was a moderate politician rather than an extremist. There were heavy fines and severe punishment for abuse of litigation, such as blackmail and implausible accusation that acquired less than a fifth of the jury’s votes. Jurors had to be adults over the age of 30 and were selected through a sophisticated procedure of sortition that prevented efficiently partisanship and embracery of jurors. The accused had the right to defend himself by speaking to the jury, calling witnesses and co-speakers, and interrogating his accusers.

Though Socrates appeared to irritate the jury several times, he was allowed to exact all his rights as a defendant. Finally, the Athenians had extra time to reconsider their verdict in the case of Socrates, for his execution happened to be postponed for a month due to a religious festival. iii

Furthermore, we have clarified the complicated discussion of the causes of the trial, dividing them into six interlinked categories. Three of them are religious accusations: the denial of Athenian gods, the introduction of new deities, and atheism. The others are political ones: personal enmity, the subversion of democracy, and corruption of youth.

The accusation of atheism seems less significant because the works of atheism were available on the streets of Athens. Personal enmity is another weak accusation because it justified only the motivation of accusation but not the guilt of Socrates.

This analysis of the causes of the trial highlights the destructive effects of Socrates’ philosophy. His elenchus is profound examination of established norms, being they religious, moral or political. Common understandings of divinity, justice and other moral

150 concepts collapsed under his criticism. Therefore, Socrates appeared to be irreligious, immoral and antidemocratic in the eyes of the public. He would not have had such a poor public image if he had kept his philosophy to himself. However, for some reasons,

Socrates brought his philosophy into the public. He used to stay in the agora, gymnasia and other public places all day long. He debated with people there and proved their intellectual inferiority. A group of young people, following him around the city of

Athens, received his instruction or imitated his elenctic way of questioning. They made themselves a nuisance to the public. People were angry with Socrates because of this philosophical exercise by him and his followers, and the philosopher came to hold the public image described in Aristophanes’ comedy.

Socrates justified his philosophical practice in the name of divine authorities and altruism.

The former refers to the Delphic oracle and his daimonion, which are controversial or even unrecognizable. As to the latter, there was an abundance of evidence after the

Thirty Tyrants that Socrates’ philosophy produced the opposite effect. Some of his followers were in the core of the oligarchic coup in 403. Their lawless behaviour confirmed the long-term suspicion that Socrates and his philosophy corrupted the youth and was a threat to the democracy and other established norms. iv.

In summary, we have presented a case of certain consistency among the three events of the Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C. : the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates. There might be some objection that the trial was a deviation from the law reform and the reconciliation rather than an example of them. It

151 was said that the Athenians, having soon regretted their execution of Socrates, erected a statue of him in a public place and punished the accusers with death or exile. 106 This legend suggests that the trial, not complying with the due process of law and deliberation, was a precipitate case under the impetuosity of the demos, like the trial of the ten generals in 406. 107 However, as Aeschines’ famous testimony indicates, 108 the Athenians did not regret their decision. Besides, there is no evidence that the legal procedure and deliberation required by the laws were ever compromised in the case.

On the other hand, more voices claim that the trial was a violation of the amnesty. 109

However, as argued in chapter three, the amnesty was neither an unconditional nor a complete oblivion of the past. Given the nature of the Athenian judicial system, the law could not prohibit the accusers from mentioning Socrates’ past behaviour as evidence of his character, nor did it protect him if he was judged to be a danger not only in the past, but also in the future. 110 In fact, an Athenian democrat might even rebuke the pupils of

Socrates, boasting that the trial was not only consistent with the amnesty literally, but also illustrated its spirit of maintaining communal harmony, as judged by the extraordinary internal stability of fourth-century Athens

The previous two chapters, it is hoped, have pointed to a prevailing tendency among the

Athenians, especially after 403, to rebuild Athens with a conservative nationalist ideal, that is, to define Athens as the community of the Athenian offspring ruled by the laws founded by their mythical common ancestors. The common appeal of this ideal is

106 Diog. Laert. 2.42-43. 107 Xen. Hell . 1.7.12ff, 1.7.35. 108 Aesch. 1.173. 109 for example, Todd 1985: 196-7; B. Strauss 1986: 3; Wolpert 2002a: 48-49; Mossé 1973: 19-20. 110 See also Stone 1988: 155; Hansen 1995: 11-12; Brickhouse & Smith 2002: 7-8.

152 attested by the fact that since the beginning of the law reform in 411 almost every politician, democratic and oligarchic, justified their behaviour with the slogan of returning to the ancestral constitution. The enormous power of this ideal made the

Athenian democrats ungratefully turn away their foreign comrades, while embracing their former enemy, the Athenian oligarchs, with such an unprecedentedly generous amnesty that the democracy won unanimous praise even from its severe critics. Its nationalist character expressed most clearly in the reconfirmation of Pericles’ strict law of citizenship that Athenian membership was in principle an inherited privilege granted for being born to Athenian parents, not to be earned by one’s political belief, knowledge, wealth or contribution to Athens.

The consolidation of the democracy and the unity of Athens were then the two main tasks that the Athenians strived hard to achieve at the same time by making a difficult balance between them after the civil wars. As discussed above, there were reasons behind the suspicion that Socrates was at odds with these serious causes. On the one hand, he obviously still preferred some sort of hierarchical order based on virtues or knowledge to the democratic belief and practice of equality and participation. 111 On the other hand, while the democrats and the victims of the Thirty had given up so much in exchange for the harmony of Athens upheld with the myth of the common ancestors, Socrates showed no intention of adjusting his individualistic way of philosophy that was imitated by his young followers to mock the elders as well as time-honoured practices of all sorts. The defiance of traditional values was hardly acceptable at this period, for it would have appeared as a blunt mockery of the ancestral constitution that was the central principle for

111 For example: Xen. Mem . 1.2.9; Vlastos 1983: 89. See also the collection of the relevant Platonic texts in Brickhouse & Smith 2002: 192-195; Millett 2005: 37 ff.

153 the law reform, the amnesty and the peace agreement between the democrats and oligarchs. Socrates’ way of life, therefore, would have been judged at that time as a conspiratorial act that would push the whole community back into the chaos of civil strife.

The threat of Socrates was further confirmed by his close connection with Alcibiades and

Critias, two of the most notorious oligarchs. Judging by their experience that was still fresh and painful, the Athenians, especially the democrats among them, had reasons to suspect that Socrates would have soon cultivated another Alcibiades or Critias if they had failed to stop him in his way of life.

154 Chapter Five Xenophon and Athenian Democracy We have already examined in the earlier chapters the three important events completed by the Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C.: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates. While the last of these has discredited the democracy since ancient times as the impetuous murderer of maybe the greatest philosopher, the Athenian demos’ achievements in relation to the first two events has recently started to win it a reputation for generosity and observance of laws. These two contradictory images of the direct democracy have now reopened an important debate among historians and political theorists: whether the Athenian democracy was a good government or not. It is time now to re-examine what Xenophon and Plato said on this issue and consider their insightful thinking on and personal experience with the democracy.

Xenophon and Plato used to be considered strict critics of Athenian democracy who attest the decline of Athens under the folly of the democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C.

Their criticism of the democracy is easy to find in their writings. However, when examining their works closely, we also find their recognition of the democratic achievements of law reform and reconciliation. There are even signs that indicate their reconsideration of the trial of Socrates.

Let us start with Xenophon, whose contribution to the discussion of ancient Greek political thought is often neglected. Xenophon actually constitutes an interesting case compared with Plato. Both came from similar social backgrounds, but approached issues of political thought from different perspectives. Plato was of course the much more

155 sophisticated and articulate philosopher, but Xenophon did not lack philosophical insight.

He is one who would forgive Athenian democracy for its execution of Socrates, for he understood the importance of forgiveness in dealing with political conflicts caused by ignorance, envy or other human flaws. He was also more experienced in real politics as a politician and military leader. His political experience provides a first-hand account of how an intellectual elitist struggled to be successful in popular politics, stories that we can hardly find in Plato or other ancient Greek writers.

It is important to note that Xenophon was not only a political writer, but also a veteran soldier and politician who pursued fame in public spheres. 1 His political ambition is a key to understanding his view of the democracy. In a nutshell, Xenophon was undoubtedly an elitist who firmly believed in the ideal of political hierarchy in which the superior ruled over the inferior classes. He was a pupil of Socrates and exiled by the democracy for thirty years for siding with Sparta against Athens. However, as suggested in his appreciation of the rule of law and the reconciliation project under the democracy as well as in his persistent interest in Athenian politics, he did not hold a completely negative view of the demos’ political capability, despite all of his disagreements with the rule of the common people. His moderate view is consistent with his life-long pursuit of a public career, a decision that would have been incomprehensible if he had thought that the demos was too wild to be led.

1 The predominant voice in today’s discussion of Xenophon’s political thought is the Leo Straussian school. There seems to be a tendency among Straussian scholars to view Xenophon more as a Socratic philosopher than as an active general and politician, maybe because of their belief that philosophy was the ultimate end of both his theoretical reflection and practical deeds of politics. However, some of them also recognized Xenophon’s lifelong interest in politics and the problems of interpretation caused by dismissing Xenophon’s active political life. For the view that Xenophon was mainly a Socratic philosopher, see Leo Strauss 1975: 112, 136, Bruell 1987: 105, Pangle 1994: 150, Howland 2000: 876, Nadon 2001: 179, 180, Buzzetti 2001: 31. For recognition of Xenophon’s interest and achievement in politics, see Bruell 1987: 91, 111, Bruell 1994: x, Buzzetti 2001: 31.

156 As to the interpretive approach of Xenophon’s work in this thesis, there are certain assumptions as follows. First, in contrast to the focus on the issue of historicity in the previous chapters, the main interest here is the political aspect of Xenophon’s works, that is, his view of political society and his judgement on the democracy. The issue of historicity, therefore, will be discussed only when it is relevant to our examination of

Xenophon’s political thought. For example, we will not discuss in detail the level of historical accuracy in his Constitution of the Spartans or how documentary are the various dialogues between Socrates and his companions reported in his Socratic works.

Another presumption, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is that all Xenophon’s

Socratic works as well as his other works are considered as an expression of his own thought rather than that of Socrates or someone else. There are of course materials from

Socrates and others that Xenophon had borrowed, but they have been adapted and rearranged to an indistinguishable level. It is often a futile task to distinguish clearly between an author’s thought and the views of those from whom he has learnt. Lastly, it is presumed that Xenophon’s writings are basically consistent. In contrast to the case of

Plato, it is generally agreed that Xenophon wrote most of his works in the last decade of his life. 2 It is less likely for his political views to have fundamentally changed in his old age, and most studies of Xenophon appear to presume philosophical consistency of his works. 3

2 The works of Xenophon that some scholars think might be written before 360s: The Apology of Socrates, The Constitution of the Spartans, the first part of Hellenica and a few books of Memorabilia . See OCD ‘Xenophon’, Higgins 1977: 131-2, Lipka 2002: 9. For discussion of the publication date of individual works, see Cawkwell 1979: 15; 17; Waterfield: 1990: 7, 32;Gera 1993: 23; Dillery 1995: 14; Lipka 2002: 13; Cawkwell 2004: 47. 3 See, for example, Higgins 1977: xii; Tuplin: 1993: 163; Pangle 1994: 128-9; Dillery 1995: 7-8; Nadon 2001: 24-5, though they have different views on the central themes or ideas in the corpus of Xenophon.

157 This chapter begins with a brief account of the relationship between Xenophon and

Athenian democracy, before examining his responses to the three important events individually.

I. Xenophon’s Oligarchic Tendency i. Oligarchic values The relationship between Xenophon and Athenian democracy is a complex issue.

Xenophon was mainly an oligarch; he understood politics from an elitist perspective, as revealed in his more theoretical writings such as his Socratic writings and The

Constitution of the Spartans . To be sure, he was not an extremist like Critias who wanted to ‘burn down’ the democracy; 4 however, neither was he one who would have genuine sympathy with the people’s suspicion of dictatorial rule and their struggle for equal rule. 5

What concerned him were mainly the Athenian oligarchs’ political interests as well as the difficulties they encountered in a democratic society. For example, the virtue of self control that he was never tired of emphasising was in fact only possible for those who were exposed to the risk of self-indulgence due to their fortune and leisure, while poor citizens, who lived constantly in austerity, would have had difficulty in proving that their way of life was a result of their free will rather than forced by necessity. 6

He also made an explicit criticism of the democratic practice of sortition. Some Athenian politicians accused Socrates of mocking the democratic way of distributing governing

4 This is the scene reportedly inscribed on Critias’ monument. Hornblower 2000: 161. 5 For Xenophon’s oligarchic tendency, see also Anderson 1974: 40 ff. For an example of democratic ideology, see Eur. Supp . 426 ff. 6 This issue was raised in Mem. 2.1.17 by Aristippus: ‘But, Socrates, how do those educated in the kingly art [self-control]…different from those who suffered bad things out of compulsion, at least if they are going to suffer hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and all the other toils willingly?’ Cf. Cyr . 7.5.80 where the virtue of self control was used as a means of political control.

158 positions by lot, and Xenophon did not deny it. 7 In fact, he confirmed it later in his

Memorabilia : his Socrates did maintain that the rulers should be those who knew how to rule, not those who were selected by lot. 8 The Spartan way of choosing officials through fierce competition, in his view, was more appropriate. 9

Xenophon also revealed his contempt for ordinary citizens from time to time in his works.

For example, he described in Cyropaedia a Persian official as a person of the sourest nature when the Persian objected to his colleagues’ mockery of the common soldiers. 10

Manufacture and commerce in his view were vulgar and not suitable for noble and ruling people, 11 and in the account of his much admired Spartan constitution the citizens were not allowed to perform such activities at anytime in their lives. 12 He also considered it a sign of corruption that the Persian army recruited artisans, labourers and people who had to work for a living. 13 In contrast to the democratic belief of political equality, he believed educated people should rule over the ignorant. 14 Finally, his obsessive interest in great leadership in effect obscured the role of the majority, giving the impression that the quality of leadership was all that mattered for the success of a political society, the form of its government notwithstanding. 15 Some passages in his writings even have a hint that slavery under a benevolent master could be no worse than a free society. 16

7 Mem. 1.2.9-10. 8 Mem. 3.9.10-12. 9 Lac. 4.2, 10.1 and 10.3. 10 Cyr. 2.2.11. 11 E.g. Socrates’ comment on Anytus’ education of his son in Ap. 29-31, see also Oec. 6.10. 12 Lac. 7.1-2. 13 Cyr. 8.8.20. 14 Mem. 3.9.10-11. 15 E.g. Vect. 1.1; Oec. 21. 5-6; Cyr. 8.1.7. See also his accounts of Lycurgus in the Constitution of the Spartans , Agesilaus in Agesilaus and Cyrus in Cyropaedia . 16 Oec. 1.23; 13.1-14.10; Mem. 7. 1-14; Cyr. 8.1.44, 8.8.1.

159 ii. Democratic involvement However, Xenophon did not reject democracy because of his oligarchic belief. On the contrary, as discussed below, democracy held a central position in both his life and works.

He achieved the height of his political career in a democratically organized mercenary army, a success that won him the name of demagogue. Democratic Athens was one of his main concerns throughout his life, and he returned to Athens after 30 years’ exile.

Many of his works are treatises or handbooks about Athenian public policies that differ from his other works for their practicality.

Throughout his life Xenophon looked for fame in various regimes, including democracy, monarchy and oligarchy. 17 He was born in the 430s into the class of knights ( i9ppei=j ), the second highest class in Athens. He was supposedly recruited into the Athenian cavalry in his twenties, but became a supporter of the oligarchic coup against the democracy in 404/ 3. Two years after the restoration of the democracy he went to Persia with other Greeks as mercenaries under the Persian prince, Cyrus, to assist in the revolt against his elder brother, who was then king. Cyrus was soon defeated and killed by his brother. The Greek mercenaries, having lost their master and then their generals, reorganized themselves as a quasi-democratic organization in which the soldiers elected new commanders and made decisions on all important affairs in their assembly. 18

Elected as one of the generals, Xenophon and other generals led the army out of Persia.

17 For general accounts of Xenophon’s life, see Diog. Laert 2.48-59, Cawkwell 1972 & 1979, OCD ‘Xenophon’. 18 For the Greek mercenaries as a semi-democratic polis, see Anderson 1974: 120 ff, Dillery 1995: 93-94, Hornblower 2004. Dillery divided the Greek expedition into several phases according to its development of military and civic character, arguing that Xenophon preferred the army as a military organization rather than a democratic one. However, Xenophon did not abandon his generalship as the mercenaries became more and more democratic. On the other hand, Hornblower (2004: 243, 263) seems to question the distinction of military and civic characters, suggesting that the success of the Greek army relied not on strong leadership, but on the army’s ‘civically generated cohesiveness and determination not to let one’s fellow fighter down’.

160 He and his army then served a Thracian prince called Seuthes before joining the Spartan expedition and went into Persia again in 399. During his service to Sparta, Xenophon established a lifelong friendship with the Spartan king Agesilaus. When Agesilaus returned to Greece in 394 because of the revolt against Sparta by poleis including Athens,

Xenophon fought with the Spartans against his fellow Athenians. As a result of his choice he was expelled from Athens and went into exile for around thirty years. 19 He settled in Peloponnese until the decree of his exile was abolished in the 360s. However, his connection with his fatherland remained strong despite his thirty years’ exile from

Athens. 20 He sent his sons back to Athens to serve in the cavalry, though they had been trained in Sparta. 21 He himself returned to Athens, though he was said to have died in

Corinth in the 350s. 22

Xenophon’s experience of various kinds of regime is also reflected in his writings. He discussed the issues of monarchy, or tyranny, in Hiero and the greater part of Cyropaedia .

As regards oligarchy, his main works are The Constitution of the Spartans , Agesilaus and part of Cyropaedia . However, many of his works are about democracy. His Socratic works discussed many important issues relating to the Athenian democracy, though

19 There are disputes over the date of Xenophon’s exile. Some scholars suggest an earlier date, arguing that he was banished from Athens because of his service to Cyrus, while others suggest that he was exiled in 394 because of his fight against Athens. As Higgins (1977: 22) argued, any earlier date of exile before 395 is unlikely since Athens was Sparta’s subject city until that time. Athens was still obliged in 399 to send 300 troops for Sparta’s expedition into Persia. The Spartan king Agesilaus would not allow Athens to expel Xenophon either for his service to Cyrus or for his Spartan association. See Xen. An. 3.1.5, 7.7.57; Hell. Oxy . 6.1 ff; Dio. Laert . 2.51. Contra. Cawkwell 1972: 14n2; Andersons 1974: 148-9; Green 1994. For further bibliography on this issue, see Lipka 2002: 4n9. 20 Contra. Strauss’ doubt (1975: 136) about Xenophon’s patriotism. 21 The report by Diogenes Laertius (2.53) that Xenophon’s sons were sent to Athens for the Spartan interests is questionable. The Spartan army recruited non-Spartans. Hell. 5.3.9. If what concerned Xenophon was mainly Sparta’s interests, why did his sons not join the Spartan army? 22 See also Higgins 1977: 128; Anderson 1974: 192. Contra. Cawkwell 1979: 14; OCD ‘Xenophon’. It is unlikely that Xenophon never returned to Athens, as some scholars argue. For one thing, he must have seen with his own eyes the latest spatial arrangement of the public square in the city of Athens, or he would not have been confident in giving very detailed instructions about the exact procedure of cavalry parades in the city. Xen. Eq. mag. 3.1 ff.

161 mainly from the perspective of the Athenian elite. 23 Anabasis is his personal story of leading an army of ten thousand. In addition, he wrote for the Athenian democracy detailed proposals for public finance and technical handbooks regarding various issues, such as Ways and Means, Cavalry Commander and On Horsemanship . The first of these was in fact written as a public speech to the Assembly or its council.

There is an interesting point in his treatment of the democracy. Considering the extant corpus of Xenophon, it is only for the democracy that he ever developed itemized plans and step-by-step instructions as to certain political issues, while his discussion of monarchy and oligarchy are mainly in the form of theoretical reflection 24 or disguised in the form of fiction, 25 appearing more general and distant from daily politics. A likely explanation for Xenophon’s unique treatment of the democracy is his membership of no other city but Athens. While Xenophon was born as an Athenian citizen and entitled by the laws to participate in the government as a member of the sovereign group, he did not enjoy such civil rights in other political organizations and had to express his opinions less directly.

With this background knowledge of Xenophon’s elitist values and democratic involvement, we move on to discuss his view on the three historical events.

II. The Law reform Though Xenophon did not give a systematic comment on the law reform by the democracy, his attitude towards this important reform can be reasonably established from his views on two relevant issues: the possibility of a democratic order under the slogan of

23 Xenophon’s Socratic works include Apology of Socrates , Symposium , Memorabilia and Oeconomicus . 24 An example of this is his Constitution of the Spartans , a general discussion of the Spartan constitutions as founded by its legendary Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus. 25 His main works on monarchy, Hiero and Cyropaedia , are both fictional.

162 the ancestral laws, on the one hand, and the substantial contents of the laws, on the other.

It is argued that, while Xenophon recognized to some extent the respect the democracy had showed to the laws, he disagreed with the people over the content of the laws. i. The Obedience of the Demos As argued in the chapter on the history of the law reform, ‘the ancestral laws’ had been the political slogan in Athens since the end of the fifth century B.C. No matter how the politicians’ proposals varied, almost all of them appealed to the public in the name of the ancestral laws, a phenomenon that attests the strength of popular reverence at that time for the traditional practices. Xenophon himself also witnessed the great power of this popular belief in his report that the ancestral laws were claimed to be the foundation of the restored democracy in 403. 26 While his Socrates recommended the use of the popular conservative sentiment as a most persuasive rhetoric strategy, 27 Xenophon himself did not fail to exploit it from time to time in his political career. He started his first speech to boost the soldiers’ morale by mentioning the glorious deeds of their ancestors when he was elected as a general of Greek mercenaries, 28 while one of his later works, Ways and

Means , also concluded with an appeal to restore the ancestral laws. 29

1. The dialogue between Socrates and the younger Pericles Was then the popular belief in the ancestral laws ever sufficient to form a strong basis of legal order in Athens? This was the question the younger Pericles, the son of the famous

Athenian politician Pericles, raised in his conversation with Socrates. 30 In their

26 Hell. 2.4.42. 27 Mem. 3.5.8 ff.. 28 An. 3.2.11. 29 Vect. 6.1. 30 This conversation in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 3.5, as far as I know, has received less attention among scholars than it deserves maybe because of its pro-democratic tendency. Cf. Strauss’ remark (1972: 67-68)

163 conversation Socrates suggested that the Athenian people were now more obedient and ready to restore the ancestral way of life, for their impetuosity had been humbled through their defeat in the war with Boeotia. He argued that ‘confidence implants neglect, easygoingness, and disobedience, while fear makes people more attentive, more obedient, and more orderly.’ 31 However, the younger Pericles responded in a typical tone of cynicism, claiming that there was no hope of lawful order for the Athenians who were rebellious, egoistic and keen to abuse the laws in prosecuting fellow citizens. 32 Socrates immediately expressed his disagreement, pointing out the common people’s excellent performance on various occasions such as choruses, athletic contests and naval operation that proved both their spirit and discipline. He said:

Don’t at all believe that the wickedness with which the Athenians are sick

is so incurable. Don’t you see that they are orderly in naval matters, that

they obey those in charge in athletic contests in an orderly manner, and

that in choruses their subordination to their teachers is inferior to none? 33

Socrates also pointed out that the deliberation and action of the Council of Areopagus, a council consisting of senior ex-officials of the democracy, was second to none in terms of nobility, lawfulness and justice. 34 The younger Pericles then corrected his prejudice against the demos, admitting that its dutiful obedience was in fact a wonder , especially in

that the dialogue was meant to be implicit criticism of Pericles’ policy of radical democracy and his naval strategy during the Peloponnesian war. 31 Mem. 3.5.5; cf. 1.2.19. Strauss (1972: 68) tended to play down Xenophon’s praise of the common people, saying the cause of their discipline was their fear rather than their knowledge. However, there is no plausible reason for his disconnection of fear and knowledge in this case. What is meant in the dialogue, it would be more reasonable to assume, is that fear forced the people to recover their rationality, to make a proper evaluation of their situation, and to act accordingly. In such a process, knowledge or practical wisdom was required. 32 Mem. 3.5.16. 33 Mem. 3.5.18. 34 Mem. 3.5.20.

164 contrast to the arrogant character of the hoplites and cavalry, who were from the upper class. 35

This important dialogue reveals certain aspects of Xenophon’s likely view on the law reform. First, he recognized the existence of a democratic legal order. The Athenian people, instead of abusing the laws in the name of tradition, had the genuinely conservative tendency to follow what they thought had been established on the Athenian soil in the course of time. 36 Moreover, they had proved themselves that they could be obedient, cooperative and at the same time outstanding in their collective activities, even though it is quite unlikely, as in Socrates’ apparent eulogy, that they were the noblest, most harmonious, honour-loving, friendly and enthusiastic to sacrifice for the common good among the Greeks. 37

Second, there were two institutional arrangements in the law reform that won

Xenophon’s welcome. He would have approved of the procedure of election in selecting law investigators as described in the decree of Teisamenus, 38 for, as mentioned above, he considered election a far superior way of choosing magistrates than the democratic way of sortition. Furthermore, he would also have considered that the restored democracy had made the right decision by putting the execution of the laws under the guardianship of the

Council of Areopagus, 39 an institute that he thought was at the highest level in terms of wisdom and integrity. 40

35 Mem. 3.5.19. 36 For Xenophon’s recognition of the people’s reverence for the ancestral laws, see also Hell. 2.4.42-43; Eq. mag. 7.3 37 Mem. 3.5.2-3. 38 Andoc. 1.83-84. 39 Andoc. 1.84. 40 Mem. 3.5.20.

165 Finally, the dialogue between Socrates and the younger Pericles also provides an explanation for the success of the law reform. Socrates suggested that military defeat and fear of the enemy played an important part in curing the demos’ disease of lawlessness, making it agree to put its freedom under some sort of regulation. While the victory over

Persia and the establishment of the Athenian empire had boosted the demos’ confidence and led it astray, its defeat by Boeotia in turn made it afraid and moderate, according to

Socrates. The demos, after being defeated, was now eager to obey just like sailors at sea under the threat of a storm, as Socrates said:

And I would make this judgment also on the basis of those who are on

ships. For when they fear nothing, they are surely full of disorder. But

whenever they are in terror of a storm or enemies, they not only do

everything they are bid to do but even keep silent, watching anxiously for

further instructions just like members of a chorus.41

2. Interpretive issues There are two interpretive problems regarding the dialogue between Socrates and Pericles.

The first is that the dialogue was set to predate the law reform, and is therefore problematic as evidence of Xenophon’s view on the reform. However, what is discussed here is the philosophical implication of the dialogue rather than its historicity, and the actual date of writing of the dialogue was decades after the reform. It is therefore a reasonable expectation that this dialogue represents the author’s view at the time of

41 Mem. 3.5.6.

166 writing. 42 Besides, though the historical context of the dialogue was set decades before the law reform, and the military defeat mentioned there was their defeat by the Boeotians rather than their unconditional surrender to the Spartan alliance, this comment of Socrates fits even better the situation of Athens in 403 when the crisis was much more serious and the desire for reform presumably much stronger.

The second and much more difficult problem is the supposed ironical tone in the dialogue.

The younger Pericles was in fact one of the generals who were tried as a group and executed by the democracy. Xenophon described the trial as a blunt violation of the legal procedure on the side of the people who let their collective passion overrule the due process of the laws. 43 It is therefore very ironical when Socrates encouraged the younger

Pericles, who was initially reluctant, to be a general of Athens with the assurance that the demos had learnt from its mistakes and was now moderate and obedient to the laws. Was then Xenophon’s true meaning that the lawlessness of the demos was beyond all remedies, including the cruelty of war? Maybe not, for the following reasons: first, the person who encouraged the younger Pericles to go for a political career in the democracy and was therefore responsible for his execution was none other than Xenophon’s beloved mentor, Socrates. He admired Socrates as the wise man who always gave beneficial advice to his companions. 44 In fact, Socrates persuaded not only the younger Pericles,

42 Chroust (1957: 229n32) put the historical background of this dialogue even as late as the days after the battle of Leuctra in 371 when a Boeotian polis, Thebes, defeated Sparta and became the most powerful polis in Greece. 43 Hell. 1.7. 44 Mem. 1.1.4. Strauss (1972: 68) tried to excuse Socrates by arguing that Pericles did not follow Socrates’ advice, for Socrates seemed to advise him to be a general of the army instead of leading the navy. Since Pericles was executed by the democracy for his responsibility as a general in a naval battle, Socrates, he suggested, should not be held responsible for his execution. However, his argument fails to pay sufficient attention to the importance of the navy in Athens. The fleet was indispensable for protecting the route of grain supply to Athens. It was natural for Pericles, once elected as a general, to lead the navy.

167 but also many of his companions, to enter into the democratic politics. 45 He even claimed himself to be a professional trainer of politicians.46 Therefore, an ironical reading of the dialogue between Socrates and the younger Pericles does not fit into

Xenophon’s praise of Socrates as a great teacher of political art. Furthermore, Xenophon himself, as shown in his life and writings, was constantly enthusiastic about politics all his life, considering public honour as one of the most important values. There is, in fact, hardly a trace of political apathy in all his words and deeds. Therefore, for the reasons given above, it appears that Xenophon did not mean to be ironical when his Socrates praised the moderation and obedience of the Athenian demos in the dialogue with the younger Pericles. As to the conviction of the younger Pericles and other generals in 406, this infamous trial certainly revealed the great risk involved for politicians in the

Athenian democracy and how the demos might be led astray. Yet, Xenophon did not turn away from democratic politics because of this unfortunate incidence. As discussed at the end of this chapter, he was still optimistic about the people’s sensibility and believed that the risk of a political career could be managed. ii. ‘The Ancestral Laws’ As to the substantial content of the ancestral laws, however, Xenophon was in disagreement with the democracy. The law reform made it one of the most essential principles in the democracy that the only valid laws were those confirmed and written down through certain legislative procedures, while Xenophon had considerable reservations about the justice of these written laws for the reason that they were human

45 In addition to the case of the younger Pericles, see also Mem. 3.1.1-3; 3.2.4; 3.3.1; 3.7.1; 4.1.2; S ymp. 9.42-43. Contra. Strauss’ claim (1972: 55, 72, 177) that, though Socrates might have trained some of his companions to be politicians, he did not encourage anyone into politics, except for Charmides and Callias. 46 Mem. 1.6.15.

168 invention rather than divine creation. His ideal of the laws was probably the so-called

‘unwritten laws’, which, rather than a collection of social customs and practices, were a loosely defined set of scientific principles that applied universally beyond human intervention. 47

His distinction between the written laws and unwritten laws disagreed at some point with the traditionalist tendency implicit in the term ‘the ancestral laws’. The discovery of universal principles was a difficult task that required much more than conventional wisdom in exploring beyond particular cultures and societies. Therefore, these universal laws would from time to time appear to be in conflict with what most people believed to be traditional practices, as we can see from Xenophon’s discussion of the two legendary lawgivers: Solon for Athens and Lycurgus for Sparta. The two founders of the ancestral laws for Athens and Sparta in Xenophon’s description were in fact revolutionaries rather than traditionalists. Solon was said to have ‘ philosophized before he laid down most excellent laws’ 48 , and Lycurgus was said to imitate no one, but invented the Spartan constitution by himself, as Xenophon said:

I think that he [Lycurgus] reached the utmost limit of wisdom. For it was

not by imitating other states, but by devising a system utterly different from

that of many others, that he made his country pre-eminently prosperous. 49

This kind of revolutionary innovation against established practices was not the privilege of the legendary lawgivers; on the contrary, Xenophon encouraged his contemporaries to

47 See the important dialogue on the written and unwritten laws between Socrates and Hippias in Mem. 4.4. Cf. the famous conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles in Mem. 1.2.40-46. Cf. Strauss (1972: 111 ff) suggested that even the natural laws mentioned in the dialogues between Socrates and Hippias did not really have universal validity. 48 Symp. 8.39. 49 Lac. 1.2

169 adopt laws that were not from their own tradition, but ones that fitted their purposes. For example, his Socrates urged the Athenians to learn from their own ancestors or, alternatively, from the Spartans. 50 In his Oeconomicus an interlocutor was praised for his free combination of the Athenian laws and the Persian laws in his domestic management. 51

In summary, Xenophon did not seem to have a genuine belief in the ideal of the ancestral laws. For him, it was mainly used as a tool of popular psychology. 52 He believed that legal regulations would be more readily accepted by the people if they were convinced that these arrangements had been founded or accepted by their ancestors. His Socrates said:

If we wished them to lay claim to wealth that others had, we would show

them that it is their patrimony and belongs to them, and it is in this way

especially that we would set them on the path to claiming it; but since it is

holding first place together with virtue that we wish them to attend to, we

must show them that this, in turn, has long ago belonged most to them,

and that by attending to this they would be best of all. 53

III. The Reconciliation Xenophon provided a much fuller account of the reconciliation than of the law reform, and his version of the reconciliation was friendlier to the democracy than that of the

Athenian Politeia , which was another main source for our understanding of the event. 54

50 Mem. 3.5.14 51 Oec. 14.3-7. 52 For a similar but blunter remark, see Strauss 1975: 122. 53 Mem. 3.5.14. 54 See the section of the source question in the chapter on the reconciliation.

170 He credited mainly the democrats and the Spartan King, Pausanias, with the success of the reconciliation, while blaming the Athenian oligarchs for the civil war. His praise of the democrats was quite unusual, especially considering that he was supposed to be on the side of the oligarchs during the civil war. i. Condemnation of the Thirty Xenophon’s account gave the impression that the Thirty failed because of their extreme impiety and lawlessness. 55 Their impiety was described most vividly in their dragging away one of their victims, Theramenes, from an altar where he was seeking divine protection. A ruthless act like this was considered in ancient Greece one of the most impious crimes a human being could ever commit. 56 As to their lawlessness, they unjustly executed many people, citizens and foreigners alike. 57 At the beginning of their government, they still followed the formal legal procedure and put to death only those who were notorious for blackmailing oligarchic citizens. As their authority became established, they started to arrest innocent people suspected of political opposition, or simply because of their wealth. After their summary execution of Theramenes, who was a main opposition leader, their crimes increased to a much larger scale. To make the city their own, they expelled most of the residents from it and redistributed those people’s property among themselves. The height of their lawlessness was the collective execution of the Eleusians: they asked their fellow oligarchs to put to death these innocent

Eleusians for no obvious reason other than as a sign of solidarity in their crime. Worst of all, the whole process was staged as a mockery of the legal process of trial under blunt

55 Xenophon was an unusually religious man, even by Athenian standards. See his defence of his religious enthusiasm in Eq. mag. 9.8. 56 Cf. the story of Cylon’s revolt in Athens and that of Pausanias in Sparta in Thuc. 1.126 ff. 57 Hell. 2.3.12 ff

171 surveillance and terror, a scene that, Xenophon observed ironically, was pleasant to those

‘whose one thought was of their own advantage’. 58 ii. Praise for the democrats 1. Piety and Justice In contrast, the democrats were described as pious and just. They had divine favour because they were the victims of the Thirty’s injustice. 59 Xenophon recorded two occasions on which divine favour was showed on the democrats’ side. One was the dramatic change of weather to their great advantage at the beginning of their revolt, 60 and the other was the sudden madness of their prophet, which was a sign of being enlightened by superhuman power. 61 Besides, the democrats showed their piety in following closely their prophet’s instruction on the battlefield, as well as in performing sacrifices to Athena at the Acropolis as soon as they returned to Athens victorious. 62 Though these episodes might appear trivial to modern readers, they did convey significant religious implications to Xenophon’s intended audience. 63

On the other hand, their revolt fitted the traditional concept of justice for the reasons that, instead of hurting the innocent, they were avenging the wrongs that the oligarchs had done to them, and that their aim was to recover what belonged to them lawfully - their property and their city - rather than committing theft and robbery. This justification was mentioned in the democrats’ three speeches reported by Xenophon. The democrats’ general, Thrasybulus, spoke to his soldiers before the decisive battle of Munychia that the

58 Hell. 2.4.10. 59 Hell. 2.4..14. 60 Hell. 2.4.3, 14. 61 Hell. 2.4.18-19. 62 Hell. 2.4.19; 2.4.39. 63 This is merely Xenophon’s version of the story. Other Athenians might not have agreed with him over the role religion had played in the restoration of the democracy.

172 Thirty ‘robbed us of our city though we [the democrats] have done nothing wrong, the men who drove us out of our homes and who, by their proscriptions, have victimized our dearest friends.’ 64 What their victory would do for the democrats, he said, was to bring back ‘our country, our homes, our freedom, our honour and …our wives and children.’ 65

A democratic soldier, Cleocritus, questioned the oligarchic army in the battlefield:

‘Fellow citizens, why are you driving us out of the city? Why do you want to kill us?

We have never done you any harm.’ 66 Finally, Thrasybulus taunted the oligarchs after returning to Athens by saying, ‘Are you morally better? Then why is it that the common people, though poorer than you are, never did you any harm for the sake of money, whereas you , who are richer than all of them, have committed many disgraceful crimes for the sake of your own profit?’ 67

2. Sympathy and Commitment However, in addition to the traditional virtues of piety and justice, another two virtues were needed for the success of the reconciliation. The traditional concept of piety and justice did not prevent the victims from taking vengeance on the perpetrators, nor stop the victors from taking full advantage of their defeated enemies. The other two qualities of the democrats that made them prefer forgiveness and reconciliation to other options, according to Xenophon, were their sense of Athenian community and their virtue of keeping promises.

64 Hell. 2.4.13. Cf. Parker’s observance (2005: 373) that ‘Very strikingly, the “men from the Piraeus” marched to Athena on the acropolis in what must have been felt as a respectful variant on the Panathenaic procession. The restoration of the democracy was celebrated with an evocation of its most compelling ritual.’ 65 Hell. 2.4.17. 66 Hell. 2.4.20. 67 Hell. 2.4.40.

173 The democrats’ sympathy for the oligarchs was revealed most vividly after their decisive victory over the oligarchic army in Munychia. Xenophon reported that the Athenian democrats appropriated the arms of the dead oligarchs, but did not strip off any dead citizens’ clothes. 68 Implicit in the account is that the Athenian democrats had no difficulty in distinguishing their fellow citizens from non-Athenian dead soldiers, such as the Spartans and other oligarchic mercenaries, and treated their corpses in a different manner accordingly. Furthermore, while the Athenian democrats and oligarchs approached each other and talked on the battlefield, Cleocritus urged the oligarchs to abandon fighting, recounting the details of the civil and military life that all the Athenians had shared, and assuring the democrats’ sympathy for the killed oligarchic citizens. He appealed to the oligarchs:

Fellow-citizens…We have shared with you in the most holy religious

services, in sacrifices and in splendid festivals; we have joined in dances

with you, gone to school with you and fought in the army with you, braving

together with you the dangers of land and sea in defence of our common

safety and freedom. In the name of the gods of our fathers and mothers,

of the bonds of kinship and marriage and friendship, which are shared by

so many of us on both sides, I beg you to feel some shame in front of

gods and men and to give up this sin against your fatherland…yet all the

same you can be sure that we as well as you have wept much for some of

those whom we have just killed. 69

68 Hell. 2.4.19. 69 Hell. 2.4.20-22.

174 While the sense of community constituted a strong emotional impulse for the democrats towards reconciliation, their collective effort to maintain domestic harmony also helped secure the future of the reconciliation. As might be expected, personal hatred and desire for vengeance could not be suppressed completely, but erupted from time to time threatening the post-war peace, despite the existence of overlapping communal networks.

Therefore, some extra measures might have been needed as well. For instance, Athenian

Politeia reported that the democracy once made an example of a citizen by putting him to death without trial for his instigation of hatred against the oligarchs. Ever since the summary execution, according to Athenian Politeia , all the other Athenians observed the rules of reconciliation in the noblest manner. 70 Xenophon, for his own part, considered that the collective willingness to honour the agreement of reconciliation on the side of the democrats was necessary. Therefore, the democratic leader, Thrasybulus, was said to have asked his followers to perform one more deed after all their noble performances during the civil war. He appealed to them: ‘my friends…all I ask is that you should give us an exhibition of just one more virtue in addition to all your other ones. Show us that in all good faith you can keep your promises.’ 71 The majority of the Athenians did as he urged, as Xenophon concluded that till the day of his writing the democratic and oligarchic citizens lived together as fellow citizens, while the people honoured the oaths which they had sworn. 72

In summary, Xenophon’s account of the Athenian civil war presented an obvious case that, while members of the upper society, for all their upbringing and education, could be wicked to the worst possible level, the behaviour of the common people might be just,

70 Ath. Pol . 40.2. 71 Hell. 2.4.42. 72 Hell. 2.4.43.

175 pious, sympathetic and reliable. A political lesson Xenophon gives us in his story of the reconciliation as well as the law reform is that a direct democracy was capable of creating a well-ordered society even in a most difficult situation. Just as Socrates taught the younger Pericles not to have a cynical view of the democracy in a dialogue mentioned previously, so Xenophon suggests that the demos, instead of being an incurable mob, could be reasoned with and more obedient than the oligarchs, especially when the demos had learnt from the disastrous consequences of its own mistakes, as it did at the end of the fifth century B.C.

The next question we should ask, then, is what Xenophon might have thought about the demos’ execution of Socrates exactly at a time when it was thought to have learnt from its mistakes and started to act in a sensible way.

IV. The Trial of Socrates Though the trial of Socrates was a critical event in Xenophon’s life, it did not turn

Xenophon away from politics. He was still keen on pursuing public honour under

Persian monarchs, Spartan oligarchs and the Athenian demos; politics remained the central concern throughout the rest of his life. While defending firmly Socrates’ innocence, he did not seem to consider his execution an unforgivable injustice on the part of the democracy; on the contrary, he came to the unusual conclusion that Socrates himself attempted to end his life in the trial, a theory that in effect alleviates the responsibility of the democracy to some extent. 73 We will examine respectively

73 There is a claim among some scholars that the main concern of Xenophon’s Socrates in his irritating defence was to appear pious and just, or, at least, to be innocent in appearance, e.g. Strauss 1972: 138, Higgins 1977: 41, Waerdt 1994: 19-20, esp. Pangle 1996: 20 ff. However, it is still unclear why we should not accept the much more obvious answer that Socrates aimed to evade the sufferings of old age, as Xenophon’s theory of his voluntary death suggests.

176 Xenophon’s defence of Socrates against the charges listed in the previous chapter, 74 interpret his opinion of Socrates’ voluntary death, and conclude with the theory that

Xenophon reconciled himself with the democracy over the execution of his admired mentor. i. The Defence of Socrates 1. Religious defence Denial of the Athenian gods : Xenophon disputed this accusation, pointing out that

Socrates offered sacrifices and consulted divinity both regularly and openly. He said: ‘he visibly sacrificed often at home and often at the common altars of the city; and it was not difficult to see him using divination.’ 75 This testimony supposedly referred to an obvious fact and was therefore conceivable. Xenophon was confident that many citizens had seen or heard of Socrates’ engagement in religious activities. However, the reference to

Socrates’ use of divination might not be only a defence, but also a support of another charge by his accusers, namely his introduction of new gods, the next issue that

Xenophon had to address. 76 Besides, Xenophon might have evaded another likely aspect of the accusation: though Socrates attended public sacrifices regularly, his eccentric concept of divinity might be as radical as denial of the traditional concepts of the gods. 77

The introduction of new divinities: Xenophon had no intention of denying Socrates’ consultation with his daimonion, which was a well-known fact, but argued instead that it

74 The evasion and distortion of Xenophon’s Socratic works due to their apologetic nature has been noted by many scholars, e.g. Bruell 1987: 106-7, Pangle 1994: 133. 75 Mem. 1.1.2. 76 Mem. 1.1.2. Xenophon said: ‘for it had been widely bandied that Socrates said that the divine thing gave him signs; and, in my opinion, it is especially for this reason that they accused him of bringing in new divine things.’ 77 For example, Socrates’ discussion of the unwritten and divine laws in Mem. 4.4.19 ff and his discussion of the God in Mem. 4.3.13.

177 was no different from the common practice of prophecy. He said that Socrates ‘brought nothing newer than those who consult birds of omen, sayings, portents, and sacrifice victims because they believe in divination.’ 78 However, an important difference between the common practice of prophecy and Socrates’ cult was covered in this metaphor. The former was established and familiar to the public, while Socrates’ daimonion was recognizable to him alone. The secrecy of his cult might cause more trouble for him than his act of introducing new gods itself. 79 In ancient Greece, priests did not have complete authority in their interpretation of divine will. When the priests were suspected, as they often were, the public was more than ready to examine the divine signs themselves and reach their own conclusions. 80 There was a fair possibility that Socrates, the self-made priest of a one-man cult, appeared to be a liar and an abuser of divinity in front of an audience as sceptic as the Athenians. 81 While Socrates justified his behaviour and his advice to others in the name of his daimonion, the anger of the jurors might have been out of disbelief much more than out of envy. 82

Atheism : Xenophon refuted the accusation of atheism, using Socrates’ habit of giving divine consultation as evidence of his religious belief. He said that if Socrates did not

78 Mem. 1.1.3. 79 Cf. Parker (2005: 89-90) that it was the assembly and the people who made the final decision about religious affairs. A cult that was unrecognizable was incompatible with the democratic principle. See also section 3.2 of chapter 4. 80 Xenophon himself did not trust priests. For example, his attack to discredit a soothsayer in An. 5.6.30. Xenophon’s own augury was suspected in An. 6.4.14-16. He had Cyrus’ father warn Cyrus that ‘both seeing what is to be seen and hearing what is to be heard, you would understand these things yourself and not be dependent on the prophets, in case they should wish to deceive you by telling something different from the signals of the gods.’ Cyr. 1.6.2. 81 Xenophon himself proved the possibility. He mentioned a theory among the Athenians that Socrates was put to death because he lied about his daimonion. Mem. 6.8.1. Even his close companions sometimes had doubts about his divination, e.g. Antithenes complained playfully that Socrates used his daimonion as an excuse for avoiding him, Xen. Symp. 8.5. 82 Cf. Xen. Ap. 13-14: when Socrates boasted that his divine consultation never went wrong, the jurors ‘raised a clamour—some disbelieving what was said, others being envious that he should receive from the gods too greater things than they themselves received’.

178 have genuine belief in divinity, he would not be confident in giving advice to his friends as well as to other people. However, many Athenians would not be impressed by this argument, for, as mentioned above, the divinity that Xenophon mentioned here was

Socrates’ notorious daimonion, a secret cult that appeared more like a religious mockery rather than evidence of piety.

Xenophon also denied the charge by arguing that Socrates was not a natural scientist, a profession that was often considered as atheistic in ancient times. He attested that

Socrates was not interested in natural and heavenly objects as natural scientists or some sophists were at that time; instead, Socrates occupied himself with the study of human affairs. 83 However, this testimony is not without question. As one can find in his

Socrates’ criticism of natural scientists, Socrates was in fact not unfamiliar with their activities and studies.

Another reason for his piety, Xenophon argued, was Socrates’ advice to his friends that they should seek instruction from the traditional gods. 84 We have Xenophon’s personal testimony that he was advised by Socrates to consult the Delphic oracle about his Persian expedition. 85 This is a better defence against the accusation of atheism as well as against another charge: the denial of the traditional gods, for it referred unequivocally to the worship of the traditional gods instead of to the cult of Socrates’ personal daimonion.

Xenophon also did a better job in his explanation of Socrates’ distinction between human affairs and divine affairs; while the former should be managed by human beings through education, the latter belonged to the discretion of divinity. His Socrates maintained that

83 Mem. 1.1.16. 84 Mem. 1.1.6. 85 An. 3.1.5-6.

179 ‘what the gods permit to be done by those who have learned, one should learn, but that what is not clear to human beings one should try to ascertain from the gods through divination, for the gods give signs to those toward whom they are gracious.’ 86 This distinction, granting human independence of divine intervention to a higher level than some of his contemporaries admitted, 87 might have earned Socrates a reputation for disbelieving the divine forces. Xenophon, therefore, had the intention of dispelling this impression by clarifying Socrates’ position on the issue.

2. Political defence Personal enmity against Socrates : as mentioned in the previous chapter, there were two kinds of personal hostility against Socrates: one was on account of quarrels between

Socrates and others; the other was incurred through conflicts between his companions, such as Critias and Alcibiades, and others. Xenophon did not deny that Socrates had made many enemies by his practice of disputing with people in the streets, 88 but he insisted that Socrates’ behaviour was well meant and beneficial to those who accepted his advice. 89 As to the damage or hatred caused by his companions, Xenophon claimed that

Socrates, instead of being blamed for others’ misbehaviour, should have been rewarded for his effort to put them under discipline. 90 It is not clear how persuasive this argument would have been to the jurors. Some might have been persuaded and accepted the claim of Socrates to be a benefactor, but there must have been others who rejected Xenophon’s

86 Mem. 1.1.9. 87 Mem. 1.1.9. 88 E.g. Mem. 4.2.39-40; Ap. 30. 89 E.g. Mem. 1.1.4; 1.4.1; 4.8.11; 90 Mem. 1.2.26-28. Though a man of honour, Xenophon did not lack sophistry, e.g. his cunning self-defence to the Greek mercenaries regarding his failure to exact agreed payment from the Thracian king. An. 7.6.11 ff, esp. 7.6.27.

180 defence as deceptive, insisting that Socrates was a patronizing freak, if not a mastermind behind anti-democratic conspiracies. 91

Subversion against the democracy : the two main possible reasons for this charge against

Socrates were his criticism of the democracy and his association with Critias, Alcibiades and other extreme oligarchs. As to his oligarchic association, Xenophon argued that

Socrates had nothing to do with the oligarchs’ coup against the democracy in 404/3.

Socrates, instead of collaborating with the Thirty, was critical of their murderous behaviour. 92 The demos, as Xenophon said, should have rewarded Socrates for his chastisement of the young oligarchs, rather than punishing him for what he had not done.

However, this defence was not successful. Many Athenians still considered Socrates as a trainer, rather than an opponent, of extreme oligarchs, as shown in Aeschines’ famous testimony. 93

As to Socrates’ criticism of the democracy, Xenophon did not deny it, but claimed that

Socrates pursued his political ideal only through the peaceful means of persuasion. 94 He argued that persuasion was much more efficient and safe than violence and terror, and there was no reason for Socrates, who, he claimed, was a master of the art of persuasion, to prefer violence and terror. Yet, was Socrates really a master of persuasion? In terms of elenchus, he was; however, we do not know of any example where Socrates won public approval by addressing a crowd. Even in his private conversation, most of the

91 Xenophon reported that most people walked away from Socrates after being ridiculed by him, whatever his intention was. Mem. 4.2.40. Chroust (1959: 222) suggested interesting similarities between Socrates and Antiphon, who was executed by the democracy for his role as the mastermind behind the oligarchic revolt in 411. According to Thucydides 8.68, Antiphon was also well known for his verbal fluency, and did not pursue a public career due to the popular suspicion of his cleverness. 92 Mem. 1.2.32 ff. 93 Aeschin. 1.173. 94 Mem. 1.2.9-11.

181 time Socrates appeared more likely to win the debate rather than to acquire hearty agreement from his interlocutors. Xenophon, deliberately or not, misled his readers by confusing two different arts of speech.

Xenophon also disputed the accusation that Socrates justified violence against the demos with the story of the Homeric Odysseus who beat commoners in an arrogant way if they dared to stand up and make known their opinions about public affairs. 95 Xenophon did not or could not deny Socrates’ citation of the Homeric story, but argued that those who

Socrates most strongly prevented from discussion of public affairs were not the demos, but only those who were useless to Athens. This qualification of political participation,

Xenophon claimed, had nothing to do with social or economic status, but depended on one’s contribution to the community.

However, this defence does not look strong. The idea of limiting the right of political participation to certain groups was in fact nothing different in essence from the slogans of the oligarchic coups in 411 and 403.96 Besides, the violent implication and contempt for the demos in the Homeric story were too obvious to be glossed over. It is also inconsistent with Xenophon’s claim that Socrates used only peaceful means of persuasion.

Corruptor of the traditional norms: Socrates was accused of seducing young people and corrupting them into violence and rebellion against traditional morality, as he was described as doing in Aristophanes’ Clouds . The immoral behaviour of his young companions, Critias and Alcibiades, testified to the Athenians what Aristophanes had said in his comedy several decades earlier. Since Xenophon’s defence of Socrates

95 Mem. 1.2.58. 96 For a similar view, see Anderson 1974: 45.

182 regarding his social association with extreme oligarchs has been mentioned above, the next paragraph focuses on the problems of Socrates’ political ideas.

Other reasons for this accusation of Socrates, as surmised from Xenophon’s account, might be Socrates’ teleological view of morality and intellectualism. The former refers to the view that the value of one’s action should be determined by some specific ends, while the latter claims that knowledge, rather than tradition, should be the base of authority.

Firstly, Socrates was accused of justifying all deeds, no matter how vicious they might sound, as long as they produced gains ( k°rdow ), by distorting Hesiod’s words that ‘no work is disgraceful, but idleness is disgraceful’. 97 Xenophon did not deny Socrates’ recitation of Hesiod’s words, but argued that the criterion of action should be its benefits

(»f°leia ) and good ( égayÒw ). Therefore, both the accusers and the defender seemed to agree that Socrates judged the value of human actions by their consequences produced.

What they disagreed upon was the teleological criteria preferred by Socrates. It can be inferred from the context that the accusers believed it was material gains, while

Xenophon suggested it was some sort of morality. In any case, the accusers pointed out a worrying tendency in Socrates teleological way of thinking, that is, nothing was morally wrong as long as its consequences were acceptable according to certain specific criteria.

Secondly, Socrates was accused of seducing young people, encouraging them to revolt against family and other traditional institutions, with the claim that knowledge, rather than tradition, should be the authority, for it was knowledge alone that provided the guideline to success or other beneficial outcomes. With such claims Socrates was said to have deprived Athenian society and families of their respect among the younger

97 Mem. 1.2.56.

183 members. 98 Socrates, Xenophon admitted, did make this kind of claim for the superiority of knowledge over traditional values; he was also proud of his influence among young people. 99 However, Xenophon insisted that Socrates, instead of turning them away from their society, meant to teach them their responsibility to make a contribution to their associates. The lesson Socrates had taught is that:

If someone wished to be honoured—whether by a father, brother, or by

anyone else—he would not neglect them, in reliance on the fact that he

was related to them, but attempt to be beneficial to those by whom he

wished to be honoured. 100

By doing this, without altering the essence of Socrates’ intellectualism, Xenophon changed its image from criticism of traditional values, which was used as an excuse for youthful rebellion, into a demanding requirement for young people who desired respect and honour from society. However, the tension between Socrates’ intellectualism and the

Athenian traditionalism did not disappear. Though Xenophon recognized individuals’ duty to benefit the Athenian community, he was reluctant to admit the authority of the community over oligarchic citizens or its right to make decisions through the established democratic practices. ii. The Death of Socrates Though, as discussed above, there might be some problems regarding the persuasiveness of Xenophon’s defence of Socrates, Xenophon himself would have had no doubt about

98 Mem. 1.2.49-52. 99 Xen. Ap. 21. 100 Mem. 1.2.55.

184 Socrates’ innocence. 101 He was therefore expected to blame the democracy for its execution of Socrates. Nevertheless, as shown below, Xenophon’s view of the trial, due to some of his peculiar considerations, excuses the democracy for its trial of Socrates to some extent.

Litigation in Athens was considered mainly as a contest between one man and his enemy.

Victory brought psychological satisfaction and social reputation as well as material goods; the loser suffered the loss of property, respect and, in some instances, his life. Therefore, we have seen that Anytus, one of the accusers, passed by Socrates and his friends in a truly swaggering manner, and Socrates received it with a prediction of misfortune for him and his son. 102 After the condemnation of Socrates, there remained an important task for his friends and pupils: to save the philosopher from being remembered forever as an executed criminal, incompetent speaker and a loser in the court. 103 We have seen

Xenophon’s defence of Socrates’ innocence against the religious and political charges, but other strategies were used as well to save Socrates from the humiliation of defeat.

1. Glorious defeat One of the strategies that Xenophon seemed to use was to turn upside down the customary implications of victory and defeat. In the trial of Socrates, it was suggested that the victory was a disgrace because the accusers used cheating and other dishonourable methods. Their accusation was said to be out of private envy rather than lofty considerations of common interest and justice, 104 and they won with blunt lies and

101 Cf. Strauss (1972) seemed to suggest some irreconcilable conflict between philosophy and politics that inevitably made Socrates an atheist and a corruptor in the eyes of the public. For similar views, see Pangle 1996: 38n10, Amber 1996: 107. 102 Xen. Ap. 30. 103 For a similar view and more detailed discussion, see Danzig 2003: 285 ff. 104 Xen. Ap. 29.

185 perjury. 105 By contrast, Socrates was glorious in his defeat by showing his fearlessness.

He maintained his integrity perfectly in a most dignified manner, despite the jurors’ anger at his bragging. Though he knew how to please the jury and win his acquittal, he would rather die than satisfy them ‘by slavishly begging to gain a much worse life.’ 106

2. Justice from higher authorities The second strategy was to denounce the significance of contemporary public opinion, claiming that the true reputation came from one’s self-estimation and the judgement of his friends and future generations, rather than from the opinions of the jurors and other contemporary Athenians. Xenophon’s Socrates remained confident that he had lived a most superior life among human beings, and he had confirmation in his self-evaluation from his friends. 107 He also believed that his reputation of justice and piety would be restored among people other than the current Athenians. 108 As to his contemporary

Athenians who condemned him to death, Socrates predicted their infamy in the future for killing a just man. 109

3. Voluntary death The third strategy was Xenophon’s theory of voluntary death, namely, that Socrates decided to die in order to escape the sufferings of old age. 110 This strategy is also the most relevant one to our discussion on the responsibility of the democracy for the execution of Socrates.

105 Xen. Ap. 24. 106 Xen. Ap. 9. However, begging for sympathy was never the only way to survive an Athenian court, as we can see from the works of the Athenian rhetoricians. 107 Mem. 4.8.6-7. 108 Mem. 4.8.10. 109 Mem. 4.8.9-10. See also his prediction about Anytus in Xen. Ap. 29-31. 110 The Socratics were unlikely to have been the first users of these strategies. There had been a tradition of self-consolation on the part of the defeated in litigious Athens. Chroust 1957: 216 ff.

186 As we can see from his Memorabilia , one of Xenophon’s motivations was to solve the puzzle of why Socrates did not persuade the jury to acquit him. At the very beginning in the first book of Memorabilia he said: ‘I often wondered ( §yaÊmasa ) by what possible speeches those who indicted Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he deserved death from the city.’ 111 He then repeated the same question at the end of the first chapter as well as in the second chapter of the Memorabilia Book I. 112

Why was Xenophon shocked by the jury’s decision to execute Socrates? The reasons are as follows. The first, of course, was his firm belief in Socrates’ innocence. To him,

Socrates was a man of piety, justice and benevolence, as well as other moral characteristics, to the highest degree; it was impossible for a righteous man like Socrates ever to commit any crime that his accusers had charged him with. The other reason, perhaps less obvious, but probably making a bigger contribution to Xenophon’s wonder, was his confidence in Socrates’ art of speech. He said that Socrates was never seen defeated in his debate with others; on the contrary, he always mastered the course of conversation at his ease, exacting any kind of concession he wanted from his interlocutors. It therefore came as a genuine shock to Xenophon that Socrates, instead of persuading the jury, was defeated and put to death by his accusers. Xenophon summarized his understanding of Socrates as the conclusion of his Memorabilia :

In my opinion, to be sure, inasmuch as he was such as I have described—

so pious as to do nothing without the gods’ judgement; so just as to harm

no one, not even a little, and to benefit to the greatest extent those who

dealt with him; so continent as never to choose what was more pleasant in

111 Mem. 1.1.1. 112 Mem. 1.1.20, 1.2.1, 1.2.64.

187 place of what was better; so prudent as not to make mistakes in deciding

what was better and worse, nor to need another in addition, but to be self-

sufficient in his judgement of these matters; and competent also to say

and to define such things in speech; and competent as well to test others

and to refute them when they made mistakes, and to turn them toward

virtue and gentlemanliness—he was such as a most good and happy man

would be. 113

How then could the jury put Socrates to death? Even if the accusers tried to convict him by the most vicious slander, there should have been no problem at all for Socrates to persuade the jurors of his innocence. Arguably, it was under such a dilemma that

Xenophon came to the unusual conclusion that Socrates sought his death with the purpose of avoiding the imminent disgrace of his old age. 114

According to Xenophon’s account, Socrates did not prepare for his defence speech; instead, he gave an arrogant talk in the court that irritated the jurors several times.

Socrates claimed that his daimonion stopped him from defending himself. 115 He inferred that this was a beneficial warning, saying that the divinity had prepared the easiest way for him to escape from the sufferings of old age. He explained the miserable fate that was waiting for him in the near future had he won the trial and continued living:

If I should live longer, perhaps it will be necessarily to pay the price of old

age, both seeing and hearing less, and thinking more poorly, and ending

by being less capable of learning and more forgetful, and becoming worse

113 Mem. 4.8.11. 114 For a similar view, see Danzig 2003: 317. 115 Mem. 4.8.5.

188 in the things at which I was better before, moreover, for one who did not

perceive these things life would not be worth living, while for one who did

perceive them, how could it not be necessary that he live worse and more

unpleasantly? 116

Arguing that Socrates acquired successfully what he had conspired, Xenophon claimed to clear his name of loser in the law court.

If the interpretation above is correct, one of its implications is that Socrates himself, rather than the demos or the democracy, took the main responsibility for his death. The democratic jury might not have had this intention, but were forced to put Socrates to death as he wished because of his deliberate provocation. Nor should the democracy be blamed for his decision to end his life. It was so decided due to his fear of disgrace in old age, rather than because of his disappointment with the democracy for any of its faults.

Admittedly, the theory of voluntary death sounds rather like a not too perfect exercise of self-deception over the humiliation of being defeated. Socrates did defend himself in the court, trying his best to ‘appear neither impious as regards gods nor unjust as regards human beings.’ 117 At some point, he seemed to flatter the democracy, praising its practice of electing generals. 118 Though, according to Xenophon, Socrates did not allow himself or his friends to propose an alternative punishment to the death penalty proposed by the accusers, he did not stop them from defending him in the court as co-speakers, who obviously aimed to save his life. 119 Moreover, after the verdict, there were indeed

116 Mem. 4.8.8; see also Xen. Ap. 1, 7, 22, 32. It might be noteworthy that Socrates’ concern here seemed to be more about the loss of reputation than about the imminent physical illness or pain in old age. 117 Xen. Ap. 22. 118 Xen. Ap. 20. 119 Xen. Ap. 22, an often neglected passage.

189 bitterness and anger from the losers’ side. 120 Finally, Socrates, instead of showing appreciation, condemned both the accusers and the jurors for their help in relieving his coming sufferings. He predicted that both of them would be ashamed in the future for their impiety and injustice in killing him. 121

In any case, this theory of voluntary death is what Xenophon convinced himself of:

Socrates ended his life intentionally; he would have prevailed over the jury and annihilated his accusers in the court had he so wished. The theory at least reveals one of

Xenophon’s basic political beliefs that the demos and the democracy were not hopeless, but could be led by one who was equipped with a good public reputation and the art of persuasion, plus a share of divine favour. For him, the death of Socrates was of course a tragic incident that taught an important lesson about the risk of political life, but it was far from a revelation of its complete unworthiness.

As to the bitterness and grudge shown on a few occasions in his Apology and

Memorabilia , there are also signs that these negative emotions were later replaced in his other Socratic writings with an understanding of sympathy and forgiveness. 122 There is a story in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia in which a wise man was put to death on the charge of corrupting young people, an episode that manifestly refers back to the case of Socrates. 123

The father who had killed him confessed that he had done so out of envy over his son’s

120 Xen. Ap. 29. 121 Xen. Ap. 24; Mem. 4.8.9. 122 Cf. Strauss (1972: 140) observed that Socrates’ omen about Anytus was the only case in which he tried to harm his enemies. See also Pangle 1996: 33. 123 Xen. Cyr. 38-40.

190 affection for the murdered teacher. Xenophon then had Cyrus, 124 the hero of Cyropaedia , advises the son to forgive his father, for his crime was human. 125

V. Conclusion i As mentioned at the beginning, Xenophon was an ambitious politician as well as a political writer. Though he was an oligarch, democracy had a peculiar place in his writings and political life. It was a natural option for him to pursue a political career in the Athenian democracy, since he was born as one of its citizens. He might have had the thought of replacing the democracy with an oligarchy of the Spartan style in his fatherland, but the failure of the oligarchic experiments at the end of the fifth century B.C. destroyed that dream. Furthermore, the height of his political career was when he was elected a general of the Greek mercenaries who reorganized themselves along democratic principles. While Xenophon led the army, he exerted his influence by addressing the soldiers’ assembly, just like a politician would do in the Athenian democracy. 126 Besides, his plans for the democracy were much more specific and straightforward, suggesting a higher level of practicability when compared with his works on oligarchy and monarchy, which are mostly put in theoretical or fictional forms. It is arguable that, had Xenophon not been exiled from Athens, he would have been an active politician in his fatherland, addressing the public in ways not too different from those used by a demagogue.

124 It might be noteworthy that Cyrus was portrayed as a forgiving ruler on an occasion in Cyropaedia . See Cyr. 6.1.36-37. 125 However, the obvious association between Socrates and the legendary wise man is compromised to some extent by the term sophist that Xenophon used to describe the latter. It is not clear why Xenophon chose this at least potentially negative term here. Besides, there is some reluctance among today’s commentators to accept the apparent message of forgiveness in the story. For relevant discussion on this issue, see Strauss 1972: 119, Tatum 1989: 145, Gera 1993: 92 ff, Nadon 2001: 85. 126 He once boasted his reputation as a friend of the common soldiers, namely, a demagogue. An. 7.6.4, 39.

191 He was not reluctant either in criticizing the faults of his upper class society or in praising the political achievements of the common Athenians. He praised the common Athenians for the respect they had shown for their ancestral practices and for their discipline in public gatherings and naval battles, while criticizing a rebellious tendency among many oligarchic citizens. He approved the law reform by the democracy for its selection of the legislators by election rather than by lot, and of entrusting to the Areopagus council the responsibility of supervising the constitutional laws. In like manner, he acknowledged the justice and piety of the democratic party in their victorious return to Athens, and in the success of the reconciliation he testified to their generosity to the oligarchs and their faithfulness to their promises, while giving his unreserved condemnation to the Thirty’s impiety and cruelty.

As to the tragic death of Socrates, the responsibility of the democracy was in effect explained away to some extent in Xenophon’s defence of Socrates. The execution of

Socrates, he claimed, was not the accusers’ victory; instead, it was Socrates’ own wish that led the jurors to reach the verdict. Socrates’ consideration in doing this, Xenophon believed, was his fear of the disgrace that came with old age, an inevitable natural consequence that had absolutely nothing to do with the democracy. Maybe more importantly, if there was still bitterness left against the democracy, Xenophon suggested that it should be forgiven. ii There are some noteworthy points in Xenophon’s observation of the democracy. First,

Xenophon attested quite consistently a strong communitarian sentiment among the

Athenian people, differing from today’s dominant realist approaches. He commended the

192 sincerity of the Athenians’ belief and pride in the laws of their common ancestors, a tendency which should have received more weight as a main support for the constitutional stability in fourth-century Athens than most historians admitted. On the other hand, through his account of an encounter between the democrats and the oligarchs on the battlefield during the civil war, Xenophon also showed us how the communal sympathy accumulated through daily public gatherings helped the Athenians to overcome the hatred of civil strife; yet, many historians have rejected Xenophon’s account as unrealistic.

Second, Xenophon suggest a theory of an historical circle where a society declined as a consequence of its people’s disposition to indulge in times of success, but they would also revitalize themselves due to their ability to learn from their mistakes. 127 As his

Socrates indicated, the Athenians became carefree, soft and arrogant after their victory over Persia and the establishment of their naval empire; however, their ability for self- examination was not completely lost. They regained their discipline and the traditional way of rigorous life once their arrogance had been humbled in battlefields in the hardest way. 128 Xenophon’s narratives of the Athenian civil war appeared to be arranged along this narrative pattern: the Athenian naval victory off Arginusae was followed by the notorious trial of the generals, after which came the capitulation of Athens to Sparta and the brutal rule of the Thirty; the demos, having suffered in its defeat and exile, turned to be virtuous and blessed, restoring its city miraculously. The democracy, having recovered its moderation and prudence, and leaving behind the conflicts and hatred of the

127 Connor (1984: 210ff) provides a similar view in his interpretation of Thucydides’ History . The side of decline seems to receive more attention among today’s scholars than does the other side of recovery; e.g. Tuplin’s comment (1993: 47) that ‘the merits of the eventual victors in Athens are principally a sign of the demerits of the Spartans and their agents.’ See also Dillery 1995: 162. 128 Mem. 3.5.

193 past chaos, resolved to return to its ancestral way of life. 129 Yet, though Xenophon confirmed that the demos lived by the ancestral laws after the civil war, he was expecting another cycle of decline in Athens, as he worried in the 360s that, though the Athenians were still proud of their ancestors, their determination to defend their fatherland might not be as strong as it had been. 130 As to the performance of the democracy, this dynamic historical perspective provides an interesting alternative to other views that tend to attribute a fixed character to the demos.

Finally, he considered that the Athenian common people were at least average men of reason. They did good things and bad things just like the educated oligarchic Athenians.

Xenophon’s account of the trial of the generals in 406 is often cited by modern scholars as evidence of the demos’ rashness. However, when the demos was behaving nobly in the civil war as well as on other occasions, Xenophon did not fail to observe them because of his oligarchic tendency. A satisfactory political order under the collective rule of the common people might seem to be an illusion to those who considered the demos as nothing but an unthinking rabble, but for Xenophon it was a perfectly reasonable goal, or simply a political reality in his times. He would consider it a questionable presumption that the demos, always vulnerable to manipulation by demagogues, could never appreciate the value of a constitutional order nor learn to control its emotions and instant desires. On the contrary, it was more likely, in his belief, that the demos, due to its moral and intelligent capacity, could be led to great deeds of nobility if its leaders were

129 Hell. 1.6.1 -2.4.43. 130 Eq. mag. 7.3-4.

194 competent and trustworthy. 131 This kind of optimism is one of the reasons that made

Xenophon a practical politician instead of a cynical philosopher.

131 Leadership or the relationship between leaders and the people in a democratic society is one of the most important issues in Xenophon’s political thought. This issue could not be discussed here due to space limitations. To put it most briefly, Xenophon emphasised that the people, demanding and sceptical, would be fooled by deceptive speeches only for a very short time; a successful leader, he argued, should be not only sliver-tongued, but, much more importantly, also be knowledgeable and trusted by his people. See, e.g. the dialogue between Cyrus and his father in Cyropaedia 1.6 and his instruction in the Cavalry Commander .

195 Chapter Six

Plato and Athenian Democracy

We have seen in the previous chapter how Xenophon adjusted himself between his oligarchic values and the democratic reality. Plato, by contrast, is more hostile towards Athenian democracy. While Xenophon accepted the rules of democratic politics as part and parcel of his pursuit of political career, Plato withdrew from the Athenian public arena into the

Academy. He developed a fierce criticism of democracy, especially in the Republic Book 8 and the Laws Book 3, attacking every aspect of popular government from its core values of equality and freedom to its ways of decision-making.

However, as we will find in this chapter, there are important passages in Plato’s works that indicates his appreciation of what Athenian democracy did in its law reform and the reconciliation project. We will also find his reconsideration of the trial of Socrates from a perspective that acknowledges popular suspicion of Socratic philosophy and the need for

Athenian democracy to contain radical intellectual activities under its laws. These passages, though not proving Plato a supporter of Athenian democracy, constitute an alternative trend of thought alongside his much more apparent anti-democratic position.

The interpretative issue regarding Platonic works will be discussed first in this chapter. My view is that it is still better to take the so-called ‘mouthpiece’ theory which identifies the main 196 characters in Plato’s works, normally his mentor Socrates, as his spokesperson. There will be then a brief account of the debate over the relationship between Plato and democracy. It indicates that, despite recent efforts to make him more considerate of the demos by some scholars, Plato was still largely an anti-democrat because of his intellectual elitism, the belief that political power should be in the hands of the very few people who holds knowledge. His concession to democracy does not constitute a profound change of political position.

With the background knowledge of interpretive issues and Plato’s political position, this chapter then move on to the discussion of Plato’s response towards the three important events: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates. While the whole Platonic corpus will be consulted, the Laws and Statesman will be particularly useful for our discussion of the law reform. The discussion of the reconciliation will focus on the relevant passages in the

Menexenus . As to the trial of Socrates, we will discuss Plato’s account of the trial in the

Apology followed by discussion of his afterthoughts in the Protagoras , Republic and Crito .

I. Interpretive Issues

Interpretation of Platonic thoughts is much more difficult than that of Xenophon’s. We do not have as much reliable information about Plato’s life as we do in the case of Xenophon whose extant autobiography provides useful guidelines for our understandings of his political

197 thought. The two main extant sources about Plato’s life are the account of Diogenes Laertius 1 and the Platonic Seventh Letter . While the former was written more than five centuries after

Plato’s death and is of dubious historical accuracy, the latter might not have been written by

Plato himself. Therefore, though the account of the historical background in the Seventh

Letter, such as the general information of his family and his visit to the court of Sicilian tyrants, is generally considered reliable, it is still risky to use it as a basis for the discussion of subtler issues such as Plato’s thoughts on the Athenian democracy. 2

Plato’s writing style is also more sophisticated than Xenophon’s. With the latter, it is not difficult to find out his intention or political position, for he made his views known, even in his fictional works such as Cyropaedia . Plato, by contrast, is much more elusive. Apart from his letters where the authorship is a matter of debate, he mentioned himself in only three places throughout his enormous extant corpus—twice in the Apology and once in the

Phaedo — and never voiced his personal opinions as the author. Therefore, the thoughts and theories that are ascribed to him are inevitably disputable products of hermeneutic reconstruction out of the extant corpus, a large part of which is full of irony, playfulness and inconclusiveness. Besides, the criticism of writing as a way of education in his Phaedrus and

1 Diog. Laert. 3. 2 I follow J. Annas’ advice (1996: 1190) that ‘it is very unwise to use such material [the Platonic letters] to create a basis for the arguments in the dialogues, which are deliberately presented in a detached way.‘ For a recent similar view, see Schofield 2000b: 299-301; 2006: 14-19. 198 the Seventh Letter raise the most radical question of whether Plato would ever have conveyed his philosophy to us through the medium of written words. i. Main theories of interpretation

There are three principal ways of dealing with these elements of vagueness. 3 The route that many scholars took is to dismiss them, presuming Plato’s dialogues as nothing essentially different from treatises, identifying the author’s arguments as expressed by the predominant characters in his corpus, and explaining contradictions between his spokesmen in different dialogues largely as the outcome of different developmental stages of his life. 4 This approach is usually labelled the doctrinal or dogmatic approach, for its outcomes tend to be Platonic theoretic accounts on various issues. 5

The second approach is the esoteric teaching which takes the criticism of writing in the

Phaedrus and the Seventh Letter most seriously, arguing that the Platonic corpus is apparently anything but his genuine philosophical teaching. This perspective argues that the writings serve as a deliberate device for various concealed purposes, such as to turn away undesirable students or to introduce promising ones to real philosophy, etc. 6 The best known example of

3 For a comprehensive survey of this issue, see Press 1996. 4 For a concise summary of this approach, see Press 1996: 311. 5 Strictly speaking, the mouthpiece approach does not necessarily lead to doctrines, nor does the dialectic reading mentioned below necessarily reject Platonic doctrines. See Corlett 2005: 5, 9. 6 Press 1996: 315; Schofield 1998& 2002. 199 this approach in political philosophy is Leo Strauss and his students. 7 Though they also emphasise the dramatic characteristics of Platonic dialogues as the next approach of dialectic reading does, their peculiar esoteric view should be singled out for their influence in the field of Platonic political philosophy. 8

Finally, many scholars nowadays claim that the dialogue form and other dramatic features, instead of being literary embellishment, are the key to the core of Platonic philosophy. 9 They also believe that the reason that Plato kept silence and inconclusiveness in his writings is his refusal to commit himself to any set of established doctrines. 10 This approach, which maybe called the dialectic interpretation, includes two subtly different concepts of Platonic philosophy. 11 One view is that the engaged conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors is the immediate display of the spirit of Platonic philosophy, that is, Socratic elenchus. This view of philosophy is best illustrated in Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues where established beliefs are refuted with no substitute established. Another view argues that, in

7 For their methodology, see Strauss 1941. 8 For example, Gadamer, though also emphasising the dramatic features of Platonic dialogues, disagrees with Strauss’ esoteric approach. See Gadamer 1994: 539. 9 E.g. Friedlander 1958: 125; Gadamer 1980; Frede 1992; Arieti 1995: 275; Annas 1996; Tarrant 2000: 26; Wolfsdorf: 2004. Press (1996: 310) indicated that this was actually an alternative tradition since ancient times. 10 This dialectic reading of Plato seems to follow the ideological trend since Grote that prefers the liberal spirit of Socrates in Plato’s ‘earlier’ dialogues to the more dogmatist position in the later ones. It might be not completely wrong to say that after the ‘democratisation’ or ‘liberalization’ of Socrates Plato is now in his turn to be ‘Socratized’. See Lane 2001: 27. See also Deneen’s similar view (2000: 424). 11 For this subtle distinction, see also Arieti 2000: 481-2. 200 addition to the method of Socratic elenchus, there is still certain genuine Platonic teaching behind his dialogue setting, and it is the truth that one has to find for oneself and within oneself through the process of relentless questioning and answering, as shown in the Meno and the Theaetetus . 12

To be fair, there is hardly any universal interpretive rule for the Platonic corpus as a whole. 13

One obvious problem with the doctrinal approach is its tendency to dismiss the dialogue form, absence of the author, irony and other dramatic elements in Plato’s writings, which are now believed by many scholars to be critical for our understanding of Plato. 14 Besides, it is also criticized for explaining the contradictions and inconsistencies between and within individual

Platonic works as products of different stages in Plato’s life, an assumption that was not without serious controversy and is now losing its popularity. 15

As to the esoteric reading, though guiding our attention to the important Platonic criticism of writing, it seems to create a hermeneutic cycle in which one is supposed to appreciate its view

12 In the Meno Socrates shows how one can find knowledge within oneself. In the Theaetetus Socrates claims himself to be a philosophical midwife who helps others to give birth to their self-knowledge, but is himself absolutely infertile with wisdom. See also Friedlander 1958: 18; Gadamer 1980: 35; Schofield 1998 & 2002; Deneen 2000: 437. 13 See also Schofield 2006: 5. 14 For recent efforts to deal with the challenge of dialectic reading with the traditional concepts of developmental and unitarian theories, see Lane 2000: 162; Samaras 2002: 1. 15 For recent examples of the unpopular tendency of developmental approaches, see Annas & Rowe 2002, esp. p. 2; Schofield 2006: 2. 201 only after one has been initiated into the inner group that is by definition the devoted supporters of esoteric teaching. 16 The majority, by contrast, are not supposed to agree with the teaching, for they are all outsiders who, again by definition, cannot understand its truth due to their own ignorance.

There are some problems about the dialectic reading of Plato. It seems an overstatement to say that the Platonic works have no substantive views or theory whatsoever but Socratic dialectic. 17 This perspective is more plausible in explaining the so-called Socratic dialogues in which playfulness and inconclusiveness might build up the effect of subverting the established opinions or arguments previously given in the dialogues, but would be less persuasive in other works such as the Republic and Laws where the predominant speakers bring out their substantial views at length. As to the view that Platonic dialogues refer to certain transcendental truth, it tends to see Plato as an all-wise philosopher, considering the insufficiency or contradiction of his arguments as part of his mastery scheme of leading the

16 See also Burnyeat 1985: 343. 17 Though some proponents, such as Frede (1992: 257-8) and Wolfsdorf (2004), might agree that it is an overstatement, there seems a tendency among proponents of the dialectic reading to claim that all Platonic dialogues, including the most lecture-like ones, are essentially practices of Socratic dialectics. For a similar observation, see Deneen 2000: 424. For a recent attempt to read the whole Platonic corpus through dialectic perspectives, see Gill 2002: 150 ff. 202 readers to the elusive philosophical truth. 18 This assumption is not only questionable but also unhelpful in developing critical understandings of Platonic philosophy.

It might be said that, while the latter two approaches emerged as attempts to deal with the difficulties and contradictions that the traditional doctrinal approach failed to solve, it is doubtful if their interpretations could be more comprehensive and consistent without creating more interpretive problems. 19 As suggested in Harold Tarrant’s vivid metaphor of civil war between many new schools of interpretation after the overthrow of the old despotic regime that was the doctrinal reading of Plato, the prospect of a new interpretive order is not yet in sight. He says:

Plato has been plundered by looting bands of opportunists anxious to make up

for the time that agendas have been pushed underground. The looters have

at times failed to show respect either for the text itself and its historical context

or for the need to establish lawful procedures of interpretation. The war-lords

of various factions have divided the spoils between them. Rebuilding the

discipline in a new and more democratic fashion will take years, and it will take

18 E.g. Friendlander 1958: 18; Gadamer 1980: 22; Smith 1980: ix. 19 Testimonies from proponents of dialectic reading. Arieti (2000: 482): Plato was like artists who ‘do not speak in the same forthright way as a discursive philosopher like Aristotle, who tells you as clearly as he can exactly what he thinks. And this uncertainty accounts for why there are more, and more varied, interpretations of a play like Hamlet than of a work like the Physic .’ 203 a quiet, thoughtful, inclusive approach that carefully assesses the merits of the

views of all interested parties. 20 ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis

My view on this issue is closer to the doctrinal approach mainly in its tendency to identify

Plato’s view with those of the predominant characters in his dialogues, an approach that is often called the mouthpiece theory. This presumption, as Richard Kraut argued, though not without its problems, at least has been proved ‘a successful working hypothesis’. 21 Scholars often dismiss this mouthpiece assumption by comparing Plato with playwrights such as

Shakespeare or Sophocles, claiming that the Platonic characters do not represent Plato, just as

Hamlet does not speak for Shakespeare, nor does Ajax for Sophocles. 22 This analogy, I believe, fails to do justice to one of Plato’s unique dramatic arrangements, that is, the extremely unequal relationship between predominant and subordinate characters. 23 It is the fundamental pattern throughout Plato’s writings that a predominant interlocutor holds almost absolute control throughout the conversation, while most of the time all the other characters play only subordinate roles as respondents, occasionally raising questions or objections only to be driven to aporia by the hero who is usually Socrates. Moreover, what the main

20 Tarrant 2003: 436. The emphasis original. 21 Kraut 1992: 29. 22 E.g. Arieti 2000: 481; Clay 2000: 102; Blondel 2002: 18. 23 For a fuller and, I believe, persuasive defence against the comparison of Platonic dialogues with drama, see Kraut 1992: 25-30 204 characters normally do is not only to refute arguments given without revealing their own thoughts, but also, to the surprise of their interlocutors, proposing idiosyncratic ideas on various subjects such as the immortality of souls, the myth of afterlife and the rule of the philosopher-king. Plato as the author should have been aware that such unbalanced narrative arrangements would naturally lead most readers to identify the author with the predominant characters, and there are good reasons to believe that this is the effect that he planned. 24

Besides, the literary context, it should be noted, will be taken into account, at least to a reasonable extent, within the mouthpiece perspective, since it is mainly through these predominant speakers that Plato conducted his irony, inconclusiveness and other tricks of vagueness.

Finally, it should be noted that the acceptance of the mouthpiece theory in this thesis does not mean its siding with the doctrinal reading on other issues as well. For instance, there will be no argument in this thesis for the existence of a systematic Platonic theory on democracy or other political issues. On the contrary, through the following discussion in this chapter of his response to the democracy’s law reform, the reconciliation project and its trial of Socrates, it

24 Blondel (2000: 18, 20, 42-3), though in recognition of the obvious dogmatist tendency created by the extreme inequality between Platonic characters, still insists that the form of dialogue ultimately rejects the mouthpiece assumption. Cf. Ferrari’s incisive criticism (2000) that questions the logical association of dialogue form and the lack of doctrines; see also Schofield (2000a: 224): “Thinking with” does not exclude “acting upon”, and Lane (2001: 132): ‘To welcome something as theory provides no safeguard against dangerous attempts to put it into practice.’ 205 is shown that there is an ambiguity in the Platonic corpus as a whole toward Athenian democracy.

Furthermore, we will not try to prove the coherence of Plato’s view on democracy with developmental theories that attribute Plato’s works to different stages of his life, as the proponents of doctrinal approaches often do. Though it is assumed in this thesis that Plato reconsidered his criticism of Athenian democracy as the popular government proved itself a better government than most other contemporary regimes in the fourth century B.C., its position is based mainly on the common sense that people often revise their opinions following their experience, rather than using any specific developmental order of Plato’s works. There are several problems of developmental theories. For example, it is still an issue of many debates how we reconstruct the former from the latter, since we do not have sufficient knowledge of Plato’s life to decide the chronological order of his works beyond reasonable doubt. It is further complicated by the fact that, as revealed in the next section, seemly contradictory views of democracy are often found not only among Plato’s different dialogues but also in the same single works such as the Republic and the Laws . Before arguing for a general developmental pattern of thought throughout Plato’s life with a specific classification of his writings, there is then a need to prove the inherent coherence of individual dialogues, an enormous task that cannot be dealt with here due to the limitation of space.

Therefore, it is better that we do not attempt to solve the problem of seeming inconsistency in

206 Plato’s work on his behalf, but keep it as a remainder of the level of complexity between philosophy and democracy. As to the different views of democracy in the Platonic corpus, we would considers them more like thematic accounts rather than chronologic development of

Plato’s thought. 25

II. Plato’s Antidemocratic Tendency

The issue of Plato’s political preference as revealed in his works is a complicated issue of many controversies, especially since the Nazis’ infamous exploitation of Platonic ideas in the

1930s and Karl Popper’s subsequent criticism of Plato in his Open Society and Its Enemies .26

However, owing to the limitation of space, this section provides only a brief account pointing out Plato’s antidemocratic views, followed by a discussion of recent scholarship that tries to reconcile Plato and the democracy. It should also be noted that Plato’s antidemocratic tendency means here his opposition to the values of equality and freedom from oligarchic rulers as revealed in the participatory politics of Athenian democracy. It should not be confused with the modern concept of representative government and individualistic civic rights.

25 See also the conclusion of 2.2 of this chapter. 26 Lane 2001: 111 ff. 207 i. Oligarchic values

Though both Plato and Xenophon came from similar oligarchic backgrounds, the former was less compromised in his antidemocratic position. While sharing Xenophon’s dislike of the demos and its participatory government, Plato developed a highly advanced and radical criticism of the democracy in the Republic Book 8, the Laws Book 3 and throughout his works. Furthermore, judging by his intellectualist criterion, Plato hardly found anything genuinely worthy in the democracy or in any actual regimes. While Xenophon taught and practised the art of public speech which he believed was an essential part of great leadership,

Plato usually dismissed it as brazen flattery of the ignorant masses. 27 While Xenophon aimed to pursue a successful political career through which he claimed to benefit not just himself and his companions but also the wider community, Plato warned that political life was actually nothing more than a vicious circle of mutual corruption between politicians and the demos. 28

Plato’s criticism of the democracy at Athens, to put it briefly, can be explained with two interpretive propositions: his intellectualism and his elitism. 29 He claimed that political power and decision making must be based on true knowledge rather than force, wealth or the number

27 E.g. Grg. 463a ff. Cf. Grg . 456b and Phdr . 462d ff where Plato considers the possibility of rhetoric to serve the interests of philosophy. [Professor Sarah Broadie’s comment.] 28 E.g. Grg. 502d-503a; 513 b-c; Alc . 132a; Resp. 492b-c. 29 See also Samaras 2002: 112-4; Bobonich 2002: 6-8; Schofield 2006: 54-55.. 208 of people involved. 30 He disputed the common people’s right to rule, since they, being uneducated, were ignorant of the true purpose of political community and of the means to achieve it. Even worse was their unawareness of their ignorance or the refusal to admit it. 31

In Plato’s view, the democracy, rather than a proper government, was revelries of common people who, having rejected the discipline of rationality and becoming self-indulgent and riotous, would blindly lead the whole community into chaos. 32

Is there any chance that the common people could ever be educated and entitled to participate in the government? Plato’s answer to this question is negative, following his elitist belief that knowledge is accessible only to a very small number of people. While Socrates is said to commit himself to educating everyone who listens to him, 33 Plato made it clear that only very few people would ever become possessors of true knowledge; ‘it’s impossible that a multitude be philosophic.’ 34 The rightful rulers who held knowledge were always the smallest in number.

It is, therefore, from the smallest group and part of itself and the knowledge in

it, from the supervising and ruling part, that a city founded according to nature

30 E.g. Grg. 466e; Euthyd. 292b; Prt. 319d; Plt. 292c; Leg . 689c 31 Ap . 21b-e. 32 Resp. 564a; Leg. 701b-c. 33 Ap. 23; Saxonhouse 1996: 89. 34 Resp. 494a. 209 would be wise as a whole. And this class which properly has a share in that

knowledge which alone among the various kinds of knowledge ought to be

called wisdom, has, as it seems, the fewest members by nature. 35

According to this belief, the Athenian democracy with its comprehensive scale of civil participation was by nature never a wise government.

Having said that Plato provided a more critical and advanced account of the democracy than

Xenophon did, does not mean that his antidemocratic position was absolutely intransigent.

On the contrary, it is one of the basic presumptions of this thesis that Plato compromised his essentially elitist belief as a result of his recognition of the democracy’s successful reconstruction of political order after its disastrous military defeat and civil war at the end of the fifth century B.C. However, with the reasons given above, it is concluded that Plato’s political thought was clearly and profoundly antidemocratic; his concession to the democracy constitutes only a significant set of exceptions to elitism. ii. Recent debates

While there are numerous books and articles which challenge the traditional reading of Plato as an antidemocrat, we discuss only two recent efforts by scholars who aim to discover Plato’s likely appreciation of democratic values and institutions. The first group of scholars,

35 Resp. 428e-429a See also Ap. 25b, Plt. 297b, Leg. 640a. 210 Thanassis Samaras and Christopher Bobonich, followed the traditional approaches of doctrinal reading and developmental theories, arguing that there was a radical change of

Plato’s view from the outright opposition to the democracy in his early or middle works, especially in the Republic , to a moderate position in the Laws as well as in the other later works. 36 Though far from saying that Plato changed from an enemy to a supporter of the democracy in the later works, both scholars pointed out Plato’s higher evaluation of the common people’s ability to know the truth or what was genuinely good for themselves, as suggested in his adaptation of certain democratic practices such as rhetoric, the written laws and participatory politics in the later works. According to their interpretation, Plato’s recognition of public opinion, though limited, constituted a substantial difference from the strict intellectual elitism in the Republic .

T. Samaras and C. Bobonich made a significant contribution to Platonic scholarship with their detailed survey of an important aspect of Platonic political thought. 37 As they have argued, some of Plato’s discussion of the written laws, public opinion and democratic practices indicates a compromise of his anti-democratic position. However, it seems an overstatement to say, as they did, that the Statesman and the Laws were less anti-democratic than the

Republic overall. The interpretation of the Platonic works is a delicate business, and it is risky

36 Samaras 2002: 1-7, 235-245, 305-325; Bobonich 2002: 9-12, 478-9. 37 For the criticism of Samaras and Bobonich, see Rowe 2001, Kahn 2004, Stally 2004 and Brisson 2005. 211 to make general statements even about one of his dialogues. For example, few people would dispute that there was a strong elitist tendency in the Republic , but it is still problematic to claim, as Samaras and Bobonich did, that Plato had no appreciation whatsoever of public opinion in his Republic . In fact, public opinion was defined in the Republic not as the opposite of true knowledge but something between it and ignorance. Plato’s Socrates did say in one place in that dialogue that the common people could be persuaded to accept the rule of true philosophers. 38 On the other hand, the Nocturnal Council in the Laws was arguably the corresponding institution to that of philosopher-king in the Republic .39 Some measures in the

Laws were even more anti-democratic than in the Republic . For instance, maritime culture, which had strong democratic implication in Athenian politics, constituted part of the city in the Republic , but it was rejected in the Laws as corruption of virtue. 40 The common people who were members of the city in the Republic were enslaved in the Laws .41

The other group of scholars who dispute the traditional interpretation of Plato as an antidemocrat, instead of following doctrinal reading and developmental theories, emphasise

38 Resp. 499d-500a. Cf. Kamtekar 2004. 39 Brisson 2005: 109 ff; Strauss 1963: 87; contrast Samaras 2002: 285-301. 40 Resp. 371a-b; Leg. 704b ff. 41 Rowe 2001: 74; Kahn 2004: 345; Stally 2004: 168; Brisson 2005: 97. 212 the literary characteristics of Plato’s works such as his form of dialogue and the element of irony. 42 Their arguments are largely as follows.

First, Plato is said to be a well-intentioned or loyal critic of the democracy. The purpose of his criticism, some scholars argue, is not to discredit the democracy, but to improve the common good of the whole community by pointing out the imminent dangers, such as demagogic manipulation and the popular abuse of power, to which the democracy was liable. 43 However, this argument is not very convincing, since there is no way of knowing for sure about Plato’s actual motivation. Besides, the image of Plato as a loyal critic does not fit well with his explicit attack on the core values of the democracy, that is, its civil equality and political participation. 44

Secondly, Plato was said to be anti-political more than an anti-democratic, for he denounced all kinds of actual regimes, not just democratic governments. 45 This argument might clear

42 These scholars include Saxonhouse 1996, Euben 1997 & 2000, Monoson 2000, Clay 2000, J. Wallace 2001, Blondell 2002, etc. Deneen (2000: 424) suggests that Euben is the leading scholar of this Platonic ‘democratic school’; see also Schofield 2006: 55. However, Plato’s antidemocratic tendency is not completely ignored by the ‘democratic school’, see Euben 1997: 52, 204-5; Monoson 2000: 13. 43 E.g. Euben 1997: 50-51, 206; Monson 2000: 13, 126; J. Wallace 2002: 391-2. 44 While Monoson (2000: 13) and J. Wallach (2002: 281-2) admits that Plato is antidemocratic on this issue, Euben (1997: 205-6) tries to argue that equality and participation were not the core values of the democracy. His argument is not convincing. Cf. Schofield’s solution (2006: 54) that Plato was sometimes a loyal critic, while sometimes denouncing utterly the values and practices of the democracy. 45 E.g. Euben 2000: 125; Monoson 2000: 115. 213 Plato’s name as an advocate of authoritarian and totalitarian states, since he was critical of them as well. However, it does not change his antidemocratic position.

Thirdly, following the dialectic reading of Plato, more and more scholars argue that there is actually no doctrine in his works, either antidemocratic or any other kind of ideology. They argue that by writing dialogues instead of treatises Plato meant to present his thinking in an essentially liberal and democratic vein. 46 This theory draws our attention to the literary aspect of the Platonic writings that has been dismissed for most of the time in the past. However, as mentioned in the section of interpretive issues, it is not very convincing with its assumption that the literary form of dialogue is the decisive factor in the interpretation of the Platonic corpus.

Fourthly, an important approach in recent years has pointed out that Plato adopted many democratic practices in his writings, such as the freedom of speech, public hearing and audit, dramatic performance, rhetoric, etc. 47 Following this new perspective, it is suggested that

Plato, instead of rejecting the democracy, expands many of its practices and values into the new territory of philosophical discussion. This new approach makes a valuable contribution by complicating the relationship between Plato and the democracy, putting into doubt the

46 E.g. Euben 1997: 215, 219-220, 238; Monoson 2000: 133-4, 139; Clay 2000: 169; Rowe 2001: 75; J. Wallace 2002: 291-2; Blondell 2002: 18. For recent criticism of this view, see Schofield 2006: 55-59. 47 Saxonhouse 1996: 89, 92; Euben 1997: xiii, 35-7; Rowe 1998: 246-7; Monoson 2000: 12, 123; Blondell 2002: 75 ff. 214 over-simplistic assumption that Plato was either a democrat or an antidemocrat. However, as some commentators have pointed out, Plato’s adoption of certain democratic practices, or his

‘democratic entanglements’, does not necessarily make him a friend of the democracy. 48 He still stubbornly denounced the democratic core values of equality and participatory government. The possibility is not ruled out that Plato’s use of the democratic conventions, deliberate or not, has the effect of subverting the democracy itself. A good example is the oligarchic coup in 411 B.C. in Athens. It was exactly by abusing the freedom of speech in particular that a group of oligarchs overthrew the democracy. 49

These scholars’ efforts to read Plato as a democrat, especially the last two arguments mentioned above, have enriched our understanding of Plato’s political thought. However,

Plato’s explicit opposition to the essential democratic principles of equality and participation should not be marginalized in our evaluation of his attitudes towards the democracy.

In summary, my view is closer to Samaras and Bobonich for its doctrinal reading and emphasis on Plato’s discussion of the written laws, public opinion and democratic institutions.

However, their developmental theory that Plato became less anti-democratic in his later works is still questionable. It is probably better that, by borrowing Max Weber’s concept of ideal type, we consider Plato’s concession to the democracy as an alternative tradition that existed

48 Deneen 2000: 426-7; Mulgan 2002: 634; Schaeffer & Nichols 2003: 468-9 49 Thuc. 8.67. 215 alongside his much more obvious and dominant anti-democratic political thinking, both of which can be found not only in the Platonic corpus as a whole but sometimes even in the same dialogues. Based on these assumptions, we move on to discuss Plato’s compromise to the democracy in his reflection on the three historical events conduced by the democracy. 50

III. The Law reform

In a conversation reported by Xenophon in the previous chapter, Socrates was said to guide the young Pericles to see the prospect of democratic constitutional order. There is a similar discussion in Plato’s Laws . However, in those passages Plato, who seemed to be even more cynical than the young Pericles, did not share Xenophon’s optimism about the demos. 51 For example, contrary to Xenophon’s praise of the demos’ discipline in naval exercises, Plato observed that the Athenian sailors, mainly common people, were a group of cowards without any sense of honour. He said:

Marines are quick to jump forward, then to retreat at a run back into their ships;

they see nothing shameful in not daring to stand and die in the face of

attacking enemies. Excuses are readily made for them, and they’re quite

50 Samaras (2002: 180-3, 346-9) also argue that history was the reason for Plato’s change of attitude, but as Stalley (2004: 164) observes, Samaras’ concept of history is vague. He fails to take full advantage of recent studies by scholars of ancient history concerning the political histories of the democracy in the fourth century B.C. 51 Even Samara (2002: 227-8, 232n23) who argues strongly for Plato’s democratic turn in his later period of life agrees that he remained an antidemocrat all his life. 216 prepared to throw away their weapons and flee, in certain routs they claim are

not shameful! 52

Besides, when Xenophon extolled the demos’ harmonious cooperation and its willingness to obey in chorus competition, Plato, though not here questioning their discipline, maintained that it proved neither a genuine political order nor its possibility, for the people still did not hold the knowledge needed. He wrote:

It’s laughable that the great mob considers itself capable of knowing what is

good harmony and good rhythm, and what is not, as many of them as have

been drilled to sing to an aulos and dance in rhythm; they don’t realize that

they practice these things without understanding each of them. 53

Moreover, as Xenophon observed, one of the reasons for the demos’ change of attitude from arrogance to moderation was the disastrous consequences of over-confidence in battlefields that had taught it the values of discipline and obedience, especially as critical danger loomed ahead. Plato, on the other hand, though accepting the theory that people learned from their mistakes and were disciplined in the face of danger, considered it hardly applicable to the history of the democracy. In his historical account, the demos learnt only once in the remote

52 Leg. 706c. 53 Leg. 670b-c. Though this passage is mainly about music, its political implication is clear when compared with Xen. Mem . 3.5.16-18, where the demos’ music performance is used as evidence of the possibility of democratic order. 217 past at the time of the first Persian invasion when ‘the magnitude of the invading force…struck [the Athenians] with a helpless feeling of fear’ and converted them into willing

‘slaves of the rulers and the laws’. 54 Then, according to Plato, following their victory over

Persia and the creation of the Athenian Empire there was a non-stop decline of traditional virtues as the people indulged in excessive equality and freedom. 55 Plato suggested that should there be any chance that the people would ever learn to be moderate again, it would be in their afterlife in Hades. 56

Plato’s verdict on the Athenian democracy seems unfair and harsh, given its 80 years’ constitutional stability in the fourth century B.C., which is a fact commonly accepted among today’s historians. Maybe Plato was judging with a different measure of time, for as he wrote in the Republic : ‘For surely, the whole of the time from childhood to old age would be short when compared with all time.’ 57 Or, it might be for the reason that the criterion Plato set for a good government was some sort of morality rather than durability in time, as he wrote in the

Laws :

54 Leg. 698b-c. 55 For Plato’s concluding assessment of the democracy in his later political works, see Leg. 701b-c. His is of course an oversimplified version of the history of the democracy without discussing the effects of all the numerous serious military and political events after the Persian invasions in the fifth century B.C. 56 Resp. 619b-e. 57 Resp. 608c. 218 In our consideration of the nature of the land and the order of the laws, we’re

looking now to the virtue of the regime. We do not hold, as the many do, that

preservation and mere existence are what is most honourable for human

beings; what is most honourable is for them to become as excellent as

possible and to remain so for as long a time as they may exist. 58

Nevertheless, the democracy’s long-term stability was not completely dismissed by Plato, even if it was not one of his most cherished political values. As shown in the later discussion of the written laws, Plato pointed out the amazing durability of some regimes whose corruption, when judged from intellectualist points of view, were deeply rooted beyond any cure. 59 The Athenian democracy was arguably one of the regimes in Plato’s mind when he raised this issue, since it emerged in his discussion of the written laws of the democracy.

Though different from Xenophon’ view, Plato considered that the cause of democratic stability, rather than anything virtuous on the demos’ side or its learning any lesson from its mistakes, was more likely an accidental outcome of an institutional design of the democracy, that is, its radical fragmentation of political power that made the democracy relatively incompetent to make any change from worse to the worst.60

58 Leg. 707d. 59 See section 3.2.4 of this chapter. 60 See section 3.2.3 of this chapter. 219 i. ‘The Ancestral Laws’

Plato, like all who participated in the discourse of constitutionalism in fourth-century Athens, resorted to the slogan of the ancestral constitution. 61 This slogan, we may say, consisted of two closely connected but nevertheless different aspects: archaism and communitarianism.

Archaism means here the inclination to worship established practices mainly for the reason of their presumed connection with ancient or legendary times. The popularity of this concept is best attested in the Athenian practice of naming all their laws after legendary lawgivers and kings, such as Solon, Draco and Theseus. 62 Communitarianism, on the other hand, emphasises the significance of what is supposedly common or shared among all citizens or members of the community. These two ideologies were intertwined with each other, since the

Athenian community used to identify itself with the past, as shown in the historical-ethnic belief that all Athenians were offspring of the common ancestors who had grown up nowhere else but from the Athenian soil. However, Athens was also defined by another two non- historical elements: communal participation and common interests. That is, in Athens all political decisions were to be made collectively by the citizens in the name of shared interests.

By analogy with Lincoln’s famous saying, Athens was supposedly of the citizens, for the citizens, and by the citizens directly.

61 See chapter 2. 62 M.H. Hansen 1989: 78. 220 Following the distinction above between archaism and the two communitarian concepts: communal participation and common interests, we move on to discussing Plato’s use of ‘the ancestral constitution’.

1. Archaism

First of all, Plato, though occasionally claiming the superiority of ancient conventions to later ones, 63 was not a faithful archaist; on the contrary, he recognized the innovative or even revolutionary dimensions of legislative projects. 64 In his view, conservative sentiment was more like a double-edged sword that could help or hinder a constitutional project. He said:

The tribal unity, the similarity of language and of laws, since they imply a

sharing of the sacred things and all such matters, create a certain friendship;

but then again, they do not easily accept laws and regimes different from their

own. Sometimes, even when they have suffered from civil strife as a result of

the wickedness of their laws they still prefer, out of habit, to live with the same

63 E.g. his criticism of the Athenians’ failure to live up to the standard of the ancient laws in Leg. 700a ff. 64 It is Critias, not Socrates who claimed the ideal city in the Republic was actually Athens in its golden age as reported by Solon. Ti . 25e ff. For the flexibility in the interpretation of the ancestral laws, see Leg. 630d. Cf. Leo Strauss (1953: 84) that archaism was incompatible with the critical spirit of philosophy; Brunt (1993: 276) that Plato used existing laws by ‘rules of logics and his own psychological, ethical and metaphysical doctrines’. See also Rowe 1998: 253. Contrast: Morrow (1960: 80 ff) and Samaras (2002:249 ff) who argues Plato’s genuine admiration of the Solonian laws in his Laws . 221 habitual customs that corrupted them before. So they give trouble to the

founder and lawgiver and become disobedient. 65

For Plato, the power of tyranny seemed much more tempting than the potential of popular reverence for tradition. He suggested in the Laws that the most efficient way to fulfil a constitutional project was not to persuade the uneducated demos, but to cooperate with tyrants who had the power to reconstruct the whole community as they liked single-handedly. He said:

You’d see that if a tyrant wishes to change a city’s habitual ways, he doesn’t

need to exert great efforts or spend an enormous amount of time. What he

has to do is first proceed himself, along the route he’d like the citizens to turn

toward, whether it be toward the practices of virtue or the opposite. He need

only first trace out a model in his own conduct of all that is to be done, praising

and honouring some things while assigning blame to others, and casting

dishonour on anyone who disobeys in each of the activities. 66

2. Common interests

On the other hand, the value of common interests was much more important in Plato’s view than the other two claims of tradition and popular participation. For instance, Socrates

65 Leg. 708c-d. 66 Leg. 711b-c. 222 defended his public elenchus as divine benefaction to the whole city in the Apology .67 The search for the common interests between rulers and the ruled is arguably the central theme of the Republic .68 In the Laws , Plato emphasised that all the laws should have no partisan consideration but be for the community as a whole. He wrote:

Nor do we declare any laws correct that are not laid down for the sake of what

is common to the whole city. Where the laws exist for the sake of some, we

declare the inhabitants to be ‘partisans’ rather than citizens, and declare that

when they assert their ordinances to be the just things they have spoken in

vain. 69

3. Civic participation

Plato’s discussion of civic participation in legal affairs is more complicated. Civic or demotic participation was principally incompatible with Plato’s elitist intellectualism that we have discussed in the previous section. However, he showed limited but significant compromises in his Laws .70 Though the initial legislation of the laws remained in the hands of professional lawgivers and elected magistrates in the Laws , the demos was now allowed to play a role in the revision of the laws. Plato suggested that the laws, once established for a decade, should

67 e.g. Ap. 30a-b, 36c. 68 E.g. the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2 of the Republic . 69 Leg. 715b. 70 For more detailed accounts of Plato’s use of democratic practices, see Samaras 2002: 235-245; Bobonich 2002: 374-384. 223 not be changed without the consent of the whole citizenry. 71 His concern here, though, seemed more about the stability of the laws rather than the intrinsic value of civic participation.

Plato’s second concession, in contrast to his denouncement of rhetoric in Gorgias , is his recognition of the need for public persuasion for a more efficient rule of law. 72 He saw problems both in the enforcement of the laws and in the fulfilment of their educational function if the demos was left out and stayed uninformed of the spirit of the laws. While the dialectic method applied at most to very small groups of people, the democratic practice of public speech was then adapted as a tool of communication between the large crowd and the professional lawgivers. With such consideration Plato argued that the lawgivers should add persuasive speeches into their laws. 73

The most obvious communitarian consideration in terms of civic participation in the Laws was in his discussion of the local judicial system. It is there that Plato explicitly said that even common citizens should participate in the procedures of trials, exactly because of their interests and rights as members of the community. He said:

71 Leg. 772d. 72 Leg. 659e-660a, 719e ff. 73 Schofield (2006: 88) argues that Plato’s adaptation of persuasion here presupposes a much higher view of the intelligent potential of the ruled. 224 In regard to crimes against the public, it is necessary, first, that the majority

have a share in the decision. For when someone does an injustice to the city

everyone suffers the injustice, and they would justly be vexed if they had no

share in such trials…Even in private suits it is necessary that everyone take

part as much as possible. For anyone who does not share in the right of

judging considers himself not at all a sharer in the city itself. 74

There is a complicated debate about whether these concessions mentioned above constituted a real difference from Plato’s intellectual elitism exemplified in the ideal of philosopher-king. 75

After all, all these participatory institutions were likely to be nullified under the sovereignty of the Nocturnal Council and various other limitations in the Laws , such as its strict law of citizenship and rigorous censorship. Therefore, Brisson argues that ‘in short, power no longer resides in the discourse which, particularly in Athens, unfolds at the Assembly and the courts, but in the knowledge possessed and cultivated by the members of a Council [the Nocturnal

Council] established by law, which escape all control.’ 76 In any case, we can at least say that

Plato’s use of democratic institutions in the Laws reveals something different from his intellectual criticism of the democracy. He recognized that the institution of assembly, instead

74 Leg. 768a-b. 75 For scholars who argue a genuine difference implied in Plato’s adaptation of these democratic practices, see Samaras 2002: e.g. 245; Bobonich 2002: e.g. 436-449. For those in doubt, see Saunders 1992: 472-6, Brunt 1993: 257-261; Stalley 2004: 167-8; Brisson 2005. Lake (2000: 273), on the other hand, is ambiguous on this issue. 76 Brisson 2005: 107. 225 of destroying the order of law, could sometimes be used to protect its stability. It is also suggested that rhetoric, instead of being an arch-rival of philosophy, could be a tool in making people understand or be obedient to the rule of philosophy. Maybe the most interesting of all is the reason he gave for citizens’ participation in the judicial process. In saying that, to be a member of the community, citizens must share in the decision-making, he appeared to recognize certain communitarian values that, if not superior to, were at least independent of his intellectual critique. All these are noteworthy, even though they did not constitute the main principles for the construction of Magensia in the Laws . ii. The Written Laws

The recording of the laws is one of the most revolutionary projects in the democracy’s law reform. For the first time in the history of Athens the laws were systematically collected, inscribed and archived in Agora for public consultancy. Only laws that had been written down through this or other procedures of legislation had legally binding force in Athens. The authority of these written laws was further strengthened in this reform to an unprecedented level by other constitutional principles. The written laws were proclaimed to be the superior authority over decrees by the Council and Assembly; all magistrates were required to rule by

226 the written laws that should be applied to the citizens indiscriminately. A result of this development, then, was strict control of administrative discretion under the written laws. 77

In the following discussion we will find that Plato’s first reaction to this constitutional switch to the written laws was negative, for he thought that writing was not an ideal medium of instruction. 78 Nevertheless, he then compromised his criticism of the written laws by switching from the intellectualist position to the sympathetic considerations of the reasons why the demos preferred the written laws to professional statesmen. He came to a conclusion that rule by the written laws was the second-best form of government, though it was still far inferior to the rule of true knowledge as humankind were from God. 79 The transformation of his view on the written laws is seen most clearly in his Statesman .80

77 For further discussion, see section 4.4 of ch. 2. 78 Lane (1998: 151, 154 and 160-1) disagrees that the discussion of the written laws in Plt. 297 ff referred to Athens since the actual Athenian laws were not completely unchanged as Plato’s law-abiding regime did. See also Rowe 2000: 249n25. However, there is already more than enough evidence in the text for its reference to the Athenian legal practice. E.g. Dusanic 1995. There is no need of perfect historical accuracy for Plato to make his readers understand the subjects of his discussion. None of his philosophical works, including the stories of Socrates, could claim that degree of historicity. 79 Plt. 303b. 80 Plt. 297d- 303b. The radical change of view in this passage has been widely recognized by scholars. E.g. Rowe (2001: 70) that ‘It has long bothered me that Plato should have spent so much space and energy—in the long section immediately preceding 300a…—in attacking current methods of legislation as absurd, and as likely to produce nothing but absurdities, only then to turn round and say “Well, at least the established laws are based on experience, and on the basis of advice and persuasion; so they are acceptable/ tolerable—better them, in any case, than allowing individuals a free hand.’ See also Annas 1995: xix; Lane 1998: 156; Gill 1995: 293. 227 1. Criticism of written laws

At first, Plato, judging from his intellectualist view, considered that the written laws could not provide perfect instruction because their rigidity inevitably disregarded human diversity and mutability. He said:

Legislation can never issue perfect instructions which precisely encompass

everyone’s best interests and guarantee fair play for everyone at once.

People and situations differ, and human affairs are characterized by an almost

permanent state of instability. It is therefore impossible to devise, for any

given situation, a simple rule which will apply to everyone for ever. 81

Even worse is that writing, instead of educating people, in fact increased their ignorance and arrogance by misleading them to take the written words for true knowledge. The former,

Plato believed, were nothing more than ‘dream images’ of the latter. 82 He condemned the inventor of writing, saying that

It will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learnt it: they will not

practice using their memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is

external and depends on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to

81 Plt. 294a-b. Cf. Plato’s claim that a good speech should address to the different needs of the audience. Phdr. 271b. 82 Phdr. 277d-e. 228 remember from the inside, completely on their own. You have not discovered

a potion for remembering, but for reminding; you provide your students with

the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality. Your invention will enable them

to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that

they have come to know much while for the most part they know nothing. And

they will be difficult to get along with, since they will merely appear to be wise

instead of really being so. 83

2. Reconsideration of written laws

This criticism of the written laws is largely based on Plato’s intellectualism. According to this view, the main problems of the written laws lie in their ignorance of the true condition of human diversity, their incompetence in representing Plato’s ideal of true knowledge, and their prejudicial effects on the education of true knowledge. However, this intellectualist view that takes the written laws as an educational tool is not without its own problems. The idea of true knowledge on which Plato based his criticism of the written laws is an elusive concept that could not be recognized by the majority in the real world. As Plato himself put it: ‘as long as we fail to understand what this knowledge [i.e. political expertise] is, we’ll never be able to distinguish a king with his wisdom from those who merely pretend to be statesmen.’ 84 In fact,

83 Phdr. 275a-b. 84 Plt. 293d. 229 even if someone could ever find such knowledge, another problem is that, according to Plato’s elitist view, the majority were still too ignorant to appreciate its importance. As Plato stated unambiguously:

That it’s quite out of the question for a large number of people—never mind

who they are—to acquire this knowledge and so govern a state with

intelligence. No, if we’re to discover the one and only perfect political system

we’ve been talking about, we have to think in terms of scarceness, rarity—

uniqueness, even. 85

Such considerations refer sinisterly to a justified use of deception or even violence, as Plato actually did with the metaphors of medicine and captainship. He wrote:

What about when people have been forced to go against their written code

and their traditions, then, and to follow a course of action which is more just,

moral and honourable than what they were doing before? How is one to react

when these people express dissatisfaction with the constraint they’ve been

subjected to? Wouldn’t it be the height of absurdity to say that those who

85 Plt. 297b-c. 230 applied the pressure treated those who were at the receiving end of it wrongly,

unjustly and badly? Wouldn’t that be the last thing one should say? 86

However, at this point came a radical switch of perspectives. Instead of condemning the practice of written laws from his theory of knowledge, Plato turned to re-examine the cause of its emergence from a perspective that was less intellectualist and more sympathetic to the demos’ concerns. 87 He took more seriously the demos’ suspicion of politicians and the

86 Plt. 296c-d. 87 There is a debate in what sense Plato recommended rule by the written laws. There are three plausible reasons that it was at least not as bad as lawless regimes (e.g. 300b), that the written laws were sanctioned with experienced consultation and popular consent (e.g.300b), and that the written laws were imitations of true knowledge (e.g. 300e). Much of the controversy falls on the last one. Rowe (2000: 247-249 & 2001) argues that the law-abiding regime imitated the rule of Knowledge by not changing their laws since the expertise required was not available. He argues that the only thing common between the ideal rule and its imitation is the principle that no law was to be altered without Knowledge while the written laws themselves had no share of Knowledge since they were presumably enacted by ignorant people and their equally ignorant politicians. For similar views, see Lane 1995: 287. On the other hand, Samaras (2002: 173-177) argued that the written laws shared a substantial part of Knowledge for the reason that Plato had revised his elitist position and allowed non- philosophers to own limited ability to partake in his ideal world. Though the debate between Christopher Rowe and Thanassis Samaras made an important contribution in clarifying Plato’s treatment of the democracy and the written laws in the Statesman , there is no need for me to take sides on this issue. No matter in what sense the law-abiding regime followed the ideal government, to make sense of his distinction between law-abiding regimes and lawless ones, Plato must allow some substantial intrinsic value to the written laws that were enacted through democratic procedure. If the written laws were not praised because of their substantial imitation of Platonic Knowledge, they could still be chosen for the sanction of democratic procedure. Even Rowe, who insists that Plato’s condemnation of the democracy in the Statesman was as harsh as in his Republic , agreed that in the Statesman the democratic procedure of legislation made a difference to the quality of the written laws. He wrote (2000: 249n25) that ‘Still, it must be conceded that those laws must at least not be wholly intolerable (which would put the decision between them and the lawless types at risk), and that will perhaps be guaranteed to the extent that they are founded on experience and general agreement.’ See also Schofield (2006: 125) ‘it is clear from Plato’s handling of the issue that laws and customs established by trial and error, deliberation and popular 231 people’s effort to curb the abuse of political power with the written laws. We find that his elitist intellectualist metaphor of medicine and pilotage in fact was not so convincing to the suspicious Athenians, 88 as he wrote:

People doubt that any one could ever live up to this ideal rulership; they doubt

the possibility of a moral and knowledgeable ruler who would dispense justice

and deal fairly with everyone in the matter of their rights; and if such a ruler

were possible, they doubt that he would be prepared to rule in that way, rather

than injuring and killing and harming any of us whenever he felt like it. 89

A logical conclusion following this suspicion of politicians is what the Athenian demos actually did: to prevent the government from falling into private hands with the various

consent are not what he would regard as knowledge. At the same time he appears to concede that in a democracy or oligarchy they might be regarded as constituting a body of wisdom and expertise.’ 88 Plt. 298a-b, 301c-d. This element of popular suspicion in founding democracies had not been taken seriously enough among scholars. e.g. Gill 1995: 296; Annas & Waterfield 1995: 70n67. Even scholars like Samaras (2002: 176) who looked out for democratic signs in the Platonic corpus missed the issue. The main reason for the dismissal is probably the optimistic claim in Plt. 301d that ‘if there were to come to be someone of the kind we are describing, he would be prized and would govern a constitution that would alone be correct in the strict sense, steering it through in happiness.’ (Rowe’s translation) This is odd, to say the least, giving the stress on the fact of popular scepticism in the immediate context or, as Rowe (1995: 233) mentioned, Plato’s memory of the execution of Socrates. Melissa Lane (1998: 163) came up with the theory that ‘these imperfect regimes need to overcome their squeamishness so that they would be sure to give the true statesman the welcome he deserves.’ However, it is still unclear how to make such highly suspicious and ignorant people accept the rule of an ideal ruler. The gap between philosophy and democracy in the Platonic political thought might still need to be overcome through force and violence, as Rowe (1995: 233) suggested that the ideal king must have had the power to change his people before he could be accepted by them as the ruler. 89 Plt. 301c-d. This consideration is confirmed by Plato’ mouthpiece in Leg. 875a-d. 232 arrangements of direct democracy such as the assembly, sortition of governing positions, preview and review of magistrates’ performance, and of course the written laws.

Since this is our impression of them [the apparent experts], that we were to

make it a matter of policy that members of these professions are no longer to

be allowed unchecked authority over anyone, not even a slave, let alone a free

man. We decided to convene ourselves into an assembly which might either

be open to the whole citizen body or be restricted to the wealthier

citizens…Once the assembly has heard all this advice, whether it has come

from doctors and captains or else from laymen, the majority decision about

these matters is written up on the official notice-boards and inscribed on stelae

(and also included within the unwritten code consisting of our time-honoured

traditions), and from then on it dictates the ways in which sailing and the

treatment of the sick are practised. 90

Even more, the actual existence of the written laws provided another reason for Plato’s revaluation. In any case, the principle of ruling by the written laws was firmly established in fourth-century Athens by the democracy. For all his criticism of the written laws, Plato recognized a much graver danger in governing officials’ abuse of the laws once the authority

90 Plt. 298b-e. 233 of law had been established. He warned that the state, if not falling into chaos altogether, would suffer the tyranny of magistrates who pursued egoistic interests in the name of the laws. 91 He then came to the conclusion that the strict rule by the written laws was the best way of government available in the real world.

States which are governed by these bodies of people [democracies and

oligarchies] apparently have no choice, then; their only chance of being true

reflections of the authentic political system we’ve been talking about, which is

government by a single person with expertise, lies in their never allowing the

slightest infringement of their written laws and their time-honoured traditions,

once these have been established. 92

3. The status of democratic rule with written laws

After his justification of the written laws Plato proceeded to provide a classification of regimes in terms of the obedience to the laws and the number of rulers. There were three law- abiding regimes: kingship, aristocracy and democracy which were respectively ruled by one, a limited number or a large group of people. There were also three law-breaking regimes: tyranny, oligarchy and democracy that were again respectively ruled by one, a limited number and a large group of people. Democracy, when following the laws, was the least desirable of

91 Plt. 300a-b. 92 Plt. 300e-301a. 234 the law-abiding regimes, but was the most acceptable of the law-breaking regimes. The reason for democratic regimes’ mid-position in the classification, Plato said, is their fragmentation of power among large numbers of the people that made the governments least competent in either enforcing or abusing the laws. 93 Here, the status of democracy was considerably upgraded compared with that in the Republic and the Laws where democracy or the Athenian democracy was characterised by the tendency of lawlessness with chaos looming ahead. Here, democratic regimes, including the Athenian one, were not denied the possibility of being a law-abiding government. Even when they were breaking the laws, the damage they incurred was not as harmful as the other two forms of bad regimes.

Nevertheless, this discussion of regime classification appears somehow awkward in this context. It is followed by a reconsideration of the written laws in the Athenians democracy in which Plato described the idea and practices of the written laws that happened in no other regimes but in the democracy. 94 Then, suddenly he told us that there were another two forms

93 Plt. 302d-303a. This view is similar to his use of the institution of the assembly to maintain the stability of law in the Laws . See Leg. 772d. 94 Griswold (1989: 178-9) is one of the few scholars who have noticed that only the democratic procedure of legislation was mentioned in the discussion of law-making in non-ideal regimes. He comes to the conclusion, which is right in my opinion, that the second-best regime was supposedly a democracy. Cf. Rowe (2000: 248) who also made the same observation that only the democratic procedure was mentioned in the context, but he rejected the inference that a certain form of democracy was supposed to be the second-best regime, with the reason that it contradicted Plato’s intellectual elitism. Contrast to Schofield (2006: 134n62) who rejected this reference to Athens for the reason that Plato ‘continued to regard his own city as well on the way to extreme lawlessness and terminal disaster.’ 235 of law-abiding government, kingship and aristocracy which he had not mentioned before. The readers may get confused in which ways the written laws emerged and operated in non- democratic governments, especially when considering that the main reason for people’s preference for the written laws, according to Plato’s earlier account, is their envious suspicion of the rulers. How were such people ever persuaded to trust a few politicians with their government? Besides, a main problem of the Athenian democracy in Plato’s description here was its obsession with the authority of the laws: no one was allowed to challenge the laws for whatever reasons. Therefore, when Plato told us that there were two kinds of democracy: the law-abiding and the law-breaking ones, the readers may be confused again in what conditions the law-breaking democracies came to be, giving up the written laws that were supposed to protect their interests and rights against vicious politicians.

Another issue of interpretation regarding this part of the discussion in the Statesman is its ironical tone. Plato made the democracy a ludicrous scene in which a group of uneducated bumptious people, playing professionals, put their oars into the most complicated and important business of the state. Moreover, the people, having become complacent with the misconception that they were already knowledgeable, would not tolerate criticism of the written laws. The chance of the people and their written laws being examined and improved

236 was therefore diminished. 95 Plato described a scenario of intolerance that reminded us of the

Athenians’ trial of Socrates.

whoever develops theories about these matters which go beyond what has

been written down in the legal code—is, first, not to be called an expert in

medical or naval matters, but a sophist, talking hot air and drivel…and if it is

decided that he does influence people of any age to behave illegally and in

contravention of the written code, then we shall impose the maximum penalty

on him. 96

The young Socrates, a minor interlocutor in the dialogue, after hearing all the mockery of the democracy, made the following comment:

Obviously it [the democracy] would completely obliterate expertise in all its

forms, and the ban on research means that there’d be no chance of it ever

recurring again either. Life is hard enough as it is, but the effect of all this

would be to make life absolutely unbearable in the future. 97

95 Cf. Phdr. 275a-b. 96 Plt. 299b-c. 97 Plt. 299e. 237 However, I believe, what Plato did here is more than providing another intellectualist mockery of the democracy. 98 He was actually starting to see democratic politics from a different perspective that was more practical and sympathetic to the demos. It has been emphasised several times in this part of the dialogue that, with no truly trustworthy statesmen in sight, the best way available to the people is to make out their laws together, write down the laws, and stick to them, as the Athenian democracy had actually done. 99 The sarcastic observation, then, should be taken as a reminder of the immeasurable distance between the written laws and true knowledge, rather than outright denial of the democracy. 100

4. The wonder of democratic order

The reply of the young Socrates, on the other hand, reminds us of the cynical young Pericles in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 3.5. 101 As Xenophon’s Socrates influenced the younger Pericles, similarly Plato or his mouthpiece the Elean stranger led the young Socrates to see the

98 Cf. Gill (1995) who argued that Plt. 291-303 constituted a two-staged dialectic assessment of popular constitutionalism. According to his interpretation, the first stage from 291-299 was destructive criticism of popular constitutionalism while the second stage from 300-3 was its theoretic reconstruction. Cf. Blondell (2002: 389) ‘The point is rather that Plato is now using a dominant (and therefore privileged) character to entertain the idea that the death of an individual—even such a remarkable one as Sokrates—may be a price worth paying for living in one kind of state rather than another.’ Her emphasis. Cf. Schofield (2006: 124-5) that ‘the visitor responds…that in the political realm, while the troubles suffered by cities which operate “according to written rules and customs without knowledge” are remarkable, it is no less remarkable that though ships sailed on similar principles would sink, some cities governed that way have a sort of natural resilience…Ignoring all this would be a massive mistake.’ 99 Plt. 297e, 300b-c, 300e-301a, 301e. 100 Plt. 303b. 101 See the previous chapter. 238 democracy from a more positive perspective. When hearing the young Socrates’ pessimistic view on the democratic rule by the written laws, the Elean reminded him that the rule by the written laws was actually the best way available in a world where no ideal ruler existed. He pointed out the disastrous consequences of breaking the laws once their authority had been established. Finally, he comes to the showdown of their discussion on the written laws. The

Elean stranger pointed out the long-term stability of some regimes that could not be explained from intellectualist perspectives. These regimes, like the Athenian democracy, were regulated by their written laws and traditions that were considered completely ridiculous and corrupt according to Plato’s intellectual elitism. Plato, we may say, appeared to admit here that the stability of the democracy and other regimes is a wonder beyond the understanding of his intellectualism, as revealed in the following sentence.

Do we wonder, then, Socrates, at all the evils that turn out to occur in such

constitutions, and all those that will turn out for them, when a foundation of this

sort underlies them, one of carrying out their functions according to written

rules and customs without knowledge—which if used by another expertise

would manifestly destroy everything that comes about through it? Or should

we rather wonder at something else, namely at how strong a thing a city is by

its nature? For in fact cities have suffered such things now from time without

239 limit, but nevertheless some particular ones among them are enduring and are

not overturned .102

The overall interpretation above of the Statesman 297d-303b is largely with the traditional reading that there emerged a certain form of written constitutionalism that was independent of, or even contradictory to, his intellectual elitism.103 Accordingly, Plato, willingly or not, came to recognize the government of the Athenian democracy whose practices of law were mentioned in this passage as typical of a law-abiding regime, in contrast to his criticism of the democracy in the Republic Book 8. However, Christopher Rowe disagrees with this

102 Plt. 301e-302a. Rowe’s translation. Emphasis added. My view of the passage is similar to Samaras (2002: 177): ‘If we do not want to attribute the perseverance of those cities to sheer luck, we should accept that there is something intrinsic in their constitutions which is the source of this success. The obvious candidate is, of course, law and the adherence to it.’ In contrast to Rowe’s view (2000: 249) that: ‘the visitor—and no doubt Plato—will be taking up an uncompromising position: that there is nothing good, except perhaps through happy accident, in any existing constitution… We may get things right, sometimes, but without knowledge we are more likely to get them wrong—and regularly do.’ ) The reason for his reading is his attempt to keep this passage consistent with Plato’s strict intellectual criticism of the democracy and all other actual regimes, as he continued: ‘this is an extreme position, but it is wholly consistent with the way in which the Visitor began, and will end, by dismissing all existing politicians, without exception (291a-c, 303b-d).’ (249-50) Rowe’s reading is not without problems. For one thing, Plato actually offered no explanation for the long-term stability of some actual regimes, which he called a ‘wonder’. However, given his strong rationalist temperament, it is doubtful that Plato would have ever been content with the explanation of ‘happy accidence’ for such an important political development. Cf. Lane (1995: 286) ‘Yet we find ourselves, with the Stranger, confronting a rather embarrassing, and surprising fact. States do exist, and some are stable…and strong…despite the theoretic argument just concluded to how that rule by law must obliterate the arts’; though she immediately got out of the embarrassment by saying the political art aimed something higher than the existence of state. She wrote: ‘the political art produces not the state, but its unity…It now appears that such unity is not a necessary condition for the existence of states.’ 103 For recent examples of this view, see Griswold 1989: 179-181; Annas 1995: xix-xx; Stern 1997: 273. For more detailed discussion, see Samaras 2002: 171-181. 240 interpretation, arguing that Plato’s position of intellectual elitism and his strict criticism of the democracy remained unchanged in 297d-303b. 104 A brief examination of Rowe’s view, therefore, will be provided as the conclusion of this section.

Rowe’s central concern seems to be the coherence of Plato’s political philosophy. He worries that Plato’s substantial concession to the legal practice of the Athenian democracy would amount to a betrayal of his mentor, Socrates, who had been condemned by the democracy, and consequent subversion of Socratic/ Platonic philosophy. Rowe says:

If Plato really is willing even to contemplate the idea that the democracy was

justified in killing Socrates, he will surely have abandoned everything he ever

seemed to stand for—not only the idea of free inquiry, but the main thing that

that inquiry always seemed to be for , namely the goal of a better and more

virtuous life…This must be so, because on any account the laws to which strict

adherence would be required would be imperfect, and would be framed with

ends that are not only different from those of the virtuous city, but actually

inconsistent with them (because they would be framed by people without

expert knowledge). In short, if we are being asked to settle for absolute

adherence to law, under the terms given, we are also being asked to approve

104 Rowe 1998, 2000 & 2001. See also Gill 1995; Lane 1995: 286-291& 1998: 146-163; Taylor 2000. 241 of the killing of Socrates. So my question is: can we really suppose Plato to

have been quite so prodigal with his principles (and if so, what would the

consequences be for our assessment of him?) 105

Therefore, in his interpretation, Plato was remarkably consistent throughout his work in his intellectual criticism of the democracy. The Statesman , instead of offering any justification for the democratic rule by the written laws, ‘is arguing against the [popular] view that sticking to the established laws is the first and best option for city-states.’ 106 Though the rule by the written laws was undeniably called the second-best form of regime, Rowe dismisses it as ‘a pretty poor second’. 107

Rowe’s perspective, of course, is fully justifiable, and his research is to a very high level of scholarship. Plato’s criticism of the democracy was indeed a dominant theme throughout his works, and Rowe’s warning of the effect that the tendency to make Plato a democrat might produce in misleading our understanding of Plato should be kept in mind by all scholars of ancient political philosophy. 108 However, some interpretive problems of the text also arise from his attempt to observe the Platonic intellectual criticism of the democracy at every step of his interpretation of the Statesman 297-302. Firstly, he seems not to pay enough attention

105 Rowe 2001: 67. 106 Rowe 2001: 73-4. See also Rowe 2000: 244. 107 Rowe 2001: 74. 108 Rowe 2001: 74. 242 to the democratic implication of Plato’s distinction between law-abiding and lawless regimes.

As Rowe himself has agreed in the previous discussion, the laws must be enacted through democratic procedure, and therefore Plato’s recognition of the law-abiding cities implied his recognition of the democratic practice of law, to some extent at least. Though the immensity of the gap between the ideal city ruled by experts and the law-abiding city was emphasised over and over again in the Statesman , it is still worth asking in what sense Plato might think that the democratic procedure of popular consultation could make a difference to the quality of the laws. If Plato still refused to consider the possibility that the majority could be equipped with some limited capability to partake in philosophical knowledge, could he be suggesting some sort of popular and practical wisdom that was essentially different from philosophical knowledge? Or, Plato’s consideration here might have nothing to do with the people’s intellectual capability, but something based on his appreciation of the institutional arrangement of the democracy, as suggested in his observation of the positive outcome of the fragmentation of political power in a democracy.

Secondly, Rowe appears to play down Plato’s more realistic observation as suggested in the concluding passage of the Statesman 301e6-302b3. His reading of the passage as an expression of Plato’s ‘chilling’ and pessimistic view about the prospect of all actual political regimes does not have sufficient support from the text itself. 109 This passage is in fact one of

109 Rowe 2000: 250. See the previous footnote 90. 243 the rare occasions, and probably the clearest one, that Plato came to recognize an important development of the actual world that he confessed constituted a difficulty to his intellectualist understanding.

On the other hand, it might be worth pointing out Plato’s recognition of the destructive side- effects of Socrates’ philosophic activity. As discussed later in this chapter, Plato did make some changes to the Socratic way of life. It was no longer an open exercise free to every one as described in the Apology , but an exclusive training offered only to a small group of the elite based on their talent, education and age in the Republic and Laws .

Does any of Plato’s substantial recognition of the democratic practice of law, as Rowe argues, constitute his betrayal of the ideal of Socratic/ Platonic philosophical life? Probably, but there is no need of exaggeration on this issue. Plato did not offer us a clear-cut solution to the conflict between the Socratic way of life and the democracy. What we have found in the

Statesman 297-302 is his hesitation and reconsideration of the value of democratic politics, or, to borrow Ruby Blondell’s word, he might just entertain the idea of putting the claim of the democracy before that of philosophy for once. This kind of mental exercise is not necessarily a betrayal of Socrates; on the contrary, it could be seen as a perfect exercise of his mentor’s philosophical practice, that is, critical examination of all established opinions, including his own prejudices.

244 IV. The Reconciliation

Though the maintenance of political harmony against the danger of civil strife is one of the main concerns in Plato’s political thinking, the Athenian reconciliation after the brutal civil war in 403 largely seemed to escape his notice. While Xenophon provided a historical account that became one of our major sources of this important event, Plato mentioned it only briefly in his mockery of the practice of funeral speech in the Menexenus . While Xenophon praised the piety, generosity and other virtues the democrats had shown in their reconciliation with the oligarchs, we can hardly see any difference these exceptional efforts made on Plato’s general critical view of the democracy. Plato’s solution of civil strife, generally speaking, is idealistic. As shown in both his Republic and his Laws , his main interest, rather than analysing and improving the performance of actual regimes in dealing with the problem of political conflicts, was to prevent the causes of civil strife and other sorts of conflicts at source with the radical arrangements regarding nurture, education and other institutions that constituted his ideal cities. 110 i. The seriousness of Platonic funeral speech

The only occasion we find that Plato explicitly mentioned the success of the reconciliation is in his Menexenus where he presented a mock public funeral speech. 111 Within a brief passage

110 See also Ober 2005: 4. 111 There are three main views on the Menexenus . Some scholars maintain that there was an ironic tone which was the central theme throughout the whole dialogue. These scholars include Coventry 1989, Nightingale 1995: 245 in the speech the Athenians were praised for setting up a laudable model of reconciliation that was definitely to be followed by all other Greek cities in their own crises of civil strife. 112

The reconciliation was such an exceptional achievement that it defied all expectations of other cities, yet the Athenians were said to do it simply as a matter of course. The very fundamental reason for the miracle of the reconciliation, according to the speech, was the ties of blood shared by all the Athenians.

Plato’s observation and explanation of the reconciliation in the Menexenus should be cited in full before further discussion.

There was civil war among us, fought in such a way that, if people had to

engage in internal strife, no one would pray for his city to be stricken in any

other. So readily and naturally—so much contrary to the expectations of the

other Greeks—did the citizens from the Piraeus and those from the city deal

107, Pradeau 2002: 15, Long 2003, Pownall 2003: 38-64 and Loraux 2006: 404. Huby (1957) and Kahn (1963), on the other hand, argued that the dialogue was a political pamphlet addressing contemporary issues in a non- ironic tone. While few of today’s scholars completely accept the views of Huby and Kahn, many of them, according to Long (2003: 62), still agree that some parts of the dialogue, especially the exhortation at the end of the speech, seemed serious, or much less ironic than the rest. E.g. Henderson 1975: 45, Monoson 2000: 199. For the latest discussions and fuller bibliography, see Monoson 2000: 181 ff, Long 2003 and Pownall 2003: 38- 64. 112 There is no discussion of issues in the Menexenus other than Plato’s view of the reconciliation due to the limitation of space. 246 with each other! So moderately did they bring the war against the men at

Eleusis to a conclusion.

And the sole cause for all that was their genuine kinship, which provided them,

not in word but in fact, with a firm friendship based on ties of blood. We must

also remember those who died at each other’s hands in that war and try to

reconcile them in ceremonies such as today’s by what means we have—

prayers and sacrifices—praying to the gods below who have power over them,

since we ourselves are reconciled as well. For they did not lay hands on each

other through wickedness or enmity, but through misfortune. And we, the

living, are witnesses of this ourselves, since we, who are of the same stock,

have forgiven each other for what we did and for what we suffered. 113

What Plato truly meant here is far from clear. The Menexenus is particularly notorious even among his works for its unusual density of playfulness. 114 At the beginning of the Menexenus

Socrates already made fun of the Athenian practice of public speech, saying that the speeches constantly made him feel ‘taller and nobler and better looking all of a sudden.’ 115 Besides, in addition to the typical ironical tone in his conversation with the young Menexenus, Plato’s

113 Menex. 243e-244b. 114 For further discussion of the various techniques of irony and playfulness applied in the Menex. , see Henderson 1975, Coventry 1989, Long 2003, Pownall 2003: 38-64. In Contrast to Huby 1957 and Kahn 1963. 115 Menex. 234b. 247 Socrates also cast doubt on the authorship of the funeral speech that he reported in the dialogues. He denied that he was the author of the speech; on the contrary, he claimed to have learned it from Pericles’ non-Athenian lover Aspasia who made up the speech in one go by combining what came to her mind and some of the surplus material from her composition of

Pericles’ famous funeral speech. The speech reported in the Menexenus , then, appeared to be a playful practice to seduce the young Menexenus who was enthusiastic about rhetoric, rather than an expression of serious reflection on the history of Athenian democracy. Furthermore, as many scholars have pointed out, the historical narrative in the funeral speech is full of distortion and deception that raised the Athenians to an unlikely point of perfection. Plato’s portrayal of the Athenians here could hardly fit into his political criticism in his other writings.

Finally, some events mentioned by Socrates are obviously an anachronism, for they happened only after his death in 399. By such means, Plato indicated his playfulness to readers of the dialogue.

How then should we interpret Plato’s account of the reconciliation in the Menexenus ? Given the irony in the dialogue, there is a strong tendency to dismiss his account as a mockery of this important event. 116 Following this view, what Plato suggested might be as follows: the democracy did not truly honour the terms of reconciliation; persecution and collective conflicts among citizens continued after the civil war, and the demos showed nothing

116 See the previous footnote at the beginning of this section. 248 praiseworthy in its decision to reconcile with the oligarchic citizens, for it was not their self- control, generosity or sense of community, but their egoistic calculation that forced them to choose reconciliation instead of revenge. After all, this image of the demos is more consistent with his general criticism of the democracy.

Nevertheless, there could be another interpretation. First of all, it has demonstrated in a previous chapter that the democracy was credited with the success of the reconciliation; even

Plato could not dispute the consequent peace that had been achieved in this exceptional project. Besides, there is a tradition of considering the Platonic funeral speech a serious work since ancient times, 117 and many of today’s scholars still believe that Plato gave serious suggestions to the public in the speech. 118 Furthermore, there is no reason to presume that all of Plato’s ironical expressions are the opposite of what he thought to be true. 119 In respect of the effects that the author tried to achieve, the speech could also be a partial distortion or exaggeration of facts rather than complete untruth. Finally, it should be noted that Plato himself considered the Athenian practice of funeral speeches, not complete fiction but rather a mixture of true and untrue statements. This comment of his should carry substantial weight in our interpretation of his funeral speech. Plato wrote:

117 Huby 1957: 104. 118 See the previous footnote. 119 Cf. Nehamas’ view (1998: 12) against Vlastos that Platonic irony did not necessarily mean the opposite of what Plato wrote. 249 [The orators] do their praising so splendidly that they cast a spell over our

souls, attributing to each individual man, with the most varied and beautiful

verbal embellishment, both praise he merits and praise he does not .120

What then was the function of the ironical element in his account of the reconciliation? 121

There are several plausible explanations. Firstly, Plato might have meant to make fun of the

Athenians’ excessive complacency over the achievement of the reconciliation, which, though exceptional, was not immaculate. For example, the encounters between the democrats from

Piraeus and the oligarchs from the city were not the happy ending of reunification as Plato reported. There were bloody battles before the initiative to reconcile. It is uncertain whether the Athenian audience would be willingly deceived by Plato’s rosy version of the past, or whether the memory of fierce fights and heavy casualty at that time would come to their minds again. Secondly, Plato might have suggested that the motives behind the reconciliation were not simple and selfless as the democracy had claimed. It sounds simplistic, if not naïve, to claim, as Plato was playfully doing here, that the civil war was caused by nothing but misfortune and ended solely because of the citizens’ belief in their common ancestry. Thus,

Pownall comments that ‘the Speaker [of the Platonic funeral speech] takes a point of which the Athenian democracy could legitimately be proud and exaggerates it to the point of self-

120 Menex. 234c-235a with emphasis added. 121 The reconciliation was just one of the numerous historical events mentioned in the Menex. and did not receive much attention from the commentators. 250 parody, in mockery of the tendency of the Athenian orators to tailor historical facts to flatter the masses.’ 122

However, even these two explanations are not without problems. Firstly, while some scholars says that Plato was making mockery of the democracy by exaggerating its motive and the achievement of the reconciliation, Plato’s account was actually not as flattering as other contemporary versions of the reconciliation; on the contrary, he seemed to be more keen on glossing over the oligarchic citizens’ responsibility for the civil war by playing down the democrats’ contribution to the reconciliation. Secondly, Plato’s version of ‘genuine kinship’ or the myth of autochthony with which he credited the success of the reconciliation might not have been particularly to the democrats’ liking, either. As also shown in the discussion below, there are serious messages in this story despite its incredibility; what Plato did with the myth of autochthony in the Menexenus as well as in the Republic was to promote his elitist values by appropriating traditional superstition.

Therefore, it is likely that one of Plato’s purposes in his account of the reconciliation in the

Menexenus is to exhort the Athenians demos to go a step further along the reconciliatory

122 For similar views, see Monoson 2000: 184n7. Loraux (2006: 403): ‘Only irony can deflate the self- importance of those in authority: to the funeral oration a speech that creates a sense of importance, there is no other possible antidote than Socrates the Silenus.’ 251 principle of not remembering the past wrongs. 123 He seemed to say that, to truly reconcile the

Athenians, the democracy should have done more than granting a legal amnesty to the oligarchs; it should also have given strictly equal recognition of the oligarchic cause in the civil war as it did to the democratic party in all its public ceremonies and institutions of social welfare. Only then should the bitterness in the Athenian collective memory of the past be replaced with true peace and harmony. ii. The Myth of Autochthony

What was Plato’s attitude towards the established myth of autochthony, according to which all

Athenians were the offspring of Attica the Motherland, 124 when he claimed that the genuine kinship based on the myth was the one and only reason for the reconciliation?

The story that people were born from the earth might sound unbelievable to our modern ears.

Besides, Plato was apparently not a believer in the myth, but he recognized its usefulness in

123 My view is therefore close to Huby (1975), Kahn (1963) and Monoson (2000: 203), though none of them applied this interpretive principle for a detailed analysis of the reconciliation. For example, Monoson (2000: 203) quotes Loraux, saying that ‘The epitaphioi and the Republic offer images that self-consciously aim not to describe Athenian life accurately but to illuminate the political and personal virtues to which people should aspire, that is, to illuminate the possibilities for the city. Loraux has noticed this, writing, for example, that “in its essence and in its history, the Platonic city irresistibly suggests the city of the epitaphioi. Characterized like it by unity, the polis of the philosopher, like that of the orators, knows none of the mistakes and difficulties of earlier humanity.”.. Loraux here asserts a link between the discourse of a serious funeral oration and that of the Republic . Both ideally invent a polis that is imagined successfully to avert corrosive civil conflict and achieve extraordinary happiness and honor.’ Monoson’s understanding of Loraux might not be right. See Loraux 2006: 404. 124 His two main accounts of the myth are in Resp. 414d ff. and Menex. 237b ff. 252 politics. In the Phaedrus when Socrates was asked if he believed in a mythic story of an

Athenian princess abducted by the god of the north wind, he appeared to be indifferent, saying his priority was to examine himself rather than to assess the truth of popular stories. 125 In the

Republic , Socrates told us explicitly that the story of autochthony in his ideal city was a lie, though a noble one. 126 Therefore, there are reasons to suspect that what Plato was doing here is nothing else but making mockery of popular superstition or self-deception.

However, there are also some serious messages behind Plato’s ironic tone. First, Plato’s doubt about the truthfulness of the myth of autochthony does not necessarily contradict the people’s belief in the myth and the role it played in the reconciliation, though it was unlikely to be as decisive as he claimed in the Menexenus . People often sincerely devote themselves to some religious ideas that seem groundless or even laughable in philosophers’ sceptical eyes, as proved many times in the human history of religion. This basic fact of human society did not escape Plato’s notice. The myth of autochthony, instead of being discarded as sheer superstition, constituted an important foundation of Plato’s ideal city in the Republic .127

125 Phdr. 229b-230a. 126 Resp. 414b-e. The passage, however, does not necessarily prove Plato’s disbelief. Many of the Athenians took it for granted that their indigenous status was unique among the Greeks; all other cities’ myths of autochthony, including the one of the ideal city in the Resp. , were then considered fake. 127 Resp. 414b-e. 253 Besides, Plato’s version of autochthony is not an ironic flattery that discredits itself with many excessive eulogies of the Athenian democracy, as many scholars might have thought. On the contrary, Plato’s story does not put as much weight on democratic values as the reports of

Xenophon and other orators normally did. Lysias claimed that freedom was one of the core values in the reconciliation, 128 while Isocrates emphasised the value of political equality. 129

Even Xenophon highlighted the culture of civic participation that built up strong bonds of comradeship among the Athenians. Plato’s account, by contrast, switched the focus from the civic relationship to those between Attica the Motherland and her offspring or between the city and her members, associations that were modelled on ideal families of caring parents and filial children. 130 The Motherland and the city gave birth to the citizens, nourished and educated them, while the citizens responded with affection and obedience as their offspring.

The values of equality, freedom and participation that constituted the civic life of the Athenian democracy were then pushed out of the spotlight in Plato’s account.

To be fair, Plato mentioned that political equality and freedom were implied in the myth of autochthony or common ancestry. His funeral speech claimed that the Athenians who were

‘all brothers sprung from one mother, do not think it right to be each other’s slaves or masters.

128 Lys . 2.64. 129 Isoc . 7.69. 130 The account of the relationship between the Motherland and the Athenians is at the beginning of the funeral speech while the account of the city and the citizens is at its conclusion. 254 Equality of birth in the natural order makes us seek equality of rights in the legal and defer to each other only in the name of reputation for goodness and wisdom.’ 131 Yet, Plato’s account of equality and freedom here, with his emphasis on election of political leaders rather than rotation of magistrates by lot, made the Athenian regime more like a modern representative government or even a Greek oligarchy rather than a direct democracy. He wrote: the

Athenian government ‘was the same then and now, an aristocracy; we are now governed by the best men and, in the main, always have been since that remote age. One man calls our polity democracy, another some other name that pleases him; in reality, it is government by the best men along with popular consent…There is, rather, one standard: he who is thought wise or good exercises power and holds office.’ 132

While the equalitarian implication of the myth of autochthony was compromised in the

Menexenus , it was further subverted and replaced with the rule of hierarchy in the Republic , where Plato attached to the original myth another tale that divided the fellow citizens of the same ancestry into classes of different ‘metals’. The power of religious beliefs that used to support democratic values was then converted by Plato into justification for the rule of his authoritarian guardians. 133 Plato’s Socrates told the citizens of his ideal city that ‘all of you in

131 Menex. 239a. 132 Menex. 238c-d. Kahn (1963: 226) and Rowe (1989: 252) argue that this definition of the democracy represented Plato’s genuine political ideal, while Coventry (1989: 11-12) and Monoson (2000: 187) believe that it was another mockery of Pericles’ view of the democracy. 133 See also Coventry 1989: 12. 255 the city are certainly brothers’ born of the same mother, ‘but the god, in fashioning those of you who are competent to rule, mixed gold in at their birth; this is why they are most honoured; in auxiliaries, silver; and iron and bronze in the farmers and the other craftsmen.’ 134 iii. Responsibilities for the Civil War and the Reconciliation

Though the Platonic funeral speech in the Menexenus praised the reconciliation as the perfect happy ending of the Athenian civil strife at the end of the fourth century B.C., its account of the civil war and the reconciliation was in effect far less pleasing to the democrats’ ears than were the versions of Xenophon and most orators. In their accounts, the civil war was the conflict between the good democrats and the evil oligarchs. The former were virtuous and victorious, while the latter wicked and defeated. The responsibility for the civil war was put squarely on the oligarchic leaders without a shadow of doubt, if not on all of their supporters as well, whereas the democrats were largely credited with the achievement of the reconciliation. 135 Though the prosecution of the oligarchic supporters was prohibited by the amnesty, the civil war was still remembered as the glorious victory of virtuous democracy over evil oligarchy in terms of intelligence, morality, military strength and divine favour.

Plato’s account, by contrast, put the roles of the democrats and oligarchs in the civil war on exactly the same terms. Both the parties were equally innocent of the atrocity of the civil war,

134 Resp. 415a. 135 For Xenophon’s account, see the previous chapter; for an excellent summary and discussion of the public version of the reconciliation, see Wolpert 2002a: 87-99. 256 which was said to be caused not by any citizen’s wickedness or enmity among them, but through misfortune alone. If there should be some people responsible for the civil war, it was every citizen’s responsibility, not just the oligarchs’. Besides, the oligarchic citizens suffered as much as the democrats did, and deserved the same amount of sympathy as granted to the democrats. Likewise, the civil war was ended not as a victory to the democrats, but through equal affection and coordination between the two parties. The reconciliation, rather than the democrats’ mercy on the oligarchs, was therefore mutual forgiveness between the citizens for what they had equally done and equally suffered at each others’ hands.

Following his account of the civil war and the reconciliation, Plato concluded his account with the exhortation that the Athenians should remember not just the killed democrats, but all the citizens, democratic and oligarchic, who had been killed fighting each other in the civil war, and soothe their hatred against each other in Hades. This is odd, to say the least, for a funeral speech was supposed to favour the dead buried on the spot, not their enemies and murderers. Nevertheless, there are reasons for Plato’s exhortation. Presumably, the oligarchs killed in the civil war were neither buried in the same public cemetery, 136 which was ‘in the most beautiful quarter outside the city wall’, 137 nor honoured regularly as the dead democrats were in public funeral speeches and many other state ceremonies such as this one of funeral

136 This is inferred from Plato’s claim that the dead democrats and oligarchs must be reconciled at other occasions. 137 Thuc. 2.34. 257 speeches and many others, 138 for the oligarchs were killed as enemies of Athens or the democracy. Besides, life in Athens for these oligarchs’ families would not be easy. Their parents and children, instead of receiving support and protection from the state as the family of Athenian citizens killed in wars normally did, might from time to time in their daily life encounter suspicion and discrimination for their oligarchic background. Finally, the public memorial and regular commemoration of the victory of the democracy in the civil war did the opposite of soothing the emotions of these oligarchic families. In summary, despite the success of the reconciliation and the amnesty, many oligarchic supporters and their families never felt themselves fully reintegrated into the democratic community, because the civil war was remembered as the struggle between the good democrats and evil oligarchs, and the reconciliation as the victors’ mercy on the defeated.

After giving a lavish list of support, protection and honours that Athens provided for the war dead and their families, the funeral speech concluded that: ‘Quite simply, for the dead she [the city] stands as son and heir, for their sons as a father, for their parents as a guardian; she takes complete and perpetual responsibility for all of them.’ 139 When reading this, we cannot help but wonder: what about the dead oligarchs and their families?

138 Cf. Menex. 249b: ‘The dead themselves she [the city] never fails to honor: every year she herself celebrates for all publicly the rites that are celebrated for each in private, and in addition she holds contests in athletic prowess and horsemanship and in music and poetry of every kind.’ 139 Menex. 294b-c. 258 Plato therefore seemed to suggest here that for the reconciliation to be completed the amnesty or legal prohibition on prosecuting for the past crimes was never enough. The oligarchs were still remembered as enemies rather than fellow citizens. To bring true peace to the memory of the past and genuine harmony to the community, Plato argued, the oligarchic dead must be remembered and honoured in the same ways as were the dead democrats. That is to say, the collective memory of the civil war and the reconciliation, not to be suppressed into oblivion, should be reinvented as Plato exemplified in his funeral speech: the war should be remembered as a hideous manipulation of supernatural forces for which no citizen should be held responsible, and the reconciliation, rather than condescension of some part of the citizenry to the other, must be a joint enterprise of the same-blooded citizens, democratic or oligarchic, working in unison.

V. The Trial of Socrates

The trial of Socrates was arguably the most influential factor in the formation of Plato’s attitude toward the democracy. After his execution, Socrates was reborn as the hero in most of Plato’s works, and the conflict between Socrates and the democracy, or the relationship between philosophy and politics, became a central theme of his political philosophy. For a person whose political view was mainly based on the democracy’s execution of his beloved mentor, it is understandable why it was so difficult for Plato to reconcile himself with the democracy.

259 Plato’s account of the trial is even more uncompromising than Xenophon’s in a sense.

Though there are many similarities between the two pupils’ defences of Socrates, Xenophon at least made an effort to represent the defendant in line with the traditional norms, while

Plato made his mentor a stubborn character to the utmost degree who put his own divine or philosophical mission before all social expectations. Besides, there is no theory of voluntary death in Plato’s account to excuse the democracy’s execution of Socrates; instead, a myth of an afterworld was added to create a divine substitute for the secular authority of the Athenian court.

Nevertheless, we have also identified a number of Platonic passages that suggested a tendency of reconsideration and reconciliation with the democracy over its execution of Socrates. As we have seen in his treatment of the law reform and the reconciliation, Plato was at times willing to express views that appeared to be more sympathetic to the democracy than was his intellectual elitism, even on issues such as the trial of Socrates. To give a fuller account of

Plato’s view on the trial of Socrates, we would not only discusses his defiant defence of

Socrates against the charges by his accusers and his response to his mentor’s defeat in the

Athenian law court in the Apology , but also draws attention to those passages that indicated a less obvious side of his view on this important issue.

260 i. The Defence of Socrates

At the beginning, there should be a few words about the interpretive position regarding the

Apology that separates my view from some main commentators. 140 Firstly, as mentioned in the previous chapter on the trial of Socrates, I argue that the Apology is a sophisticated mixture of facts and fiction rather than a factual report of what the historical Socrates had said in the law court. Secondly, it should be noted that the purpose of the Apology was not to serve as a law court defence in searching for the defendant’s personal acquittal in the court.

There was no point for Plato to do this after the execution of Socrates. Instead, his Apology should be considered as a post-trial justification for the posthumous reputation of Socrates and his philosophical way of life against the infamy caused by his defeat and condemnation in the law court. 141 Thirdly, given its apologetic nature, we should be cautious about Socrates’ repetitive claim in the Apology that he was an artless speaker and would say nothing other than the truth. His claim, rather than an honest announcement, was more likely a defensive response to the accusation of him being a cunning sophist, as Leo Strauss pointed out:

140 E.g. I disagree with Brickhouse and Smith over most of their conclusions due to the difference in interpretive presumptions. 141 This is actually the position taken by most commentators. Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 37-8. For recent examples of this view, see Danzig 2003: 281, Metcalf 2004: 160. In contrast to Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 38) who claim that they will ‘try to show how the Platonic Socrates’ own moral and religious commitments, announced in the Apology but also to be found in other early dialogues, require him to undertake a sincere and effective defense to his jury.’ 261 Socrates’ accusers had said that he is a clever speaker, and it was generally

believed that he was a most artful speaker—that he could render the weaker

speech the stronger (18b8-c1). It was therefore imperative that he should

state right at the beginning that he will not speak artfully…he can speak

artfully.’ 142

Lastly, there should be no presumption of Socrates’ innocence, justice or altruism. The philosopher might as well have been a person of integrity to the highest level as Plato claimed in the Apology . However, there is simply no sufficient evidence to prove that. It is risky to base our interpretation of the Apology on such convictions as Brickhouse and Smith claim, that Socrates ‘must do everything within his power compatible with law and morality to make the truth known to the jurors about the real nature of the activities for which he has been brought before them.’ 143 On the contrary, we should be cautious of the danger indicated by another scholar that ‘motivated by our own pious feelings toward Socrates , we may distort

Socrates’ philosophical activities by inadvertently smuggling non-eudaemonistic altruism and suspiciously Christian charity into his motives.’ 144

142 Strauss 1976: 39. In this insightful article Strauss proved that the Apology is in fact full of deception and inconsistency. In contrast to Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 39-41. 143 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 43. 144 Metcalf 2004: 149 with original emphasis. See also West (1979: 10) that ‘my chief complaint against the writings of contemporary scholars on the dialogue concerns their general assumption that Socrates was right and Athens wrong.’ 262 It might also help to remind the readers that the main purpose of this section is not to judge the justice of the trial of Socrates, but to evaluate the persuasiveness of Plato’s defence of

Socrates in the Apology in light of the historical background that we have learnt in the previous chapters. We start with the religious defence and then discuss the political ones.

1. Religious defence

The denial of the Athenian gods : Contrary to this accusation, Plato portrayed Socrates as a favourite of the gods who devoted himself to the service of them. Socrates was said to start his critical examination of himself and others after the oracle of Apollo at Delphi announced that no one was wiser than he. 145 His claim, though not well known to the public, was supported by a brother of his friend, Chaerephon, who was also a well-known democrat.

Pondering over the implication of the oracle, Socrates came to the conclusion that the god was using him to teach people a moral lesson: human beings should not be complacent with their wisdom which was actually worthless compared to the gods’. In Socrates’ view, the oracle seemed to say: ‘this man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless.’ 146 Socrates, following his interpretation, occupied himself with the

145 Pl. Ap. 20e ff. This is the impression that most readers would have from the oracle story. As Metcalf (2004: 145-6) notices, one of Plato’s defensive strategies was to claim that Socrates himself made no decision, but was ordered by higher authorities. On the other hand, it is highly plausible that Socrates had already made a name for himself as a wise man in Athens through his elenctic practice and other intellectual activities, which could be the reason why Chaerephon raised his question to the Delphic oracle. For further discussion, see McPherran 1996: 214 ff. 146 Pl. Ap. 23b. 263 mission that he thought was imposed on him by the god, to the extent of neglecting his own private business and traditional social and political obligations imposed on Athenian adult male citizens. He said:

So even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me—and I go

around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I

do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is

not wise. Because of this occupation, I do not have the leisure to engage in

public affairs to any extent, nor indeed to look after my own, but I live in great

poverty because of my service to the god. 147

This oracle story was problematic as a defence against the charge of not recognizing the

Athenian gods for the following reasons. Firstly, the amount of evidence that Socrates had provided was barely sufficient for such an unusual story. As Strauss pointed out, ‘the truth of the story is guaranteed, not by the god, not by the Pythia, nor even by Chairephon, who is no longer alive, but by Chairephon’s brother. The story of the Delphic oracle is new to the audience.’ 148 Stokes even suggests that it was a convenient invention, saying that ‘the

147 Pl. Ap. 23b. 148 Strauss 1976: 41. 264 function of the oracle appears to be the provision of a rhetorically plausible account of

Socrates’ way of life without detailed and necessarily lengthy argument in its favour.’ 149

Secondly, the story, even if true, did not actually answer the charge of not recognizing the

Athenian gods, that is, defying the established religious practice and belief. Instead, Socrates evaded the charge by changing the definition of piety from following the established religious practices to devoted pursuit of his personal divine mission. While Xenophon mentioned at least Socrates’ regular offerings at the public altar, Plato’s Socrates unapologetically plagued the inhabitants of Athens with loaded questions that exposed their nothingness, claiming that his way of life was the most pious way of paying tribute to the gods. It is even doubtful that he participated in the religious activities of the city on any regular basis, since he was so busy with his individual divine mission. 150 While Socrates claimed that he and his eccentric way of life had a mandate from an established oracle, it is unclear how many Athenians believed in this extraordinary story and accepted his definition of piety, or it might be more likely that they considered it one of the barely disguised and most outrageous blasphemies they had ever heard. 151

149 Stoke 1997: 123. For a theory that the oracle story was pure invention, see Stoke 1997: 115-6. For scholars of similar views, see also Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 89n71. In contrast to de Strycker & Slings 1994: 74. 150 Though, as McPherran (2000: 164) indicates, Socrates performed religious practices many times in other Platonic dialogues, Plato did not mention it in the Apology . 151 For a recent example of similar views, see Burnyeat 1997: 138. 265 The last problem is the gap between the oracle story and Socrates’ mission of examining others. Even if we accept the truthfulness of the oracle story and agree that Socrates’ elenchus could be a form of pious activity, the oracle itself still did not grant real support for Socrates’ interpretation. As M. H. Hansen observed, the statement of the oracle that no one was wiser than Socrates does not necessarily mean, as Socrates claimed, that he was the wisest; it could also simply mean that Socrates was only as wise as other people. 152 Besides, as many scholars pointed out, the oracle did not command Socrates to examine others or to expose their ignorance. 153 As Mark McPherran puts it, ‘the report of the Oracle appears to be utterly nonprescriptive, and hence, no source of obligation at all’, and ‘it is understandable that some have found Socrates’ derivation of his alleged divine obligation as analogous to pulling a rabbit from a hat: a rabbit concealed within the hat by the magician himself.’ 154

All these problems of the oracle story not only weaken Plato’s defence against the charge of not recognizing the gods, but also put all of his arguments in the Apology into serious doubt.

As we are going to see in this section, the two pillars of the defence in the Apology for

Socrates and his philosophical way of life were the Delphic oracle and the daimonion which was equally controversial. Without the support of these divine authorities there seems no

152 To my knowledge, M.H. Hanson (1995: 34) was the only scholar who notices this problem. 153 For a list of scholars who dispute the logical connection between the oracle and Socrates’ mission, see McPherran 1996: 211n79. See also Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 90; de Strycker & Slings 1994: 78; Penner 2000; 182; Metcalf 2004: 147-8. 154 McPherran 1996: 211-212. 266 compelling reason for the Athenians to tolerate or honour Socrates for his ‘service’ to the city.

Though Plato did also mention some non-religious reasons, such as Socrates’ moralist motives, his insistence on justice and law, and the beneficial outcome of his elenchus, these arguments acted more like supplements to the religious justification. 155

The introduction of new divinities . Plato’s Socrates did not deny his use of his personal daimonion; on the contrary, he showed if off in front of the jury. He appreciated the daimonion’s warning for him to keep away from public affairs, having found that politics were too intolerant and dangerous for honest people like him. 156 He even considered his irritating speech in the court and the consequent condemnation by the jury a good sign, since the daimonion had no objection about that, as he said: ‘it is impossible that my familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was right.’ 157

On the other hand, according to Plato’s account, Socrates’ daimonion could hardly be a threat to the community due to some of its curious characteristics. The daimonion was said to issue

155 E.g. Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 199-200): ‘Piety provides the crucial premises in his defence against those who would hold against him the fact the he has a following, and that some of its members might draw destructive and inappropriate conclusions from the destructive elements in Socrates’ peculiar form of philosophical activism.’ de Strycker & Sling (1994: 155): ‘Plato places strong emphasis on the fact that it is the god who, through his agency of Socrates, confers a benefit on the Athenians…the divine sign is Socrates’ first line of defence; to be sure, its authority is immediately reinforced by arguments independent of it, but still it appears to have an overriding importance of its own.’ See also Schofield 2006: 26. 156 Pl. Ap. 31e. 157 Pl. Ap. 40a-c. 267 only prohibition rather than instruction. Socrates claimed that it ‘is a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything.’ 158 This claim has the advantage of evading responsibility for many daimonion- related activities or plots of which Socrates might have been accused. While in Xenophon’s version Socrates and his daimonion gave out instructions to other people and were therefore partially responsible for their behaviour, 159 Plato’s Socrates removed such blame from himself and his divine sign.

With such claims mentioned above Plato might have cleared some suspicions of Socrates’ secret cult, but the religious tension between the democracy and Socrates remained especially because of the latter’s tendency to put the order of his private daimonion before secular authorities. For instance, Socrates referred to his daimonion as one of the reasons for his disengagement from the democratic politics and for his outspoken speeches in the law court. 160 By these stories Socrates seemed to tell us two things: one is that the daimonion did not like the democracy, and the other is that he was ready to follow his daimonion rather than the democracy if the two disagreed.

158 Pl. Ap. 31d. 159 Xen. Mem . 1.1.4. 160 Pl. Ap. 31e-32a; 40a-c. 268 Yet, the core of controversy about Socrates’ daimonion, as mentioned in the previous chapters, is its secret nature. The great majority, or all the people except Socrates himself, had absolutely no access to the daimonion, since it appeared only to ‘few or none in the past’. 161

It is a reasonable doubt that the daimonion was Socrates’ invention to crown himself with some supernatural aura. As Brickhouse and Smith put it, ‘even if his jurors accepted what

Socrates says about his daimonion (which doubtless many would not have done), they might worry that Socrates has made a faulty induction.’ 162 Leo Strauss made the point more explicit by saying that Socrates ‘refers to a mysterious power to which everyone must bow and which cannot be asked questions; recourse to the daimonion is needed only for justifying refusals (to act).’ 163

Atheism : Plato’s Socrates defended himself more straightforwardly regarding the charge of atheism. Instead of using curious stories and complicated arguments, he simply denied this charge by calling for witnesses and by pointing out an obvious logical contradiction between the charges of introducing a new cult and of not believing in the existence of divinities. He was confident that no one ever saw him in the practice of natural sciences as he was said to be in Aristophanes’ comedy. He confidently asked the jury to testify to his claim: ‘all those of you who have heard me conversing, and many of you have, should tell each other if anyone of

161 Resp. 496c3-5 in de Strycker & Slings 1994: 155. 162 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 169. 163 Strauss 1976: 47. See also Stokes 1997: 10. 269 you has ever heard me discussing such subjects [natural sciences] to any extent at all.’ 164 On the other hand, he appeared to ridicule successfully his accuser Meletus, saying that he was speaking ‘in riddle and in jest’ by accusing him of believing in divinities but not believing in their existence. 165

Both Plato and Xenophon put up a good defence against the charge of atheism. However, it should be noted again that Socrates’ belief in his mysterious daimonion and other unconventional ideas, though logically incompatible with atheism, could sometimes give the impression of Socrates being an atheist in the eyes of the public. 166

2. Political defence

Personal enmity against Socrates . There were two kinds of personal bitterness: one was caused by Socrates himself, and the other indirectly by his companions. Plato’s Socrates defended himself with different strategies in respect of the causes of personal enmity. 167 In response to the first kind of enmity, he said that he had incurred immense hatred from many people because of the humiliation they had suffered under his critical examination. 168 He

164 Pl. Ap. 19c. However, Socrates’ claim here is contrary to his statement in Phadeo 96a-c: ‘when I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it exists.’ 165 Pl. Ap. 27c-d. 166 See the previous chapter. 167 His strategies, as we will see below, were not only used against the charge of personal hatred but also against the other two political charges. 168 Pl. Ap. 22e-23a. 270 argued that this kind of hatred was wholly unjustifiable, since his practice was a divine mission sanctioned by the Delphic oracle, 169 not motivated by plots, material gains or other blameworthy considerations. Besides, he claimed that his mission was to benefit the

Athenians, not to hurt them. 170 Finally, he suggested that those people deserved humiliation not by him but by their own arrogance and ignorance. He never meant to flaunt his intelligent superiority at his interlocutors’ cost. On the contrary, he claimed to search sincerely for someone who was wiser than he.

As to the other kind of enmity caused by his followers, he seemed unable to deny the harm that his associates or followers had done to others and to the city. However, he denounced any responsibility for their behaviour. He admitted that some young fellows, having learnt his skill of questioning during their association with him, went on harassing people, enjoying seeing their victims irritated and humiliated. Socrates confessed that there was indeed pleasure in this operation; yet, he immediately emphasised an essential difference between his practice and his associates’ imitation. While there was an element of hubris in the others’

169 Pl. Ap. 23a-b. See also his famous metaphor of being a gadfly in Ap. 30e: ‘I was attached to this city by the god…as upon a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to be stirred by a kind of gadfly.’ 170 Pl. Ap. 30a, 38a. 271 behaviour, what he did was a deadly serious divine mission. He alone had the mandate from the god. 171 He said:

As they listen they take pleasure in the examination of people who think they

are wise, but are not. It is, indeed, not unpleasant. But I, as I say, have been

ordered by the god to do this, both in oracles and in dreams and in every way

in which any other divine dispensation has commanded a man to do anything

at all. 172

However, those bully-boys indeed learned their elenctic skill from no one else but Socrates.

Should he not be held partially responsible for their behaviour? Socrates denied this, arguing that his examination of others was an individual pursuit of a divine mission, not a pedagogic

171 The uniqueness of Socrates’ divine mandate, surprisingly, reveals a religious aspect of Socrates’ or Plato’s philosophical elitism, as opposed to the intellectual one. Can we infer that the Philosopher-king rules not only because of his superior knowledge, but also due to his exclusive divine favour? This question would constitute a profound difficulty for the pupils of Socrates. The numberless people who claim to practise Socratic elenchus in ancient and modern times might have to explain whether they have the divine sanction that Socrates had. McPherran ( 1996: 80) puts up a complicated theory based on the presumption of the philanthropic intention of the divinities and the beneficial function of philosophy, arguing that ‘since the gods are wholly good, it is a compelling hypothesis that they desire our virtuous happiness…Since philosophical activity in both its constructive (i.e. truth-establishing, belief-warranting) and destructive (i.e. elenctic, inconsistent-belief-showing) modes aims at the production of this, and since our service to the gods would seem to call for us to satisfy their desires, philosophical activity is pious.’ However, both of his presumptions are not without serious disputes. Besides, his effort to generalize philosophical activities is simply at odds with the intention of Ap. 33c where Socrates maintained that other people’s imitation of his elenchus had no support from the gods. 172 Pl. Ap. 33c. Stokes’ translation (1997). 272 project. 173 He was not a teacher and taught nothing, but people learned his interrogative skill by observing his interaction with others. He never encouraged them; on the contrary, he claimed to help the city by constraining some of the young people from using his method on the public. 174 He concluded that

I have never come to an agreement with anyone to act unjustly, neither with

anyone else nor with any one of those who they slanderously say are my

pupils. I have never been anyone’s teacher. If anyone, young or old, desires

to listen to me when I am talking and dealing with my own concerns, I have

never begrudged this to anyone, but I do not converse when I receive a fee

and not when I do not. I am equally ready to question the rich and the poor if

anyone is willing to answer my questions and listen to what I say. And I

cannot justly be held responsible for good or bad conduct of these people, as I

never promised to teach them anything and have not done so. If anyone says

that he has learned anything from me, or that he heard anything privately that

the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the truth. 175

173 Pl. Ap. 33a-b. 174 Pl. Ap. 39d. Cf. Xen. Mem . 1.2.26-28. 175 Pl. Ap. 32a-b. 273 This explanation by Plato is similar to Xenophon’s in their claims of Socrates’ beneficial motivation and his rightful innocence of other people’s behaviour, though Plato’s account has a stronger religious flavour by connecting Socrates’ elenctic practice to the Delphic oracle.

How persuasive was Socrates’ defence against this charge? It seems not very successful. As to his account of the enmity aroused by him personally, the main problem is that Socrates justified himself by claiming himself an agent of the Delphic god, a story that, as argued earlier in this section, was highly controversial, if not untrue. Therefore, Socrates’ repetitive mentioning of his divine mission, instead of making a compelling case, had a hollow ring.

Even worse is that it produced a knock-on effect on the credibility of his other claims. If the suspicious oracle story was Socrates’ chief justification, the reader has reasons to doubt the truth of his altruism and his service to the city. At the end, the only plausible justification left seems to be the argument that those victims of Socrates’ elenchus deserved their share of public humiliation due to their own complacency, or simply because of their defeat by

Socrates in the game of elenchus.

As to the harm and enmity caused by his followers, Socrates denied any serious collaboration between him and his associates. He was alone on his divine mission while other people came to him and left as they wished. He also claimed that there was a critical difference between his elenchus and his followers’ imitation: his, again, a divine mission while others’ was

274 derision for the sake of pleasure. This strategy of defence in fact caused more trouble than it solved. At first, the evidence for Socrates’ close association with a particular group of people was too obvious to be denied, and their relationship, as we found in Plato’s and Xenophon’s works, went much deeper than the casual interaction between acquaintances. The relationship between Socrates and the followers, as Socrates said, might not have been that of teachers and paying pupils; yet, that does not exclude the possibility that he exacted other forms of reward, such as loyalty and company, from his young and beautiful friends.

Therefore, there was a need for Socrates to denounce his companions even further by saying that their behaviour was an abuse of his elenctic method in search of pleasure at other people’s expense. ‘It is, indeed, not unpleasant.’ confessed Socrates. 176 These words, in my opinion, turn out to be the most revealing sentence in the Apology and indicate the other side of Socrates’ divine mission. Did Socrates ever enjoy his mission? And if he did, was the enjoyment, instead of his suspicious divine mandate, the true reason for his relentless examination of others? Though Socrates utterly denied that his behaviour was for the sake of pleasure, not a few commentators suspect that he did enjoy it. For instance, de Strycker and

Slings observed that Socrates’ distinction between his elenchus and others’ imitation is ‘not entirely satisfactory’. 177 Strauss wrote: ‘it is not unpleasant not only for possibly frivolous

176 Pl. Ap. 33c. 177 de Strycker & Slings 1994: 171. 275 youths but simply; it is not unpleasant for Socrates himself.’ 178 Metcalf writes: ‘there is something gratifying… in witnessing someone’s inflated opinion of himself being deflated publicly.’ 179

The Apology 33c, therefore, constituted a difficulty for scholars who are sympathetic to

Socrates’ elenctic activity. Its divine sanction was suspicious, and now it could not even be differentiated from teenagers’ hubristic behaviour. Emile De Strycker and S.R. Slings tried to solve the problem by repeating Socrates’ altruistic motive, saying that ‘we can see that what inspires him is something quite different: it is the concern for the well-being of others, and quite especially of his fellow citizens that motivates Socrates.’ 180 More commentators take a much bolder strategy. They suggest that despite the nature of his intention Socrates’ examination of others was justified as long as the consequence was good for the people involved. For instance, McPherran writes: ‘there is no obligation to undergo the elenctic examination of an ill-intentioned Sophist unless (oddly enough) there promises to be a net gain in virtue for all.’ 181 Robert Metcalf, pointing out the elenctic effect as described in the

Sophist of restoring one’s sense of shame by purging his complacency, suggests that ‘the

Eleatic Stranger does not address the enjoyment one has in subjecting others to elenchus, but

178 Strauss 1976: 48. 179 Metcalf 2004: 154. 180 de Strycker & Slings 1994: 144. 181 McPherran 1996: 241. 276 such enjoyment would not, in any case, diminish its cathartic effect, for some degree of moral improvement comes out of the encounter.’ 182 Brickhouse and Smith even come to maintain that those malicious imitations of Socrates’ companions could also bring benefits to their victims. They said: ‘though… there is no suggestion that in doing so they recognize their practice as a religious mission, there is equally no suggestion that in imitating Socrates they inevitably somehow fall significantly short of obtaining the same result he had obtained.’ 183

However, this mode of consequentialist interpretation has the effect of confusing the distinction of the good elenchus by Socrates himself and the bad imitation by others, a difference that Socrates maintained in the Apology 33c. Another problem is that we can hardly find anyone in the ancient sources whose moral status had been improved through

Socrates’ elenchus. On the contrary, we see many vicious characters conversing with

Socrates in Plato’s and Xenophon’s works. The need for Socrates to denounce his associates’ behaviour in the Apology speaks loudly about the degree of their corruption. It is certainly arguable that Socrates should not be responsible for the crimes his associates had committed; yet, the point is that he seemed unable to justify his philosophical life with the claim that it had produced positive influence on his associates, the fellow citizens, or the city.

182 Metcalf 2004: 154. 183 Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 28. For their non-religious consequentialist justification of Socratic elenchus, see Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 16-29. 277 Subversion against the democracy . Discussion of this charge is divided into two sub- categories: Socrates’ view of the democracy and his personal association with the oligarchs.

Socrates gave different defences regarding these two issues. He did not conceal his criticism of democratic values, but strongly denied any involvement in the oligarchic regime of the

Thirty, since his practice was well beyond any considerations of partisan politics.

Plato’s distrust of the demos’ ability to deliberate over public business was as obvious in the

Apology as in his other works. He named the three most important institutions of the democracy: the law courts, the council and the assembly, suggesting that they were ruining the young generation rather than improving their true interests. 184 In his elitist view, it was only the professionals, who could only be a few, who knew how to accomplish such an important and difficult task.

Furthermore, Socrates’ metaphor of the experts and the ignorant bore a dangerous hint that violence could sometimes be a justified tool for suppressing the popular demand for participation in the government. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Xenophon tried to gloss over this issue with the theory that Socrates used only the peaceful means of persuasion

184 Pl. Ap. 24e-25b. The implication of intellectual elitism in this passage is obvious, though Brickhouse & Smith (1994: 165-6) argue that Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge suggests his disapproval of all despotic forms of government. They argue that if even Socrates, who was the wisest, could not be knowledgeable, no one else could claim to rule according to the true knowledge. Hence, no government could legitimately suppress the people in the name of true knowledge. 278 in pursuing his political ideas. Plato said little on this issue in the Apology , and in his other works he even seemed to argue that the means of violence was justifiable when necessary. 185

As to his political association Socrates applied the same tactic he used in denouncing his responsibility for his companions’ abuse of his elenchus. He maintained that he was an outsider of both democratic and oligarchic causes, since neither of them could come up to his moral calibre. He mentioned that while many people in the city collaborated with the Thirty during their reign of terror, he refused to follow their order to arrest an innocent person for execution, disregarding the risk of death. 186 Besides, though he admitted that he was often surrounded by people from oligarchic backgrounds, he was never biased towards the rich people. On the contrary, they came to him and left as they wished just like everyone else. 187

Socrates said that he was not with the democracy, but rather with law and justice. He did mention his dutiful military service under the democracy, saying that ‘I had, like anyone else,

185 Admittedly, the hint of violence is less strong in the Apology since those who were to be put under discipline were not the adult citizens but their younger generation. In most of Plato’s works it is usually the people themselves who should be disciplined. The most obvious passage supporting the means of violence is Plt. 296b ff, though the context there indicates Plato’s significant reservation about this radical but logical conclusion. See the discussion on the written laws in this chapter. See also Prt. 319d; Grg. 521e-a; Resp. 540e-541a, 557a-569, etc. Contra. the resolute denouncement of violence in Ep. 7 330c-d: ‘let him [the philosopher] not use violence upon his fatherland to bring about a change of constitution. If what he thinks is best can only be accomplished by the exile and slaughter of men, let him keep his peace and pray for the welfare of himself and his city.’ 186 Pl. Ap. 32d. 187 Pl. Ap. 23c. 279 remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered me.’ 188 He also mentioned one of his close friends who had joined the democratic revolt against the Thirty. 189

Yet, he claimed that he himself would never obey the democracy if it committed anything wrong. He pointed out his single-handed confrontation with the wrath of the crowd during the infamous trial of the generals in 406, addressing the jury that he would ‘run any risk on the side of law and justice rather than join you, for fear of prison or death, when you were engaged in an unjust course.’ 190

In summary, Socrates claimed that, as he was not responsible for his followers’ anti-social behaviour, neither was he responsible for their anti-democratic plots. 191 He was alone in his divine mission sanctioned by the god to help Athens, following the daimonion’s warning and his own prudence. He was not a democratic partisan, nor did he have any private relationship with the oligarchs, be it based on political, financial or any other motivations. Though there were constant flows of people followed him and imitated his practice, he was not willingly involved in any of their activities, and therefore should not be responsible for their crimes.

188 Pl. Ap. 28e. 189 Pl. Ap. 21a. 190 Pl. Ap. 32b-c. Vlastos suspected that Socrates did not live up to his own claim here, given the fact that there was no record of Socrates’ opposition of the Athenian imperialism and other injustices. Turner 1998. 191 Pl. Ap . 39d. 280 Socrates’ defence against the accusation of his anti-democratic association was basically the same as he said in denying his responsibility for his followers’ other culpable behaviour, and was therefore equally problematic in convincing the audience. However, there should be some credit given to Socrates for the courage and integrity that he had shown on the two occasions mentioned above during the democracy and the reign of the Thirty. Both the illegality of the trial of the generals and the injustice of the Thirty had been well recognized by the public by the time Socrates was on trial. Besides, contrary to what happened in his religious stories, there were many witnesses who could testify to Socrates’ words and the amount of danger involved in the two cases. His opposition to the political authorities on these occasions, as he himself claimed, did constitute ‘great proofs’ of his integrity. 192

The corruptor of the traditional norms . This charge of corruptor, as mentioned in chapter four, included the other charges of impiety, personal hatred and subversion of the democracy.

Plato’s defence against this charge was therefore intertwined with the arguments used in response to other charges. For instance, there were claims to justify Socrates’ behaviour, such as his divine mandate, the benevolent motivation and his independence of all closed relationships and partisan groups that excused him from the responsibility for the crimes done by his followers; there were also attacks on the accusers, such as the conspiracy theory that the trial was motivated by unjustifiable personal hatred rather than by genuine considerations

192 Pl. Ap. 32a; Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 193. 281 of the common good. All these strategies were used to refute the corruptor charge as well as other accusations.

There were another three defence strategies that are more relevant to the corruptor charge than to other charges. The first two of them disputed the logic of the charge and punishment. The last one called on witnesses to testify to his innocence, but sounded suspicious when considered together with Socrates’ previous claim that anyone who claimed to have learnt from him was lying.

Firstly, Socrates disputed Meletus’ claim that the democracy was credited with the improvement of the young generation while Socrates alone was responsible for their corruption. 193 He argued that the young generation were more likely to have been corrupted by the common people rather than by individuals, since the majority were ignorant of the professional knowledge needed to educate the young.194 This argument of probability was as good as accusing the democracy of being a corrupt regime and of interfering with Socrates’ divine mission.

Secondly, Socrates questioned the validity of the corruptor charge, arguing that no one of sound mind would ever corrupt his fellows deliberately. His arguments ran as follows: to

193 Pl. Ap. 24e ff. 194 The theme that the democracy was the corruptor was repeated and developed in various places in Plato’s other dialogues. See, for example, Resp. 492b-c, Alc.132a, Grg. 513b-c. 282 corrupt someone was to make them worse, and it was in no one’s interest to corrupt his companions, for these people, having become corrupted and worse, would hurt the corruptor in return. Therefore, Socrates argued that if one really corrupted his companions, he must be insane or acting out of ignorance. In either case, he concluded, what a corruptor deserved was not a trial and punishment but help and education. 195 In response to this sophistic defence, the accuser or the jurors might simply have retorted that the death penalty was the most salutary chastisement for his corrupt nature. 196

Lastly, Socrates seemed fully confident that none of his companions or their families would ever testify to the charge of him being a corruptor. He said that all of them and their families were more than ready to help him out in the court. He provided an array of names as his witnesses, including members from both aristocratic and democratic backgrounds. He asked the jury why these people so eagerly came to his rescue if they or their families were ever hurt by him, as the accusers said. This sounded a powerful argument for its logic and the list of

195 Pl. Ap. 25c ff. This argument developed into an important ethic theory in Plato’s other dialogues that no one committed injustice voluntarily. 196 Cf. Resp. 380b: ‘the poet mustn’t be allowed to say that those who pay the penalty are wretched…he should say that the bad men were wretched because they needed punishment and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by the god’. Grg. 480b-d: ‘for someone’s defence for his own injustice, or when his parents or his friends or his children or his native state do injustice… he should denounce most of all himself, then his relatives, and whatever other friend does injustice; and should not conceal the unjust action, but bring it into the open, to pay justice and become healthy…he should pursue the good and find, not counting the pain, but offering himself for flogging, if his unjust action deserves flogging, for prison, if it deserves prison, paying a fine, if it deserves a fine, accepting death, if it deserves death…to have his unjust action exposed and get rid of the greatest evil, injustice.’ 283 witnesses provided. However, put back into context, the argument was not in perfect harmony with what Socrates had said a few lines earlier. Before providing his witnesses,

Socrates denied that he had taught anything to anyone, insisting that ‘if any one says that he has learned anything from me, or that he heard anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the truth.’ 197 His disclaimer seems like a response to a certain specific accusation. A plausible inference we might gain from this is that the accusers also produced their witnesses who testified to Socrates’ teaching or corruption of someone they knew. Socrates was therefore forced to denounce any relationship with those named by the accusers’ witnesses. If this inference is plausible, the actual situation would not be as

Socrates boasted that none of his companions or their families would testify against him in the court.

In summary, the main problems of Plato’s defence of Socrates in the Apology lies in its theological structure in which the divine sanction for Socrates was derived from the stories of the Delphic oracle and his daimonion. With these stories Socrates turned out to be the most pious person in Athens contrary to the accusation of impiety. While the daimonion exempted

Socrates from his duties to participate in the democratic government, the oracle testified to the superiority of Socrates and his way of life, gave him the right to harass or even humiliate people in the streets, and excused him from responsibility for all troubles related to his

197 Pl. Ap. 33b. 284 behaviour, since the god or his loyal agent was by definition inculpable. However, as we have found, the validity of these religious stories was not beyond reasonable doubt, and the moral or political justification Socrates drew from them was equally questionable, if not deceptive. There is no way to prove the existence of the daimonion, and the oracle, if ever having recognized Socrates’ wisdom, did not encourage him to ridicule people in the streets.

The foundation of the whole defence in the Apology for Socrates and his way of life, therefore, seems shaky.

The dubiety of his religious stories also casts a shadow on Socrates’ other claims. How can we believe in his integrity, the altruism of his motivation, the enormous benefit that the city could have received from his service of elenchus, and all other assurances that we hear

Socrates claiming in the Apology , after his apparent exploitation of the popular reverence for the supernatural spheres? There are actually some reasons for the sceptic Athenian audience to believe that Socrates’ elenctic practice had nothing essentially different from his associates’ imitation; both of them aimed for a malicious type of pleasure at their victims’ expense. ii. The Death of Socrates

As argued in the previous chapter, in addition to proving Socrates’ innocence, another important task of Xenophon’s and Plato’s defences was to clear the humiliation of their mentor as a loser in the law court. While in dealing with the task Xenophon argued for

Socrates’ glory in his defeat, denounced the public opinions by appealing to alternative

285 judgements, and worked out the theory of Socrates’ voluntary death, Plato’s strategies include the first two, but had no use for the last one. Besides, he added a myth of afterlife that we do not find in Xenophon’s writings. 198

Firstly, Socrates pronounced that the victory of his accusers was shameful, and his defeat in the law court a moral victory. In his view, the accusers were motivated by unjustifiable personal hatred, 199 and they won the case not because of any truth in their prosecution but mostly due to an entrenched social prejudice against him. 200 Socrates recognized the extreme difficulty of his case, since he was facing a hostile jury already under the profound influence of the prejudice well established decades earlier. Despite his claim that he could easily have won if he had ever compromised himself to adapt the conventional formula for successful defence, that is, to cry and beg for mercy with as many children, relatives and friends as he could have brought into the law court. 201 However, Socrates claimed that he was too proud to make himself such a miserable creature. 202 He reminded the jury of his reputation as a superior in society, saying that they should not expect him to behave in any pitiful way, saying that: ‘if those of you who are considered superior, be it in wisdom or courage or

198 For a similar approach but sometimes different observation, see Danzig 2003: 309-315. 199 See section 5.1.2 of this chapter. 200 Pl. Ap. 18a. 201 Pl. Ap. 34c-35a. 202 However, Danzig (2003: 302) points out that ‘by mentioning his family…Socrates, surprisingly enough, does appeal to his judges for pity in this conventional manner, despite his claims that this would be the wrong thing to do.’ 286 whatever other virtue makes them so, are seen behaving like that, it would be a disgrace.’ 203

His execution was therefore a result of his choice to die with honour rather than to live in disgrace.

Secondly, Socrates also dismissed the thought that public opinion and the jury’s verdicts could do him any harm, referring to his divine mandate and benevolent motivation in pursuing what he had done in his life. 204 Despite most jurors’ disbelief which he himself recognized, he insisted on the truthfulness of what he had said. 205 Compared with Xenophon’s version,

Plato’s claim here was actually more unworldly due to its transcendental tendency. While the latter rejected the humiliation of being defeated by referring to the defendant’s self-assurance regarding his truthfulness and ultimately to the divine intention, the former made an additional appeal to the human judgement of the friends as well as generations other than contemporary

Athenians.

Lastly, a myth of the afterlife came up at the end of Plato’s Apology to relieve the pain of defeat and execution. 206 Considering his future destiny, Socrates said that death was likely one of the following two things: non-existence without any perception left, or departure for

203 Pl. Ap. 35a. 204 This appeal to alternative authorities sometimes developed into unyielding defiance of popular or worldly belief and practice. For instance, Pl. Ap. 29d; Grg. 481b ff. 205 Pl. Ap. 38a. 206 Pl. Ap. 40c ff. The myth of afterworld was also developed in Plato’s other works. For instance, Phd , Cri . 54b, Grg. 523a ff, Resp. 614b ff. 287 another world. Either way, he claimed, was much better than living in this world. In the first case, death, rather than anything abhorrent, was like a dreamless sleep which, Socrates believed, even a great king preferred to his power and wealth in the world. It is even better in the other scenario. Socrates believed that if he was going to another world after his death, that place would be nothing like democratic Athens. There he would receive the just verdict from the true judges composed of legendary sages and demi-gods, enjoy the company of great writers and heroes, and continue his critical examination of other people with no risk of being put to death again. iii. After the Apology

What we have found in Plato’s Apology is a proud Socrates who declared his privileged divine favour as well as his moral and intellectual superiority. With an aloof manner he disclaimed his responsibility for all the troubles caused by his associates, saying that he was too honest to be involved in any social or political activities. Sometimes he even passed the responsibility to the democracy and society. On the other hand, he dismissed the condemnation of the jury, saying that he was by no means to be hurt. He said that death was not a capital punishment but a blessing, for there was a good chance that he was going to a

288 better place where he would be rewarded for his justice by the real judges. In a word, the

Apology , just like Xenophon described, was indeed a megalhgori/a . 207

However, as one major concern of this thesis is to search for philosophical recognition of

Athenian democracy, it might be worth asking: did Plato ever soften his position on the trial and death of Socrates like Xenophon did who, at first, proposed the theory of Socrates’ voluntary death and then replaced his bitterness towards the democracy with sympathetic understanding and forgiveness? This issue is too complex and cannot be discussed in detail here. As the trial of Socrates was one of the defining events in Plato’s life, any reconsideration of this event would inevitably generate profound effects on all his political philosophy. 208 What is provided here then is to draw attention to several important passages in Plato’s other dialogues that indicate some trends of development in his reconsideration of the trial of Socrates. There will be no further discussion in this thesis on related issues raised by these passages due to the limitation of space.

207 In contrast to de Strycker & Slings (1994: 199) who argued that Socrates’ seeming arrogance was not out of his contempt for the people, but was ‘informed by his constant dedication to objectivity and by the certainty that his conversations were both a divine mission and a blessing to Athens.’ However, all Socrates’ claims of supernatural support, altruist motivation and beneficial outcome of his mission in the Apology , as we have seen, are questionable, if not unfounded. 208 Discussion of this issue is often formulated into two issues. The first and more popular one is Plato’s development from a Socratic or elenctic way of life into the construction of an authoritarian or even a totalitarian state. The other development is from his strict criticism of the democracy to the confession of the destructive consequences of Socratic elenchus, the impossibility of true knowledge, and his limited appreciation of the democratic decisions and practices. 289 1. Patriotic values

Firstly, Plato came close to a sympathetic understanding of the imperfect nature of human beings in his interpretation of Simonides in the Protagoras . Plato wrote: ‘I do not seek an utterly blameless man, of us who reap the fruit of broad earth…I shan’t praise anyone for being such a man; it is enough for me if he is in between and does nothing bad, for I praise and love all.’ 209 Following this understanding, it was argued that it was in bad taste to protect his reputation by criticizing his people and the city from a detached moral high ground. A noble person, even when he was wronged, should repress his anger and reconcile himself with his fatherland and fellow citizens. Plato wrote:

An honest man often forces himself to be a friend and praise someone; for

instance, it often happens that a man has an unnatural father or mother, or

country, or something like that. When that happens to bad men ( tou\v

ponhrou&v ) he views it almost with pleasure and makes a great display of

castigating and blaming the shortcomings of his parents or his country, in

order that he himself may not incur any blame or reproach for his neglect of

them, so he berates them even more than need be, and deliberately makes

new enemies on top of those he can’t avoid. But good men ( tou\v a0gaqou\v)

conceals it all and forces himself to praise them, and if he gets angry at his

209 Prt. 346d. 290 unjust treatment by his parents or his country he calms himself down and

makes friends again, forcing himself to love and praise them. 210

This passage of the Protagoras might be seen as providing a negative version of Socratic elenchus, which is to find fault with one’s own country and to make a good display of what he had found. There are several interesting points of comparison between this passage and

Plato’s more positive account in the Apology . Firstly, though the Protagoras also indicates the pleasure of elenchus, its account is somehow different from the version in the Apology .211

While the latter suggests that the pleasure is a psychological result of seeing people humiliated publicly, the former indicates that it could also come from one’s self-justification for one’s dislike of one’s fatherland and the negligence of patriotic obligation. Secondly, while the Apology argues strongly that Socrates should not be blamed for the hatred against him that had been incurred during his elenchus, 212 the Protagoras suggests that he could be responsible for ‘making new enemies on top of those he can’t avoid’. In summary, contrary to the Apology where the elenchus is described as a divine mission and the greatest act of generosity, 213 the Protagoras considers it vulgar rather than noble, since the motivation

210 Prt. 345e-346b. Taylor’s translation with minor revisions. Few scholars take this passage seriously due to the overall ironical tone in the context. However, Frede (1986: 746) argues that, despite its ironical tone, the passage did contain serious ideas that Plato developed further in his other works. 211 See section 5.1.2 of this chapter. 212 See section 5.1.2 of this chapter. 213 See section 5.1 of this chapter. 291 behind that kind of behaviour is ingratitude and other egoistical considerations. For all the faults one has found in one’s own country and the injustice he has suffered in its hands, this passage in the Protagoras suggests that he should still love and praise, turning a blind eye to all the problems and conflicts; a suggestion that might have been demonstrated in the Platonic funeral speech in the Menexenus .

However, this passage is inconclusive. It was suggested as Socrates’ interpretation of

Simonides’ poetry during his contention with Protagoras in which an obvious sense of playfulness existed. 214 Besides, the tolerant and patriotic sentiment recommended in this passage is not in perfect harmony with Plato’s strict criticism of the Athenian demos and its government in the other dialogues, which according to his interpretation of Simonides is behaviour in bad taste. What we can say with certainty is that Plato was familiar with theories of tolerance and forgiveness, though he might not have accepted them.

2. The corruption of Socratic philosophy

Secondly, Plato readdresses the issue of Socrates’ responsibility for his associates’ behaviour in greater details in the Republic where the issue was formulated as the following argument.

Adeimantus challenges Socrates:

214 e.g. Guthrie 1975: 227. ‘Socrates, who sees no point in taking moral lessons from a poet instead of working them out for oneself, feels entitled to treat the subject with outrageous levity.’ 292 Now someone might say that in speech he can’t contradict you at each

particular thing asked, but in deed he sees that of all those who start out on

philosophy—not those who take it up for the sake of getting educated when

they are young and then drop it, but those who linger in it for a longer time—

most become quite queer, not to say completely vicious; while the ones who

seem perfectly decent, do nevertheless suffer at least one consequence of the

practice you are praising—they become useless to the city. 215

Socrates’ answer, at first, was similar to the strategy used in the Apology . He claimed that philosophy had absolutely nothing to do with evil and crimes, for it was by definition the pursuit of truth. Philosophers minded only their own business and kept themselves away from partisan activities. They did not corrupt young people; instead, the young were corrupted because of themselves, their relatives, the democracy and the whole society. 216

However, Socrates himself then admitted that philosophy itself was a highly precarious business. He said: ‘How a city can take philosophy in hand without being destroyed. For surely all great things carry with them the risk of a fall, and, really as the saying goes, fine

215 Resp. 487c-d. 216 Resp. 488a ff. 293 things are hard.’ 217 He recognized the destructive effect of his elenctic practice against the established norms. He said: 218

When a question is posed and comes to the man who is so disposed, ‘What is

the fair?’—and after answering what he heard from the lawgiver, the argument

refutes him, and refuting him many times and in many ways, reduces him to

the opinion that what the law says is no more fair than ugly, and similarly

about the just and good and things he held most in honor—after that, what do

you suppose he’ll do about honouring and obeying as rulers the things he

heard from the lawgiver?

The answer to this question is that the practitioners of Socratic elenchus became dangerous nihilists.

When they themselves refute many men and are refuted by many, they fall

quickly into a profound disbelief of what they formerly believed. 219

217 Resp. 497d. 218 Resp . 538d-e. 219 Resp. 539b-c. The importance of this passage has been noticed by Nussbaum (1980: 88) who said that ‘Plato charges his teacher with contributing to moral decline by not restricting the questioning processing to a chosen, well-trained few. Socrates is too optimistic about the potential of man for understanding and moral growth.’ See also Bobonich (2002: 498n86) that ‘the bad effects that the passage ascribes to the use of the elenchus involving those under 30 explicitly include the bad effects of having it practiced on them (see 538a-539a and especially, 539b9-c1). Establishing the precise age limit is not important for the issue at hand, however, since the passage does restrict the elenchus to those who have undergone the Republic’s extensive mathematic education (537c-d).’ 294 Furthermore, he was once afraid that his practice of philosophy would turn in a sinful direction and make him an involuntary murderer. 220 He only prayed that he might be excused with the reason that his crime was only an unintended consequence of his honesty. He said:

To speak knowing the truth, among prudent and dear men, about what is

greatest and dear, is a thing that is safe and encouraging. But to present

arguments at a time when one is in doubt and seeking—which is just what I

am doing —is a thing both frightening and slippery. It’s not because I’m afraid

of being laughed at—that’s childish—but because I’m afraid that in slipping

from the truth where one least ought to slip, I’ll not only fall myself but also

drag my friends down with me. I prostrate myself before Adrasteia, Glaucon,

for what I’m going to say. I expect that it’s a lesser fault to prove to be an

On the other hand, some scholars aim to solve the apparent tension between Plato’s observation in the Republic 539b-c and Socrates street style of elenchus in the Socratic dialogues. Irwin (1995: 277) argues that Plato did not propose an overall ban of elenchus among the young people. He says what Plato meant here was only to limit the use of elenchus by people under the age of 30, but this group of people still needed to be examined elenctically like people of different ages. Guthrie (1975: 527n1) argued that Plato only meant to prohibit bad ways of elenchus, not the type of elenchus exemplified by Socrates, which should always be beneficial. Scott (1999: 33-34) argues that it was the young people’s desire for vulgar pleasure, not the practice of elenchus itself, that corrupted them. Both Guthrie and Scott seem to follow the approach used in the Apology 33c where Socrates distinguished his good practice of elenchus, which was a divine mission, from others bad imitation which was said to be in search of pleasure. 220 Cf Bloom (1991: 311) suggested that the drama of the Republic started with Socrates being caught by a dead victim of the Thirty. Socrates was then forced to defend himself for his responsibility for the terror of the Thirty. 295 unwilling murderer of someone than a deceiver about fine, good, and just

things in laws. 221

With such recognition of the danger of philosophy, the Socratic way of life could no more be a free exercise open to everyone in public places as described in the Apology . Though Plato might have still insisted on the innocence of Socrates, he would not approve his mentor’s street style of elenchus. Instead, philosophy became in the Republic and the Laws the most selective and secret practice that was accessible only to a very small elitist group who must have been proved talented, experienced and mature in addition to many other qualifications. 222

Besides, the minimum age for the admission into philosophic education was thirty; all younger people were thus rejected for their immaturity. We should never find in Plato’s ideal cities the scene of an old Socrates ‘whispering with three or four boys in a corner’. 223

3. The sovereignty of law

The last but not the least is the theory of obedience to the laws in the Crito .224 While in the

Apology Socrates used to counter the democracy and the city by citing the higher authorities

221 Resp. 450d-451a with emphasis added. 222 For instances, Resp. 494a, 536a-b, 539b ff; Leg. 951d ff. 223 Grg. 485e. 224 Another important passage about the trial of Socrates and the laws is Plt. 297d-303b. For discussion of this passage, see section 3.2.2-4 of this chapter. The relationship between the Apology and Crito is a complicated issue of many debates. I only point out the change of tone and emphasis in the Apology and Crito , but does not argue the consistency or inconsistency between the two Platonic works. For recent discussion and bibliography 296 of divinity and morality which he believed were on his side, in the Crito at least the laws now came to the aid of the city and the democracy. 225 To be sure, the laws had no dispute over

Socrates’ innocence, but argued that Socrates should obey them and accept his execution even when the jury’s verdict was grossly unjust.

The main argument ran as follow. 226 The city and the laws deserved full respect and obedience from the citizens, for they, just like parents, gave birth, nurtured and educated the citizens. Besides, the city was far from being a tyranny. If citizens disagreed with the laws or instruction of the city they were given the chance to change them by persuasion. Even when the citizens failed or did not want to persuade, or for whatever reason they were dissatisfied with the city, they were free to leave. However, for those who remained within the city, they were bound by an agreement with the city: they should either persuade the city to change or follow its laws and orders. Socrates was born and grew up in the city. He fully understood the government of the city, but still stayed in Athens all his life when he was free to go. He was given the chance to persuade the jury of his innocence, but failed. He therefore had no excuse to escape his execution.

on this issue, see, e.g., Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 143 ff; de Strycker & Slings 1994: 158; Penner 2000: 184-9; Danzig 2006. 225 The law and justice in the Apology 32c were not necessarily the laws in the Crito . The former could be transcendental principles such as the natural law and moral conscience while the latter were the traditional and written norms in force in Athens. In any case, the atmosphere changed in the Crito . The lawful authority was now on the side of the democracy while Socrates did not argue his case by citing any natural or moral law. 226 Cri . 50aff. 297 The three passages discussed above might be seen as part of Plato’s effort to understand and alleviate the conflict between philosophy and politics. The distinction between good and bad persons in the Protagoras emphasised the value of sympathetic understanding of human nature, arguing that philosophy should not be used as a cynical excuse to deny one’s civil responsibility. The readdressing of the corruptor issue in the Republic admitted the dangerous side-effects produced in the practice of philosophy that needed to be put under careful control.

The speech of the laws in the Crito maintained that for whatever reason they had, individual citizens had no right to dismiss the regulation of the laws single-handed, for the laws, based on the principle of reciprocity and agreement between the community and its members, should not be changed without the consent of the community.

IV. Conclusion i.

We have proved in this chapter that there is an alternative tradition of Plato’s political thought that, compared to his basic position of intellectualist elitism, is more sympathetic to the

Athenian democratic way of life. This alternative tradition has been demonstrated in this chapter through our investigation of Plato’s responses to three important historical events in

Athens at the end of the fifth century B.C.: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of

Socrates.

298 In the discussion of the democracy’s law reform, we have found Plato’s recognition of the democracy’s participatory practices. For instance, the institution of assembly, for all its defects, could help maintain the stability of the laws. Rhetoric or the art of public persuasion, instead of being corruptive deception, was here an efficient tool for the education of the people and the execution of the laws. The law courts at the local level should be composed of common citizens, and Plato here agreed with the democracy that to be a citizen was to participate in public affairs.

On the other hand, Plato put up a case for the democracy’s trust in the written laws rather than in political experts. Experts with true political knowledge were hard to find, if not impossible, and if they were available, there was popular suspicion that they might abuse people’s trust to their own advantage. Given such sceptic considerations, the people had reason to believe that it was safer to specify the form and content of the ruling power in writing before they granted anyone the power of government. Furthermore, after the laws had been written down and were in force a more important task is to make sure that the government follow the written laws as strictly as possible. No violation of the laws should be tolerated, for Plato argued that, though the written laws were always inflexible and had all the other deficiencies as an imperfect product of popular opinion, strict compliance with the laws had the invaluable advantage of preventing them being abused by dishonest magistrates, which was a much more worrying consequence especially when the laws had now been endowed with great authority.

299 In the end, Plato concluded that the observance of the written laws itself constituted another criterion of good government in addition to his intellectualism. Some law-abiding regimes did enjoy surprisingly long-term stability, even though their laws were full of misconception and corruption compared to the rule of true expertise.

As to the democracy’s reconciliation project, we have also found Plato’s positive response in his Menexenus 243e-244b. Contrary to many scholars’ view, there is actually no sign of scepticism or cynicism about the success of the reconciliation or the democracy’s hidden motivations in Plato’s account of this important event in this dialogue. Neither is Plato’s account here a mockery of the Athenian democrats’ complacency by exaggerating their reconciliatory achievement to a ridiculous level. Compared to other contemporary accounts which almost unanimously condemned the oligarchs for the civil war and extolled the democrats alone for the post-war peacemaking, Plato alone raised the oligarchs to a position perfectly equal to the democrats by playing down the latter’s leading role in the reconciliation. 227 Therefore, it appears that there were in fact serious messages beyond the ironic tone of the dialogue. Plato recognized the democracy’s self constraint in not prosecuting the oligarchs after their victory in the civil war; however, he also maintained that that was not enough to create true harmony in Athens, for the bitterness of the civil strife was still much alive in the citizens’ memory and public rituals. He believed that there was a need

227 The Athenian Politeia is also sympathetic to the oligarchic citizens excluding the Thirty. 300 for the Athenians to go further along the reconciliatory path by revising their collective memory of the past. That is, as he had demonstrated in his rosy story, the civil war should be remembered as sheer misfortune for which no citizen should be held responsible, and the reconciliation as the equal co-operation of all the citizens rather than the democrats’ forgiveness of the oligarchs.

A sympathetic trend of thinking can be found even in Plato’s account of the trial of Socrates.

While Plato portrayed an innocent and uncompromising Socrates in the Apology who swore to go on with his divine mission even if the democracy issued an injunction against his critical examination of citizens, he had second thoughts on the relationship between philosophy and the democracy in his other dialogues. In the Protagoras he mentioned a theory of filial obedience to the verdict of one’s own country no matter how wrong it was. Furthermore, in the Republic , he even recognized the corrupt effect of Socratic elenchus, suggesting that the art of elenchus should only be practised among small groups of selected well-trained elites, contrary to Socrates’ indiscriminate style. Finally, in the Crito as well as in the Statesman he provided justification for rule by the established laws, arguing that the authority of the laws must be protected even at the cost of the philosopher’s life. ii.

What should we make of the discrepancy between Plato’s basic position of intellectual elitism and his sympathetic understanding of the direct democracy that we have found in this chapter?

301 A common solution to this difficult question would be certain developmental scenarios that

Plato revised his criticism of Athenian democracy as this popular government proved its competence through time, or simply because he grew older and more experienced. This is highly plausible. However, we can not go much further than this general presumption and, as many scholars did, arrange Plato’s works into different stages of his life, each of which has its own set of philosophical principles and ethic values. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, we do not have enough reliable information for such detailed reconstruction of the relationship between Plato’s life and works. Besides, we have often found that the conflicting claims of elitist criticism and appreciation of the democracy coexist in the same Platonic works. This happens in many of his political works, including the Republic , Statesman and

Laws . It seems futile to divide Plato’s political works into different stages of development regarding his attitude toward the Athenian democracy.

Therefore, it is better not to use developmental models, but provide only a thematic account of

Plato’s compromise with the democracy, especially with its participatory way of life. In summary, this account consists of the following four parts.

The first part is Plato’s re-examination of his intellectualism that one’s claim to political power should only be based on his possession of knowledge. The first problem with the intellectualism is the extreme scarcity and elusiveness of true political knowledge. 228 The

228 See section 3.2.2 of this chapter. 302 attempt to rule a city according to true knowledge would be impracticable if such intelligence could not be found, or if found, how could one prove its authenticity? Another problem is that the intellectualist criterion might be set at such a high level that some valuable aspects of practical politics would not receive their fair share of attention. For instance, the long-term stability of some actual regimes presented a ‘wonder’ to the intellectualist minds, for, by their prediction, such regimes were corrupt and should have collapsed into chaos of lawlessness long ago. 229 Last but not least, the essential part of the intellectualist training or Socratic elenchus might produce nihilistic side-effects. There is a true danger that the procedure of

Socratic critical examination, rather than guiding people toward anything constructive, simply makes them rebellious by destroying their capacity to believe. 230

The second part is Plato’s recognition of the demos’ intellectual capacity, if only to a limited degree. He recognized that the people were not wholly ignorant, but could be knowledgeable in a sense or even able to partake in Plato’s philosophical knowledge. Given his intellectualist criterion as revealed in his theory of the philosopher-king that the claim to political power should be based on the possession of knowledge, the people were now entitled to participate in politics in proportion to their share of knowledge. His recognition of the people’s intelligence can be found in the Laws where Plato chose to promote the fulfilment of the laws

229 See section 3.3.4 of this chapter. 230 See section 5.3.2 of this chapter.. 303 and the virtues of the ruled not through violence, but by means of public persuasion, 231 a decision that presumes the people’s ability to distinguish the good from the bad as well as their willingness to pursue their true interests. Besides, his view of the rule by the written laws as a form of good government in the Statesman also indicates a positive assessment of the demos’ intelligence, since these laws were the product of demotic deliberation. 232

Thirdly, Plato could also find some positive results from the democracy’s institutional designs.

He observed that its participatory institutions might have the effect of maintaining constitutional stability, since the fragmentation of political power caused by massive participation would constitute enormous difficulties for attempts to change the laws. 233 He also noticed that these participatory institutions could also be efficient tools in preventing the abuse of power. 234 The demos, having no trust in people in power, would like to have the government in its direct control both by way of direct participation and through the written laws that had been enacted not by legal professionals but by the demos itself. Plato shared this concern of the demos; therefore, though he was still critical of its non-professional ways of government and legislation, he accepted the use of these participatory practices in preventing the abuse of power when the true ruler was not available.

231 See section 3.1.3 of this chapter. 232 See section 3.2.3. There are more relevant passages in Plato’s works, such as the definition of common opinion as something between knowledge and ignorance in the Republic 478b-d, the discussion of ‘the democratic knowledge’ in the Protagoras 320c-328d, the theory of true belief in the Meno 97e-98a, etc. 233 Reference to the section of the ancestral laws and the section of the written laws. 234 Reference to the section of the written laws. 304 Lastly, Plato recognized that civic participation could also be justified from a communitarian point of view: the people were entitled to participate in the public decision-making not because of their intellectual capacity, but simply for the reason that they were members of the city. 235 This argument can be seen clearly in his discussion of the local jury composition in the Laws where he claimed that all citizens should participate in the law courts as much as possible, since they were part of the political community.

235 See section 3.1.3 of this chapter. 305 Chapter Seven

Conclusion

There are deep-rooted suspicions of Athenian democracy in the history of western political thought. It seems unlikely to many people that a government consisting of a group of uneducated people could be effective, for themselves or for others. Indeed, it is often thought that, without the guidance of professionalism, there will be much more conflict than consistency in their policies. The decision-making process of Athenian democracy is often considered highly inefficient on account of the enormous size of its assembly, which consisted of six thousand citizens. Athenian democracy, therefore, is classified in most cases as an undesirable form of government.

The image of Athens has improved substantially since the publication of Grote’s History of

Greece in the mid-nineteenth century. The city’s military and political achievements in the fifth century B.C., such as the victory over Persia and the establishment of the Athenian empire, are now well recognized. However, the credit for these deeds goes largely to its leaders rather than to the Athenian demos and its democracy. The suspicion of direct democracy remains. A common theory is that the Athenian demos was lucky to have

Themistocles and Pericles whose powerful leadership, having overcome all the deficiencies of direct democracy, led Athens to greatness. It is often regretted that Athens lost its empire

306 after its golden age under Pericles, fell into civil wars, and suffered a terminal decline because of the folly of the common people.

The view that presumes a relationship between the decline of Athens after the days of Pericles and the importance of leadership in its history has been questioned by a group of scholars of ancient history since the 1980s. They point out correctly that Athenian democracy was not in a process of terminal decline after the death of Pericles. On the contrary, it restored order and stability after the civil wars not only successfully but also efficiently. Many of them also dispute the traditional focus on its politicians, suggesting that the participation of the Athenian citizens might play an essential role in making their city what it was. Given the intensity of civic participation in the democracy, their suggestion points to a better understanding of

Athenian politics.

Nevertheless, this new trend of historical research has been largely disregarded in the more theoretical studies of Athenian democracy. Most scholars of political philosophy and democratic theory maintain the negative view of direct democracy, holding the established view that Athenian democracy was inherently corrupt and needed external remedies such as great leaders, the rule of law or some forms of professionalism. Even for those who have noticed the recent trend of historical research, none of them has appreciated its full implication for our understanding of the first democracy.

307 This thesis, following the lead of Josiah Ober and other scholars of ancient history, offers a new interpretation of Athenian democracy by focusing on three important events at the end of the fifth century B.C.: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates. The first two projects, by founding the democratic stability of fourth-century Athens, proved the political capability of the demos that has been largely concealed in its long-term negative image. The trial of Socrates, on the other hand, has arguably made the greatest contribution to the traditional suspicion of Athenian democracy. A revisiting of this notorious case is therefore essential for our evaluation of Athenian democracy.

The second chapter has shown the complexity of the Athenian law reform. It was caused by serious military crises and went through five regimes in twelve years, mixed with, on the one hand, the nationalistic ideology of ancestral laws and, on the other hand, murder, terror, foreign intervention, coups and civil wars. Nevertheless, despite all of these difficulties, an unprecedented and stable legal order was finally established in 399.

It is fair to say that the law reform is largely a result of the Athenian demos’ collective decision, especially after its defeat in the naval battle of Aegospotami. Of the three oligarchic regimes involved in the law reform, the Five Thousand lasted too briefly to make any significant contribution, while the Four Hundred and the Thirty brought Athens into much deeper chaos. The first restored democracy from 410 to 405 did substantial legal work, such as the systematic investigation of laws, but it also used the laws freely in persecution and

308 eradication of political enemies. This strong partisan tendency made Athenian democracy in this period look more like a tyranny of the majority rather than a lawful government.

A drastic change of political atmosphere came in 405. The law reform turned in the direction of tolerance and inclusiveness, probably because the democracy had learnt from its defeat at the battle of Aegospotami. It was now able to consider its partisan interests in the wider context of the whole Athenian community, and realized the common interests between the democratic and other Athenian citizens. As a result, the Athenian laws after the reform, rather than mere partisan tools, were more like solemn agreements of all citizens on which a stable political order was established. For instance, the non-democratic or oligarchic elements were now incorporated into the democracy’s legislation procedure, as shown in Teisamenus’ decree.

Recorded and archived, the laws were accessible and applied to all citizens. Every magistrate was required to rule only by the laws. While the abuse of law, as happened in the regimes of the Four Hundred and the Thirty, was certainly ruled out after the law reform, the scene of the laws being bluntly disregarded by a mob, as in the trial of the generals at 406, would also become much rarer, if not having disappeared altogether.

The complexity of the law reform, though a major issue of scholarly debate since the mid-

1980s, is not fully appreciated. Some scholars consider the law reform a success of constitutionalism over populism. The problem in their separation of Athenian laws from their democratic process has been pointed out by many scholars. Most scholars argued that the law

309 reform was a sophisticated exploitation of the laws by the democracy to protect its power and interests. This theory, though basically correct, tends to overlook two points. Firstly, the laws were more than a means to an end, as they also embodied important democratic values such as equality, participation and suspicion of arbitrary power. Secondly, the demos’ concept of self-interest did not remain the same throughout the period of law reform. The democracy changed from an oppressive regime to a tolerant government after a military crisis in 405.

This was a transformation that indicates the people’s capability to readjust what they thought was in their best interests. Without taking into account their experience in 405, it is hard to explain why the demos did not make the result of law revision as harsh as it could.

The discussion of the reconciliation in chapter three demonstrates the great effort that

Athenian democracy made to restore the harmony between democratic and oligarchic citizens.

For instance, the democracy not only forgave most of the crimes committed by the Thirty and their supporters, but also arranged another city for those of them who did not want to stay in

Athens under its government. The demos even repaid Sparta the loan that the Thirty had borrowed to fight them. Considering the cruelty of the Thirty during the civil war, the democracy’s generosity towards the oligarchs should be called one of the greatest deeds in the history of Athenian politics.

Most scholars, holding to the traditional view of Athenian democracy, tend to play down its achievement of reconciliation. They question its success with the reason that political tension

310 and conflict still existed in post-war Athens. They also believe that the democracy, rather than out of its own free will, was forced into reconciliation with oligarchs because of external pressures from Sparta, constraint by moderate politicians, or disagreement among Athenian citizens. Nevertheless, as argued in chapter three, the reconciliation was successful both in terms of the achievement of its goals and by the criteria of the reconciliatory terms. Besides, none of the external factors mentioned by scholars so far has been proved as a sufficient cause for the reconciliation and the subsequent period of peace in Athens. Therefore, the central role of the democracy must be admitted, since it won the civil war and restored its authority in the city.

Another theory has recently suggested that the success of the reconciliation was due to the nationalistic concern for the unity of Athens that not only suppressed the people’s desire for revenge, but also compromised the authority of direct democracy. The great strength of nationalistic concerns is well attested at the end of the fifth century B.C., especially by the popular appeal of the ancestral laws and the tightening up of the ethnic qualification of

Athenian citizenship. It has also substantial textual support from ancient writers, including

Xenophon and Plato. However, this theory overstates the importance of this nationalistic concern, claiming that the democracy’s victory in the civil war was annulled and its power and values were virtually sacrificed for the harmony of the Athenian community. What we actually see in Athenian history is that, alongside the reconciliation, the Athenian government

311 soon restored its radical form of direct democracy. Popular participation was encouraged rather than discouraged at the same time with extra financial reward for citizens attending the assembly. Therefore, it is more reasonable to include both democratic consolidation and communal harmony as goals of the Athenian reconciliation.

As we have seen in chapter four, we can question the use of the trial of Socrates as a case against direct democracy. Athenian trial procedure was not hasty, but incorporated elements of deliberation. For instance, the accusers risked harsh punishment if presenting unconvincing cases to the law court. The corruption of the jury was prevented by a sophisticated way of selection. Despite his arrogant style, Socrates’ right as defendant was well respected in his trial.

As shown in chapter four as well as in our analysis of Xenophon’s and Plato’s defences of

Socrates in chapters five and six, the Athenians had reason to believe that Socrates had not only been partially responsible for the crimes of the Thirty, but would also be a threat to the restored democracy and the Athenian community in the future. Socrates might very well have meant to benefit his fellow Athenians with his philosophy, but his way of life was neither justified by any positive outcome nor sanctioned by the divine authorities claimed in his defence. What the Athenians actually experienced was the destructive effects of Socrates’ philosophy. Common norms and beliefs collapsed under his critical examination. Young people, fascinated by the power of his philosophy, became hubristic. Some of his pupils led

312 an oligarchic coup that brought the whole of Athens into the chaos of civil war. Furthermore,

Socrates’ claim that his way of life was instructed by the divine authority of his daimonion and the Delphic oracle is suspicious. His private daimonion could not be recognized by anyone else, while the Delphic oracle did not ask him to scorn traditional beliefs or democratic values on the streets.

In summary, what emerges in our historical examination of the three Athenian events at the end of the fifth century B.C. is a contrast between a successful direct democracy and failed

Socratic philosophy. Athenian democracy not only had equality and freedom, but was also lawful and generous. It was able to adopt the conservative nationalism that was the basic value of its law reform and the reconciliation. Socratic philosophy, by contrast, was associated with lawlessness and cruelty. Its radical criticism, having so efficiently exposed the faults of existing norms and institutions, turned in a tyrannical direction.

The success of Athenian democracy and the failure of Socratic philosophy are also attested to in the works of Xenophon and Plato. Contrary to the common impression that they were uncompromising critics of direct democracy, we have found significant passages that indicate appreciation of democratic values and deeds. Xenophon and Plato were undeniably oligarchic writers, and the passages that have been discussed in this thesis are far from representing a general picture of their philosophical concerns. Nevertheless, these passages constitute a remarkable aspect of their experience of democratic Athens. It is therefore problematic to

313 disprove Athenian democracy with the works of Xenophon and Plato, as many scholars usually do.

With regards the law reform, Xenophon disagreed with the Athenian common people over the content of the ancestral laws, but he also pointed out their reverence for the laws that associated them with the glorious past and gave instruction about the future. He disputed the cynical view that the demos was incorrigible in their abuse of law, arguing that it could be obedient to authority as shown in the chorus, athletic competition, and naval exercises. As to the reconciliation, Xenophon was obviously in favour of the common people. In his account, they were pious, just, trustworthy and sympathetic to the oligarchs. He suggested that it was because of their virtues that the reconciliation was successful. As to the trial of Socrates, though he had no doubt about his mentor’s innocence, the democracy’s responsibility for killing Socrates was first exonerated as a result of his theory that Socrates actually conducted his own death, and then forgiven as Xenophon developed a deeper understanding of human fallibility.

Xenophon therefore understood Athenian democracy from perspectives different from the negative view of direct democracy that has been well-established since ancient times. Firstly, in contrast to dominant realist theories that tend to consider the Athenian demos short-sighted and selfish, he pointed to the importance of communitarian values such as reverence for tradition and fellowship in the success of law reform and reconciliation. His report of the

314 battle between Athenian democrats and oligarchs at Munychia is one of the most revealing stories that indicate the dramatic power of a close-knit community over the division of civil war.

Secondly, in contrast to the myth of the decline of Athens, Xenophon suggests a theory of historical circle based on the understanding of human nature that people tended to become corrupt because of their success, but they also learnt from failure. His Socrates, having seen the Athenians’ arrogance after their victory over Persia and their modesty after being defeated by Boeotia, concluded that ‘confidence implants neglect, easygoingness, and disobedience, while fear makes people more attentive, more obedient, and more orderly.’ 1 Xenophon himself also recorded the transformation of the Athenian demos from a lawless mob in the trial of the generals in 406 to virtuous people after suffering the tyranny of the Thirty in 403.

This theory of history enabled him to criticize Athenian democracy without losing sight of its achievement in law and domestic harmony.

Finally, Xenophon would have reservation about the view that the Athenian demos was liable to manipulation by passion and demagogy. As mentioned above, he believed that the demos had the capability to learn and, in turn, became more disciplined. He also believed that the demos could distinguish good politicians from bad ones. He was optimistic that the demos

1 Mem. 3.5.5. 315 would finally reward their leaders for their honesty and efforts to improve common interests, while demagogues would soon be punished for their deception and unrealistic promises.

Athens is but one of the issues in Plato’s works, and his attitude toward its democracy in general is probably much more hostile than Xenophon’s; yet there are still passages that indicate his recognition of the success of Athenian democracy and the failure of Socratic philosophy. Regarding the Athenian law reform, we find in the Laws his recognition of certain democratic institutions and practices such as the assembly, the people’s law court and the use of rhetoric, though his consideration there is neither from a democrat’s perspective, nor is it without reservation. He puts up a substantial argument for the democracy’s use of written laws in the Statesman . The people trust neither governing officials’ expertise nor their integrity. Therefore, the people prefer to make laws by themselves, to write them down, and to order their government to following the written laws as strictly as possible. Thus, the abuse of political power would be prevented. Plato agrees that these are reasonable measures.

Democratic governments, he argues, have an additional advantage that their laws are much more stable than those of monarchies and oligarchies because of the fragmentation of legislative power in their governments. Thus, he classified democratic regimes by the written laws as a desirable form of government in the Statesman .

In the Menexenus we find Plato’s praise of the reconciliation. He agrees that the reconciliation was an exceptional success that made other Greek cities envious. He ascribed

316 its success to the popular myth of common ancestry, an explanation that was welcome among the Athenian demos. However, there is a subtle difference between his account and popular versions of the civil war. In the popular memory, the oligarchic supporters of the Thirty took the full responsibility for the civil war while the democrats were credited with the reconciliation. According to Plato’s account, the civil war in 403 was not any Athenian’s fault, but caused by sheer misfortune, while the reconciliation was due to the common efforts of all the Athenians, including the oligarchs. Thus, Plato was aiming to remove the blame on the oligarchs for the civil war. He appears to urge the Athenian demos that the democracy should not only forgive the supporters of the Thirty, but also remember them as equally patriotic citizens to the democrats. Thus, Plato suggested, the Athenian oligarchs would no longer live in shame, and the true reconciliation would be achieved.

As to the trial of Socrates, Plato reconsiders this infamous event from three perspectives that differ from that of his Apology . Firstly, a passage of the Protagoras reveals a sympathetic understanding of human imperfection and recognition of patriotic obligation. It is argued in this passage that a good citizen, rather than criticizing his country from a moral high ground, should reconcile himself to his fatherland whatever its wrongdoing is. Though it may not represent Plato’s attitude, this passage gave us an alternative view in Plato’s time on the issue of philosophy and democracy.

317 Secondly, Plato discussed the side-effects of Socratic philosophy in the Republic . He admits that the Socratic way of radical questioning, having discredited the validity of common norms and beliefs, might lead its practitioners down the route of nihilism or tyranny. This consideration is one of the main reasons that in both the Republic and the Laws philosophy is no longer a common practice for all, but the most selective training for a small group of elite citizens alone.

Finally, Plato considers in the Statesman and Crito the need to maintain the authority of law even though there might be gaps between the laws and justice. The Athenian jury’s verdict on

Socrates might not be just, but there is no evidence to question its legality. Can one disobey an unjust but legal decision of the law court? Plato’s answer in these two dialogues is negative. He is concerned that any theories of disobedience might destroy the authority of the laws, since they might be used to justify all kinds of unlawful behaviour. Besides, the

Athenian laws were not intolerant. Socrates not only had the right to persuade the city but also had the freedom to leave for another city. He knew the problems of democracy, but chose to stay in Athens receiving the care and protection provided by the laws and the city. It is therefore unjust, the Athenian Laws argued in the Crito , for citizens like Socrates to disobey the legal decision of the city.

The discussion of Plato’s concession to Athenian democracy indicates significant differences from his basic position of intellectual elitism that denies the demos’ role in politics because of

318 their ignorance. The first difference comes from Plato’s revision of his intellectualist position.

He points out some of its problems. The first is about its feasibility. The knowledge that guides a political community towards perfection seems far beyond human intelligence. It would be extremely difficult for people to recognize such expertise, and it is even more difficult, if not impossible, for them to learn it. Another problem is the power of intellectualism to understand political reality. Platonic intellectualism tends to presume a certain intellectual quality as a prerequisite of stable government. This approach has difficulty in explaining why some regimes such as the Athenian democracy, though not equipped with such qualities, actually existed for a long period of time. The third problem comes from the dangerous side effects of its training method or Socratic elenchus. Plato asks, what would a person become but a nihilist or tyrant who shows no respect for the norms of this world if all the beliefs that he could find are doomed to contradiction and ridicule under the storming of Socratic elenchus?

By contrast, Plato starts to incorporate some democratic values and practices into his theorizing of politics. He recognizes the political role of the demos by raising the status of popular wisdom. The people are qualified for philosophical persuasion, since they are able to follow their true interests. Their consent, therefore, becomes a condition of governing legitimacy. This is a democratic development following his intellectualist way of thinking.

319 There are also considerations perspectives other than intellectualism. Plato recommends the use of written laws by Athenian democracy to control the power of governing officials. He also finds that the extreme fragmentation of political power in direct democracies may help support legal stability. These views suggest a switch of emphasis in Plato’s political thought where political communities, rather than educational systems that aim to improve members’ knowledge, are considered organizations that provide stability and protection from abuse of political power.

Communitarianism is another non-intellectualist perspective that we have found in our discussion of Plato. He considers the improvement of common interests as an essential condition of laws. Common ancestry, in his view, is the cause of reconciliation between

Athenian democrats and oligarchs. He describes citizens’ obligation to obey their cities with the metaphor of parents and children. All of these positions reflect certain communitarian values that were prevalent in democratic Athens. Yet, the most revealing case should be his justification for citizens’ rights to be involved in the local judicial process. He argues that all citizens should participate in the law courts as much as possible simply because they are members of the community. No one should decide for other citizens even if he is the wisest.

We have put up a defence for Athenian democracy against established negative views. It points out the democracy’s success in law reform and reconciliation at the end of the fifth century B.C. which laid down the foundation of post-war stability in fourth century Athens. It

320 draws attention to the legality of the democracy’s trial of Socrates and the reasons for the jury’s decision. It also finds recognition of the democracy in the works of Xenophon and

Plato. It is therefore problematic to reject Athenian democracy either with the testimony of

Socrates’ pupils or with the reason of the democracy’s decline after the Peloponnesian war, as many scholars often did.

What have been discussed in this thesis are only a decade of Athenian history and an aspect of its philosophy. Yet, it is hoped that by challenge the stereotype of Athenian democracy this discussion could reopen the debate on Athenian politics and philosophy, especially in the realm of democratic theories. Athenian democracy is a great political experiment in human history, as many of its deeds defy our common understandings. It is still worth asking how a group of people organized themselves successfully into a stable government and maintained the highest degree of equality and freedom that we have ever heard of, and for what reason the

Athenians went to such lengths as to make sure that they were ruled solely by themselves.

We have seen the establishment of the rule of law through the collective efforts of Athenian citizens. The authority of law was imposed in Athens by neither the forceful leadership of politicians, nor the professional instruction of jurists. Instead, it was based directly on the common citizens’ own political experience and judgement. This is at odds with our impression of the tyranny of the majority, and does not fit our common belief of constitutionalism that, to maintain the legal order of a society, the laws should be guarded by

321 impartial jurists and be independent of popular interference. We have also seen in the

Athenian reconciliation how the popular nationalistic sentiment overcame the destructive effects of civil strife. It presents a challenging case for the study of human society that often presumes the egoistic aspect of human nature and expects conflict rather than cooperation in

Athens.

Athenian politics is full of wonders, and not only to the modern readers. Even its contemporary great writers, Xenophon and Plato, puzzled over the nature of its democratic order. Many scholars tried to make this amazing phenomenon comprehensible by using established conceptual frameworks, such as modern constitutionalism and models of political struggle. However, in the process, the peculiarity of Athens is often missing. The strangeness of Athenian democracy should be kept in our mind as a source of inspiration. We may compare it to a special kind of wonder that, as Aristotle said of the First principles, makes us realize our ignorance and start to philosophize. 2

Athenian politics is full of wonders, and not only to the modern readers. Even its contemporary great writers, Xenophon and Plato, puzzled over the nature of Athenian democratic order. Many historians and political theorists, as shown in this thesis, try to make

Athenian democracy comprehensible by putting it into established conceptual frameworks, such as modern constitutionalism and models of political struggle. However, in the process,

2 Metaph . 982b. 322 the strangeness of Athenian culture is often missing. If it is allowed, we may preserve this peculiar feature of Athenian politics by comparing it to a special kind of wonder that, as

Aristotle said of the First Principles, makes us realize our ignorance and, start to philosophize. 3

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