ISSUE 147
March 2013 SM2 and Sea Control: A New Air Warfare Capability for the Royal Australian Navy China’s Aircraft Carrier: Implications for Southeast Asia Pacific Partnership: Australia’s Contribution and Benefits Muscular Maritime China ?
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For more information contact our Maritime team: Tel: 1800 038 081 www.QinetiQ.com.au Issue 147 3 Operation Slipper Contents - HMAS ANZAC ince the commencement of purpose; to increase the security and SM2 and Sea Control: A New Air Operation SLIPPER in 2001, prosperity of the region by working Warfare Capability for the Royal SAustralia has maintained a maritime together for a better future. Australian Navy 4 contribution to operations in the Middle CMF is working to defeat terrorism, ( East Area of Operations MEAO). prevent piracy, reduce illegal trafficking China’s Aircraft Carrier: Implications for Currently this consists of a Major of people and drugs, and promote the Southeast Asia 7 Fleet Unit, the Anzac Class Frigate, maritime environment as a safe place for HMAS Anzac, which is flexibly cross mariners with legitimate business. tasked between US-led Combined HMAS Anzac is conducting Pacific Partnership:A ustralia’s Maritime Forces (CMF) Combined Task maritime security operations across Contribution and Benefits 9 Forces (CTFs) 150 (counter terrorism), the Combined Maritime Forces’ area 151 (counter-piracy) and 152 (Gulf of operations. HMAS Anzac’s mission Muscular Maritime China ? 16 maritime security). allows her to undertake maritime CMF patrols more than 2.5 million interdictions and counter-piracy square miles of international waters operations, including activities under the Japan’s formidable new strike weapon to conduct both integrated and command of CTF 150. HMAS Anzac of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the coordinated operations with a common entered the MEAO in July 2012. t Darwin raid 19
Britannia Royal Naval College Report 33
The Battle for the South China Sea – World War II, Today and into the future 36
F ront page : Obituary: CAPT David John Ramsay 42 AP-3C Orion operating in the Middle East Area of A Middling Power, What is the ADF Operations passes meant to do, exactly? 45 HMAS Anzac during the last operational United Kingdom: National Involvement flight in the Middle in the Indian Ocean Region 51 East before returning home. As a farewell gesture the Orion World Naval Developments 56 dispensed flares as it heads for home. Book Reviews 60
Issue Number 147 Visions from the Vault 67 Printed by Everbest Printing SPONSORS: Company Style Notes for Headmark 69 - RAYTHEON - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL - QINETIQ ISSN 1833-6531 CEA Technologies - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DMS MARITME - ATI - SAAB - Design & DTP by ANI Membership Application Form 71 Diane Bricknell AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - LOPAC - BLOHM+VOSS NAVAL +61 3 6257 8051 [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 SM2 and Sea Control: A New Air Warfare Capability for the Royal Australian Navy Boy C mmodore Peter Leavy
n June 2011 HMAS Sydney conducted a series of missile firings Ion the US Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility off the coast of Hawaii. A key aim was to prove that the upgraded Adelaide class frigates (FFG) could exploit the full capabilities of the SM2 Standard Missile after a major upgrade program that saw it replace the previous SM1 surface to air missile. A proven, contemporary surface to air missile capability is a core component of the surface force’s ability to gain and exploit sea control. Without sea control, a maritime force will be unable to adequately protect sea lines of communication or conduct maritime A ble Seaman CSO power projection operations. as were SM1 missiles, although the missile. To understand the large Maxine Wilmott The SM2 missile is the mainstay of modifications were required to the increase in capability the SM2 will give in the Operations the US Navy’s anti-air warfare system launcher to cater for the new missile the RAN it is necessary to understand Room of HMAS Perth monitoring the SM2 and will be the major weapon in the interface and capability. The FFG class the differences between the SM1 and launch RAN’s new Hobart class destroyers is in service with seven nations around SM2 missiles. (DDG). It is a solid fuelled, tail the world, but the RAN is the first navy The SM1 has a nominal range of controlled, supersonic surface to air to attempt to integrate the SM2 into the 25nm, flies at Mach 2 and is a ‘home missile designed to defeat the full range class and the magnitude of this effort all the way’ semi-active missile.1 In of aircraft and missile air threats. It is a should not be underestimated. order to engage a target the ship must very capable weapon, having a range of HMAS Melbourne conducted the first illuminate it with a continuous 90nm and speed of >Mach 3. However, RAN’s first SM2 firing in late 2009 radar wave (known as continuous wave it is only one variant in the Standard against a surface target to prove the illumination, or CWI). The missile is Missile family. Its predecessor, the modifications made to the combat then fired and detects the reflected SM1, was first test fired by the United system and launcher. HMAS Newcastle radar energy that is returning from the States in 1966 and was introduced into conducted the second firing, and first target. The SM1 missile homes on this the RAN Perth class DDG in the late- against an air target, during Exercise reflected signal until it intercepts the 1970s. SM1 was the original weapon on RIMPAC off Hawaii in 2010. These target. the Adelaide class FFG and upgraded first two firings were designed to prove The continuous wave illumination versions of the missile are still in service the ships were capable of replicating required to guide the SM1 is with a number of navies around the the capability of the SM1 missile that transmitted from a dedicated fire world. The SM3 variant is gaining was replaced, but at that stage the control radar on the ship that must prominence as the weapon used in the supporting software and associated continue to point at the target US ballistic missile defence system and systems to allow the full capability throughout the missile’s flight. The SM6 is the next generation surface to of SM2 to be used were still under RAN’s FFGs have two fire control air missile destined to replace the SM2. development. The firings conducted radars for this purpose, so the ships The FFG are the first RAN ships to by Sydney were an integral part of that 1 A ‘semi active’ missile detects the return be modified to fire SM2. The missiles development and tested a number signal transmitted by the firing platform. An are fired from the same launcher of the high level features available in ‘active’ missile transmits its own radar signal and detects the returns. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 5
were capable of engaging two air targets system will be able to track all targets details being explored and the results simultaneously. Should the SM1 missile in 3-Dimensions at all times. Using the are classified, but were very promising. lose reception of the CWI signal, the SPY1D(V) radar (the primary radar One firing was conducted in the missile self destructs as there is no other fitted to the ships) as a tracking source, ‘home all the way’ mode to prove that method of homing onto the target. data is continuously sent to the SM2 capability, while other firings explored The SM2 missile has a number of in flight by the SPY radar as guidance various performance limits, system significant improvements over the SM1 commands, again without the target redundancies and operating modes, including a greater range (90nm) and detecting that it has been engaged. including firing at the edge of the speed (>Mach 3). While it can be fired AEGIS can manage multiple weapons designed operating limits. A number in the same ‘home all the way’ mode at multiple targets at any one time, with of firings were conducted where the as SM1 it can also be fired without the CWI illuminators time sharing target was deliberately manoeuvred needing the CWI radar return to guide illumination of the targets during the after the missile was fired to ensure the H MAS Sydney it until the terminal phase. In the FFG terminal phase of the engagement. ship’s combat system could accurately launching a SM2 this is known as mid course guidance The trials Sydney conducted in monitor the PIP and send updates to missile on the Pacific mode, where the missile initially flies Hawaii covered a number of key aspects the missile. There are also a number Missile Range Facility autonomously towards a predicted of the SM2 missile system. The specific of key redundancies built into the offH awaii intercept point (PIP) calculated by the ship’s combat system immediately prior to launch. The ship continues to update the PIP based on changes to the target’s movement after the SM2 is fired with an updated PIP being transmitted as necessary to the missile which then adjusts its flight accordingly. Once the missile gets close enough the ship’s fire control radar commences transmitting the CWI signal for the missile to home on the target during the terminal phase of flight. Consequently the SM2 does not waste energy by unnecessarily manoeuvring early in its flight which increases both its overall range and its ability to manoeuvre heavily in the terminal phase of the engagement. The mid course guidance mode has other advantages. CWI transmissions are easily detected by a target so once illumination commences, the target gains valuable warning time of an imminent threat. As the SM2 missile does not need to have the target continually illuminated with CWI for its entire flight, there are reduced warning queues for the target. In the current FFG configuration, there does need to be fire control radar support to track the target and provide the target’s 3-Dimensional position for the PIP calculations. Not so with the new Hobart class DDG as its AEGIS combat Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 SM2 and Sea Control: A New Air Warfare Capability for the Royal Australian Navy
SM2 system and simulated faults were undertaken by the RAN, the Defence Commodore Peter Leavy RAN is currently injected in some firings to test these Materiel Organisation and a number Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) at Fleet redundant modes. of Defence contractors to bring the full Headquarters. He is a Principle Warfare The results of these firings are capabilities of the SM2 missile to the Officer with service in DE, DDG, ANZAC now being used to refine the various RAN. software systems in the FFG with the The RAN is now well placed to and FFG class ships. His last command final product to be delivered to all four provide significant air defence capability was HMAS Sydney during which he ships shortly. Once this happens, the when and where it is needed and, in undertook a range of SM2 missile firings RAN will have a tested and proven anti- doing so, gain sea control in order to in Hawaii which, in part, provided the air warfare capability out to 90nm from execute military missions. t inspiration for this article. the firing ship, which will fundamentally change the way the ADF conducts air warfare. The range at which hostile aircraft will feel threatened by ships has effectively increased from 25 to 90nm, significantly complicating their ability to detect and identify surface contacts while simultaneously reducing their own weapon performance. This is a tremendous advance in the RAN’s current anti-air warfare capabilities; an advantage that will be further boosted once the Hobart class DDG enter service later this decade. The RAN’s SM2 capability will also greatly increase the operating area that friendly aircraft can operate in which provides a tremendous increase in the ADF’s air warfare capability. For example, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft can operate at some distance from the ships, whilst remaining under the protective umbrella provided by SM2. Indeed, the AEW&C aircraft will provide much of the cueing and targeting information for the ships’ weapons to use; an excellent example of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts. SMARTER AND SAFER The combination of ships and aircraft working together to detect and UNDERWATER SOLUTIONS identify air threats and then ships and combat aircraft being able to engage those threats will be a powerful force ...Since the beginning multiplier for the ADF. Knowing where a threat is situated is one thing – SM2 brings the capability to deal with those threats if necessary. The For more information, please contact: [email protected] trials conducted by Sydney in June www.thalesgroup.com.au 2011 validated the very good work Photograph © Australian Department of Defence Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 7 China’s Aircraft Carrier: Implications for Southeast Asia By Koh Swee Lean Collin
Synopsis The induction of China’s first aircraft carrier by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is no cause for overreaction by Southeast Asian governments, from the strategic and operational perspectives. Still, China’s aircraft carrier programme may provide greater grounds for concern by 2020. The induction into service of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, amidst ongoing tensions in the East and South China Seas, could not have been more coincidental. Inevitably this could provoke regional concerns in regard to whether China would use its newfound capability against competing CBG to train to operate together as dream dated from the Kuomintang China’s first Aircraft claimants in those disputes. one cohesive fighting force can be period in the 1940s and this was Carrier This might be especially so for considerably lengthy. revived by the communist government comparatively weaker countries in Moreover, the Southeast Asian in the 1980s. High-profile purchases Southeast Asia which have viewed maritime confines, characterised by of decommissioned Australian and China’s growing naval might over narrow and semi-enclosed waters, Soviet medium-sized carriers in the the past decade with at least some do not favour the operation of large- mid-1980s and early-1990s exemplified concern. However, should Southeast sized carriers. A typical CBG presents Beijing’s intent. This meant that over Asia be overly concerned about this a large and highly visible target with these decades, regional governments development? its accompanying fleet train, which have at least been partially desensitized increases its vulnerability to detection. to the Chinese carrier prospect. Carrier in confined littorals In confined littorals, large warships Since the 1990s, even if it does not The accepted consensus amongst naval could be particularly vulnerable constitute the primary motivation analysts is that building a full-fledged to well-concealed asymmetric behind Southeast Asia’s naval carrier capability takes time. More countermeasures, exploiting local modernisation, China’s aircraft than just having the aircraft carrier, it geography, such as submarines and carrier intent could have spurred involves providing supporting elements long-range missiles. The encounters regional acquisition of such ‘cheaper’ such as escorting warships and between US Navy carriers and PLAN anticipatory countermeasures as replenishment vessels, not to mention a submarines in 1994 and 2006 as well long-range missiles, aerial maritime fully-developed carrier-borne aviation as the successful attack on the Israeli surveillance and submarines. These complement, all of which constitute a Navy corvette INS Hanit in 2006 by could have helped in mitigating the typical carrier battle group (CBG). a Hezbollah shore-based anti-ship potential materialisation of China’s A CBG is still not considered a missile highlight such vulnerability. aircraft carrier programme. In sum, fully-operational fighting force until N o surprise for regional Southeast Asia is generally prepared for the necessary doctrine and operational such a contingency. and technical knowhow of carrier governments Therefore, China’s first aircraft operations are acquired, diffused The Chinese carrier programme should carrier should not warrant any and mustered throughout the entire not have come across as a surprise overreaction on the part of Southeast CBG. The time taken for a whole regionally. China’s aircraft carrier Asian governments. However, China’s Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 China’s Aircraft Carrier: Implications for Southeast Asia carrier programme may potentially for such benign present a real source of concern by purposes. In fact, 2020 when the two planned indigenous Beijing should carriers, according to PLAN sources, be aware of the are expected to enter service in 2020 peaceful utility and 2022 respectively. The indigenous of such large carrier is reported to be based on but naval platforms, larger than the Varyag design, implying as its hospital a vastly more capable vessel displacing ship Anwei had more than 70,000 tonnes full-load. demonstrated in One needs also to pay attention its international to Beijing’s overall attempts to build goodwill voyages. up its CBG capacity. This is well L ess glamorous power exemplified by the recent induction projection and construction of new destroyers optimised for fleet air defence coverage, If Southeast Asians are worried that conceivably with CBG air defence the new carrier could be used to assert in mind. This means that China is Beijing’s maritime claims in the region, seriously bent on pursuing a long-term based on recent patterns of Chinese carrier capability which is more than gunboat diplomacy, this worry could just a prestige pet project. be exaggerated. China has been relying Benign aspect of increasingly on lightly-equipped aircraft carrier civilian law-enforcement vessels for such functions instead of PLAN Given that a full-fledged CBG warships and this trend is projected carrier programme deserve greater T op: Chinese aircraft capability for China will require more to continue as China rapidly builds up attention of China’s Southeast Asian carrier Liaoning time to materialise, it is premature to such capacities. neighbours. t cruises back to a port after its first navy strike the alarm bells; the actual use of In times when its emergence as a sea trial in Dalian, in a carrier is arguably more crucial than great power has come under intense northeastern China’s the mere possession of it. And it could international scrutiny, the last thing Liaoning province in have a benign impact as well. Beijing would want is to be seen as late 2012 Prior to the 2004 Indian Ocean overly aggressive by exploiting its tsunami for instance, Singapore’s newfound naval might. The deliberate Chinese military on force of new Endurance-class low-profile induction of this first parade on board their new aircraft amphibious landing ships projected a aircraft carrier is one such gesture of Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate carrier somewhat aggressive image but their China’s reluctance to be portrayed research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam humanitarian deployment off Aceh as using disproportionate force in its School of International Studies (RSIS), in the aftermath of the disaster aptly exercise of gunboat diplomacy. Nanyang Technological University. He demonstrated that these otherwise Also, rather than an aircraft carrier offensive-looking platforms do have in the South China Sea, greater efficacy is pursuing doctoral studies focusing on their benign aspect. and credibility can be achieved through naval modernisation in the Asia-Pacific, The Americans for instance ‘less glamorous’ power projection especially Southeast Asia. deployed their carriers to good effect capabilities such as Beijing’s rapidly after the 2004 tsunami and the 2011 expanding amphibious assault forces, East Japan Sea tsunami. The Thai Navy or fourth-generation land-based First published as RSIS Commentary used her ‘pocket carrier’ RTNS Chakri airpower supported by mid-air No. 183/2012. Naruebet for the southern floods refueling aircraft. That would provide disaster relief. The Chinese could take more immediate ramifications to the note of these instances and strive to regional naval balance. In the shorter utilise its future carrier capabilities term, these aspects instead of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 9 Pacific Partnership: Australia’s Contribution and Benefits By Rhett Mitchell
he public often thinks of navies to provide free medical treatment, Since its inception until the end of in purely militaristic terms; veterinary care and engineering Pacific Partnership 2011 (PP11), the Tthey exist to defend their state at sea support for developing states in the operation has visited 15 states, treated through force. However, navies also Asia-Pacific region. Led by the United approximately 348,000 patients, and provide an important, but far less States (US) Navy Pacific Fleet in San completed 130 engineering projects.2 publicised form of defence through Diego, the overarching aim of Pacific For example, PP10 treated 109,754 military diplomacy. By visiting other Partnership is to maintain a secure patients, performed 859 surgeries, states on goodwill on humanitarian and stable region while building distributed over 60,000 pairs of assistance/disaster relief (HADR) relations between participating and glasses and sunglasses, provided 1505 missions, navies can act as informal host states. According to Tongan dental treatments and repaired 124 diplomats and generate soft power for Minister of Education, Women’s pieces of medical equipment valued their respective state. The benefits of Affairs and Culture, the Hon Dr ‘Ana at approximately US$5.8 million.3 Its soft power are significant. Soft power Maui Taufe’ulungaki, programs such success has also inspired other states. generates trust between states, which as Pacific Partnership demonstrate China, for example, implemented in turn increases security. Further, “to the Pacific and the world, that the a similar operation, Harmonious these missions give other benefits such defence services of the participating Mission, in the Indian Ocean region as interoperability and extra experience countries are there to protect the peace commencing in 2010.4 for the participants. One such mission and security of the region, and to help Pacific Partnership improves both the Australian Defence Force (ADF) improve and maintain the welfare of the perception and reputation of participates in is Operation Pacific the people.”1 participating states. Following PP06, Partnership. Pacific Partnership evolved from a survey undertaken by research Pacific Partnership is an annual the HADR response following the 2004 organisation Terror Free Tomorrow USNS Mercy diplomatic military operation designed Boxing Day Indian Ocean Tsunami. in Indonesia and Bangladesh showed (US Navy)
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 Pacific Partnership: Australia’s Contribution and Benefits
85% of Indonesians and 95% of local civilians and military, Bangladeshis supported the mission.5 helping build rapport Further, 87% of Bangladeshis said the with the host states, as mission improved their perceptions well as showing new of the US, with general positive US techniques for tasks such perceptions doubling. Support for as civilian/infrastructure terrorism and Osama bin Laden in construction, medical Indonesia dropped to 12% from a treatment and military high of 58% in 2003.6 While Pacific logistics. Partnership cannot claim sole Cultural exchanges responsibility for diminishing terrorist and community relations support, continued humanitarian between host and assistance in Indonesia following the participating states Boxing Day Tsunami witnessed a drop are just as important in support by 25%. as the medical and Pacific Partnership projects are construction work. undertaken at the request of the host Cultural exchanges enable state, enabling the participating states the participating and host to provide the right resources for the states to experience and projects requested. For PP11, Tonga understand more about requested, amongst other things, help each other’s culture. refurbishing local schools, including This improves cultural installing solar power, water tanks and awareness and allows play equipment. These projects were all sides to influence the undertaken with the help of the local perceptions of each other. community. Tongan Prime Minister, For PP09, a new way T he Australian Lord Tu’ivakano, expressed his of conducting cultural exchanges NGO’s and military representations contingent for PP12 gratitude, saying: emerged. Instead of small-scale from five states (including the US), in front of USNS I am pleased to note this year’s interaction through work, dedicated supported PP11. Mercy (RAN photo) inter-governmental approach events were organised to interact with The command ship for Pacific where the impact and benefit locals, particularly schoolchildren. Partnership alternates each year has been widened by working The Pacific Fleet Band and US Navy between USNS Mercy (a ‘white hulled’ closely and in tandem with the helicopters proved popular, as they hospital ship) and a ‘grey-hulled’ ship, New Zealand and Australian allowed the children to sing, dance usually a transport/supply ship (for governments. I am sure this will and tour the helicopter. Personnel PP11, the amphibious transport dock form the foundations and perhaps distributed toys donated by non- USS Cleveland was the command a model for future humanitarian government organisations (NGO’s), ship). While grey-hulled ships are not missions that draw together and which the children also enjoyed. This hospital ships, they have the capacity unite different parties to achieve a allows the participants to interact with to carry large amounts of medical set of clearly defined goals.7 a larger part of the community than equipment and have a dedicated One of the other benefits of Pacific before. medical clinic on board. By alternating Partnership is that it works with local between Mercy and a grey-hulled ship, communities, educating and training US involvement the focus of the mission alternates them in professional exchanges and Though organised and led by the US between medical treatment and community conferences. Community Navy, Pacific Partnership is supported engineering projects from year to year. conferences cover topics such as by states with an interest in the Asia- The 1000-bed Mercy has a history natural disaster response, and give an Pacific region as well as NGO’s such in the region, further enhancing the opportunity for the community to say as Rotary International and Project goodwill the mission receives. Mercy what they want from future missions. HOPE (an international healthcare first deployed on a humanitarian Further, participants work alongside organisation). For example, eight mission in the region in 1987, and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 11
was involved in the HADR response care, building infrastructure and states. Neither national interests (for following the Boxing Day tsunami. working with locals can be just as, if example national security) nor strategic According to the US Navy, the not more, effective in creating security interests, such as regional security, primary purpose of Pacific Partnership than militarily defeating an enemy. can be promoted successfully without is to: Soft power is created by the positive relations with neighbouring • strengthen relationships with attractiveness of a state’s culture, states. By building and maintaining host/partner states and NGO’s, political ideals and policies; it spreads positive relations through operations • build partner capacity to through a state’s actions and decisions, such as Pacific Partnership, Australia conduct peace, stability and validates and reinforces the state’s is more likely to be able to positively consequence management common values, beliefs and lifestyles.10 influence the region. operations, From an Australian perspective, with Positive working relationships • improve host/partner state limited hard power options, soft power increase Australia’s national security, HADR capacity, and is vital for securing Australian regional as friendly states are less likely to • improve security cooperation interests, such as trade, resources, and attack each other. Positive working among partner states.8 sea lines of communication. Australia relationships build trust. Trust between Other benefits for the US Navy include; projects soft power in numerous ways, states, particularly militaries, is integral knowing what the emergency response such as student and cultural exchanges, as it allays fears that Australia is a structure and facilities in the affected film and television broadcasts, and negative regional influence and sends states and what HADR priorities in government and NGO’s such as the message that Australia’s military those states will be if there is a natural AusAID or World Vision. One of the intent is benign. HADR missions are disaster in the region; HADR training; ways the Australian Defence Force effective ways to build trust between regional awareness, and relationship (ADF) projects soft power is through states. building with participating and host Pacific Partnership. Trust is also important in creating states. The US Navy also recognises Australian interests avenues for future cooperation and U S Navy aircrewmen the benefits of working with partner trade between states. From an ADF comfort an injured governments, militaries and NGO’s, Pacific Partnership helps promote perspective, working with regional Nicaraguan woman and seeks to continue to strengthen Australian national and strategic militaries allows them to understand prior to take-off these relationships. interests by building and maintaining how other militaries operate, what during a medical evacuation (US Navy) Reasons for positive relationship with regional their capabilities are, and what role ongoing Pacific Partnership missions
Soft power and diplomacy Soft power diplomacy is important for modern states. Soft power is the ability of one state to influence the actions of another through persuasion or attraction, rather than through hard power measures such as threats, sanctions or violence. As leading soft power scholar Joseph Nye surmises, “If I can get you to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not w a n t .” 9 Providing medical Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 Pacific Partnership: Australia’s Contribution and Benefits
A rmy vehicles sit in the tank deck onboard HMAS Tobruk (Navy image) they play in their states’ political/ a stable region being a key Australian economical realities. While parts societal structure. Understanding strategic interest. of Asia are becoming increasingly these elements allows the ADF and ADF participation in Pacific wealthy, many Pacific states remain Australian Government to work more Partnership supports the 2009 White poor. In the 2010/11 financial year, effectively with regional governments, Paper objectives. The White Paper Australia contributed about $1.1 billion mutually increasing regional security. outlines that as a prosperous state, in aid to Pacific states, representing When people are healthy and have Australia should help other states, 25% of Australia’s total aid budget, basic infrastructure, they are less particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, and half of the total aid given to those likely to rebel against the government, and that the ADF provides specialised states globally.12 Providing aid, both potentially creating failed states, capabilities on a scale that no other financially and materially, Australia destabilising the region. Increased Australian Government agency can promotes itself as a good neighbour regional stability means there is less supply.11 As the White Paper further who cares about the interests of its likelihood that Australia will have to mentions, Australia has a strong neighbouring states. deploy the ADF within the region as a interest in ensuring the stability and Australia’s motivation for stabilising force. prosperity of states in the region. participating in Pacific Partnership is Security is more than just With other states vying for regional multi-faceted. Firstly, it has a purely defending against an armed attack. influence and exerting their own soft altruistic element; the Australian Non-traditional security threats, power, it is in Australia’s interests Government wants to help the region such as natural disasters, terrorism to maintain a positive regional achieve higher standards of living. and public health epidemics are now relationship. This is one of Australia’s Secondly, it provides an important core security considerations. Pacific key strategic interests as outlined in HADR and interoperability training Partnership is not designed to prevent the White Paper. A positive regional opportunity for ADF personnel. an armed attack, but it is designed to relationship means there is less Thirdly, it develops regional security. improve public health, infrastructure likelihood another state can influence Fourth, it builds relationships between and disaster response capabilities. the region negatively, against Australia’s Australia and the participating and Improving these capabilities increases national interests. host states, and finally, it helps promote the stability of regional states, and Australian regional policy Australia’s national interests abroad. therefore the region as a whole, with reflects the region’s geostrategic and HADR operations such as Pacific Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 13
Partnership form part of Australia’s larger, with over 300 participants for and other participating/host larger diplomatic efforts. While HADR PP10. This demonstrates the level of states (such as New Zealand, missions are not traditional diplomacy importance the ADF now places on the Japan, Papua New Guinea, East (that is, diplomat to diplomat), they mission. Timor), form part of Australia’s larger public The LCH’s play a vital role in the • experience for ADF medical/ diplomacy mission. Public diplomacy mission. Due to their shallow draft dental/veterinary and is whereby one state directly influences and large cargo capacity, the LCH’s are engineering personnel both in the citizens of other states to shape the perfect vessels to move personnel the region and in general, their opinions, perceptions and and supplies between the ships and • experience in HADR missions, attitudes in a way that will serve the shore. They can also access areas that and home state’s foreign policy interests. larger ships cannot, extending Pacific • strengthening relations with Culture, education, trade and citizen- Partnership’s reach beyond towns neighbouring states through to-citizen interaction are all part of with large ports. During PP10, HMA public diplomacy. creating effective public diplomacy. Ships Labuan and Tarakan became The commander of the Australian Effective public diplomacy floating staging bases for medical and contingent for PP11, Commander contributes to national security. dental teams. Embarking an extra Ashley Papp, RAN, said that the Pacific According to the Department of 21 personnel each (who slept on the Partnership’s benefits to the ADF are Nursing officer Lieutenant Sarah Foreign Affair’s and Trade’s Public open vehicle deck under mosquito improved interoperability with host/ Jarvis with local Diplomacy Handbook, public netting), the LCH’s landed the teams participating states and improving the children on the diplomacy “contributes to [Australia’s] in the morning and picked them lives of people in the region. Further, Indonesian island national security by helping to build up at night from remote towns and Commander Papp added, “Working of Siau during PP12 understanding about Australia and islands inaccessible to larger vessels. closely with friends and allies in this (RAN photo) its place in the world as a stable, This allowed an estimated sophisticated, tolerant and culturally 13,000 extra patients to be diverse nation.” These traits are all treated.13 aspects of soft power projection, For PP10, the Landing making public diplomacy a practical Ship Heavy HMAS Tobruk application of soft power. participated, greatly However, Pacific Partnership is enhancing the amount of not a pure public diplomacy exercise supplies the RAN could as it incorporates aspects of military transport. Tobruk also diplomacy (military-to-military/civilian received the honour of interaction) and medical diplomacy being the first non-US (medical aid). The culmination of command ship for Pacific these three types of diplomacy enables Partnership when Captain Pacific Partnership to influence a broad Lisa Franchetti, USN, based spectrum of society. This provides great herself aboard Tobruk benefits to Australia and the ADF. for the final leg between Darwin and Rabaul, Papua ADF Contribution and New Guinea. benefits The ADF has The importance of Pacific Partnership participated in Pacific to the ADF continues to grow. Up until Partnership since 2006, PP08, the ADF contingent was a small providing RAN vessels, number of medical officers and combat ADF medical personnel and engineers. Since PP09, two landing combat engineers. Pacific craft heavy (LCH) amphibious ships Partnership provides the have been sent to transport equipment ADF with benefits such as, such as medical and building supplies. • interoperability The Australian contingent is now with the US Navy Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 14 Pacific Partnership: Australia’s Contribution and Benefits way in times of peace helps us to refine Chancellor of the University of Natural (Endnotes) our procedures, understanding and Resources and Environment in Papua 1 Tongan Government Portal, Pacific cooperation, so that in times of crises New Guinea best surmised Pacific Partnership Forges Enduring Friendship in Island Communities, viewed at
Depth Charge Depth Charge Depth Charge Depth
16 Charge Muscular Maritime China ?
nder new rules to come into the laws of innocent passage through a Imperial Japan which penetrated China Ueffect on 1 January 2013, China nation’s territorial waters? Is this just from the north and raped its way south has announced that it plans to send the normal behaviour to be expected of in the 1930’s causing tens of millions of Hainan Provincial police to board and a rising seapower moving through the deaths and the destruction of a way of search ships which are acting ‘illegally’ spectrum from Brown to Green to Blue life that generations of Chinse had built in its territorial waters, including those water naval capability? over three millennia. which are in dispute. Acting ‘illegally’ Perhaps this is the case. But there Having myopically ignored the sea may in practice mean that any foreign may be a more complicated, deeply and the development of naval power flagged vessel in Chinese territorial seated and historically ambiguous since the early fifteenth century, the last and disputed waters can be stopped, relationship between Beijing and the emperors of the Middle Kingdom were boarded and searched and escorted out South China Sea which might help helpless to prevent the destruction to the high seas or detained. to explain the subtext to this recent of the Manchu dynasty’s rigid social The pronouncement appears to chest beating and determination to order by foreign merchants and foreshadow an intention by the PLAN be recognised as the Asian arbiter at missionaries. Nor could they prevent to board and search foreign vessels sea. It is not just about who gets what the carving out of spheres of influence in what the owners of the ships and maritime resources in the twenty by the great powers of the West. The their flag state may consider to be first century, though that is a part of invaders ships crossed uncontested their territorial waters. This action the rationale for action. It may also the waters that China considered would be a direct affront to regional be about how China was treated by came under its historic suzerainty. governments that would require a the seapowers of the nineteenth and They imposed trade conditions on the response. One of the actions deemed twentieth centuries. weakened and debauched Imperial illegal by Beijing under the new China under successive dynasties government’s mandarins in Peking. regulations will be ‘conducting acts feared that invasion by barbarians When resistance was offered in 1860 of propaganda that threaten national would come from the east over the the Imperial summer palace was looted security.’ That means whatever Beijing endless plains of central Asia. Indeed in and burned and Peking occupied. says it means! Clearly the right of 1276 the Mongols came from the East Popular uprisings were crushed by the innocent passage through such and became the Chinese ruling dynasty. west with relative ease as it sailed into disputed waters will not be respected Centuries of wall building and repair China’s ports troops and firepower either. The Chinese Ministry of attest to this persistent fear that new to meet the challenge. It was the sea Foreign Affairs spokesman Hong Lei barbarians were just over the border. which ultimately was the author of this declined to elaborate at a press briefing Of course it was true. There were massive loss of Chinese life, wealth and on what might constitute illegal entry. barbarians waiting their opportunity prestige. How significant is this edict? to invade. But the ones who would Treaties lowering tariffs and China’s maritime neighbours are determine China’s fate in the modern demanding concessions, including certainly not happy. Surin Pitsuwan, era were not over Mongolian land the right to navigate the Yangtze, the Secretary General of ASEAN, border they were over the maritime were won from a bitterly resentful but has called this ‘a very serious turn horizon. They were despised nations powerless Chinese emperor. Even of events’, diplomatic code for an developing technology and firepower the infant Australia was involved in unacceptable arrogation of new that massively outstripped the capacity this dubious occupation when HMCS powers to determine behaviour at of pre industrial China to match. Protector sailed to China to be part of sea by Beijing and a challenge to all It was from the sea that the the suppression of the Boxer rebellion states disputing China’s version of who European and American barbarians in 1900. It did not take a Chinese owns what features. What is behind came to ‘humiliate’ China in the Mahan to work out that the origin of China’s determination to challenge the nineteenth century. Later it was the China’s misery and destruction lay in international agreements which govern troops of the great new Asian seapower her failure to keep pace technologically Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 17
with the West and to apply the new China as far as the territorial waters of to accommodate itself to the fact industrial skills to building a Navy the rest of South East Asia’s maritime that pronouncements will be made which could command the waters off states were once, and therefore should by Beijing principally for internal her long open coastline. be again, under Chinese control. They consumption. Is the pronouncement From the 1890s onwards Japan built are not in the least interested in the on boarding vessels in territorial waters a modern battle fleet, with the help of arcane rulings of the International just such a banner waving action the British, and prepared for the new Tribunal for the Law of the Sea intended to allay popular fears that century with confidence. China had (ITLOS) in Hamburg or the principles China is being outfaced at sea, or is neither the resources or the knowledge of Law of the Sea Convention 1982. it China’s real intent to follow up the or the freedom to become a naval In fact China stated when it words with deeds at sea? Time will tell. power. That made all the difference to ratified UCLOS that it will not accept Standing behind the smaller these two Asian powers’ relative fates compulsory arbitration of its maritime ASEAN maritime powers and Japan is in the first half of the twentieth century. disputes. It has the right to do this the United States which does not wish The lesson was learned and Mao began under UCLOS and is not the only to find itself watching a shooting match the process of building and buying country to make this declaration. That between the PLAN and vessels of its a fleet from Moscow. The project to opt out entitlement does not prevent regional allies. Time will tell whether modernise and enlarge the PLAN is the flag state of a seized vessel from Beijing really intends to metaphorically never ending for China. bringing a claim against China and that poke a chopstick in the eye of the Why is all this history relevant to may well happen if China enforces its American eagle by attempting to the first half of the 21st century and claims. enforce its claimed entitlements to stop China’s recent pronouncement? The In summary the people to and search the vessels of friends of the men who rule China today know that whom the Communist Party must United States. the capacity of the ruling Communist be responsive are not interested in The young United States Congress Party to retain the ‘mandate of the rights of Japan, the Philippines, sent its tiny Navy to war with the Royal heaven’, and continue single party Malaysia, Indonesia or Vietnam Navy in 1812 over Britain’s demand to rule indefinitely, depends on the to assert their historical claims to search US-flagged ships on the High willing participation of the mass of the maritime features which would give Seas seeking wartime contraband and Chinese people in the bold experiment them fishing and mineral rights. Such British born sailors. Perhaps that bit of that is the rise of China. They are riding assertions are regarded as attempts at naval history needs to be pointed out the tiger! The Chinese masses must humiliation of the motherland. The to the more ambitious of the muscular observe and participate in this new age average Chinese wants to hear that maritime converts in the Chinese where the humiliations of the past are the Japanese, still resented for their Politburo before more ambit claims now impossible. wartime cruelty and their twisting of are made which enrage the neighbours Bullying of Beijing, or the modern history, are the ones being and cause friction with the regional perception of it, must stop and humiliated over their claims to these maritime superpower whose Seventh ultimately one suspects obeisance by ‘Chinese’ islands. The logic presumably fleet still patrols the waters China smaller powers must recommence is: something must be done to assert persists in claiming as exclusively its after an unnatural interruption of half a China’s new found strength with regard own. t millennium. With this recrudescence of to perceived Japanese hegemonic hope and self belief in the public mind claims. This is something, therefore it go certain facts about how the future must be done! The forced closure of will be for the Chinese people. Japanese company’s car plants in China “Depth Charge” submits his work Most Chinese believe passionately by furious workers was apparently a anonymously to the Editor. that Taiwan is a temporarily detached spontaneous expression of real anger ‘renegade province’ of the motherland over Japanese claims. which must be returned to central These facts about how the future authority one way or another. This is going to be, which are believed should occur peacefully if possible by the Chinese proletariat and the and by force if necessary. They believe ruling elite, are, for the foreseeable intuitively that all the seas around future, immutable. The West needs Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18
N ovember 2012 a number of RAN Ships have been involved in the annual EXERCISE Triton Warrior taking place in the EAST Australian Exercise Area (EAXA) of Jervis Bay. This is a valuable opportunity to develop interoperability and for RAN personnel to gain new skills and develop experience. The pictures show the testing of the new remote control surface target trials. This capability will allow the RAN to develop skills and tactics to overcomes threat from Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC). The testing involved the Australian Maritime Warfare Centre, HMAS Darwin, 816 Squadron and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.
76mm gun after firing, duringE XERCISE Triton Warrior , HMAS Darwin.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 19 Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid B y DrTom Lewis and Peter Ingman
apan deployed four of its aircraft nominally the same, carriers against Darwin in 1942. This they were quite different Jwas no “air raid” as such: the Imperial in fine detail. Soryu was Japanese Navy had a new “wonder completed first, in 1937. weapon’ at its disposal and used it She was the smaller of accordingly. The end result was an the two: her sister ship overwhelming tactical victory for the was completed two new empire of the Pacific. years later and was 1.5 The Imperial Japanese Navy took thousand tons bigger: at their different types of carrier and 20, 250 tons compared welded them into a formidable force to Soryu’s 18, 880. that operated as one. This will be Hiryu was nearly four discussed later, but its effect was to foot wider (about 1.2 shape a formidable force that could metres). 1940 naval review overwhelm whatever target its admiral While both ships carried a crew of then that Hiryu was in every respect aerial view (front to chose it to destroy. 1100, and were capable of 34 knots, a better ship, but there was one back and left to right) Soryu and Hiryu were of the same Hiryu carried two more aircraft: 73 noticeable difference: the newer vessel Tone, Settsu, Mizuho, class, named after the former. Although opposed to 71. It might be supposed had her island superstructure based and Isuzu.Ships of on the port (left) side of the ship. The the World magazine No. 40, December, rationale behind this is discussed a little 1960-1. later. The Japanese carriers were generally speaking at the forefront of the marque’s latest ideas, but they were not perfect. Naval historian David Hobbs points out: “A major Japanese weakness was the need to strike aircraft down into the hangar to be refueled and rearmed, a time-consuming process in which the operating sped of the lifts was a critical factor that was to prove disastrous at the battle of Midway…”1 The aircraft hangars below the main, or weather, deck were serviced by lifts, which descended to the hangar, or further down to a second hangar, to bring up and down the aircraft, the carrier’s fighting weapon. The lifts were complex pieces of machinery, able to carry several tons of aircraft, equipment, and people at a time. Their operation was vital to the carrier’s operation of aircraft, for if they jammed or became battle damaged, aircraft would be stranded above and below until repairs were effected. Generally Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid speaking, the hangars were aft at the of the four: the others’ being 31 knots of construction. In fact, exactly how stern or amidships in the middle of the for the flagship Akagi, and 34 for the an aircraft carrier’s vitals should be vessel, with the bow area designated for two smaller ships Soryu and Hiryu. In arranged would occupy designer for aircraft takeoffs, which were most likely a line of advance the entire strike force decades more to come.3 carried out without the later inventions would be limited to Kaga’s speed so as Sources differ as to the reasoning of catapults and certainly without ski to retain cohesion within the protective for the placement: one4 suggesting it jumps. Aircraft could also be stored force of cruisers and destroyers. was “an experiment in determining along the sides of the carrier for a short Steaming into the wind was a whether this characteristic would period.1 necessary operation for carriers improve flight patterns when operating Construction and performance launching or recovering aircraft: it a mixed task force of port-sided and effectively gave 28 knots (or whatever starboard-sided carriers.” Another5 The lengthiest carrier in the Japanese speed the carrier could make) under states that the rationale was as the force, at 855 feet (261 metres) Akagi the wings of the aircraft launching, result of 1930s design studies which was longer than a soccer field – 130 therefore meaning they were already showed that “turbulence over the yards / 119 metres – and comparatively “flying” at that speed, and so much flight deck aft (which affected aircraft massive in breadth and displacement, closer to the speed needed for liftoff. during landing) could be reduced by roughly equivalent to the larger USA On landing, the wind on the aircraft’s moving the island away from the ship’s carriers. Like many aircraft carriers in nose effectively meant there was exhaust gases.” Yet another3 suggests: the world at that time, she was a hybrid already a brake on the aircraft’s landing. “the island was placed on the starboard ship, a carrier deck built on battlecruiser Kaga’s lesser ability here meant side because early (propeller) aircraft or battleship lines; in Akagi’s case the her aircraft were at a disadvantage turned to the left more easily (an effect former. Oddly, she was originally heavily compared to the other carriers: that of engine torque). Obviously such armed with guns, the main armament three knots when compared to Akagi an aircraft can execute a wave-off to of carriers being their aircraft; a and the six knots lesser speed for Soryu the left more easily, so the island was leftover from her early planning as a and Hiryu meant that the Kaga aircraft put to starboard to be out of the way. conventional line of battle vessel. Even could not be so heavily loaded with fuel Another idea6 was to allow two carriers at Midway it would seem she possessed and bombs. to operate extremely closely; the left six or eight eight-inch guns.2 Having said that, Kaga was a worthy and right islands of a pair allowing Kaga’s main problem when in ship. She was some 40 feet shorter than maximum visibility as they steamed company with the other three carriers the flagship but displaced 1, 300 tons alongside, but there is no evidence of of the Darwin group was her lesser more. She carried one less aircraft: this from Japanese archives so far. speed: 28 knots making her the slowest 90 as opposed to 91. The two smaller Akagi even had a downward- carriers Soryu and Hiryu operated 71 pointing main funnel on the starboard 1 The Japanese carriers had wooden planking decks over a lattice of steel beams, and 73 respectively. side, showing the type of experiments like the US Navy’s vessels, as opposed to The two smaller carriers showed that had been undertaken to control British ships, which had an all-steel deck construction. The Americans would pay the results of around a further decade the flow of heated air and how it might dearly for this when kamikazes targeted the of thinking relating to carrier design. “flat-tops” in the later stages of the war: the 3 Haze Gray & Underway suggests: wooden decks were a lot more vulnerable Completed in the late 1930s as opposed “Initially the island was placed on the to impact than steel plates. The Americans to the 1920s, they were faster; more starboard side because early (propeller) and British, the operators of large carrier 2 aircraft turned to the left more easily (an forces in the Pacific, never developed this efficient in their power delivery than effect of engine torque). Obviously such interesting suicide technique whereby a their bigger sisters – so using less fuel – an aircraft can execute a wave-off to the pilot sacrificed his life for the devastating left more easily, so the island was put to impact an aircraft crashing into a ship could and in Soryu’s case more graceful; she starboard to be out of the way….Once the achieve. Ultimately however, it did not stop was a purpose-designed carrier from starboard side position was established the Allied advance. (Reference discussions and a few carriers were built in that the keel to the island superstructure. between author Lewis and David Hobbs.) configuration, it became difficult to change. 2 Nihon Kaigun suggests ten 8-inch guns, Akagi and Hiryu both – most Pilots used to landing with the island to later to become eight; while Shattered Sword notably and oddly – had their islands their right would be confused on a ship gives only six. (p. 7) Akagi was completed with the island on the other side. There was in 1927, after a stop in her construction to placed to the port, or left, side of the nothing to be gained by moving the island, change her from a battlecruiser to an aircraft ship. This was related to the constant so it stayed in the same place. Once angled carrier. She was refitted in 1935 when it decks were introduced this became even would seem she was made more “carrier- experimenting which was being carried more important, since the deck angle would like” and it would have made sense to get rid on in the carrier world at the time have to be changed to move the island.” See of some guns then to save weight. http://www.hazegray.org/faq/smn5.htm Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 21
A Japanese carrier under construction (Simon Loveday)
affect aircraft performance. Whatever enormous range of aircraft, compared hits often the projectile passed straight the rationale, these two ships, despite to ships, meant that they could fly long through the aircraft’s side; and out of their different class and ten years of distances and then attack shipping. The the other, not making enough damage thinking inbetween their construction, big guns of the carrier’s force (and in to bring down the craft. Many a pilot spent their lives with their islands to some cases, the carrier also had large survived combat in WWI and II the left. At least their pilots could not anti-ship guns fitted) were ill-suited to bringing home an aircraft shredded get confused and land on the sister anti-aircraft fire, lacking often elevation with hits, but still flying. Pilots found ships Kaga and Soryu… landing on the to fire upwards to a sufficient height; quickly that armouring themselves wrong deck indeed something that has reload speed necessary to engage a fast – with backseat-armour for example indeed happened in the tremendously moving aerial target, and accuracy – – was a most useful measure to keep intricate world of carrier operations. the solid shell even deflected forward the machine under control from a live Akagi and Hiryu remain the only two of the target accurately being too small pilot. carriers in the history of the marque in its frontal area to achieve sufficient The best shipborne AA weapons to have islands to port. But once the hits; something like a shotgun spread were the quick firing weapon such starboard side position was established seemed a better alternative. as the Oerlikon, with its large 20mm and a few carriers were built in that Consequently during WWII round most effective if it caught an configuration, it became difficult to anti-aircraft defences sprouted from aircraft in its vitals or hit the pilot. The change.” 7 carrier and escort ships like quills heavy machinegun – the .50 calibre – from porcupines. They consisted of also had a spread of shot, a big enough Carrier defences two main types: quick-firing, small, calibre, and sufficient muzzle velocity Ironically, the biggest threat to the fast projectiles; and machineguns, to do good damage to an aircraft. It safety of a carrier by the end of 1941 preferably of a heavy enough calibre was rather like using a shotgun against was aircraft – other people’s coming to make a sufficient hole in whatever the flying machines, but it was a big your way armed with hostile intent. they hit. While aircraft were sometimes shotgun: smaller calibres such as those It was becoming obvious that the too thin-skinned to withstand such in .303 didn’t do enough damage. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid
Such weapons were effective, but not to one hundred percent. Often an aircraft would get through the fusillade of shot fired at it, and successfully fire a torpedo or drop a bomb; divebombers – aircraft diving from a considerable height and releasing a bomb – indeed being a new weapon but one that was quickly taken up given its effectiveness both on land and – hopefully – at sea; proven in A scene on the deck the Spanish Civil the uptake as to what it actually was three-man Nakajima “Kate” – which of the carrier Akagi War with the Stuka, and thought to be they were firing against. Some aircraft could carry gravity-drop bombs, or (Courtesy Bob Alford) a new weapon for the sea war. And so were slow biplanes, and easily enough torpedoes for anti-ship strike, and it proved: in the carrier battles of the identified. But most on both sides were Aichi “Val” two-man divebombers, Pacific and against conventional ships fast metal monoplanes, looking similar primarily designated for shipping such as the Tirpitz, the divebomber was enough to non-flying people as to be attack. To protect the bombers the to be an effective if short-lived weapon. easily confused with the hostile’s side’s single-seat Mitsubishi “Zero” – the The dive-bomber was to prove most machines. The incidents of “friendly proper designation was “Zeke” – flew vulnerable to anti-aircraft weapons, fire” began in the early years of WWII, with the bomber force and warded off given the attack configuration of and rapidly became worse. enemy fighters. The range of this strike descending rapidly in a limited square The ultimate AA weapon was force was in the region of hundreds of of sky, and also conventional fighters. however the defending side’s own miles, depending on the load carried, While at Midway the divebomber aircraft, deployed far enough away superseding the big guns of the struck hard at the Japanese carriers from the strike force so as to ensure battleship, which could fire up to many and indeed proved decisive, as warfare insufficient “leakage” of a massive aerial miles, depending on the size of the gun. technology evolved so did the dive- incoming force could not get through bomber’s capabilities diminish, and to attack the ships. This meant that A ircraft at sea post WWII it disappeared from some aircraft had to be deployed as Ever since someone in a navy thought armouries across the world. defending fighters. Obviously they that aircraft at sea were a good idea, Shipborne AA defences had an had to be given guidance apart from the concept of keeping them there has unintended, bitter, but understandable the aircrew’s own eyes, and so radar been one eagerly embraced by some side-effect. Anyone in a ship having was seen very quickly as being totally seaman, initially rejected by others, but been attacked by an aircraft, especially necessary to the defence. Radio linked eventually accepted by all. if they had seen the consequences of everything together in a complicated Aircraft at sea have distinct a successful torpedo or bomb strike, but workable solution. advantages. Historically, they were was extremely nervous about being The aircraft were also an attacking first useful for reconnaissance – seeing the victim of such an onslaught. force. Three main single engine types where the other side’s ships were so you Consequently AA crews tended to were carried by the Japanese fleet. could more effectively attack them, or be quick on the trigger and slow on Bombers – the Allied-designated spotting the fall of shot from your guns. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 23
In this respect they were rather like all. The rise of air power, many have airborne; they needed flammable fuel; those aircraft – balloons – employed in argued, sealed the fate of the battleship. they needed mechanical specialists to the American Civil War: a means to an Large and cumbersome, the battleship tend them, and they were quite delicate end. The concept of towing a balloon was a dinosaur by the twenties and in construction – hardly suitable to be from a ship was experimented with thirties and fatally vulnerable to air carried in quantity aboard a rolling, but did not eventuate as a custom and attack according to this school of pitching, and often leaking ship. They aviation at sea was not really a concept interpretation. The debate has been needed a new specialized crew to until necessity arrived. characterised as one that split navies fly them, and what were these new When WWI arrived and Zeppelins between a younger, dynamic group technically-minded people: officers or came out to bomb Royal Navy warships who argued the case of the supremacy sailors? it was realized that an on-board aircraft of aviation against the older men who As WWII dawned and came into would be the best means of chasing remained wedded to their reactionary being the future of the aircraft carrier them away. It was quickly seen that ideas of all-big-gun ships engaging was far from certain. The role of those aircraft could be catapulted from a each other in blue water. Geoffrey Till operating air operations over the sea ship, or they could be lowered over has argued that such interpretations of was also the subject of much debate the side to take off on water. But how the Royal Navy are crude caricatures. and often acrimonious argument – could they be recovered? The concept He sees the Navy as one in which should it be land-based aircraft or had been tried: in 1912 Lieutenant technological innovation was being carrier-borne machines that filled this Charles Samson had flown a biplane discussed the whole time and informed position? off a platform on board the battleship doctrinal debate. According to Till, air In Britain in 1939 the battleship was HMS Africa. Fighters were duly fitted power was taken seriously, but as an still the king of the sea battle, and this to several warships. The problem of unproven force it could not be allowed concept was carried through to every how to recover such a machine was one to dominate thinking and planning other navy as well. But events in the worth pondering over. Crash-landing entirely.” war quickly began to change matters – and losing – the aircraft was feasible, The carrier was much experimented The loss of the British carrier but losing the pilot too was too much with after the War. The ‘big gun’ Glorious is a good illustration of to ask, especially when the through- battleship was still though the ambition how concepts were embedded. life training and expense of a pilot was of all seamen officers, and the carrier The situation is best described in considered. was seen as an aid to sea battle: useful John Winton’s Carrier Glorious, but The concept of a deck from which to for finding submarines perhaps, and essentially this British ship was part launch and/or recover the aircraft was for carrying aircraft to sea, where they of an invasion of Norway in 1940. The one much experimented with in WWI, did have their uses, but not otherwise attack was a failure, and repulsed by and eventually success was achieved a key element of sea power. This idea a strong German defence the British in limited form. The light battlecruiser was hotly debated by some theorists withdrew. Glorious was steaming back Furious was converted into an aircraft however, who saw possibilities for the to Britain, escorted by two destroyers, carrier and the first ever successful striking power of the ships. when she was surprised, and quickly deck landing occurred in August Aircraft though in the main were sunk by two German battleships, the 1917 when Squadron Commander not keeping up. The machines of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, despite EH Dunning landed his Sopwith Pup time were often slow, both in their the best efforts of the two escorts, on board. Aircraft carriers in WWI top speed, thus limiting in a time/ who were also sunk. Glorious, despite however were in their infancy and range equation, and in their approach having aircraft available, did not have their use was much decried; derided, speeds, thus meaning they were one flying in reconnaissance, which applauded and otherwise argued about, vulnerable in any idea of attacking a would have saved her, let alone in a as indeed aircraft themselves had been ship with bombs or guns. They were mode where they could have defended argued about during the war. frail too – a hail of machine-gun fire her. Her commanding officer – Captain Indeed, Mark Connelly, the author was quite possible fatal to any aircraft Guy D’Oyly-Hughes – did not rate of Battleships and British Society, notes hit. Aircraft had many annoying aircraft carriers highly, and indeed ”Naval historians have debated whether features which were detrimental to was contemptuous of their aircraft’s the Royal Navy (and indeed any other ships carrying them: they usually defensive abilities, and furthermore, navy) should have built battleships at needed wind over the deck to become annoyed by such things as course Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid deviations he would have had to make of Bismarck in May 1941 by an attached sub-sea component of to turn into the wind to launch and aircraft launched from the submarines. The purpose of this flotilla recover the aircraft. carrier Ark Royal; she was then of vessels was to protect the carriers – a Over the next five years the sunk by ships of the RN. prime target – and also to let offensive mindset of such officers was shattered. • The ttacksa on tactical land operations be carried out unhampered Significant combat events utilizing air bases in the Pacific, where by hostile combatants. The Darwin aircraft carriers included: islands were bombed and raid group was no exception. Three • The ttacka on Pearl Harbor strafed by aircraft before troop cruisers – heavy units Tone and by the Japanese forces in landings. Chikuma, and light cruiser Abukuma; December 1941. This massive • The battles of the Coral were present, their big guns’ primary assault smashed many useful; Sea and Midway which task was to keep offensive surface heavy warships, and would significantly utilised carriers. vessels at a considerable distance from have destroyed aircraft carriers As the war came to a close the the carriers. Mitsuo Fuchida, the Air too, if they had been there. usefulness of carriers in the public eye Group commander, and historian • The ttacka on distant land came more to the fore. The role of the Masatake Okumiya, also suggest that targets by airborne carrier- battleship had not been devalued so two battleships, Hiei and Kirishima, based assets, such as that upon much as reconsidered. Especially in were also present, although this is not Darwin on 19 February 1942. the Pacific, the strategic concern was borne out in other sources. It is an odd The use of aircraft bypassed to take and invest land bases, hence notation, because Fuchida was writing shore heavy gun defences the attacks on places such as Saipan only 13 years after the raid, and one designed for use against and Okinawa. As these were islands, would presume the presence of two battleships, which would they needed to be bombarded by huge vessels as this would have been otherwise have closed the coast naval-based gunnery, which included indelibly noticeable.8 and shelled their target. The attacks by aircraft, before the ground C ruisers: Heavy Cruisers x 2; Light installation of heavy guns on troops went in. Indeed, the more Cruiser x 1 shore meant such ships were bombardment the better, because this vulnerable to these attacks. saved Allied lives. Although the heavy The design of Tone and Chikuma was The aircraft, as an alternative, guns of battleships were most useful, were able to fly around such aircraft could often hit what ship-based guns, and were only partially guns could not, utilising rockets and vulnerable to small rapid-firing bombs to great effect, and often flying gun systems. in support of infantry, where heavy • The ttacka on Japan by the guns would have endangered friendly aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel troops. James H. Doolittle in April Different carrier types had 1942, launched from the evolved: the ‘escort’ carrier, which the aircraft carrier USS Hornet. Americans often called a ‘jeep’ carriers, This daring raid, using B-25 as opposed to the main battle type. “Mitchell” medium bombers, The difference was usually in tonnage especially lightened for the – around 8,000 tons as opposed to 20- take-off, made an especially 30, 000 tons. The concept of a strategic useful psychological raid on carrier – one that was specifically Tokyo. designed for land attack, and designed • In August 1942 the carriers to influence foreign affairs, was in the Eagle, Indomitable, Victorious future. and Furious provided air cover along with the re-supply Protection force of aircraft to Malta as part Grouped with every carrier whenever of operation Pedestal. she was in a combat zone was a surface • The finding and disabling protection force sometimes including Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 25
quite different to Western cruisers. identical. ahead, behind, and “up threat” – in the Their firepower was concentrated The heavy cruisers Takao and Maya direction from where any danger might forward of the bridge, and the aft – both Takao-class – were deployed emerge – the underwater warriors end of the ship was kept for flying from Palau from 16 February as distant silently sought out enemy ships that operations. The six seaplanes they cover, meaning they were most likely might be trying to close the carrier each carried were very useful for positioned between where it was group and attack. They took good care reconnaissance, especially when she thought any elements of the ABDA not to be near the force itself, else the was working with an aircraft carrier force ships would be.9 Although details escorting destroyers perceive them group. have not been located, this would most falsely as a threat, and attack them. This The two ships were virtually likely have been between the main is a technique still practiced today with archipelagic islands near the Sunda modern carrier groups. Strait, as being the most likely choke Finally, the submarines were often point through which enemy vessels used between the carrier force and would have to pass. the target to recover downed aviators. A “screen’ of seven, some suggest10 Surfaced, they could see a reasonable eight, destroyers was also engaged to distance along the axis of flight to shield the group from submarines, and from the target, and would be although their torpedoes and guns positioned accordingly. They could were also useful against surface vessels, also be used as long distance scouts although this may well have been at to report on weather, although in this a cost of themselves, their light build function they were gradually being meaning no armour was carried.11 displaced by aircraft. A submarine force was also grouped with the attack force, ironically the F lying operations three remaining boats of the Sixth Launching and recovering aircraft Submarine Squadron which had involved the whole carrier force. The attacked Darwin the preceding month. aircraft carriers themselves had to turn In an operation which remains a into whatever wind was available, to revelation to most even today, four give wind over the wings of the aircraft submarines had laid mines and and therefore help lift them off the attacked a convoy in mid-month, decks. Turning large ships such as these culminating in an action12 where one called for a lot of searoom, and turning of the vessels – the I-124 – had been with them was the whole protective defeated in a close-range battle with force. the corvette HMAS Deloraine. The Once the aircraft “armada“ had 279-foot (85 metre) boat, with her been launched – on 19 February 1942, 80 crew on board, still lies outside 188 aircraft in total indeed necessitates Darwin harbour today. The other such a word – the carriers could three submarines had fled, causing resume a different course, usually one the Japanese High Command to think that took them towards where their again about a methodology for closing aircraft would be returning from, in down the northern port. Vengeance case any were damaged and low on for their fallen comrades must have fuel. This had to be tempered with been on the minds of the three other caution however, as it was usually submarine crews on board the I-121, the direction from where attack I-122, and I-123. might eventuate. Given a strike could The submarines’ task was also force take some hours, the carriers and protection, but in a different manner their escorts often would steam in from the close-range protection the a “racetrack” pattern, a large figure surface ships provided. Roving far eight, for example. When the aircraft Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid returned the carriers would again have to turn into the wind, this time to lower the landing speed at which the aircraft touched down, to be caught on arresting wires and dramatically stopped. In Darwin the direction of the incoming flight was more known and the steaming pattern altered accordingly. The intricate complexity of the carrier operations was immense. It resembled a ballet of men, flying machines, weather, and ship operations. Aircraft were brought up from below the deck on lifts somewhat larger than Western carriers, as IJN aircraft did not have as capable folding wings – the Kates had folded wings, the Vals only folded wingtips – and readied for flight. The pilot and– in Detail of the port side the divebombers and vertical bombers killed the crew the ship would often most difficult aspect of operations of either Akagi or – aircrew, boarded and the engine was complete the destruction. from a carrier was landing on the Hiryu. Note the gun started. The aircraft was pushed and Once in the air the pilot was master deck. The tail hook landing was always sponsons. (Darwin pulled into position for takeoff, guided of his craft to a degree, but he was challenging. There were sometimes Military Museum via by signalers armed with a complex usually to be part of a formation that accidents and I saw aircraft crash and Simon Loveday) set of hand movements to signal the would be part of a massed attack. Upon the pilots were usually killed.”14 aircrew as to how the aircraft would return the aircraft would approach assist with engine and brakes. Once the carrier from astern of the ship, T he Japanese Commanders in position the engine was accelerated which was steaming at high speed At the start of 1942 the Japanese while the aircraft was held in position to give a headwind that would assist carriers of the First Mobile Striking by its brakes and restraining cables. the landing. Most navies employed Force were the most powerful Whether the four carriers which a “batsman” at this point who would naval force on earth. Referred to Japanese pilots Masao Asai and attacked Darwin had catapults assist the aircraft pilot by signals, more simply as Mobile Fleet, it was Masao Sato aboard is unlikely. One source suggests indicating he was too high, low, fast, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo carrier Akagi, 1938- “Japanese carriers also began to be slow, or off course. An aircraft could Chuichi, who flew his flag from the 1939, with Zero equipped with catapults just before war be “waved off” at this point, meaning a carrier Akagi. Some sources refer to fighter broke out, starting with the Shokakus.” fly over of the ship; rejoining However, another source suggests: the line of aircraft waiting to “All takeoffs were deck launches, as “land on” and having another Japanese carriers had no catapults.”13 attempt. Crashes on deck An aircraft handler would give the were not infrequent, and final permission for release, and with for this eventuality – or any the engine at full power the aircraft other emergency – firesuited would accelerate at maximum along men in helmets were kept the deck and into the air over the bow at instant readiness, ready of the ship. Failure of machine or men to take to a crashed and at this point was usually fatal: a “cold possibly burning aircraft with shot” meant the carrier would often fire axes and retrieval of the run straight over the top of its aircraft, crew. Fighter pilot Tsunoda and if the impact of the crash hadn’t Kazuo recalled: “To me the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 27
Japanese carrier Mobile Fleet as “Nagumo’s Carrier power at sea. With Task Force”15 or “Nagumo Force”.16 the island on the However, Nagumo himself had little to port side, this is do with his own air operations. While either Akagi or Hiryu. Two other a competent officer, he was “largely 17 carriers in the passive and not terribly innovative”. background leader Little if nothing of the success of the three battleships force can be attributed to Nagumo. or battlecruisers, It was rather a case of being in the with two or three carriers behind right place at the right time: he was (Simon Loveday, commanding a superior weapon Darwin Military system which was employed using Museum) effective and successful doctrine. While the Pearl Harbor attack was a celebrated success, Nagumo failed to order a further strike. This may have crippled the base infrastructure, and according to Admiral Nimitz could had famously led the Pearl Harbor to crack an egg, this was the time”.26 have lengthened the Pacific War for attack. Fuchida himself led the B5N Certainly this was a curious use of the another two years.18 Kate unit on Akagi. Also from Akagi force at this critical time, especially Fortunately for Nagumo, he had was a veteran fighter pilot who led the given that the two carriers of Division a number of talented officers serving Zeroes, Lieutenant Commander Itaya 5 (Shokaku and Zuikaku) had also under him who were deeply committed Shigeru.22 Another influential officer participated. Thus in the two months to the development of high quality, was Lieutenant Commander Egusa following Pearl Harbor, Akagi and Pearl Harbor attack, massed naval airpower. The stand-out Takashige, who led the D3 Val unit Kaga steamed long distances but faced 7 December 1941. was Nagumo’s air officer, Commander onboard Soryu. He was the recognised only negligible opposition. A Japanese Navy Genda Minoru, who has attracted Japanese expert on dive bombing.23 It was in early February when they Zero fighter (tail superlatives such as “brilliant”19 Further, Genda respected him as being arrived at Palau and made rendevous number A1-108) and “house genius”.20 It was Genda a “God-like” combat leader.24 Egusa with Hiryu and Soryu. These carriers takes off from Akagi, on its way to who first pushed for the carriers had led the crucial second wave dive had detached after Pearl Harbor to attack Pearl Harbor to be grouped together in a single bombing attack against ships at Pearl support the Wake Island occupation. during the morning command. It was also Genda who Harbor. Indeed, virtually all of the So the best carriers of Mobile Force of 7 December had designed the daring Pearl Harbor flying leaders at Darwin were Pearl were again re-united and the first 1941. (Official US operation, so he was largely responsible Harbor veterans. At least 80% of the mission was to strike Darwin. Douglas Navy Photograph, National Archives for developing the air doctrine that aircrews themselves must have been Lockwood, writing the first book on Collection) enabled aircraft from different carriers similar veterans.25 to operate together effectively as a The Darwin raid would be single force. As this was so new, there the first time the carriers of was nobody else suitably credentialed Division 1 (Akagi and Kaga) and to critique his plans. Nagumo himself Division 2 (Hiryu and Soryu) were was certainly unable to do so. Hence to operate together since Pearl the air operations of Mobile Fleet “were Harbor. Indeed the Division 1 disproportionately the responsibility of carriers had initially returned a single individual”.21 to Japan. They then only faced The core architect of the Darwin insignificant opposition during air strike was undoubtably Genda. raids against Rabaul and the wider However he had a cadre of very New Guinea area in January. It experienced and capable aviation was in reference to these raids leaders. Chief among these was that Fuchida made the comment Commander Fuchida Mitsuo, who “if a sledgehammer had been used Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid the Darwin raid, and interviewing regarding Darwin itself, and did not the aviator, claimed that Fuchida saw expect serious opposition. Perhaps Darwin as similar to Rabaul, and thus this overconfidence led to what was the sledgehammer and egg metaphor perhaps the only oversight during the was again valid.27 operation. During attacks elsewhere, However it is clear that the Japanese the Japanese were meticulous in recognised the strategic value of attacking all air bases in the vicinity Darwin in regard to their operations of the target. However at Darwin in the Netherlands East Indies. The they failed to attack Batchelor, just 50 Japanese Navy General Staff had miles south of Darwin – less than 20 31 approved the Darwin attack as soon minutes flying time for the bombers. Japanese raid carrier as possible after Pearl Harbor. Genda Batchelor was very significant in that it defined around the capital ships. But article/Kate replica himself ‘recommended that it be was used by American heavy bombers. in November 1940 the Royal Navy aircraft in 2005, the first target”.28 The commander RAAF Wirraways had been dispersed launched the first entirely carrier with ordnance slung. (Photo by Captain of Carrier Division 2, Rear-Admiral there from Darwin. Batchelor was also aviation anti-ship strike of the war, Joe Broker) Yamaguchi, wanted to attack Darwin the only location outside of Darwin when Italian battleships were sunk or himself using only Hiryu and Soryu. to be allocated AA guns. So this disabled in the port of Taranto. This He first made this proposal on 20 oversight is unexplained, especially as effectively put the potentially powerful January, when the Division 1 carriers the field would usually be easily seen Italian capital ships out of the war, and were far away in the New Guinea from the air given the relatively thick helped secure the balance of power area. However, it is also recorded that surrounding jungle. But it seems the for the British in the Mediterranean. Yamaguchi’s reasoning made reference Japanese never knew about Batchelor.32 The strike weapon that produced this to a surprise attack by American stunning result was just 24 fabric- destroyers on a Japanese convoy off T he Japanese strike weapon covered biplanes flying from a single Balikpapan. He wanted all bases within The Japanese carriers had one unique carrier – perhaps a force more likely to a radius of 600 miles of intended advantage over any other carrier force have been thought useful for scouting operations to be attacked.29 Darwin in the world: they combined their than as a strike force. was certainly within such a radius in aircraft into one formidable weapon, to Such a stunning result did not go regard to Timor, for example. be used decisively against any target.33 unnoticed by the Japanese, who studied The Japanese could have attacked Other carrier-operating nations had Taranto closely. It ultimately led to Darwin much earlier. However not yet understood and undertaken this the formation of the First Air Fleet in Yamamoto himself made it clear that tactical idea. Given all of the aircraft April 1941: for the first time carriers four carriers would be used, even from any Japanese carrier force – at were being combined together as was though it meant delaying the attack. Darwin 188 aircraft operating against natural with the “big gun” ships. This Accordingly, on the afternoon of 9 a target of town and shipping – this has been called a “truly revolutionary Val escorted by February Yamamoto sent Southern meant the air fleet armada was virtually development” that transformed naval a Zero. Note the Force Telegraph Order No. 92 to the unstoppable. No matter how good the aviation from an ancillary role to divebomber’s undercarriage does carriers. This assigned Mobile Fleet defender’s countermeasures were, and “a decisive arm of battle”.34 Within not retract. (Photo by to attack Darwin one day before the at Darwin they proved not to be very months this led to the well planned and Victor G. Archer) invasion of Timor was planned to good, the countermeasures would be commence, around 19 February. The overwhelmed, and the target swamped order also comprised a second part and devastated. which sent Mobile Force into the The first years of WWII had at first Indian Ocean to destroy enemy forces seemed only to confirm the supremacy south of Java. of the “big gun” ships. The British These plans make it clear that leader Churchill fretted about the likes Darwin was considered an important of the raider Bismarck and whether target. Genda said simply “the the Germans would employ the newly planning was a comparatively easy surrendered French battleships. Naval t a s k ”. 30 He had good intelligence operations and sea power were still Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 29
perfectly executed Pearl Harbor strike. The Japanese were the first to combine the air fleets of multiple carriers into a single strike force. Even until Midway and beyond, the big American carriers operated independently – indeed, depending on the carrier itself, some squadrons from a single carrier were unable to execute properly coordinated attacks. The Japanese, however, were able to get multiple squadrons from multiple carriers into the air at one time, and co-ordinate them successfully to overwhelm a designated target. At Pearl Harbour, two strikes were launched from an unprecedented six big fleet carrier decks. Both strikes comprised a mix of fighters, dive- bombers and torpedo bombers (also Coral Sea in May, at the crucial Battle only about half of the aircraft on a Kittyhawk & Zero used as conventional “level” bombers). of Midway the following month only single carrier could be assembled on fight over Darwin on 19 Feb 1942. Including the fighters that flew four of the major fleet carriers could be the deck at any one time. At both Pearl Painting by Bob combat air patrols over the carriers, an assembled. These were the same four Harbor and Midway, such “deckload” McRae incredible force of over 400 modern carriers of Division 1 & 2 that attacked strikes were launched.36 This meant aircraft were utilised during the Darwin in February. In this respect, the that the first strike at Pearl Harbor operation. attack on Darwin counts as one of the comprised 180 aircraft, or about half Pearl Harbor is remembered as few great carrier raids mounted by the the full attack strength.37 A second the “day of infamy” which began the formidable Combined Fleet before it wave was launched afterwards with the Pacific War and brought the United was decimated at Midway. remainder of the aircraft. States into WWII. However, it was However, the Darwin raid was Darwin was unusual as a maximum revolutionary in fully utilising this unusual in comparison to the other strike was launched in a single wave. newly discovered combined power of big raids. Recently, and drawing on Thus the first half of the strike was carriers for the first time. Matching contemporary Japanese sources, launched, and kept waiting while the Japanese military doctrine perfectly, authors Jonathon Parshall and Anthony remaining aircraft were brought up the carriers delivered overwhelming Tully, have pointed out that a critical from the hangar deck. This was quite power to a particular point in a surprise practice in Japanese carrier operations a complex business, as each elevator attack, hoping to deliver a knock-out was “deckload spotting”, whereby half brought up one aircraft at a time, which punch. They did deliver a hefty blow to of the potential aircraft force could be would then be man-handled into a the American battleships, but the great launched at one time.35 The lighter precise position on deck. Parshall and irony was that they missed the only aircraft, namely the Zero fighters, Tully refer to this practice of launching force that would ultimately reckon with would be spotted forward as they the entire air group as being “probably them on anything like equal terms: the needed much less of deck-length impractical” as the first wave would US fleet carriers. to take off. The heavier aircraft, the burn up precious fuel waiting for But after Pearl Harbor, the six two-seat divebombers (D3A1 “Vals”) the second wave to join them. They great Kido Butai carriers were fated to and three-seat attack bombers (B5N2 suggest it would take at least half an never again operate together. Five of “Kates”), would be further back.4 But hour to complete. In fact, this appears them combined together in the Indian 4 Allied code names for Japanese aircraft to be exactly what happened during were formalised later in 1942, so their use in Ocean in April 1942. However, due to context of the Darwin raid is not historically rather than being the code name, which damage and aircraft losses to the two correct, but are used here because they are was “Zeke”. The “Vals” were Type 99 carrier Division 5 carriers at the Battle of the so widely recognised. However, the term bombers; the “Kates” were Type 97 carrier “Zero” refers to the Type 0 Naval Fighter, attack aircraft. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid the Darwin strike. Japanese records wave, after the defenders had been refer to a three-Zero Combat Air fully roused, angry, and fighting back Patrol being launched at 0615h.38 as hard as they could. Surprise would Commander Fuchida, the same famed pay dividends and minimise losses.40 leader of the attack force who led the Besides, a second strike was planned Pearl Harbor strike, took off in his B5N to take place anyway, only with land- attack bomber from Akagi at 0622 ... based bombers at high altitude. These most likely he followed the nine Zeroes would go in unescorted as the carrier from his carrier, and possibly some of strike would destroy any local fighter the lighter divebombers as well. But opposition, which the Japanese knew after take off, his aircraft did not depart would not be significant. Evidence from the vicinity of the carriers until of the Japanese disregard for Allied 0700, almost three-quarters of an hour air strength was a Combat Air Patrol later. This is consistent with waiting of just three Zeros being maintained for the second deckload of aircraft to over the carriers during the day (from be brought up, spotted on deck and a total pool of 15 aircraft held for launched from each of the four carriers. this purpose). This is consistent with Given the changed circumstances, it expecting, probably at most, a prowling is most likely that both deckloads were flying boat or reconnaissance aircraft. spotted differently on 19 February, This did, in fact, occur as will be related and probably did not comprise evenly later. balanced proportions of aircraft. Other Darwin was always seen as a raid factors, such as cruising speed and against a relatively weakly defended overall range would have been taken target. As Fuchida would later famously into account. One source39 suggests comment: “It hardly seemed worthy of the divebombers took off last, and us. If ever a sledgehammer was used used their faster cruising speed (as to crack an egg it was then”.41 So there compared to the Kates) to catch the was never a need to consider a second Dr Tom Lewis and Peter Ingman are the main force en route. However the carrier strike. Also, a single strike authors of Zero Hour in Broome, 2010, take-off times quoted vary hugely allowed the Mobile Fleet to do their with that given in the Japanese Official business and return north as quickly as Avonmore Books, which described the History. Also, technicalities, such the possible, thus limiting their exposure March 1942 attack by nine Japanese fact that the Vals could only use the near Allied territory. Lingering in Zero fighters on Broome – the second- middle elevator due to only having the area increased the possibility, most devastating air raid on Australia, folding wing-tips, rather than full however unlikely, of enemy attack by in terms of loss of life. folding wings (such as the Kates), some means. Finally, because of the meant that a selection of aircraft in perceived weakness of the target, the This is a draft extract from each deck-launch was more likely. This carriers could get reasonably close to their new book – Carrier Attack! is consistent with the Zeroes being the target, thus permitting the luxury Darwin 1942 – which is just stowed forward in the hangars, the Vals of extra time in the air burning fuel. being released. The work is a midships, and the Kates, which needed The Japanese plan was to launch the technical analysis of the 19 the greatest deck-length for take off, strike at a point 80 miles south of Babar February raids on Darwin, which were aft. Island, well into the Arafura Sea. This killed around 250 people, and So why was Darwin different in gave an approximate range to target sunk 11 ships. having just a single, maximum aircraft of around 200 miles. This is similar to strike? Clearly, the recent experience of other raids flown at this time – Pearl Pearl Harbor loomed large in the minds Harbor was also launched from a of the Japanese planners. Among similar range of 200 miles.42 t other things, most of the aircraft losses at Pearl Harbor were in the second Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 31
(Endnotes) (Accessed June 2012.) Mark Stille agrees in Darwin on 4 April 1942 and a large number Imperial Japanese Navy Aircraft Carriers of documents were recovered from it. 1 Hobbs, David. A Century of Carrier 1921-1945. Airfields were marked at locations such as Aviation: the Evolution of Ships and Daly Waters and Katherine, but there was Shipborne Aircraft: USA: US Naval Institute 14 Tsunoda Kazuo served as a fighter pilot nothing marked at Batchelor. Press, 2009. (p. 146) in the Imperial Japanese Navy from 1937 to 1945. He gained the rank of Lieutenant 33 Shattered Sword analyses this 2 Parshall, Jonathan, and Anthony Tully. and was credited with 13 aerial victories, comprehensively, and for the authors, makes Shattered Sword. USA: Potomac Books, many of them Australians he fought in New this deduction for the first time. 2005. The authors suggest Soryu could Guinea. 89 years old when interviewed, he “outrun Kaga at only 40% power.” (p. 9) was living in a cottage in the countryside in 34 Shattered Sword (p.86) 3 The angled flight deck, allowing landings Chiba Prefecture where he was interviewed 35 Shattered Sword (p.86) while takeoffs were being carried out at by Peter Williams and translator Yayoi 36 At Midway the second strike was never the bow of the ship, was to be a 1950s Akaboshi. launched: the Japanese carriers were concept, as was the mirror landing system, 15 Gill, G. Hermon. Royal Australian Navy famously caught while frantically re-arming and the ski jump – all ideas of the Royal 1939-1942. Melbourne: Collins, 1957. these aircraft for attacking the US carriers Navy. Nuclear engines from the USA were (p.591) that had just been detected; they had been a massive improvement, giving speed, prepared with weapons for a ground strike enormous endurance, and limitless range. 16 Fuchida, Mitsuo. Midway The Battle against Midway. The use of helicopters and the development that Doomed Japan. Hutchinson of London, of the “commando carrier”, made for London, 1957, uses “Nagumo Force” 37 By the time of Midway, the Japanese amphibious landings, were significant. throughout, e.g. p.55 carriers were short of aircraft. The first wave against Midway comprised just 108 aircraft. 4 See the WWII database http://ww2db. 17 Tully and Parshall. (p.14) com/ship_spec.php?ship_id=A465 The 18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_ 38 These times and subsequent detail are authorative Hobbs’ A Century of Carrier Pearl_Harbor accessed 25 November 2012 taken from the DMM translation of Senshi Aviation. (p. 148) notes this rationale, but Sosho. says there is no evidence to support it. 19 Fuchida (p.43) 39 Tagaya. (p. 49) Also see for a further in depth discussion 20 Tully and Parshall. (p.17) with more factors Polmar, Norman, and 40 Most of the first wave P.H. losses were Minoru Genda Aircraft Carriers: A History 21 Tully and Parshall. (p.17) the torpedo bombers, that had to fly dangerously low. Ignoring these losses, the of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on 22 Lockwood, p.8 refers to Itaya as an World Events. Volume 2. (p. 72). Google first wave losses at Pearl Harbor were just “already established ace”. However he does a handful of aircraft – indeed, virtually the ebook. http://books.google.com.au/ not appear in the list of Japanese naval books?id=6z7quhWS-BoC&dq=port+island same as “Darwin” (where no torpedoes were fighter aces in Hata, Izawa and Shores. used). s+aircraft+carriers&source=gbs_navlinks_s Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and 5 Shattered Sword. (p. 7) their Aces 1932-145. Grub Street, London. 41 Lockwood. (p.5) 2011. 6 See Hobbs, pages 147-148. 42 Francillon. (p.8) In emergency 23 Tagaya (p.21) circumstances longer range raids were 7 Hobbs, David. (p. 139) launched, for example on 20 December 24 Parshall and Tully. (p.132) 1941 Carrier Division 2 struck Wake island 8 Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Masatake from around 350 miles, although the force Okumiya. Midway – the Japanese story. 25 Parshall and Tully p.88: at Midway in comprised only divebombers and fighter London: Cassell and Co.; 1992. (p. 63) June 70% of Val dive bomber crews and 85% of Kate bomber crews were Pearl Harbor escorts. 9 Combined Fleet website. http://www. veterans. Some months earlier at Darwin combinedfleet.com Accessed May 2012. these ratios must have been even higher. 10 A brief discussion on the http://www.j- 26 Fuchida (p.56) aircraft.org discussion forum led to a suggestion that the destroyer Yugure was 27 Lockwood, Douglas. Australia’s Pearl also present. 28 November 2012. Harbour. Melbourne: Cassell. 1966. (p.5) 11 Combined Fleet website. http://www. 28 Lockwood. (p.6) combinedfleet.com Combined Fleet 29 Senshi Sosho.(p.1-2) Bôeichô Bôei movements 15 February 1942: DesRon 1’s Kenshûjo Senshishitsu [Military History ABUKUMA departs Palau with the Carrier Department, National Institute of Defense Striking Force’s CarDiv 1’s AKAGI, Car Studies, the Defense Agency] ed. Ran’in Div 2’s HIRYU and SORYU, CruDiv 8’s Bengaru-wan hômen kaigun shinkô sakusen CHIKUMA and TONE and DesDiv 17’s [The Dutch East Indies and Bengal Bay URAKAZE, ISOKAZE, TANIKAZE and Area: Naval Advance Operations]. Senshi HAMAKAZE and DesDiv 18’s KASUMI, Sôsho vol. 26. Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, SHIRANUHI and ARIAKE. Accessed May 1969. 2012. 30 Lockwood. (p.7) 12 See Darwin’s Submarine I-124, published by Avonmore Books, and written by Tom 31 The Kate bombers had a 235 mph Lewis. (2010) maximum, and a 161 mph cruise speed. Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific 13 See “Japanese Carrier Operations: How War, which were translations from the Did They Do It?” Article first appearing in Japanese manufacturers, gives B5N2 Kates - the Spring 1995 issue of The Hook magazine, 140kts at 3,000m, and D3A1 Vals - 160kts at published by The Tailhook Association. 3,000m. (Courtesy Bob Alford. Author: Carl Snow, Tailhook Association archivist. http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/ 32 Email from Bob Alford 27 November Japanese%20Carrier%20Operations.pdf 2012. A Betty bomber crashed near Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Issue 147 33 Britannia Royal Naval College Report By Midshipman Joshua Armstrong
idshipman Armstrong, Captain’s Cabin.” There “Mare not many good things that start by being called up to see the Captain, but as I gave my uniform a once over and gingerly knocked on Commander Sonter’s door to present myself, the then Commanding Officer of HMAS Anzac, I was greeted with a smile and a signal informing me I had won the Commodore Harry Adam’s Prize. To my relief. The winning of this prize, which involves a one week exchange with Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, a return flight to London and $500 was for me one of the greatest honours to be able to represent our Navy at such a fine institution. In my brief time I learnt a great deal, had an amazing time and made excellent friends. If I had one criticism is that it and a passing out parade week. capacity at the college whilst was not long enough! In most respects college life is very completing their studies, of which it The primary course of Dartmouth similar, easier in some respects with is the equivalent to our Phase I & II is the Initial Naval Training Officer less time allocated daily to Drill, and of JWAC. This was perfect for me as course which is of a similar length harder in others, especially regarding of which the course had a very high and purpose to NEOC. At the time the leadership assessments judging proportion of those selected to be of my visit the course was two terms by the amount that fail. Of interest is Submariners and we were all essentially both consisting of 14 weeks with the hierarchy that exists at the college at the same stage of training. IWOF leave inbetween. The first term due to there being three courses being itself much like the early phases focused on basic Military and Naval present at different stages. Up until the of JWAC focuses on Navigation, skills, beginning with a two week passing out parade course members are Mariner Skills, Rules of the Road and militarisation period much like ITP, considered Officer Cadets, and are only Meteorology. In addition, it includes and ending with the ‘Assessed Basic given any form of rank following their strategic studies, time on a bridge Leadership Exercise’ on (and in) the militarisation training to proceed on simulator as well period on one of the hills, rivers and bogs of Dartmoor. IFT, which consists of a white tab either Colleges Yachts with the opportunity to Term 2 was primarily spent onboard a worn on their sleeve or under their gain a RYA Day Skipper ticket. capital ship for 10 weeks, followed by substantive rank on their epaulette. From IWOF Warfare Officers exams and the ‘Maritime Leadership Following the parade they are entitled proceed to a nine month posting Exercise’ assessing Mariner and to wear their full rank and are given onboard a surface vessel of any variety Navigation skills on the river Dart. their commissions. of size and purpose, with a four week This has now been altered to a three For my time at the college I was Navigation coursed in that period term of consisting of ten weeks each; essentially a member of the Initial at HMS Collingwood, across the of again the first being Militarisation, Warfare Officer Course, the third harbour from Portsmouth, followed Marinisation with more focus on term for Warfare Branch officers at by week long assessment ashore to be instruction in strategic studies and Dartmouth. And as IWOF students awarded their NWC. This is probably maritime leadership, then Initial Fleet have passed out, they are termed the greatest difference in our training Time of 8 weeks, an examination week Seniors and act in a Leadership that their first significant time on the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 Britannia Royal Naval College Report
bridge is to gain their Watch Keeping Certificate, of which the awarding of lies not in the hands of their Commanding Officer, but following assessment on a Bridge Simulator. After this they proceed to a 14 week course back at Collingwood for Divisional Officer and warfare training before commencing Submariner Training or being posted to a Surface vessel for Endorsement. As I visited in December I was welcomed by sleet, bitter winds, and cold rain, but also had plenty of blue sky over the beautiful college and town not very familiar sit down discussion much to their surprise. Perhaps as a that is Dartmouth and BRNC. The with the Commodore commanding the punishment we had a fairly intense PT college itself sits on a hill over looking college. Commodore Williams noted session early in the morning, followed the very picturesque English town on how both our Navies have recently by more Uckers and a journey up the the river Dart which the college backs began to operate closer together in river for lunch. During my visit I was on to. This naturally leads itself to recent years considering our shared able to organise a visit to Plymouth and plenty of time on the water on their history, of which he was full of praise see much of the Fleet including HMS variety of motor boats and yachts, for our Navy and stated the respect Ocean and a very impressive Vanguard as well as late night runs ashore to for which it is held. This seemed to be Class SSBN. Later in my own time I a number of the pubs in the area. a fairly familiar theme throughout my was able to visit Portsmouth and see Arguably just as good as the blue water time. HMS Victory. and white sands of Jervis Bay. However, as it was the last week My visit as well as the journey of I had been told that in the past those for IWOF there was not an awful those I spent time with during the week before me had experience something lot scheduled for them to do. I was ended with the Passing out Parade of a tailored program, I had however therefore able to watch a lot of fairly overseen by the First Sea Lord Admiral said that I was more than happy to awful English TV, learn Uckers and Stanhope and the Winter Ball. For do what ever it is that the rest of the generally get to know the other Officers those graduating the highlight was IWOF officers were doing. I was and Cadets as I just blended into the marching up the stairs, the prerogative not disappointed. First up Monday scenery. As I walked the magnificent only of those who are commissioned morning was Parade practice, and halls, passing various portraits and much like our own tradition on the although I was told I didn’t have to model ships navigating its labyrinth Quarterdeck at Creswell. This then march on the day, it was said to the of passageways, I found everyone was culminated the next evening at the Ball squad they were looking a bit thin exceptionally friendly, if not curious. As which lasted into the early hours of the on numbers. I offered to march if it to the culture at the College, I found it following morning. made things easier, if only to be polite. very similar to Creswell, if only being Luckily it was the last I heard of it, and I a little bit more formal in some areas, was given a nice VIP seat at the Parade but on other end of the scale more amongst the various visiting high boisterous. ranking officers and dignities. A novelty I certainly experienced a work hard for a Midshipman, and to the benefit of and play hard attitude amongst the a very grateful Sub-Lieutenant who was junior officers centered around a strong my host for the week who also gained culture of banter. This was perhaps best a seat. epitomised during the comedy night This was then followed by a very that was staged, in which not many familiar Quality Control session cadets or staff got off lightly. It was also regarding their course content, and a the scene of my first and last Fosters, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 35
On the whole what I found interesting was a strong warfare culture that pervaded nearly all aspects of training, which results in Young Officers of all branches having a great sense of context for their training and of purpose. It was evident even at Dartmouth that the RN has embarked upon program to combat ‘Sea Blindness’ and although aimed at the general public and the political class, educating their Young Officers about the purpose of the Navy is seen as the first stage of that. As stated, the IWOF curriculum includes more billets and courses in both Navies important that it has ever been. And amongst other tertiary level subjects open beyond a handful of designated although our use of primarily US a period of Strategic Studies which is exchange postings. This would developed weapons systems has in accredited by Plymouth University. surely benefit career satisfaction and the past led us away from the Royal Perhaps the ADF could greater utilise development, but more importantly Navy, our proven common procedures the considerable academic facilities help cooperation and provide a cost remain the same, and this is arguably of ADFA in this capacity for all of its advantage considering the contraction more vital to cooperation. As the First officers. In their first year RAN Officer of defence budgets across the Western Sea Lord, Admiral Stanhope said at the would be superior navigators and world in contrast to the developing passing out parade :‘the Royal Navy perhaps a more grounded officer due arms race in both our Oceans to our remains as the gold standard in the to their time in the fleet on the bridge, North. world’, and having seen this first hand I but an RN officer would have a better From what I have observed there have no doubts. idea of the Navy, its job and the world is certainly a capacity, a willingness What makes the Royal Australian off the bridge. This initial investment and clear benefits for our navies to Navy so unique, as well as lucky, is early in a Warfare Officers career work together beyond our current ad that it able to utilise the resources seems beneficial as it provides a solid hoc Task forces and handful of short of US defence industry and employs foundation for the future. exchanges. Talking to a number of these advanced platforms using Royal Perhaps considering that Australian Royal Navy officers there is a genuine Navy principles and procedures. officers in the past completed their desire to work more with the RAN, Thus through the combination of the training at Dartmouth, it is a suitable and other Commonwealth navies, best of both worlds, Australia has place to be reminded of our previous reflecting a more global outlook one of the most respected Navies bonds. It seemed in an effort to rather than a solely North Atlantic worldwide and certainly one of the mature and be independent we let slip and the European Continent focus. most effective. It is through exchanges opportunities and strategic knowledge Considering at any one time the Royal like this at Dartmouth, whether they be that could have been shared. News Navy maintains permanently in the operational or cultural, that facilitate that we will taking advantage of Indian Ocean four Minehunters, a Bay this continued strength. I will certainly the RN’s strength in Amphibious Class Dock Landing Ship, at least two take any opportunity in the future to operations and ASW is certainly the Warships and an SSN, we have clear, work with the Royal Navy to return step in the right direction, as is that and growing, mutual interests in a body and apply that deep knowledge and we are providing opportunities for of water far from any current US Naval experience in our region, and am those laid off during the latest round base. very grateful that I now also have of UK defence cuts. Although there So whilst much is made these colleagues that I can call upon in the are not many Wardrooms these days days about Joint Warfare across the future. I therefore encourage every that don’t have a RAN Officer with an services, and this is certainly a great Junior Officer to write about issues English accent, surely however more force multiplier, in reality coalition that matter to them, and apply for this integration is possible through making war fighting across navies is more fantastic opportunity. t Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36 The Battle for the South China Sea – World War II, Today and into the future By Midshipman Joshua Armstrong, winner of the 2011 Harry Adams essay contest
T his article is dedicated to the 3,505 US forming 1.6% of the United States focus on what lessons can be learnt Submariners who are still on eternal Navy1 sank 55% of tonnage.2 Thus why and applied by the RAN and its allies patrol. Having sacrificed their lives in Japan’s then Prime Minister Hideki from the US Campaign in the Pacific, World War II, by the highest ratio in the Tojo named the Submarine War on as those nearly identical sea lanes shipping as a major reason of why the and materials pass through the very United States Military, so that today we allies defeated Japan.3 same region the US fought Imperial may live in Peace and Freedom. May Whilst this proved successful Japan those years ago, and may be that never be necessary again. in the 20th century, such a strategy an area of conflict in years to come. could be just as useful in 21st century I therefore discuss the development he appearance of military as the US’s naval dominance in the and motivations for China’s current installations on seemingly region comes under challenge by The strategy, and argue that the US’s Tinsignificant atolls, with oil deposits People’s Republic of China. This is strategy in the Pacific that used beneath and oilers passing by as naval fundamental to Australia’s security submarines in the 1940’s to attack vessels perform exercises in the middle as 70% of Australia’s trade moves Imperial Japans Sea Lines could be of one of the world’s busiest shipping through4 the South China Sea, which used to safeguard Australia’s interests channels, the South China Sea is China claims and has treated like its in 2030 and beyond. This is because the fast becoming the most strategically own territorial waters, believing it has strategic geography of the South China important area in the world. Add to “indisputable sovereignty”5 over the Sea region has changed little over this Taiwan and the US 7th Fleet, on area. The protection of our trade, fuel time, with WWII Imperial Japan and its edge in the context of petroleum supply, sea lanes of communication and the People’s Republic of China today politics, all creates a volatile mix in our northern approaches are named sharing much the same strategies and a region where intimidating, risky, therefor in Force 2030. 6 Crucial too vulnerabilities. muscle-flexing manoeuvres are is our alliance with the US, forged T he South China Sea Today increasingly common. during the Pacific Campaign, and the For this reason the South China protection that provides, including Recent tensions have involved a more Sea has been dubbed by some as the guaranteeing free passage on the high assertive posture by China over its “Second Persian Gulf”, whilst this seas. claim of the South China Sea and currently refers to the estimated large The aim of this paper then is to particularly over the contentious energy deposits, it too more and more is a vital Sea Line of Communication for shipping and military operations. But perhaps more ominously the tag is fitting as it enters a new age of similar turmoil and geopolitical wrangling, to possibly become the world’s central focus of conflict in the coming century. However it was only 70 years ago that the South China Sea was a key battleground in World War II. Following Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, both powers engaged in a campaign to gain control of this sea, in which the US was to prove victorious. Crucial to the Allied victory in the Pacific was the US Submarine service devastating campaign against Imperial Japan’s homeland as well as its Naval and Military forces, which despite Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 37
R egional arms race? - Malaysian Scorpene- class submarine KD Tunku Abdul Rakman (Photo by Chris Sattler)
Paracel and Spratly island chain. No only to Saudi Arabia, about 25 times Sea is “historically proven” and is less than nine states have claimed larger than China’s current oil reserves therefore non-negotiable. However sovereignty in various7 areas, as it has and eight times its gas reserves,13 to support their position under the potentially more natural gas than Saudi making it the world’s largest. This UN Convention, it has occupied Arabia and more oil than Iran8. This would therefore make it an energy the disputed islands by setting up is despite the doubt that surrounds superpower in its own right. military outposts on the previously such estimations due to the difficulty China as a result of its desire for uninhabited islands as a means to of exploration in such a politically power and security has begun a new extend its exclusive economic rights sensitive area. Great Game in the Asia-Pacific with an and sovereignty over the entire sea. The motivation for China’s policy armed forces modernisation program This policy however is not recent, is clear: energy security. As of 2010, that has sparked a region-wide arms with China only recently coming into 55% of its oil was imported9, more race, accompanied by its militarisation enough power to implement it. It can importantly, this is growing with some of the South China Sea in the disputed certainly be seen to be inline with predictions saying that this import territory. China has repeatedly not only China’s 1982 maritime plan, which reliance will be as high as 78% by stated it has indisputable sovereignty set out a naval strategy into three 2030.10 That level was well beyond over the Sea, but has just as often geographical and chronological stages; what the Global Times, a Chinese backed up such statements with the firstly control of the water inside the Communist Party produced tabloid, interference of foreign vessels in the first island chain, which includes the says is the “globally recognized energy vicinity of its claims. This has resulted Paracel and Spratley Islands from 2000 security alert level of 50 percent”.11 For in numerous incidents resulting in the to 2010. Secondly, from 2010 to 2020, this reason, the Global Times states; damage of namely Vietnamese and to control the waters out to the second China has expanded exploration in the Filipino Oil and Gas Exploration, as island chain to Guam and Indonesia, South China Sea to ease dependence well as fishing vessels. Both leaders and finally from 2020 until 2040 on Foreign Oil, which it estimates of the respective states have clashed challenge US hegemony in the Pacific contains over 50 billion tons of with Beijing over its actions, calling for and Indian oceans.14 crude oil and more than 20 trillion China to follow the UN Convention Although it now has a close to cubic meters of natural gas, with on Laws of the Sea, which they operational aircraft carrier, China the exploitation of these deep-water believe cannot be used to justify their is behind schedule in terms of pure resources stated in the Government’s territorial claims. sea control. However it possesses a 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15).12 This China in turn has stated that powerful anti-access capability in the would give China oil reserves second its ownership of the South China first island chain; having numerous Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38 The Battle for the South China Sea – World War II, Today and into the future
Surface to Air Missile Batteries, anti- ship ballistic missiles to [hopefully] sink US Carriers, and a large and advanced submarine fleet.15 In terms of this later capability at 70 boats, 21 for the South China Sea alone, China is the greatest littoral submarine operator in the world. As in late 2010 a new type of diesel-electric attack submarine (SSK) was launched, said to be of Chinese design with a advanced propulsion system possessing greater submerged endurance.16 Specifically, China has built up a military presence on both Islands group, including naval infantry, 3D Radars and surface-to-air missile batteries.17 It has also launched two Seawolf-class fast- new landing platform dock vessels Navy inflicted little damage on the This was critical as two of the attack submarine designed for amphibious operations, Merchant fleet or the Imperial Japanese objectives of the Pacific campaign were USS Connecticut and has based more of its naval forces Navy in the first year of the war, for to stop Japan’s enterprises overseas and (Courtesy US Navy) south, closer to the Islands. 18 reasons including faulty torpedos, and to deny the homeland of food and raw The US in turn has responded timid submarine captains, but mainly materials so as to ruin their economy 27. subtly both diplomatically and because it had a focus on Mahanian As China’s exports account for nearly militarily to the developing situation. doctrine22, with the Admirals wanting 40% of its GDP28, and 90% of its trade China has warned the US off involving submarines to focus on ‘glamourous’ is transported by sea, it too would be itself in the dispute, following Secretary warships 23. Success in decisive battle vulnerable to such a campaign.29 of State Hillary Clinton’s statement that was to come later, especially in 1944. Common Sea Lanes, Trade and Energy the US had a “national interest” in the It was not until 1943 following the Torpedoed Vulnerabilities Japanese destroyer South China Sea and could facilitate rectification of issues in these areas, as photographed 19 talks. So too it has often deployed well as in ULTRA, intelligence derived Certainly the most important attack through periscope the Japan-based carrier USS George from the cracking of the ‘Maru Code’24, on the Japanese logistics chain was of USS Wahoo or USS Washington and her battle group into that the attrition of Japan began by against its oil supply which was both Nautilus, June 1942. the South China Sea. Furthermore attacking its Merchant fleet, oilers devastating and comprehensive as (US Navy Historical) the US has increased and upgraded and transports, its presence re-committing itself to otherwise known the region militarily, including raising as the ‘war of the the number of attack submarines.20 Maru’25. With Australia’s cooperation, it is also This resulted currently conducting a Global Force in a reduced Posture Review to balance against a flow of materials rising China. Simply, The United States and energy to does not intend to be surprised in the the Japanese Pacific again. homeland, as The US Campaign in the South well as to the China Sea During World War Two frontline, crippling Even before World War II, it production in had been clear to the US Navy that nearly every the use of blockade via Submarines industry, thereby of Japan would be essential to any also halting their coming conflict.21 However the US war machine.26 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 39
Japan was not only heavily reliant on same Sea Lanes from Sumatra, Java and to US forces. 48 Furthermore later in oil for domestic production, but even Borneo.39 the war submarine attacks on the more so for the operation of its military South East Asia Defensive Perimeter experienced 32nd and 35th Infantry and naval forces: the ‘lifeblood of the divisions in the New Guinea theatre Japanese war machine’30. Thus the Because of Japan’s reliance on oil, the were diverted troops nearly 800 Munitions Minister said after the war Japanese Army conceived the control km from their destination.49 This that ‘the shipping shortage and the of the South East Asian Archipelago was amongst many other transport scarcity of oil were the two main factors as a way to protect the approaches to sinkings, which were the second that assumed utmost importance in Japan, as well as to gain resources for its favoured targets after oilers.50 This Japan’s war efforts’ 31. operations on the Chinese mainland.40 therefore demonstrates the difficulty This success was critical in stopping With Imperial Japan’s ‘defensive of amphibious operations in the South production in Japan’s advances sea wall’ consisted of both a ‘outer China Sea Archipelago in the face of a on the front line 32, but also naval defensive perimeter’ and a ‘secondary Submarine threat. operations. After 1943 Japan’s lack of line’41. The Chinese People’s Liberation As stated in the ANZUS treaty oil was the IJN’s single most important Army Navy has also committed itself to there should be no ‘illusion’ that constraint,33 because it alone required having free manoeuvre within the ‘two Australia and the US stand alone in 1.6 million barrels34 monthly to run. island chains’42, and is seeking to block the Pacific, and will both contribute It has even been suggested by a US access to China via its sea lanes from forces to preserve collective defence in military report that if submarines had the US military.43 In both geography the area 51. However there is nothing focused on the tankers immediately and purpose there is a striking parallel. to say conflict in the South China after Pearl Harbor the fuel shortage The viability of such defensive Sea, especially over energy alone, is would have been critical a year earlier.35 positions is questionable in the face inevitable. China has stated that it is This shortage in turn denied Japan the of sustained attack because of their committed “to a peaceful resolution ability to win any decisive naval battle,36 vulnerability in the disruption of of the South China Sea issue through forcing many IJN ships off the sea and these sea lanes. This was seen during bilateral dialogues and consultations head home for fuel.37 Furthermore the Pacific Campaign with Japan’s with related parties” and “will not the US Submarine Service’s focus on communications inside and beyond the resort to the use of force or the threat attacking commercial vessels was not defensive perimeter being devastated of force.”52 China and Japan have also exclusive to decimating IJN vessels, by US Submarines, in what has been in the past been able to agree on joint especially in the successful year of 1944. called the most successful blockade exploration of gas in the East China The ease at which the USN was able in Naval History.44 Indeed Corbett Sea where there are overlapping to disrupt Japanese oil supplies and observed that the principles that claims of Economic Exclusion Zones. trade should be concerning for China govern the attack and defence of trade China however has shown it is as it faces much the same external are similar to overseas expeditions45, willing to make short terms sacrifices liabilities, especially so in its reliance and that transports and the enemy’s in soft power to guarantee a long on imported energy. This demonstrates army, not his fleet, should be the term defence from potential foreign that the South China Sea is never likely “principle object.”46 And although the interference, with recent incidents and to be a “Chinese Lake” as seaborne collapse of the Japanese economy was tension in the South China Sea being supplies cannot be guaranteed, a fundamental to the war effort, a major only symptoms of China’s growing pressing issue for China as 95% of its objective of the US submarine war was maritime assertiveness world wide, imported energy needs are transported to cut off of supply between Japan47and demonstrated in its deployments to by Sea38. This is all the more case for their military bases, thus following Anti-Piracy operations in the Gulf of protecting stationary and difficult to a Corbettian Maritime rather than a Aden and its evacuation of Chinese defend offshore oil and gas platforms. purely Naval Strategy. Nationals from Libya. So too, Imperial Japan and modern Imperial Japan’s defensive perimeter But whilst this paper has looked China share much of the same sea lanes plan was to prove ineffective. As at the vulnerability of China, it is with China seeking to protect its oil by 1942 the US strategy was clearly fundamental to understand Australia’s supplies passing through the Yellow, successful during the US Guadalcanal sea lanes could come under just East China and South China Sea. campaign, where the Japanese army as much threat from blockade and Imperial Japan’s supplies used those received only 10% of supplies, relative submarine action. Australia too is Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 The Battle for the South China Sea – World War II, Today and into the future 5 Washington post, 2011 ‘Beijing claims ‘Commander of US Seventh Fleet renews commitment to Asia’, heavily reliant on trade passing through ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over South Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 22 February 2011 the South China Sea and energy China Sea’ July 31, 2010, Available from 21 Roscoe, T. 1949, United States submarine operations in World Internet: http://www.washingtonpost. War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, p.169 imports, and must improve its ASW com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/ 22 Graham, E. 2006, Japan’s sea lane security, 1940-2004 : a matter capability. Just as importantly the RAN AR2010073005664.html of life and death, Routledge, New York p.80 6 Department of Defence 2009, Defending 23 Hall, R. 1982, The underwater war, 1939-1945. Blandford Press, or USN could employ this strategy Australia In The Asia Pacific Century Force Poole, Dorset. p.122 with submarines offensively so to fight 2030 - Defence White Paper 2009, AGPS, 24 Winton, J. 1993, Ultra in the Pacific: how breaking Japanes codes Canberra, Available from Internet: http:// and cyphers affected naval operations against Japan 1941-1945, any conflict at a distance. Thus clearly www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/ Naval Institute Press, Annapolis p. 137 justifying Australia’s expansion of the defence_white_paper_2009.pdf p. 42-43, 25 Graham, op cit, p.80 7 Jane’s Navy International, 2010, ‘PLAN 26 ibid p.328 Submarine Service to twelve more spearheads China’s ambitions for a greater 27 ibid p.304 capable vessels.53 Therefore whether regional sphere of influence‘ Jane’s Navy 28 Trading Economics, 2011, China Imports March 2011, Trading International, 20 October 2010 Economics, Available from Internet: http://www.tradingeconomics. during World War II, the Falklands 8 Bloomberg, 2010, ‘China Says Its South com/Economics/Exports.aspx?Symbol=CNY accessed 16 April 2011 and into the future, submarines are Sea Claims Are `Indisputable’, Bloomberg, 29 China People’s Daily, 2007, ‘China joins shipping elite’ China 29 July 2010, Available from Internet: http:// People’s Daily, 29 November 2007, Available from Internet: http:// not simply weapons of sea denial, but www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-30/ english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6311629.html accessed the best platform in which to exercise china-has-indisputable-sovereignty-in- 16 April 2011 south-china-sea-defense-aide-says.html 30 Wheeler, K. (1981). War under the Pacific, Time-Life, Command of the Sea, especially 9 Global Times, 2011, ‘Oil bonanza in Alexandria, New Jersey, p. 160 through blockade, and create affect South China Sea’, Global Times, 21 April 31 Poirer, op cit. 2011, Available from Internet: http://special. 32 O’Lavin, Lieutenant Commander, B. 2009, Mahan and Corbett upon the land. globaltimes.cn/2011-04/645909.html on Maritime Strategy, paper presented to Naval War College, This can serve as a lesson today 10 Vasan, Commodore, R. S., 2010, Newport, Rhode Island. Availalbe from Internet: http://www. for Australia as a middle power, or ‘China’s Maritime Ambitions: Implications dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc. For Regional Security’, Eurasia Review, pdf&AD=ADA509453 accessed 3 April 2011 on the other hand as a warning for Available from Internet: http://www. 33 Graham op cit. p.88 the status quo or revisionist power eurasiareview.com/china’s-maritime- 34 Poirer, op cit. ambitions-implications-for-regional- 35 Roscoe, op cit. p.339 alike, as Australia could easily use a security-20012011/, accessed 10 April 2011 36 O’ Lavin, loc cit. similar model to interdict shipping in 11 Global Times, op cit. 37 Roscoe, loc cit. 12 ibid. 38 China People’s Daily, op cit. the Indian Ocean. The US Submarine 13 Michael Richardson, 2011, ‘Beijing’s 39 Wheeler, Op Cit. p. 160 strategy in the South China Sea was troubling South China Sea policy’ Japan 40 Spectre, R., 1985, Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Times online , 28 April 2011, Available from Japan, Free Press, New York, p.76-7 devastating to Imperial Japan because Internet: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi- 41 Roscoe op cit. p.303-304 of its territorial strategy, reliance on bin/eo20110428mr.html 42 Yoshihara, T. and Holmes, J., 2008, Asia looks seaward power 14 Captain Stacy A. Pedrozo, USN , 2011, and maritime strategy, Praeger Security International, Westport, energy imports and exposed sea lanes. ‘China’s Active Defense Strategy and its Connecticut p.102-103 The conclusion of this article then is Regional Impact’ Transcript of Testimony 43 Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2011, ‘Analysis: China White Paper hints before the House of Representatives at platform, strategic developments’, Janes Defence Weekly, 8 April that in dealing with a future challenge U.S.-China Economic & Security Review 2011 in the region, the strategies of the past Commission , 27 January 2011, Available 44 Reeve, J., 2001, Maritime Strategy and the Defence of the from Internet: http://www.uscc.gov/ Archipelagic Inner Arc - Working Paper 5, Sea Power Centre, can certainly provide a guide, with hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/ Canberra p.5 the burden to protect the freedom of hr11_01_27.php 45 Corbett, J. 1911 Some Principles of Maritime. Strategy, 15 Council on Foreign Relations , 2009, Longmans, Green and Co. London, reprinted by AMS Press, New Australia likely to fall upon the Silent ‘China’s Security Future’, Transcript, 19 York, 1972 p. 285 Service in the Asia Pacific century, just October 2009, Available from Internet: 46 Corbett p. 237, 240, 286 http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-security- 47 Roscoe op cit. p.304 like the last. t future/p20678 48 Poirer loc sit. 16 Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto , 2011, 49 ibid ‘Indonesia and the South China Sea dispute’, 50 Wheeler op cit. p.168 Jakata Post, 7 April 2011, Available from 51 Department of External Affairs, 1952, Security Treaty between (Endnotes) Internet: http://www.thejakartapost.com/ Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS], 1 Poirier, M. 2008, ‘SILENT VICTORY: news/2011/07/04/indonesia-and-south- opened for signature 1 September 1951, [1952] ATS 2 (entered into America’s Pacific Submarine Campaign of china-sea-dispute.html force 29 April 1952). World War Two’ ea Classics, March 2009 17 LaGrone, S., 2010, ‘Chinese flag planting 52 Global Times, 2011, ‘Keep Sea issue simple, says Beijing’, 2 Blair, C. 2001. Silent victory : the U.S. causes swell in disputed area of South Global Times, 15 June 2011, Available from Internet: http:// submarine war against Japan. Naval Institute China Sea’ Jane’s Navy International, 1 www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/articleType/ArticleView/ Press, Annapolis, p.878 September 2010 articleId/661629/Keep-Sea-issue-simple-says-Beijing.aspx 3 Morison, S.E. 1998, ‘Thoughts on Naval 18 Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2011, ‘Waves 53 Department of Defence, Op Cit. p. 70-71 Strategy, World War II’, Naval War college of concern - Southeast Asian states plan Review, Winter, 1998. p. 63 naval defences’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 14 4 Baldwin, Commander, C. 2001, April 2011 SEABORNE TRADE FLOWS IN THE 19 Edward Wong , 2011, ‘Beijing Warns ASIA PACIFIC PRESENT AND FUTURE U.S. About South China Sea Disputes’, The TRENDS, Sea Power Institute, Canberra, New York Times, 22 June 2011, Available Available from Internet: http://www.navy. from Internet: http://www.nytimes. gov.au/w/images/Working_Paper_9.pdf com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23china.html accessed 3 April 2011 20 Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 2011 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
42 obituary aptain David Ramsay was one of the Fleet Air Arm’s finest. Captain David John Ramsay He did everything at jet speed, Cwhether in the air, on the golf course, oam, ranr tennis court or just out and about exercising. When you work closely with aka ‘Checkmate 1 – Ramsdog’ someone for over 30 years and respect them as an officer and gentlemen, when David JRamsay they are taken from you, the loss is felt in the last group of Australians to very deeply. The shock and deep loss undergo training at Dartmouth where and sadness at Captain Ramsay’s passing he shone as a young seaman officer. He will be felt even more keenly by his wife demonstrated his enormous potential Janine, his children James, Nicholas and and was awarded the Queen’s medal Juliette as well as the extended Ramsay in 1970. Having been dux of his year at and McInerney families. For close Dartmouth, Captain Ramsay completed friends and former shipmates, the ‘Dog’ another nine months of operations and was special and will forever remain so. weapons courses in the Portsmouth Captain Ramsay had an amazing area. It must have been during this time career with many highlights. There David became fixated on British car were also many challenging jobs along technology – his beloved Rovers. the way. First as a seaman officer, then a On his return to Australia, David fighter pilot and Air Warfare Instructor, completed his Bridge Watch keeping Naval staff officer, several sea postings, Certificate training in HMAS Brisbane Shore and Sea Command, Royal Yacht during her 1971 tour of duty as the attachment, post graduate study, back last RAN Ship to operate with the US to back postings as the Naval Attaché Seventh Fleet in Vietnam. in Indonesia, and then a return to In 1972 Captain Ramsay underwent Indonesia in a very important public flying training with the RAAF displaying service role. What more could have this his superior flying skills by graduating Naval Officer jammed into his life? dux of 84 Pilots Course. I was fortunate rubbing shoulders with Royalty as the RAN Contingent Captain David Ramsay was born to have been on the Pilots course behind Officer in HMY Britannia during the Royal Tour. He then was in Sydney in 1948. He was born into a David, and whilst there was a rank posted to 805 Squadron and embarked in HMAS Melbourne naval family and with his mother and differential between us, he was always for a memorable Spithead Review deployment to the UK. On three sisters, accompanied his naval extremely supportive and a great role return to Australia David was posted to RANAS Albatross as father around Australia and overseas model. On his return to the Naval Air the Station Air Warfare Instructor. until January 1963, when he joined the Station, Captain Ramsay started his fast In 1979 Captain Ramsay was posted to exchange duty with Naval College at Jervis Bay as a Junior and furious flying career with the Fleet the Royal Navy flying Sea Harriers during the introduction to Entry cadet midshipman. Captain Air Arm, completing his operational service of that aircraft. I had the pleasure of instructing David Ramsay’s entry into the Navy must flying training on Skyhawk fighter/ on the finer points of hovering in a Wessex helicopter prior to have been a great thrill for his father, bomber aircraft in December 1973. his departure. He again displayed his outstanding flying ability who eventually retired from the Navy Captain Ramsay served on 805 front and professionalism. as a highly decorated Commodore line squadron embarked in HMAS After completing his embarked time and exchange service, who went on to be the Governor of Melbourne and then underwent the Royal Navy requested he stay for an additional six months Queensland from April 1977 to July the Air Warfare Instructor course, to continue assisting training and trials during and after the 1985. After graduation in 1967, David teaching OFT students the finer points Falkland’s conflict. He returned with the family to Nowra as served as a Midshipman in HMA Ships in air combat and weapons delivery Commander (Air) in 1983 until the Government’s decision to Yarra and Sydney, spending most of the techniques. He was a natural instructor. scrap the fixed wing element of the Fleet Air Arm and retired year in the Far East. Captain Ramsay loved instructing and his favourite toys, the Macchi and Skyhawk jets. I know As a Sub-Lieutenant, David the students loved him. this was a tough time for David and many of his fixed wing experienced time in the UK and was Captain Ramsay had a brief stint colleagues. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 43 obituary David was then posted as Executive we served together in Creswell. The convinced the Chief of Navy at the time not to cut ties with OfficerHMAS Success bringing her into time working for David confirmed the Fleet Air Arm Museum. naval service. This was a challenging my previous opinion of this fine naval Captain Ramsay’s last working challenge brought all his posting which required the ship officer and gentlemen. skills to the fore, including his Indonesian language skills, to spend many months alongside David was then posted as insight into Asian culture, aviation experience and astute conducting engineering acceptance Commanding Officer Success, followed staff skills. The Department of Infrastructure and Transport trials and testing. by a subsequent change in career benefited from David’s presence in Indonesia, where he Captain Ramsay then had a 12 direction, and post-graduate language worked with distinction until his untimely passing on 4 Sep month posting as the Director of training and back to back posting as the 2012. So much so were his skills appreciated, Captain Ramsay Sailors’ Posting prior to a promotion Naval Attaché in Indonesia. These were was awarded the Secretary’s Award for excellence in 2011. and posting to HMAS Creswell as the challenging and demanding times with Thank you Captain David Ramsay for your contribution Commanding Officer. It was during Australia rebuilding international ties as a Naval Officer and excelling at every task you undertook. this posting that I also was posted to with Indonesia, just prior to the East Your sense of humour, humility, skill and professionalism were Creswell as Captain Ramsay’s Executive Timor confrontation. unsurpassed. Combined with your devotion to family, you Officer, the first and possibly last time In 1997, Captain Ramsay was were one of the finest officers and gentlemen I have had the two birdies ran a Naval Establishment. awarded the Medal of the Order of privilege to serve with in the Australian Defence Force. God It was an absolute privilege to work Australia for meritorious service to bless you and keep the formation tight. t closely with David. We made some big Naval Aviation leading to the formation inroads into junior officer training and of the current Commander Fleet Air “When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk relationships with the newly formed Arm organisation. After transferring the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you Australian Defence Force Academy. to the Naval Reserve in 2001, David have been, and there you will always long to return” Our families enjoyed the Creswell conducted a study that saved the FAA – Smithsonian publication community life and activities. I have Museum from being disestablished many fond memories of some of the and many of his recommendations to Commodore Geoff Ledger DSC, AM RAN (Ret’d) high jinx David and I enjoyed whilst restructure and resource the museum
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Issue 147 45 A Middling Power What is the ADF meant to do, exactly? By Hugh White
n trying to explain the purpose of our armed forces, defence ministers Ioften fall back on that plangent phrase “the defence of Australia”. In a recent speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Defence Minister Stephen Smith reminded his audience that the 2009 Defence White Paper “underlined that Australia’s most basic strategic interest remained the defence of Australia against direct armed attack”. He then foreshadowed that the next White Paper, promised some time next year, would come to the same conclusion. This appealingly simple idea, that the reason we have a defence force is to defend ourselves against direct attack, has been central to defence policy for at least the past 40 years, and the public seems to accept it. But support an election in Cambodia, that the mother country’s protection Once a two-carrier Navy…HMAS few people in government or Defence or even to try to reconstruct could not be taken for granted, but also Melbourne, with think that Australia faces any credible Afghanistan. We only spend that that they could not defend themselves Westland Wessex risk of major military attack, and fewer kind of money to protect ourselves. without Britain’s help: the continent flying, escorts still believe we could defend ourselves Decade after decade, the biggest was too big, the population too small, Sydney on passage to if we did. As a result, neither the share of the defence budget has gone and their potentially threatening Vietnam. government nor Defence has taken on capabilities, such as fighter jets, neighbours, though poor, were too (Courtesy RAN) what is supposed to be the main task major warships, submarines and numerous to be fended off without aid. of the ADF very seriously, which goes heavily equipped land forces, that This dilemma racked those charged a long way to explaining why Defence are irrelevant to the lighter tasks we with developing Australia’s defence has been lurching from one arms have been sending the ADF off to do. policy. We couldn’t depend on our procurement or maintenance fiasco to If these capabilities make sense at all, allies to defend us because we couldn’t another. it would only be in fighting a major be sure they would be willing or able Of course, apart from defending war. Yet hardly anyone believes this to send forces halfway around the our shores, the ADF has always had is a realistic prospect, let alone a world when crisis struck. Yet we had something to do – peacekeeping in winnable one. No wonder Defence to depend on our allies, because we the Middle East, nation-building doesn’t seem to know what it’s doing. could not defend the continent alone. in East Timor, tsunami relief in This kind of muddle is not new. These conflicting realities drove us Indonesia or fighting bushfires in Australians first started thinking about in two separate directions – to build Victoria – but these aren’t reasons their security in the 1880s, when the forces to support our allies wherever enough to have a defence force. rise of powers like Germany, Russia they fought, in the hope they would This financial year Australians are and the United States started to reciprocate when we needed them, spending $24.2 billion on defence; challenge British power. Until then, and to do what we could to defend the that’s more than $1000 for each they had blithely assumed that the continent unaided. In trying to do a Australian man, woman and child. Royal Navy would always be on hand to bit of both, we ended up doing neither We don’t willingly spend those sums defend them. As Britain’s power waned, well. just to lend a hand in Somalia or Australians began to realise not only In the 1970s, things started getting Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 A Middling Power What is the ADF meant to do, exactly? easier. China seemed less a communist adversary. in a crisis the US would not be able menace and more a promising partner. This made self-reliance rather easy. or willing to support Australia. And Indonesia stopped being so threatening Indonesia had a large army, but weak lastly, if Indonesia realises its potential, and became a mostly responsible naval and air forces. Australia’s navy we will for the first time face on our neighbour. Above all, surprisingly, the and air force were always superior, doorstep a great power, one with an US emerged from failure in Vietnam as thanks mainly to Australia’s much economy much larger than our own the uncontested leader of Asia. After greater GDP. and the capacity to build formidable air Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, Mao But “the foreseeable future” is now and naval forces. accepted US primacy in return for past. In 1976, no one expected the Just as we need more than ever Washington’s recognition of Beijing’s Asian century, or foresaw that within to rely on our allies for security, it communist government. The likelihood 40 years China would be on the verge becomes less and less certain that we of a major direct attack on Australia of overtaking the US economy, and can. decreased, and we were confident that India would be following fast in its Finding a way through this maze if any serious threat did develop, the footsteps. No one could have foreseen is the task of the Gillard government’s US would come to help. Consequently, that Indonesia’s GDP would surpass new defence White Paper, due in Australia felt more secure from direct Australia’s, and that the country would 2013. The 2009 White Paper, released armed attack than at any time since the be spoken of as a great power in its by Kevin Rudd, tried and failed. Pax Britannica had begun to fray in the own right. These things have come to Though it went further than previous 1880s. pass, sweeping away the assumptions attempts in describing the trends in All this emboldened Australia that have framed Australia’s defence Australia’s strategic circumstances, the to take responsibility for its own policy for more than a generation. We government ducked taking any serious defence. In November 1976, the Fraser haven’t really escaped the old dilemma decisions by assuming nothing much government tabled a White Paper between defending ourselves and would change before 2030. They talked that said we should be able to defend relying on distant allies; we have just big about Australia as a “middle power” the continent without direct combat enjoyed respite from it, and now the in the Asian century, but kept plans for support from our allies. Self-reliance in holiday is over. new capabilities almost exactly where the defence of Australia has been the China’s rise, and the broader John Howard had left them. Since then, main tenet of our defence policy ever ascendancy of Asia, is the biggest shift even these modest plans have been since. in the distribution of global power in filleted by repeated budget cuts. The But defence against whom? The at least a century, and the biggest shift 2012–13 budget is 10% below last year’s 1976 White Paper boldly predicted in the balance of strategic forces in in real terms. All the headlines about that the powers of Asia – India, our region since Australia was settled plans to double the submarine fleet China and Japan – would not pose by Europeans. The implications for from six boats to 12 overlooked the key any strategic problems for Australia, Australia’s defence are fairly clear, fact that 20 years from now we will still and that our defence policy could and very significant. Firstly, the era of have only six boats, and we won’t have therefore afford to ignore them. Asian stability based on uncontested 12 until almost 2050. “No more than the former Great American primacy has come to an Next year’s White Paper will Powers of Europe,” it stated, “can end. A new, significantly different yet need to do much better if Australia’s we expect these powers individually stable order in Asia may emerge, but defence policy is to respond to the to play a large military role in we can be far from sure that this will challenges of the Asian century. It strategic developments directly happen, or that it will last. We therefore must start by offering a far more affecting Australian security in the face a much greater risk of major- sophisticated account of the risks foreseeable future.” True enough, power rivalry and conflict in Asia we might face – especially from none of the Asian powers was foolish over the coming decades. Secondly, China. In the 2009 White Paper, enough to risk threatening a close as the economies of China and other and in things he said publicly and American ally. With Asia’s main countries continue to grow, the US will privately as prime minister, Rudd players off the board, we only had to demand more support from its allies, gave the impression that he saw be able to defend ourselves against including Australia, especially if it aims China’s growing power as a threat, our immediate neighbours – and to retain its power in Asia. Thirdly, but it is not that simple. At present, Indonesia was the only conceivable there remains a significant risk that nothing in China’s policy and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 47
outlook justifies an assumption that changes in Asia are happening, and policy insight and imagination, it will threaten Australia militarily. how little time we have to decide to address it squarely – so don’t It is possible for China to continue how to respond. After all, the key hold your breath. If the response is to rise peacefully, if a way can be changes are already far advanced, fudged, we are likely to end up with found to accommodate its growing and any response will take time to the worst of both worlds. We will power and ambition within a new implement. Should the next White waste a lot of money on things we Asian order that also protects Paper conclude that we will need don’t need, while still not doing what everyone else’s vital interests. different kinds of armed forces in is required to stop us sliding swiftly Helping to create this kind of new the 2040s and 2050s, when by some into the ranks of the small powers. regional order is perhaps the most projections, China’s GDP will be Which, in fact, is exactly what we are important diplomatic imperative double that of the US, we have to doing now. Australia has ever faced. start building them now. We can define a middle power as Yet there is a clear possibility that Most importantly, the new White able to stand up to one major power these efforts will fail, and that Asia will Paper must decide whether Australia without relying on another. So should become fractured by major-power will hang on to the objective we be one? To answer this we need rivalry. So while China’s emergence we set ourselves in the 1970s – to weigh up the costs of building the does not threaten Australia, it that of defending the continent armed forces we’d need against the overturns the stable regional order independently against a direct benefits of reducing risk. Looking at of the past 40 years, and raises huge military attack – in circumstances risk first, Australia is in many ways questions about what will replace where a threat from a major power an intrinsically secure country. We it. Likewise, there is no reason to can no longer be as easily dismissed. are – or at least have been – far from assume a stronger Indonesia threatens The alternative is that we rely ever the major centres of world power, with Australia, but it similarly increases our more deeply on the US, even as its neighbours much weaker than us. long-term strategic risks: the stronger relative power in Asia declines. This We possess a huge territory not easily Indonesia becomes, the more serious is perhaps the most fundamental dominated, and we are surrounded by the consequences for Australia if we do strategic question we face, testing vast oceans. Add to this that we have come to blows. our seriousness about being a middle had the region’s dominant military The new White Paper will also power. It will take real political power as our close ally, and Australia need to recognise how fast these courage and leadership, as well as seems very unlikely to be attacked, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 A Middling Power What is the ADF meant to do, exactly? which is precisely why for the past 40 to take the possibility seriously, and Australia. The other approach would years “the defence of Australia” has have not yet woken up to how the be to attack directly the forces being seemed such a hollow policy precept. changing strategic setting makes it projected towards us. This looks In the next 40 years, our island- essential that they do so. Designing inherently easier, and less likely to continent geography will continue to large-scale campaigns is not the lead to escalation. Most importantly, ensure that only radical changes in ADF’s kind of thing. Australia’s it would allow us to exploit the the political, economic and strategic military has always been focused fact that it is much easier to stop settings in Asia will substantially on tactics – the business of fighting someone else projecting power over increase the risk to Australia. But battles on the ground – an area in the sea than it is to project power such changes are indeed underway. If which they excel. It has been happy oneself. Indonesia fulfils its potential to become to leave higher level questions, such Here, we need to distinguish what a major power, distance will do less as deciding which battles to fight, naval strategists call ‘sea control’ from to protect us than it has done. Other to our allies. The ADF does not feel ‘sea denial’. Sea control is the ability to powers will be much stronger than at home with these questions, and protect your own ships by preventing they have been, and more inclined to I suspect even feels intimidated by others from attacking them, and is compete with one another, so it follows them. It seems uneasy about taking needed to safely advance by sea. Sea that the risks of us being drawn into on the responsibility for defending denial is the ability to attack an enemy’s major-power rivalry and conflict must Australia independently, and ships, and thus deprive it of sea control. also be higher. Australia’s strategic risks reluctant to open up discussion that The most crucial operational fact for will also depend on how we behave might entail significant changes to the defence of Australia is that sea as the region evolves. Our policies the kinds of forces we require. The denial is much easier to achieve than towards our neighbours will make a big ADF would rather stick to what it sea control. This hasn’t always been so. difference in how we’re viewed. It is not knows, and successive ministers, Back in the days when Britannia ruled clear that we really understand this yet. with no appetite for hard questions the waves, protecting your own ships Perhaps the most we can say at and harder answers, have been happy and attacking the enemy’s were almost this stage is that, while the risk of to leave them be. two sides of the same coin. Technology direct attack on Australia will remain To most of us, the idea that has now shifted the advantage to sea quite low in the Asian century, it will Australia could stand up alone against denial, and this trend shows no sign of nonetheless be higher than we have a major power seems far-fetched. Our reversing. This means Australia should known for several generations. We experience as part of global coalitions be able to achieve sea denial against should try to reduce this risk through in the two world wars makes us even a major power without too much diplomacy and other non-military think that success in a conflict means trouble, if we focus our efforts on it means, particularly by promoting a vanquishing the enemy and occupying single-mindedly. stable regional order that minimises their territory. Against a major power, Sea denial has two essential steps: great-power rivalry. But we cannot Australia is never going to be able to do finding ships and sinking them. assume this alone will work, so we that independently. The most we could Finding the ships means building an must at least consider building the hope to achieve would be to raise the effective and reliable surveillance armed forces we would need to defend costs and risks of attacking Australia system capable of covering ourselves from a major power without to the point where it is not worth an Australia’s air and sea approaches relying on America. enemy’s while. But, fortunately, that thousands of kilometres from our What kinds of forces we would may not be as hard as we might think. shores. We already have some of the need exactly, and how much these There are two ways it could be key elements, including the JORN might cost, are then the critical done. One approach would be to over-the-horizon radar system, and questions of military strategy for threaten an adversary’s own country technological innovations should Australia’s defence. We would with a direct attack –“to rip an arm make it easier to enhance this over expect the ADF and the Defence off any major Asian power that the next few decades. In the age of Department to devote much effort sought to attack Australia” as my old Google Earth, a ship moving slowly to answering them. My impression friend and colleague Ross Babbage over the surface of the sea is not that is that they have done no such thing. so colourfully put it. This defence hard to find. Sinking ships is not that Like the rest of us, they find it hard might suit a nuclear power, but not difficult either. Today’s torpedoes Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 49
and missiles make ships easy to has shaped the debates that have raged weakness in Australia’s demography target and very hard to defend. over whether the boats should be large or skills base. Although it is crystal Indeed, most of the technologies in or small, designed here or overseas, to a clear that our current defence force today’s warships are devoted to self- new design or off the shelf. Little or no and department aren’t up to the task, protection rather than attack. thought has been given to the two most as long as we can get access to key The challenge is to carry the critical issues: numbers and timing. technologies, Australia has the capacity torpedoes or missiles within firing Once we start to ask how Australia to build and operate the kinds of forces range. It makes no sense these days to might defend itself with a sea-denial we would need to defend ourselves. It carry them in a warship, which is itself campaign, it becomes clear that we would simply take a lot of work. both expensive and vulnerable. Instead, need at least double the 12 submarines Which brings us back to money. they are most effectively carried in currently being planned. At the same Whether we should build the forces to submarines and aircraft. Within range time, there is no need for the exotic defend ourselves independently in the of airbases, aircraft are cheaper, but and expensive options that are adding Asian century depends on how much it beyond that range – anything over a so much to the cost, risk and schedule would cost. New technologies such as few hundred kilometres – submarines of the proposal. What Australia needs, drones could help to keep some costs are the sea-denial platform par if we decide to invest in the capacity down eventually, but there’s no dodging excellence, because they are so for independent defence over coming the fact that independent defence will difficult to find. That makes them decades, is large numbers of good, cost a lot of money – certainly a lot perhaps the most important single quiet, lethal boats optimised solely for more than we have been spending capability for the independent defence the task of sinking ships. And we need recently. There is, however, one big of Australia, because the further from them soon. offset – the potential for savings. We our shores we can start to deny the A big fleet of submarines like this waste a lot of money in defence in ways sea to an adversary, the further its would cost a great deal of money, and large and small, but the biggest drain of costs and risks rise. What’s more, over would only be one element of a range of all is the billions spent on capabilities coming decades, submarines might capabilities needed for the independent we do not need. be the only way we can project power defence of Australia. Effective denial The Gillard government is currently against significant military forces in of our air and sea approaches would building three air warfare destroyers the Western Pacific. The advantages of require a much larger air force than (AWDs) at a cost of $8 billion. We sea denial over sea control only work we have been planning – perhaps 200 simply do not need them. We do need in our favour so long as we are not front-line combat aircraft rather than smaller, cheaper warships, such as the trying to project power using ships the 100 being considered. It would Anzac frigates for low-level operations, ourselves. Australia has no serious also, perhaps surprisingly, require a but the AWDs are equipped at great chance of achieving sea control against somewhat larger and more heavily cost for high-end naval battles. They any major Asian power, even in our equipped army, because a maritime- are supposed to escort and protect the own immediate maritime approaches. denial posture relies on there being a huge new amphibious ships in which That means if we want the ability to substantial land presence to drive up our army, like US marines, might be use armed forces to protect our wider the scale of forces the enemy has to deployed to assault the territory of an strategic interests in a major-power project. So the ADF needed for our enemy in a major war. Yet this scenario conflict, submarines could be the only independent defence would look very is fanciful. Even with the AWDs, we option we have. different from the force we have known have no chance of achieving sea control This is why the government’s failure for the past 40 years, or indeed since against a capable enemy. Just as it is to make the new submarine project World War II. easy for us to achieve sea denial against work is so serious. Most of the myriad Obviously, building and operating an adversary, it is easy for them to deny problems have come about because the this force would make unprecedented us. The amphibious ships would stand government has no coherent idea about demands on the ADF and the too high a chance of being sunk with what the submarine fleet is supposed to department. We could hardly expect all troops on board to ever be put to do. In fact, the project has been driven the outfit that has failed to crew and sea, and even if they went to sea and not by strategic imperatives but by maintain a fleet of six submarines to do found their way ashore, a couple of commercial concerns about where the any better with 24 or more. But these thousand soldiers would have little boats will be designed and built. This problems do not reflect any inherent if any strategic effect. In any major Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 A Middling Power What is the ADF meant to do, exactly? conflict, amphibious assault is simply and ’60s we spent an average of 3.3% not a credible option for Australia, and of GDP, so this would take us back to in low-level contingencies amphibious what we spent before the great strategic forces would not need AWDs to changes of the early 1970s allowed us, protect them. for a time, to ignore the possibility of This appalling waste of money conflict with great powers. and effort is happening because the Australia could afford this level Howard government ordered these of defence spending. It would mean ships, on the advice of Defence, higher taxes, but our tax levels are still without anyone apparently having quite low compared to those of other thought through whether these would countries. Nonetheless, to go down contribute cost-effectively to achieving this path would be a huge decision. Australia’s strategic objectives. Despite what the industry lobbyists say, Yet even if we cease wasting money, defence spending is in the end a form Dr Hugh White is Professor of Strategic an independent defence capacity is of consumption, not an investment. We Studies at the Australian National going to be expensive. It is impossible should only spend this much money if University. He is also a Visiting Fellow to give a precise figure, but if we were the strategic risks of the Asian century at the Lowy Institute for International careful to spend money only on the are grave. It is quite possible that they Policy. His work focuses primarily on capabilities we really needed, it would will be. This is what the next defence cost between 3 and 4% of GDP. For the White Paper must assess. For the first Australian strategic and defence policy, last 20 years, we have spent an average time in a very long period, our political Asia-Pacific security issues, and global of about 2% of GDP on defence, so that leaders are going to have to take strategic affairs especially as they means a steep increase. But to put it in defence seriously. t influenceA ustralia and the Asia-Pacific. historical perspective, during the 1950s
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 51 United Kingdom: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region B y Fay Clarke, Future Directions International Pty Ltd Research Assistant
Key Points • Conscious of the current straitened economic circumstances, the UK is pursuing “commercial diplomacy” by seeking new markets in burgeoning Indian Ocean region economies. • Within the Indian Ocean region, the UK’s diplomatic resources have been strategically pivoted towards the emerging economic “powerhouses”. • The Indian Ocean continues to be vital to British strategic maritime interests. The UK maintains a naval presence within the Indian Ocean region and plays a leading role in counter-piracy and maritime security efforts. • The United Kingdom is committed to promoting its values abroad and uses its former colonial links to help forge and strengthen relationships.
Summary Archipelago and three islands formerly lease is due to expire in 2016, with the Though no longer an empire, the belonging to the Seychelles) is the only possibility of a 20-year extension built United Kingdom still maintains an remaining UK territory within the into the original agreement. Despite interest in the Indian Ocean region. As region although, according to the 2006 overcrowding concerns, given the a global power, the UK sees the Indian Brits Abroad study by the Institute current US strategic pivot towards the Ocean as critical to its own economic for Public Policy Research, there are Indo-Pacific, it seems unlikely that success. In addition to security over an estimated 1.9 million British interest in Diego Garcia will diminish interests, the strategy of “commercial persons living in the greater Indian in the future. US FA-18F Super diplomacy”, which taps into the rise of Ocean region. The BIOT atoll of Diego The UK has important commercial Hornets (foreground) a number of Indo-Pacific economies, Garcia is leased to the United States interests in the Indian Ocean. In part fly in formation with the continuing geostrategic relevance to house its major Indian Ocean naval due to the legacy of the primarily two Indian Navy Sea of the Middle East and longstanding base. Diego Garcia is strategically vital: mercantile British Empire, the UK Harriers, bottom, and two Indian Air Force Commonwealth links from a colonial it sits at the centre of the Indian Ocean, has a sizeable commercial shipping Jaguars, right, over past in Africa, provide the basis for offering roughly equidistant access to industry operating within the region. Indian Navy aircraft the UK’s national involvement in the all major shipping lanes and to the rim Total British shipping revenue for 2010 carrier INS Viraat Indian Ocean region. and island states of the region. The US stood at £12.6 billion ($19.3 billion), (Courtesy US Navy) A nalySIS Security and Geostrategic Interests For much of the twentieth- century, the United Kingdom was the preeminent power in the Indian Ocean, a region considered crucial to the commercial activities of the British Empire. Today, the strategic presence of the UK is on a considerably diminished scale and Sino-India and Sino- American rivalries (real or perceived) tend to overshadow the strategic presence of other actors in the region. The British Indian Ocean Territory (the BIOT, comprising the Chagos Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 52 United Kingdom: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region
of which almost £9 billion ($13.8 in its former billion) came from overseas trading, colony of Kenya: much of which would be conducted in a neighbour the Indian Ocean region. The Indian of Somalia Ocean region is vital to Britain’s and regional strategic maritime interests, and the “diplomatic UK is a major stakeholder in promoting hub” for the maritime security. Admiral Sir Foreign and Trevor Soar, the Royal Navy’s former Commonwealth Commander-in-Chief Fleet, confirmed Office (FCO).1 the strategic importance of the Indian Whitehall Ocean to the UK, when he told Future recognises that R oyal Navy Multirole Directions International that, out of the Somali piracy ‘cannot be solved at sea’ its efforts to “rebalance” the flagging Hydrographic and 25 per cent of the Royal Navy units that and has led multilateral diplomatic UK economy through international Oceanographic Survey Vessel HMS are deployed at any one time, it is likely efforts to support the return of stable trade and investment. The ongoing Echo (H 87)-photo by that over 50 per cent of the Navy’s governance to Somalia. In February economic instability of the Eurozone Michael Nitz manpower and assets will be located in 2012, the FCO hosted the London (Britain’s most important export the Indian Ocean. Conference on Somalia, attended market) and the slowdown of Britain’s The UK plays a leading role in by over 50 states, to plan future own national growth, in addition to a multilateral counter-piracy efforts in nation-building, counter-piracy and weakened ability to project influence regional danger zones, particularly humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia. abroad, have led the UK to seek new around Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. UK support for the African Union force markets and pursue opportunities The UK is a significant contributor combating al-Shabaab militancy was within the growing economies of the to the anti-terrorism and anti-piracy underscored and, that same month, Indian Ocean region. Combined Task Forces 150 and 151. a British Ambassador to Somalia was While there has been a general The Royal Navy currently provides the appointed for the first time since the reduction of the British diplomatic Commander and headquarters for the fall of former dictator Mohammed Siad presence worldwide following the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, Barre in 1991. The September 2012 implementation of government-wide charged with combating Somali piracy. election of Somali President Hassan austerity measures, there has been In October 2011, London authorised Mohamud and a new parliament a clear strategic reorientation and the carrying of armed guards by was greeted with cautious optimism streamlining toward the economic British merchant vessels transiting by the UK, as a key member of the ‘powerhouses of the near future.’2 The the Gulf of Aden, Strait of Hormuz international community backing the adoption of “commercial diplomacy” and other “chokepoints” along major ‘roadmap to end the transition’. has seen the creation of the FCO sea lanes. The United Kingdom has Trade and Diplomacy: Business Charter and the UK Trade also capitalised on its Commonwealth and Investment portfolio, which “Commercial Diplomacy” connections to broker co-operation identifies a number of Indian Ocean with countries such as Mauritius, the Trade and commercial interests are economies, including India, Indonesia, Seychelles and Tanzania, as well as now more than ever positioned at Malaysia and Singapore, as key high- the self-declared state of Somaliland the centre of the United Kingdom’s growth ‘target markets’.3 British exports to prosecute suspected pirates and to diplomatic engagement with the Indian to Indonesia alone, for instance, imprison those convicted of piracy. Ocean region. In 2011, the British increased by 44 per cent in 2011. The United Kingdom, like the Government launched a new strategy 2 Jeremy Browne MP, ‘Navigating the US and EU, has a considerable stake of “commercial diplomacy” as part of Emerging Order: the UK and the Emerging in restoring stability to Somalia and 1 In addition, in March 2012, a UK firm Powers’. Transcript of speech given at made the first ever discovery of oil in Chatham House, 20 July 2011.
Sailors chock and India and Indonesia are seen as growing Indian Ocean economies support for human rights and political chain an Indian Navy particularly important and, in recent through multilateral means. London freedoms, including the release of Chetak helicopter years, London has commenced annual is spearheading efforts to negotiate political prisoners, as a necessary to the flight deck strategic business summits with European Union Free Trade precondition for the strengthening of of the guided- them. The bilateral UK-Indonesia Agreements with Singapore and India, bilateral ties between the two countries. missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald Partnership forum covers the key and hopes to bring both sets of talks to The UK has sought to consolidate as amphibious policy areas of foreign policy and a conclusion by the end of 2012. The and expand its already strong economic command ship USS international security issues, trade UK was also a major player in bringing ties to the wealthy Persian Gulf states. Blue Ridge passes and investment, climate change and about the suspension of EU economic In recent years, the UK has become behind (USN photo) sustainable growth and education. sanctions (excepting the continuing more reliant on foreign energy imports The range of issues reflects not only ban on arms sales) against Burma in as domestic natural gas and crude oil the commercial diplomacy strategy, April 2012. Accompanied by a business production declines; it is now a net but also the UK’s interests in regional delegation, Prime Minister David energy importer. It is critical for the stability and supporting democracy Cameron became the first Western UK to maintain friendly relations with in Indonesia as part of a strengthened leader to visit Burma, during a four- international suppliers, rather than risk ASEAN regime. Britain also views its day scoping tour of Burma, Malaysia, restricted access to long-term supply in highly creative and productive science Indonesia and Japan taken shortly an age of austerity. Qatar, for instance, and technology industries as a critical before EU sanctions were suspended. accounts for 60 per cent of British LPG asset, with research and development The trip also demonstrated the close imports. Qatar is also an important an important “pull factor” for UK alignment of British business and bilateral investment partner for the UK trade in the competitive Indian Ocean diplomatic interests in the region, with and a key stakeholder in the energy marketplace. the UK eager to explore economic trade within the Indian Ocean region. The UK has also pursued opportunities within Burma but It is not just energy that is critical “commercial diplomacy” with reiterating its firm committed to to UK interests within the Gulf. The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 United Kingdom: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region
area has lucrative markets for UK healthy two-way trade, cultural and the two countries have held regular exports in financial, training and historical ties and knowledge-sharing, AUKMIN defence and foreign policy educational services, plus specialist with numerous bilateral agreements summits, the fourth of which took technical products including defence, in health, law, science and technology. place in January 2012. Major items engineering and industrial equipment. Recreational travel remains the of discussion included constructive Saudi Arabia is the UK’s largest market primary contributor to the services engagement with China, reform in for goods and services outside of the trade on both sides. Amongst the Burma, counter-piracy efforts (and OECD and Britain’s most significant major Australian exports to the UK are the increased role of India in such trading partner in the Middle East. gold (totalling $4.5 billion in 2011-12), operations) and Australian support Oman and Kuwait are also significant coal and lead. The main UK exports to for UK engagement in the Indo- markets for Britain. British arms Australia include medicines, platinum, Pacific via the Five Power Defence manufacturers hold major contracts in silver, printed materials and passenger Arrangements (FPDA). The FPDA Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, while the UK motor vehicles. Australia is seen as brings together the UK, Australia, is the largest foreign investor in Oman, a safe market for British investment Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand with high levels of bilateral trade in and an attractive base for Indo-Pacific and has remained in place for over addition to defence co-operation and regional operations, primarily in the 40 years, with joint training exercises educational exchanges. infrastructure, pharmaceuticals and held each year.6 In common with London maintains a naval presence energy industries. The Department of the United States, New Zealand and in Bahrain, which hosts the United Foreign Affairs and Trade notes that Canada, the UK and Australia are Kingdom Maritime Component the UK is the second-largest source of also members of a number of military Command (UKMCC) headquarters total foreign investment in Australia interoperability programmes that and the Royal Navy’s Armilla Patrol, and the second-largest source of can, at times, incorporate an Indian tasked with ensuring the safety of foreign direct investment in Australia, Ocean aspect: the ABCA (American, British vessels in the Persian Gulf and behind only the United States.4 British, Canadian, Australian and Arabian Sea including minehunters, UK investment in Australia has New Zealand)Armies Programme, the submarines and surface combatants. proved resilient despite the global naval AUSCANNZUKUS (Australia, Bahrain purchased nearly £3 million economic slowdown. Following the Canada, New Zealand, United ($4.6 million) worth of military post-2008 downturn which had a Kingdom, and United States), ASIC equipment in the April-June quarter significant impact upon the UK, British (the Air and Space Interoperability of 2012. Additionally, British Prime FDI into Australia increased by $1.8 Council), the military scientific and Minister David Cameron has recently billion in 2009. The UK currently technological Technical Co-operation closed deals with Saudi Arabia and the exports more to Australia than it does Programme and intelligence agency United Arab Emirates on the sale of the to India or China (although Australia linkages. Eurofighter Typhoon. These advanced is only Britain’s thirty-third largest A bilateral UK-Australia National aircraft are being purchased to replace source of imports.)5 With its focus on Security Partnership in 2009 pledged the ageing Panavia Tornado, first emerging economic powers, the UK’s to further co-operation on intelligence introduced in 1979. new “commercial diplomacy” strategy sharing and responses to emerging As lucrative as its trade relations may alter the proportion of British security challenges. In 2011, a with the Gulf States are, the UK may exports to Australia. Memorandum of Understanding not be able to take them for granted. The United Kingdom and Australia pledged further collaboration in The Gulf States are also seeking have a long history of defence and science and innovation to aid counter- increased commercial engagement security co-operation. Since 2006, terrorism and national security with emerging and established 4 Australian investment in the UK is measures. Australia remains an considerable, with over 1,500 Australian Asian powerhouses such as India, companies active in Britain, largely in the important market for UK defence South Korea and Japan and those financial services sector, but also including 6 The FPDA entered into force in 1971 dual-listed resources companies, such as as a security guarantee for Singapore and relationships may come to take priority BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. ‘United Kingdom Malaysia and has continued since. Despite over those with “Old World” powers Country Brief’, DFAT, March 2012. no longer having a major military presence such as the UK. 5 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in the region, the UK retains assets in ‘Country Profile: Australia’. http://www.fco. Singapore including a refuelling depot at Britain and Australia maintain a gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel- the Sembawang dockyard, which also hosts strong relationship, characterised by advice-by-country/country-profile/asia- warships from the Australian, New Zealand oceania/australia?profile=all and United States navies. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 55
exports. Given their considerable a continued source of skilled migration vital to the United Kingdom’s history of military, defence and security to Britain, and currently 60 per cent maritime strategic interests and the co-operation, in addition to Australia’s of intra-company transferees to the UK will continue to play an active strategic position in the Indo-Pacific UK are from India. The importance of role in regional security efforts, both region, bilateral engagement between these links with India is underscored unilaterally and multilaterally. Seeking the UK and Australia in these areas by the strong support of the UK for the to revive its own flagging economy, may increase over the coming “Asian proposed European Union FTA with the United Kingdom will continue Century”. On the other hand, the UK India. to pursue new markets through such does not yet actively participate in The United Kingdom is also strategies as “commercial diplomacy”. major multilateral maritime security keen to promote its values alongside As a global power, the UK may find initiatives such as the Indian-initiated diplomatic, commercial and strategic it has increasingly to compete with Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, or engagement with the Indian Ocean influential rising regional powers to take part in the Exercise Malabar region. As such, London has been a secure opportunities and strengthen operations, which Australia, India and firm supporter of democratisation existing relationships, despite retaining Singapore all do. and political freedoms in countries strong ties to many former colonies. Cultural Interests such as Burma, Somalia and Egypt. The United Kingdom is, however, well Prime Minister David Cameron was placed to offer mutually-beneficial The United Kingdom offers a the first foreign head of state to visit opportunities in trade, defence, number of special higher educational Egypt following the Arab Spring. education and skills training and opportunities, particularly to The Department for International knowledge-sharing in specialist areas of T he Japan Maritime Commonwealth students, through Development also offers considerable science and technology, to help achieve Self-Defense Force initiatives such as the Chevening, aid initiatives to various Indian Ocean its commercial goals in the Indian destroyer JDS Marshall and Commonwealth countries, including India, Kenya, Ocean region. t Kurama leads the Scholarships. Large-scale migration to Bangladesh and Burma and offers guided-missile the UK from Commonwealth countries incentives to support the UK’s regional Any opinions or views expressed in this destroyer USS Fitzgerald, flying in the Indian Ocean region has policy objectives. paper are those of the individual author, their battle flag, enhanced cultural ties; Indian migrants unless stated to be those of Future and the Indian Navy constitute the largest ethnic minority Conclusion Directions International. guided-missile resident in the UK. Indian nationals are The Indian Ocean region remains destroyer INS Ranvir
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 World Naval Developments B y DrNorman Friedman
erhaps the most surprising development in this year’s PEuronaval show, in Paris this October, was the public interest in naval ballistic missile defense shown by several important companies, presumably reflecting new official interest. The US Navy has been on anti-ballistic missile patrol since 2004, and NATO has accepted a land installation in Romania. However, many Europeans have argued against embracing this type of defense to avoid offending the Russians, who regard it as an attempt to devalue their own nuclear forces. This is an increasingly sensitive issue as the Russians find that they cannot afford anything remotely matter if the Iranians decided to touch A second possibility is to strike F ire Controlman 2nd like the scale of military investment off a Middle Eastern War. Ballistic directly at the Iranian program. It Class Matthew E Bell mans a SPY-1B (V) achieved by the old Soviet Union, missile defense may be the best way would probably be entirely possible radar console in the hence cannot modernize or maintain to counter the future Iranian nuclear to deliver weapons to Iranian targets, Combat Information their non-nuclear forces on anything threat. but the Iranians have dispersed their Center aboard the like the old scale. More and more that The West is currently attempting nuclear program and they have also, guided-missile cruiser leaves Russian nuclear forces as the to convince the Iranian regime to it seems, hardened it. Evaluations of USS Shiloh. (US Navy photo by Lieutenant core of Russian national military power. abandon its program by imposing this option tend to offer to delay the (JG) Nelson H. Balido) The United States has consistently economic sanctions. Advocates of Iranian program by a year or so, but argued that its evolving national missile sanctions point out that the Iranian not to destroy it. There is no reason to defense system is directed against economy is visibly crumbling. imagine that the Iranian government attacks far smaller than anything However, the sanctions seem not to would be friendlier a year or so from the Russians might mount. Outside have had much effect on the regime (as now, particularly after having been Russia it is usually assumed that the opposed to, on the Iranian population). attacked. How much would that delay system, both in the United States and One reason why is that sanctions which buy? Complete destruction of the in Europe, is directed at least initially damage a country’s economy tend to Iranian program would be a different against the rising threats of Iranian strengthen the hand of the regime at proposition, but that would probably and North Korean missiles. NATO has which they are aimed. The regime require a nuclear strike, which would formally accepted emplacement of the becomes the only source of increasingly kill millions of entirely innocent people US Phased Adaptive Approach system, scarce goods. For that matter, the –an unthinkable means of dealing with Iranian Navy missile based on the naval Aegis system, in population generally blames the a postulated future threat raised by boat Central Europe. sanction-setters rather than the regime Presumably the Europeans are for its problems. That is certainly now increasingly alarmed at Iranian what happened in Iraq under UN progress. This is not to suggest that any sanctions. The sanctions did prevent European imagines that the Iranians Saddam Hussein from maintaining his will suddenly decide to immolate some air defenses, but that mattered only major city. Rather, it must be the fear when Iraq was invaded. Advocates of that, once they have the ability to do sanctions generally imagine that they so, the Iranians will apply pressure are an effective alternative to war, not whenever they want to force European a means of making an eventual attack policy. That might become a critical more effective. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 57
a few men in Qom or in Tehran. An for deterrence). It certainly helps that attack on Iran which did not destroy the Aegis system to be emplaced in the country would likely cement Europe has repeatedly proved itself, so government support and undermine that the Iranians would have to bet that any opposition. defenses would be effective. Then there is deterrence: if the Three companies displayed ballistic Iranians do launch an attack, surely missile defense systems at the show. they must contemplate nuclear EADS (European Aerospace Defense retaliation. Unfortunately it is not clear Systems), a Franco-German company, whether the Iranian leadership would showed a model of an Exoguard missile be deterred by the threat of nuclear which could be fired out of either the retaliation. Some Iranian statements US Mk 41 vertical launcher or the suggest that they would welcome French Sylver (as in the current Franco- setting off a nuclear war, which they Italian frigates). It also displayed a say would result in the victory of their model of the kinetic energy kill vehicle SPY-1 Variants version of Islam – but that may be which the missile would carry. There and control element. That EADS feels (Courtesy Defense no more than poker-playing. That is were no accompanying brochures, but there is a need for this kind of software Industry Daily) aside from the question of whether the missile figured in a formal report suggests that European governments a nuclear threat against the Iranian to the French Senate last year. Perhaps are increasingly interested in ballistic population would necessarily affect more significantly, EADS displayed missile defense. those ruling Iran. This type of question software intended explicitly to teach The second company was has always bedevilled nuclear strategy. officials and military decision-makers Fincantieri, the Italian warship builder. Probably the only effective deterrent not yet familiar with ballistic missile Included in its large array of warship would be a direct threat to the Iranian defense how it would work. The models was a theater ballistic missile Japanese WWII leadership; but what if the leaders software simulates engagements, defense surface combatant, a frigate carrier power at sea. actually believe what they say about the showing how and when decisions equipped with an Arleigh Burke class Two other carriers in desirable outcome of such an attack? have to be made and how many type SPY-1 radar and with six sets of the background lead We have never been particularly good opportunities a given missile system vertical launchers (eight cells each) three battleships or at understanding truly alien cultures, has to intercept an incoming threat. for the defensive missiles (it also had battlecruisers, with two or three carriers as witness the failure of US deterrent Presumably this relatively simple what looked like Harpoon launchers behind (Simon policy against Japan in 1941. software is designed so that it can be amidships and the standard Italian Loveday, Darwin The new idea is that a program like grown into a missile system command 76mm gun forward and a RAM missile Military Museum) Iran’s can be countered by deploying ballistic missile defense, which may be able to neutralize the Iranian weapons after they are launched. This is actually another form of deterrence, which is always an attempt to affect a potential enemy’s calculations. It can certainly be argued that no ballistic missile defense is foolproof. However, any Iranians contemplating an attack would not be at all sure that the defensive system would fail. If it worked, they would be in a rather embarrassing position. They would have fired a dud while waiting to see whether the West fired back with something a lot more massive and more effective (there is no question of substituting missile defense Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 58 World Naval Developments
launcher aft, as well as a big bow sonar). Full load displacement was given as 6550 metric tons, considerably less than that of a US destroyer (but with only about half as many vertical launcher cells); overall dimensions were 144 x 19.7 m. No maximum speed was given, but the ship was designed to cruise at 15 kts (range 6000 nm). The Italian model could be interpreted not as an approach to European markets, but rather as a potential contender for the current Saudi Eastern Fleet competition. As displayed, the frigate is equipped with US rather than European weapons and sensors (the Saudis would probably Japanese Maritime buy US equipment, even if they bought probably other powers would almost which may have been intended as an Self Defence Force a non-US hull). This interpretation certainly much prefer the Saudis to alternative to the SPY-1 which equips ship JS Makinami suggests that the Saudis want the invest in missile defense rather than Aegis ships (there was no explicit at RIMPAC. (U.S. system largely for its ability to deal with in nuclear weapons of their own, the connection to ballistic missile defense). Navy photo by Mass Communication ballistic missiles. They are certainly existence of which would probably The Saudi competition may also Specialist 1st vitally interested in defense against induce further governments to acquire explain why the Korean shipbuilder Class Michael R. Iranian missiles, because they see Iran their own nuclear weapons. Egypt, Daewoo exhibited (for the first time McCormick) as their main regional threat. Saudi which historically has sought the at a Euronaval), since it is currently Arabia seeks to lead the majority leadership of the Arab world, would be building large Aegis ships. Again, (Sunni) branch of Islam. As such it a prime candidate. Daewoo made no explicit connection competes against the Iranian-led Shia Reportedly other contenders for to missile defense, although South (Shi’ite) branch. Each conceives the the Saudi order include France and Korea is interested in countering other as heretical; each has an activist the United States. The competition existing and future North Korean wing which advocates destroying the seems to explain why the US stand ballistic missiles. other. For example, the majority of included a model of the Lockheed The third company was Thales, people killed by the Sunni Al Qaeda Martin (displacement hull) version of the European electronics giant, whose Iranian kilo class movement have been Shi’ites, not the Littoral Combat Ship adapted as a Dutch naval branch (formerly Signaal) submarine Westerners. small Aegis ship In the past, the Saudis have been with the SPY-1F interested in deterrents against Iran, radar (which is beginning with ballistic missiles bought probably much too from China during the Iran-Iraq small to support War of the 1980s. There have been ballistic missile suggestions that the Iranian nuclear defense). The program will (or perhaps already French DCNS has) trigger a Saudi nuclear program, company showed because to be without a bomb would an evolved make Saudi Arabia intolerably version of the vulnerable (Israel is generally assumed current Franco- to have a substantial nuclear arsenal, Italian FREMM the great question being why or frigate featuring whether it is not an effective deterrent a fixed four-face against Iran). The United States and active-array radar Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 59
company showed a version of its the Standard Missile (hence relatively Smart-L long-range three-dimensional easily adapted to ballistic missile radar l adapted to missile defense defense). It is reportedly closely related specifically for the Royal Netherlands to the S-1850 radar of the French- Navy. The passive array of the standard Italian-British PAAMs system, though Smart-L is replaced by an active array, that radar apparently has a different and the radar is adapted to use special antenna which might not be as easily ballistic missile defense waveforms. adapted to active operation. The It can operate in either staring or existing Smart-L can be adapted (using rotating mode. In the staring mode, new software) for shorter-range missile the radar can detect a missile at a range defense, with an effective range of of 1800 to 2000 km (about 1000 nm); about 600 km. This version was tested in rotating mode, detection range off Hawaii in 2006 against ballistic is roughly halved because the radar missile targets. puts much less energy onto a given The missile defense exhibits Norman Friedman’s latest book is The cell in space (detection range depends represented a small proportion of Naval Institute Guide to World Naval on how much energy pours onto a the Euronaval show; what seems Weapon Systems target). A company representative significant is that they were present at commented that a rotatable radar all. They suggest a shift in European offered the political advantage that the governmental attitudes, and probably Russians would not consider it directed also an increasing suspicion that specifically against them (presumably nothing short of an unacceptable he had a land-based version in mind). attack can prevent the Iranians from The Royal Netherlands Navy is the completing nuclear weapons and launch customer. mating them with ballistic missiles. t Smart-L is integral to the Dutch- German naval air defense system using
Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force destroyer JDS Haruna-photo by Michael Nitz
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 Book Reviews
supplies on anchored ships, and he was readable prose author Wilson takes not universally known and marvelled apart the stories, but he is also to be at for his everyday activities. These are congratulated for a side-effect: in his just repeated aspects of the tale – the analysis he also tells the tale of Gallipoli. story that many would rather believe. So should the statue be melted Not that Wilson stops with the down, or all of them reassessed, for simple. For example, he analyses the in fact there are other statues, and 300 or so journeys Simpson is reputed memorabilia. Wilson does not say to have taken with his donkey, between that Simpson should be dismissed, the time of his landing and the day he or forgotten. Rather, he is asking was killed. The calculations eventually for people to not affix qualities that sound like an algebra problem: “if are in the end rather insulting to the one soldier with a donkey takes 105 ordinary bloke concerned, Private John minutes to bring one casualty down to Kirkpatrick Simpson. the beach, how long will it take…” and The book is well illustrated with Dust Donkeys and so on. Wilson shows convincingly that black and white photographs of the Delusions Simpson could not mathematically time. An exhaustive collection of have done what was ascribed to him. notes, appendices, a bibliography, By Graham Wilson Also analysed completely and and an index will assist those who Published by Big Sky Publishing for competently are the other aspects of wish to follow up any of this research the Army History Unit. the story. Was Simpson “missed out for themselves. Dust Donkeys and for a Victoria Cross?” No, he wasn’t – Delusions is well written; beautifully Softcover, 402 pages in fact he wasn’t even recommended. researched, and thoroughly Reviewed by Tom Lewis Was this due to some intransigence recommended. t by those above him? No, although the It’s questionable as to whether the author spends I think, too much time Dr Tom Lewis recently exposed many Australian War Memorial’s statue of analysing the characters of two of these myths of the battlefield in Lethality Simpson and his donkey will have to men: Colonel Howse, and Lieutenant in Combat, a study of the realities of be melted down after the revelations of Colonel Sutton. combat through six wars. Dust Donkeys and Delusions, but as the Did Simpson make “lightning immortal Duke is reported to have said, dashes” into dangerous ground to it will be a near run thing. For author rescue downed men? Was he at greater Graham Wilson, in this comprehensive risk than others? Was he revered by the survey of the story, has demolished Indian soldiers, and did he exert mystic almost everything that Australia command over animals? Did all on the understands to be fact in the pervasive Anzac peninsula mourn his death, with myth of World War I’s Private Simpson “a hush” falling over the battlefield? and his donkey. Was he technically “a deserter” from I say “myth” deliberately here, his real task? All this and more – to be because Wilson has proved his case. all of these things Simpson would have He takes on the simple aspects of the been a busy man who didn’t need sleep story: Simpson was said to be a tall, – are shown to be just part of the myth, Australian, larrikin soldier with an much of it growing after the campaign. applauded sense of humour. Simpson, In the end author Wilson shows in fact, was from Britain, of a height of Simpson to have been just an about five foot eight inches – about 174 ordinary soldier, doing an ordinary centimetres ; possessed an offence-free job – one done by others too. It was personal records, and was not, as per not Simpson’s fault to have these legend, given to drinking his mates’ stories made up about him, for he was beer, leading a raid on officers’ food dead by then. In calculated yet very Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 61
and details of their equipment; they are particularly helpful for learning recognition features that illustrate the slight differences that existed between them. I had not seen a photograph of a Supermarine Seagull III on Australia before she was fitted with a catapult and found that image particularly interesting. The line drawings by AD Baker III and the colour artwork by Eric Leon are excellent. For modellers, the book reviews every product from which models of a County class cruiser can be created, some of which are now collectors’ County Class Cruisers items long out of production and only By Les Brown available at specialist sales but most Wi ngfield at War are currently available. They range in Seaforth Publishing By CAPT Mervyn WingfieldDS O DSC RN scale from 1:3000 for war-gamers to ISBN 978-1-84832-127-4 1:128 for a floating, radio-controlled E dited by Captain Peter Hore RN 64 pages including line drawings, model. Accessories that allow basic Whittles Publishing, Caithness, 2012 coloured artwork and numerous kits to be improved are also described. www.whittlespublishing.com black and white photographs The central section includes colour hardback; 168 pages with 30 b/w photographs of completed models, photos, GBP £16.99/ $US 21.95 £14.99 recommended including a 1:700 model of HMAS Reviewed by Commander David Australia. Some of these are scratch- recommended Hobbs MBE RN (Ret’d) built and the spectacular close-up shots ISBN 978-1-84995-064-0 of them allow levels of detail to be seen Reviewed by Commander David This attractive monograph is the that could not easily be picked out in latest in a series that cover British, black and white photographs of the Hobbs MBE RN (Rtd) American, German and Japanese real ship. If anyone reading this review warships of World War II. Whilst has ever thought of building a model This is the first in a series of books to intended primarily for ship modellers, County class cruiser, this book will be edited by Peter Hore and published they contain a wealth of detail about provide the stimulus to get started! by Whittles in the UK which have as individual ships that will not be found However, this modestly-priced their basis the previously unpublished in other publications, including paperback gives a lot of general detail memoirs of people who were connected coloured artwork that shows the about the County class together with with the sea. This autobiographical camouflage schemes that distinguished individual ship histories and will be work by Mervyn Wingfield was written several ships during the war. That for of interest outside the ship-modelling for his family and made available to the HMAS Canberra shows her as she community. I recommend County editor by his son who also helped with was in May 1942 after her last wartime Class Cruisers to anyone who wants to the selection of photographs. Peter refit. know more about these iconic ships. t Hore has taken the original document The first section gives details of and set it into context by carefully the class design and construction adding footnotes and endnotes which and the second describes the careers, amplify references to people, places and modifications and refits of individual ships with which the modern reader ships, those for HMA Ships Australia, might not be familiar. He also provides Canberra and Shropshire running to an unobtrusive, historical framework several pages. Photographs are well- within which the story can be located. chosen to illustrate different ships Mervyn Wingfield was a submariner Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62 Book Reviews who commanded three boats, Umpire, through the eyes of the author which are navies have changed over time, and, Sturgeon and Taurus during World carefully edited to ensure their accuracy. in turn, how the past continues to War II; he did not serve with the RAN I thoroughly recommend it. t influence the way these navies see but his stories of the RN from 1925 themselves today. Whereas most onwards describe an organisation studies concentrate on capability, that will be familiar to generations of this study also examines the ideas Australians who were trained by or behind naval contributions to national who served with the RN. He spent power. As maritime strategy in the time on the China Station during the 21st century increasingly moves 1930s in the submarine Odin, sister towards naval cooperation instead of ship of the Otway and Oxley operated confrontation – in Geoffrey Till’s words, by the RAN between 1927 and 1931, towards post-modern naval strategy and writes of a way of life that is now instead of modern naval strategy – the almost forgotten with quiet humour importance of the cultural dimension that brings his adventures to life in has increased.1 This book addresses the the reader’s imagination. His wartime intent, as well as the capability, of each exploits included surviving a collision South-East Asian navy. in the North Sea; spending a winter The navies of South-East Asia have operating with the Russians in the been neglected in contrast to the major Arctic; penetrating a Norwegian Navies of South-East Asia-Pacific navies, particularly China Fjord by passing through a minefield; and Japan. In the past, perhaps not surfacing off St Nazaire in full view of Asia: A Comparative surprisingly, considerable effort has German guns to act as a navigation Study been applied to strategic and academic marker for a raiding force; fighting James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie studies of the rise of China and the cavalry in the Northern Aegean and, not subsequent impact upon the United least, commanding the first British boat Cass Series: Naval Policy & History, No. 50 States and its major allies. Unlike the to sink a Japanese submarine. Routledge, London & New York, 2013 great naval races of the early 20th Many of his contemporaries R eviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert century, however, when the global naval were ‘burned out’ by their wartime powers predominated and smaller experiences, especially those who held Every year a number of publications, navies were largely irrelevant. All navies submarine command for as long as he such as The Military Balance and Jane’s operating in the Asia-Pacific today did, but Mervyn Wingfield went on Fighting Ships, report recent intelligence must take the small to medium navies to enjoy a successful post-war career, on the world’s navies, Much of this of South-East Asia into account, as reaching the rank of captain. He material is of considerable value as the various navies are likely to play an served in a number of appointments it generates thoughts on how such increasingly significant role. including command of an air station, physical changes influence our own Stand-alone chapters detail the staff appointments and time as a strategic outlook but often we are left development of ten of the region’s naval attaché. I particularly enjoyed wanting more. There is a yawning gap navies: the Royal Brunei Navy, the account of his time in command in our understanding of why each of the Burma’s Navy, the Royal Cambodian of the reserve fleet in the Gare Loch world’s navies are changing, and of how Navy, the Indonesian Navy, the Royal in Scotland during the mid 1950s in other nations see themselves applying Malaysian Navy, the Republic of the which he states, modestly, that he was sea power. We need to enter the cultural Philippines Navy, the Republic of made an honorary member of the dimension! Singapore Navy, the Royal Thai Navy, Royal Northern Yacht Club principally Navies of South-East Asia: the (now defunct) South Vietnam because he was prepared to move A Comparative Study provides Navy, and the People’s Army of a battleship or a cruiser to different a comprehensive survey of the Vietnam Navy. The development of moorings in order to clear the yacht development and operations of the each navy is placed within its national racing course. navies of South-East Asia since the context with considerations of Wingfield at War is a delightful book end of World War II. The authors use 1 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 2nd edn, Routledge, that gives insight into historical events history to describe how the selected London and New York, 2009, pp. 1-19. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 63
economic, technological, and national South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific research. Skilled biography based on development, as well as the origin of century. Unlike many other books on eyewitness interviews can be a most the respective navies. For example, the navies, this one puts the reader in the effective pathway into the much larger British Royal Navy exerts a ‘hidden’ same cultural mindset as those who story within which a life was lived. So influence on the strategic outlook serve within the navies of our region. it is with this excellent new biography and operational effectiveness of the It is a tool for peace and stability, for of Lieutenant Sam Stening, RANVR, Royal Malaysian Navy. In turn, this cooperation and understanding, as well by noted Australian naval historian Ian has benefited and hindered the Royal as for common values and customs. Pfennigwerth. Malaysian Navy’s development. The This book is one of the building Sam Stening was an inspirational ‘British model’ remains important for blocks of the global maritime RAN medical officer serving the needs the navies of Malaysia and Singapore, partnership which is needed to secure of his fellow POWs working as slave even today, just as it does for the the maritime commons. Navies of labourers in Japan for four long and Australia and New Zealand navies. South-East Asia should be mandatory brutal years. Post war he was a pioneer The US Navy’s methods differed reading for all permanent naval Australian neonatologist. This was a significantly from the British, and members who need to engage with rare, if not unique medical career. The affected the development of the South their counterparts in regional navies. It lives that Sam saved during his years of Vietnamese, Philippine and Thai should be kept within reach of anyone captivity were those of men suffering navies in an altogether different way. involved with maritime strategy, all the horrors and deprivations of life The Indonesian Navy and the People’s capability, intelligence, or international as prisoners of Japan. For the rest of his Army of Vietnam Navy experiences engagement. Every ship and every base medical career he kept alive the most were, at one time or another, influenced needs to have a copy at hand. t tiny and fragile newborn premature by a Russian approach, and again babies. The common denominators they generated both favourable and between these two parts of his life were unfavourable results. These ten chapters his skill, ingenuity, compassion, and his are unique and valuable, potted determination never to give up while histories of each South-East Asian navy life continued to flicker. He claimed over the last 70 years or so. to be a merely a medical officer, Both authors, James Goldrick and to be, ‘not very brave.’ In reality and Jack McCaffrie, have had long he modelled from captivity, for his and illustrious careers with the generation, naval leadership in the very Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and highest traditions of both the medical it shows. They both have extensive branch and the wartime RAN and was operational experience and are known rightly decorated for his courageous for their intellectual contribution to leadership of men. the RAN; however it is their in-depth Sam Stening was a young Sydney knowledge and experience in navy- doctor who on the outbreak of war to-navy engagement that comes to volunteered for the RANVR. He was the surface in Navies of South-East In Good Hands: The Life posted to HMAS Canberra to find his Asia. In a thousand subtle ways, the feet as a new naval doctor. By June 1941 authors have navigated through dense of Dr Sam Stening, POW he was in HMAS Waterhen on the minefields, and avoided cultural By Dr Ian Pfennigwerth “spud run” to Tobruk. On this most sensitivities, without holding back hazardous of delivery runs Waterhen when important stories needed to be ISBN: 9780987227836 was badly damaged by bombing and told. They do not kowtow to national BELLONA 2012 later sank. Fortunately no lives were or political pressures and they are not www.publish-me.com.au lost in this first RAN ship lost to the unintentionally biased in the way that Reviewed by enemy in World War II. That escape some Western authors (including some without lost of life is where the Navy Australians) often are. LCDR Desmond Woods, RAN and Sam Stening’s luck ran out. The book is a direct and honest Naval History, like all other history, After leave and marriage to Olivia guide for everyone who is interested in depends on good scholarship and in August 1941 he was posted to join Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 64 Book Reviews
Captain Hec Waller’s HMAS Perth may have rested for posterity. In Good holds lacked any sanitation and which he found to be a highly efficient Hands has corrected that omission in previously healthy men died in as and happy ship. He was the junior public knowledge and done justice to a little as ten days of heat exhaustion, medical officer. He was not to see his great Australian. This is a story of what dysentery dehydration and despair. The new wife for four years. happened to Sam after Perth was lost. survivors were barely fit to stand far The first account intended for the He faced a regime of callous, less work when they arrived in Japan. public of the life and death of HMAS senseless beatings, indifference, The stupidity of this inhumane regime Perth in the Battle of Sunda Strait was corruption and outright theft on the seems never to have been a sufficient written in 1953 by Ronald McKie in part of the third rate Japanese troops cause for moderating it in the interests his book Proud Echo. McKie describes and Koreans who made up the POW of having men fit to work at the other Sam Stening’s first weeks as a POW guards. Sam negotiated for his men end of the passage. doctor treating his shipmate survivors: with a succession of their equally Sam for much of his captivity was “…Many of the more severely insensate Japanese officers who initially the only officer in ‘other ranks’ camps wounded did not survive the ordeal treated reasonable requests by Sam having to exercise command over of the hours in the water, which for improvements in sanitation and traumatised men of many nationalities. was covered densely with fuel oil. for adequate food and medicines with Rarely was he among Australians. This Surgeon Lieutenant S.E.L.Stening, contempt, and more violence, while may partly explain why his reputation RAN who was wounded, was profiting personally from the misery in his homeland has never been fully amongst those saved: they were they inflicted. Sam took the beatings acknowledged and his name is hardly picked up by a Japanese destroyer and gradually wore down opposition by known. Most of the men who, despite and transferred to the Somedong his dignity, logic and quiet courage. his skilled ministrations died, most Maru, on which they were POWs were forced to work in an of the lives he saved or made more imprisoned for a week. inefficient unskilled POW slave labour bearable were American, Canadian or After some days a Japanese Army regime, demanding human muscle British – not Australian. surgeon came with two assistants power in mines and docks, on a very Sam had to tread the line between and good equipment, and with low calorie diet. It resulted in semi- not giving way to the incessant and the help of Stening and a petty starvation, lowered resistance, injury inhuman demands of the Japanese for officer dressed the wounds, though and diseases. These included beri slave labour from sick men while still insufficient dressings were left for beri, malaria, dysentery and diphtheria retaining the ability to be influential after care. Some 300 men were then and the ever present weakness with the camp commandants. taken to Serang in trucks, where and muscular wastage caused by Remonstration without redress was they were kept in the gaol and emaciation. Clear evidence that men pointless. Sam had to decide who got cinema. Only after ten days were were in a state of physical extremis was the limited supply of Red Cross food the medical officers released from no impediment to their being made and medication which got through to the gaol cells. Stening had only a to work 14 hour days in biting cold or him after being pilfered by the hungry dressings forceps and scissors and suffocating heat using the last reserves guards. The allocation of food was a very few dressings with which to of health and strength. The lack of life and death decision which he had to work and quite inadequate drugs rest and food meant that strength make daily for years. There was never to treat the dysentery and malaria was never able to be replenished enough lifesaving medicine to go round which soon beset the 600 men in the before the gruelling pointless regime and Sam had to use his ingenuity to prison compounds. After a month, resumed. Work and torture were obtain more from local Japanese – at during which two deaths occurred, indistinguishable and equally lethal. great risk to himself. Stening and twelve other officers Sam Stening was moved through In addition to the external enemy were taken to Batavia and shipped eight POW camps and was frequently he had to deal with the hostility felt to Japan….” the only western trained doctor by men who believed that they had If Ian Pfennigwerth had not available to treat hundreds of men been betrayed by the actions of the undertaken his research interviews for who, like himself, had arrived in Japan Dutch East Indies Government. Ian this book McKie’s account is where the in infamous “hell ships”. These were Pfennigwerth writes of this: “Many if public record of this remarkable but cargo carriers where the conditions not most of the American and British little known RAN officer’s war service below hatches in grossly overcrowded survivors of the Battles in the Java Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 65
Sea brought with them not only the he was effectively alone in command teacher and physician.” smouldering humiliation of their defeat for years. It is hard to imagine a more One of his former POW charges wrote: and the burden of the memory of lost testing set of circumstances for any Sam often tried to prevent the comrades, but the conviction that it junior officer to be placed in. Sam’s last bestial parades and beatings and was ‘ all the fault of the Dutch’”. Sam service to the prisoners was to prevent was beaten himself. His request for was called on to mediate and try to them gorging themselves on food when medicine paid off and rice dust was resolve disputes which threatened to the camps were liberated before they allowed into the camp to add to the tear the fragile multi-national POW were ready for a normal diet. Those rice food. Men were suffering from community apart. who ignored his advice died. malnutrition, colds, bronchitis, He also had to deal firmly with a In 1945 Sam returned to Sydney and dysentery, eye conditions, burns, few uncontrolled NCOs from many set about re-making his medical career abrasions, bruises, broken bones, nationalities who, in the absence of and finally starting married life. When frostbite. Men could not walk, their officers, had plans for running the a true understanding of the magnitude many were unconscious. Imagine camps as they saw fit without reference of his achievement in captivity became the Herclean effort by “the Doc”; to legitimate military authority. In known to the Australian Government no letup for him. the absence of the ability to enforce Sam was awarded the Distinguished It is appropriate that this book has military justice or disciplinary Service Cross. His medical colleagues appeared in the 70th anniversary year sanctions Sam used his intelligence and knew little about his war service and of the loss of HMAS Perth. Given all moral force to largely keep a lid on this Sam did not enlighten them. that we know of her gallant Captain, self interest and undue influence which Sam was one of the pioneers and his dedication to his men, one were always incipient. He was dealing engaged in creating the role of neonatal must conclude that had Hec Waller with starving, ill clothed conscripts, paediatrician in Sydney. For many lived to know of the service that Perth’s who knew that not everyone was years this was another rather solitary newly joined junior medical officer was going to survive the hell they were battle as the majority of the medical to perform while a prisoner of Japan living through. It was his constant establishment were unconvinced of the he would have been full of admiration moderating influence and care that need for children’s specialists. Post war and gratitude for the care and skill prevented a “Lord of the Flies“ scenario the general attitude of senior members that Sam showed for Perth’s men and being played out where the strong of his profession was that children and later so many others who had fallen preyed on the weak and survival of the babies were, medically speaking, just into captivity. Sam waged war on fittest became the only law. small adults and could be successfully the cruelty, neglect and barbarism of For an inexperienced RANVR treated by GPs. Sam led his junior the camps that the Japanese Empire junior medical officer to be dealing colleagues in wining recognition that administered. In the midst of bestiality with such complex matters, providing this was not so and that the care of and despair he kept hope alive for men leadership and ethical example to the new born and sick young children who needed to be in his good hands. hungry men while retaining his own needed specialist training and new This thoroughly researched and morale and sustaining others was technology if the best results for infants well illustrated new biography is heroic. Australians rightly honour and ‘sick kids’ were to be obtained. highly recommended. It should be the surgical skill, determination and There must be thousands of Australians read by Junior Officers studying courage of Lieutenant Colonel Edward now in mid life and older who owe leadership. It will be of interest to all ‘Weary’ Dunlop as he protected and their existence to Sam and his team’s readers who care about the history defended his exhausted men being dedication to keeping them alive and of the Navy’s medical branch and the brutalised on the Burma railway. oxygenated when they arrived in the capacity for moral leadership of an However ‘Weary’ was an experienced world prematurely and jaundiced at the RAN junior officer when required by senior officer, with other more junior Sydney Women’s Hospital in Crown wartime circumstances to exceed all officers with him to confide in and to Street. His particular expertise was in expectations of his rank and experience share the burdens of command. Sam the area of paediatric allergies. Sam and to lead by serving his men. t was experiencing the same mindless, died in 1983. One of his colleagues robotic violence directed at himself and wrote: “ People who worked with him his men, as Weary Dunlop and other and his team had a great respect for his senior officers of POW camps, but clinical acumen. He was an excellent Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 66
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 67
rdered in the early 1960s to in March 1965 at Defoe Shipbuilding and naval gunfire support. During the provide limited area air defence in Bay City, Michigan, this photograph 1970s and 1980s the ships received Ofor the fleet, the three American of Perth nearing completion shows regular weapon, sensor and C2 designed Charles F Adams class guided her Supply Officer, Commander Ian upgrades and remained extremely missile destroyers (DDG), HMA Ships Crawford (left) and Executive Officer, effective ships, Brisbane serving Perth (II), Hobart (II) and Brisbane Commander Ian Richards conferring in the 1991 Gulf war providing (II), introduced wholesale changes into on the upper deck. Shortly thereafter air defence and fighter control for the RAN. Farther and faster than any Perth began sea trials in Lake Huron US Navy aircraft carriers. The last previous developments, the need to before formal commissioning at Boston DDG decommissioned in 2001, her absorb new technologies, an unfamiliar on 22 May 1965. withdrawal necessary due to high naval lexicon and a modern computer- The DDGs provide an excellent personnel requirements and the based logistic support system, pushed example of the long-term flexibility increasing cost of mechanical upkeep the navy away from its British roots of a well-designed warship. All three rather than the obsolesence of her and down the path towards becoming were employed during the Vietnam warfighting systems. t a uniquely Australian service. Taken War providing maritime interdiction Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 68 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 147 69 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute H MAS Anzac’s Ship’s Boarding Team prepares for boarding operations in international waters in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO). Since the beginning of Operation SLIPPER in 2001, Australia has maintained a maritime contribution to operations in the MEAO