CEU eTD Collection
In partialfulfilment oftherequirements forthedegreeof M EREOLOGICAL Doctor ofPhilosophyin Prof. KatalinFarkas(secondary) Prof. TheodoreSider(external) Central EuropeanUniversity Department of Philosophy Prof. HowardRobinson Ludmila Olszewska Budapest, Hungary Submitted to Supervisors: 2009 By
N IHILISM
CEU eTD Collection
diplom thesis containsnom published byanyotherpersonexceptwheredue To thebestofm a inanyuniversity. y knowledgeandbeliefthis a terial whichhasbeen accepted fortheawardofanyotherdegreeor ii
thesiscontainsnom acknowledgem e nt hasbeenm a terial previously a de. This CEU eTD Collection
to MereologicalNihilism ordinary language.Theseargum im favour ofandagainsttotalMereologicalNi presented andrejected,astheyarenotfull-bloodedstabletheories.Argum rival –MereologicalUniversalism unproblem with m This dissertationisanexpositionofMereol plausibility, thealternativepossibilityofatom a terial com atic theoryofm position. Theclaim .
a terial com ents areregarded . Tworestri isthat position. Itisconfrontedwithit’sm A BSTRACT iii ogical Nihilism Mereological Nihilism cted versionsof hilism
eitherasnotconclusive,orpeculiar less gunkscenario,anditsclashwith arediscussed,thelatterbeing:its
–oneofdoctrinesconcerned MereologicalNihilism isthem o o st sim st im p ents in portant le and are CEU eTD Collection Chapter II How“Deep”AreOntologicalQuestions? Chapter I Introduction..…………………………………………………………………...….….....1 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………...145 Mereological Nihilism Chapter IV Argum Chapter III Mereological Nihilism ents AgainstNihilism 4.4. MereologicalUniversalism 4.3. OrdinaryStatem 4.2. OrdinaryStatem 4.1. NoClash-OrdinaryLanguageAsNotOntologicallyCom 3.2. ExistenceofAtom 3.1. Im 2.2. Argum 2.1. Argum 1.1. OntologicalDebatesAsMerelyVerbal……………………………………..8 1.3. HowToBeDeepAboutOntology……………………………………..…..28 1.2. OtherW plausibility.……………………………………………………………....59 4.3.3. ParaphrasingUsingPluralProperties…………………………....135 4.3.2. ParaphrasingUsingReferenceToSets………………………...... 133 4.3.1. ParaphrasingUsingPlurallyPluralQuantification……………....131 3.2.5. IsTheGunkHypothesisDestructiveForNihilism 3.2.4. Maxim 3.2.3. Interm 3.2.2. Minim 3.2.1. StuffAndThings.……………………………………………..…..83 3.1.1. OntologicalCom 2.1.2. “ToBeIsToALivingThing”……………………………...... 51 2.1.1. “ToBeIsToHaveNon-RedundantCausalPowers”………….....32 1.1.1. TheDoctrineofQuantifierVariance…………………………...... 9 ent From ents forRestrictedNihilism a ys ToBeShallow………………………………………………...25 vs.Com ……………………………………………………………….....30 ediate Nihilism a Science…………………………………………….……...54 a ents Misunderstood……………………………………....126 ents AsStrictlyFalse…………………………….……….124 …………………………………………………………....59 l Nihilism l Nihilism less GunkAsaChallengeToMereologicalNihilism m onsense Ontology...…………………………...……122 m ..……………………………………………....100 vs.Com .……………………………………………....114 itm CONTENTS ……………………………………...……….7 s ents..………………………………………65 AndExtendedSim iv ( s)……………………………………...31 m onsense Ontology………………....141 p les……………..…..108 m ? …………….115 itting……….122 .....78 CEU eTD Collection “being an properties wouldbeherelike:“bei a thingwouldbethentosaythatitinstantiatescertainnaturalproperty.Natural things. should rathersaythatIbelieveinexisten believe thattobeanaturalthingiscorre properties beingnaturalornon-natural,Ispeakofthingsnon-natural. with respecttocarvingrealityatthejoin but ratherinterm I donotintendtoputthispictureexplicitlyin reality, or,toputtheideainterm reality. W roughly, asfollows.Iassum Mereological Nihilism another object question thatconcernsconditionsunderwhic 1 categories, thesem be asignificantorspecial necessary andsufficientconditionforbeingathing. be evensuchageneralpropertyas“bei TheSpeci
The m My viewisthenthattobeathing Perhaps m al h x C ”, where“ at Im o a m 1 in subjectof . Ibelievethatthecorrectanswer posi s ofthings.Andtherefore y ean bythisisthattherearesom t viewcanbeputinterm u i on Quest st bethingsf x . ” standsforathingweacceptinourontology.Perhaps therewould Myreasonsf thisthesisistheso-called“SpecialCom i on wasfi
e portionofreality.Ifthereareanygenuine ontological thatthereis s borrowedf i rst of rst I NTRODUCTION l o y r believingthatMereologicalNihilism addresse all– s ofpr ng athing”,whoseinstantiationwouldbe ce ofnaturalthings,asopposedtounnatural the differencebetweenLewis’viewandm ts, isthef 1 spond toacertainjointinnature.Actually,I a m r things asbasicbuilding-blocks ofreality.To ng ahum term om be adistinguishedportionofreality–itisto d i h twoorm n i D.Lewis–thatrealityhascertainjoints. operties aswell.Tosaythatsom nd-independent ontologicalstructureof t to theSpecialCom h s of e i s
form distinguished properties,inthewayLewisdoes, an”, “beingatable”,oringeneral: o llowing: whileLewisspeaksof
i n o vanInwagen(1990,pp.20-32). re m a portionsoraspectsof terial objectscom position Question”–a position Questionis istrueare, e thing is pose i ne,
CEU eTD Collection words: ifthingscorrespond tojointsinrea our oldfam vague ifthereisathingornot.Inm there isatableornot;itsom f that itcannotbevague.Butnowafterweha cannot bevague.Itissom thing inthefirstplace,andsoifitwasa there is there. Andatacertainpointwew Take atable,forinstance.Mostpeoplewoul objects, sinceeverycom portions of further requirem defined” or“clearlyindividuated”,even say thatthingsaredistinguishedportionsofrea same will starttodoubtwhetherthereisatablether repeat thisstepasm then letustakeawayanothertinypartofthe the same still haveadistinguishedportionofrealitythere.Now,m part of concept ofthing,thatitisadistinguishedpor a m iliar tables,wehaveendedupwithsurp tablestill,som thistable–anatom Innocent asitm no table table, sowem realityIwanttohighlighttheirim iliar tablesarenotthings inthefi atall,andperhapsthatthereis e nts thatthingsm e a –if ny tim i u ght be,thisviewischallengedwhenappliedtocom p st really lex m e thereisstill f how incorporatedin es aswelike. o r instance.Have e a tim terial objectis
have thesam es vagueif ill becom y u opinion st m a table eet. lity, itcannotbeavague m Andsom “clearly distinguishable”,eventhoughtheseare distinguished portionofreality,itsexistence 2 portance intheontologicalstructure. table, andanother,yetletus e rising conclusions:itissom d saythatitisathing,andso,applyingm ve takenawaysom e ornot.Som the answertothesepuzzlesisfollowing: surethatthetableis tion ofreality.Nowlet thetableissam westillgotatablether atall,andsom lity isnotexactlytosaythattheyare“well- W subjecttotheso-called“SoritesParadox”. e no thing rst place.Ortoputitin slightlydifferent theideaofdistinguishedportionreality distinguishedportionofrealitythere.But h en Isaythatthingsaredistinguished e where betweenthesedeductionswe atall.Butsurely,if o st peoplewouldsaythatitisstill e ofus e –if a e will doubtifthereis ny atom ornot;itissom thereis not thesame a tter whetherthereis e? If us takeawayatiny e thetablewasa yes–wem s from tim p a thing lex m es vagueif , orthat ourold e a atall tim terial the u es st y
CEU eTD Collection just en “arrangem the notionof com are anything-jointsinreality,thentheym that thenotionof“thing”becom correspond tojointsinnature.IsaythatactuallyUniversalistsbelievesom seriously. MereologicalUniversalism Universalism vagueness seriously.Theonlyanswersthatdo not. ThereforeIdism the exam that theyallowofaresusceptibletothechar living organism criteria ofthinghood:adjacency,contact,in com All otheranswerstotheSpecialCom objects alwayscom Question. TheotherradicalanswerisUniversalism is MereologicalNihilism Question: “W joints: thingswithnoproperparts.And a thingornot.Therefore,Isaythattheonlything-jointsthereare 2
“ tities co x t s” areu hose object posite objectsandbansom position, anypartstakentogetherdoinfactcorrespond toajointinnature.Thism The advantageof Mereological Nihilism m e ple of nt s p ed o of s in ed “jointinnature”trivial.Butthenotion , s –t hen dotwoorm astheydonotallowofanycom x th o thetable,itissom s”, andt . Them f h is p th e e x pose afurtherobject.Orinshort:any a s. x p s. Theuseofsuchexpressi e iss m h r to ese expressi a . Nihilism in problem
referto oderate answers,as
isoneof o re objectscom e so e others.The ons arenot s trivialand e overUniversalism m tim withm e o goesagains position es va b j tworadicalanswerstotheSpecialCom ect supposedt s. W ons doesnot gue whethercertaincom u ode ge ofvagueness–aswe 3 so m st believethat stantiating anewproperty,orcom pos positional “greyzone”. m non-distinguished. Iftheybelievethatthere Question arem e rate answersisthatthecom canalsouseexpressionslike “collectionof I saythattheydonottakethechargeof oderate answerscanbebasedonvarious so aretheradicalanswers:Nihilism e afurtherobject?”is:“Never”.Andthis t thespiritof y answertotheSpecialCom o cannot carry isthatonlythef i , accordingtowhichtwoorm m pl y x
any t s alwayscom betrivial.Youcannothavea anything h at
oderate: theyallowof com t m h ere i y m assum i posite objectsexistor t s haveseenalreadyon , interm m arethesim any ent o rm t pose afurther s hi p
t ng overandabove tion thatthings o er takes
posite objects furt s of a her ny things, p m posing a le thing- position position com a things som terial x and a s” or p kes o y l e re 2 e x .
CEU eTD Collection concern here.AsfarastheTem not onlyspatial,butalsotem Universalism not aboutaparticularwayofexistence sense onlywhencontrastedwithitsanti-concept,sotospeak. world m Nihilism com two argum In thesecondchapterabriefaccountofMereol detail, andvariouswaysofbeingserious Universalism Question. InthisthesisIhopetodem Mereological Universalism answers. Peoplewhodotakethechargeofvaguenessseriouslyusuallyoptfor only itseem “Four-Dim Mereological Nihilism perdurance (havingtem com m concerned, MereologicalNihilistcanbeeither a ke anyjudgem p posite m atible withbothendurance(beingwholly In thefirstchapterproblem W Universalism a inthem h de entirelyofjoints–therem ents forRestrictedNihilism en itcom ensional Sim s thatMereologicalNihilism a isunderstoodastheTem toNihilism terial objects.Asitisclaim e a nt aboutthesem nner proposedbythese argum e , asIrefertoithere,is s toansweringtheSpecial andtheTem p . les”.
poral parts).Som astheonlyaccepta poral partsordi a tters, ifhe poral Part poral PartsTheoryandexistenceacrosstim onstrate whichis poral Pa of“depth u andMereologicalUniversalism st and beingshallowaboutontologyarepresented. e d, thereisnoreasonwhy oneshouldrestrict be som m 4 only aclaim that therearenocom e across time e s Theorycanbefoundinthechaptertitled likes.Atanyrate,MereologicalNihilism furtherrem Com rts Theory,accordingtowhichthingshave a friend,orfoeofthem nsions. ThisaspectofUniversalism ogical Nihilism aviewthatacceptsonlyhum ble answertotheSpecialCom ents: ifargum ” ofontologicaldebatesisdiscussedin present atalltim e non-jointsaswell.Aconceptm position Questioninanon-vagueway aboutm . Initsm a rks aboutcom ispresented,togetherwith ents forNihilism a p terial com elling reasonstoprefer es ofexistence)and o st popularversion . Orhem areequallygood position, and an beingsas b ination of workfor position i isnota ght not e are a kes is CEU eTD Collection second argum the problem objection isthatUniversalism first argum is discussed.Thethirdchapterconcernsar the endofsecondchapterrelationship any otherm are beings atall.DoIthink that change anything? life. Ifyouknewforsurethattherewerenoco The question–orratherpickingaparticularan perhaps itisworthtoaskwhythisquestionshould beofanyinteresttousinthefirstplace. com portions ofnon-physicalreality),likeforex possibility oftherebeingsom things. Theref reconciling thesetwoarepresented. between MereologicalNihilism that thereisonlyonething–theworld.Thefourthchapterconcernsrelationship and gunkscenarioresultseitherinhavingacom Nihilism possibility oftheworld’sconsistingat conceived asacomposite (non-vague) p lex universals. Before wescrutinizetheproblem This paperconcernsMereologicalNihilism isabletoem ent istheargum a ofontologicalcom terial object,theyalsoworkfo ent againstNihilism ore m No.Youthinkyouareahum
y def brace thepossibility e ent from nce of you isjustasim e non-physicalcom m do notexist? andcom , itm andasits Mereologi im ents of plausibility ofNihilism s pos materialthing plau om r hum ofgunk,however,reconciliationNihilism gum 5 m Mereological Universalism eem between Nihilism No.Ionlythinkthatyou donotexistifyou less gunk.Itisclaim onsense ontology,andvariouswaysof cal Nihilism sible asNihilism swer toit–willdef m ed bytheSpecialCom p am an being.Ithinkthattherearenohum ents againstMereologicalNihilism posite m letely objectlessontology,orinaccepting s –them ans understoodasm p onlyasappliedtotherealm lexes (stillunderstoodasdistinguished ple bundlesofm . Ofcourseyoudoexist insom a o terial objectsatall–wouldthat isstillcom st powerfulone–concernsthe . Theproposedreplytothis andthescientificapproach . Asapartofthisresponse i nitely notchangeone’s e a d thatMereological e terial com ntal properties,or position Question, isdiscussed.The p atible withthe ofphysical p lexes. In . The an e
CEU eTD Collection m som or gainingparts,whilenon-vaguesum is m a non-vaguesum which youareathing.AllIwanttosayhereis sense of“you”,andyouarecom
encouragem Sider fortheircom to deeperunderstandingofsom which theSpecialCom And ifthisisreallyso,thenIam Special Com m that itm will notchangethescopeof answers toit?Itwillnotchangethewaywe And whyshouldanyonebeinterestedingiving choose. Iam i a nus oneatom terial things,object-orthinghood,structure e o ofusareinclinedtosaythattherem stly becauseallsuchquasi-objectslikeyou, I wouldliketothankm W i ght shedsom hy thenshouldanyonebeinterestedin ent thatcouldnotbeoverestim inclinedtosaythattherearem position Questionisworthaskingbecau , thetablem ofitsparts,youarenotsuchathing.Norisanyvisiblem m e e nts, ideas,andadvice,butm position Questionundoubtedly lightonthewayswe ourexistentialquan i nus twoatom e philosophicalproblem notai posite insom y supervisor s ofpa m u i ated. st ng atansweringadeepphilosophicalquestion, s andsoon. u 6 live, itwillnotchangethewaywetalk,and ch fewerthingsthantheywanttoaccept. thinkaboutm be plenitudeofthings,likethetable,table rts arenot.W s: HowardRobinson,KatiFarkas,andTed that givenacom
askingtheSpecialCom e tif argum sense,perhapsthereisevenasensein tables, orcars,areabletosurviveloosing of reality,andthelike.Soperhaps ier, aswenorm o se of“side-effects”thisenterprise. stly fortheircontinuoussupportand is,butratherattryingtocontribute s atleast. ents infavourofonetheradical
This isthewaythatUniversalists a terial com h en exposedtothisproblem a lly useit.ButIam posite m position, identityof position Question? a terial object.It a terial thingis sure , CEU eTD Collection structure oftherealitythatwouldm instance. Youbelievethatthisfusionisas there issuchajointinnaturelikefusionof theEiffelTowerandyourleftarm structure ofthereality. from a senseinwhichyoum to saythatallcom joints –thatthestructureisbuiltofthem not. IfyouarearobustMereologicalNihilistfo certain structure,inwhichentitiesar can bef there issom as towhichofthealternativeontologicaltheo that youtakeontologicalquestionsseriously–thinkthereare either a 3 electrons”, “Therearetables”,andthelike etc. robust ontologistsaboutproblem defl det Herewetalkaboutissuesconcer e at rm i sim onary i n If youarearobustUniversalistontheother W Thinking ofpossibleapproachestothena e t o robust ontologist p r instanceexistenceof r h approachesaret ut les. Theyexistasm at aretheontologicalfactsthatdeterm h ofsent e thing intheworldthatdeterm
H OW ences concerni posite m “D o i befoundwi ght wanttosaythat ora s like EEP a ning m terial objects
e deflationist aboutontology re arrangem ng exi
joints innature–thef coincidence ofm ” A a terial com t a h s ke the t i RE e n nce ofcom al C l . ont O If youareaMereologicalNihilist,alsowant 3 are not HAPTER e . position, andsowe com nts ol NTOLOGICAL 7 e distinguishedandotherallegedentitiesare thecom ines thetruthofsentenceslike“Thereare ogi distinguished inthestructureaselectrons, a ries istrue.Inotherwords,youthinkthat terial objects, of sim p posites inanysensedistinguished.Thereis r instance,youthinkthatsim cal l e suchjoints–thatthereisnothinginthe x m in ture ofontologicaldebates,onecanbe debat hand, anontologicalfactforyouisthat e thetruthof a p act thatm t I e posites areontologicallyderivative les, andassuchdonotcontributeto ri e al s. Andsowecanhavedefl . Ifyouaretheform object persistence andidentityconditions, are interestedonlyinfactsthat i Q s. However,robust nd-independent realityhas existentialclaim UESTIONS facts ofthematter p er, itm les aresuch at and ? i oni
s st ? This s and , e for ans
CEU eTD Collection ontological pluralists use “exists”indif thing asafusionoftheEiffelTowerandClin fusion oftheEiffelTowerandClinton’snos This istosaythattherenogenuinedisa expressions, asusedbydifferentpartiesin shallow aboutontology. m som The veryideaofontologicalfactsm the others.Thisiswhatbeingarobustontologistam m 4 ontology, orathowourlanguageworks. want toresolveallapparentontological the participantsofthesedebatesarecorrect Fol e o rely sem lecules andtablesare,thatinnosense l e o how trivialforyou;thesearequestionsth wi The m If youareadeflationist ng M
a . Ekl ntic answers.Anddependingontheanswers,therearevariouswaystobe o st popularwaytobeshallowa und (2008). f e rent m 1.1. OntologicalDebatesAsMerelyVerbal 4 , claim eanings. Peoplewhobelievethatthisisreallythecase,callthem thatontologicaldisputesar
bout ontology,youdonotbelieveinanyontologicalfacts. a kes greem questions bylookingeitheratcom ontological debates,havedifferentm 8 no sensetoyou.Ontologicalquestionsare given whattheym any ofthem e” andonewhosays“Thereexistnosuch ton’s nose”,sincetheform at m bout ontologyistosaythatontological ent betweenonewhosays“Thereexista ounts to. i ght havenoanswers,orm e m arem
e rely verbal.Thism o ean bytheirterm re orlessprivilegedthan er andthelatter m i eans that ght have eanings. onsense s. They
CEU eTD Collection different ontologicallanguagespo existence ofvisiblephysicalobjects)isto interested hereonlyintheUniversalism 2005). Hirschbelievesthattheonlywaytore 5 ontologist are nosuchthingsasanobjectm which peoplespeak,andaccordingtothe every theorythereisalanguageaccordingtowhichthiscom different theories.Andsoyouhaveutterly its sentencescom Davidsonian is expressedinoneofthem speaking Englishastothe truthofthissentence, som particular m drinking. Now,inthiscom im differences inm predicate variance.Norm SeeDavi agine acom e otherm Hirsch believesinthepluralityofpossi The m W dson (1974). h could en wethinkofvariouslanguageswith eaning of“cup”.InEnglishthis principle ofcharity eaning. IfpeoplespeakingA-Englis o m st prom speak.Moreover,itispossibletom eaning. Hirschdescribesthis unity inwhoselanguage(ca e outtrueoratleastreasonable 1.1.1. TheDoctrineofQuantifierVariance inent friendofthelatterapproachisEliHirsch(2002a,2002b, ally thepredicatesare m
unity thesentence , canbe : weshouldinterpretalanguageinsuchwaythatm a de ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffelTower. ssible, hesays,butthereisoneactualEnglishlanguage translated vs look athowpeopleusethelanguage.Thereare sentence isobviouslyfalse,because“cup”has 9 phenom . Anti-Universalism ll itA-English)“cup”m different ontologicallanguages,sothatfor ble languages.Therearem solve som this partoflanguagethatisresponsiblefor wewouldsaythatsuch a debateism dispute issettledonceandforall–there h weretoenterintoadebatewithpeople 5 “A glassisacup”true,duetothis . Differentontologistsadheretoutterly various m intoanother.HereHirschem a enon inthefollowingexam ke them e ontologicaldisputes(Hirschis eanings, weusuallythinkof allintelligible,sothatwhat disputewithregardsto e s outtrue. eans anyvesselfor a ny languagesan ple: letus o ploys e st of rely CEU eTD Collection restrict thequantifierandlookatwholeworld, thissentencewillcom the interioroffridge,andwe when lookingintoanem spoken bytheUniversalist,forinstance,inwh quantifiers, notthepredicates,thatchange when itcom settled. Thesentenceistruewhenwem disagreem verbal. Them quantifier). T.Sider(2007a, pp.210-17)usesnotionsof our quantifier,wem m quantify onlyover conditions ofasentence.W quantifier restriction but falseinothers. different truthconditionsinlanguages, ontological debatesbeingm languages iscalledbyHirsch true inordinaryEnglish.Thisphenom com the differencebetween quantifier varianceand eaning, wedonotintendtotalkonlyaboutsom posed ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffelTowe Quantifier varianceisnotquantifierrest It isim And likewisewithontologicaldebates,says ent. Itisenoughtosayclearlywhateachpartym e s toontologicaldebatesandthe eaning of“cup”differshere, portant nottoconfusethedoc some ean itunrestrictedly,incl . Quantifierrestrictionisanotheroperationthatcanchangetruth objectsfrom pty fri e e m rely verbal.Becauseofquantifiervariance,onesentencehas dge. W e the rely restrictour lookonlyattheobjectsthatare
quantifier variance ourtotaldom enon of e ean “A-cup”,andf restrictourquantifiertoaspecificarea,nam 10 m uding allobjectsthatexist(accordingtothis we wouldsay,andsothereisnogenuine quantifiers changingtheirm eanings ofstatem ich thesentence:“Thereexistssom variety ofontologicallanguages,itisthe and soitcancom quantifierifforsom r” istrue.Thissentenceobviouslynot quantifier restriction.W trine of riction. W e objects,excludingother.W ain. Itis Hirsch.Theonlydifferencebeingthat , andassuchisresponsiblefor contexts quantif a eans by“cup”andthedisputeis lse whenwem likesaying:“Thereisnobeer” h en wechangethequantifier ents. Thereisalanguage and e ier variancewithm outtrueinoneofthem e there meanings reasonswewantto e outfalse. ean “cup”. e h . W anings between en wewantto h h toexplain en weun- en weuse e e thing ly to e re , CEU eTD Collection would say“Therearethreethingshere”.Th us pickadif m the m whole townf looking intotheem restrict thequantif tells usnothingm object orathingisjusttosaythatitinthescopeofsom predicates really,eventhoughtheyaresom about predicatevarianceafterall!W these, “object”and“thing”appearin when wethinkofsentenceslike:“ “object” isthenachangeofthem expressions like“object”,“thing”,“thereis”,or quantifier asusedbytheUniversalisthassevenobjectsinitsscope. Nihilist doesnotrecogniseanyfusions–th both speakdifferentlanguageswith are seventhingshere”.Bothrightaccordi u st changethem eaning of“beer”and“thereis”isthesa ∃ It isusuallyclaim ∃ x O(x)(where“O”standsfor“object”) x T(x)(where“T”stands for“table”) f o e r instance,andinthiswaycha rent exam o ier, wesim re thanthattheuseof“ eaning ofthesentence,while pty fridge.W ple –aworldcontai e d thatquantifierva p ly changethe e canchange x eaning of“t is anobject”,or“ e predicate ll, itseem ∃ x” iseligible.Sentenceslike“ e MereologicalUniversalistwouldsay:“There 11 e erefore itrangesonlyoverthreeobjects.The ning threesim nge thetruthconditionsof tim context ofourutterance,likeinthecase ng tothequantifiervariancedoctrine,since our contexttoabroaderone,lookingatthe here is”.Now,thiscanbeabitconfusing, m quantifiers. Thequantifierasusedbythe “thereexists”.Changeofthem beingabletokeepourcontextfixed.Let es usedaspredicates.Tosaythat e riance isaboutchangeofm position, andquantifiervarianceis . Ifwethinkofquantifiervariance, s that“object”and“thing”arenot y is notanobject”.Insentenceslike e quantifier.Andso: p les. TheMereologicalNihilist oursentence.Still, x isatable”: eaning of eaning of x is an not
CEU eTD Collection “thing” or“object”,sincebysaying“ belongs. Therefore,wecansaythatquantifier of thequantifier),andontopthatthey are m
x which alllanguagesare equalwhenitcom one reallysayso? other languagesarem this wasthecase,onecouldsaythatbroa that bysim “object” vary. object the collectionof Universalist uttersthesentence,heasse by “table”.Mostprobablytheym “There existtables”.Heretheykeepm when f of m drinking. Thedebatebetweenthem exam ”. a sim king clearthat“cup”hasdifferentm ple withA-Englishspeakingcom u -forhim p o ch m
How doesthism This wouldbeagainstthe spiritofthe It cannotbethecasethatonequantifierm licity, thattheyusethesam r instancetheUniversalistdisagreeswithNihilistovertruthof p o le undoingtherestrictionwecan re inform particlesarrangedtable-wise.TheNihilistdeniesthatthereisanysuch
collectionsarenotobjectsat e ative, sincetheytellusthat re restrictionsofit. a ke theontologicaldebatesm andtheordinaryEnglishspeakerscanberesolvedby ean “m e x quantif isanobject/thing”wesaynom eaning eanings rts thatitistruethereexists m unit The bigger,thebetter–onecouldsay.Butcan any e 12 tell ussom dest languageisthebestlanguage,becauseall s to iers. W of thepredicatefixed–theym y, forwhich“cup”m in theirlanguages.W acquire thebroaderquantifierm variance isindeedofm particles arrangedtable-wise”.W quantifier variancedoctrine, accordingto ean their abilitytodescribe the world.If x all. Thisisbecausetheirm is anobject(becauseitinthescope ing isjustarestrictionofanother,and e haveacaseofquantifiervariance e thing aboutthesortaltowhich e rely verbal? e assum eans anyvesselfor o Letusrecallthe re than“thereisan an object e ean thesam thesentence , forthesake e eaning. If anings of e whichis aning of h en the x e
CEU eTD Collection than theotherbecauseitisricher,yetquitedifferentthingtosaythatonelanguage would beprivileged cannot reallyspeakofbetterandworselanguages. could m to ontologicaldeflationiststherearenojoints richest languageisthebestfor quantifier variancedoctrinewasam which isthem would bethebroadestlanguageafterall.But claim better thantheotherbecauseitdescribesworldm im could bebroaderthan the languageofMere other languagesarerestrictionsontheUniver language. Thisbiggestlanguageisthe language shouldbenoworryatall.Atleastnotin principle. restrain f broadness. Thisistheonlyproblem treating languagesasbetterorworseaccording facts m cannot saythatonelanguageisbetterthan language betterthantheotherwhen com Perhaps theworrythathavingbiggest portant –wecannotim e s directlyfrom thattherichestlanguagewould However, itseem o a re correctly.Thislackofontological r ke oneofthelanguagesm om that-if o st correct ontologically speaking thefactthatthere wecantellexpre s thatm languagewhenitcom agine apossiblela e reology o Icans re e be privilegedwithrespecttoits re restrictionofquantifiers,onecouldsaythatthe correct ssive powerfrom are noontologicalfactsthatwouldm describing theworld.However,sinceaccording correctness ? is other languagesbecauseitreflectsontological 13 Onethingistosaythatonelanguagebetter language wouldthreatequalityoflanguages ee inhavingthebiggestlanguage.Butifwe anareainwhichwereallyhavethebiggest nguage suchthatobjects recognisedbythis why wouldthatim criteriacouldperhapsbeam salist quantifier.Nom indescribingtherealitythanother,we ological Universalism in thenatureandsothereisnothingthat of Universalism to adifferentcriterion–theof e Isitsocertainthattherichestlanguage s todescribingwhattheworldislike? criterionisem o re correctly.Idoagreewiththe correct , ply thatitisthelanguage ness –havingthebiggest andthequantifiersofall . expressive power e Andwhatism ployed. Andsowe reological language o tivation for a ke one –it o re
CEU eTD Collection but recogni that thebiggestlanguagerecognises. This In pri objects from situation looksdram and com – onlylivingorganism there existonlyobjectssuchaslivingorgani reader, buttogiveindicationoftheirquantif VanProtonish, Differenceish(oddnam following: thereareonlythreepossible dom objects areasubsetofVanInvage the dom m restriction. Takeforinstancethreem we havehere,aresom quantifier variancefrom objects areinthescopeofUniversalist language arenotrecognisedbytheUniversalist 6 what thedifferencebetweenquantifier possibilities likethisone.Andonlybydrawing principle. Therequirem This is,Ithink,aniceexam num
It eanings. CalltheselanguagesUniversalish,
wecant i s ain. Nowtrytoforgettheseandotherfa ber ofobjectsitrecognises)doesnotrec not n ci ses. pl Yes, itis.Mereologyisquiteaspecificdebate.Becauseoftheparticularlanguages necessary ains ofobjectsrecognisedbythesela e wecoul posite objectsapartfrom It h ’s i nk ofexam all not
t real d haveal smaller h at l t y h pl possi atically different:not e bi es l s andprotons,accordi e m languagesdom ggest nts andconditionsofthedoctrineshouldbesuch astoem a i bl k e nguage e e m how inclined e t re quantifierrestrictionsoundhere? l o ple ofhowthe
e a t nt nguage recogni h al i t nk of h nish’s dom object at
livingorga recogni language stillwouldbesm material e s, propert
s here to thinkthatquantif ains, butthe e reological languageswithdifferentquantifier variance ses only thereisnolanguagethatrecognisesall 14 se m ain, whichinturnisasubsetofUniversalish’s sm object s al ier m few ext quantifier variancedoctrineshouldworkin iliar m VanInwagenish, Nihilish.W ognise anyoftheotherlanguages’objects. m i are introducednotinordertoconfusethe s andelectrons,accordingtoVanProtonish e nguages, youcanseethatNihilish’s quantifier. Isthedem l s, et nism e object exam ng toDifferenceish–allpossiblesim reological languages:VanElectronish, s not eanings). AccordingtoVanElectronish andthequantifier r c. e a object reological languagesandim s, protonsandelectrons.Herethe broadest bei s t ples liketheoneabovewecansay h 6 at ng recogni . Allsortsof arerecogni s, but aller, given ier varianceism
fai language (broadestbythe sed i l s t sed i o restriction t recogni n h com Uni a e number nd todistinguish n al h v posite m l en youlookat ersal ot se m e re quantif her l ofobject i reallyis. s a t agine the ny l a a nguages. nguage, object a brace terial p s i ier le s t
CEU eTD Collection quantif Sider statesthefollowingpossibleform Sider (2007a).Usingthefollowingbasicform
iers: Weak me Moderate Strong Form Unrestricted M outruns som unrestricted m restriction ofit, - there arem (W - Q(E) - - - - - c: - m ) mb hich isjusttosaythatthere al conditionsforthedoctrineofquan e r “Unrestricted”: Aquantif “Outruns”: ModelM “Depicts”: ModelM Q(E) E M M M o : setofquantifierm : : setofm /E-quantifier variance context,
f /E-quantifier variance m
o M M e : setofquantifiersbasedon eaning, re objectsinMthatwouldbeexpressedby m outrunssom e /E-quantifier variance M/ m e m b E-quantifier variance er ofQ(E) odels –worldsaccordingtodifferentquantifiers, b er ofE(providedMisapropersuperm e m depicts eanings, outruns e m s of b Everym er ofE ier is W no suchcontextforwhichMwoulddepict m m 15 correspondence betweenquantifierworldsand eaning-context pair< eak ulas: W eaning E , unrestricted Everym M eak e /E-quantifier variance+everyM tifier variancehavebeenstatedbyT. m m b er of M i ff forno /E-quantif e iffthereexistsnoproper M m m depictssom b ; Misricherthan er of c odel ofsom m, c ier variance+som does Mdepict< > M depictssom e e m m e e m m m ), b m, c b er of ∈ er of m
M > – e e
CEU eTD Collection pp.304-305), (1987,p.71). object com English speakershavetheirrelevantlanguage people reallyspeakoneontologicallanguage, m quantifier variancerequiresthateachquan which istosaythatthem variance saysthatatleastonequantifierworl quantifiers beingm between quantifiervarianceandm 7 Hirsch believesthatquantif worlds. hold, wewouldhavesom world depictssom containing it. of is Clinton’snose,andtherewas/is/willbesom done bystipulatingthatthissentenceistrue som m speakers. Peoplecanacquireadifferentquantifierm
H.Put eaning. Thestrongestform eaning of“thereexistsom thenewquantif e thing com n However, theotherpossiblequantif It seem The weakquantifiervarianceistooweak,sinceitdoesnotm am seem posed ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffelTowerwhatsoever. s t s thatHirsch’spositionisnotasm posed ofClinton’snoseandtheEi o t ier issim e h unrestrictedquantifier.If i e nk t re restrictionsonthe h e opposi eaning cannotbe p e ier vari quantifierwordsth ly theroleitplay istheunrestric
e thing” such t e –t h ance ispossibleratherthatactual at e re quantifie peopl ier m e i 16 unrestricted togeneratetheworld.Thestrong m that wouldrendersentenceslike“Thereis d isbeyondthereachofatleastonem whenever therewas/is/willbesom ted quantifiervariance:hereeach n tifier worldisbeyondthereachofsom s indeterm theunrestrictedquantifiervariancedidnot a e fact s too),andaccordingtowhichthereisno thing thatistheEif xim which isordinaryEnglish(hopefullynon- eani f at wouldbem f dospeak r restriction.Itisconsistentwithall e a ngs canbem l Tower”true.Thiscanbef l quantif u ch deflationaryasonem eaning bythinkingofachangein ining thetruth-valueofsentences di fferent ier. Them a e
de intelligibletoEnglish ont f re restrictionsofother e l Tower.Them ol ogi 7 a . Hebelievesthat oderate quantif ke anydifference cal
l a nguages o i e ght think. r instance thing that eaning, eaning (1994, ier e
CEU eTD Collection m say th variance doctrinewouldbesound m quantifier m could thinkofathirdlanguagethatcontains m som by him stipulating that“ ordinary Englishspeakercanm would bef English. Alanguage,oraquantifierm assum 9 8 to usetheUniversalist’squantif there alsoexistsanother,thethirdobject?W Does heneedtoaddanythingelse? Tower” istrueif He canstipulatethat“Thereissom SeeSi Pro o u e re object taphorically, wearenot st differtoo.Otherwise,thefollowingtw e v at Clin thing thatiscom i d e der (2007a,pp.216-17). e , , togetherwithHirsch,thattheco An im According tothef Hirsch proposestouseam It isrelativelyeasytom Now, howcananEnglishspeakerm if d
th s haveafusi his to at o n eanings, theirnam r instancethequantif m language,thatisEnglish,doesnotrecognisethiscom ’ portant thingtonoticeisthatwhen s n e reo o x “ThereisClinton’snose”true,andtheEif s e ex exists” istrueonlyif l o g on, si y ists, an
is o posed of nce i n i rst argum t really o d l th t o woul
g e EiffelTo i e cally co ier s, predicates com 9 Clinton’ d addnot a a . 8 e ier m ke anarrowerquantif ke thisqua . Buthowcanthisextrastatem taphor here. Doeshe ent, if m m e
thi x itted. W m eaning na wer ex eaning ittin refers toasim hi ng com wehadtwodifferentquantifiers: ng t m s noseandtheEiffelTower.Ifwespeak 17 a g both ofthem e , functionsym m ists. Bu ke a . o powerfulargum ll, itseem have tosaythatontopofthesetwoobjects Ifm o on ontologicallanguageisreallyordinary ntif t e as usedbytheMereologicalNihilist.An Metaphorically speaking h speak twolanguagesdifferwithrespecttotheir e ont rrower thanthatoftheordinaryEnglish posed ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffel e broader m ier m reo t th ol l en o ogi p g as if s so,if itwo eaning intelligibletohim y le. . Butwhenweapplytheordinary isn cal ier m bols, referenceanddenotation pi only. e u o aning intelligibletohim l t ct theEnglishspeakerintends d , th eaning intelligible.Letus ure. b ents againstthequantifier e en ent beseriouslyasserted triv posite object? p e ial to rh ap f e , hesays,thereis s itwo sayth l Tower”istrue. ∃ 1 and u at an l
d su s y ∃ elf ffice to two 2 s , we by elf
o ? r
CEU eTD Collection com exists som sem attem of theTarskiantheorytruth.Itisclaim this problem of inferencerules,predicatesandnam inference rulesvarywithrespecttodifferent disputes, likethoseconcerningdifferentm m com inference rules:quantifierelim
introduced toform And soitisnolongerpossibletoinfer eanings. Andso,itwouldm a m e ntics. AccordingtoTarskiantheoryof outequal: p itted onlytoobjectsrecognised bytheir t tom Another argum
This wouldinturnm
e thing thatthenam canbesolvedbysaying that a ∃ ∃ ∃ F(a) F ∃ F(a) ( F ke biggerquantif 1 1 2 1 1 1 x F x F x F(x)( x F(x) (a (a ulas containingnam 1 1 ) ) ( 1 1 ∃ (x) ( (x) 1 ∃ elim ent againstthequantifierva 1 elim ∃ ∃ 2 1 introduction) ination) introduction) ination) ean thatwecannotreallyhavetwodifferentquantifier ination and ean thatontol e from iers intelligib e e s here: s andpredicatesspecificfor
e the biggerlanguagedenotes.W trut d thatpeoplewhospeaksm ∃ 18 with differentlanguages notonlyquantifiers quantifier introduction,thequantifierscould 2 quantifier m ean x F(x)from sm h, theywouldhavetothinkthattherereally ogical debatescannotbem le tothem ings ofpredicatesforinstance.Butif aller language,theycannot doso.Again, riance doctrinecom eanings, wereallyhavetwosets
∃ selves, m 1 x F(x),since ∃ 1 . u e aller languagesand st rejectTarskian s from ∃ h e 2 ereas being re sem application cannotbe a ntic CEU eTD Collection reference decisions. Andsobychoosinga what thereis,sinceexistenceclaim of antirealism English. W which iscorrectinEnglish,nam of “tail”andtherebyyoudecidetospeak,sa question ina course!”. Now,itseem in which“tail”referstolegsonly,thecorrect answer isobvious:“one,ofcourse!”. there isalanguageinwhich“tail”referstolegs.Ifyouaskhowm m Linguistic decisionsastowhichontologicallanguagespeak,determ spoken –theordinaryEnglish,andaccording Tower ornot.AccordingtoHirschthereis determ com false. Theirtruthisnotm if wehavetwodifferentquantifiers: vary, butalsootherlinguisticphenom
eaning of“thereexists”,saysHirsch.Andhegivesthefollowingexam m it onetoantirealism ine whetherthereexistssom Now, thispartm W Yet anotherim 2 e anddenotation ll, itisandnot.Hirschclaim h at hasgonewronghere? different language . Itm a y beclaim portant objectiontothedoctrineofquantifiervarianceis s thatHirschplaysw i ght seem i 2 nd-independent. Isthatcorrect? . (2002a,pp.51-53).Ourlinguisticdecisions,hesays,donot thatithasbeenaskedin.Ifyoudecidetochange m e e given languagewerendercertainexistenceclaim d thatquantifie abitm ly thatadog
s aretrueorfalse ena, like e ∃ thing 1 and y sterious s 19 y, T-English,youcannotreallygiveananswer only oneontologicallanguagethatisactually th com ∃ ith differentlanguageshere:heanswersthe answertothatquestionshouldbe:“four,of reference anddenotationinthiscase.Again, 2 at thequantifiervariancedoctrinedoesnot has onetail,butwhichisnotcorrectinT- , wehavereference to thatlanguagethereisnosuchobject. r variancepresupposesantirealism posed ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffel . Iwouldthinkthatifspeakalanguage with respect
a 1 todifferentlinguistic ny tailsadoghas,the anddenotation ple: letussaythat ine onlythe s trueor eaning about threat 1 , and CEU eTD Collection
is stilltruethatdoghasonlyonepartofthebodyitwaveswheneverhappy.Only asked inT-Englishhowm believe, thattherearem are afull-bloodedontologicalpluralist,andbe if youdonotthinkthatthereisoneactual language thatallpeoplespeak,hecananswerthequestiononlyinthislanguage.However, and Nihilistsdo,asthey believeinexistenceofjointsnature.Inno way arethejoints believe inexistenceofm two differentareas.Oneistheareaofontologi variance doesnotcom whenever thedogishappy.Sotherem of itsbodyusedforrunning,scratching,a that “tail”willrefertolegs.Thedogrem facts reality. W quantif Languages changeandanswerschange.Sothere not! Butwe,whoconsistentlydecidedtouse Clinton’s noseandtheEiffelToweranobject? refer tothesum now thisisnotwhat“tail”m rem ier variancecom I guessthatsinceHirschbelieves It seem On theotherhand,allthosepossibleont Let ustakeanotherexam a h ins thesam enever youswitchtoadiffere s thatweneedtothinkof ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffe e m . Youdonotchangeanyt m it onetoantirealism i u its onetoantirealism nd-independent ontol ltitude ofequally a ny tailsadoghas, eans. ple. Letussay therealism u a st be nt ontologicallanguage,yourworldof ins thesam . goodontologicallanguages,andifyouwere 20 language thatontologistsspeak,andsoifyou
nd diggingholes,andoneusedforwaving . you wouldsaythatdoghasfourtails.Butit ogical facts,likeMereological Universalists
a senseinwhichthedoctrineofquantifier the newlanguage,wem l Tower.Andnowletusask:isthesum lieve, inthewaythatCarnapandPutnam Hirschwouldhavetosay:ofcourseitis cal facts.Hereyoucanbearealistif hing inappearanceofadogifyoudecide that f thereisactuallyonlyoneontological m - ological languagesdescribethesam u antirealism st beasenseinwhichthedoctrineof e r : anordinarydogstillhasfourparts om nowonwewilluse“object”to distinctionasapplicablein u st say:yes,itis. empirical of e
CEU eTD Collection speak facts beyondtheirlinguisticdecisionsas that alllanguagesareequallygoodandcorrect ontological facts? invented. Thequestionisnow:aretheontological dependant uponhum 10 of ontologicallanguagesisprivilegedforreasons no ont fact would beabletosettleontologicaldebates.W structure happen tospeakthisparticularontologicallanguage that theyarebeingreflectedinthelanguage Hirsch cannotreallyadm independent, structuredontologi perhaps weshouldsay: theparticlesarrange overlooks Parisregardlessofwhetheryoubelie the sam an objectcom or choices.Andontologicalpluralistsdonotsa that theworldofem this wouldbeaveryoddposition.Anem facts isjustagainstthespiritofontologicalpluralism
And thatpeoplehappentospeakoneparticularlanguage. ol 10 t h ogi . Thisisam One couldstillattem Ontological pluralistsare i e s , areantirealistsaswell.Theydonotbelieveinexistenceof i . Clinton’snosetravelwithClintonalloverthe world,andtheEif cal s am fact posed ofClinton’snoseandthe o s oft re defl W h a pirical factsisnotreally e m tter ofchoice.Ontologicalpl e at an thought:theyareoutther ll, Ithinktheyare. i onary a t t it, asthiswouldbe e r, andt posi
p t tosaveontologi t h i cal reality.ButIthinkthisissom on t at not al h antirealistswhenitcom l an t
descri h at Full-blooded ontologicalpluralistswhobelieve ofHi pt pirical antirealistwouldbesom 21 i to whichontologicallanguagetheyshould outthere,independentofanyone’sdecisions ons wespeak.Buttheexistenceofontological to agreethatthereareontologicalfacts,and d Clinton’s-nose-wisechange theirlocation h Eiffel Towerornot,yourem y this.W at actuallysettlesthedebatesisa rsch’s. Al areeq , m ve inunrestrictedcom uralists likeHirsch,whobelievethatone cal realism pluralistslikeHirschantirealistsabout different e, waitingtobediscovered,not u . st thinkthattherearenoontological Sothispositionisnottenableatall. u a lly elig l h a n Si ether youbelieveinexistenceof because that del herebysayingthatpeople ib e s to le. l e (2002),bel reflecting theontological itm empirical facts e thing thatpeoplelike
ontological facts position ornot.Or i rrors them i e pirical worldis e ves t one whosays h f e at linguistic l Tower . Ithink t h ere are that i nd- CEU eTD Collection sentences not reallyduetoontologicalfactsandjointsbe sentences thataretrueineverylanguagesisonl m believe inexistenceof objects. Itcanbeaworldofsom according tothetotalNihilistisaworldm which therearenoobjectswhatsoever,isperfectlytenabletom that arerecognisedbyeverylanguage.Total think thatsuchatom pluralism the quantif so perhapsthereareobjectsthatrecognisedbyallpossibleontologicallanguages,when objects”, becausethisiswhatIthinkpeopleha quarks”. Thosesentencesshouldbereallyread tail. in otherwords.Andthisisperhapsan Eiffel-Tower-wise occupythesam together withotherparticlesarrangedC 11 quantifier m certain degree.Itwouldbethecaseiftherearesom of context) SeeSi a tter isgunky,asopposedtom der (2007a,p.215). However, onem Still, itispossiblethatevenontologicalpluralistsare : therearesom happen ier isunrestricted.If 11 eanings, andcouldberenderedfa . Exam tobetrueinalllanguages. Iw ples ofsuchsentencescouldbe: ic sentencesareactual.I thetotalobjectwhic i e ght saythatontologicalrealism objectsthatar
thisisthecas a e tter beingcom e one who lo cation atalltim e recognisedbyeverylanguage.Now,Idonot tended m a linton’s-body-wise, andtheparticlesarranged de 22 does notbelieveincom ontological Nihilism do notthinkthatthereisasetofbasicobjects h isthewholeworld,andwhobelievesthat lse onlybyquantifierrestriction(bychange e, thenthereissom entirely ofm as:“Electronsareobjects”and“Quarks y apparent,asthetruthofthesesentencesis ve inm ing outthere,butduetothefactthatthese posed ofsim ould notknowhowtoanswer suchan eaning ofHirsch’sexam e “There areelectrons”,or:
atomic sentences es. Theworldof i nd whentheysay“thereare”.And basedonexistenceofatom a p tter thatfailstoconstituteany les. –adoctrineaccordingto ontological realists e realism y position, anddoesnot opinion.Theworld thataretruef matter inontological ple withdog’s isthesam toa o r all ic e , CEU eTD Collection treat thisrestrictionasgivingyou quantifier does.Inthiscaseyousim a problem quantifier m dif com com difficult, orevenim The reasonwhyontologicaldebates linguistic agreem objection. Itactuallyseem 12 m does notrecognisesom the otherissm languages, suchthatoneofthem as if m does notrecognise.Hirschproposestousea com you trytostatethem m
SeeT.Si e u eaning, notonlythecontext).However,as f ntioned above.W st beinprinciplepossible, giventhat e m m e rence inm only. Canthisanswerbesatisfactoryforthequantifiervariancedoctrineobjectors? s tom unity using“cup”foranyvesseldri it yourself,seem Giving them Still, therearepeoplewhodonotagreeth Another thingisthatitpossible,ev der (2001). . Thisisprovidedthatthelargerqua e eaning, onem rely verbaldebatesaboutm eaning is.However,whenonetriestoexplainorm aller given ent oncertainfacts. possible, tostateonepa eaning ofthesm e speakm eaning ofthelargerquantifierusingsm e oftheobjectsrecogni s, toexistenceoft i ght com the number s thatthereisso
e taphorically when islargergiven e acrossveryseriousdifficulties. cannot betreatedasm aller quantifier unrestricted p ly rest ofobjectsitrecognises.Still,thelargerlanguage eani 23 hose extraobjectsthatyouroriginallanguage rty’s viewsinotherparty’slanguage.W quantif rict yourquantifiertoasm theobjectiongoes,youareintroublewhen ng ofpredicates,likeintheexam ntifier recognisesallobjectsthatthesm m nking, itisprettyeasytoexplainwhatthe en thoughperhapsnotactual,tohavetwo sed bythesm m e at ontologicaldebatesarem m thing m e wespeakthelargerlanguage.W the number taphor forthispurpose,asithasbeen by m eaning (thisishowyouchangethe ier doctrineisnotm eans ofthelargerquantifierisnot o e re toontologicalrealism re sem ofobjectsitrecognises,and aller language.Thissituation a a aller one.Youhaveto ke intelligibledif ntic debatesisthatit aller dom e e re quantif rely verbal ple ofthe ain and e speak f h than e en it aller rent
ier 12 . CEU eTD Collection if youm intelligible bym the sam your quantifierinsuchawayastoexclude quantifier intelligible,itisnotenoughjustto restriction. Ifyouspeakthelargerlanguage have incom of alanguage.Ifyouhave languageswithdiffe parts oflanguage,likelogicalfunctions,nam rem language apparatus:otherpredicates,quantifiers only onepredicatevariesinm m are extrem introduced, andthescopeofchangeswhenanewquantifierm changes thatneedtobeintroducedala people m intelligible donotworrym be anuntenableposition.Theallegedprobl the Universalistquantif that thelanguagelargerthanyoursrecognise com eaning, likeforinstancethem a m in thesam itm W I donotthinkthereareanyform How seriousistheobjectionthatitnotpossibletom e tim i ents insom h ght wanttosaythatontological a en youchangethequantifier,onotherhand, youm ely different.W ke anewquantifierintelligible e! m on arepredicatesatm e . Itisnotdifficulttointroducesucham eans ofsom e sense.Youspeak ier, andthatistheendof h e en yougiveanex e atall.Instea otherquantifie eaning be eaning of“c o st. Its al reasons as if nguage whenanewpredicatem disputes cannotbem d, Icanthinkof tween twolanguages.Thewholerem som 24 toyourself,youchangeyourontological rs? e s. Youbecom hould notcom yourreallybelievedinthoseextraobjects up”, youusuallydescribeasituationwhen s, re here,andyouwanttom am thestory. restrict yourquantifier.Youm e Ifyouswitchtoadifferentlanguage,and em , logicalconstants,referenceandthelike, objects,andincludesom rent quantifiers,theonly partsthatthey astowhyontologicalpluralism ference, andthelike.Thisisavastarea ple ofanordinarydebateonpredicate s withm i nor changetoalanguage. e apossiblereasonwhysom aUniversalistwhenyouuse e a asasurprisethenthat it is king thelargerquantifier eaning isbeingintroduced, e rely verbal.The u a st changealsoother ke som e a eaning isbeing newobjectsat ke thesm e quantifiers u st change scope should a ining aller of e
CEU eTD Collection major partofyourlanguage difficult becauseyouchangeyour due to really itseem difficult thanchangingthequantifierm predicates intelligibletoourselves,usingour into alanguage.Letusim over m dif deflationary positions:Maxim shallow aboutontology.FollowingM.Eklund( to settlethesequestions. Theproblem adm deflationist positions”.Theothertwo,asitseem the relevantobjectsexist.Thesetwopositi really claim be describedaccordingtohim that therearenoobjectswhatso f i its thatontologicalquestions are cult tom s com thatontologicalstatem eanings of
An OntologicalNihilist(nottobeconf Believing thatontologicaldisputesarem Agnosticism the scope m itted totheexistenceof a s thatdif ke alienquantif all of changes,andnotduetothespeci aboutontologyisinsom predicatesofalanguage,orastr f i culties withm 1.2. . agine aneffortofm ents areinasens a solelyinterm iers intelligible. lism ever (notonly:nocom Other WaysToBeShallow quantifier meaning , Nihilism
genuine various objects;theyaretrue hereis a eaning, na king a 25 , , becausetherearefact s of m AbsoluteFictionalism e ons arewhatwecouldcall“full-blooded e fictional–whenweutterthem lien quantif us se old predicates.Thisisperhapsevenm e It m s, arenotasm rely epistem ed withaMereologicalNihilist)believes m matter nse anon-deflationaryposition,sinceit e 2008), wecanlistatleastfourother re e a u s, andreferenceatthesam king thewholelotofentirelynew , itisdifficultbecauseyouchangethe ly verbalisnottheonlywaytobe st beasdif posite objects).W ying tointroduceallnewpredicates or fic dom iers’ m stuff i c: therearenowaystoknow u ch deflationary. . AnAbsoluteFictionalist f ain ofchanges.Itisnot eanings intelligiblearise i cult ashavingadebate
on theassumption s ofthem , andAgnosticism h atever exists,can a , wearenot e tter ashow tim e. But . that
o re CEU eTD Collection speaking, anythinggoes –whatsensecanyoum only Mereological Universalism position. Iwouldrathersaythatdifference betweenOntologicalMaxim applicable. nature, f Universalist’s ontology,butwhilefortheUniversalisteverythingcorrespondstojointsin so forhim Ontological Maxim the sam com nature, andthesejointsareabundantenoughto m Mereological Universalisttheontologicalquesti between thesetwopositions.Thedifferenceliesin
this wouldbetosaythatthereisnowayknow the ontologicalfacts.Perhapstherem 13 exi Universalism classify. Ontheonehand,OntologicalMaxi exist, giventhattheem genuine as theMereologicalUniversalistdoes Ifwerest a s tter astowhatsortsof t e posite objects.AndeventhoughtheOntol nce ofnon-m seems For Eklundthisspecificm An OntologicalMaxim e ornot. o num ri r theOntologicalMaxim ct different.Ifyoubelieveinabundantjoin
ourdom . anything goes TheOntologicalMaxim ber ofobjects,hism a t e ri al a ai list doesnotbelieveintheexis object n t o pirical factsarethe m objectsexist.FortheMereologicalUniversalisttherearejointsin s, andobject a isnotsosignif t , m e ri
al a object e list believesthat reologically speaking.Hisontologyisasrichthe o o tivation m a tivation fo s wi s onl list theno i ght be a 13 list believe t . However,Eklundseesasignificantdifference h y bot , ast i 26 cant asitm sam h m another waytobeanOntologicalAgnostic– a m h kes r doingsowouldbeentirelydifferent.The ogical Maxim e Ont a e a ons aregenuineandtherefactsofthe lism a t . Thispositionm there actuallyareanyobjectsthatcould tion of e ke ofajointinnature? s infactexistenceofasm ri Ontological Maxim allowhim tence of o al whether ts innature,suchthat,m l seem ogi andnon-m cal i ajointinnatureissim ght seem motivation M s verysim jointsinnaturef theontologicalquestions a a xi list wouldbelieveinexactly a tobelieveinallsortsof m t e a ri l atf i al i s ght beabitdifficultto t part , heclaim canal ilar toMereological i a rst. Them lism s. Ajointinnature so bel adeflationary i rst of e i reologically e a s a ve i ny objects . Forthe lism o all,and tivation p n
ly not and are CEU eTD Collection seem that wouldnotm nothing m opposition tonon-distinguishedportions.Andits portion ofreality”areyoutalkingabout? and com is supposedtobea radical andm But thisistheonlyontological debatetaken Fictionalists inallsortsofontologicaldis distinction isquitegeneral.W applicable toallsortsofontologicalquestions. properties, substances,etc.).Theref a givensort,orasdistinguishedincer of them Maxim som could believeinbothm believe inexistenceofallsortpossibleproperties,andbeaPropertyMaxim would say.ButonecouldalsobeaMaxim sorts of Maxim Ontological Maxim e s tobeofnoapplicationhere. one whobelievesonlyinm a a And thesam It isim com lism list withrespecttom a posite objectscorrespondtojointsinnature–whatsenseof“beingadistinguished ny ways.BeingaMaxim e reologically non-distinguished,because asanexam posite m oderate positionsastowhat sort portant torealisethattherear a ke anotherobject.Thewhol distinguished portionofreality a e list, Agnostic,Nihilist,or istrueabouttheother a terial objects.This a ple. Onecouldbean terial andm a ny distinctions. a terial substance e a canthinkofPluralists,Nihilists,Agnostics and
list islikeageneraltendencytoem e ore Ma ntal subs Distingui putes. Mereologyisnotuniqueinthisrespect. a 27 is ourf up here.Everywherein ontology wecanhave lis xim tain way(objectsasm Being anOntologicalMaxim OntologicalMaxim tance, andbeaMaxim of t indifferentways.Onecouldforinstance ways tobeshallowaboutontology.This e variouswaysinwhichonecanbean e ideaofdistinguishedportionsreality entities,givenaparticular distinctionor a Fictionalist.LetustakeOntological for instance.Inotherwords,onecanbea lism thereisnosucharrangem shed portionsofrealitycom . Butifyousaythatallpossiblesim eem a m ism iliar MereologicalUniversalism s thatfortheUniversalistthereis o re likeanattitudethatis a list andbelieveinall a a brace allentitiesof list ascom terial com a list isjustone e nt ofobjects a e list, orone onlyasin p posites, ared to p , I le CEU eTD Collection These are:thoughtexperim em genuine disagreem m coincidence ispossible,andsotherem disputes. Therearepeoplewhosaythattherenofactsofthem def settling differentontologicaldis criterion, exist.Arobustontologistbelieves both partiesof a debateoverthenatureofquantifier,orth entities. ThedebatebetweentheMereological eligibility, steam this isnotontologicaleligibility,steam worth m reality com candidate m If youbelieveinexistenceoflogicaljoints m to whatobjectsexist.Youbelievethenthateventhoughtherearem eanings forthequantifier,som a pirical facts.Andsothe m tter astowhichpropertiesaregenuineproperties. l ationary ontologistssayingthatthere Robust ontologistsseeontologicaldebates If youarearobustontologistbelievethat e ntioning thatpeoplelikeHirschalsobe e eaning istheonewhichclosest s alreadystructured,andthatitsstructuresettlesontologicaldisputes.Itis thisdebate,them ing from ent astowhichm 1.3. How therealuseoflanguage. e nts, considerations e thods theyuse putes. Andeverywhereintheontologywecanhavealso e ofthem o ToBeDeepAboutOntology st eligible eaning this i ght be i are(ontologically)m ng f are nof 28 in nature,youwillsaythatthem e natureofexistence.Thereis,accordingto to settlethedebatearespecific tophilosophy. peoplewhosaythattherearenofactsofthe m Universalist andtheMereologicalNihilistis r om to thejointinnature ofsim eaning ofthequantifie that therearedifferentontologicalfacts is.Theyareinadebateoveranextra- lieve inacertainsortof structureof acts of as debatesovernatureofontological
therearesom p licity, coherence,integration with them thereality,but o re a tter settlingontological eligible e . Youbelievethatthe factsofthem r, andtheyareina u eligibility–but ltiple candidate thattheothers. a tter whether o st eligible linguistic a tter as CEU eTD Collection of things.AndthisiswhatIbelievetobethecase. related toit,thereisonlyonecorrectm intelligible tohavem constants. Itdeterm discovered. Thisstructuregivesm all robustontologistsisthattherealitycom other philosophicalandperipheraldom
ines ourreferenceanddenot u ltiple candidatesf eaning tothequantifierweuse,andourlogical ains ( eani o r 29 ng ofexistence,andthereisonlyonedom e quantif like physicsforinstance).Theparadigm s structured,andthatthisstructureistobe ation of
ier m theterm eaning andthewholeapparatus s weuse.Andevenif itis for ain CEU eTD Collection “m whole). Aconsequenceofthisviewisthat proper philosophical theorieswith oldplausibleviews. enterprise. Inotherwords: com views aresocom Som philosophical analysisandwhetherthereis course thereisaquestionofhowm scrutiny turnsouttobeperfectlyconsistent what wasonceregardedascontradictingcom favouring oneviewovertheother.Manyphilos living organism and cars.Moreover,weareinvitedtosharean m experience. W com call a“com ountains orpiles,butalsotheexistenceof etaphysical atom m m e tim onsense pictureisnotlostontheway–whether thereisstillsom onsense existentialstatem parts(partsthatarenotidenticaltoth However, Iam I adm Mereological Nihilism es itseem it thatMereologicalNihilism m e s, includingourpets,friends,orevenparentsandpartners. areinvitedtodenynotonly onsense ontology”.Nihilism p licated andobscurethat s thattheattem s”. notcertaintowhatde M EREOLOGICAL plausibility isadoctrineaccordingtowhichnothingwhatsoeverhas ents con p ts torec C HAPTER u isof ch cerning m istoagreatextentatoddswithwhatonecan with com oncile som one m 30 such “well-defined”objectsliketables,chairs anything “com of thecom extrem ten lostwhenonetriestoreconcilenew gree shouldplausibilitym allthingsthatexistarejustsim
the existenceofsuch“vague”objectsas ophical analysesaim e whole;partsthataresm m obviously im a y starttodoubtwhetherpreservingthe N onsense beliefs,afterasophisticated II m acroscopic objectsofoureveryday ely im IHILISM onsense conceptionoftheworld.Of e noveltheorieswithcom m onsense picturerem plausible viewthatthereareno m onsense” inthepicturestill. plies denialsofm
atdem a ke areasonfor e senseinsuch onstrating that aller thanthe a m ins after onsense p les - a ny CEU eTD Collection the sim since physicalatom understood asthesm plausible viewsatleasttothesam Moreover, asIshallargue,them argum presented byMerricksandvanInwagenareto ha m organism either onlyhum there aresom com living organism is thattherearenocom presented byT.MerricksandP.vanInwage physical entitiesoursim m avoid speakinginterm a a nner thatthesetwoauthorsdo.ThereforeI y turnouttobecom m onsense m ents f Two argum The onlythingsthatexistaccordingtoth Therefore IdoacknowledgethatNihilism p les then,speakinginterm s (vanInwagen).AsIshallclaim o r unrestrictedNihilism e exceptionstoargum s). Bothargum acro-physical objectsdonotexist,andinthesecondpartitisarguedthat an beings(Merricks),or ents f 2.1. ArgumentsforRestrictedNihilism(s) s arecom allest, indivisiblepartsof s ofphysics,asentitiesthataredeem posite physicalobjects, posite objectstom p les standfor. o r restrictedversions posed ofsm ents consistoftw a e in rivalof extent. . s ofphysic
ents presentedinthefirstpart.Theseexceptionsare aller o , therearenoreasonstorestrictNihilism rrow. 31 n. Thecom Nihilism hum exceptofhum parts, likeelectronsforinstance.W s? m will arguethatifargum o parts:inthef AndsoIdonotwanttodeterm of Tobeperfectlyhonest,Iwouldrather a e Nihilistaresim an beingstogetherwithotherliving ve anyforce,theyshouldbetreatedas tter. Thesearenotthephysicalatom is MereologicalNihilism –Universalism adeparturefrom m on conclusionoftheseargum an beings(andperhapsother ed sim i rst itisarguedthatm p p -isadeparturef les. Theseshouldbe le byphysicstoday, plausibleviews. ents forNihilism havebeen ine what h inthe at are ents r a om ny s,
CEU eTD Collection about certaineffects.Theseeffectsoccu in factthereisnothingm Causal efficacyofcom m redundant causalpowers,andthisisduetohum no applicationtohum their existenceshouldbedenied. m m straightforwardly sensoryorcausal,asitis m that object’sconstituentatom existence andintrinsicpropertiesof,spatiotem These aredefinedaspropertiesthat“not,ofm acrophysical objectstoexistisha acrophysical objectsdonothaveanynon-redundant acrophysical m e ntal propertiestothefactthatone However, Merrick’sNihilism Merricks’ argum Theargum Therefore: (2) (1) redundant causalpowers. powers doexist. Out ofm Only hum 2.1.1. “ToBeIsToHaveNon-RedundantCausalPow a terial things. ent looks,roughly,asfollows: acrophysical thingsonly ans, duetohavingsom p an beingsatall. lex m ent f o re andabovecausa a o s” (2001,pp.88-89)
terial objectsis,accordingtoMerricks,entirelyredundant: r restrictedNih
islim ve non-redundantcausalpowers(2001,pp.33-82). Hum ited onl 32 in caseofevidencefortheexistenceother ’s evidenceforone’sexistenceisnot r prim l powersofsim e a sortofm an beings’havingsom those whichhavenon-redundantcausal n beingsinfactdodisplaysom ilism y tonon-hum . Merricksrelatesthefactofhaving poral andcausalinterrelationsam arily onthem e taphysical necessity,im isbasedontheclaim causalpowers,andduetothisfact e ntal properties,displaynon- p les thatactingjointlybring an m i a cro level.Andso terial objects;ithas e
mental plied bythe properties. thatf ers” e non- ong, o r CEU eTD Collection hum are causallyredundant.Thisargum Prem
powers: Merrick’s StepOneArgum The needofrestrictingNihilism an m ise (2)isrelatedtotheOverdeterm The OverdeterminationArgument (3) (1) (b) and (a) (1) The StepOneArgument (4) Therefore: (3) (2) a interrelations am by theexistenceandintrinsicpropertiesof, and spatiotem
terial things. atom The baseball–if The shatteringofthewindowisnotoverdeterm If thebaseballexists,itdoesnotcauseshatteringofwindow. Hum The shatteringofthewindowiscausedbythoseatom There issom An object’sexistingandbeingFis Hum s, actinginconcert,causetheshatteringofwindow. a ns (understoodasm a ns causethingsinvirtue of(existingand)beingF. ong, thatobject’sconstituentatom e ent, whichsaysthathum intrinsicpropertyFsuchthat: itexists–iscausa (2001, p.89): onlytonon- ent is acrophysical com inati (2001,p.56): applicable, accordingtoMerricks, 33 on Argum hum lly irrelevanttowhetheritsconstituent not, ofm ans have an m p ent, whichsaysthatm lex objects)exist. i ned. a s, terial objectsispresentedin e taphysical necessity,im some s, actinginconcert. non-redundantcausal poral andcausal a terial objects any non- plied CEU eTD Collection m true. But properties? atom atom hum of theprincipleConsciousness(C)(2001,p.94): The firstpartoftheprem
e ntal propertiescanbehad onlybycom ans, sincetheydisplaycausalpowersthat s? s. Myquestionis:whycannotweattr W The conclusionofMerrick’sreasoning Necessarily, ifsom Consciousness (C) interrelations asA intrinsically likeA (3) Therefore: (2) to believethathum spatiotem hum (existing and)beingFdoesnot properties andspatiotem effect Einvirtueof(existingand)beingFdoesnot is hy shouldweassum ittrueinthefirstplace? Thecrucial Itseem an’s constituentatom There issom If (1)istrue,thentheresom poral andcausalinterrelations. s thatMerrick’sargum 1 : …A 1 e …A e atom propertyFsuchthat an’s constituentatom ise oftheSt n com n interrelatedbyallthesam poral andcausalinterrelations. e s A thatatom s causeEinvirtueof pose aconsciousobject. 1 …A all byitself ep OneArgum n p com en 34 lexe ibute thesecausalpowerstotheconstituent t wouldfailwithoutthisassum s e cannotbeattributedtotheirconstituent propertyFsuchthatahum question hereiswhether causallyeffective s likehum pose aconsciousobject,thenanyatom cannot seem a hum s giveoneareasontobelievethat cause Einvirtueof s tobethef havem an’s causingeffectEinvirtueof ent (1a)issupportedbyrejection an beings,orwhetherthey can theirintrinsicpropertiesand all byitself e spatiotem e ntal causallyeffective o llowing: there giveoneareason poral andcausal theirintrinsic an’s causing p tion being are s
CEU eTD Collection m object wecanascribem we areinclinedtothinkthatthereisanobject one predicates: “surrounding” collectively instantiateam surrounding anythingelse. the cordon,isjustm not believeinsuchobjects(andwe,beingMere legitim here andsaythatsentenceslike:“Apoli another -therem be instantiatedonlybythem behave likea m also beattributedtom property” only ways ofapplyingthephysical-m subject eligiblefor“havingam either singularorpluralsubject.Idonotwant e a ke sensetoascribem ntal propertiestothem objectonly. ate. W And likewisefor“havingam Let ustaketheexam 1) Strong Mental propertiescanbethoughtofinat e collective ll, theyare,if allows of u Reductionism st bem predicate,like“surrounding”forin e a re collectionsof e ny policem e ntal propertiesto ntal properties.Now plural subject.Andso“having e requires a ntal property.Howe a ple ofparticlesth ny objectsto onebelievesin ny particles,and e a
ental distinction.Theseresultinthefollowingpositions: ntal property”here. ny –wecannot a pluralsubject,whileitseem en. Sothis e ntal prope sim ce cordonsurroundedthebuilding”areperfectly surround anything.However,onem many 35 spatiallyscatteredobjects.Forthosewhodo p at allegedlycom wayoranother,youcannothaveoneobject les –the thattheparticlescom so that“havingam ver, thereisadifferencebetweenthesetwo I shallclaim ological Nihilists,donotbelieveinthem toclaim sensiblysaythatoneobjectsurrounds objects(actinginconcert)ratherthanto leastfourways,dependingondifferent rty” –therecanbem x s. Theideahereisthatitm thatpluralsubjectistheonly a m stance. Thislatterpredicatecan thatitispossibletoascribe pose ahum e ntal property”m s that“havingam e pose, andthattothis ntal property”m an body.Usually a ny objectsthat i ght object i ght have e i i ntal ght ght ), CEU eTD Collection on them one: onem the physical-m properties. following: thereisaphysicalsubstancethat that theunderlyingsubstanceisphysicalin two exhaustallwaysforasubstancetobe).For thesakeofargum properties isofacertainquality,itcouldbee substance canhaveboth:physicalandm either physicalorneutral. supervenience base.Onthisaccountthereisalsojustonesubstance,anditcanbe properties isthattheirnaturecannotbederivedfrom a sufficientdegreeoforganisationandfuncti properties are properties do,onthisaccount,supervenephysi physical-m two waysforthissubstancetobe.Itcanbe Now, onecansaythatit ispossibleforthe A m The firstwayofthinkingaboutthephysical-m 4) Substance 3) Property 2) Em Another m i cro levelofthebrain.On ental distinction. a y holdthatm o re m produced ergentism ental distinction.Thisactually w oderate positionisProperty oderate positionisEm Dualism Dualism , sotospeak,bysom
e ntal propertiesarein
thisviewthereisonlyonesubstance,butm e ntal properties.Ifthesubstanceunderlying 36 e ergentism either physical,orneutralwithrespecttothe sophisticat ither physicalorm caninstantiateboth:physicalandm onality. Adistinctivefeatureofem ould bringm factreducibletophysicalpropertiesfound its nature.Theviewwouldthenbethe Dualism cal propertiesinaspecialway.Mental substance tobeneutralwith respectto ental distinctionisquiteanaradical aboutm ed physicalentities,whichdisplay natureofentitiesthataretheir , accordingtowhichthesam o re sym e e ntal (assum ntal properties.Mental m e try intothepicture: ent, letusassum i ng thatthese i ergent ght be e ntal e e
CEU eTD Collection physi being objects,orissom effective) properties? say thattheconstituentatom displaying m Displaying causallyefficientm say isthathum seem these viewswouldgiveMerricks’argum actually heldbyMerricks? properties respectively.W to whichtherearetwosubstances:physicaland properties. we wouldhavetheneutralsubstance,whichis 15 14 complex materialobjects hum am the existenceandintrinsicpropertiesof acting inconcert. properties thatcanbecausallyeff can occuronl com think thatMerrickswouldhave to
Furt And ong, hum p cal ans exist.Butthen,wearesupposedtobelievethathum l s thatMerrickswantstosaythelatterratherthanf e her quest x object i
f Wh Merricks saysthathum cau
The otherradicalposition,andthelaston t h ere wereot sally effectiv a y t oncom i s t i e ans’ constituentatom ons: s ntal (causallyeffective)prope h ans areobjectsinvirtueof
at in virtueof are canbecausal p l her t a e e p
x l ll m e r h o vel e an . Andsoitseem p e ntal propertiescausallyeffective? e thing anobject Orperhapsweshould h s rties ? ment ective apartfrom what then? ich ofthesefour be happytoacceptexistence of su l Fort y
effect ans havecausallyefficientpropertiesthatarenotim s actingincon e not al ntal properties h cau deri e sakeoft i v s. W sally effectiv e? vabl Howabout Canhum ent m s thattherem e f h causallyeffectivephy displaying causallyeffectivem , andspatiotem h atever in virtueof r e argum 37 om physi rties andbeinganobject.Otherwisewhynot a views onthephysical-m able toinstantiateboth:physicalandm xim is asufficientconditionforbeinganobject. cert areabletodisplaym m e p som ans displaym ask aslightlydifferentquestion:whichof e this list,isSubstanceDualism has suchpropertiesexists.Therefore, ent ntal, thatinstantiatephysicalandm r u o cal m e p l
Arem e emergent e power? causal rties o u t displayingm usassum st ch com be averycloserelationbetween poral andcausalinterrelations e o f ntal properties l sical propertiesascribedtoatom
rm y com ef st
p e er. W e ri f lex physicalobjectsaswell. ntal properties ect t ct p h lex physicalobjects,suchas l at ans existconceivedas i y ve propert phy i h t e i at hereallywantsto ntal properties s si al ental distinctionis t cal e h l ntal properties e onl andonl propert e i e ntal (causally s of y propert in virtueof according t y h i m e e at plied by s t e nt h 14 oms i e e e at al ntal ntal ? It
s of s
15 , I .
CEU eTD Collection overdeterm what Iam are -thatdisplayingm are objectsaswell. It isnotanecessaryconditionthough,because Are allcausallyeffectivethingsnon-vague? question isthen:thereanysuchrelation? relation betweenbeingcausallyeffectiv term a necessaryconditionforbeingdistinguishedportionof causally effective? reality –thejointsarecausallye between thesetwoaccounts? says thatthingsarewhatiscausallyeff what thingsare.Isaythataredis distinguished, non-vagueportionofreality.But what spacetheyoccupy andwhattheirnature vagueness astowhatsort ofentitiestheyare, com sim are non-vague,thenwem p positionally vague,sincetheyhavenoproper s ofm les thatarecausallyeffective)non- It seem According toMerricksthebaseball,ifit The latterseem The easiestwaytochallengethisclaim goingtodo,takingthingsfrom a i ned shatteringofthewindow.Iwoul terial com s thatthisisaquestionshouldberatherputinterm position). Henceanyacceptablebridgingconceptsm s dubious.Ifwearereadyto e ntal propertiesisnot u st saythatthesim Doesitm f f ective, orif tinguished, non-vagueportionsofreality.Merricks a ke sens adifferentangle,sotospeak. e andbeingcom ective. Cantherebeany“bridgingconcepts”
38
p m vague. W what m Are allnon-vaguethingscausallyeffective? les thatcausedshatteringofthewindow(the isto is. Thisagainm atom eaning thattheyarewell-defined, weknow e toaskwhetherdistinguishedportionsof thereisanything this istogivetwodifferentaccountsof exists, issom d saythatabaseball,ifitexists,is saythatthisissim parts. W s thatdonotdisplaym adm a kes som e ll, thesim it thatallcausallyeffectivethings
e reality istobenon-vague(in assum positionally non-vague.The e i thing anobject.Andthisis ght beasim e thing thatcausesanon- p apart from les them e herethatthereisno s of p ly notwhatobjects vagueness e p ntal properties u selves arenot lification, but st dependon them thatis , since
CEU eTD Collection Now Idonotthinkthatonesim one sim say howm challenge atall,itisalsoaforthenon-redundantaccountofobjects.W also non-vague.Iwouldnotbeinclinedtosay whether let usm see kind ofem m us seewhathappenswhenweapplythisde vague term The lattercannotaccom things. Theform concepts betweenthecausaleffectiveness to thechargeofvaguenessaswell.Hence the difference? of sim step asm window. Nowwetakeanothersim the window.Nowwetakeonesim sim e ntal distinction.Inordertom ilar tothefam where p Regardless ofdisagreeingwithMerricks’ The conclusionisthenthefollowing:effectivenessaccountofobjectsfallsprey les isnotabletoshatterthewindow.Butagain-thereasinglesim p a the number le couldm a ke theseassum thisem ny tim ergentism s. And a ny sim es aswelike.Surelywillrichthepointinwhichrem er isquitehappywithvague ergentism vice versa iliar SoritesParadox.W p a les areactuallycausingthe ofsim betweentherealm ke adifferenceastowh m p tions forthesakeof odate anyvagueness.Non-vagueterm canarise. p . les thatareactuallycausi p a le couldactua ke hisview p le away,andanother,another.Andwerepeatthis p le away,a ofthe e haveaclum 39 finition todifferentaccountsofthephysical- account andthejoint-in-natureof it seem ether thewindowcouldbeshatteredornot. coherent,Merricksm physical andtherealm num so. Iwouldrathersaythatifvaguenessisa theargum shattering. Thiswouldbepossibleonlyif lly m nd theclum definition ofcom ber ofatom s thattherecannotbeanybridging a ke thisdifference.Thecasehereis ng theshatteringofwindowis p ofsim ent. Theproblem p isstillabletoshatterthe s beingcausallyeffective. s cannotbetranslatedin p p les thatactuallyshatter lex physicalobjectslet ofm u st saythatthereisa e ntal. Nowletus hereisrather p le thatm a ining clum e cannot a kes p CEU eTD Collection – Physical-MentalEmergentist Em com different kindofem between therealm whole em arises betweentherealof thephysicaland physical properties,whichistherequirem the realm em Theref physical propertiesofparts.Buttheclaim of physicalproperties:properties latter sortofreducibilityisth properties arereducibletoofatom properties instantiatedbycom will havetosaythatm em any waybyanythinglikesum emergent properties ofthem holism ergentism ergentism ergentism p lex m ore thesortof : To avoidanyconfusion,letusdistinguish If onebelievesthatofthefi A friendofEm onem properties,sincetheycannotbereducedto ofthephysical).Them ergentism a terial objectsiscorrect,wehavetosaysom . thatarisesbetweentheconstitu , AfriendofStrongReductionism andPropertyDualism u st saythatm a ofthem ny sim , andphysical-m ergentism ergentism em e ntal propertiesinstantiatedbyhum p ergentism le objects.Thisis e whole-partreducibilitythatissupposedtoholdintherealm e m p e ntal andthereal com lex physicalobjects,buthewillhavetodenythatthelatter ntal propertie a ), wouldrathersaythat the , tion e whichinourterm ntal propertie e ) of propertiestheparts.Thisisacasepart-whole that istrue, s intopl ental e herem the realm nt ofStrongReductionism 40 we canhaveherewillbethepart-whole em ent atom s ofacom to saythatpropertiesofacom one m s thatcom ay. Assum wholesaresupposedtobereducible s ofcom ergentism (callhim m rst threeviews(StrongReductionism u between twokindsofem ofthephysicalwebelievetobetrue, st bethatsuchreductionisnotpossible. inology isthesortofem ofthem u propertiesofitsparts,orobtainedin s andthecom st becom e p thing alongthefollowinglines. lex objectm p pose thesecom .
i Dependingonwhichrelation ng thatMerricks’definitionof lex objectarenotreducibleto Merricks -StrongReductionist e ans arereducibletophysical ntal (letuscallhim real superveniencebase for m itted toacertainkindof p lex object(stillwithin . u st bereducibletoits p ergentism lex objects.The p ergentism lex objectare
Merricks : part- that ) ,
CEU eTD Collection necessary forouraccountofthephysical-m m the onehand,andem between physicalpropertiesofthepartsand If hesaysthattheyarenotreducible,we that physicalpropertiesofacom m a m im em be em the com supervenience basewereeitherphysicalproper objects aretobeem properties. W even suchalooserelationasem They canexistorbeinstantiatedbyanobject no reducibilitybetweenphysicalandm em will suf Dualism between theform that itcaninstantiatebothphysicalandm e e ply thatactualsim ergentism ergentism ntal propertiesofthecom ntal propertiesarephysicalof e ntal propertyis,andregardless ofhowva ergent inanysense,theonlyviab Can suchaviewbereasonably held? In caseofPropertyDualism f p viewisthatphysicalandm i ce here,andsothef lex object.Hereitseem withintherealm thatholdswithintherealm h ere doesem er twoviews(StrongReducti p les –thepartsm ergent, thenwhatis ergentism ergentism ofthephysical.W p r iend of lex objectonth p betweenphysi s thatifthe lex objectare itm com ergentis e Em e ntal ntal properties. u of u st havem have acaseofdoubleem e st becl erge intoplayhere? propertiesarenotrelatedonthisview m e Ireally 41 ntal enta a com m le kindofem physical propertiesofthecom independently ofeachother,sotospeak.Not e their base?Onthetwoform m ntism ispossiblebetweenthesetwosortsof ntal propertiesalone.Butthisinturnwould onism reducible tophysicalpropertiesofitsparts. e guely itsconcepthasbeen putforwardso e otherhand.However,thisclaim properties.Now,anim ties oftheparts,orphysicalproperties cal propertiesofthecom l em ntal propertiesofacom aim h at e p doubtso.Itratherseem ntal propertiesaswell. canclaim lex object.Hem iscrucialforthisvi e ergentism andEm d thatonlyacom Ifm ergentism ergentism thatthereisnopart-whole . e Onelevelofem ntal propertiesofcom ergentism i ght orm isthepart-whole p ) portant difference ew isthatthere andtheProperty p lex objectissuch lex objectareto p s thatwhatever lex objectand p : em er viewsthe lex objecton i ght notsay ergentism ergentism isnot at all p lex .
CEU eTD Collection si properties onthePropertyDualism Ho t phy part-whole em spirit ofthePropertyDualism seem f 16 be i Dualism atoms com there wouldbenoreasontoaccepttheexisten effective. Otherwisethecom requirem problem properties thatwoulddoforasupervenienceba sim opposed tothecom problem The part-wholeem bridging relationbetweenthem objects really.Thereisthephysicaland bearer ofthephysicalpropertiesand for m physical sim h a Thi m ere i r, itis wev p n si p l st p cal e s le m so.Thephysical-m s e ant lex m di l –objectswhosem e at ntal propertiesasdisplayedbyhum a si r, ifwestillwan accountthephysicaland Is thenem It seem st spl i l isthatinordertoaccom withm a m rem e east e t not a nt thesim e ntal propertieswouldbe.Icannotrea p y d i e l i e ntal properties. onerel p ng am a som andam ndependent rk m les ergentism s thatasim 16 e i ntal atom e ght . e ergentism a thing thatcanbeinstantiated nt p t ergentism e i p t beabi on bet lex m al nt to le m propert al l ad y propert . Herewehaveacaseof isnotviableeither e h ental em w e ntal orquasi-m e ilar problem e t ntal properties,or at een phy ntal properties,would s isthatitnot re to atallpossibleonthePropertyDualism y account,wewillhave oddswi wouldleadagain .
viewtobindphys p
y lex m th m ofany . Andthisis e e claim si ntal propertiesdonotdependin ergentism cal t h e ki andm what m ntal pr arisesfortheSubstanceDualism nd real th odate ental pr at th an beings.Nootheroptionseem hasbeensai e nt 42 is , sinceitwouldleadtoanoddideaof theirbearerswouldhavetobecausallynon- exclusion operties wouldbesim l howthephysical-m ere are y al clear whatthesim this viewwithMerricks’causalefficacy m . Excl propert toadm not aviableoption,sinceitisagainstthe lly thinkofanyexam ofthem se forcom ical andm ce ofthecom operties wouldm e to thebizarreideaofm be, andinturn–whatthebearersofsuch ntal substance,andtherecannotbeany by suchm no usi bet d i it thatthereisnothingoddin a physical rel on i before,nam e s ont w a t s een t e i qui ons bet ntal propertiesaretwodifferent e p h ntal propertiesinanyway.The lex m e Propert any wayoneachother,andsocan t h i e nute objectsasourf e phy ast p lex objectsthatinstantiate w e p l een phy e a y rong rel ental em le m ntal properties.Another ke asuperveniencebase si t h p y cal at account? ples ofsim Dual ly redundant,andso ont propert e si account.Herethe ntal properties,as a t e cal s possiblehere. i i h s ntal atom on, Iwoul ergentism m e Propert andm account y ofbei Itdoesnot p e le m nt y d say ng a a .
mental al s. One m fails.
e iliar ntal . So CEU eTD Collection the object,orbetweenphysicalandm there m hum em that inordertom properties ism argum are notelim hum claim substance. ButinMerricks’argum go together:wheneverthereisam argum of theotherisafailurefrom argum Substance Dualism hum properties isonhisviewam existence ofhum Dualist. Butifthisisreallythecase,thenIcannotseehowMerrickscanarguefor is neither.T.Sider(indiscussion)hassugge Property andSubstanceDualism two viewsthatallowforsuchsituations: ergentism ans havem an beingarenotderivable ans arecom e ent. However,onehas thesegoodreasonsonlyinsofarasonebelieves that ent thatm ent isbyanappealtoexternalguara d thatallMerricks’argum Is Merrickshim W u st besom h ich ofthesefourviewsconcerning . inated togetherwiththe othercom Ifm o e a st com p ntal properties,itonlyfollows kes anattem ans ascom lex physicalobjects,butthat e a e viewthereisagapbetween sortofem ke anyuseoftheargum ntal propertiesinstantiatedbyacom s p elf aStrongReductionistor atible withMerricks’ itsverybegi p e p ergentism ntal substance.If lex t toproveexistenceofanythem from accountsthereisnoroom physical e ent nosuchguarantorisavailable.Stillitm physicalpropertiesofthatobject’sconstituentparts, ntal subs ent issupposedtoshownotthatwecan e eith ntal pr nning. Theonlywaytom Strong Reductionism objects,ifthesubstancethatunderliesm 43 er betweenphysicalpropertiesofthepartsand tance, thereisalsoacorrespondingphysical ntor duetowhom argum ent onehastoadhereacertainkindof operties oftheobjectitself.Thereareonly sted thatMerricksisactuallyaSubstance theSubstanceDualism we havegoodreasonstobelievethatthey thetwosubstances,anditseem that theyarem relations betweenphysicalandm p lex physicalthingsby the exclusion an Em ent f o forem ergentist? p r RestrictedNihilism lex m thetwosubstancesalways andEm e ergentism onthebasisofexistence a ntal substances.Onthe terial objectsuchasa a W ke ashiftinanysuch viewistrue,andif e ergentism ll, itseem atall. ? prove s thatany Itseem . s thathe Onthe i ght be e e that ntal ntal s CEU eTD Collection properties thatcannotbereducedtoof existence ofcom properties. TakeStrongReductionism off ifcom Merricks’ argum Substance Dualism 17 relative m m object’s constituentparts,andaresuchthathum certain levelofphysicalcom em it certainthattheyareonlythem Merricks saysthathum all thattheseem of m are takenasactinginconcert.SofarIhave
properties have som conscious objectaswell.Soitispossible, sim think thatthisshouldbereadas“anobject so accordingtohim Li ean thatwhateverinstantiatesthesecom ergent p ke t e les alikeinthespatiotem ntal properties.Merricksspeaksofthem h It seem e popul 17 e physical e thing thatinstantiatesonlytheco ntal propertiesalsoexists b . ined withadifferentview ar Zom s thenthatMerricks’argum ent. p ergent causallyeffectivepropertiesare lex physicalobjectsbecause istrue.Andsoallwho properties thatarecausallyeffective–theappearona b itisnotthecasethatif i e exam ans causethingsinvirtue pl e. p
lexity, arenotdi poral andcau e ntal propertie ? Merricksrejectstheprincipleof forinst ent f p lookingattheStrongReductionism on therelationbetweenphysicalandm instantiating m do notsharethisbeliefrem le 44 been speakingoftheseem som sal relationsbindingthem x physicalpropertiesanddoesnotinstantiate in o m rectly derivablefrom s? r ance. W ans dothingsinvirtueof thism of p theirconstituentparts,eveniftheseparts Restricted Nihilism Allthisdoesnotexcludetheexistenceof e they displaysom lex physicalproperties,butnotm sim theseem a p nner aswell.Butitisnotcertainat les com e aresupposedtobelieveinthe e ntal properties”)thenanyother ergent properties.Butstill–is only pose aconsciousobject(I them e physicalpropertiesof wouldbem em ergent propertiesas a wouldcom Consciousness in unconvincedby them ergent properties, e ntal properties. . W account,to u ould that ch better pose a e e and ntal ntal CEU eTD Collection properties. Andthenitissom emergent the existenceofcom due toinstantiating m instantiating em existence areem Nihilism (actually –onesuchobject).Thiswayoranot about existenceisasortofNihilism about existence,accordingtowhichthereexis is com whole world(ifweagreethatthereissuch according towhichtheonlycom level ofcom single physicalparticles.Moreover,itm single partsalone:propertieslikecoloursor instantiated onlybycom lead toacceptingitinothercasestoo?After level ofm that Merrickswouldaccept.Inprinciple,we m o a tter f re objectsthatMerricks would liketoaccept. p Therefore ifthisisallaboutinstantiati Perhaps itshouldbem Should wethenworrythatacceptingem atible withonlyoneanswertoth o , r theexistence,thenIam properties(m andwecannotsay a terial com position, andsowem ergent properties. ergent emergent mental position. p lex physicalobjects:instantiating ental orphysical).Merricksstrictlyspeaksonlyofem mental p lex m a e de clearintheargum properties.Ifthesearereallyem how a that hum p terial objects, surewe lete accountof u st , , not assumed since take intoaccountthepossibilityof i e SpecialCom ght any ans areinanyway anobjectlikethewholeworld).GlobalHolism canhavem it allowsonlyforobjectswithoutproperparts 45 bethecasethatem can havephysicalem em her, itseem all, therem ng em that thepropertiesm ts onlyonetotalthing:theworld.Monism physical resistancecannotbeascribedto propertiesthatcannotbeinstantiatedby er However,existentialdifference m ergent properties.If propertiescanbegiveninterm gentism ergent properties,wewillhavem ent itselfwhatism a position Question,nam ny m mental i s thatwecannothaveRestricted inonecaseofcom ght bem o re com ergentism properties orinstantiating special ergent propertiesonany a ergent propertiesthat ny propertiesthatare p thisisthecasethen lex m withrespectto a o tter f occurson re im Global Holism a terial objects position will e o ly Monism portant for r hum s ofthe i ght be ergent every ans’ a ny ,
CEU eTD Collection other isthatitdoesnotseem here: oneisthatthisdefinitionofobjects has alreadybeensaidbefore:thisisnotwhat object issom com whenever theyareinstantiated,thereisan properties m m of m the existenceofwholeassom is awholecom m wants tosaythatthe accepted bysom Merricks wouldhavetosaythatm 18 other words,Ishallsaythatitisthe Mereological Nihilism reifying m argum property instantiatedat the placeoccupiedby to existenceofcertainobjects perform properties. Existenceof
e e a P. nt ny ntal propertiescanbeascribed i p van oned al e ent lex objectexistsonlyinvirtueofinst ntal properties? x s actinginconcert,andnotonlybyasinglecom The questionhereiswhethertheexisten There isatendencyinphilosophytoarguefrom thecom from isenoughtoenablethem Inwagen so i i e i n ght beascribedalso(or thing thatinstantiatesatleast n Kri posed ofparts,andthatthisw st argues p ant e lex. SofarIhavebeenfollowi s one whotakesthethreatof M i a t c i Ithinkthatthereare Dani x i ng anat ) n s com tocollectionsof the
t h i el s m ’s “B x s, togetherwithsufficientorganisationandfunctionstheycan pose afurtherobject toooddtosay a
u nner from ral 18 rut . However,itseem propert to e a only thing over l Si e collectively nt x m tocom s, takentogether,thatareabletoinstantiatem t p al propertiesareinsom sim y h l e (i i nki s”, unpubl only stillsusceptibletothevaguenessobjection.The n Lewi 46 one m p ng t objectsare.Actuallytworem antiating m and aboveitspartsnecessaryforinstantiation object no plausiblereasonstoclaim les thatdonotcom that m p hole isabearerofm –tom lex objects.ActuallyIshallclaim m ce ofphysical-m ng Merricks’assum o instantiate m exi s’ sense)t e e i in virtueof s taphysical vaguenessseriously.Ifone ntal property.HereIcanonlysaywhat thatinstantiatesthem hed). x s e s thatthiswayofarguingcannotbe t s, onewillhavetoaccept thewhole ntal propertiescanbeinstantiatedby e nce oft p lex object instantiationofcertainproperties a e ke thisclaim ntal properties.Or:acom o
h e t e t h ntal properties. thefactthatthereisanew e ental em e h pose anyf exi i respects nkers (1990,pp.115-23).An . p
e s tion thatthereactually t ntal properties.Butis e nce com ergentism of a . Onceagain:a u special rks areinorder thatem rther object.In an p atible with i ndi thatthese justifies ,
vi so that ergent dual posite e ntal
i s
CEU eTD Collection definitely donotinstantiateanym properties stillinstantiated? properties stillinstantiated?Nowletustake instantiate som particles thatallegedlycom Another aspectofthisproblem particle actuallym which exactly bunch ofm exactly which any f object com instantiating apropertycanbevaguesom if annihilated oneafteranother,andsotherew This couldbef vague whetheranynewpropertyisinstantia Vagueness ofinstantiationleadsheretovague virtue ofinstantiatinganewproperty,ther problem analogue onthesideofcom both sides:onthesideofcom problem existence. Ifonedoesnot believeinexistenceofanythingoverand above the thelum u rther objectinordertocollectively
The problem ofvaguenessconcernsonly instantiationofanewproperty.Itissom concernsthe p posed exactlyofgiven e of taphysically vagueobjectsinone’s com x particlesstillinstantiatesth e s instantiatetheproperty.Sopr m o r instancethecasewhenconstitutiveparticlesof a e p kes thedifference? ntal properties.Nowletustakeawayoneparticle–arethem lex objectinstantiatesagiven ofvaguenessdoesnotthreaten existence Andsoon.Finally pose ahum p lex objectsism p isthefollowing:giventhat le ofcom x objectsandonthesideof e ntal prope x
s. Itisthenagenuineexam an body.Le p lex objects,sinceone e stantiate anewproperty,itm 47 tim ill beam e propertyof o ted ataplacewhichisoccupiedbysom e existsanewobject(acom re rties. Butwhereistheborderline?W es awayanotherparticle–arethem ness ofexistence.Som ontology.Itisbecauseitm we willendupwithasetofparticlesthat threatening.Afterall,herethevagueness , itisvaguewhetherthereacom oblem t usassum theexistenceofcom property. Takeforinstanceasetof o m ofvaguenesshasitsanalogueson e nt inwhichwecannotbecertain “beingatable”ornot.Butif e thattheseparticlesjointly x m s donothavetocom x i ght wanttosaythatin s. Butitseem ple ofvagueness atablearebeing e i tim p ght bestillvague lex objectsonly. es itm i ght bevague p e tim lex object). s thatthe es vague i x ght be s, the e e e pose h p ntal ntal
ich lex x s.
CEU eTD Collection m does Merricks-whenhe suggeststhatthere them say thatthisbaseballwasnothingm possible worlds,nowandinallpastfuture not abletosurviveanychangeofitsparts survive anysuchchange–theywouldnotbe to survivechangeof som here: thebaseball(if what itsconstituentatom the Overdeterm taking partsandwholes,orobjectsevents on, inm convinced byexclusionargum argum existence isvagueduetovaguenessofinstantiationanewproperty. which involved, aretoointim The relationsthatpartsbeartothewhole, overdeterm different causesthatareabletobringaboutthesam ean justthis:thatthebaseball isableto e selves, orelse:nothingdifferentfrom thing ent forNihilism One waytoanswerthisquestionissaythatthebaseballsom Let usthinkofthisproblem One m x s collectivelyinstantiateanewproperty. y opinion,som in addition i nation israised.W o re rem ination Argum itexists)anditsconstituen itsconstituentatom toitsconstituentatom a isagoodargum ate tosaythatwehaveinfact rk aboutMerrick’sargum e s do.Soitisassu far-fetchedphilosophicalthinking.Thisthinkingconsistsin ent Merrickssaysthatthebaseballiscausallyirrelevantto e ents atall.Anyargum ll, inm from o re and y ent. Ther opi aslightly s, while thes survive changesthatthe atom 48 s? nion, therearenotwodifferentcausesreally. m or objectsbeartoeventsinwhichtheyare – ifitwascom the same m above, ornothingdifferentfrom e inwhichtheseobjectsareinvolvedastwo tim e atom d som t atom i ght beboth:theatom ent is eason forthisisquitegeneral–Iam these es) ofexactlythesam differentangle.Inthefirstprem two But thereisnothingsuchthatits e ent from inorderhere:Idonotthinkthathis e s. Butwhatwouldbethebaseballas s inthisparticulararrangem effect.Thisishowtheproblem how thatwehavegottwoentities atom constituentatom
different s af posed (inthisworldandall overdeterm ter all.If causes. s andthebaseball-
e thebaseballwas e s arenotableto thing thatisable s arenotableto i atom nation isbased theatom s, Iwould e nt. But ise of not of s CEU eTD Collection different survivalandidentityconditionsis things shattering thewindow.Hedoesnotstrictlysay entities: thebaseballanditsconstituentatom it inaparticularm replacem survive? Doesheactuallysaythatthebaseball does notspeakoftwodiffe really twodifferentthingshere:thebaseba if youarereluctanttom relation isavailableincase ofthepoisoning thought offorinstanceasbeingatsom baseball areboundwithsom are and thebaseballitsconstituentatom different. Thereis overdeterm able tobringaboutthesam poisoning atexactlythesam the shot,sothatiftheydidnotdiefr im talking aboutoverdeterm identity conditions,thenIcannotseeanygoodreasonforhavingtwothingshere. agine som related Perhaps am Now, inm because ent ofallitsconstituentatom inthewaythatpoisoningandshooting arenot.Theatom i nation. e one whodiesfrom they havedifferentsurvivalandidentityconditions.Perhapshaving y a difference opinionthecasewithbaseballanditsconstituentatom o o re generalobservationaboutove m e nt canbringabout? i x thingsandevents).Nothing evenrem i nation, acertainkind rent thingsbeingthere e e tim e betweenthepoisoningandshootingononehand, thing wecancalla effectatth shotintheh e theyactually s iscausallyirrelevanttowhattheatom om e s onth tim ll andtheatom shooting,theywouldundoubtedlydiefrom 49
and theshooting(or poison andthebullet I doubtit.Merricksspeaksoftwodifferent ead, butwhohasbeengivenapoisonpriorto e sam already im e as som s, e other.Surelytheatom an im diedfrom asof of exam that theycanbetakenastwodifferent because e constitution relation rdeterm tim e proper partofeachother.Nosuch thing thatisabletosurvivegradual twodif plied intheclaim theyhavedifferentsurvivaland e. Thisisastandardcaseof ple isusuallypresented:letus s. Perhapsnot.ButifMerricks shooting.Eachcausealoneis i nation isinorderhere.W f o e tely sim rent possiblecausesof s andthebaseball whichm ilar canbindthe thatthereare s com s is
s andthe entirely i posing ght be h en
CEU eTD Collection Merricks’ exclusionargum whole itselfareoneandthesam following: asfarcausalefficacyiscon shattering ofthewindow.Inth overdeterm perhaps tosee m shooting. ThisiswhyIthinkthatMerri could havesom things whentheircausalpowersareconcerned.As as longtheirm m atom one hand,bytheeventofshatteringth overdeterm poisoning andtheshooting.ThereforeIcannotr 20 19 atom any baseballtherewithoutbeingitsc unintelligible tom shattering. PerhapsIshouldsaythatwhatm tim here asi Nihilist wouldsaythatthere are the Seeal Thel a o ke anyappealingcaseforNihilism m e –therecannotbetwodifferentthingsther s (arrangedbaseball-wise)w s ontheother.Perhapsthereissom e nt Icannotseeanydepthofthisproblem a so T.Si f t At anyrate,evenforsom My conclusionisthenthefollowing:therenothingproblem Ibel t e r i s i i ofcourset i nation oftheeventshatteri nation, atleastincasesliketh e der (2003b)forsi ved i why e one dyingfrom n odal propertiesareconcerne exi e otherpeoplecouldbeattractedbythisview. isthatonecausecouldnot h s e caseprovi t e nce ofcom ent isnotableto m i
l atom a e caseofthepart-wholeoverdeterm r rem e ded t p cause theshooting e ithout therebeinganybaseball l s withouttherebeingthebaseball. e one whobelieve x object a h rks about at webel 20 . ButnonethelessIthinkitisworthm . e ng ofthewindowcausedbybaseballon s. cks argum thi e windowcausedbythebaseball’sconstituent cerned, partsthatcom 50 overdet i e baseballanditsconstituentatom onstituent atom e ng thatIam save hum d, butitseem a ve i e thatcouldactasindependentcausesofthe kes Merrickscaseofoverdeterm existwithouttheother:therecouldnotbe . W without them eally seewhythereshouldbeaproblem n exi erm s inefficiencyofexclusionargum e fixedtothisworldandparticular m ent from s t i e nat an beingsfrom i nce ofcom ght havetwodifferentthingsthere i m on. s thattherearenotwodifferent s, andtherecouldnotbeany i ssing here,butatthepresent beingpoisonedpriortothe overdeterm Forthesakeofsim
19 p l . W e pose thewholeand i x object nation Iwanttosaythe h elim ereas obviouslyyou s. TheM i nation doesnot ination. Onthe p atic about licity Ispeak i e s causing e nation so ntioning, reol ogi ents, cal of
CEU eTD Collection objects. However,asIclaim say thatthiscriterionofexistenceallowsforunacceptablevagueexistence. other hand,itisinstantiatingm m em one hand,iftheargum p.73). Theargum objects likelivingorganism whole hum chairs andtables,therearenotevenarm Therefore, accordingtovanInwagen,ther the am plausible criteriaform (1990, pp.56-97).VanInwagenstartshisconsider collectively, andsothatthereisnoreasontopostulateexistenceofanyfurtherobjects. part-whole em and sothatwem instantiates part-wholeem a ong allegedparts)asleadingtocounter-int ergent propertiesisareasontoreifyth terial objects,orjustforonecom x s com
The m Another argum Either waywecannothavehum an bodiesandotherlivingorganism pose som a ergent propertiesandm in argum ent canbestatedasfollows: u st becom e thing ifandonlyactivityofthe ent f ent worksforsom 2.1.2. a ent forrestrictingNihilism terial com ergent propertiesor o s isthat“youand m r RestrictedNihilism , itisnotcertain “To BeIsToALivingThing” itted totheirex e ntal propertiesth position ( p lex m e ntal e s ans as com a 51 e arenosuchcom e wholes)itworkseitherform nd feetofhum like: contact,fastening,cohesion,andfusion a I existandwearecom properties canbeinstantiatedbytheparts istence assinglecom terial object,whichistheworld.If,on s, aswellsim uitive results.Theproposedsolutionisthat m p at allthatinordertohavesom e lex m at m ntal propertieswem the onlycom
has beenpresentedbyP.vanInwagen sothatitacceptsonlysuchcom ations from a a kes theexistentialdifference,thenI terial objects(ifinstantiatingsom x s constitutesalivingorganism an bodies.W p rejectingsom p les thatconstitutethem p lex (non-vague)m lex physicalobjectslike p posite objects”(1990, lex objects.Isaythat u st reifythewholes, h at thereare,are a e ny com intuitively e thing that a posite terial p
. lex e .
CEU eTD Collection
dif with theexistenceof certainty of cogito be arguedfor,andnotpresupposed. claim extended thingarejustthesam although asgivenunderdifferentaspects.Theid existence isbeingaf com but towhatwecancall,followingtheCartes thinking object,ofwhom the argum thinking (“Ithink,thereforeIam its certaintyf and thesecondprem f i p culties. Mym lex physicalobjectthathasgotparts,a bearsastrongcom prem Theref However, itseem Therefore, Ishallclaim Still, onem On theotherhand,“I”from ent istrueonthebasisofim the ise, isthebearerofm ore: 3)Nihilism r om cogito certaintyof a 2) 1) I in objectionisthattheterm i f ght wanttosaythatthetw ise. Thefirst i a rm prem I haveparts material exist ed inthe itcanbeundoubtedlyassertedthatexists. m s thatthisargum itm ise canbetransferredto theconclusionconcernedexclusively isf ent toacertain thattheonlyreasonabl one’sexistence,whichisrootedincertaintyof e com thinggiven cogito ”). Consequentl a prem lse sincethereisatleastonecom thesecondpr e ntal proper p lex object.W ise shouldbereadasthe prem ent againsttotalNihilism 52 po ise. ian tradition,an“extendedobject”.Thisisa theoryofm ssibility ofdoubtingit,then“I”referstoa under differentdescriptions.However,this nd assuchisnotreallythethingwhose ties. Itrem “I”changesitsref ea herem em y, wecansaythatifthefirstprem o usesof“I”refertothesam ise doesnotrefertoathinkingobject, e cannotsim e ref i i a nd-body identity,whichshould ght bethatthethinkingand e ins am rent of cogito p ly takefor “I”,if e y p rent betweenthef stery tom lex m facessom prem itisusedinthe a terial object ise: itderives granted e howthis e serious e thing, one’s ise of that i rst CEU eTD Collection m com “I” whichinthef
constituent sim “artefacts” (non-livingcom pp.115-123). Heisquitehappytoadm entirely dif probably thesearethecom som with hum a singleobject.VanInwagenpopulatesthedom other activitiesperf able toactcollectively x the thinking,theyareabletodisposeofsom objects, whichisnotacceptable.AndsoIam And likeinothercasesof reifying som reifying them dam sending inform s, andsoon. a terial objectbyclaim e p a thing aboutholisticnatureoflivingorga ged parts,exchangingandthelike.Thism lex object.Thisissom Van Inwagenm But still–isthisreason Moreover, itseem an beings,butwithalllivingorganism f e e rent incaseof . arrangem p ation from les, andassuchdonotreally i orm rst prem e e a d bylivingorganism i nts sim kes anattem ng thatonlya do thethinking thissort–onewillf s thatnotonlythinkingandotherm onepartofthebody thinking(andotherm e ise ref thing thatneedstobeproved. p p lex objects)are licated functionsthatlivingorganism good enough p ly e rs tothe because p t tobind . Thinkingrequiresasingleobject. unitary it thatallactivitiesperform 53 e ? quitehappytoadm theyareabletoinstantiateanewproperty.
s are Inm of them require existenceof thinking subjectalsostandsforam i nally enduppostulatingexistenceof objectisabletoperform nism in factperform ain ofcom to another,reactingpain,rebuilding e y so specialthattheyrequireexistenceof s afterall.Itseem the thinkingobjectwithcom ntal activitiestoo).Herethe opinionthisisjustanotherinstanceof s thatiscrucialforexistence.Most andreplacesom i ght seem p lex m e ntal activities,butalsoall it thatthe e asingleobject.Butitis d collectivelybytheir likeagoodreasonfor a terial objectsnotonly e s canperform e s thenthatthereis d bywhathecalls ofthem thinking(1990, x s areabletodo withother x s arenot vague a , terial like p lex
CEU eTD Collection existence), butwehaveevenbetterr reasons forbelievingthatMereologicalNi charge ofvaguenessexistence.W vague num Inwagen’s), sincetheystillacceptexistence one cannotbeconvincedbytheargum approach hassom m scientif m from view isperfectlyagreeablewithscience.Th accept vaguenessofexistence),youcannotrestrictitonlyto Nihilism charge ofvaguenessexistenceisnotta to believeinexistenceofsom justify MereologicalNihilism for Nihilism than vanInwagen.Merricksdoesnotuseargum least som e e taphysics (forsom taphysical theories,itm thelackofobjectionsfrom
ic approach.Obviously,wedonotwa
Som At anyrateitseem shouldreallybean e com ber ofsim e inthefirstplace.VanInwagendoes:heem peopletrytom posite objectsexist).StillMerricksseem e influenceonm e p goodreasonsitisbetter to les. Infact,one s thatif u st benoticedthat 2.2. all ornothing andthenhesays a e ke acasef m ascientific onetakesthe ArgumentFromScience e e reologica taphysical theories.This influenceisapparentinthe easons forrestrictingit(becauseis h ents for at they could saythattheseargum ken seriouslyenough,Iwouldsay.Mereological o gam r Mere 54 e argum lly f Mereological Nihilism stance. Ifscienceistohaveanybearingon reallysayisthefollowing:wehavegood Restricted Nihilism hilism of com nt tom charge ofvaguenessexistenceseriously, that inspiteoftherearegoodreasons e : ifyoubelieveinit(becausedonot ents from u keep them ological Nihilism zzy objects.Thisisinconsistency.The ent from istrue(becauseofvagueness p a lex objectsthatarecom s m ke scienceanultim existentialvaguenesstoargue ploys existentialvaguenessto apart).However,thescientific o some scienceisratheranargum re consistentinhisenterprise com (bothMerricks’andvan ents sim iscom byclaim p lex objects. p p evident atible withthe ate guidef ly i ng thatthis ignore posed of thatat the ent o r CEU eTD Collection physical com object q from structured m such system nature, arrangem so-called “holisticsystem sense priortotheirconstituents.Couldthatreally bethecase? existence ofsuchsystem fact thatwehesitatetoendor 22 21 opinion, areasonwhyoneshould prefer that thereisasetof Set galaxies. Yetitseem various properties,thetheoriessaysom m m scientif solely interm reference tocom arrangem replaced byterm objects inallscientificstatem seem is aqualifiedversionofNihilism at all. m u Qu u acroscopic physicalobjects.Apartfrom odern science. a The ch enoughi s n ofsi tificatio s possiblethatperhaps an statesofsystem i
on l tifyin a ic theories.MereologicalNihilism A possibleobjectiontoMereologicalNihilism It istruethatourcurrentscientif t m t t e o e p r
t l nts of n g p h e exam o s bel o lexes. e s arelivingorganism n a v ordert whol nner, orentangledsystem v e s of e r setsreallyco pl r arran ong t x p e i e e s allowstoparaphraseexpressionscont lex objects s referringtosim the nt andinteractionsam project s o x o ci expl s s thatthesedescriptionscan g adi s thatcom e is t x e m d by we s -particles.Theideahereisth ai e n
fferent s provesthatthew of n o n t donot s”, thatallegedly t t s an m to paraphrasi J.Schaffer(2007).Exi h , 21 se m m according ei
sayth . ont it o d r behavi setsd ents (andperhapsinordinarylanguageaswell)canbe knowevery pose them e n ol s thatareable Monism taphysical theoriesthatar e ogi to ng, nam at th p o th our. B cal e les or to s n inqua e ex e cat ere isa thing aboutplants,anim toNihilism which o ong particlesthatconstitutethem t u e t co isten is egory 22 hi l t ic 55
y t holes –thesesystem ng about . Som cannot beexplainedpurelyinterm t h arrangem n forces, influences,andrelationshipam ntum notatheorythatwouldbecontestedby h i t there existonlyonesim theories em ce o s rad at doesnot t toreplacetheirpartsinanorganisedand s physical objectcom t i h betranslatedintodescriptionsexpressed e i t an com nce ofsuchent ct Mereo f com m , e sets? whereMonism peoplem ent echanics, whosestateisnotderivable
m m e m a Ifth nts ofsim i p ngl i aining pluralpredicatesand t at allterm ght beraisedduetobehaviourof l s ean t l e onet o x phy ed sy ploy descriptionsinterm g e seriouslyatoddswithcurrent is th i cal h at i o ght beinclinedtosaythat a si st evenm Nih suchknowl ngl is cal em als, m s –areintheontological e case, posed ofthese
in p ed sy ilism object p s –ort s ref les. Quantifyingover le: theworld.However,it fact asortofNihilism o i
re dubi st th as nerals, planetsand e em s. en rring tocom h e it at Therefore dge
s i th is . Exam wedonot ous object ere s p , i i r s x esen
n s. Butdoes not m Schaffer’s i s ofthe g
ted ples of t possi h o t
s t adm
know b s of p h ong e –it lex e h
bl re. an an i e t
CEU eTD Collection
an analogybetween explanatory som present stateofknowledgewecannotexplain “holistic system and thisiswhatIactuallybelievetobethe there arenocom priority does than theirparts,existinthedeepontologicalsense. explanatorily, butalsoexistentiallypriortoth does. Incaseof But thisinourterm reason forAtobeexplainablesolelyinterm of entangledsystem there isnosuchpossiblestateofknowledgeth entangled system not ableto“foresee”whatitsfuturestat that giventhewholepresentset-upof thousand yearsafterhum in principle,andanexam explainable orknowableinprinciple.Therem e thing m If theholisticsystem It seem There canbetwopossibleanswerstothis priorityofthewholesover o not re tobeknownaboutthepartsinorderexplainbehaviourofsuchsystem s thatwem s” isinprincipleexplainable inf p s isnotofsuchkind.Itseem elling reasonstobelievethat holisticsystem s. inology wouldm explanatory act entailexistentialpriority.It an racegoextinct,provi ple of i ght besom s existandarewhatwe and suchaf s thisw existential ean thatB the parts.Itm e tim act canbewhattheuniversewilllikeone universe andknowingallphysicallaws,oneis es willbelike.However,knowledgeofthe 56 es t ould m s by thebehaviouroftheirparts,butgiven case –isthatthebehaviourofso-called i e parts.Andinturn,th s thatwearenotinapositiontoknow of ght bethingsorfactsthatcannotknown at wouldallowustoexplainthebehaviour priority.Afterall–whatcouldbeabetter this isactuallythecase.Anotheranswer– oo hastyinsayingthatsom B,if curves natureatthejointsbetterthanA challenge. Oneistosaythatexplanatory ded thatdeterm it yet.Theideahereisthatthere m thinktheyare,m ean thatthewholesarenotonly i i ght betem notB’sexistentialpriorityoverA? ght betem p p inism ting tothinkthatthereis ting tothinkitdoes,but at thewholes,rather isnottrue,andso a ke acasefor e thing isnot s. CEU eTD Collection for herecanbesom interrelations am “holistic system f knowledge inwhichthisphenom knowledge inwhichsom have nowayofknowingthattherearesuch. such way.Thisdef explanation. Moreover,there though wecanknowthatsom we shouldbem that doesnotallowustoexplaincertainphenom one ofitsrivals–theinterpretationsaying there arenodeterm experim of knowledgeisim principle which saysthatitis The Heisenberg’sPrincipleism Uncertainty Principle,astheyarequitea 23 Un sam o Thi llowing claim certain e s tim form As appliedtoourproblem For som Entangled system e ty Prin , duetothenatureofquantum ntal apparatusisfarm e ul 23 at . TheCopenhagenInterpretationsaysthatsuchknowledgeisnotpossible i on canbet cip e : l s” cannotbeexplainedsolely reasonsthisinterpretationbecam o itisnotentirelycertainthat e. ong particlesthatconstitute re carefulinsayingthatso inate valuesofentangledsystem i e perfect, andthatwehopeto nitely thing like: not possible a ken asoneoft s arem e is thing is“unexplainable knowledgeaboutnature andbehaviourof
might be e thing x o -type particles,whenarranged enon canbeexplained. o st com toknowallvaluesofpropertiesthesystem o re advanced.TheCopenhagenInterpretationsaysthat of st oftendiscussedwithconnectiontoHeisenberg’s h e i is theholisticsystem phenom explainableinprinciplewithoutknowingitsactual d eas m only knownunderitsCopenhagenInterpretation, popular exam m associ 57 that itisonlyourpresentstateofknowledge echanic Because, forallweknow,m them m thenatureandbehaviourofso-called interm ena unexplainableinprinciple,butwecan e at ena -couldberuledout.Ishallclaim thing isinprincipleunexplainable,even findthisthingsoutinfuture,whenour ed wi e dom . Thesortofknowledgewearelooking in principle”,therem s tobeknown. s. Itdoesnotsaythatourpresentstate t h s ofthenature,arrangem t ple of“theunknowninprinciple”.
inant. ButIreallycannotseehow h e C s, thisideaboilsdowntothe openhagen i y -wise, behaveinsuchand n t e particles i rpret ght beastateof a a t i ny statesof on oft – the e nts and atthe h e that x in s, CEU eTD Collection and notaboutthe
sim like. Ishallclaim entangles system knowledge ofthenatureandbehaviour sufficient toknowhowthepartsoflivingor of option inthef existential andexplanatorypriorityoverever which saysthatthereisonlyonegenuine case wewillhavetoretreatanotherra having theparticlesalone,whatnatureandbe nature ofsom of quantum thenatureandbehaviourof p les. However, itstillm entangledsystem e o system llowing chapters. s willsufficetoknowwhatth y thatknowledgeaboutco s –thecom s isirrefutablyholistic i ght bepossiblethatallhasbeensaidhereaboutthenature s andlivingorgani p particlesconstitutingf lex objectsthatthe dical solution,nam 58 m , andthatthereisreallynowayofknowing, ganism thing–thewholeworld,whichhas ything else.Iwillendeavourtoexplorethis p particlesallegedlycom sm e natureandbehaviourofthesystem lexes isderivablefrom haviour ofasystem s isjustwrong.Itm x s allegedlycom s arerebuiltorhowtheygrow.Such o r instancelivingorganism e ly MereologicalMonism pose. Suchknowledge wouldbelike.Inthis i ght bethecasethat knowledgeabout posing quantum s willbe s are ,
CEU eTD Collection not abletodetect. less oneparticle.Adifferenceofparticle exist. Them Question choseUniversalism 24 you willnotbeabletoseethedi Som One reasonfortakinghum after all,adisciplinethathasquestionedtes senses inotherways)m som interact with “com It certainlydeniestheexistenceofm em everything (andcertainlyitdeniestheexistence Nihilism preference arenottooappealing.Them Seefori pirical way;theonlyobjectsthatrem e e how beingassum m phenom onsense ontology”. However, thisisnotthem Theref Most ofthepeoplewhooptforaradi isthatthelatterdeem n st ance: a m in reasonisthatexistential questionsarenotof ore MereologicalNihilism ena cannotbesim M e dium . Hel l A e -sized goodslikehouses,tables,chairs,andotherpeople.Itis e r (1990,p.49),D.Lewi u d thatwhateverisvi st exist.Butthiswayofreasoningseem RGUMENTS an sensesasabad astheonlyacceptabledoctrine
p ly fference betweenthetableatt 3.1. Implausibility ed im a C seen in reasonw HAPTER o o st a plausible, sinceitdeniestheexistenceof st . Youcanlookasthoroughlyyoulike,andyet in have is A (if notall)objectsrecognisedbytheso-called s (2001,pp.211-13); popular reasonforpreferringUniversalism GAINST tim 59 challenged bythef guide towhatexistsisthattheyare sible ortangible(orcaninfluencehum ony ofhum is sim sof hy oursensescannottelluswhatthings
of allobjectsthatcanbeconceivedinan cal answertotheSpecialCom III a p r astatusof ly som N IHILISM an sensestoquitealargeextent. T.Si
a kind e 24 thing thathum . However,reasonsforthis der (2003a,pp.120-25). s toonaïve.Philosophyis, 1 theoreticalentitiesonly). , andthesam act thatwecan thatcouldbeanswered
an sensesare e tableatt imperfect position see alm over and o an st 2 .
CEU eTD Collection house onthecorner”or “There aresom is toem are notim something to them belongs to,ifany.Definitelythereis with som m do. AllIwanttosayisthattheentitiesth we other people,etc.,whiletheydonotexist.How But Ishallclaim fortune, andsohavingthem inherited afortune,andspendthem there wereobjectswithoutbeing in fact Acting asif acting asif we cannot trying toprovethatthef given intheliteraturewhereauthor(whosenam
by em 25 of subject t e To st e i taphysical categorywethinktheybelongto. m pretend u ony s pirical testim e th . Andsothesam Now, Icannotagreewiththisconclusion.It There aretwopopularstrategiesofres som ofsenses,andarenot brace theobjectionandtosaythatour e e Kan taphysical categoryof e aginary entities. weinteractwith,clum thing cannottellyouanythingabout act onehadinheritedafortuneisnotrea our richaunthaddiedandweinher to interactwithsom e t h
tian i as if ng m thatitispossibletoactasiftherewerecertainobjectsliketables,chairs, d i o ony. Inthisrespecttheyare stin re t they existedwhiledonotexis ctio h at e a m m i n
s , anal th iliar m al u oney infact(unless st holdforth ey are ready
yt e i c thing im ps ofparticles, eith e cont a pri dium aginary entitiesinthewaychildrenonactorsstage er. Ev something understoodas ai o oney on ned i ri e -sized chairs synt en e objects,theauthorsays:youcannot n 60 ifn i het t objectsdoreallyexistinthef ponding totheim in fact. . at weinteractwithdonotbelongtothe
everydayexistenceclaim o weinteractwith,butthism i a priori c or chunksofm t in theroom anything welike,withoutinheritingthe is thatpossible? lly possiblewithoutinheritingthefortune related we arepreparedtoputourselvesindebt). In otherwords:thefactthatyouinteract inthesensethattheyarenot relatedtoem whatm ited afortunewhilewehadnot,infact. is truethatwecannotactasifhave e
joint innature Iunfortunatelycannotrem to statem t infact,becauseitwouldbelike em e taphysical categorythisentity ” areliteraryfalse,since there p i rical ev ents a plausibility objection.One tter forinstance,andthese Idonotwanttosaythat 25 . Undoubtedlythereis id . Thereisanexam en ce, th s like“Thereisa i ey stilld ght notbelong o llowing way: e act asif m o b assess pirical er) is ple
CEU eTD Collection there arehousesaswell.The ontology. However,accordingtothelatter:wh y are nosuchthingswhatsoever 27 26 corner” house onthecorner”m literary false,butthattheym above” com least onem because anysuchfilledregionofspace-tim space-tim constraints aretheactualregionsofspace-tim shall claim to agreatextent.Butthisisnotreasonw Mereological Nihilism f “house”, “chair”,etc.,arejustnam grasp m arrangem the following:itisonlyifwe
u -wise) isacom SeeG.R Thi rther com m s i onsense ontologyisthatthelattercom s For som Universalism However appealingtheserespondsto away 27 y eanings ofourwords.Itm -wise arrangem . Theclaim o e e filledwithm sen, C nt of , Universalism a m terial object(andm em itm sim . e pl Dorr(2002,pp.151-174),and P.vanInwagen(1990,pp.108-114). ents astowhetherthosebitsof peopleagoodreasonforpreferringthingsover oy m ed by p on assum populatestheworldwith thattherearesom les is.Butitisnotcertain isundoubtedlyadoctrinewhichcontradictscom e T.M nts. eans just:“Therearesom contradictscom a tter, wecanpopulate e rri
knowwhatahouseis,thatwecanlearnhouse-wise 26 p ean som cks (2001,pp.13-19). . Anotherstrategyistosaythatsentenceslikethosearenot tion of a ny otherobjects i only ght be e s forpa both: dif e e thing
x m the casethatnam s arrangedhouse-wiseorstatue-wise(forshort: f on sensenolessthanNihilism hy Nihilism 61 e e, rence betweenMereologicalNihilism MereologicalNihilism rticular arrangem else thanitisusuallythought.“Therea e m enever therearehouse-wisearrangem m regardless howscattereditis,containsat thatthisistherightwaytoseehowwe any m filled withm it withavastnum the im itted totherebeingsom a that areitsproperparts). Aninteresting tter constitutecom e thingsarrangedhouse-wiseonthe a shouldlosetoUniversalism terial objectsyoulike.Theonly plausibility objectionm e s form a e tter. Ifthereisaregionof nts ofm y acroscopic objectslike -wise arrangem ber ofobjects–itis p andcom lex objectsornot.
m a . e
tter, bearingno thing “overand onsense beliefs m i onsense ght be, e . nts is AsI and e nts, CEU eTD Collection of Tem every partisanotherobject.MereologicalUniv tim any changeofparts. beliefs aboutobjects–isthatpostula property oftheseobjects–athat exist atthem earlier aswell.Theonly reasonableconclusionseem cannot reallybeidenticaltotheform sake oftheargum exists, nom detachm Since sam B, C,AB,AC,BC,andABC. According totheUniversalist,inthisworldwe another object.Letusthinkofaworldinwhich an object,itseem postulated bythisdoctrinecangain,lose,orch Mereological Universalism not believeintem and canexistindependently.Youbelieve Mereological Universalism exists, leadstoFour-Dim e, nom Let usfirstconsiderMereologicalUniver MereologicalUniversalism poral Partsaccordingtowhicheveryobj e nt ofapartwillnotbeaninstance e a ness ofarrangem a tter howscatteredanddiscontinuous,is“filledup”withoneobjectwhose o tter whatitsspatialdistancef m e nt partCwasannihilated. s thatanychangeofparts ent, thatpartChasbeen poral parts,oryoucanbelie
ensionalism istrue. andtheDoctrineof e nt ofpartsisnot Now, whathappenswithobjectABCifitloosespartC? isadoctrine , aspres er ABC, r 62 om would resultinobject’sbecom annihilated. W undoubtedlycontradictsthecom ented forinstancebyT.Sider(2003a).Still, ted byUniversalism loosingit.CisapartofABCaslong that MereologicalUniversalism ersalism
sinceitisidenticaltoABwhichexisted haveinfactsevenobjects,whichare:A, ange parts.Sinceeveryclum Tem other partsis.Letusthenassum relevantf there areonlythreeparticles:A,B,andC. ve intem ect hastem salism according towhicheveryregionofspace- poral Partsaretwoseparatedoctrines, s thenthefollowing:ABC ceasedto onitsownandletusaskifobjects , whencom poral partsandnotbelievethat o poral partsateverym h r Universalistobjects,sim at islef arenotabletosurvive b ined withtheDoctrine t thereisAB,which i ng identicalto p ofm istrueand m e o , forthe onsense m a tter is e nt it p le
CEU eTD Collection the sam som not seem the sam arrangem ABC. object com Now –isABCDidenticaltotheform as anexam
objects wearedealingwith:ABatt cannot reasonablyaskifABhassurvivedth tim exists f Essentialism space. AndsoifwehaveobjectABatt have thetem really askwhathappenstoobjectsiftheygainorlooseparts spatio-tem com allowed sinceobjectsareidentifiedbythesam e istherefore e b of ine MereologicalUniversalism Another problem Therefore, Ishallclaim The sam Moreover, itseem r e e them om ness of object.Itseem so.Ifwetakeanycom e nt ofpartstogetherwithsam poral entities:theyhavenotonlysp posed onlyofA,B,andC,itseem ple, andletusaddtoitanothe t aspresentedbyR.Chisholm 1 poral dim relativetotheothers,orsim to t arrangem e not applicable happenswhenwetrytoaddapa 2 and consistsofABatt e s thatthereisnopossi nsion; theyareexte isarrangem s thatpossibilityof e nt of thatMereol partsim to Universalistobjectsatall. p lex object withtheDoct er ABC? 1 , ABCatt e portant e ness of r particle,D,whichwehavejustcreated 1 nt of (1973,1975, p ogical Universalism and wetrytoadditanotherpartCatt 1 ly 63 and rearrangeitspartsbychangingpositionof and ABCatt nded intim changingpartsisexactlythesam byscatteringalltheparts,wewillstillhave e
ble rearrangem e change,becausethereareatleastthree W f ness ofparts. partsareim atial, butalsotem o parts. Incom s thatthisobjectisidenticaltothef e 2 r identityof , rt toanexistingobject.TakeagainABC ll, itcannotbe,sincetherestillexistsan rine ofTem
and theirsum and 1989).Nochangeofpartsis e, justliketheyareextendedin 2 . Theideaofchangingpartsin portant forobject’sidentity.Is in time Universalistobjects?Itdoes e poral Parts.Hereobjectsare isidenticalto nt ofpartsthatcouldaffect m , whichisanobjectthat onsense ontology,the poral parts.W , sincethepartsalready Mereological e whenwe ex nihilo e cannot o 2 rm ,
we er . CEU eTD Collection a count counterpart space-tim with them com and possibleworlds. is im Mereological Nihilism this incom identity isthatitnotco only availablecriterion.Butim objects. Actually,ifwewanttospeakof tim particles thatconstitutem object, m Universalist objectsifwelookatthem parts havebeendiscussedaboveasapplied of arrangem object’s identity.Andthisgoessim 28 com can beidenticalonlytoABCatalltim are identifiedbythesam questions m addressed here. Iftheseareobjectsfrom es inallpossibleworlds posed ofABCatt m plausible, butsoisUniversalism erpart onsense views.Andif This isnottosaythatsam Change ofparts(gaining,loosing,andexch y , cannotbeusedbyUniversalistsasanobjection againstNihilism self forinstance,itm ofA*at p a e atibility answerstheim ke sensewhenappliedtoUniver nt ofpartsforobject’sidentity. e. W t 1 * exi
h di There isnowayinwhichUniversalism 1 andUniversalism at and ABatt s fferent t makes i e ng i e ness ofparts,bot m 28 weredif . thatisthecase,f p n possi
t anot atible withourcom h a e count kes sensetoas portant thing her possi bl e 2 ness of p e worl canbeidenticalonlytothesam f ly agains e plausibility objection,atleastinawaythatputs with erpart rent, orif
across possibleworlds es a inthe ds we objecthoodinterm bl parts rel e worl its objectsthatcannotchangepartsacrosstim 64 nd inallpossibleworlds.Likewise,anobject h overtim over salist objects?Notatall.Universalistobjects a
t ourcom are t t i sam k whetherIwouldbethesam on: Iexistedatadif about thesam d i is abadcriterionof
a m i s time l act thatneitherNihilism e adi n k anging) andchangeofarrangem onsense intuitionsaboutobjects.And position.Theansweris:yes,Nihilism vi i ng about rt e andacrosspossibleworlds.ABC . Stillwecanaskwhathappensto ffe m ue ofwhat rent onsense intuitionsabouttherole count quest s ofm . IfIlookatacom e couldbecom ness ofpartscriterion i i f erpart s on, andassuchi e Aat rent tim e e reology, itseem identityf particlesatthesam s ofA,B t 1 ex istin . e. Dothesam
iscom e , objectifthe andC p g in o atible with s not r m m th onsense bei is wo and p a e atible terial s the nt of ng rld e e e
CEU eTD Collection Universalism there isone)thef which isclearfortheNihilist,and plus thekeyboardofm m m For onething,theyhavedifferentidentityandsurvivalconditions.another,their considered. Itisbecausethisobjectquite advantage ofthelatteroverform which ism 30 29 Lewis, whosaysthefollowing: com objects intheworldornot.Thisproblem clear whattheirm tim o f Perhapstheonlyinstanceof anon- Letu p e e e. taphysical statusisdifferent:com taphysical categories,m a rticles th m
itm s referto Universalist objectsaredubiousentitiesforyetanotherreason.Itisnotentirely are thesam It just further “Given apriorcom The factthatam ents ofMereology”andhasbeenraisedm at co e 29 doesnotallowforsuchdifference atem is com seem
m them p o p e s e m o portionofRealityeitherway”(1991,p.81) e m taphysical statusis:whet o s tobeof r . Theyjust itm arily flato llowing: there e atth ent. Thefusionisnothingover y ong m com u is m m st adm 3.1.1. OntologicalCommitments
b itm nohelpasf puter”. Univer j o ect assu a object accordingtoUniversalism are m ny objectspostulate ent tocats,say, e it that“I”ex n it.Takethem t er. must . m m i n onsense g be , is perhapssharedbycom fo m
65 a differentfrom a differencebetweenobjectsandnon-objects. r th r as salism her theirexistenceincreasesthenum i ists insom ght becalled“theproblem e sak ontology,ifitisabletorecogniseany togetherortakethem reconciliation withthecom 30 a com cannotseethisdifference.Thisidea e . Nihilism o o d byUniversalism stly duetocertainpassagesfrom f sim and abovethecatsthatcom e m p m whatthecom w licity, th itm o ould beanem re im does.AndhereIseethe ent tocat-f at th portant sensethan“m m onsense ontology(if ere isawell-d separately,thecats thereisthisone pty region m usions isnota ofontological onsense “I”is. m onsense is e fin of pose it. ber of e space- d set D. e CEU eTD Collection sense. words –m who saysthatcertainthingsdonothaveafu significant. AndsoIbelievethatthereisadifference inontologicalcom by com while certaindonot.Ibelievethatbysayingth assum com anything totheontologicalset-up–whys If how anyonecansensiblyengageinadebateon are identical. Com worlds exactlythesam som havingaf e position? position holds,whileintheotheritdoesnot thing’s beinganobjectdoesnotadda e thattherereallyissom If It seem case ofidentityinthebroadenedsense”(1991,p.83) whole andoverlap–askindsof relations –them striking isthisanalogythatitappropria “Mereological relations(…)arestriki were com innocent: itcom Composition asIdentity so tospeak,thepluralform relation ofm “I saythatcom m thesepassagesf itting oneself e reology u Ithinkthattherem sion issotrivial,andif s thatwhatLewiswantstosa m itted tobefore”(1991,p.82) a must ny partstotheirfusion–islikeidentity.The‘are’ofcom totheexistenceof position –therelationofparttowhole,or,better,m m a beontologicallycom e r ny-one relationofcom its usonlytothingsthat om exceptthatinone Lewis’arestrictly . Itisinvirtueofthisthesisthatm e thing im u st besom ofthe‘i the identity. portant anotherobject,onedoessom 66 fact thattherearecertainfusionsdoesnotadd nything toone’sontology.Youcanhavetwo e sion, andonewhosaysthattheydo.Inother thing m m at certainobjectshaveafusionandthereby hould anyoneargueaboutprinciplesof whether certainthingshaveafusionornot. insayingthatcertainthingshaveafusion ngly analogoustoordinaryidentity.So . Ontologicallyspeaking,thesetwoworlds ofthem and literallytrue,thenitisdif itting ifde te tom position, theone-onerelationsofpartto y inthesepassagesisthef s’ of Ordinary identityisthespeciallim are identical,sotospeak,whatwe o re tom identity.Callthisthethesisof a rk itbyspeakingofm theprincipleofUnrestricted bates aboutitaretom e reology thanthat.AndsoI e reology isontologically e thing ontologically m itm f ents ofone e position is, i cult tosee reological o llowing: a a ny-one ke any iting
CEU eTD Collection the InnocenceConceptionofMereology,and two versions:aweak,andstrongone.However, another claim ontologically innocent(referredtoas“the m has beenm “Genie”. Theargum considers afusionofcatandm Inwagen’s viewsonthisissue. m identity. Anargum relations andsaythatthe“are”of analogous form following: thepredicate“are”,usedin for thispurposeisnotsound.TheStrongCom e o reology inthefollowingway.ApparentlyLe re detailinvanInwagen(1994),andsoitw of“is”identity.TheW “… accordingtotheStrongCom The StrongCom An attem so, Geniem identical with)Genie,where‘are’is W nor Jerry”(1999,p.146) course, Genieisnotoneof e canreconstructthisargum to theidentityrelationthatitissufficient 1) a de recentlybyB.-U.Yi(1999). –thethesisofCom Genie =Tom p t ofquestioningthecorrectness ent forinsufficiencyofth u ent againstthestrongreadingisfollowing: st beoneof position Thesisfailsaccord andJerry eak Com constitutionis, position asIdentity.Thelattercanhave,accordingtoYi, Tom andJerry Tom andJerry ent inthefollowingway: ouse: To thequotedpassagefrom positi position Thesis,Tom 67 InnocenceConceptionofMereology”)with literally e W on Thesissaysthatcom Yi arguesagainstontologicalinnocenceof m pos ill bediscussedinthepartdevotedtovan andJerry,towhichhegivesthenam wis supportshisclaim , becauseGenieisoneof so tospeak strong readingwhichwouldbesufficient ; f theweakreadingistootosupport eak Com ition Thesisasform whatLewissaysinthequotedpassage to classifythem o anotherform r GenieisidenticalwithneitherTom ing toYiinthefollowingway. position Thesisispresentedin , thepluralform Lewis’,is andJerry ofthe intothesam position issom ulated byYiisthe thatm ‘is’ ofidentity.If literally Genie ofthe“is” are e e reology is groupof (viz. are another . Butof u ch e
CEU eTD Collection following: The conclusion3)isobviouslyfalse,because
z statem Yi doesnotreject2),andsotheonlywayout statem predicate tobindtwoindividualobjectswith am rather tosay:“ on eachside.Ithinkthatthisisnottherightwaytousepredicate.The Cicero”. Thisissupposed tointroduceapluralterm in 2)with“GenieandCicero”,consisten the followingway(1999,p.147).Heproposesto replacethesecondoccurrenceof“Genie” 2) thatshouldberejected,not1). sentence “Genieisoneof m says, isthatacertainthingm plural . GenieisidenticalwithneitherTom e notentirelysureifYiusesthepredicate m b term er ofacertainset.ThereforeIcannot ent of ent. Therefore: However, itseem Actually, Yirealisesthatthisobjectionm x 3) 2) ontheright-handside:“the isoneof identityistrue),andsointhef Genie isoneof Genie isoneofTom x is oneof y and s thatthereissom Genie y z s”, andsotohaveasingleterm if andonly ” canbecorrect.Itseem andJerry(byLeibnizLaw) e m norJerry. b y er of s”. Itseem x e 68 “being oneof”inthecorrectway.Yiusesthis o thing tly “Tom is eitheridenticalwith acollectionof rm seehowtheuseof“beingoneof”in the correctreadingof“beingoneof”is each other(actually-withitself–ifthe ula: “ i Therefore wem ght beraised,andhewantstoavoiditin wrong withthisargum f s thatwhatthepredicate“beingoneof” o after andJerry”with“Tom r him x is oneof s thatintheargum every istoreject1)–theidentity som ontheleft-handside,buta occurrenceof“beingone y u ” wehavea e st rej things,orthatitisa y , or ect either1)or2). x ent. Firstofall,I is identicalwith andJerry, ent aboveitis single term
CEU eTD Collection Cicero”. Theargum with sheets,nor pillowcases, b Tom with Tom because Tom suggests thatweshouldtakethisnam How canthatbecorrect?Atfirstglanceit of “Genie isoneofGenie”andsoevenifwe Jerry, norCicero,andsoweshouldrejecttheidentitystatem Still, accordingtoYi,theconclusionisobviously of”, andso“GenieisoneofGenie”here pillowcases ” isalwaysplural,therestillam andJerry.Butthenwhyshouldonesay andJerry,nam nor Jerry” “(…) Genieisnotoneof Yi saysthefollowing: However, evenifthesem 3’) GenieisoneofTom Therefore: 2’) GenieisoneofandCicero 1’) Genie=Tom Genie isidenticalwith , andGenieisnotidenticalwithJerr . Orthataf
ent wouldthenlookasfollows: e ly our-pack of andJerry Tom andGerry andJerry,Cicero(byLeibnizLaw) neither a Tom andJerry noeuvres excludesuchoddusesof Guinnessisnot o e re seriousproblem asre ecause whatitisidentical withis . Itislikesayingthatabedsetidenticalneither Tom ferring toonewhole- guarantee thattheterm 69 seem
y, becauseGenieisidenticalwithafusionof replacedwith“Genie nor that GenieisnotoneofTom ; f s thatputting“Tom Jerry? false,sinceGenieisneitherTom o r GenieisidenticalwithneitherTom identical withanyof withYi’sargum ObviouslyGenieisnotidentical ent whichm occurringafter“isone am andJerry”initalics is oneofGenieand
being oneof e u ent. reological sum st befalse. thef
our bottles, sheets and andJerry as in , nor of
CEU eTD Collection neither Tom of Tom In “GenieisTom m m we use“and”–aconjunctionoperator,itreallystandsfor“ use ofwhatevernam of” thatbringsdisjunctionintoplay.Itseem m because Genieis Surely GeniecannotbeeitherTom because itisidenticalwith so “ “being oneof”: (this principleisactuallyheldbyYi),butra case that: abuse ofalogicallysloppylanguage. claim Yi saysthatonem i e e sunderstanding: “Tom reological sum reological com x isoneof i ng thatGenie It seem
or Jerry” “Som The confusionwiththeuseof and
norJerry.However,thislatteruseof Jerry. ButthenYirejects“Genieisone ething isoneofTom s thenthatYim x
and andJerry”Yiobviouslywants position is)toseethedifference. s i (inthesenseinwhichsom ght challengehisargum Tom andJerry e is y s occurafte oneofTom ” alwaysm andJerry”hasonlyone,conjunctivem the fourbottles i xes uptwol r it.W andJerryif, eans “ andJerryindeed,thatthisisbecauseitnotthe
orJerry( “beingoneof”isevidentalsofurtherinYi’spaper. in theproper,conjunctiveuse.Toavoidany h x enever weuse“oneof iseither 70 ent againsttheStrongCom ogical operators:conjunctionanddisjunction. s thatthispredicateisboundwithdisjunctive . Onedoesnothavetobeakeenfriendof ther thatthef one ofTomandJerry to saythatGenieisidenticalwithasum Tom andJerry x , or only if ofTom e one whobelievesinunrestricted y ” Thism , itisidenticalwitheitherTom x or o llowing isthecorrectuseof andJerry”becauseGenieis y x ”, logicallyspeaking.And eaning, thisisrather“one and isobviouslydisjunctive. u st beanexam y indisjuntiveuse), ”, theneventhough position Thesisby ple ofan
CEU eTD Collection
Jerry”. ButperhapsYidoesnotwanttom either withTom two otherobjectsfrom statem Tom andJerry with correct tosay,firstofall,thatGenieisone torso, exam a radicalwayofreadingtheStrongCom identity relationinthiscasebehaves,according toSider,likea put as:“T= is nottosaythatTidenticalanyof distributive object O,whichiscom true, eveniftheoriginal sentenceis.Thela and Dickcarriedthecasket andHarrycarried the casket”.Adistributivereadingof“carry” Tom andJerry ple. Tosaythat t ent: “Genieisoneof , andtoexpressthisfactinthefollowingnotation: or JerryelsethefusionofTom “Som Obviously, asYipointsout,thelatterprin Is Yi’swaytheonlyofreadingfi T = predicate.Identityislike“carry”in h h , ething isoneofTom and T= a
, andsorequiresassum , orwithJerry.Onthisassu l , and . Butbelievinginm
a Ted iscom t thevery posed of
and T= Tom andJerry l beginning,andthisim and T= h posed ofahead, , andJerryif, a , l i , and ng that t
”. Thisisalsonottosaythatthereanyf h andJerry”(1999,pp.147-8) e , reological sum a a tter sentencem ” suggeststhatwetakeGenietobeafusionof ke thisassum t m , 71 , andtowhichTedbearsidentityrelation.The l position Thesis.Sidergivesthefollowing Tom andJerry p , or the casket”.However, latterm tion Genieisidenticalonlywith“Tom is som Tom andJerry h sentence: “Tom rst prem ciple isnotcorrect.Butagain,theinitial t , apairofarm , andsotheidentitystatem only if e thing like:“Tom plies thatGeniecannotbeidentical
s p ise? requiresacceptingthatGenieis eans thateachofthem tion here.Insuchacaseitis , itisidenticalwitheitherTom arereferredtoasawhole. T.Sider(2007b)offersquite , orthatGenieisidentical s , Dick,andHarrycarried , a , apairoflegs, collective
carriedthecasket ent cannotbe , ratherthan i ght notbe e n carried l , anda u rther and not
CEU eTD Collection single object(oratleast intheform and can bealsoascribedto this distributiveidentityrelationin“ reading of“ would rathersaythattheapparentfalsehoodof“ “being oneof”.Butisthesentence“ eligible. Itistruethat that wecancom t listed objectsandsaythatsom com and Tedontheother.Itisnotdifficulttoa plural andsingularobjectsisa switch thereadingfrom am h And likewisetheidentityrelation:itdoesnot further objectcom to carryit,whereasitwasnottooheavyf the caskethim 31 If , isoneofTed,andthat , Thi Tedisidenticalto a ong others,thefollowingdisadvantage:itgive , e t s l 31 s inapluralform way , and . Butthiswouldinturnm I thinkthatbothSiderandYiuse“one However, asSiderpointsout,thisreadi ofusi t , butdirectlybetweenTedand h , s ng “bei elf. Anditm a e , upwithinthiswayareobviouslyfalse. l posed ofTom , and ng oneof”hasbeenquest h , andreferstom h oneusetoanother.W h a isoneof a , , t ” thatweapplyhere.Andsothefalsehoodarisesbecause , whichisoneof a l , and , i ght bethecasethatcasketwastooheavyforasinglem l , and
e bit m thing isidentical ean, accordingtoSider,that , t Dic , then,byLeibnizLaw,whatev h t ofasinglesubject).Shall wesee“Ted”entirelyas“ . AndsowhateverisoneofTed,also , i sleading here.W a k, andHarry,whichcarriesthecasket. h h a , ny objectsatthesam is oneofTed”reallyfalse? l is oneofTed”,whereTedhasbeenpickedas a , and o i h oned above. r threem h , 72 , a hold betweenTedandanobjectcom pply thedistributivereadingtoanam a hy dowethis? , t , . Andthisreflectsthedistributivesenseof l ng oftheStrongCom , and l with it.Now,itisf , and s theunwantedreadingof“beingoneof”. of” inthewaywhichIbelieveisnot e h n tocarryit t e is oneof . t
have , isTed,etc.Allidentitystatem e h tim h , , whichisoneof Ted”isduetocollective Ithinkthattheuseofboth a er canbeascribedtoTed, , together e. W l , and a Iwouldnotsayso. r m e position Thesishas, justtake o t . Still,thereisno re dif on theonehand, They f i h cult tosee one , carryit. posed of a , h ofthe e l , , and that ents a , a h l n , ,
CEU eTD Collection this ism or donottakeitasasingleobject single objectaf objects there.W from collective readingencouragedbythesingleobject.Itis,afterall,veryoddto of Ted”,wearenotusing“beingoneof”inth ontologically innocent,even thoughitm two thingsthatcouldreallycoincide.Andye if m about objectsandthepossibilityofcoincidence of m sam m in coincidingdistinctm anything m m was ontologicallyinnocent,therewouldbeno m be oddtosaythatm com There isnothingoddtheninsayingthat a
, e a e l reology de of.Suchapersonactuallybelievesthat reological f , and e e m asingleobject!Inordertobeable e tim reology isontologicallyinnocent.Ifm reological fusions–theym itting hasbeenm Another attem o t e. Butif ”, thingswouldhavebeendifferent.W stly duetotheplural-singularc o is not re thanm u ter all.Butthisis sions –af e ontologicallyinnocent.Thefirstis theyarem ll, therearem e e p reology isontologically reological sim a t toanalyseLewis’cl a de byP.vanInwagen terial objects:likeast ter allhewould a de of a ny objectsthereinasense–arem hidden u thesam st beth only p les. Theothercaseconcernssom h a onfusion. Now,donottakeTedasasingleobject, . Tryto in thesingleobject.Itisallverym isoneofTed. kes certainontologicalpositions untenable. e sam e e parts,then–bytheprincipleof 73 reology isontologicallyinnocent,thereareno t Lewiswantsustobelievethatm distribute from there aretwoobjectsatthesam not betherebycom e distributivesense.W (1994). AccordingtoVanInwagenitwould innocent. Hedescribestwocasesinwhich aim atue andalum h cannot, asitseem e en wesaythatitisnottrue“ (1994,pp.208-9).Sothisspecificview see obstacles f thatm MereologicalNihilism them a e correctlyweneedthem ny partsinTed,sotospeak. reology isnotontologically o r theNihilisttobelievein p ofclaythatthestatueis s, beevensensiblyheld m itted toexistenceof e areswitchingtothe e one whobelieves a ny partsofthe extensionality : i ifm sleading. But e placeatthe e reology is distribute e h reology isone a ny
CEU eTD Collection supposed analogybetweencom Com is reallythepluralform an unintelligible“hybrid”useof“is”and“ar above theirparts,heneverexplainswhat as Identityarethefollowing.Firstofall:when 32 listed inLewis’(1991,p.85):
accepted byLesniewskiwho believed thatitisacorrect innocent and thatcom correct theoryofcom be convincingonlyforsom com does notholdtoadegreethatw rejected. Andsotheanalogybetweencom van Inwagenacceptswithnoqualificationonly However,i position. VanInwagen’sconclusionisthat position View”.Andasf 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) just Van Inwagen’sgeneralobjectionstoLewis’accountofthethesisCom
32 redundant tosaythat exists, so,giventhatthe exists, cannot betwothingsbothofwhicharefusionsthe tim identical withthelatter,so fully todescribethe just as,giventhat just astherecannotbetwothi “just asitisredundanttosaythat just asf . t i e if s not as position isidentity,onecanconcludethatm thef at u x lly todescribe al and l o cert position. Andsoonlyassum rm y a er isthef i for“is”.These n m t x e h u o at one whoalready exists, itisautom
x st occupythesam x r theW s isfullytodescribetheirfusion, t andthe h position andidentit e concl ould enableonetosaythatidentityisalim x u x is f sion of s exist,itisautom x eak Iden u u and the lly todescribetheobjectthatisidenticalwith si y ngs bothofwhichareidenticalwith s exist,when on t being overandaboveam thelatter”, pos x 74 are objectionstowhatYicalls“theStrong e”, m h and at ition andidentity,accordingtovanInwagen, theoryofcom Lewissaysthatthingsarenothingoverand tity View,vanInwagenexplicitlyrejectsthe m a believes thatunrestrictedcom the thesisofCom y tically truethatsom s m e e i y reol regionofspace-tim xing them i ng thatunrestrictedcom 3) and5),while1)2)arebeing exist when y. Outoffivepointsthisanalogy u ogy st occupythesam x a isafusionofthe tically i s position. Ifhisclaim ont togetherandsayingthat“are” ol x x ogi true thatafusionofthe s, e is identicalwith position asIdentitym reology isontologically cal ounts to,andhem l e y thing identicalwith i nnocent e iftheform e regionofspace- y s, thatthereare position istrue woul position isa iting caseof x , sothere y d be position , soitis er is x a i , so kes ght x x s
CEU eTD Collection identity”), andanotherkindof identity thatholdsbetweenonethinganditself kinds canholdbetweenthingsontwodifferent attributes toButlerthef of identity:alooseandpopular,strict presented byD.L.M.Baxter(1988). t real the mereologicalview things looselyasonething,butwecountdistinct replaced byanalternativeview.Accordingto loosely. m occurring inanidentitystatem loosely, orbetweentwothingscountedbothst counting things.Andsotheone-oneidentityhol “strict andphilosophical”areherem referred toas“m other isthatthewhole is them the wholeisanum h at a ny-one identityholdsbetweenm m l y sevenobject e reol the jointparthoodinanidenticalwholeofwhatare distinct”(1988,p.578) no caseof “On thisopposingviewtherearenotdifferent This distinctionbetweenthelooseand Yet anotherinterestingapproachtothethesisof Baxter discussestwodifferentviewscon ogy i s ont
s wherewehaveonl ol identityonloosestandardsof any-one identity”).Actua ogi erically distinctthingf cal , andintroducesitinthefollowingway: l y o i llowing idea:therearetwokindsof nnocent identitythathol ent m y a . t
ny partsc h ree object u st refertothingscounted a ny things o re direc r s-part om 75 ounted asonething(the IdentityView).The lly, thepredicates“looseandpopular” distinguishes, afterBishopButler,twosenses and philosophical.Strictlyspeaking,Baxter ds betweenm itsparts(theNon-IdentityView),andthe thingsdistinctonstrictones.Thereisjust cerning thepart-wholerelation.Oneisthat ds eitherbetweentwothingscountedboth s i rictly; atanyratethetwosingularterm this otherviewwedonotcountdistinct partsasonewhole.Baxtercallsthisview
tly applicabletotwodifferentwaysof (let usref counted strictlyandonething the strictidentitycanbeavoidedand s standards.Thereisthenonekindof t o standardsforcountingandsothereis haveany Com e a r tothisidentityas“one-one ny thingsandonething(tobe si position asIdentityhasbeen gni identity,andoneof on thesamestandard fi cance, hecoul
d not
bel these . The i e ve s
CEU eTD Collection view, nam identical withanyoftheparts.Andc of thepartshasthisproperty.Therefore,weareinclinedtothinkthatwholeisnot has atleastonerelationalpropert som latter viewisnottodenythatthereexistsaw a m is allitspartscountedloosely.Acceptingthisdi the distinctionoriginatinginBishopButler’swritingsandadherestoviewthatawhole this isasufficientreasontorejecttheCom parts. Baxterbelievesthatthereactuallyexist that anywholehaspartsisa and apparentlyforBaxterthispriceistoo with thewhole. which thepartsareeachdistinctfrom the aboveopposingm addition tothepartscollectivelyoccupyinglocationwholeoccupiesittoo.Taking things countedstrictlytogether. Inotherwords,thereisnosinglecount onwhichweare count. Andsothereisnopossiblecountonwhic exclusive. Ifwecountthings,them It isbecausethetwowaysofcountingthings u e ltitude onastrictcount,andsinglethingloosecount. thing additionaltotheparts’existence. At anyratethereare However, thereisapricethatonehas A m e o ly theIdentityView–anditisth tivation f o r theNon-Identityviewis,as o tivations, Baxterpropos never y thatnoneofitspartshas:it
n multitude +1 thingswhereonehas thewhol high. AconsequenceoftheCom ourse thereissom 76 b , andsothatnosinglethingcanhaveproper hole assuch,butitistodenythatthewhole ination View.ThereforeBaxtergoesbackto single thingswithparts,nam : thelooseandstrictcountarem to payforacceptingtheCom
e, andyetthepartscollectivelyareidentical e factthatitwouldbe either stinction enableshim h wecancountthingscountedlooselyand es theCom Baxterclaim ontheloosecount, e n b m comprises ination View,accordingto parts thatcom
o tivation fortheopposite s , thef tosaythatawholeis oddtosaythatin allitsparts.None act thatthewhole b e or ination Viewis ly persons,and b pose awhole. ination View, onthestrict u tually CEU eTD Collection able tocountboth:thepartsandth
things onthestrictcount,andwehaveonethingloosecount. than theirparts.Theycannothavedifferent objects cannotoccupydifferentspacethantheirpa confused withidentity,sincetheyaresim composition object thattheycom that com nothing overandabovetheparts.Objectsare according toUniversalism of partsdohavem being identity.ForaUniversalistlikehim inclined tosaythatLewism from above itsparts,because there isnothing,inte am It couldnothavehaddifferentpartsthenitdoe parts. Itcannotsurviveanychangeofparts com objects arethesortof and persistenceconditions.Foranyonewhobe som ount to? e posed ofdifferentparts.W itsparts.Soasfarthe com differencesbetweenthepartsand W Are thingssom However, anyonewhobelievesinrestricted position isidentity.W h ere doesthisleaveuswhenitcom Ontheonehand,itisveryplausibletosaythat awholeisnothingoverand whichshouldbedistinguishedfrom e pose. Andtherelation entitiesthatcansurvivechangeof e reological sum thing “overandabove”thei com i ght beright h e enever som posite objectsar cannotsay e whole.Andsowheneverwehave position isconcerned,the partsexhaustthewhole.But s , com s elf ila in asense – itwouldnotbethesam e 77 com obj e position m the sam rm , r inm between thepartsandfurtherobjectis colours thantheirpartshave.Butthereare s to
s –itwouldnotbethesam who believesthatallpossiblecom lieves inrestrictedcom s ofcom posite object.Theseare:m ects-parts haveafusion,thereisfurther theInnocenceofMereologyclaim e identifiedbytheirparts.Objectsare rts. Theycannotweightanym r partsandwhatexactlydoesthisclaim com
a identity e ny respects.Forinstance,com inwhathesaysaboutcom thingaboutanygivencollectionof position cannotadheretotheview u position, thatisinthewhole apart st beidentity.Thisisbecause partsandthatcouldhavebeen . Com position canbeeasily e collectionanym position com n e parts,wehave collectionthen. odal properties o b re orless position inations ? posite posite Iam ore. n
CEU eTD Collection that theworldm ontological structure.AndinthissenseIcan another thing-jointinreality,andsothatthis believe thatbeingcom have afusionthism this debateisabout.Butobviouslyitcannotbe principles ofcom again –ifthisisallthatcan 33 restrain from not havetheirpartsnecessarily.ButIdo som their parts.IfIbelievedinrestrictedco
him occurs? thesis. HowabouttheNihilist–onewho things canchangepartsorthatdonot com persistence conditionsofcom this thesisunacceptableforadifferentreason:itdoesnotprovidem Thet andtheUniversalistispointless. e position canadheretotheCom thing overandabovetheirpartsbecausethey e rm Perhaps them I donotshareYi’sandSider’sobjections Hecannotacceptthethesiseither,sin “gunk”i sayingso. 3.2. i s position isquiteshallow.Actu ght consistsolelyofatom borrowedfrom Existence ofAtomlessGunk u o st m m
st powerf itted totheexistenceof ean thatthereexis besaidaboutwholes–thedebatecorrectnessofcertain
D.Lewi p lex objects.Onlysom Mereological Nihilism u l challengeto position as s (1991,p.20). m less “gunk” 78 fusionoccupiesadistinguishedpositioninthe say thatthingsaresom position, Iwouldalsosaythatthingsare ts anotherobjectinadditiontotheparts.I have theirpartsnecessarilym believe inrestrictedcom ce thiswouldm does notbelievethatthecom Identitythesis.Anyonewhobelievesthat true–whenpeoplesaythatsom ally, ifthisisthecase,Idonotknowwhat acertainf totheStrongCom Mereological Nihilism cansurvivechangeofparts,andtheydo AsaChallengeTo e 33 one whobelievesinunrestricted . Aworldconsistingof gunk isa u sion istobelievethatthere e an thatthedebatebetween e position Thesis.Ifind thing overandabove odal propertiesand position, soIm isthepossibility u position ever st rejectthis e objects u st CEU eTD Collection joints. Letusthenstatethem can beputexplicitlyinterm Gunk Hypothesisevident,wem whatsoever hasproperparts. claim world inwhicheverythinghasproperparts;isdivisible
vague. Iwilluse“stuff” heretoreferso is usuallytakenasasynonym one canbelievethattheworldconsistsexclusivel be m are bothobjectsconstitutedbystuf where thevariables that noobjectsarecom part ofx”. objects. Onem portions ofstuffasitsparts.Therearevari som objects. However,itisstillcom i ght thinkthatthereareobjectsandstuf mere e one believesinstuffasopposedtothi e d thatsuchaworldisincom Gunk Hypothesis: Mereological Nihilism However, if
Mereological Nihilism stuf f , andthatthereissom i ght forinstancebelievethatthingsare wewanttom x and posed ofotherobjects, ∀ y x standforobjects,and“xPy”shouldbereadas“yisaproper asthef ∃ : isaclaim s of of“m
y (xPy) ∀ u x p st statethese
a atible withobjectshavingpartsthatare ∼∃ e objects ke theconf f stuf andstuf o atter”, a y (xPy) llowing principles: p
atible thatnoobjectshaveotherastheirparts,or f inthe f understoodasentitiesthatcarvenatureatthe , but m 79 withtheNihilist’sworldinwhichnothing nd itseem f ous waysinwhichstuffm ngs, onem th e two doctrinesm lict betweenMereologicalNihilism thing thatunderliesobjects: arawm that if world thatf or thatnopartsofobjectsarethem at constitutesobjectsintheworld.Orone y ofthingsorexclusivelystuff.“Stuff” stuf constituted s thatthesetwonotions are equally i f ght saythatasim constitutesanobjectitceasesto a ils toconstituteanyobject.Or o re carefully.Bothdoctrines bystuffandsothatthere ad infinitum i ght berelatedto p not le objecthas objects:if andthe a . Itis selves terial
CEU eTD Collection are notboundinobjects,sotospeak. together withotherportionsof portions of on theirown,constituteanyobject.However,theyanobjecttogetherwithother be extended–thereareportionsofstuffthat stuf that objectsarem gunk andMereologicalNihilism this doctrinewithMereologicalNihilism into halvesthatinturncanbeseparated–toput this inam requirem divisibility way. Rather,whatisunderstoodbythepossib inconsistent. However,itseem objects, andthatisnotaproperpartofanyotherobject. proper partofsom that everyobjecthasanotherasaproperpart.It therefore alsobestatedinterm Nihilism requirem f . Iam This wayofunderstandingtheGunkHypothesis opensthedoortoreconciliationof Mereological Nihilism The GunkHypothesis,ifitistobeach Mereological Nihilism isaclaim e e nt thatthepartsshouldbeobjectsth nt hereisonlythatthepartsof notsureif , notnecessarilydivisibilityintoobject stuf f . Still,itseem a aboutindivisibilityintoobjects. de of e therecanbestuf otherobject.Therem . Iam isnotaclaim andtheGunkHypothesisasstatedaboveareapparently stuf thencom s ofobjects. s thattheGunk s thatthereare , itm f , constitute i f ght beuseful thatdoesnotconstituteanyobjects.If m . objects arenotthem Actu itte As itisstatedabove,theGunkHypothesissays 80 aboutindivisibilityofobjects i are sm em d totheviewthatobjectsareconstitutedby ght anobject.Therearenoportionsof no portionsof Hypothesis isnotalwaysunderstoodinthis ally, toclarif selves. Som allenge toMereologicalNihilism bethebiggestobjectthatcontainsall s. TheGunkHypothesisdoesnotputany ility ofgunkexistenceissom
totalkaboutvariouskinds ofNihilism aller thanthesim does not o re picturesqueway. e stuf y possiblerelationsbetween thing isgunkyifitcanbecut saythateveryobjectisa f thatdonotatall,even p selves. Mereological le, andtheydonot, in general asim stuf e sortof , should p le can . The f that
CEU eTD Collection Nihilism instead ofonesortonly.Letusthendistingui
divisibility thatareim physically orevenm kinds ofInterm object m given inthebeginningofthischapterasaclai 1) 2) 1) 2) 3) 3)
It shouldbenoticedthatthecharacterisa : i
the beginningofthischapter), indivisibility capturesthem physically dividedintopartsthatar –extended sim the actualworld), nom holding intheactualworld;itisindivisi worlds. indivisibility intoobjects Intermediate Nihilism( Minimal Nihilism physical indivisibility Maximal Nihilism metaphysical indivisibility ght notbesuf ologically accessiblefrom ediate Nihilism portant f e p taphysically. Therefore, f les, i cient f according towhichthereareonlypoint-sizedsim according towhichthereisonlyonesim o –anobjectisindivisibleinvirtueofthelaws ofphysics r statingdif s s) requiresom o
r som according towhichthereareinterm –anobjectisindivisibleinthiswayifitcanbe –anobjectisphysically indivisibleinallpossible eaning of e theactualwo sortsof f e 81 rent sortsof sh, followingJ.Shaffer(2007),threekindsof e m thepr th tion ofMereologicalNihilism thatnoobjectisaproperpartoffurther weneedtodistinguishthreekindsof e notobjectsthem ing stronger:thatasim Nihilism ble onlyinthepossibleworldsthatare inciple of rld (thatobeythephysicallawsof Nihilism . Minim Nihilism :
a p l Nihilism selves (thiskindof le -theworld. ediate sim asitwasstatedin p le isindivisible p thathasbeen les, andsom p le objects e
CEU eTD Collection different com say thatitisenoughifthepossibilityphysical, thenwewillhavedifferentsim of beingseparatedshouldbeunderstoodasphys possible, isasim can beseparatedfrom into sm and onlyif concerning separability.AndsoIassum parts isthatsom m indivisible, whichinturnim weaker: ifsom of indivisibilityarelistedfrom this objectintohalvesandseparatethem 34 there isanindivisibleobjectwith parts ofobjectsandnon-objects.The indivisibility, aswewillsee,isnotalwaysnecessaryforbeingasim indivisible. objects suchthattheyarepartsofsom m Thi a a ke itclearthatIdonotusethenotion nner analogoustowhathasbeenproposedin s i
s One m Dif W anobject aller entitiesthatcaninturnbese h f itcanbeseparatedf en Isaythatanobjectis“physicallydi e rent kindsof p i ght objectatthispointtom lexes indifferentpossible worl i on rai e thing ism e p thing isapart le. However,Ishouldalsosaysom s ed by eachother,areparts. T.Si Nihilism e plies thatitis taphysically indivi
der, i theweakest r om in virtueof partsthatcannotbeseparated n thelatter. di arebasedon scussi e thatagi –to y of parthoodasaprim parated, isacom indivisible intoobjects. on. 82 useof to thestrongest.Thestrongerkindim e th putthem som W And whateverissuchthatseparationnot ds. Isthisacceptable?Perhaps itis,iffor ing thatisphysicallyorm objector m h sible, itisim the caseofgunk:that ical, orasam atever entityissuchthatitcanbedivided ven entityisapartof visible” Im e divisibilityasappliedtothetalkabout otherfacts.Thesefactsarethe dif e apart,sotospeak.Thethreekinds thing aboutwhetherthepossibility f e rent sortsof i ght saythatitispossible p lex entity.W ean thatitisdivisibleinthe plied thatitisphysically e taphysical possibility.IfI itive notion.Myviewon 34 And sotherecanbeno p . Therefore,Ihaveto le. som indivisibility.But it ispossibletocut h e atever entities otherentityif e taphysically plies the p les and
CEU eTD Collection Nihilism sized entities?Itisverylikelyso. that inturncanbeseparated.Doesm because insom But still,whatisphysicallysim som both: thingsandstuff.“Thing” istobeused a thing.Thereisnostufffloatingfree,sotospeak. Allstuffthatthereis,isinthings. are m believe thatinoneworldtherem believe thatthesetwom stuf accept thissolution,theseparabilitycriterionm that canbelocatedinspace-tim say thattheworlddoesnotcontainspace,butth if spaceissupposedtobeapartoftheworld separating twohalvesoftheworld?W divided intopartsthatarenotobjectsth f e . Ibelievethatm reasonswewanttokeepthedistinctionbetween a de of However, theseparabilitycriterionm
A noteonterm Stuff, asIunderstandit,isthem In m . W stuf y e expositionofMereologicalNihilism wanttosaythatif e f rem , butstuf o a te possibleworlditcanbephysicallydividedintosm inology: Iwillusetheterm terial realitycom odes ofbeingfor f isnotm p e –isitself i ght beboth:thingsandstuff. le intheactualworldm 3.2.1. StuffAndThings thereis a de of h a e ere w terial c th s intwoways:eitherasthings,orstuf ean thattheonlym onetotalobjectonly–theworlditcanbe ings. Thereisnostuf 83 m em i located interchangeablywith“object”, and“stuff”– too? ght be ould therebeanyspacetom a i terial entitiesdonotexcludeeachother;I selves. Buthowcanwem ontent fillingregionsofspace-tim ght beveryhardtocom at theworld–asasum Onesolutiontothisproblem “entity”inthem problem
inspace-tim I wanttousethenotionofm physical i ght be atic whenappliedtoMaxim e taphysical sim and f thatwouldnotconstitute e. Ifwearenotreadyto metaphysically metaphysical o st generousway,for e totalofallentities by. ove them
p a les arepoint- aller entities ke senseof m com i e. Things ght beto sim f . Ialso apart, a terial p p lex, les. a l CEU eTD Collection whole). Neithercom (parts toawhole),whileparthoodcanoccurbetweensingleentitiesaswell(apart the parthoodrelation.Thedifferenceisthat portion ofstuffwhosepartsthesm parts thesm “com interchangeably with“m She putsthefollowingconstraintsonparthood relation: “im is apartofthing,andthingportionstuff(Thom she bindsportionsofstuffandthingswith clay asofaportionstuff, com m presented byJ.Thom posited bythestuf com only relationthatbindsstuffandthingsis both theserelationsholdam
a ny respectsdifferentfrom 3) p 1) 2) position isarelationbetweenclayand e roper part”here,butnotinthesenseof position” isarelationbetweenm s inportionsthathavetheirsub-porti The natureofthecom t x x x . existsat ispartof is partof aller objectsare,orbetweenm t f
y y - → portions-talk, whichwillbediscussedinturn. at at position norparthoodisare
x t t is partof → ↔ atter”. “Constitution”isarelationbetweenstuf son (1998).However,
thespaceoccupiedby x ong differentportions and she doesnottreatstuffinthesam theaccountpr position relati y x both existat at aller portions t (parts arenotonlyproperparts), a ny sm parthood relation,sayingthataportionofstuff ons. However,therem com 84 a identity, butinthesenseofm constitution. AsfornowIassum statue; andalthoughshespeaksofalum ny sm oposed here.Thom on isusuallyunderstoodinthem aller objectsandonebiggerobjectwhose t Thom position relatesm (parthood entailsexistence), lation thatstuffbearstothings,although are.Com ofstuff,andam x at aller portionsofstuffandonebigger t son’s accountofcom is partofthespaceoccupied by position istheref e waythatIdo.Firstofall, ong differentthings.The a son’s standardcaseof ny entitiestooneentity i ght besom son usesthenotionof f andthings.And u tual parthood). position isin ore relatedto e e thatstuff problem a nner p y of at s CEU eTD Collection take stufftobeanultim stuff andthisthingoccupythesam relation ofconstitutionshouldholdforanyportion refers toaportionofstuff,and“ALFRED”re ALFRED at2PM”arethefollowing(parthood that thenecessaryandjointlysuf pp.161-3). shape-constrained tem that athingcannotbeportionofstuffunl Apparently theyaretoosm stuff constitutesthings.Atom distinguishes threeontologicallevels:atom of I addthefollowingconstraint:
stuf (ii) (i) 4) f Thom Another differencebetweenThom will bediscussedinm x likealum is partof CLAY ispartofALFREDat2PMand ispartofCLAYat2PM CLAY, andnothingthat ispartof There isa son def p y of at i nes theconstitutionrelationinf z porary properties,lik clayoralum suchthat t ate entitythatconstitutesthings(artefacts),becausesuchportions →
all –shestipulatesthat“portion”istobesousedinsuchaway x and o re detailbelow). s arenot,acco z y e f is partofCLAYat2PM,andsuchthat belong tothesam placeatthesam i cient conditionsf p of
son’s andm gold areinturnconstitutedbyatom s, st e beingapiece,puddle,lum 85 z ess itcanfrom at2PMisessentialtoALFRED uff, andthings;atom for Thom fers toastatue;Iassum rding toThom of stuffandanythingifthisportion e e tim y ontologicalcategory(thisconstraint o accountofstuffisthatshedoesnot r thetruthof e): son isrelativetotim o llowing m tim e totim son, portionsofstuff. s constitutestuff,and “CLAYconstitutes a nner. Shebelieves p, orheap(1998, e possessoneof e z thatthesam is essentialto s. Thom e; “CLAY” son e
CEU eTD Collection say thatALFREDconstitutesCLAY. (iii) issupposedtopreventthingsfrom stuff ism take astanceonwhatism different entitiesandthattheyaregovernedby parts, whereasthingsarenot. These principlespointouttoadistinctivepr relation obeysthefollowingprinciples: and thattheycannotbeboundwithparthoodre
(ii* (i*) (iii*) (iii) ) There Assum Stuff andthingsbelongtodifferentontologi o re basicthanthings.This wouldm CLAY andALFREDoccupythesam CLAY) essential toALFRED,andnothingthatispartof to CLAY) essential toALFRED,andnothingthatconstitutespartof ALFRED CLAY, andnothingthatisconstitutedbypartof NOT-(There isa NOT-(There isa i ng, asIdo,thatthingsandstuff is a y such that o re ba
z z suchthat suchthat y sic: stufforthings–Iam is partofCLAYat2PM,andsuchthat cons z z ispartofALFREDat2PM,andsuchthat is partofALFREDat2PM,andsuchthat 86 tituting portionsofstuff operty ofstuff–isindividuatedbyits ean thatanyfactaboutthings superveneson e lation, onem belong todifferentontologicalcategories spaceat2PM different principles.IfIam cal categories–Ibelievethattheyare som i ght saythattheconstitution
y e z at2PMisessentialto how inclinedtosaythat at 2PMisessentialto
z – wedonotwantto at 2PMisessential y is supposedto essential z z is to is CEU eTD Collection intim fact(s) aboutstuff.Orthat,tom
the wayinwhichcom m m there areasonwhywewouldneedtohavethesetwoontologicalcategories? could havebeenconstituted of then thatstuffanditsarrangem such casesthethingisstillsam usually toacertainextentonly,butneverthele of stuff.Athingm conditions thanstuffdoes.Athingm can countforathingthanthat? This istosaythatparticularstuffinarrangem thing –andyouhavethedescribed-there the stuff,itsarrangem believe thattheideathingsare ontological categories,suchthatonecategorycannotbereducedtotheother. to “obtain”athing.Andthissolutionrequire and above”phraseintroducessom constitutes them here isthatifonem i i ght wanttosaythatthingsaresom ght besom ate, thateveryfactaboutthingsissuch-and-soinvirtueoffact(s)things. But ifthisisreallyso– However, onem W h ether thingsarereallysom e im , onem portant reasonstokeepstu i i ght surviverearrangem ght wanttosaythatth e posite objectsaresom nt, andrelationsam u i st notclaim ght wanttosaythata
e different stuff,stillbeing thesam nt donotexha a factsaboutthingsarereducibletostuff–is e ke thec e nothing extrapropertie , whilestuf i ght survive thatthings e e thing overandabovestuffisanopenissuesofar.I thing ings aresom m onnection betweenthingsandstuffevenm e 87 ong nt ff andthingsapart.Oneisthefollowing:one o over andabove e ust thenatureofathing. Moreover,thething ss athingcansurvivequitelotof re andabovestuffm thing overandabovetheirparts).Theidea f s thatstuffandthingsbelongtodifferent of stuff.Thesechangescanbecarriedout anditsarrangem various portionsofstuffthatconstitutea aresim is nothingelsetobesaidaboutthething. change ofstuff,lossandaddition thing usuallyhasdifferentpersistence s thatm e e thing overa nt constitutesathing.W p ly reducibletostuf u st be“added”tostuffinorder stuff(inawayanalogousto e e thing.Andsoparticular nt aredif eans thefollowing:take nd abovethestuffthat f e rent. Itseem f W . The“over them e h ll, there at m . In o o re re s CEU eTD Collection Or wecansaythatm perform perform functionality thatm or identity. stuff anditsparticulararrange distinction betweenthingsandnon-things. particulars (1983,pp.343-377).Andm m like “beingatable”,orstone”,thing”asnatural.Butnonethelesshe pp.59-61). Theim understood analogouslyto like “beingatable”,orstone”? without thething’sceasingtoexist.Butwhichpropertiesarethose? im often contradictorypropertiesatdifferenttim each andeverypropertym continuously instantiatethesam would notbeanyfunctionforthem joints betterthanotherproperties, justlikeLewisiannaturalpropertiesdo. Carvingreality the f e portant propertiesdowntotheso-called ntions anom o llowing: perhapsproperties like“beingata The ideabehindcom One m Another possibilityisthattobeathi W e s certainfunction.Butitm d ornot.Moreover,wecanthinkof h at elsecanm i ght thinkthatpropertiesim inalistic theoryof portant differenceisthatLe a tters: weareinclinedtosa a ny ofthem a tter forexistenceofath a natural properties tters forthing’spersistence–thingscaninstantiatedifferent, p aring propertiesliketh m e e nt arenotnecessaryforthisthing’scontinuousexistence perform property,or toperform propertie i ght beva y claim portant fo f essential properties 88 unctions onlyfrom s thatdrawsprim postulatedforinstancebyD.Lewis(2001, isth iftherewerenohum things thatperform wis wouldnotprobablyconsiderproperties gue som es. Therefore,wem ng, andtorem the sam y thatacertainthingpersistsaslongit ble” or“beingastone”carve realityatthe at perhapstherecanbesuchaprim ing? r existenceofcertainthingsshouldbe ese toLewisiannaturalpropertiesis Onem e e setofproperties.Obviouslynot tim es ifagivenfunctionisstill hum –suchthatcannotbelost i a itive distinctionsbetween ght wanttosaythatitis in thesam nofunctionwhatsoever. an beings. an perspective–there u Aretheseproperties st narrowthesetof e thing,isto
itive CEU eTD Collection joint unrestricted Nihilism m things are in thesenseofdisagreeingonwh the joints they aresom reality. Thingsunderstoodinthiswayarem concerning things.Orinotherwords:therearethings reality concerningproperties,sotherem The ideahereisthefollowing:justastherem other propertiesarereducibletothe“natural”ones. that som independent structure.Iam are som get closertopickingthem for propertiesm at thejointsm 35 concerning existenceofthings conception. Justtorem The otherviewisthatthere isaspecial,dis while naturalpropertiesareforinstance:“bei
Iam e reological atom 35 in . Oneisthatathingportionofstu It seem The talkaboutcarvingrealityatthejointstakesusbacktothing-joints d e e e distinguishedaspectsofreality,or, b propertiesarelessrealthantheot natural things t natural ed e to thing m eans (oratleas s thattherearetwoviewscan T.Sid a nage topicksom . Andsoforinstanceaccordingtova s (basicparticles)andliv e thenaturalthingsareonlym o r fo re andabovethestuff.W i , andthensaythatpeoplewhoseriouslydisagreeaboutontology, r th nd, onthething-joint thansom is d notcertainwhether,
t thisishowIunderstandit)thatcertainpredicatesstanding i stin – factsofthem ctio at objectsorthingsthereare,disagreeinfactonwhich e distinguished e n others .
i ght tinguished m 89 hers. Perhapsitm ing organism predicates.Thisviewpresupposesthatthere ng atable”,“beingdog”,orthing”. in otherwords,thatrealityhascertainm a f be certaindistinguishedportionsofreality de f view therearecertainfactsofthem a e thatinstantiatescertainnaturalproperty, tter concerning m ofstuffarrangedin i and if aspectsofreality,oratleastm e beassociatedwiththeideaofathing- ght becertaindistinguishedaspectsof reological atom i ght callthethingsthatcarverealityat so–towhatextent,thisissay that are eaning ofaqua n Inwagenthenaturalthingsare s. Forsom i ght beclaim distinguishedportionsof thinghood s. e one whobelievesin particularway,but ntifier, suchthatit or e d onlythatall objecthood a nage to a i nd- tter . CEU eTD Collection anything else.Ibelievethatthere m entities. Theyjust that instantiatecertainpropertiesthings.My worth askinginthevicinityofthisproblem here isthattherearethingscarvenature com ontological entitiesarethings,portionsofstuff, portions ofstuff. view wewouldneedtopostulatetwonatural two realm these entitieswouldinstantiatenaturalpropertie account therewouldbejustonerealm properties. that m thing-joint conceptionm view, theentitiesthatexistaccord m 36 of exi p k nat bei and aret m r i Thei o n o a a u ng opposedt st d p de of.Idonotintendtoaddressthequesti nages topicktheseandonlyentities ral . e ofont Th position withintherealm rties in s t m e d i is n nce, andourunrest h ea oft I willuse“stuf I donotreallyintendtoaddresstheque Another dim ght bepickedbythenaturalquantif eani erefore onl ol a s Lewisian tu ogi : therealm ngs of h ral m o e nat cal C a debat ean ∃ rnap/ y u . Aconsequenceofbel account ral sen are there in e quant e H g nsion ofthisdistinctionisthefollowing:onnaturalproperty s s areregarded“shal o ofthings,andthereal f e carv i r ” r i f sh’s i c m th a t s ofhowdi e i y resultindifferent f d useof“ e ex i o e e re asatechnicalterm d , sittingcom r, aspresent realityatth ea of
isten ofthings,and must be ing tothisnaturalquantifier tial q quantifier variance fferent ∃ ” shoul i e u l e j e vi o a ofentitie d by part w”, si ng t n o tifier isd som f in d correspondt ortably inontologicalstructure,not Si ts, so h , i 90 e at nce t like forinstancewhatm s use der (2001),i ier m atitsjoints.Therem t m e inventories ofthingsbeingaccepted.Things quantifiers: oneforthings,andtheother therefore thefirstandforem answer, ifany,isthatthingsareprim h things,tostartwith. on ofwhatm d ofportionsstuff.Perhapsonthelatter ere aredi that arethings.Thingswouldbe,onthis or properties.Thispaperisaboutm s. Onthealternativeviewtherewouldbe e h o s, nam term ∃ ey
e , accordingtowhichthereare different,equally stion ofwhetherthem to ref s indifferentway i boi ght notnecessarilyinstantiatenatural ∃ in carv o t ed l downt s h fferent e e t i b r tosom s ly portionsofstuff,andsom e h not realityatth y e fol j o i a possi in on. Exi o 36 l kes certainportionsofstuff o pi ts in . Thesetwoaccountsofthe wi s cki . e ng. Therei bl thing thatthethingsare reality:j ng di i e m s ght beotherquestions e j t e a nce i o kes portionsofstuff eani in fferent ts to s ngs for u o al s st asn o st fundam onl o st assum m ogi . Th y in virtueof eani onenot cal ∃ a is id tu isth nat ng for ral ea is a u at terial p e itive ral e i tion ntal on of ∃
,
CEU eTD Collection speaking, there isathingornot,sincetheirapproach a jointinreality.Actually,theyseem portion ofstuffconstitutesathing,andsothat things isthattheyarethesm things. Onem com while certainportionsof stuffdonot.This, sense tospeakof divisible, thisideam to changethestuffitism sub-atom m that donotconstitutethings. idea ofcarvingrealityatthejoints,leastin the spiritofconceivingthingsasdistinguished m the f if everythingisdistinguished–doesthedistinc sam are unique:anypartshavejustonefusion.No m a e odal propertiesandpersistenceconditions.It ke thenotionof reological sum e i r ng intoexistence parts. iends of One reasontohaveboththings Friends ofunrestrictedcom But thiswouldbetosaythatanyporti ic particlesthatchangetheirconstitutiv extensionality unrestrictedcom i ght wanttosaythatm s thetotalthinggainingand . Tosaythatm athingtrivial.Myview a kes nosenseindeed.Howe ex nihilo isoneofprinciplesdescribingnaturetheirthings– a de of? allest portionspossible.PerhapsIshouldagreewiththat. position postulate , andsom Ifwethi e reology isex position, likeLewisforinstance,believethatany tosaythatarrangem andstuffinourontologyisthattheyhavedifferent y view e stuffisceasingtoexist. Andofcoursethistalk nk thatasub-atom 91 isthatunrestrictedcom caseofthingsasopposedtoportionsstuff foranyportionandarrangem on isadistinguishedportionofreality.And loosing stuf is thatwhatm portionsofreality,andsoalsoagainstthe however, canoccuronly ifsom tothinghoodisextensional.Or,strictly tion m tensional istosaythatm two fusionscanbeofexactlythe m ver, if e stuf so m i ght beoddtotalkaboutpersistenceof a f oneisaMaxim ke senseatall? a . ny thing-jointsinrealitythatthey Isthatpossiblef e f sothatthethingstillpersists nt doesnotm a ic particleisnotphysically kes som position goesagainst Theproblem a e l Nihilist,itm portionsofstuff e a o reological sum tter f r suchasim e o nt thereis r whether e stuffis isthat
a kes p le s
CEU eTD Collection things couldhavebeenm m
plausible atall).Thesereasonsarethefollowing: addition tothings(hereIquoteonlyeightofth a kes sensef 6) 5) 4) 3) 2) 1) N. Markosian(2006)liststenotherreas
stuf problem postulating fewerobjectsthancom Restricted Nihilism device todescribeagunkyworld;theprobl the onlyobjectsthereare,areatom atom portion of able togiveanaccountoftheirheterogeneity,sayingforinstancethatonesub- be nothom these are: Mereological Essentialism objects haveafusion which isalsoaphysicalobject,and postulating stuffissupposedtoanswer stuff isincludedinourcom believing instuffreflectsthewayweuseourlanguage, there aretwom it ispossiblethattheworldconsists it ispossiblethatthereareextended f constitutingbothastatueandlum s; thism o r theInterm issolvedbyco-constitution:this stuf The PrincipleofUnrestrictedFusions ogeneous; anditisonlyifwe i f ght beaproblem f e a illing thesim reological principlesthat de ofdifferentstuff. ediate Nihilist.In , likevanInwa m which saysthatevery physical objecthasitsparts onsense ontology, p le isredandtheotherblue, f o m 92 r th onsense ontologydoes, solelyofgunk–therearenom
s; pos all of m gen, andingeneralforanyontology e MereologicalNihilistwhobelievesthat em e ons whyoneshouldbelieveinstuff p theproblem reological sim seem of , sinceIthinkthatthelasttwoarenot have stuffinour thesecasesitm tulating stuf is tosaythatthereoneportionof clay, em tobeatoddswithcom arisesalsoforthebelieverin which saysthatanyphysical ofcoincidentobjects;the p f willgivetheNihilista les; thosesim ontology thatweare a kes sensetoaskif The Principleof m e p reological les m on sense; i ght
CEU eTD Collection analogy withregionsof space,orregionsof portions ofstuff,according toanyontology.Po objects. Ontheotherhand,thereseem restricted view,variousNihilism applied tothingsonlyononeview–theUn governed bydistinctm between thingsandstuff:theyare(atl reasons f – IbelievethatMereologicalNihilism 6) sinceIdonotbelievethatcom since Idonotbelievethatstatuesorlum they com natural languageshouldbeanym 2), sinceIdonotthinkthatontologicalso Out ofthesereasonsIfind3)and4)really One rem o sam stuff –takeawayanysub-portionofapor portion ofstuff,andthatallsub-portions nothing controversialinsayingthata sense seem hand, seem exists forexactlyaslongallofits essentially; togethertheseprinciples e r believinginstuf from e .
a com rk m s torejectthem s toacceptbothprinciples m a onsense ontologyorna de byMarkosianseem e reological principles. f thatm m s o including, u on sensede both, re st beappealingtoanyMereologicalNihilist. plausible thantheotheranswers s tobe isa p s of lutions em at leastasappliedtoobjects east accordingtom 93 clayareobjects.AndIam space-tim true ontologyofthings,and3)4)are livers anyclearontologicalclaim nothingoddinapplyingthisprincipleto entail thateachfusionofphysicalobjects does notallowtoapplythisprinciple s to restricted Com tural language.Iam The PrincipleofUnrestrictedFusionsis partsexist;com as appliedtoportionsofstuff ny twoportionsofstuffm rtions ofstuffareconsidered ratherby plausible.Iam of stuffareessentialforanyportion tion ofstuffandtheportionisnot ployed incom point outtoanim e: anyregionsofspace-tim position view.Anysortof o st ontologicaldoctrines) notconvincedby1)and m m on sense,theother notconvincedby5) onsense ontologyand ; however,com portant difference notconvincedby precisely because a -thereis ke another s . Inshort e fuse m on
CEU eTD Collection tem Parts DoctrinepresentedbyLewisandSider,as as onetem tem things thataretem presented bySider.Anim speaks of this principleexhaustsChisholm Chisholm distinctive of nothing oddin into abiggerregion,andanyportionsofstu “logical constructs”(1970). thing anditself only betweenagiventem relation ofconstitutioninfact.Healsosays and sothatthereisonlyidentityin“al He alsosaysthattem parts. Chisholm don’t changetheirparts,andthelatterarefou sense intendedinthispaper!).Theform things andtem poral parts.Thepointof m poral parts.Inotherwords–itseem It seem The secondprinciple-PrincipleofMereologicalEssentialism (1989,pp.65-82).However,Iam constitution poral partwithoutanypropertem stuf porally non-intactthings(clear scattered s thatthispositionisquitesim . speaksexplicitlyof Four-dim f poral partsoffour-dim . Usuallytheapplicationof poral partscannotbest relation,asholdingbetweentwotypesofthings:tem regionsofspace-tim ensional thingsthat poral partanditsel
portant differenceis a king theserem ’ s position. “f our-dim s that er arethingsexistingatsom ensional objectsdonotseem oose andpopularsense”,whichisadisguised notentir 94 poral that a“strictandphilosophical”identityholds e or rictly identicalwithfour-dim aslongthethingrem This isforthefollowingreason:Chisholm r-dim changepartsduringtheircareersarem ly thisisnottheconstitutionrelationin f, andbetweenthewholefour-dim a en ff fuseintoabiggerportion,andthereis
rks istosaythatonChisholm this principletothingsisattributedR. thatf a partthatconsistsofm parts,andnot,asincaseoftheTem sional” thingsandtheir“tem ilar totheTem scattered ensional thingsthatsurvivechangesof ely surewhetherstrictapplicationof o r Chisholm portionsofstuff. poral PartsDoctrineas thetem e a tim tohaveanyproper ins intact,itcounts a ny other,sm –isevenm e inwhichthey ensional things, porally intact porally intact ’ poral parts”. s viewthere ensional poral aller o e re re
CEU eTD Collection of itssub-portions,becauseitisindividuated so cannotsurviveanychangesofthem very m on stuffandthings.Athingthat som is som Nonetheless, itseem I claim tem comes intoexistence from theoriginalportion, no scatteredportionsofstuff no scatteredportionsofstuff.OnlythenIcansaythefollowing: accom intact thingsgoingoutofexistenceandm as aloss,sinceIbelieveinscatteredportionsofstuff. portion, evenifthesub-portionhasbeensepa when thissub-portionisannihilated(seebe view andonthepresentview.Onm is anim portions, andanyslightest changewillresult or gaintheirsub-portions. Inotherwords– porally intactobjectsholds. e thing that m e u At anyrate,itseem However, inordertodrawtheanalogybetweenChisholm It seem –MereologicalUniversalism thing thatgoesoutofexistencewhenever portant differenceinthewaywhichchangeofpartsisconceivedonChisholm ch likeaportionofstuff–thisthing odations inm s thereisananalogybetweenCh persists s that , thentheanalogybetweenportionsofstuffandChisholm y theory.Im through thischange. s thatalldoctrinesapartf no , andso ontologicaldoctrineallowsporti
ceasestoexistwheneveranypartofitisrem u y st assum viewa if itistruethatwheneverasub-portionseparated ) allowthi . Aporti portion goesoutofexistenceandanew 95 portions ofstuffareindividuated bytheirsub- by sam e rated from genuine lossofasub-por is individuatedbysam low). Merechangeofpositionthesub- in theportion’sgoingout of , fo on ofstuffalsocannotsurviveanychange isholm apartofthingisrem ngs tochange,lose,orgaintheirparts. y r thesakeofthisanalogy,thatthereare talkofstuff,Im r e om ness ofthesesub-portions.Still,there ’ MereologicalEssentialism othersub-portions,doesnotcount s positionandthepresentedview ons ofstufftochange,lose, if itistruethatthereare e ’ s talkoftem ness ofitsparts,and tion ofstuffisonly oved, andthereis u st m existence.Ido oved behaves a ke som (andas porally i an ’ e s
CEU eTD Collection original sentenceexpressedinterm replace itwiththetalkabout do withexistenceofaparticularportion regions ofspace-tim another, sm any biggersub-portionwouldresultintheor stuff-talk soundverylikething-talk and weclaim about things.Afterallwequantifyoverportions stuff-talk expressedinterm for things. (like T.Siderf friends ofUnrestrictedCom them like, andtheportionofstuffrem there isanattem always do.Thingsdonothavetheirpartse m by Markosian:stuffandthingsarediffere aside” oneatom understood aschangeinstuff’sarrangem not believethatthiseffectcanbesim 37 Seeal e reological principles.Thingsdonotalways verysim so K.M
However, stuffisnotentirelyunproblem
aller portion’sstartingtoexist.Th thatportionsofstuffstandinva c Dani o ilar tom wecandestroyagivenportionofstuff.Only r instance)actuallybelievein p t m el (2003). e, canbescattered.Apar a de byMarkosiantoelim e reologically unres s ofportionsst position), andIam
some stuff a s ofportionsstuff: ins thesam 37 . Theanswertothisobjectionhasalreadybeengiven p . Hereisanexam ly broughtaboutbyrem e nt. 96 tricted objects(objectsasconceivedbythe stuff.Changethearrangem ssentially, whereasportionsofstuffdo.Still, rious relationstooneanother.Thism ticular arrangem uff m nt, sincetheyaregovernedbydifferent e existence ofstuff,butthey“disguise”stuff It isnotthecasethatbysim . Thispropertyofportionsstuffm havefusions,whereasportionsofstuff iginal portion’sceasingtoexist,andin inate thetalkabout is becauseportionsofstuff,justlike inclinedtothinkthatsom atic ofstuff,weascribepropertiestothem i . Them ght beconsideredasadisguisedtalk ple givenbyMarkosian.The a in problem e nt ofm annihilation oval ofasub-portion portions a tter hasnothingto withstuffisthat e nt anywayyou e ofanatom Universalists ofstuffand p le “putting a kes the a kes of , CEU eTD Collection can betranslatedinto:
unfair toQuine,sincefor him the sim hand, andthingsonthe other hand.Thingssim Quine doesnotspeakclearlyofa following: nam can bequantifiedoverisactuallyathingduetothefam believe thatquantif seem ascribing propertiesandrelationsto,thatm as ithasbeenalreadysaid,isallwecan like thetalkaboutthings.Mereelim term e “portion”inthephrase“aportionofstuff”thatm s, thepossibilityof ly thattobeisavalueof s “There issom is red” saying thattobeisintherangeofreference ofapronoun”(1953,p.13) variable. Interm “To beassum This solutionm However, Idonotfindthisobjectiontoo another sub-portionthatisred” “The portionof ilarity ofstuff-talktothing-talkplausi 2 , andsom
e ication isontologicallyco stuff, e e d asanentityis,purelyand stuff, i stuf ght notseem s ofthecategories
quantifying over s 3 f , suchthat thatconstitutesthes s 1 thereisnodistinction between m , suchthat thing satisfactoryforsom ination of s , butofan variable (1951and1953).ActuallyQuinesaysthe 2
m ≠ s
1 do withportionsofstu a s
97 3 kes portionsofstuffproblem constitutes thesphereandthereissom m a , ble. Afterall,itisnot traditional gram thisterm ke s m 1 p isthefusionof s stuf itting inanysense.Theideathatwhatever ly areportionsofm entity phere hasasub-portionthatisblueand sim threatening. ThisisbecauseIdonot f p a sim willnotsolvetheproblem ly, tobereckonedasthevalueofa . Butthisrem kes thetalkaboutstuffsoundvery e one whofindstheobjectionfrom ilar tothings.Especially,asit ous sloganascribedtoQuine, m a s r, thisam 2 a ff: quantifyingover,and and tter orstuffontheone theuseofsingular a a rk wouldbeperhaps tter, andportionsof s 3 , atic. ounts roughlyto s 2 isblue,and . Rather,
e stuf s f 3 ,
CEU eTD Collection in factathree-placerelati believe thattobeiscarvenatureatits them like. Andwecanaddportionsof over: m m m m want tosaythattim m speaking, things? Does thispossibilityofquantifyingovertim Ana andaparticulartim thereby sayingthatthereisatwo-placerelation“beingm also bequantifiedover.Onem does notseem what thingsthereare.Thingsareentities.But distinctive ontologicalstructureandanyjoints m 39 38 express thissentenceinthef t i m Thefriendoftem Onem a a i a a ght wanttosaythattheyareentitiesexistindependentlyofourm e, but terial thingsdo.Fairenough.W terial content–sohowcantheybethings terial things,andsoletusassum tter sim thingsinanysense. For onethingthenIdonotagreethattobe ∃ hereIassum i a ght ofcourseexpandthenum x terial things,places,andtim ∃ p y ly arethings(1976).Obviously,Quinedoesnotbelievethatthereisany ∃ so.Still,thereareothercandida z (x=a&Mxy&Mxz) poral partswould Idon’tbelievethatthisis e t es andplacesarethings? h on “beingm at wedonot e (perhapsnotevenam o llowing notation
a rather saythattwotem bel i rried to…at…”. ght wantto ber ofplaces stuf i e e e ve i havethenthreesortsofentitiesthatwecanquantify thatwe f es. W , n orsom t joints. Butforanother– e m poral e 98 utter thesentence:“Anawasm canaddtothislistpropertiesaswell,ifwe don’tbelieveinabstractthings:dowereally They arenotm can onesaythattherearenootherentities?It the basicrelation“beingm 39 tes forentities,likeplacesandtim actuallythecase.Herewespeakonlyof ifwebelieveonlyinm es e innaturethatwouldhaveanybearingon : o part stuf m and placesm poral part e s. nt oftim istobeavalueofvariable,sinceI f , if welike.Still,thisdoesnotm a s ofAnawerem rried at”, e, butaninterval) a terial, inthesenseofhaving ean thattheyare,strictly I cannotseehowthetruth a M rri , thatholdsbetween ed” bysayingthatitis a a rried oneateach terial things? a i 38 rried twice”, nd, justlike . W es thatcan e m W i a ght ke e
CEU eTD Collection objections ofasim them category toit,nam properties ortim think thatquantificationisontologically of thisQuineanslogancouldcontributetoreif 40 over spatio-tem things: dividingstuffintoportionscorresponds portions ofstuff.Thisanswerperhapscalls with extendedportionof sized sim portions ofstuff.W objections com thing aretwo inclined toobjectinthiswaystillwantsa But thisis thing. Unless,ofcourse,one’sdefinitionathingis“whatcanbepossiblyre-identified”. identified. Now,Idon’tthinkthatbeingpossi not talkaboutthings,ifoneiscom objections ofthiskindseem m And likewiseoneshouldgive anaccountofspace- preserved: ifoneisam good reasonstobeam space-tim Thi onism s actuallythingsindisguisehasabr i incaseofm s Another questionrelatedtotheconceptionofstuffiswhethertherearesm Moreover, itseem anobject e including.Thegeneralidea behindthisviewis p les, theyaref not e adefinitionofthingthatIem different i poral points,ifonewantstobeam on rai from es youdoaccepttheseentitie a terial thingss e ilar sort:likeforinstancethatitisnotacceptabletobelieveandquantify onist aboutth onist about ly stuff,withoutanyneedofreifyingitsportions. h s atever thesm . ed by illed withorm properties, thenIhavetosa s thattheobjectionquantifyingoverportionsofstuffm stuf TedSi s tobethefollo things, onegivesanaccountof partsin hould alsoworkform
ings, oneshouldalso,consistently, f ; der i andif allest things n di m scussi a they itted to de of com tim on. Si 99 for anotherprincipledifferentiatingstufffrom y thatbeingpossiblyre-identif e pointsinterm wing: onecannotsincerelysaythatdoes oader application.Therem stuf m are points,theyf s inyourontology,youcanstilladdanother are:extendedsub-atom ying portionsofstuff.Ifyoureallywantto existenceofanyentitiesthatcanbere- onism itting, andsowheneveryouquantifyover bly re-identifiedisacriterionofbeing todividingspaceintoregions.Andthis that thedirectionofexpl der’s vi f ploy here.However,ifpeoplewhoare . e If reological m incaseof sim y thatIdonotknowwheretheir ew i s ofthewholespace-tim p s les areextended,theyf t be am h anyotherentity.Andsoifone has term at any onist onist aboutanyotherentity, s ofanaccountthewhole. argum illed withpoint-sized
anation shouldalwaysbe 40
ic particlesorpoint- . Thebottom ent i t ght bevarious ied andbeinga h at e. worksfor lineof allest illed a kes
CEU eTD Collection between them point-sized sim between twosolidm any extendedportionof nature. Oneof portion ofstuffm extended correspondence doesnotholdincaseofthings.Therefore,eveniftherearethesm 42 41 possible worldsinwhichthephysicallawsar seem physically indivisiblesim world, m to thecriterionofphysicalindivisibilityforin m sim objects arem be som di Seeal Stillth vi a terial entitiescanm si p 1) closed, bl le. Itseem s thatitisonlytheactualphysicallawsth e e. Thi m so: The conceptionofpoint-sizessim According toMinim
ere m e P.Si i t things, therecannotbethesm ght stillbedivisibleinotherpossi a s phy woul i g h m . Accordingtothisdistinctionthingscanbeeither: e si them t taphysically indivisible.They or p b ons (2004,p.373),D.W cal s thattheyaretheonly les, therearethreetopologies d beacaseofext e u n l st thenbeaportionthatoccupiesexactlyonespatialpoint. y o i isthatwewillneedto su ndi a ch eet thiscriterion.Anyextendedsim terial objects vi stuf p si p o bl les postulatedfor ssib e si a f
l Nihilism . Theothe l e m e wo nded si p l 3.2.2. MinimalNihilism e rld s ot . Zi 42 in m . Givendescriptionofm her t m p wh m theonlyobjectsarepoint-sizedsim l r istheproblem e e h s bei allest rm ich p an poi m 100 les postulate aninf an (1996,pp.5-19). e differentthoseentitiesm o e ng m exam fall underthestrongestcriterionofbeinga of objectsaffectingthepossibilitycontact taphysically indivisibleobjects-noother u ble worlds.Thisisthecaseof m r nt p extended stance), evenifindivisibleintheactual at m i -si e h ght posesom t y ple byP.Sim a zed si sically in phy a ke them si m cal of portionsofstuff.Thesm p p l l d e y possibilityof i les (thataresim nite num s. i i v ndi i sib indivisible.Insom a e vi terial objectsinterm l problem ons (discussedbelow):it e ex si bl e, soi ten ber of i d ght bedivisible e d
n s oftopological sim genuine fact sim p
les according p t p les are p h les. These extended ere woul les within contact e other allest allest s of 41 d . CEU eTD Collection outerm 44 43 objects inlinewithdefinitionsform particles –itispartiallyopenandclosed. never reachit m and doesnotincludetheboundaryparticles–itisopen.Theobjectwithopenboundaries its boundaryparticles,itisaclosedobject.If there”, sinceitonly“attem space, italwaysturnsoutthat youhavetotakeasm open boundary
(1997) foradi Idonot i In ght becharacterisedasonewhosebounda 3) 2) open, fact o y The differencebetweenthesetopologiesde parts of of sim (D2) points incom (D1) I willusetheconceptsof
partially closedandopen. Iam st skinofsim i is apartof n t not e
scussi seem x nd t Object or p 44 is a le partsof surewhet x . Iftheobjectconsistsofinnerparticlesandonly o on vari and regionsnotf s t t closed object a o ke ast besom x x m is p adjacent toaregionwhichis p on withR,andtheunionoftworegionsisaconnectedregion les ornot ts” toreach,butne her wecanhaveanon- ance onwhet y ous approachest adjacent toregionR e such thateachm t h i
ng l =df 43 i k illed byanypartof . If closed,open,andpartiallyclosedopen e am ulated byD.Zim x her boundari theobjectconsistsof is aspatiallylocatedobject;andforevery ver actuallyreaches,agiven point inspace. ovi o t h ng spot e boundary a 101 vague andnon-form e ll m step “backwards”,because the objectconsistsonlyofitsinnerparticles ries approachthelim b =df es ofobject : er ofAis
i f y pends onwhethertheobjectincludes notfilledbyapartof theregionexactlyf probl ou t m
x e
h rm i em nk y s are adjacent bothtoregionsfilledby an (1996,p.6): . itsinnerparticlesaswellof ou havefoundi al concept real en some tities o the boundaryis“notreally it ofaboundary,but i on ofanopenobject illed by t oftheboundary x s r , thereisasetA l n o o cat t . See i on i y x such that n A. has no agi Varzi . An ven
CEU eTD Collection that Ihaveinm posit anytopologicalproblem ranging acrossthesam m should beunderstoodratherasfieldsextended believe thatintheactualworldsim this isnotonlytheactualworldthatwearetalkingabouthere.Iam application totheviewpresentedbym with theirconstitutivem 46 45 “perfect objects com extended objectare.Oneofthenaïveviewson objects beingingenuinecontactcannotbeanyfu continuous region.IfIbelievedthatextendedobjectshadparts,couldsaytwo occupy havenopointsincom they areadjacent,inthem SeeP.vanInwagen(1990,pp.33-37). o In st probablypenetrateeachotherandwem a si cont One m (D3) there isnosetofsim regions f parts; and (D4) I willsaythattwoextendedm m i l a act r m
xisa pose anotherobjectwhentheyareincontact x ” (2004,p.416). a i is an nner: ght objectatthispointthat i illed bypartsof nd here x D.W is neitheropennorclosed partially openobject open object e 46 regionsofspace.Andas . Zi . a m eaning providedby(D tter istheold- m
p e s form rm le partsof
=df x m an (1996,p.9).Thi and regionsnotf on, andifth x p a les ar is aspatiallylocatedobject; a odern physics.However,weneedtorem terial obj terial objectsareingenuinecontactif =df 102 x e extendedphysicallyindivisibleentitiesthat f suchthateachm a shioned Newtonianpicturewhichhasno i x viewofobjectsas ght m across som ese regionsadduptooneconnectedor is aspatiallylocatedobject; ects, neverthelessIwould liketoaddress a rther apartthantwoadjacentpartsofone m findforcesbelongingtodifferentfields s terial com 1). Thatis,iftheregionsofspacethey illed byanypartof ki u nd ofcont ch asthism 45 e regionsofspace.Thesefields . Thisisthenotionofcontact position saysthattwoorm act e i m s odern pictureshouldnot entitiesfillingupspace what b x er isadjacentbothto verym has properparts;and
x NedM
u ch inclinedto a x rkosi andonlyif has proper e m a b n cal er that o l s re a
CEU eTD Collection reach thelim the levelof possible forthem m reason isthatthisapossiblewayforthingstobe. the problem dem objects thatdonotcom contact isnecessaryincaseofparts com extended objects;com Mereological Nihilism because itshedssom genuine contacttom com have tobeequallyclose. com ontologically onapar,weshouldhavethesa m closeness. Acceptingadifferentlevelofcl contact withanotherobject,itseem contact andtopology.Therefore,Iwilldiscu a a terial com tters forcom position wastrue. a position neveroccurs,Ishouldnotbereally position. Soitseem nd thatdistinctobjects canbeingenuine If com One m The requirem basicparticles:wetaketwopartic of position: if it ofcloseness.This i position occurred,onem genuinecontactinaworldwithpoint-sizedsim ght saythatsinceIbelieveMereologicalNihilism position, andifallparts– tobeasclos e a
nt of terial com e position doesnotoccur,but is lightonhowproblem partscom s reasonabletorequire pose anyotherobject.Th not motivated genuinecontactbeing e aspartsoftheseare.Ifweconsidercom position. NeverthelessIwanttodiscussthisproblem isacaseofgenuinecontact.If e togetherto composing s thatag byproblem i ght wanttosaythefollowing:evenifgenuine 103 ss theproblem oseness wouldseem parts oneverylevelofcom les andputthem com that oneverylevelofcom a ain wehavetoreachthesam worriedaboutapplicationofproblem m tic thedoctrineofpoint-sizesatom anobject,itm possible concernstheverypossibilityof e contact atall.Ithink that thisisnot
is wouldbetosaythat weshouldnot pose acom closenessofpartsoneverylevel s stem because of m i ofgenuinecontacthere ng from p p soclosetogetherthatthey lex objectatall,itm les f wewanttobringthem i ght notoccurincaseof theproblem unjustified.Ifcontact illed withm topologyofspatially istrueandsothat position theparts position –are position from ofgenuine e a lim tter. The u here it of st be as if s is. s of to
CEU eTD Collection object thereby. distinct objectstocom not asufficientconditionforcom com objects thatarenotpartsofanyfurthersi contact: plausible atall.Theideaherewouldbeto occur onlyintwocases: case oftwoadjacentregions ofspacethatare between them open objects,evenwhentheyaretouchingeach other astheadjacentregionsofspaceare.On otherhand,ifwetakeintoaccounttwo continuous entity.Thereforeitseem is stillinf other’s boundaryparticles.Butifanytwobounda Therefore, thecontactisnotgenuine.Twocl bigger thanadistancebetweentwoadjacents In anyothercom position waspossibleatall,itseem 2) 1)
Given thethreepossibletopologiesofobj genuine point oftheotherobject. that everyopenboundarypointofoneobject when aclosedobjectisincontactwithanopenobject, when twopartiallyclosedand i nitely m . Thereforeinbothcases thedist contactincaseofpartsoneobjectand b ination thedistancebetween a ny pointsbetweenthem e intogenuinecontact position tooccu s thattwo s that 104 introduceadistinctionbetweentwokindsof with eachother,anddonotcom ngle object.Butthisseem osed objectswhenputtogether“touch”each genuinecontactwouldbeanecessary,but , asitisbetweenanytwopointsof genuinely touchingeach other,inthesense ance betweentwoobjects islargerthanin ub-regions ofcontinuousregionspace. closed objectscannotbeasclosetoeach openobjectsareincontactsuchaway twoobjectsbeinginallegedcontactis ry particlesaretouchingeachother,there otherthereisstillasinglesparepoint ects, itseem r. Itwouldhavetobepossiblefortwo isincontactwithaclosedboundary alleged s thatgenuinecontactcan contactincaseof s unm pose afurther otivated. If any CEU eTD Collection The boundarypoint-sizedatom m im m their boundarysim the boundaryofotherobject. every closedpointontheboundaryofoneobject would beveryunlikelytoingenuinecont would notbelongtooneofthem that theyaregenuinelyadjacentandthereis 48 47 whose topologywouldallowtobringitgenuinecontactwiththeotherpart. is thatifwewouldliketoreplaceapartof points ofonethetwohalvesaretobeclos boundary, andwhichistohaveanopen and partiallyopen.Intheform Another possibilityisthatthenewboundariesof boundary open(Iassum have toitsboundariesclosed,whileth sim case, wewouldencounterseriousproblem nam penet exactly thesam o fi t el Thi h a o If penetrable, atleastwithresp e ds cannot terial thingcannotoccupyapositionthatisalready occupiedbyanotherm tivation f e p r we l r s ler objects.Ifweweretodivideacom field y abl probl t h wan I rejectthepossibilityof At thesam e e probl s .
d em t bet i
sp to o hasnot e lay. Ho
r thism em regionsofspace.A th o t in a ofcoi l k l y e
o i p wev hi tim f m les, norcantheirboundarysim
ng t sim n ove com penet ci e e itseem r, th di o p e dowi les ng st thatwedividean r ere m abl as o
e at er case–whatw e . They t s shouldbenoexcep h ues andl s f nd u ect toentitiesof f
som field st b s thattwothings coincidingsim . Fortwopa r this om e can e so t s h o theverynatureof m u i m ng t m f eans thattwofieldscannot be en e p ru s. boundary? h pe erg 105 p s wh at les ex anobject,wewouldha lex objectintotwohalves,oneofthem net ed, andwhicharetobeopen? act, sincethatwouldrequireaperfectm i not evenonesinglepointbetweenthem y object bybreakingitalongastraightline). s ould decidewhichobjectistohaveaclosed , th m e otherwouldhavetoatleastone rtially closedandpartiallyopenobjectsit r at ile tryingtodecom clu thetwoobjectswouldbepartiallyclosed thesam o wouldhaveto“touch”anopenpointon ed by is id p re wi that areincontactcannotshareanyof les d i tion here.Itisbecauseifweallowfor n Inthelattercase–whichboundary p ea h g 47 ot les coincide.Iftheform del th . Them her fi a e p y e m s itsap knownast kind o a ssib el terial entities.Theym ds, dependi really coincideev ility o p 48 a licatio in andperhapstheonly . Thisistosaythatone h pose suchobjectsinto f e probl ve tofindanewpart so n aswell.Ho m ng onwhat e field em Afurtherissue
of a s en iftheyare terial thing. ran er wasthe coi forcest wev g n would i ci n u dence, e g st be a that r, th o tch: v h e e e r CEU eTD Collection im gunk that“fillsin”m and point-sizedatom Brentano, andwhichoffersanaccountofm problem coincidence ofm unconvincing becauseitbindsim that is,arewhollysurroundedbyothe im im extension. Otherwisewewouldhavetocom extended objectscom coincidence ofpoint-sizedatom 49 other, andnotwiththeirintrinsicnature genuine contactispossiblesinceboundarypoint-sizedatom exist onlyasboundariesofextendedobjects. onl Sider, inwhichobjectsarenotim that therecannotbeanyrealproblem im them case thattheatom the relationofdependencebetweenpoint-sized through eachother.Suchobject donot accessible from so m im claim T.Si p possible asappliedtom penetrable onlyonthatpartswhicharecom penetrability, sayingforinstancesom penetrability. Thepoint-sizedatom y e our y n s to“siton”–forinstanceincaseswhenth viewisthatcoincidenceim e , coincidenceinsuchacaseis notproblem der (2000)cl trab Nonetheless, itisworthm I findthisdoctrinequitem d . D.Zim e ility an fin itio theactualworld. n d o so ai m f “m a m s som th e terial objectshasbeenpr s rm t is d aterial” th s. Theultim h a an (1996,pp.27-29)presents at posed ofthem terial e t e fin h a how springintoexis ere i terial objects,isth itio obj penetrable, sowhen at p n
s possible at ects asconceivedinaccordance with alread not s positedbyde o fall underourdefinitionofm s ate constituent s, wehavetoallowalsoforcoincidenceofthewhole its th hi penetrability with y e ng object sterious. Firstof y ex ntioning that e p . Therew s are l 49 clu east r atic. o . b d e i i l finition alone.Therem e 106 onabl em thing alongtheselines:am s co n a e dependent pushedtowardseachother I, atanyrate,wanttoclaim t te oposed asasolutiontothegenuinecontact
up withaveryim tence wheneverthereisanewboundaryfor . W h posed ofatom Theboundariesofobjectsareclosed.But rial objectsinterm e objectgetsbroken;theyarealreadythere. ese possi in e realbearerofextension,andgrants r atom atom e i of theworldis,accordingtothisdoctrine, ould benoreasontorestrainfrom cid e anontologythatacceptssom d n coi e e an ontologythatoriginallycom relationsthattheatom all,itisnotentirelycleartom n fin ce o s andatom n entities,inthesensethattheycan bl e s. Asolutionofthissortseem ci “m e worl a dence ofm f m terial aterial th s cancoincide. a s thatarenotboundaryatom terial o ourdefinitionof“m ds whi i objects, butnonetheless,asSider ght plausible accountofpartial less gunkis.Itisnotthe be aworld,accordingto s ofboth:atom a in b t c thatcoincidenceis j they donotstop,butpass e g h arenom ects. Sid ri s ” in al object term a e s standtoeach r’s id terial thingis ol s, andt s o ogi aterial”. And f
ea isth cal less gunk e sortof h l e y at e s from
what t this en h i s
i s, s s
CEU eTD Collection dif be dividedinanypossibleworldisthepoi sim sm com sized atom have partsthatareinquasi-contact. objects (ifthereareany)whosepartsin diverse topologiesofobjectsm the caseofdecom coincide withgunkfrom there cannotbeanygunkattheselocations,si boundary. Isthereanygunklocatedexactlyatth object wecanfindpoint-sizedatom objects. Anotherpeculiarissueisthatonth It seem It allowsonlyfor concerning extendedm m a f allest partsare,andifforsom de ofpoint-sizedsim p i position. W culties withpoint-sizedsim les, wewanttoarriveatsom These problem All theseinvestigationsshowhowdif s thenthattheycoincidealsowith s aresom h en wetrytogetthebo some position itputsstrongrequirem e tim s positedbypoint-sizedsim extendedobjectstobeingenuinecontactwith a theotherobject. terial objectscom es thoughtofnotasrealentitiesbutratherlim p les. Itseem p a tter for les –cantheybereal? e thing th e reasonswearenothappywithacceptingextended s th s coin the possibilityofcontact,thereare posed at cannotbedivided.Theonlyentitythat atom at anyaccountofcontactanddecom 107 genuine contact,butthevastnum f ttom e boundaryofanobjectadjacenttoanother i nce thengunkfrom cult it nt-sized sim ciding withthosefrom less gunkthatistherealfillerofextended onlyofpoint-sizedatom e pointsoccupiedbyatom ofcom e p nts onreplacem les m is toconceiveofthem
i ght bethereasonwhypoint- posite objectsandseewhatthe p le. However,givenallthese oneobjectwouldhaveto ent ofparts.Actuallyif some anotherobject’s s looksveryodd. its ofanalysis s? a some others,andin terial worldas ber ofobjects Itseem com position s that p lex CEU eTD Collection presented byP.Sim two viewsonwhichsim according towhichthereisonlyoneextendedsi constraints onwhatthenatureofsim 50 N. Markosian(1998) and replacesitwithTheExtendedSim Correspondence Principle”whichbindsspatialextensionwithhavingparts: problem provide som is com (1970), I.Kant Ot her aut m “Interm parts correspondingtosub-regionsofitslocus(2004, p.376) region, calledits (ESP): Everyphysicallybasicitem occupies (2004,p.372) (GCP): Anyextendedobjecthaspartsco Sim s withpoint-sizedsim itted totheviewthattherearenotcom hors whoem ons’ m e (1755-1770,pp.45-65),A.N. W interestingviewsonwhatextendedsim e 3.2.3. IntermediateNihilismsAndExtendedSimples diate Nihilism a in argum ons (2004)andthem 50 pl . NoneofthesetwoviewsisNihilism oy p locus t les areextendedentities: h e concept ent f
, butithasnophysicalproperpa s ” isanam o r existenceof i p on ofanext p les. Sim les is, p les Principle: h i t e a head (1978). 108 xi yet acceptingpluralityofsim (sim m e f ons rejectstheso-called“Geom e a nded lly continuoussim m o rresponding tothepartsofregionit pl extendedsim posite m r variousdoctrinesputtingdif thephysicallyindivisiblesim p e) occupiesatanytim le isMonism at p les m om
are: a i ght be. sincenoneofthetwoauthors terial objects.However,they
R .
rts. Inparticularithasno J. p ). Iwouldliketodiscuss les startswithf B p o les viewpresentedby skovi p ch les (thedoctrine e anextended (1922), p les view R a . m f
e Harre e iliar rent tric CEU eTD Collection http://search.eb.com 51 The criterionforbeingasim view becauseitoffersanother,quiteinteres departs f from lim behave likespatialpointsinsom sm
decided onapriorigrounds.Extendedsim som separated. Thisim indivisibility criterion,issom be saidaboutextendedphysicallyindivisible only thathavingspatialextensiondoesnotim the physicsrecogniseassim indivisibility criterionshouldbereallyapplie they infacthaveisam size physics describestheseobjectsas be aslargeagalaxy(2004,p.378).Anotherex “Subatom all thattheirsizecannotbedetectedbyav ited spacesincetheydisplaysom 51 e eachother. thing isasim . However,itisnotcertainthattheyhavenosizewhatsoever.Perhapsareso This characterisationdoesnotsayinvirtue Quite adifferentviewofsim An exam r om i c particle” anyindivisibilitycriterionwhatso ple ofsuchextendedparticleis / eb/article-60729 possibility issetbyphysicallaws.AccordingtoSim p le ornotshouldbedi a tter ofem Encyclopaedia Britannica p p les, ifnotsom le objectisonthisviewthecriterionofm
e [AccessedOct thing thatcannot e otherrespec pirical behaving e p nuclearfor les hasb discovery. Therefore,itseem p e ober, 31,2005] 109 les m ting viewofwhatbeingasim thing thatisphysicallyindivisible? scovered inphysicalinquiry,andcannotbe likepointsinspace,havingnom ply d toSim sim t: wecannotputinfinitelym ailable apparatus.Nonethelesstheydonot een presentedbyN.Markosian.Theview ever. NeverthelessIwanttom a wave-particle,whichinprinciplem am ces thatkeepthem having parts.Andthisisexactlywhatcan i be dividedintopartsthatinturncan from p ght havedifferentsizes–butwhat les. Asim ples areelectronorquark.Them of whatsom ons’ extendedsim Encyclopaedia . p le, accordingtothephysical e thing isasim atsom a xim s thatthephysical p Britannica les. W p e a a distanceapart le am ny ofthem l continuity: on, whether
p e h le. Itsays ntion this e at would ounts to. asurable Online. odern i ght in CEU eTD Collection
som be, andinsteadofthem becom consequence isthatthingsgooutofexiste Another consequenceisthateverycom there isasim closed objects(orm to hisoriginaldoctrine. Oneoptionisto or m believe inexistenceofm two distinctthingscanbeincontactwithoutl constitute onebiggersim m (understood assom a tter thatusedtoconstituteseparatethings,oncearrangedinacontinuousm e o stuffisannihilatedintheprocessofcom re fam e The Maxim if andonly x p.405) subset ofR,and(ii)everypointinR no continuousregionofspace,R,suchthat(i)theoccupiedby In ordertoavoidtheseunwantedconseque The viewseem A consequenceofthisviewisthatwhenev continuouswithanythingelse.After isa iliar physicalobjects,liketwoorm maximally continuousobject
p le. Therefore,wehavesi a e lly ContinuousViewofSim thing overandabovethestu x o s quiteincredibleatfirstgl is a re precisely:between anewbiggersim p a le (2004,pp.417-425). maximally continuousobject ny counter-intuitiv =df p p le springsintoexistence.Thisisnottosaythat m 110 le go backtothedistinction betweenopenand openandclosedboundary points,which,I p x objectisascatteredobject.Yetanother e objects,resultingfrom nce whenevertheycom x oosing theirdistinctness.Italsoforcesusto les liketables,chairs,andhum com falls withinsom o isaspatiallycontinuousobjectandthere i ng intocontact.Theseareonlythe re peopleforinstance. ff) thatceasetobe.Andsotheportionsof p ance. Itgoesfaragainstourintuitionsthat nces, Markosianproposestwoalterations les (MaxCon): er thereisaportionofcontinuousstuff, i ng intocontactthingssim
e
objectoranother(2004, necessarily, connectinganytwo e intocontactand x x p isasim ly ceaseto an beings. is aproper things a nner p le
CEU eTD Collection closed fortheother(thiscaseisreservedpe boundary point,butitisnotthecasethat the nakedeyethattheyshareaboundarypoint, only kindsofcontactthattwo contact betweentwopeoplewouldbeim continuous entityoccursonlywhenanopenand think, boilsdowntothesam am problem whenever theycom really thecase. of stuffgoesoutexistence.Incasetw existence isam properties previouslyascribedtothatthing.Andsosayahum if athinggoesoutofexiste stuff thatsupportallthepropertiesahum two thingscom alive, beingconscious,oraperson,ar position isthenasfollows.Thepropertiesthat don’t haveanydecisiveintuitionsconcerni of thetwoobjects. contact doesnotresultinform another solutionwhichconsistsinm ounts to),butratherthat traditionalt I am However, thissolutionisnotsatisf isnotthelackofstrong intuitions notsurewhichofthesetwosolutions biguous betweensayingthatathinggoesoutofexistenceandportion e intocontact,becom e intocontactisinfact e thing),andtosa nce, thereisstillaportionofstuffthatsupportsallthe ing acontinuous people canbeinare:ordinarycontact–whenitappearsto a i ng ther king distinctionbetween possibl opology ofobjectsin term o peoplecom 111 actory better. Asf about topologyofthings (whateverthisclaim ng topologyofobjects.Th e supportedbyboth:stuffandthings.W eby onething,therearestilltwoportionsof an beingnorm boundary pointisopenforoneofthem wethinkbelongtoathing,suchas:being y thatgenuinecontactgivesraisetoa entity, sothereisnothreatfordistinctness rfect contact).Beinginordinaryorreal e sincetheyarebothclosedobjects.The nd realcontact–whentheyreallysharea a closedobjectcom to theproblem for Markosiansince,asheclaim o i r thef ng intocontactonlytheform a lly displays.Therefore,even i rst one–itseem things ofthingsceasingtoexist e intocontact.Perfect an beinggoesoutof and s ofspatialpoints erefore heprefers stuff . Thefinal s thatthe s , we and er is h en
CEU eTD Collection exist whentheycom at all.However,if borders atall,andsotheproblem the wholeuniverse.Ifthereisavalueof com view isthatsim occupied bym and checkwhetherthere isnobiggerobjectwhos that inordertosaywhether som region ofspacethatisnotasub-region “an externalcriterionofobjecthood”.Asim com is asim people com is alreadyquiteproblem two distinct controversial incaseoftwoobjectscom objects com m open) boundarypointsisnotapplicableatall. penetrate eachother,atleasttoacertainde as closetoeachothertherepulsiveforces would bealim u st adm e i ng intocontactwithotherthings.Thissim s incontinuousvaluestheym At anyrateitisworthnoticingthatMar As forthesecondsolution,itdoesnot p le. Itseem it thataconsequenceofMarkosian’ e e things intocontact,forinstancebyshaking intocontacttheyceasetoexist. a it ofcloseness.Twothingscom p tter m les m thisisthecase,f , giventhattheywerethesetwothi s thatwhateveritis e intocontactcannotr i i ght beentirelywrong.An ght bebestdescribabl atic tosaythatanythingnewcom e thing isasi ofcontactpositedbytraditionaltopologydoesnotexist i ght rangeove i rs i ng into t solutiontotheproblem 112 eally beapplied.Contact,onthefieldaccount, ny regionoccupiedbyanotherobject.Itm gree, theideaofhavingobjectswithclose(or m field foreverypointisspace,sim m displayed bythem p e interm le is p p kosian em Butifwecannothaveclosedobjects, e a le ornotwehavetolook atitssurrounding ly seem s viewofsim intocontactonthisaccountiftheycom contact isexactlythattheyceasetobethe tters forthings’ceasingtoexist,itisnot r verylargeregionsofspace,orevenover e parttheobjectinquestion couldbe.The hands, letalonetosaythatthisnewthing onthisviewanobjectthatoccupiesa appealing alternativetothistraditional ngs beforethecontact.Ithinkthatit seem s offieldsenergy.Iftheirenergy s irrelevant. ploys som convincingeither.W e s intoexistencewhentwo p allow.Sincethefieldscan les isthatwhenevertwo oftwothingsceasingto e
thing thatIwouldcall p les haveno h at is eans e
CEU eTD Collection m indivisibility andthephysical internal criterionforbeingasim departure from would be“aninternalcriterion”.Markosian’ novelty isthatwedonotlookintheinteriorofan m for beingasim sim criterion ordef there stillm separate partsisnotasim suffice toaddthephysicalindivisib being asim sim However, accordingtothephysicalindivisib whole thing.Thesethingsareobviouslycom any attem physically unbreakablem physically indivisiblecom rejected f accepting onlypoint-sizedatom u e taphysical indivisibilitycriterionwoul ch incredible,ifonlyitis em p p les andnotonlypoint-sizedatom les. Even thoughonefindsMarkosian’sm Is existenceofsuchthingsarealproblem It seem o p r thef t toseparatethem p i le? Iam ght bealessontolearnf thisstandardapproach. s thatm i nition of p o le. IthinkthattheMaxim llowing reasons:Markosianthi notentirelysure.If o indivisibility,onethat tivation fortheexternal p a p le. terial, orabom lex objects,likefo a terials f s. Thephysicali ployed withso p le. Actually,Markosianrejectsboththem r ility criterionthatsom s, wem om r om we one b m 113 d, accordingtoMarkosian,boildown th a criterionsforbeingasim lly p want toclaim a r exam ility criterionthesethingswouldcountas le m i anotherwouldresultinannihilationofthe wouldallowf s criterionforbeingasim is view:duetothelackof a ght havetoappealanexternalcriterion de ContinuousViewofSim ndivisibility criterionforbeingasim forthephysicalindivisibilitycriterion nks thatitispossiblethereexistsom xim x, butneverthelessphysicallyindivisible. e objecttosayifitis caution.Infact,m criterionisthelackofasatisfactory of variousm a l continuitycriterionquitepeculiar, ple achainwhoselinksarem thattheyarecom e o thing thatwas r theretobetrulyextended a terials insuchawaythat o a sim st oftheobjectsthat p le. Acceptinga p p asatisf p le ornot–that les isnotthat le isagreat created p e lex, itwill taphysical a actory from p de of le is e
CEU eTD Collection The sim would call“thecriterion of aspected object-ishly Anything else,especiallyobjectsofco “existence Monism nothing ism count ascontinuous. any m and asweknow,m of beingm Markosian considerstobesim think thisisthebestcandidateforasim whole universe,sinceforeverypointinspaceth im continuous andphysicallyindivisible(atalltim for space”,sotospeak. field. Itisratheraregionwhererepulsive since thisisnotacaseofoverlappinginthese fields penetrateeachotherism penetrable. Ifenergyofthisfieldcom a tter. Infacttheseobjectshavem And sowehavearrivedattheconceptofextendedsim Maxim If, ontheotherhand,sim p le objectpostulatedbyMonism a xim o re continuousthanafiled.W a l Nihilism a lly continuous.Beingspatially ”. Thisisaviewaccordingto e dium (2007). Thecriterionforbeingasim -sized m hasbeenrecentlypresentedbySchafferunder thenam m a p xim le, likepeople,chairs,andstatues,donotm o re conti p 3.2.4. MaximalNihilism a a les shouldbeunde terial objects lity”: p o m le sofar. re ga nuous thanaregionoccupiedbyonefiledonly, isindi x e powers displayedbythefieldsclash,“struggling m isasim s 114 onsense ontologyarejustcasesof in continuousvalues,itcanrangeacrossthe e ps thanfilledregions.Theyshouldnotreally
nse ofaddingtocontinuityordensitythe cannot reallysaythataregionwheretwo continuous doesnotallowofgapsorholes, whichthereisjustoneobject–theworld. visible onlyinone,the weakest sense:its ere willbeavalueof
are fullofgaps–regionsnotfilledwith es p ). Ifitisafieldthennottotally le ifandonly rstood ratherasfields,itseem p le isheresom p le whichism x contains everything. this field’senergy.I eet thecriterion e thing thatI the world a xim s that a lly e : CEU eTD Collection with theGunkHypothesis.W sm The Maxim object intheworld? would bephysicallydivisible. sense thatifthelawsofphysicsweredifferent existence ofgunk.Itisbecause onlyMereologi seem the GunkHypothesiseveryobjecthasproperpart it interm whether theyareobjectsornon-objects. been m only ifitcanbeseparatedandphysicallym explored hereisbasedoncriterionofphysical which everythinghasproperparts.Thecon
physical partsthatcanbeseparated proper partsarenotobjectsthem 52 Providedthatspaceinwhich wem allest objectsintheworld;heishappywithlargestsim s thatthisviewcanbeheldonlybyaMereological Universalistwhobelievesin However, itseem W The atom As itwasem e ntioned before,weneedtolookat s ofeverythingbeingdivisibleinto h at couldbethem a l Nihilistcaneasilyem 3.2.5. IsTheGunk less gunkscenarioisusuallycharacterisedasadoctrineaccordingto Itseem phasized earlier,onewayto s thattherearealsoothe s thatMaxim o e
tivation forhaving willlookat ove it’spart selves. Itisphys brace thegunk HypothesisDestructiveForNihilism? 52 , andsoitisalsodivisiblem
s apartdoesnotbelongtothis m a l Nihilism these possibilitiesinthefollowingchapter. 115 ove objects cept of“beingaproperpart”presentedand whatkindofentitiestheproperpartsare: , thepartsthatarephysicallyindivisiblenow d awayfrom cal Universalistsbelieve thateveryportion separability–som
understand theGunkHypothesisistoput s thatareobjectsthem only onesim ically divisible-inthesensethatithas r kindsof scenario, sinceheisnotlookingforthe . Thiswouldbetosaythataccording iscom p abiggerwhole.Still,asithas Nihilism atible withthegunkscenario. p le thatcontainseverything. p le andthereforeonlyone a e xim e thing isaproperpart taphysically –inthe thatarecom a l object. selves. Actuallyit p atible
CEU eTD Collection objects. would beinclinedtosaythat distinction betweenthingsandstuff,r understanding oftheGunkHypothesis.Ithink into objects”.Itseem the GunkHypothesisasto“div say thatthisobjectcanbedividedintoportions organism som possibly divided:itisforexam entire life.Itseem is thenphysicallydivisibleevenifinth accessible from com two halvesasseparateentitieswillnotsuffi proper partsifitisphysicallydi the senseprovidedbyphysicaldivisibilityprin descending infinitelyarenotobjectsthem part ofanotherobject. any sortof of stuffisanobject.Thisve separated. Them e p possiblenom lex objectsintheactualworld,itm If acom Another waytounderstandtheGunkHypot
) inthatworld. Nihilism theactualworld,inwhichthese p lex objectcanbedividedintopa e re possibilityof s thatanycom ologically closeworld,alt . Af
s thatinf ter all,thisisthe rsion oftheGunkHypothesisisobviouslynotcom it isactuallypossiblethatobjectsareinf ple possiblethat isibility intoportionsofstuff”,asopposedto“divisibility i nite divisib visible –ifitcanbecutintohalvesthatinturn m
drawing aline onsense co e actualworlditrem eans th selves, very ideaof 116 ecognise fewerobjectsthanportionsofstuff ility intoportionsof hough thereisnom m thetwohalvesofm of ce here.Iftherearephysicallydivisible two halvesexistseparately.Suchanobject at thereisapossibleworldnom posite objectthatwecanthinkofbe rts thatarenotobjectsthem but theyarephysicallydistinctentities,in that veryfew(ifany)peoplewhom stuf across theobjectand ciple. Thisistosaythatanobjecthas f (only).Iwillref Nihilism hesis istosaythatproperparts a ins continuousthroughits thatnoobjectisaproper e stuf (understoodasaliving y bodyareseparatedin i nitely divisibleinto e f istheprevailing r tothisversionof conceiving of selves, wecan p atible with ologically a the ke
CEU eTD Collection stuff, butassoontheyareactuallydivide arrangem actual instance. Thecriterionforbeingasim with Markosian’sm stuf points thereisinfinitely m the conceptofadjacencyisnotapplicableto rejected earlierinthispaper.Theotheroptionis are pointy partseither that thetwohalvesofpoint-sizedobj How couldthissortof halves thatcanbeseparated? extension andatthesam would therebetodivide divisibility. If Hypothesis. Thisisthepoint-sizedsim inclined tosaythatMarkosian’ssim of stuffbacktogether,webringtoexistence the sim m i ght wanttosaythatthisinfactm f adjacent iscom continuity,andsotheactualinventoryof p It seem It isquiteclearthattheGunkHypothesis le doesnotexistanylonger.However, e nt ofm p . Thepossibilityof atible withMaxim thereareentitiesof s thatthereisyetanotherkindof a coincide tter intheworld.Sim a divisibilitybeapplied xim e a a tim ny otherpoints. in thesenseofbeingatsam lly continuoussim Thisnotionof d? e weunderstanddi coincidenceof a Howcouldthatbepossibleifpointshavenospatial l Nihilism sizeof p eans thattheyare les aredivisibleintoportionsofstuff. p p le that le wh asp p les onthisviewaredivisibleintoportionsof 117 . division im ect arepoints-sizedobjectsthem d theyceasetoexist.Forthisreasonsom It the sam to apoint-sizedentity?W hasbeenproposedbyMarkosianisbasedon atial point,howcouldtheybedivided?W ich actuallyseem spatialpointsatallsincebetweenanytwo itseem evenpoint-sizedentitieshasbeenalready notreallytenableeither.Thereasonisthat p seem les likepeople,chairs,andplantsfor understood asdivisibilityintoportionsof sim sim visibility asapossibilitytobecutinto s thatthisversionisalsocom e p sim not s thatonceweputthesam le thatiscom p plies, asitseem les changeswithalm divisible,sinceafterthedivision p e le again.ThereforeIam placeatthesam s tosetthelim p atible withtheGunk s, spatialextension. e m i ght havetosay e tim o it forinfinite st everyre- selves. The e e, orthey portions p rather atible e one h at CEU eTD Collection m If theGunkHypothesisistrueandifpoint could beapplied 53 spatially extendedentitiesneverends.However, extended sim objectless ontology there arenoentitiesintheworldthatherecognisesasobjects,m Nihilist believesthattheonlyobjectsther Mereological Nihilism physically indivisibleextendedsim sim Gunk Hypothesisunderstoodasdivisibilityinto recognise thatpoint-sizedentitiescannotbedivided. or notdependsonwhether itinstantiatesa substantial andnon-substantialproperties, a pieceofwood.Inordertoelim ontology, startsfrom different reasons.Sidelle’sm why weshouldthinkitisunacceptable. portions ofstuff.Isthereanythingwrongwith T.Sider(2000,p.585)actually seem e re lim p p les. Tobem le. Surelyifallextendedentitiesareinfinitelydivisiblethentherecannotbe Perhaps thereisaconceptof Therefore, itseem An objectlessontologyhasbeenproposed its ofconceptualanalys entities areinf 53 . However,thisisnothowIusethe o andwithdescriptionofthephysical re precise,theGunkHypothesisshouldrathersaythatall rejectionofthepossibility isnottrueiftheworl i s thattheonlykindofsi nitely divisible,which
o s tobelie tivation for“P inate coincide is), itseem p les. Howeve apoint-sized ve thatpoint-sizeden 118 -sized entitiesarereal(asopposedto d consistsofgunk,eveniftheMereological s thatgunkisactually nce, Sidelleintroducesadistinctionbetween substantial propertyor not. Asubstantial claim ontologyofthissort? ure Stuffism evenfriendsoftheGunkHypothesism e are,arephysicallyextendedsim of coincidencesuchthingsasatrunkor stuff istheextendedphysicallyindivisible r, thisincom entitytowhichtheideaof im byA.Sidelle(1998),however,for m s thatwhethersom plies thattheprocessof p concept of le thatisnotcom tities aredivisible. realitygivensolelyinterm ”, ashecallshisobjectless p atibility doesnotm apoint-sizedentityhere. made of Icannotreallysee u e thing isanobject st behappywith p atible withthe point-sized divisibility dividing spatially ean that p les. If s of u st CEU eTD Collection com Objects cannotcoincide,andsotreespieces substantial propertiesthatcanbeascribedtocollectionsofsom property is“havingacertainspin”.“B exam existence. Athingthatceasestoinstantiate property isonewhoseinstantiationnecessary falling preytothechargeofarbitrariness,isaserious problem However, howtoreducethenum ontologies. Adesiredsolutiontothispr point outthatthereissom coincidence andduetothechargeof appealing inSidelle’sm best wayistoabandonalldistinctions,andsoelim quarks ratherthantreesinourontologyisarbitrary.Therefore,asheclaim is notanym existence isthreatenedbythechargeofarbitr sim m seem ontology thanourchoices? ontological categoriesm o lecule couldcoincidewithparticlesthat p p les. s thatallcom ple ofasubstantialpropertyis“being lex entitythatcanbesubjecttothecoin How seriousisSidelleaboutontologywhenhe Objectless ontologydoesnotseem However, accordingtoSidelleevensim o re substantialthantheproperty p lex entitiescanbesubject i ght bearbitrary? e o thing wrongwith tivation f Iwouldnotsaythat ber ofobj arbitrar o r rejectingallobjects:duetothepossibilityof Doeshe eing atree”and“beingwood”arealsonon- 119 oblem com iness. Thepossibilityof ariness. Perhapsthepropertyofbeingaquark the m untenable.Actually,thereissom ects andwhatcriteriontoem its substantialpropertyceasestoexist.An cidence chargeisnotanobject.Actually,it a quark”;anexam of beingatree,andsoourchoicetohave tothecoincidencecharge,sinceevena andsufficientforthatthing’scontinuous ofwoodarenotobjects.Ingeneral,any . Evenifweareontological realistsand istoreducetheirnum pose it.Therefore,theonlyobjectsare wanttosaythatth u p ltitude ofobjectsthatweacceptinour les aredubiousentities,sincetheir inate allobjectsfrom saysthatourchoicesofthecorrect indeed. ple ofanon-substantial e coincidenceseem ere isnothingm m o re basicobjects. ourontology. ber som s ploy without , perhapsthe e e o thing how. re to s to
CEU eTD Collection believe thattheworldcom
ontological sensesare. know in fact. arrive atwrongconclusions;becausewhats assum ontological doctrinesm coherent andstructured.However,wem and howsim category solvesvariousontologicalpuzzles, on thebasisof“circum direct insightintotherealm But likef reject oneofthem categories, whileother are not.W is thatthereontologicalstructure,and ontological realism think thattheseoptionsareforsom In whichcaseIhavetoopteitherf candidates forobjects.Im I thinkthatforallweknow,extendedphysicallyindivisiblesim arbitrary. However,Iwouldnotgoasfarto that. Thisquestionisreallyabouthowwe p As itwassaidearlier,Ibelievethatour Therefore Isym However, ontologywithoutanyobjectss tions aboutontologicalstructurearein o r anyothersyntheticclaim p le itis.Thisisbecausewea o toacertaindegree.The st im stantial evidence”,soto p portant ontologicalcat athise withSidelle’swo i ght bewrong.Andth i e ght bewrong,for ofontologicalcate s ontologically e h reasonsuntenable,Icanoptforobjectlessontology. en wesa o s r theMa , thereis so thatcertainentitiesaregenuineontological 120 structured, thereisstillthequestionof fundam eem u ssum y thattherearenoobjects intheworld,we how coherentwithotheraccepteddoctrines, instance becausetheworldism st reckonwiththepossibilitythatour rejectthecategoryofobjectforthatreason. apossibilityof gories, andthereforewehavetochosethem xim egories. W ontological knowledgeisapriorisynthetic. speak.Mostoftenwelookathowagiven correct, butbecauseforsom arelinkedtothisknowledge,orwhatour s sim rry thatourontologicalchoicesm e is wouldbenotbecausethegeneral a thattheontologicalrealityissim e eem l orf ntal assum p le andproblem s adeparturefrom o e r theMinim saythatdescribingtheworld in errorhere.W p tion ofontologicalrealism -solving isnotsuch a l Nihilism e thespiritof p donothavea e les arebest a reasonswe de ofgunk. ,
or,if how we i ght be p le, I
CEU eTD Collection Th (2000, p.96-70),andD.M extrem Therefore ifitturnsoutthattheworldism have astronginclinationtothinkthat things, m term 54 objection from in thiscaserem f indivisible sim way outfortheMereologicalNihilistwhois extended physicallyindivisiblesim existence ofatom sim world), m divisibility intoportionsof Mereological Nihilism Mereo o W r beingasim ey m p e s ofthingsm les. Thesearethreeoutoffourconcepts l shouldm o i e Nihilism g g W h i cal Nih t e p e a re collectionsofthingsforinstan canseethenthatitisnotreallytrue r xim o v i d existenceofatom p e p ilism a e ntion alsoanothe les inhisontology,istogofo le arenotf a o lly continuoussim s ins true:therearenoobjectsthatproperpartsofotherobjects.The a n 54 less gunkisnotcom kes nosense.W l . y so So . . m Arm m . Them e e ato m u stuf s ean t lf r m ong (1989, illed. However,
less m s fo r possibleapproachtothe probl f –iscom less gunkhasbeentherebyrefuted. o r fo st popular e p saythat e p rm le, underst reo les (as al an pp.66-76). l o p g p atible i atib alysis, b es there areobjectsasopposedtonon-objects. 121 thereisnodifferencebetweenthingsandnon- a understandingoftheGunkHypothesis– ce. Iwouldnotliketodothisreally,since de ofgunk,Iwouldratheroptforonethe treat understood byMarkosian),andpoint-sized the coreclaim r objectlessontology,asthestandardshesets prepared toacceptonlyextendedphysically le withexistenceof ood inam thattheGunkHypothesisisdestructivefor of Howe only withoneconceptofasim u ato t asim n m o ver, t t s an as y m h p a ese sol conventional entities le presentedinthispaper.The nner sim of ean em MereologicalNihilism s to
u of com t i settleo them ons seem ilar toSim p atibility ofgunkand a n t xim t o o l o beofnousehere. . See:P.Sim g a i cal q l sim on’s. Still,a p u e p le –an stio le (the even n ons s . CEU eTD Collection philosophical reflection like forinstanceproblem ordinary languagewithNihilist’sexistentialdenials. believes thatthisisactuallythecase,one em express noattitudetowardstheirexistence. ontology. Byutteringstatem weight whatsoever.Accordingtothisappro language atall–itisjustaspokenbyno-philosophers,bearingnoontological English (andotherplainlanguagestoo)isnot form between thelanguageofMereologicalNih take astancetowardsexistentialclaim seem com between them to saysom
4.1. pirical facts.Noontologicalcontentcan M m er isontologicallycom s. If onsense ontology.W EREOLOGICAL W This wouldm One ofpossiblesolutionstotheclashproblem Since MereologicalNihilism No Clash-OrdinaryLanguageAsNotOntologicallyCommitting wearecom e speakordinarylanguage m e
thing aboutpossiblewaysofrec : MereologicalNihilism ean thatordinarylanguage m itted toexistentialde e N cannotthentakeboth m ents aboutchai IHILISM VS itting, whilethelatterlacksexistentialinputatall.Plain isatgreat C s HAPTER ofordinarylanguage. deniesm o st of does nothavetoworryaboutreconciliationof 122 onciling thesetwo.Apparentlythereisaclash ilism be foundincom ach thereisnosuchthingascom . C rs, books,andhum nials of , accordingtothisapproach,anontological odds withcom
OMMONSENSE andordinarylanguage,sinceonlythe the tim isdesignedtoconveyonlyreportsof s posedbycom IV doctrines asstrictlyandliterallytrue,it
MereologicalNihilism o is tosaythatinf st of e, andonlywhenexposed to theexistentialclaim m m onsense ontology,weneed onsense statem position andm an beings,thespeakers O a ct thereisnoclash NTOLOGY , weneedto ents. Ifone m e reology, onsense s
of
CEU eTD Collection “second thought”underclosephilosophicalscrutinywe conferences orfurnishourstudyroom face value.Itiseasyandconvenienttotalk sized m com philosophical issues.Mostoftenweuseourlanguageforso-called“everyday we m language saysnothingabout theontologicalcom Ordinary languageisontologically vague,inot abandoned thisfieldandstartedtospeak for suchexpressions,wearenotdealingw in philosophicalanalysis.Butifthisisreally defined anddeterm vague existentialquantif speakers ofordinarylanguagearenotin philosophical ornon-philosophical).Insuchcase philosophical debate(itwouldbethesubject should saythatanydebateisconcernedwithobjecthoodnotacom not (ifanon-philosophicaldebateonsubjectslike speakers thatareinanon-philosophicaldisagr m ontological language.Ordinarylanguagedoes talk (if o re thanoneexistentialquantifier,itseem m i unication purposes”.W ght starttospeakontologicallanguage. weareMereologicalNihilistsf For onethingordinarylanguagelacksc a Anyway, itseem terial objects.Itshouldnotcom inate m ier. s thatexpressionslike“exist”,or“thereis”donothaveonewell- eaning inordinary e liveinaworldof s. Itcom o r instance). e asasurprisethenthatwetaketheirexistenceat a philosophicaldebate,theydonotusenon- 123 thecase,oncewehavedeterm ith ordinarylanguageanylonger.W langue;theyonlygetdeterm s. Youcanthinkoftwoordinarylanguage eem one ofthepreciseontologicallanguages. e her words.Strictlyandliterally thecom about tablesandchairswhenweorganise s quitenatural.However,whenwegiveita Majority ofourstatem not use“exist”inonem m we wouldhavetosaythataslongthe whatappeartobecom ent overwhetheragalaxyisanobjector itm then thatdeterm onsistency thatisrequiredfrom this ispossibleatall).Orperhapswe ents atall. arelikelytodeterfrom ines ifthedebateis ents arenotabout posite, m eaning, andhas m inate m ined m onsense, buta thiskindof eanings eanings e e dium have m an on - CEU eTD Collection
55 explains itspopularity. dem facts thatm structure oftheworldtoooften.Foronething, is, inm language isfalse.Itgivingusfalseim when itcom reports ofwhattheem hom chosen thelanguagethatsuitsthisform device todescribetheworld.Theworldappearsusundercertainform false one?Aplausibleanswertothisquestionm out ofsom ont Mereological Universalism on aparwithotherontologicallanguages,lik literally existentialclaim defined anddeterm ontologically consistent,andsothatitsont Th ol is assu a ogi ogeneous entitiesasobjects.Thislanguageisveryconvenientwhenitcom nd issuesarebestdescribableinordina cal Another possiblewayf W If youbelievethatthisisactuallythecase,m y di m hy havewechosentospeakthislangua opinion,thathum p sput a a tio e ny possibleontologicallanguagesha tter forthingslikesurvival s todescribingontologicalstructur n es by m u 4.2. st b inate m l ooki e also pirical facts–theofm ng at s Ordinary StatementsAsStrictlyFalse ofordinarylanguage sh eanings howordi forinstance.It ared
an beingsdonot b o r theMereological y 55 p . nary e o p l l pressions andisleadingusastray. e lik best a nguage i of species.Thehunter-and-prey,orsupply-and- 124 e Hirsch –thelanguagethatrecognisesm ologically significantexpressionshavewell- e thelanguageofMereologicalNihilism it seem arefalse.Ordinarylanguageisheretaken i ry languageofem needtobeconcernedwithontological is assum ght be:becauseitoffersusefulfictionasa e oftheworld,wem s ge then? used. ve wechosentospeakanontologically , wh o a Nihilist istosaythatstrictlyand s thatthesearem b tter arrangem e u liev W e st faceapuzzlingquestion:why d thatordinarylanguageis e e th ll, them at weareab pirical facts,andthis e u nts –are.However, o st saythatordinary st im o stly theem le to . Andwehave portant reason settle e e dium s togiving pirical -sized or CEU eTD Collection m com em language ofNihilism position. Sofarwehaveafull-bloodedont and therealm way around).Anyway,som ontological facts:factsareinaway a ontology iscorrect,hem ontology isagenuineontologicaldoctrine.Mo language tostatebothem related But onthepresentedviewstatem statem case thatsom between thelanguageofem m statem som believes thatordinarylanguageisontologically claim think, thatthiscorrespondence betweenther u o pirical factsontheother.Onecouldeasilysaythatlatterlacksontological st arriveatontologicallycom re com e m sortof thatthislanguagedoesnotgivetheco itm ents expressingontologicalfacts.So ent. Thisreallywouldbethecaseof If wearetosaythatcom W However, weshouldbecarefulandnot to statem ent, andboileverythingdowntotheno- e p needtopictureordinarylanguagethat licated. e oftheontologicalm one whom correspondence ents aboutobjects.Ifonebelie orUniversalism a u kes anem st assum pirical andontologicalfacts,hebelievesthatcom e pirical factsandthe thing like betweenthestatem m onsense ontology u m ents aboutarrangem st bepresupposed. e pirical statem itting la thatem forinst correspondence ordinarylanguageha 125 m nguage. Onceagain:thereisnoconfusion pirical factsareabletoserveasguidance rrect description.Itseem ealm ance), andordinarylanguagethatdescribes e ological languageontheonehand(like com how, startingfrom reover, ifonebelievesthatcom language ofontologicalfacts.Itisnotthe hasgotontologicalinput,andweneedto reflection ent m ves thatitispossibletouseordinary clash approach.Butherethepictureis oftheem reduce thisapproachtotheno-clash is genuinebutincorrect, wem m ents expressingem itting m betweentherealm i e stakenly takesitforanontological nts ofm ofem pirical andtherealm u st believealsothatthereis ving noontologicalinput. pirical facts(ortheother a ordinarylanguagehe tter m s thatsom pirical factsand u oftheem st besom m m e u one who onsense onsense st say,I ofthe pirical e how CEU eTD Collection particles andtheirarrangem every statem into statem assum about com
ontological expressionsandusesawell-defi investigation, pureinitsform com be relatedinanysignificantway. of theem ontological failsforsom 56 really: “Therearesom Nihilist whobelievesthatthisisactuallythe because ordinarylanguageexistentialclaim statem language canbeneithertruenorfalse,si not thinkthatordinarylanguageisontologica VanInwagenact m itting. Idonotbelievethatordinary e ents. Theyareincurablyvague. s thatallstatem Yet adifferentapproachtothisproblem As form And thisiswheretheideaofa
pirical andtherealm posite m ents concernedexclusivelywithsim ent aboutcom ual y l 4.3. a y opinion,Idonotthinkthat bel terial objects,butaboutarra e i ents concernedwithm particlesarrangedtable-wise” e ves t e reasons.Perhapsa OrdinaryStatementsMisunderstood posite m h at e
oftheontological andinnocentas nts, therem t h i s i s t a h terial object e correct paraphrase u 126 language, not“infected”byanyphilosophical st nce theyfailtoexpressuniqueontological s ned anddeterm case wouldsaythat“Thereisatable”m answert
good reasonforthinkingsoisthattherealm e beasystem itm do notmean p dium lly precise.Ontologicalclaim ngem les andtheirarrangem are sodistinctandrem is s canbetranslatedintostatem tosaythattheclashisonlyapparent, i com ght be,doesinfactcontainnon-vague -sized m ordinarylanguageisontologically o e 56 t nts ofparticles.Moreover,thisview . Ordinaryexistentialclaim h e cl e s intoplay.If,asitisassum ash probl atic anduniversalm inate quantifierm what theyappeartom a terial objectsaretranslatable em (1990, e o nts. te thattheycannot
pp.102-14). s ofordinary eaning. Ido ent about e s thod of arenot ean. A e ans e d,
CEU eTD Collection com com paraphrase available.Thism concerned exclusivelywith sim one thinksofparaphrasing ordinarylanguage problem elim artificial predicatesthatare“nowhereto paraphrase, andassuchdonotstandforanyna predicates thatm whole ideaofparaphrasing. variables, shouldbetreatedasa However, itisclaim to endupwithsentenceswherevariables idea ofparaphrasingsentencesconcernedwith single com com som plural variables problem collections ofsim e posite objectwithpluralreferencetosim posite m posite m inate referencetoallcom things”.Anotherstepofparaphrasingis Paraphrase of The predicativepartofparaphraseis The m Both thesestepsareproblem atic thanofthoseconcernedwith of p reification lex objects.Andreif a a terial objects. e terial objects(like“beingatable”)withpredicatesthatareapplicableto thod ofparaphrasingconsistsfirst xxs p u les (like“beingarrangedtable-wise”). in“ st applytoarrangem sentencesconcernedwithpluralityof e of d thatforvariousreas ∃ pluralities,whichconsistsin xxs” whichshouldbereadas“there e posite m thod m p ication isexac les andtheir group u atic. Thequan a st bea terial objects. orone e singlecom 127 nts ofsim be found”,apartfrom ons thesim p pplicable toeverystatem stand onlyforsim arrangem les. Insteadofavariable tly whattheNihilistm replacingpredicatesthatareapplicableto tural properties.Theseare,asitisclaim com threatened withtheobjectionthat existentialstatem whole of allinreplacingsingularreferenceto posite m tif treating arrangem p posite objectsonly.Usually,when icational partisthreatenedbythe . Andthisclearlyunderm les are e nts, onebringssim p les, beingreferredtobyplural com a terial objectsisthatweneed aresom posite objectsisevenm made up p les, andnothingelse. theveinattem ents intostatem u st avoid.Thewhole e ent concernedwith e x’s”or“thereare x nts of in“ for theuseof p ∃ le exam variablesas x” wehave ines the p ples, ents t to o e re d, CEU eTD Collection available forourparaphrase. be referredtoasfurthercom arrangem concerned witharrangem reference toparticlesarranged like theonem sentences containingm replaced with reference tosim sort ofstatem composite objects posit problem Gabriel Uzquiano(2004,pp.434-35)liststhefo
Norm W e h nts ofcom at dothesesentenceshaveincom
ally, weareabletoreplacesingularre ents intostatem s forparaphrase: xxs e (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) ntioned above,whenreferencetocom p . Anditseem standing forpluralvariables.This les. The posite m Som Som Som Som The chairsoutnum u ltiple ref e e e e x brickhousesarem chairisheavierthansom bricksaretouchingeachother com e nts ofcom ents concernedexclusivelywithsim standing forasinglevariableinparaphrasedsentenceis a terial objects. p s thatweneedsom x puters com lex objects.Itseem e -wise. Butordinarylanguagestatem rence tocom ber thetables posite m 128 unicate onlywithoneanother In ordinarylanguagethesearrangem posite objects,likef m i xed togetherwithsom m on? Theyallcontain ference tocom e a extratoolsinordertoparaphrasethis m terial objects,orarrangem e s thatsim table(2004,p.431) e p thod ofparaphrasingstillworksfor llowing exam lex m a terial objectsisreplacedby ilar m p posite objectswithplural les. o r instance: ples ofsentencesthat e e cobblestonehouses ents areveryoften plural referenceto thod m u st bealso e e nts can nts of CEU eTD Collection sentence ofthiskindcanbewithnoproblem object (notnecessarilythesam where by“m
xxs f com variable to quantifyoversim com pluralities of allegedly com with sim W o r sentencesthatcontainref h at weneedinordertoparaphraseasent is hereusedtoref posite objects.W posite object,andareabletorepl
It seem
xxs p le objects,isanotherdevicethat , singlevariable sim ultiple reference”Im pose com s thatthereisnoproblem (5’) Som ( 2 ’ p ) S les, thatwouldpreserve yys p.431) p e h les “com the one ofthe and r toapluralityof enever wespeakofsom o , arearrangedtable-wiseandthe p m e lex objects.W xxs y e sim c y is oneofthe e , then o rence toaplura with pluralvariable m p posing” them e les, the object),as p xxs o s x i ean referri t and is acom e ace everyoccurrenceofsinglevariable s com , xxs t withpa xxs e x h need e com , arearrangedchair-wiseandsom 129 opposedtoreferringoncem ence like(2’)intoasentenceconcernedsolely
posite objects,likeinparaphraseof s paraphrasedinto: xxs is (2004, p.434) the “com lity of puter, and(ii)forevery e would enableustoref ng m m
, aresuchthat(i)forevery such away,astohighlight thatthereare com raphrasing aslongwerefertoasingle unicates with a newwaytoref yys com puters forinstance,weneed tobeable o , andsoon.Theproblem re thanoncetoasinglecom positional” structureof posite objects.Thepluralvariable xxs areheavierthatthe y , then e r tothepluralityof x x , forevery e is differentfrom r tosim x a , if e ny objects.A x pluralityof sim arisesonly (2): with plural x yys p is oneof p y les that les, the , if (2004, posite x
is y
CEU eTD Collection quantify onlyoverthe m of alowerorder.Itisnot possibletoparaphrasethesesentencesinsuch awaythatthey when allwewanttobecom like: f com com they wouldbeiftherewereanycom hum instance thattherearenocom be bettercandidatesforfirst-ordercom table topsandlegs,hum he believesalsoinexistenceofsuchcom com sim and peopleare of com pattern ofarrangem and soon.Thereforeweneedtointroducesom som
a m p iliar m e posite objectscanbereferredtopl m posite objects,likecom ans, andsaythatthesearegenuineexam les only,andnotofothercom sim onsense ontologyistruetheseobjectsarenot position. W
As Uzquianocorrectlynotices,theproblem p eans of les arrangedcom (6) (7) first-order pluralquantif e e willsay,forthesakeofsi nts withoutcom Som p.436) The ethicscom an torsos,andhum e e com com m puter m puter networks,ta b itted toarem ers ofthecom ication arenot m posite object,whichm posite objectsth 1 -wise, andsom ittees consultonlyoneanother m itting ustoexistenceofcom m posite objects.Forsom posite objectinthefirstplace).Allfirst-order ittees jointlyissuedarecom urally, whichm posite objects.W pos an ar 130 e m ite objectslikem ples offirst-ordercom m suf b ble chains,orcom m m ers of e itt e p newdevicestoenableusexpressthe f s at arepartsofcom othersim i licity, thatthingslikecom ees. Inotherwords,it seem . These,oratleastsom cient alsowhenweconsiderstatem reallyfirst-ordercom is thecom notspecif eans thattheyarecom i ght giveraiseto e p , however,stipulateonthis les arrangedcom m i cro-processors, harddisks, ittees –com i e c f m one whobelievesthat posite m ittees. Andsoourold o posite objects(orthat r thisparticularlevel puters, tables,and m posite objects,as e e a ofthem ndation (2004, terial objects. posite objects puters, tables second-order puter s thatthe posed of , m 2 -wise ents i ght CEU eTD Collection them objects, withoutbeingthereforecom “sim plurality ofsim noun “sim endings toexistingnouns.Andsoaswecanobt developed byUzquiano(2004,p.4348),thism gain m to singulars”(1997,p.247).Inthism Hazen putsit,“aperplural(noun,pronoun,verbform by AllenHazenunderthenam but tosim when wequantifyplurallyoverthem problem They willbediscussedinturn. pleses”. W . Andsowewillref u The firstm Hence theneedforfurtherdevices.Sofaronlythreeofthem c) plural b) sets, a) ltiple levelssoastoenableus isquitegeneral:wecannotavoidco ple” byadding“-s”,inthesam p plurally pluralquantification, les thatallegedlycom 4.3.1. ParaphrasingUsingPlurallyPluralQuantification e sim p properties. les byadding“-es”ag e thod ofelim p ly addtheending“–es”to e r tosim inating referencetocom e p of pose som les thata . e “plurallyplural”or“perpluralquantification”.As m thod ourfa itted to express thealleged“com e m 131 ain, endingupwithanewperpluralnoun e llegedly com m
a com m nner existence ofafurtherobjectcom itm ain pluralform m e ref thod puters wewillref iliar pluralquantificationissupposedto ent toexistenceofhigherorderentities we canobtainreferencetopluralityof e …) isrelatedtopluralsasare r topluralityof consists inaddingplurallyplural posite objectshasbeenintroduced pose acom “sim positional” structure.As havebeennam puter asto“sim e ples” from pluralityof r asto“sim asingular posed of f pleses”. e a d: m ples”, iliar CEU eTD Collection com Using thism m philosophical discourse,anddonotfunctioninor the latter,whyshouldnotwebehappywith – isnot“beingarrangedcom arranged three-com com But itseem instantiated bypluralitiesof instantiated bypluralitiesof be foundinordinaryEnglish.Also,itisdiffi phrases expressingplurallypluralquantificati ean thattheycannotstandforsom m puter-wise”, orevenm unicate onlywitheachotherinto: However, itseem A challengetothissolutionis,accordingUzquiano,thefactthatthereareno s thattherearenopredicatesreachingfurtherintocom (2a) Som e thod wecanparaphraseourinitialsentenceaboutcom puter-wise”. Theym com the and foranysim yys m e s thatwecanthink unicate withthe sim are am o sim re specific:“b puter-wise” oddat pluralitiesof p leses ,the p ong the les, like e p naturalproperties. les, the i ght seem xxxxs xxxxs yys 132 “being arrangedcom eing arrangedtwo-com yys si on inordinarylanguage–nosim , thenthe cult tothinkofanypredicatescollectively of predicateslike“beingarrangedm (2004,p.438) m , if theform , aresuchthat(i)foranysim face valueaswell? dinary languageatall.Still,thisdoesnot oddatfacevalue.Butontheotherhand p the les. Therearepredicatescollectively xxs xxs er? are am are differentfrom Theyarebothborninthe puter-wise” f positional depth. ong the puter-wise”, or“being Ifwearehappywith xxxxs p p the o les, the puters that leses areto and the r instance. yys a xxs and ny- xxs , CEU eTD Collection possible, butaccording to him arrangem these fact concernedwith reference tocom com be happyenoughtousereferencesetsinorderelim are notm com introducing acom
posite objects.Thiswouldenableustoparaphrasesentencescontainingplural posite objectsisbytheuseof disguise An alternativewayofparaphrasingsent Uzquiano objectstothissolutionclaim e e nts ofsim reological com (2b)Som com (3b) Som posite objectsinthefollowingm 4.3.2. p lex predicatewhichwould enab the one ofthe of wise, and(ii)foreverysetofsim s is oneofthe posite m sets , if p les asitwasintende t , then sss , notsim ParaphrasingUsingReferenceToSets s e e posite objects(like setsofsim setsofsim is oneofthesss,thenm are touchingoneanother(2004,p.445) a s terial objectsforsets sss unsatisfactor is differentform sss m , thenthem p les them eans of and them p p les, the les, the set-theoreticalentities.If 133 selves. Thechargehereisthatsentenceslike y rem d. Atthesam Lewis andvanInwagenbelieve),onewould e sss e i m sss
ng th m t b a , aresuchthat(i)foreverysetofsim and b nner: ers of , aresuchthat(i)foreveryset e ers of ences containingpluralreferenceto dy ofthism le toelim at sentenceslike(2b)and(3b)arein t p , anddonottreatthem e is oneofthe les m s s b are arrangedbrick-wise,and(ii) s com ers of , foreverysetofsim e tim inate anydirectreference to m inate quantificationover e unicate withthem s e Uzquianopointsata thod ofparaphrasingby are arrangedcom sss onebelievesthatsets
asm p les s , if e m puter- t p , if b s les, e ers re is s CEU eTD Collection sets. Incaseof
predicate wouldsufficeforparaphrasing(3)into condition isthefollowing: to sim intend tom disguised forsets.Ifyou believethatsets seriously com refer toissingleobjects–m under hereisthatsetsarenotcom disguised referencetocom conditions, nam predicate “arebrick-touching-one-another”onlyif to sim p p Of courseweneedtostatesom
I m According toUzquianothisattem les f les, andthewayUzquianooffersis u “Som (ii) f som (2004, p.448) one ofthe a a st adm ke byref ils, asthisisreallyadisguise m (3*) Therearesom e o e sets,the itted tothenihilistpictur e sim r all ly setsthattoucheachother. (3b)thispredicatewillbe:“are it thatIdonotshareUzquiano’sobjectionsregarding theuseofsetsas one-another x p e , sss les, the rence tosetsisjustref x is oneofthe sss and belongsto posite m , suchthat:(i)the xxs e m
b , are p e ers ofthe lex entities. a sim terial object xxs e brick-touching-one-another conditionsastowhenthispredicateisapplicable p p les, the if andonlythereisexactlyone t torepl d ref arenotm s 134 , and(iii)the e wouldtrytosm byreferencetosets.Andsotherequired sets. Idonotthinkthatsom sss e And soifwerefertosets,allintend s. Af rence tosets.Thesim xxs e ace directreferencetosetsby therearesom r tosom are setsofsim , suchthatthe ter all,theassum e brick-touching-one-another reological com e sss sim are touchingoneanother” uggle com p p e les thatarem setsthatsatisfycertain les arrangedbrick-wise, ifandonlythereare xxs posites, theuseyou p p are les cansatisf tion thatwework brick-touching- s posite objects such that e one whois e m ”. Such b ers of y the x is
CEU eTD Collection does notbearanyfurtherontologicalcom pp.327-44). OriginallyBoolos’intentionwasto m close connectiontoGeorgeBoolosfam opposed topropertiesthatcanbeinstantiate that arecollectivelyinstantiatedbysim concerned withnom dif m these sets.Relationofset-m
quantification. Instandardsecond-or properties, wearetryingtousequantifica intended toprovethatsecond-orderlogicis those thatthefirst-ordervariablesstandfor. are entities. AccordingtoBoolosbothpluralfirs first-order logic,whichinturn,asheassu plurality of properties, thatisoverthepropertiesar or “beingwhite”.Butwhen wem u onadic second-orderlogicaredefinable f st notbeconfused.Asl e ontologically innocent rent, oneisabletousesetsref Another wayofsolvingtheproblem The routehereistakenintheopposite objects.W 4.3.3. a tter howcom e quantif Paraphrasing UsingPluralProperties sincetheydonotrequirecom e ong asonerem m b y overproper erhood isdis a ke anatte p lex objects. e r to der logicweusuallyquantifyover p m les. pluralityof in term ous 135 m e instantiatedbyeachandeverym itm freefrom tion overpropertiestojustifydubiousplural m of d bysingleobjectsalone.Thissolutionisin ties like“beingacritic”, “beingacom tinct from t-order logicandm e e p m Uzquiano callsthem d, isconcernedexclusivelywithfirst-order ent t toparaphraseordinary language sentences b discovery thatpluralquantificationand paraphrase istoquantifyoverproperties ers thatthesetworelationsareentirely provethatm s ofeachother(1984,pp.430-49)(1985, because direction, sotospeak.W com sim relationofparthood,andthesetwo m itisdefinableinterm p m itm les paraphrasinganystatem itm ent toanyotherentitiesthat onadic second-orderlogic ent todubiousentitieslike onadic second-orderlogic “pluralproperties”as e h m distributive ile Boolos s ofplural b er ofthe puter”, ent
CEU eTD Collection Scattered arrangem of suchanarrangem have tobeapropertyinstantiatedcollectivel possible groupingofthem “arrangem abundance sothattheycovereverypo the propertiesoverwhichwecanquantifyhere that therewouldhavetobeapropertyforev be paraphrasedusingthism arranged com by som need touse predicates thatenableustorefersom into sentencescom
e However, dowereallyneed topostulate One objectionagainstthism Our initialsentenceaboutcom sim e (2c) Forsom
nt” wedonotm collective p puter-wise”. les onlycollectively,likef applies tothe com the the such that e e p nts ofsim xxs xxs m nt. Isthiscredibleatall? atible withMereological ( unicate withthe , thenthe non-distributive , foranysim e pluralpropertyofsim , nom X e appliestothe thod into: ean onlyagroupofadjacentsim p yys les wouldcorre a xxs tter howscatteredtheyare.Theworryisthatthere would
e are arrangedcom thod ofpara puters com p ) predicates,thatispredicatescanbesatisfied les, the yys o e r instance“beingarrangedcritic-wise”,or a xxs , thenthe 136 rrangem y byallandonlythesim
ssible arrangem ery arrangem , (ii)f spond tobizarrescattered objectspostulated Nihilism yys this greatnum p m les phrasing, raisedbyUzquianohim wouldneedtoexistinsuchagreat unicating onlywithoneanother(2)can , if o e X r anysim nt ofsim xxs puter-wise, and(iii)f , (i)therearesom X , are differentfrom weareratherconcernedwith applies tothe e nt ofsim p ber ofcollectiveproperties? p e les. Inordertodothatwe nt ofsim les, the p les, butabsolutelyevery p p les thatarem les. Inotherwords, xxs e sim xxs , if p o the les. Andby r anysim p and the X les, the yys applies to e and s m elf, is p b xxs les, xxs ers X ,
CEU eTD Collection sim pluralities Parsonsm som Parsons’ m need toworryaboutexistenceofapropert refer toanobjectcom sentences willbefam we canexpectthatthepropertiesn language isconcernedwithadjacentclum them only byMereologicalUniversalism 57 against ontologicalinnocenceofsecond-order known objectionagainstontologicalinnocence question. W Clinton-nose-wise andsim of thinkingpluralities,thentheusepl reference topluralobjectssufficesforreificati num are clearlyaboutpluralities.Thissentenceis,
Si p m e bers, andnotaboutnaturalnum les). ForParsonssentenceslikethefollowingoneaboutnaturalnum . Andtheseareordinarylanguagestatem i thing about l a r object “W Interdefinability ofsecond-orderlogicandpl natural num is oneof henever thereare a h in concernisthatsentencesc at isbeingquestioned,ontol i on: them M the pluralities i ber chael eans som ” iliar andnatural.Most posed ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffelTower,sowedonotreally n R thatisoneof e p sni les arrangedthe-Eiffel-Tower-wise. some naturalnumbers k
, (1998,pp.75-87). e thing m ofobjectsthanaboutthem . Inordina them bers them o re like ps ural quantificationisnogoodfortheNihilistat , n+1isoneof 137 ogical innocenceofthesetwo.Them probably inordinarylanguagewewouldnever eed inordertoparaphraseordinarylanguage y collectivelysatisfiedbysim of m according tohim ontaining pluralquantificationsayrather on oftheplurality.Ifthisiscorrectway ry languageweneverreallyquantifyover en a com logic) isduetoCharlesParsons(1990) selves. Andsoitseem ts thatwewanttoparaphrase.Ordinary a suchthat0isoneof tter, hom of pluralquantification(andthereby ural quantificationisnotusuallyputin posite objectthanm them ogeneous andunitary.Andso , , theneverynaturalnum aboutapluralityofnatural them selves (whereby bers: s thatthem e re collectionof andforevery p les arranged o st well- ber e 57 re .
CEU eTD Collection quantifier from quantif its variables.IthinkthatParsons’stipulation on thisspecif existential quantif there isanysingularityalreadypresupposedin not beavailableatall.Idothinkthisreallyshouldso,sincebelievethat have to quantifier, whichindicatesexistenceofasingleobject. variable orpluralityof single object.Itdoesnotm m objection andforthelogicalconceptofan of objectsissaidhere.Theconditionsobjecthoodarepurely quantifier. Andthisistheonlyrequirem conception, itisenoughifsom scope ofquantification,andrangevariables. significant forthisconceptisthatfactsc
seem object com all. W 58 SeeC eaning ofexistentialquantifier:whatever s thatheuseswhatiscom h . ier isim Parsons(1982). Does thatdisablepluralquantification? If In thisobjectionParsonsusestheconcept enever hem reify onebelievesthatthisisthecorrectr posed ofthem or havingirreduciblypluralvariablesinitsscope. singularise plausible, tosaytheleast. ier itself a kes useof variables.W . Canthisbeavoided? doesnotdeterm whateveroccursaf a tter whatoccursaf
m pluralvariable e thing appearsas only knownas h at reallym oncerning objecthoodaredeterm e nt forbeinganobject.Nothingaboutthe ine 138 is boundbyasingleexistentialquantifier objectisthefollowingunderstandingof Thereisnothingtof what itcanrangeoverinterm eading of I s, heiscom
ter thequantif Inordertobeanobject,accordingthis the existentialquantifier,sotospeak.The ter thequantifier:whetheritisasingular the think thatwhatreallym a a variableinthescopeofexistential tters isthatthereasingleexistential of anobjectinaveryspecificway.It
logical conceptofanobject theexistentialquantif m itted toexistenceof ier. Pluralquantif i c readingof formal. o
rbid theexistential a ined bythelogic, tters f theexistential s ofnum ier, onewill ication will o 58 r Parsons’ af . W nature u ber of h rther at is
CEU eTD Collection reluctant totreatthepluralityasonecom Still, whenwearefacedwithsentenceslike: instantiates thepredicate,weareinclinedto like. Sinceitisnotsingleobjects,butanarrangem com of non-distributivepredicates,likethosein this relationtoasingle standard propertybutatwo-placerelation:“ properties. sim are arrangedcom m objects (orobjects-parts)instantiatesom arrangem som lif object (or,whichsounds evenm object com invited tobelievethatthereisacom following sentence:“Chairsoutnum relation asofacom inclination tothinkofpluralityobjects This predicateisobviouslyanon-distributiv e ted thecar,orrather,isit n canliftthecaronlyifeachofthem p e puter-wise”, “Som les. Inthiswaythenon-distributive thing im Let ustakeanothercollectivepredicate, Still itisworthnoticingthatParsons’argum e nts ofsim posed oftables,andthat partsof portant aboutthenon-distribu puter-wise onlyifeachandev p p lex object,itisveryhardto ler objectsorbyalleged e sim x and asingle p les actingtogether the men o re incredible p ber tablesin y actinginconcert? lex obj – weneedtohavepluralityof is e dist p 139 thefirstobjectoutnum xs lex object.Isitaf doing som that instantiateanon-distributivepropertyor properties aredependantonthedistributive ect com think ofthem thesentences“Som com “Men liftedthecartogether”,wearem outnum ributive properties.Andsointhiscasethe tive predicates:theyareinstantiatedby e one.Still,evenifonesharesParsons’ , thatthesingleobjectcom causedshatteringofthewindow”,and thinksointhiscase.Takef like “outnum everyrestaurantroom ery sim p ent appearstobeverypowerf lex objectsonlyaslongthesim posed ofchairs,andanothercom ber e lifting,sotospeak.Som e Thisexam nt ofthem p ys asofafurthercom le isinsom ”. Butwearenotabletoapply ber” forinstance.Itisnota u rther com e sim ber partsofthesecond
ple, Ithink,pointsat xs takentogetherthat e and pluralityof p relationtoother ”. Arewereally les arearranged p posed ofchairs lex objectthat o r instancethe p lex object. u e sim l incase p p p
o lex les ys ler re . CEU eTD Collection is possible.W quite extensivedevicesforplurallypluralquan quantification thatareavailableinourlangua seem Once thisisdone,wecanquantifyonlyoverpl the m of to beaproblem
are insom properties canbederivedfrom reifying aplurality.Idonotthinkitisgoodreasonfordoingso.Thenon-distributive objects com the least.Thesentencesayssom outnum 59 opinion issom object –Idonotagreethatthisisthecorrectreadingof“ argum objection isnotappealingtom devices forhigherpluralquantification often supportedbytheclaim Seefori objects.W problem o ent –thatwhateverisboundbyoneexistentialquantifiershouldbetakenas st naturalthingtodoseem Does thistellussom And asforthebasicobjectionitselfandfo For som Parsons-style objectionagainstpluralquan bers thesingleobjectcom n st ance Oy e posed ofthem im h atic atall. e e en wewanttoquantif . Theproblem e thing like“ donothappentospeak thislanguage.Doestellusanythingabout portant sensepriortothe peopleinstantiatinganon-distri st ei n Li nnebo, (2003,p.87). , oraboutpartsoftheseobjects. ∃ x thatEnglish(and 1 appearswhenwe
e & distributiveproper e thing aboutnature . e ∃ posed oftables thing about x s tosingulariseorreifythem 2 & y overpl 59 ∃ . However,pluralquantificationassuchseem x 3 &…& 140 form chairs andtables,notaboutbiggercom urality of ge? trytoquantif tification. Itm other ordinarylanguages)doesnotcontain urality ofcom )? Thisreadingseem er. ThiswayofstrengtheningParsons’ butive propertycanbeagoodreasonfor r whatseem ties, andthatiswhyIthinkthelatter ∃ W tification beingontologicallyinnocentis ofthings,oronlyaboutdevicesfor x n ”, whichisirreduciblyplural. e canim pluralitiesof ∃ xxs y overpluralitiesof i s acoreideabehindParsons’ p ”. Thecorrectreadinginm agine alanguagethatoffers ght notbetooelegant,butit lex objects,whichdoesnot intoonecom ourf s im plausible, tosay a m iliar objects, p lex object. pluralities s not p lex y
CEU eTD Collection pluralities ofobjectsinordinarylanguage. worried aboutthelackofplura Anyway, theyshouldnotbetakenasaguide language shouldindicatesom of things.Ortoputitindi far from nature ofthings? ontology bythem another optionf false, ascom object thatiscom Universalist istosaythatordinarylanguage ontology), andsothatthereisnoneedto ontologically com so istheUniversalist.Sim com recognised byNihilism slightly differenthere.W it m u m st beproblem onsense ontology.IftheNihilistissupposed The Universalistcan,justliketheNihilist, If theclashwithordinarylanguageposits believingthatordinarylanguagehas 4.4. MereologicalUniversalismvs.CommonsenseOntology m onsense ontologyfailstorec o W r theUniversalististotr e posed of m thod ofparaphrase. atic forMereologicalUniver hy shouldit? itting (andthatinf , Universalism h ilar solutionsareavailabletobothof ile com Clinton’snoseandtheEif fferent words:Idonotbelievethatfactsaboutstructureof e thing im lly pluralquantificationandpred Ittellsusonlysom m onsense ont isconcer portant act y toreconcilehispositionwithcom 141 in m reconcile thesetwo.Anotheroptionforthe ognise som som about ontology.Theym existential denials(like:“Thereisnosuch there isnosuchthingascom ology isconcernedwithobjectsthatarenot ned withobjectsthatarenotrecognisedby anychallengeforMereologicalNihilism salism
a e tters ofontology.ThereforeIam tofindasolutiontheclashproblem thing im claim e f thing aboutourlanguage.Iam e aswell.However,thesituationis l Tower”)arestrictlyandliterally e genuinetypesofobjects.Yet thatordinarylanguageisnot portant tosayaboutthenature them icates thatcanbeappliedto . i ght, theym m m i onsense onsense ght not. nottoo very , ,
CEU eTD Collection system Universalism sentences concernedwithtypicallyUn to findaparaphrasethatwouldenableordi far m sentences concernedwithcom that objectsarerecognisedbycom W sentence: reference toobjectsrecognisedbycom the f paraphrase thissentenceintoconcerne scattered objectslikethesum it ism A satisfactoryparaphrasewouldhavetoenableus e m o o llowing lines: i re objectsthatcom ght alsotrytoparaphrasethissentenceinterm atic m The Nihilistwaslookingforaparaphrasethat bigger thattheregionof spacethatisoccupiedbyGeorgeBush” Clinton’s noseandthe region ofspacethat “The regionofspacethat isasum portion of nose andtheportionof “The portionof Bush” “The objectcom eaningful forordinarylanguagespeak only.Therefore,theparaphras e thod ofreplacinganyreferen stuf f thatconstitutesGeorgeBush” stuf posed ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffelTowerisbiggerthanGeorge m f onsense ontologydoes, thatisasum ofClinton’snoseandtheEiffelTower.Itseem m stuf onsense com f thatconstitutestheEif m m onsense ontologyoccupy: onsense of 142 iversalist objects-recognisedby of theportionof posite objects.SinceUniversalism ce totypicallyUniversalistobjectswith e wouldhavetoprovideageneraland nary languagespeakertom er whodoesnotrecognisesuchspatially d withstuffratherthanobjects,along the regionofspacethat isoccupiedby ontology.Letusthentakethefollowing toputthissentenceinsuchterm itseem isoccupiedbytheEiffel Toweris wouldenablehim s ofdiscontinuousregionsspace s thattheUniversalistwillhave stuf f e l Towerisbiggerthanthe f thatconstitutesClinton’s tom a s thatwecan a ke senseof ke senseof recognises s sothat CEU eTD Collection Mereological Nihilism objects recognisedbycom sense ofordinarylanguagestatem properties. Itseem plurally quantifiedvariables,sets,andsi Universalism this thread,wem Perhaps duetothefactthatthisislangua language withMereologicalNihilism ontological languages,andsotheyfeelthatth stands forafalseontologicaldoctrine,isinso Mereological Nihilism and MereologicalNihilism ontological structurecorrectly.Iftheproblem believe thatcom language playim problem without therebybeingcom (ontology thatrecognisesfewerobjects)can Mereological Universalism The reasonisthatform Actually, itseem The m forcom .
a in problem m m portant roleinontologicalde onsense ontology,whyshoulditaffectMereologicalUniversalism onsense ontologyistrue,orthatthecom s thataccordingtothefoes u st adm , istrue,butnonetheless thereisasim s thatthisisaproblem m withparaphrasef . exists,itisbecausetherearesom Infactitisam itted totheexisten it thatthecl m onsense ontology. a ny peoplecom ents wit ilar problem . W hy isthecom 143 hout therebybeingcom o m ash problem re generalproblem ofclashbetweenthecom p m ge wespeakm o ere isaneedtoreconcilethecom le objectscollectivelyinstantiatingplural ce ofbiggerontology’sobjects.Butifitisa bates. Andthisisnotbecausethesepeople m they thinkthatcom e r th ofparaphrase,itisnotpossibletom sensem forMereologicalUniversalism a forordinarylanguageratherthan m ke senseofabiggerontology’stalk e Nihilistwasapparentreif onsense ontologyandcom If thisisagenuineproblem m o existsalsoforMereological onsense languagesoim re im m o onsense languagedescribes st ofthetim portant thanotherincorrect ofhowasm e peoplewhobelievethat m m onsense languagethat itted toexistenceof m onsense language e. Ifwefollow aller ontology too. ication of m m portant? onsense onsense ?
for a ke
CEU eTD Collection can beparaphrasedintootherontology’slangua However, claim different criteriaofexistenceandobjecthood, between rivalontologies.Nocom ontology. Theyaregenuine“differencem There isnowaytoparaphrasethem the objectsweoriginallyref such claim the sam all rivaldoctrines,notonlyMereologicalNihilis ordinary languagewithnon-existentialclaim to MereologicalNihilism The pointofthediscussionclashpr There areclaim
e
position. s ispreserved,withexceptionofth s thatcontainreferencetoobj s thatcannotbereconciled . If e r toexist. som e one believes p rom sothat i se is 144 a s kers” of ects butdonotasserttheirexistencedirectly eir existentialassum possiblehere–differentontologiesuse they com m arivalontologicaldoctrine,thisworksfor ge, anditseem that thereisaneedof . and hencedifferentexistentialclaim oblem AndsoMereologicalUniversalism and thesearetheexistentialstatem – theyarepreciselywhatisdifferent isthef e outtrueaccordingtotherival o s thatthewholesenseof llowing: itisnotspecif p tions of reconciliationof course–that isin ents. ic s .
CEU eTD Collection coincidence ofastatueandlum two doctrinesactuallysolvethesam solves allpuzzlespositedbym when itcom long asthereisanyportion ofstuff.Asfo that exists.Thereisnoproblem parts (portionsof and fusingofsim have alreadyestablishedthatitcannotbethe f and Icannotseehowtheideaoffusingorsplitti problem and sotherearenoproblem Mereological Essentialism ceases toexistwheneverweintroduceanychange (this isif parts (withthem there isnostrictidentityacrosschange,andthatwhatstrictlyidenticalaretheunchanged object withacom statues orlum dim u se orsplit,som e nsional objectssharingsom Mereological Nihilism atic: point-sizedandextendedphysicallyindivisiblesim wecom e p s toansweringtheSpecialCom s thatcouldcoincide.Ifthereisaproblem selves), andthatthesepa stuf e p p b sortof les isnotpossibleeither. licated career(fusing,splitti ine Universalism f ) withinthesim coincidenceof istrue).TheNih s abouttheirpersis doesnotlosein a terial com aboutthissi e tem C p ofclay withthe ONCLUSIONS e p poral pa bunchof le is tw position justaswellUniversalism rts com 145 r m notproblem ilist saysthattherearenocom o sim Universalism m As forthem case. Ifcoincidenceisnotpossible,splitting tence. Persistenceofsim a p Tem ng, changingparts)Universalism rts, whileNihilism position Question.MereologicalNihilism xim le’s identity,sinceitcontinuestoexistas ng couldbeappliedtothem any waytoMereologicalUniversalism problem pose differentfour-dim p ofitsparts(thisisifwebelievethat poral PartsTheory),orthatanobject les wouldhavetobepossible,butwe a lly continuoussim
atic, sincethesim aboutpersistenceofacom a s. Ifthereisaproblem saysthattherearetwof xim a l sim p les cannotchangeparts, saysthatthereareno p le –anychangeof p p les doesnotseem les: regardlessof ensional objects p . Iftheycould le containsall posite objects does-these saysthat about posite our-
CEU eTD Collection figure inthem Universalism things. Itseem things seriously introduced. Still,thisdoctrinealsogivesaclearanswertoproblem how oddthisconceptis,theyceas distinction intherealm m However, itseem entities, andsowewanttohavem want todrawthedistinctionbetweenthings However, thisisnotthekindofnon-thingsthat believe inanynon-m non-things withinthem other. Ifthingsaretobedistinguishedporti m things thattheideaofadistinguishedporti im cannot changetheirparts. ThereforeIam portion ofm as well–itisnotreallyconvincingthat have seen,theform denials areim a a plausibility andIam kes senseonlyifthereareatleasttwoki terial entityisathingaccordingtoUn Mereological Nihilism There aretwom a claim tter isanobject.Italsonotc plausible andthatNihilism s thatnosuchpossibilityexists i . Nihilism nd-independent ontologicalstru s thatthereisnoroom er objectioncanbeappliedinaslightlym thattheybelievethi of a a readytoadm terial non-things,like a in objectionstoMereologi m terial world.Obvious isabletoaccom a terial entities. hasaveryim e toexistwheneveranychangeinm it that a terial is any, regardlesshowscatteredanddiscontinued, forthelatterinUniversalist’sontology.Any m 146 onvincing thatcom not com iversalism MereologicalNihilism portant advantageoverUniversalism things,asopposedtom ons ofreality,therem nottooworriedabout theobjectionfrom odate thedifferencebetweenthingsandnon- nds ofentitiestobedistinguishedfrom ngs aredistinguishedportionsofrealitythat on ofrealitybecom andnon-thingsintherealm within Universalism ly, thefriendsofUniversalism Ihaveinm cture, theypopulaterealitywithsom abstract objectsortropesforinstance. cal Nihilism p atible withthegunkscenario.Aswe . Andsobeingathingm i nd here.Thepointisthatwe odified form posite objects,iftheyexist, : thatNihilism s of e s trivial.Adistinction : u evenif cannotbereconciled st beboththingsand identity. a a tter’s continuityis terial non-things. toUniversalism thef ’ ofm s existential arefreeto r : iends of it a kes no a each takes terial a ny
CEU eTD Collection
this shouldallowtostateallfactsabouttheallegedcom com Nihilism Nihilism no cleargenuinecom clear -Ibelievethatthereisnosuchthing with com 60 water W are, sincetheyarenotvagueatall.Am there areothernon-vagueentitiesthatas organism since theycannotbecom vagueness. Sim Nihilism if theworldconsistsofatom sim are continuous.Theonlyproblem continuous sim com divisible intoportionsofstuff,andits Nihilism Iam hy shouldwethenoptforel p m p les. Thepricethatwem atible withgunk,sincegunkm 60 i onsense objectscanbeputsolelyinterm ndebt ? The originalm The objectionfrom andcom . arecom andMinim s orartefactshowm Thosewhoarenothappywiththisso m onsense intuitionsof ed t o p HowardR p les canbem les arebettercandidatesfor p m atible withthegunkscenari a onsense ontologybythem l Nihilism o m obi tivation f onsense ontologicalclai theGunkHypothesisha nson fort positionally vague, a i
ght needto de ofgunkaswell,sincetheyrem a less gunkand acceptable. ny andwhich whatobjectsexis ectrons andbosonsratherthanforatom o h r Mereological i atic sim s observat u st ultim pay inthiscaseishavinganobjectlessontology, o lecu as com 147 eem p goodcandidatesforbeingobjectsassim i on. le for som sim lution m le ofwaterissuchcandidate.Oranatom objects thanlivingorganism s aretheextendedphysicallyindivisible s thatpoint-sizedsim o. Them s ofsetsorarrangem whereas itisunclearincaseofliving t andwhattheirnatureis.Tobeperfectly ately consistofthem p m m eans ofparaphrase.Claim les com Nihilism onsense ontologyandsothatthereare s s beenprovenharm thatareathreatforMereological e i reasonswedonotfindMaxim posite objects. ght wanttoreconcileMereological a pose them xim com a l sim a in sim e s f . Onem p e le canbeinfinitely nts ofsim r p p om . Them s orm les areperfectly less: allform le aslongthey thechargeof s orartefacts i ght saythat s o regarding lecules of p a les, and xim p s of a les lly a l .
CEU eTD Collection m our ontology,wewouldendupwiththeproblem lum gives risetovariouscoincidingentities,liketrunksandpiecesofwood,orstatues m us saythatitisdesirabletohaveonlyone m Mereological Nihilism indivisible sim com we reallyneedthis? an atom sub-atom particles isthatifwehadonlyatom be gained,theproblem any partswithinanobjectthatcanbechanged that theyareim for objectsthananynon-vaguecom m problem a o eans thatourchoiceofsim i ght behappyhavingonlyonetypeofobjects– ke agenuinedistinctionbetweenthingsandnon-things andsotobeontologicalrealists. re thanoneitm p position andidentity.Iftheworldisultim s ofclay.Incasem Sub-atom However, sim The sim . Thiswouldm ofcoincidence.Ifthissolutionis ic stufffloatingaround,st p p les arenotareasonableoption,wecanconsider other optionswithin m lest objectshavesom ic sim une totheproblem eans thatsom p : les understoodassub-atom p theMinim of ean havingboththings les provideneatandelegantsolutiontoproblem identityarisesagain.Anotherreasonf o p lecules ofwateror les isarbitrary. e a objectsare uff thatcouldbecom l ortheMaxim s asobj p ofiden lex entitiesat e advantage level ects inourontology,therewouldbestillalotof asgoodhavingsub-atom 148 tity throughchangeofparts.Aslongasthere ately m or lost,som andfree-floatingstu ofcom atom able tocom atom a ic leastfortworeasons.Thefirstreasonis
over anycom l Nihilism of coincidence.Onem particles seem s, ifwehadboththem a de ofgunkandextendedphysically s –andinthiswaywecanavoidthe position inourontology.Ifwehave e apartofthingwhenattachedto pose anotherobjects.Andthis e . Allthreeoptionsallowusto otherpotentialpartsthatcan p o lex entity.Firstof tobebettercandidates r pref ff inourontology.Do s concerning ic sim erring sub-atom i ght saythatwe andsim p les onlyit p alllet les in ic CEU eTD Collection Boolos, G,: Baxter, D.L.M.,“Identityin 1989 Arm Davidson, D.:“RadicalInterpretation”, Chisholm Boskovich, R.J., Harre, R., Eklund, M.“ThePictureofRealityasanAm Hirsch, E.: Heller, M., Hazen, A.P.,“RelationsinLe - “Nom ------s trong, D.M., “Physical-Object Ontology, VerbalDisputes,andCom “To BeistoaValueofVariable(o “Parts asEssentialtoTheirW
“Identity ThroughTim 1998) Logic, Logic 1970, 163-182 Kiefer, MiltonK.Munitz(eds.),Albany, 1975, 477-84 On Metaphysics Logic Journal ofPhilosophy Phenomenological Research, Vol.LXX,No.1,2005 “Mereological Essentialism , R.M.: The PrinciplesofScientificThinking 1988, 575-582 Publishing, 2008 Metaphysics into TruthandInterpretation Cam 1997, 243-8 , eds.R.JeffreyandJ.P.Burgess,HarvardUniversityPress,1998) The OntologyofPhysicalObjects:Four-Dimensional HunksofMatter, inalist b ridge: Cam The TheoryofNaturalPhilosophy A CombinatorialTheoryofPossibility Platonism , UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1989 , ed.byJ.Hawthorne,T.Sider,andD.Zim , eds.R.JeffreyandJ.P.Burgess,HarvardUniversityPress, b ridge UniversityPress,1990 theLooseandPopularSense”, wis’s Fram ”, e”, in: 81:8, August,1984,430-449(reprintedin Philosophical Review : FurtherConsiderations”, holes”, B Dialectica, 27,1974 Language, Belief,andMetaphysics , Oxford:ClarendonPress,2001 IBLIOGRAPHY ework W 149 Review ofMetaphysics orphous Lum , London:Macm r toBeSom ithout Atom , Chicago:OpenCourt,1922 State UniversityofNewYorkPress, , 94,1985,327-44(reprintedin : p , 67-97 ”, in: , Cam , 314-28;reprintedin e Valuesof m Review ofMetaphysics Mind s”, illan, 1970 on Sense”, Contemporary Debatesin b Analysis ridge UniversityPress, , 26,1973,581-603 , vol.XCVII,October m Som e rm , 57:4,October, Philosophy and an, Blackwell e Logic, , HowardE. Variables”),
Inquiries , 28,
CEU eTD Collection Lewis, D.: Kant, I.,“TheEm McDaniel, K.: Markosian, N.: Linnebo, O.,“PluralQuantificationExposed”, Putnam Parsons, C.,: Merricks, T., - - - “Sim ------“Sim “The rightstuff”,2006,unpublished “On thePluralityofW “New W “Truth andConvention: OnDavidson’sRefutationofConceptualRelativism “Against MaxConSim “Against RevisionaryOntology”, “Objects andLogic”, “The Questionof “Quantifier VarianceandRealism “The StructuralistViewofMathem “Brutal Sim 127 61, No.4,Decem Parts ofClasses Relativism, 2002a Dialectica Press, 1994 Philosophy, OxfordUniversityPress,1996,272-309) (reprinted in: 2003, 265-275 , H.:
45-65 Theoretical Philosophy,1755-1770 Geom ples, StuffandSim ples”, Objects andPersons o etry, ofwhichSam rk foraTheoryofUniversals”, ploym , vol.41,1987,69-77 Australasian JournalofPsychology p les” (unpublished) The PhilosophyofMathematics , Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1991 ent ofNaturalPhilosophyinMetaphysicalCom ber 1983,343-377 , 51-73 Realism The Monist o p rlds”, Oxford:Blackwell,2001 p les”, le People”, , Oxford:ClarendonPress,2001 ” in: p Australasian JournalofPhilosophy le Icontains 65,1982,491-516 Words andLive Philosophical Topics 150 a The Monist tical Objects”,in:Synthese84,1990,303-46 ” , Nous , Cam Philosophical Issues,12,Realismand Australasian JournalofPhilosophy aPhysicalMonadology”,in:I.Kant, , 37:1,2003,71-92 , ed.W b , 1998,vol.76,no.2,213-228 ridge: Cam , 2004,vol.87,no.3,405-428 , Cam . D.Hart,OxfordReadingsin , b vol. 30,No.1,2002b ridge: HarvardUniversity b ridge UniversityPress, b ination with , Vol.81,No.2, , 103- , Vol. ” , CEU eTD Collection
Thom Sim
Sider, T.: Schaf Metaphysics Rosen, G.andDorr,C.,“Com Resnik, M.,“SecondOrderLogicStillW Quine, W
Sidelle, A.: 175- 91 - - - “Sim - - - - “Parthood”, - - - - “W - - ons, P.: f son, J.J.,“TheStatueand theClay”, e “On Carnap' “Extended Sim
“W “NeoFregeanism “Is ThereaTrueMetaphysicsofMaterialObjects? “On W “Criteria of Parts vol. 87,no.3,371-384 May 2000,585-590 Perspectives Research Press, 2003a Four-Dimensionalism. AnOntologyofPersistenceandTime, University Press,1953 Volume, Coincident Entities”, Realism andRelativism r, J.,“From “A SweaterUnravelled:Following . V.: orlds hat’s SoBadAboutOverdeterm Richard M.Gale(ed.),Oxford:Blackwell,2002,151-174 , ply , Oxford:ClarendonPress, 2000 h 81, 2007a,201-32 at ThereIs”,in: Away”, , 67,2003b,719-726 Possible”, PersonalIdentityandth Nihilism s Philosophical Review , 15, ViewsonOntology”, p les: AThird andQuantifierVariance”, Journal ofPhilosophy Metaphysics Philosophy andPhenomenologicalResearch Nous toMonism , 2002,118-145 , 32:4(1998),423-448 position asaFiction”,in: From aLogicalPointofView W , 2001,189-209 a y BetweenAtom ”, ild”, , 116,2007b,51-91 Nous Philosophical Studies e Lim 151 Australasian JournalofPhilosophy ination”, Journal ofPhilosophy , 73,1976,859–63 , 32:2,1998,149-173 One ThreadofThoughtforAvoiding its of Aristotelian Society,Supplementary ConceptualAnalysis” Philosophy andPhenomenological s andGunk”, ”, The BlackwellGuideto , 2,1951 Philosophical Issues , Cam 85,1998,75-87 Oxford:Clarendon The Monist , Vol.LX,No.3, b ridge, Harvard Philosophical , 85,2007, , 2004, , 12, CEU eTD Collection Zim Yi, B.-U.,“IsMereologyOntologicallyInnocent? W Varzi, A.,“Boundaries,Continuity,andContact”, Van Inwagen,P.: Uzquiano, G.,“PluralsandSim
h itehead, A.N., - - m e rm
“Com Material Beings 1994, 207-220 an, D.W Research Argum 160 position asIdentity”,In ent for‘Atom Process andReality , 1996,vol.56,no.1,1-29 ., “CouldExtendedObjectsBeMadeOutofSim , Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1990 p les”, The Monist Philosophical Perspectives , NewYork:TheFreePress,1978 l ess Gunk’”, 152
, vol.87,no.3,2004,429-451,434-35 Nous ”, Philosophical Studies Philosophy andPhenomenological 31:1,1997,26-58 , 8, Logic andLanguage 93,1999,141- p le Parts? An ,