Notes on BK I Sections 1-8:

Teleology is the idea that everything in the universe has a natural function, purpose, end, aim, goal, or “good”, which is known in Greek as its telos. The telos of something is “good” in the sense that it is what the thing's activity should be aimed at accomplishing or . So, telling whether something or someone is doing what they "ought to" do, is a matter of telling whether or not what it is doing matches its specific natural function, end, aim, good, purpose or telos. Hence, a conception of our aim, purpose, or “good” as humans gives us a basis for saying how humans everywhere "should," "ought to," or are "supposed to" act. ’s in the Nicomachean Ethics is to provide a reasoned account of what our telos as humans is, and the difference knowing this makes for our understanding of the aims and conduct of life. Some goods are instrumental or useful in relation to other goods, which are known as intrinsic or inherent goods. Something is intrinsically good if it is valuable because of what it is, or “good-in-itself.” Something is instrumentally good insofar as it is a useful means to something else. Aristotle says that if we look at human activity as a whole, there is a natural and logical hierarchy of goods. In a sense, all lower goods and activities in the hierarchy serve the higher goods and activities. To put all action into perspective, examining all activity in the polis gives us an image like a giant wedding cake: all of the lower, subordinate activities and their goods are instrumental in the broadest sense because they are done ultimately for the sake of the Final, Highest, Chief Good at the very top of the cake. The Highest Good would be something that is not only intrinsically good but also is not pursued for the sake of something else, (that is, it is not also instrumental). It would be very helpful for ethics (and for what Aristotle calls “political science”) if we could grasp what this Chief Good is. As noted above, it would give us a clear and relevant standard for making judgments about conduct. If you were to ask most people what this Highest Good might be, Aristotle says they would likely reply that it is happiness, [eudaimonea], although there are many differences in thinking about what “happiness” consists in, both among the majority of people and also among Philosophers. In S.4, Aristotle notes his difference in approach from that of and “some” who thought that apart from goods like health, wealth, honor, pleasure, etc. “there is another which is self- subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well.” Aristotle differs with Plato on this in seeking the underlying rationality or “first principles” of things by beginning with “the fact” and reasoning toward its causes rather than the other way around. (See also the end of S. 7 and S. 6: “[W]hile both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.” Snap!) In any event, Aristotle sets out in S. 5 to a kind of interrogation of the idea that happiness might be the Highest Good by considering the variety of views on the subject of what human happiness actually is in order to see if it can be Highest Good and also in what sense it would be. If happiness is the Highest Good (S. 7) then it can only be so in the sense that it is not only good –in-itself but also that it is a “final” good. By this Aristotle means it must be a good that is only intrinsically and not also instrumentally good. It is wanted because of what it is itself, and not at all for any other reason or any use it might have in pursuing something better or different. Happiness meets this standard if we think of it as meaning something other than pleasure, honor, the possession of knowledge, and the possession of virtue. The second characteristic Aristotle associates with the Highest Good (and therefore with happiness in the sense he means it) is “self-sufficiency.” This means that the Highest Good doesn’t need other things added to it to make it worthwhile. Nor does it make us ‘needy’ in the way some “goods” constantly generate new desires and requirements. (For example, if you get a great new job, you may need a new wardrobe, car, house, friends, etc.) The Chief Good would have to be both final and self-sufficient and there is a sense in which happiness can be thought of as both final and self-sufficient, and this is the sense of happiness as eudaimonea that will be further specified in what follows: “Presumably,...to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude and a clearer account of what it is [is] still desired.” This, Aristotle says, will depend on getting a clearer view of what we think the human telos or function might be. Eudaimonea will consist in both a feeling and a state of fulfilled in relation to this “function” or aim. Our natural function as humans is approached by examining the unique and specific activities that set humans apart from other . These Aristotle determines to be rationally directed practical activity or deliberate free behavior. And since the virtue or “excellence” [arête] of something is the capacity to accomplish its natural function, then our happiness consists in something like deliberate free behavior in accordance with human virtue, or rationally directed virtuous activity. This he expresses toward the end of S. 7 in this way: "the good of Man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue...in a complete life." In other words, what makes us most happy in the sense that Aristotle means it is a life in which we consciously conduct ourselves over the course of one's lifetime, in a manner that exercises our distinctly human capacities—that is our human virtues. We are striving in a sense to act humanly, in striving to achieve human happiness (eudaimonea), through the development and expression of the specifically human capacities and tendencies to act known as the virtues. In S. 8 Aristotle suggests that the view he has derived corresponds with and draws together many more partial and plausible views without simply repeating any of them. Eudaimonea is identified with the soul and as an activity not a mere capacity or possession of virtue. It is also associated with pleasure, “good fortune,” and “external goods” like wealth and beauty which contribute to happiness in the larger sense.

Notes on Nicomachean Ethics BK I Section 13 and BK II Sections 1-8:

So humans' natural function is "activity of soul in accordance with virtue...in a complete life." There are two kinds of virtue corresponding to the two parts of the soul, one associated with its rationality (roughly what we often refer to as “mind” today) and one associated with the part of the soul we call “will” or “spirit.” Intellectual and Moral Virtues are ways of acting and feeling that develop and express our striving for eudaimonea-- in other words, our distinctly human happiness and fulfillment as human beings. In thinking about this idea of a distinctive kind of practice or way of conducting oneself, Aristotle developed the doctrine of the . (section 2 and following.) The golden mean is Aristotle’s attempt to provide a conceptualization of what the person of character does. This idea is intended to provide us with an example to emulate in life rather than a theoretical account of what causes virtue or defines it. Moral states include emotions and types of action. Virtue, then, is for Aristotle, "a state of deliberate moral purpose consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined...by reason, or as a prudent man [a person of character and good practical judgment or ] would determine it." (section 6 var.) Character is a person's capacity for making this determination, which is developed over the course of a lifetime of judgment in practice. It involves striking the mean between extremes of excess and deficiency with regard to universal human capacities and dispositions to act, when faced with particular circumstances that require choice. In thinking about character, then, Aristotle's emphasis is on a kind of practical judgment that is central to the exercise of virtue. Virtue is the activity of character, which develops and expresses our natural function, which is ultimately the way for us to be happy in a distinctly human way. The life conducted in this way is the expression of character which is conducive to virtue and therefore to eudaimonea in the course of one's life.

MORAL STATE DEFICIENCY VIRTUE EXCESS emotion, type of action of that state mean of that state of that state

Fear Foolhardiness; Courage Cowardice Rashness

Confidence Cowardice Courage Foolhardiness; Rashness

Anger Impassivity Gentleness Passion

Pleasure Insensibility; Temperance; Profligacy; Asceticism Moderation Licentiousness

Principled fairness Inconsistency Justice Lack of Empathy; Cold; Stolid; Unmerciful

Allegiance or Amity Undependability Loyalty Blind faith; Credulity