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The Kalamazoo River Spill: Pipelines, Politics, and Economies of Knowledge

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The Kalamazoo River Spill: Pipelines, Politics, and Economies of Knowledge The Kalamazoo River Spill: Pipelines, Politics, and Economies of Knowledge By: Sonia Grant A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master’s of Arts Department of Geography & Program in Planning University of Toronto © Copyright by Sonia Grant 2014 The Kalamazoo River Spill: Pipelines, Politics, and Economies of Knowledge Sonia Grant Masters of Arts Department of Geography & Program in Planning University of Toronto 2014 Abstract In July 2010, an oil pipeline ruptured in southwest Michigan, spilling approximately one million gallons of diluted bitumen (dilbit) from the Alberta tar sands into the Kalamazoo River. As the first major pipeline release of dilbit, the story of the Kalamazoo River spill is often cited in growing debates about dilbit pipeline projects in North America. This thesis provides an ethnographic account of the aftermath of the spill. Drawing on research conducted in Michigan in 2013, I examine how knowledge claims about the spill have been produced and mobilized in Michigan, focusing in particular on impacted residents’ responses to the disaster. Informed by my involvement with environmental justice groups in Toronto, the thesis also explores how the story of the spill has been brought to bear on debates about a proposed pipeline project in Eastern Canada. Together, the chapters engage themes of risk, uncertainty, comparison, and knowledge production in environmental politics. ii Acknowledgments I have incurred many debts throughout the research and writing process for this thesis. First, I want to thank all those in Ontario, Michigan, and other parts of the US who participated in interviews. This document would not be possible without you. I owe special thanks to Craig Ritter and Michelle BarlondSmith, from whom I learned more than I can express here, and whose friendship has come to matter a great deal. Carolyn and Jim Timmons provided much support and encouragement, and fostered exciting collaborations. Elizabeth Friedman’s dedication and sense of humor inspired me to keep going when I might not have otherwise. I thank Todd Heywood for telling it like it is, since 2010 (and way before that). I am thankful to Riki Ott and Lisa Marie Jacobs for their 25+ years of advocacy and for enrolling me in the networks that have spun out from their work. I am thankful to the MICATS for fighting the fight. Rising Tide Toronto and the environmental justice crews in Ontario provided a fun and challenging space from which to organize and grow. Vanessa and Lindsay Gray’s work in Aaamjiwnaang First Nation first taught me about the many ways in which Line 9 matters. I am thankful for all that they do, and know that many others are too. In Ann Arbor, I owe huge thanks to Arun Agrawal at the University of Michigan School of Natural Resources and Environment for making possible my time in Michigan. Joan Wolf provided invaluable institutional support, a warm welcome that made a big difference, and was the best office-mate I could have ever wished for. Thank you to Ryan for making Ann Arbor such a lovely place to walk and talk, and for everything else. I was fortunate to have had many wonderful teachers and colleagues at the University of Toronto (U of T). In particular, I received tremendous support at the Department of Geography and the Women & Gender Studies Institute, and am thankful to Jessica Finlayson and Marian Reed for helping me through the ins and outs of both departments. I am grateful to my MA cohort – especially Connor, Gwen, and Hillary – for being such fantastic people to think and learn with. Thanks to the Nobjects, the graduate student reading group that assembled around the Technoscience Salon at U of T, and many thanks to the organizers of the Salon. I am extremely thankful to the members of my MA thesis committee, Deborah Cowen and Raj Narayanareddy, and my supervisor, Emily Gilbert, all of whom engaged generously with my work, posed challenging questions that I’ll be mulling over for years to come, and encouraged me to be more explicit about what I really mean to say. In my first year at U of T, Deb taught me how cool geography can be, and encouraged me to think both experimentally and with care. Raj challenged me to follow the threads of my arguments all the way, including their knots. I want to extend my warmest thanks to Emily Gilbert, whose mentorship and steadfast support throughout my MA made a world of difference. Emily’s generosity with her time, insights, and edits has made me a stronger and more curious student. The example that Emily set is in no small part what motivated me to pursue academic work beyond the MA: the passion and care that she brings to her teaching, and her commitment to iii politically grounded and theoretically rich scholarship are nothing short of goals to strive towards. This research benefited immensely from the financial support of the University of Toronto Faculty of Arts & Science, the School of Graduate Studies, the Department of Geography & Program in Planning, and the Canadian Studies Graduate Student Network. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Ontario Graduate Scholarship provided generous external funding. Finally, I thank my family for their support before and during this process. Cath made the big city a lot less scary and a lot more fun in my first year. Joe provided a lovingly assembled toolkit. I am grateful to my parents for listening to my rants, for their insightful interventions, and for making fun of me just the right amount. I often struggled with wanting to tell this story all at once, kind of like a chemical odor can hit you all at once. Needless to say I benefited tremendously from Mom and Dad’s careful, kind, and always encouraging reminders to take things one step, and one day, at a time. iv Table of Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………...ii Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………….........iii Table of Contents..............................................................................................................v Acronyms……………………………………………………………….……................vii List of figures……………………………………………………………......................viii A note on names…………………………………………………………………..........viii Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 The spill .............................................................................................................................. 8 Cutting together causes…………………………………………………………………..10 Expansion/replacement…………………………………………………………………..11 On methods, enunciatory communities, and ethnographic folds………………………...12 The chapters ...................................................................................................................... 14 Chapter 2: Anticipating the Line 9 Reversal ............................................................................. 18 Biopolitics, security, and circulation…………………………………………………….20 The circulation of Canadian tar sands……………………………………………………22 Precaution, preemption, resilience……………………………………………………….26 Environmentalism’s ‘biopolitical topologies’……………………………………………28 Anticipating otherwise3 .................................................................................................... 34 Chapter 3: Un/knowing the spill………………………………………………………………. 38 On the edge of an explanation…………………………………………………………...38 The “tar sands name game” and missing MSDS………………………………………...44 How many gallons?...........................................................................................................50 Like a python swallowing an elephant…………………………………………………..55 NRDA……………………………………………………………………………………60 Show me the data………………………………………………………………………..62 Evacuation……………………………………………………………………………….66 Community health studies……………………………………………………………….69 Unknowing………………………………………………………………………………75 Chapter 4: Toxic Rocks……………………………………………………………………….78 The results are in……………………………………………………………………….78 Planes of in/commensurability…………………………………………………………79 It was almost like a slurping sound…………………………………………………….82 Something Gulf-like……………………………………………………………………83 Backyard experiments………………………………………………………………….89 Morel mushrooms………………………………………………………………………91 Canary in the coal mine……………………………………………………………...…92 Do you smell fire?.……………………………………………………………………..97 Anniversary..………………………………………………………………………….101 Fingerprint match and TICs…………………………………………………………..103 The most visible reminder [not mere metaphor]..…………………………………….106 Black out..……………………………………………………………………………..109 v Chapter 5: ‘Remembering the Kalamazoo’……………………………………………….114 PetKoch……………………………………………………………………………...116 Buckets………………………………………………………………………………123 “Toxic” tour?.………………………………………………………………………..125 15 Detroiters, and I don’t have the luxury.…………………………………………..128 Drawing relations.…………………………...……………………………………….130 Works cited……………………………………………………………………………147 vi Acronyms ATSDR: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry CAPP: Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers CCPHD: Calhoun County Public Health Department DCATS: Detroit Coalition Against Tar Sands ENGO: Environmental Non-Governmental Organization EPA: United States Environmental Protection Agency GCM: Global Community Monitor MDCH: Michigan Department of Community Health MDEQ: Michigan Department of Environmental Quality MDNR: Michigan Department of Natural Resources MICATS: Michigan Coalition Against Tar Sands MPSC: Michigan Public Service Commission NEB: Canadian National Energy Board NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
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