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MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN Ecological facelifting in the USSR or improving on nature* Introduction From the earliest of recorded time, man has sought to reshape nature in order to suit his purposes. The magnitude of his surgery has been limited only by the extent of his technical competence. This competence has not increased in linear fashion. Frequently, earlier generations were capable of efforts beyond the reach of their descendants. But whatever the engineering or planning skills of a particular generation, the intent was generally to make life more comfortable or more profitable. All too often, however, difficulties would arise when one man's definition of comfort and profit differed from another's. Sometimes such differences would develop between contemporaries and some- times between sons and fathers or grandfathers. Moreover* the attempt to improve on nature in one sector, more often than not set in motion other forces which sometimes have brought an even greater need for remedial action than there was in the first place. Although we are primarily concerned here with how the Soviets have sought to rearrange nature, it is readily conceded that such schemes are not a mono- poly of the communist countries. For example, we in the United States almost succeeded in severing Florida from the mainland with a canal. The so-called North American Water and Power Alliance had a grandiose plan to reroute numerous rivers from the northern part of our hemisphere. And without any plan, we managed to create a dustbowl out of our midwest by overculti- vation and a dying lake out of Lake Erie by over-industrialization. Redoing nature, intentionally or unintentionally is an age-old process and generally it plays an important part in the process of economic development. Unfortu- nately, after an initial project is completed, a subsequent reordering of nature * Portions of this article are taken from the author's forthcoming study, The spoils of pro- gress: Environmental pollution in the Soviet Union, Cambrige, Mass., MIT Press, 1972. 208 Political economy of environment is often felt to be necessary in order to compensate for the destruction the plan- ners and builders generated with their first project. No matter how simple it may appear to be at first, man's efforts to improve on nature often turn out to be a complex undertaking with unexpected ramifi- cations. It is like tampering with the free market. When you make an adjustment in one sector, somehow or other, there are after-effects in another sector. Engels saw the essence of the matter with clarity in the 19th century. "Let us not, however, be very hopeful about our human conquest over nature. For each such victory, nature manages to take her revenge. Each of these victories, it is true, has a first order of consequences which we can anticipate. But in the second and third orders (secondary and tertiary effects) there are quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the significance of the first. The people who in Mesopotamia, Greece, Asia Minor, and elsewhere destroyed the forests to obtain cultivable land, never dreamed that they were laying the basis for the present devastated condition of these countries, by removing along with the forest the collecting centres and reservoirs of moisture. When, on the southern slopes of the mountains, the Italians of the Alps used up the pine forests so carefully cherished on the northern slopes, they had no inkling that by doing so they were cutting at the foots of dairy industry in their region: they had still less inkling that by doing so they were thereby depriving their mountain springs of water for the greater part of the year, with the effect that these would be able to pour still more furious flood torrents on the plains during the rainy seasons." 1 Engels' statement has come to have particular meaning today. First of all, some of the same incidents described by Engels' in the 1880's are reoccur- ring in the world, including, as we shall see, the USSR. Second, as serious as the secondary and tertiary effects were several decades ago, with our vastly more powerful technology, the potential for damage is even greater now. Given Engels' concern over this question, it is ironic that the highest potential for increased destructiveness comes when the state monopolizes all the pro- ductive powers of the country into a single decision maker's hands as often happens in a communist country. To some extent the drive to redo nature is no different in a communist country from what it is in non-communist countries, especially those that are underdeveloped. In a communist country, however, the opposition or resistance to the restructuring power of the state is likely to be considerably less because of the absence of private property or opposition parties. With such concentrated power at its command, the potential a communist state has for reordering nature is unprecedented. Finally, as important as the economic, political and corrective factors may be for explaining why man attacks nature in such a vigorous way, there may also be a psychological element, especially in the case of Russia. Citi- 1. Frederick Engels, Dialectics of nature, New York, International Publishers, 1940, pp. 291-292. Marshall l. Goldman 209 zens in large land masses as well as planners in developing countries generally seem to have an undue fascination for large water bodies. In the first instance this may be an attempt to make up for the absence of large ocean bodies which most other countries of the world are able to enjoy and in the second instance, it may just be that unharnessed water power constitutes a mocking reminder about a country's impotence. Alternatively as Peter Wiles has put it, this excessive concern for water may be nothing more than a Freudian response. Whatever the precise explanation, the interplay of these economic, political and psychological forces is especially well illustrated by a study of what the Russians have been doing to the Caspian and Aral Seas. 1. In the beginning The Caspian and Aral Seas are unusual water bodies. Unlike most seas or lakes in the world, the flow of water is one way — in. Water is not carried out of either of these major seas to other rivers or seas or oceans. Both water bodies are located in very dry regions of the world where the evaporation rate is exceptionally high. The rapid evaporation absorbs the incoming water which explains why even though there is no outlet, the seas do not overflow. In the case of the Caspian Sea, the rapid evaporation rate also makes possible a valuable mineral recovery operation. Water is drawn off the Caspian into the Gulf of Kara-Bogaz-Gol where evaporation is especially rapid and the residue is converted into valuable minerals and salts. The general charac- teristics of both seas are presented in Table 1. Table 1. Characteristics of the Caspian and Aral Seas Caspian Sea Aral Sea Elevation - 28 m 53 m Area low water 372,000 kma 64 to 66,458 km8 high water 424,000 km' Maximum depth 1,020 m 68 m Average depth 16,4 m Volume 1 023 km Sources : Soviet geography : Review and translation 5, May 1965, p. 325; ibid. 6, June 1965, p. 328; V.L. Shul'ts, "The Aral Sea problem", Soviet hydrology: Selected papers 5, 1968, p. 489; L.B. MalinkeviC, B.A. Beljanov, "Kaspij glubie kilométra", Priroda, Aug. 1966. Even more intriguing, both the Caspian and Aral Seas have had rather erratic geological lives. Researchers feel that the Aral Sea was dry only 30,000 years ago. Subsequently, a sea was formed and then several centuries ago around the 12th century, the Aral Sea contracted only to expand again 14 210 Political economy of environment during the 13th and 15th centuries2. In somewhat the same way, the water level of the Caspian has changed markedly over the last few centuries. In the 2nd century B.C., the shoreline was at 32 meters below sea level3. Villages were built along the edge of the sea only to be submerged as the Caspian rose in the centuries that followed. By 1400 A.D., the sea depth increased to 22 meters below sea level which it is believed was similar to the depth that existed in 2000 B.C. 4 Except for a slight dip in the 16th century, the level of the Caspian was fairly stable until the mid-19 th century The changes in the level of the Caspian and Aral Seas up until the mid- 19th century are explained primarily by variation in rainfall and temperature in the watersheds of both seas 8. Beginning in 1929, the level of the Caspian Sea and in 1960 the level of the Aral Sea, began to fall rapidly at rates that were clearly due to more than just changes in rainfall7. Whereas between 1847 and 1928, the level of the Caspian fell by 56 centimeters or 6 millimeters a year from 1939 to 1965, it fell by 2.47 meters (8.2 feet) or 67 millimeters a year 8. By 1970 it had fallen another .1 of a meter so that the total drop was 2.6 meters (8 1/3 feet) 9. The recent history of the Aral Sea is similar. From 1960 to 1967, the water level fell by 1.76 meters (5.5 feet) or 24 millimeters a year10. The drop is expected to continue so that by 1980, the sea will have fallen a total of 4 to 4.5 meters u. Since the average depth of the Aral Sea is 16.4 meters (50 feet) and its maximum depth is only 68 meters, it is estimated that by the year 2000, the Aral Sea will have turned into a salt marsh12.

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