The Prohibition on Annexation: Lessons from Crimea

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\49-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 1 1-AUG-17 15:05 THE PROHIBITION ON ANNEXATION: LESSONS FROM CRIMEA JUERGEN BERING* I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 748 R II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ................. 751 R III. BACKGROUND ................................... 755 R A. The Events Surrounding Russian Annexation ... 755 R B. The Legal Background ........................ 757 R 1. The Law on Annexation .................. 758 R 2. Factual Assessment ....................... 762 R 3. Legal Assessment ......................... 763 R 4. Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law .................................... 768 R a. Enforcement under the U.N. Charter ............................. 769 R b. Mechanisms under Customary International Law ................... 770 R c. Mechanisms under Special Regimes. 772 R d. Summary .................................... 774 R IV. INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS ...................... 775 R A. United Nations ............................... 776 R 1. Security Council .......................... 776 R 2. General Assembly ......................... 777 R B. Individual States ............................. 782 R 1. The West ................................ 783 R a. European States .................... 783 R aa. European Union States ......... 784 R bb. Other European States—Norway and Switzerland................. 787 R b. United States ....................... 788 R c. Canada ............................. 789 R 2. Pro-Russia ............................... 790 R * Law Clerk at the Appellate Court (Kammergericht), Berlin, Germany. The author would like to thank Ryan Goodman, Oliver Persey, Menaka Tennekoon, Erika Noronha, Lara Sofia Romero, Amandeep Singh, Sumeya Mulla, and Andrew Li for helpful suggestions and comments. The author is furthermore grateful to the editorial staff at the NYU Journal of International Law and Politics for their assistance and advice, especially Dainec Stefan and Amy Lee Dawson. The usual disclaimers apply. 747 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\49-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 2 1-AUG-17 15:05 748 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 49:747 a. China .............................. 790 R b. India ............................... 791 R c. Brazil ............................... 792 R d. Belarus ............................. 792 R e. Central Asian States ................ 793 R f. Further States in Support of Russia . 793 R 3. Outliers ................................. 793 R C. Reactions by International Organizations ....... 795 R 1. Organizations with Russian Membership .... 795 R a. Council of Europe .................. 795 R b. G8.................................. 796 R c. Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) ....... 797 R 2. Organizations without Russian Membership . 797 R a. European Union ................... 797 R b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) .............. 799 R c. Organisation for Economic Co- Operation and Development (OECD) ............................ 799 R d. Organization of Islamic Cooperation .................................... 799 R D. Sanctions .................................... 800 R E. Private Actors ................................ 801 R F. Status Three Years After Annexation ........... 803 R G. Quantifying the Damage ...................... 806 R H. Summary .................................... 814 R V. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS CRISES ............. 815 R A. Georgia 2008 ................................ 816 R B. Kuwait 1990 ................................ 819 R C. Panama 1989 ............................... 821 R D. Summary .................................... 822 R VI. LESSONS TO BE DRAWN .......................... 822 R VII. CONCLUSION .................................... 830 R I. INTRODUCTION The events in Crimea, leading up to its annexation1 by Russia, are often considered evidence of the weakness of inter- 1. An annexation is per se illegal under international law. The Russian perspective therefore does not address the events as such. For more discussion, see infra Section III.B.3. \\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\49-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 3 1-AUG-17 15:05 2017] LESSONS FROM CRIMEA 749 national law in restricting the actions of powerful states.2 In- deed, three years3 have passed since the Russian annexation of Crimea and it seems unlikely that Ukraine will regain power over the territory anytime soon.4 Following such an argumen- tation one might be tempted to proclaim that international law in general and the prohibition on annexation in particular are not law at all.5 Given the perceived lack of consequences, even a less radical perspective could conclude that there is a qualitative difference between what is termed international law and the law we know from domestic legal systems. However, under closer scrutiny, the Crimean annexation is in fact an example of how international law creates obliga- tions that international actors follow. In addition, the specific rule prohibiting annexation is emphasized and even strengthened through the international reactions.6 First, from a posi- tivist7 perspective, actions and statements by the international legal community create state practice and opinio juris. Contrary to the critical view, the Crimean case evinces state behavior that supports the prohibition on annexation. Second, from a consequentialist8 perspective, the international backlash against Russia’s actions went beyond previous reactions. 2. In regard to powerful states and international law, see Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 105 (2006). 3. For some initial assessments after the first year, see Amanda Paul, Crimea One Year after Russian Annexation, EUR. POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=3&pub_id=5432. 4. In fact, some have argued that it might strategically be best to give up Crimea. See Michael B. Kelley, Bremmer: The US Must Come to Terms with Russia Controlling Crimea, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.businessinsider. com/us-response-to-crimea-crisis-2014-3?IRT. 5. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 208 (1832) (“[T]he law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by a given sovereign to . persons in a state of subjection to its author. [T]he law . between nations is law (improperly so called) set by general opinion.”). 6. While this paper does not attempt to ultimately prove the fate of the prohibition of annexation, which only time can tell, it does put forward that the following analysis constitutes one significant element of such a proof. 7. In the following, the term will be used to denote a perspective that focuses on the rules of international law, specifically customary rules that are formed through state practice and opinio juris. 8. In this discussion, the term shall mark a perspective that focuses on whether or not a violation of international law causes negative reactions. \\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\49-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 4 1-AUG-17 15:05 750 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 49:747 Therefore, when assessing potential reactions to a future annexation, one would predict a very different outcome after Crimea. Moreover, international attention has largely shifted from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine to Syria and other regions, measured by both media attention as well as the focus of international efforts.9 However, as evidenced by continued statements stressing the illegality of the situation, the backlash has not given way to Realpolitik when it comes to the annexation of Crimea. It is especially this shift in focus that allows for a more substantive analysis on what matters legally, decoupled from actions that are taken for opportunist reasons. In order to highlight this strengthened prohibition against annexation, the Article will begin with a brief discussion in Part II on compliance and enforcement in regard to Crimea. Thereafter, Part III will illuminate the historical and legal background of the situation. Afterwards, in Part IV, reactions to the annexation will be examined on a basis of legal and quasi-legal positions and actions by states, international organizations, and other relevant actors. Then, in Part V, these reactions will be discussed against the background of similar historic events and the international community’s reaction in such cases. Thereafter, Part VI will examine which lessons can be drawn from the previous analysis. Lastly, the Article will conclude with a final assessment of the effects of the Crimean annexation on the rule prohibiting annexations. Throughout the discussion, the Article will address both of the above-men- tioned perspectives. Thus, examining whether it is possible to find evidence of state practice and opinio juris and whether third party states answered the violation of international law. This Article claims that the international prohibition on annexation is strengthened through the Crimean case. At the very least, the Article sets out to show how critics grossly under- estimate and misunderstand the repercussions and their re- spective meanings.10 9. On both Syria and Crimea, see Hall Gardner, The Russian Annexation of Crimea: Regional and Global Ramifications, 17 EUR. POL. & SOC’Y 490 (2016) (arguing that the combined pressures of NATO, the European Union, the United States, and Arab Gulf and Turkish interests on Russia spurred Rus- sia’s efforts to annex Crimea and intervene in Syria). 10.

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