Romanian Journal of European Affairs vol. 2, no. 2, 2002
THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY?
Kirsty Hughes*
ABSTRACT: The future of Europe Convention is now three months into its task of finding answers to the challenges and questions of the Laeken declaration. The central issue for the Convention is whether it can find a route through the multitude of questions and create a strong consensus on substantive answers to the three big challenges of democratizing the EU, organizing the politics and policies of the enlarged EU, and developing the EUÕs voice in the world. The enlarged EU of 25 or more members has to be able to cope in both democratic and efficiency terms with the increased numbers of member states, and increased diversity in economic and political interests and circumstances. The status quo is not an option or the enlarged EU will rapidly find its decision- making and operational mechanisms seizing up - it will be a stalled and inefficient EU. The politics of the Convention are unfolding slowly and a myriad of political alignments are emerging. But some key differences are emerging already - particularly the traditional battle between intergovernmentalists and integrationists. The relative role and powers of the Council and Commission will be central in determining the nature of the future EU. Fundamental reform of both institutions is vital in both efficiency and democratic terms. One of the big risks is that energy is concentrated on the relative power of the two institutions and not on their effective reform. Proposals for a new, five-year, appointed President of the European Council go in this direction - they will not improve legitimacy and precisely duplicate the characteristics of the current Commission President. The paper identifies 5 scenarios for the future EU to summarize the potential outcomes of different sets of decisions by Convention and IGC: ¥ Emergent global political power; ¥ Struggling global power; ¥ Efficient but weak EU ¥ Efficient but unstable EU ¥ Technocratic, stalled and inefficient EU.
1. Introduction the enlarged EU, on overcoming the democratic After the ambitious language of the Laeken deficit, and on developing the EUÕs role in the Declaration, the hard work - and the political world so that it could become both a stabilizing maneuvering - of the future of Europe power and a model to others. But it followed up Convention has begun. Laeken set three big these strategic challenges, that are indeed vital challenges for the Convention - on the politics of questions for the contemporary Union, with a set
* Kirsty Hughes is Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. This article is the first in a new series of Working Papers published by the European Policy Institutes Network. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which she is associated. I am grateful to a number of politicians, officials and commentators across the EU for discussing with me their views on the future of Europe debate and the convention. Responsibility for views expressed here rests with the author alone.
61 Kirsty Hughes of over 50 more detailed questions, many of them outcome, the enlarged EU may rapidly find itself highly institutional and technical. in a crisis situation (as some including One of the central issues for the Convention Convention vice-chairman Jean-Luc Dehaene is whether it can find a route through this argue) or, more likely perhaps it may gradually multitude of questions to forge a strong start to seize up in its mechanisms and consensus on substantive and effective answers to functioning - a gradual stasis. What is fundamental these three big challenges. The politics of the here is to identify and to unravel more clearly Convention as it develops are being closely what the impact of enlargement is likely to be and watched both to see whether it can reach a strong where the crucial areas for change are. The consensus, without which governments will once process of the Convention itself adds to our again have a free hand in the subsequent knowledge here: there is a chance to see for intergovernmental conference (IGC), and to see the first time the political dynamics of the the nature of the policy and institutional solutions enlarged EU. proposed, in particular, whether it will produce a There is widespread agreement too on the constitution for the EU. But the process of the need to tackle the democratic deficit - as Michel Convention itself, and not only its output, is of Barnier, Commission representative on the considerable importance: will its work and its Convention, has said Ôuntil now we have debates have any genuine resonance in national built Europe for the people but without political debates across Europe? Will its work be themÕ. But will the Convention be able to find new seen as relevant to, and engaged with, solutions to this problem? Or does it risk looking contemporary European political issues, ranging at solutions only in institutional and constitutional from the ongoing and developing challenges terms, and not in terms of participation, raised by September 11th, to issues of communication and the development of a immigration, of internal security, of employment, European demos. Certainly, the rhetoric around of globalization? And will there be seen to be a the EU as a federation of nation states, which has genuine process of consultation and dialogue by found some favor in Convention debates, conceals the Convention? for now some of the real institutional power The internal politics of the Convention are battles over the relative role of the Commission slowly unfolding, but it is too early to give any and Council and of the larger and smaller definitive answers to these questions. But countries. It is a concept which can mean all things whichever direction the Convention goes in, to all people and in itself provides no new answers. there is widespread agreement that it must move One crucial question for the enlarged EU, to which beyond the debacle of Nice, if the enlarged EU is the Convention should provide some answers, is to be a vital, dynamic and effective political body whether it will be an EU dominated by the larger (and, of course, ratification of Nice still hangs on member states - at the very time when the number the outcome of the yet to be announced second of smaller member states doubles - an outcome Irish referendum). So the outcome of the which is not likely to be politically stable or Convention may be vital for the successful effective in the medium run. operation of the enlarged EU. Without a positive
62 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY?
Convention debates so far have also shown trends and groupings are emerging already. strong support in principle for the urgent need to One crucial area, where there appears to have build a much stronger common foreign policy - been understanding and broad agreement from with many referring to the current Middle East the start, is the need for the Convention to aim at crisis, and the EUÕs relative powerlessness to a consensus document and to avoid a final report impact on events, as demonstrating the need for containing lists of options on all key issues (it is new steps forward. But the Convention will be relevant to note that when Giscard dÕEstaing challenged indeed to come up with a clear route made his opening speech to the Convention, it ahead in this area that will be commensurate with was this point that provoked sustained the urgency of the current range of international spontaneous applause from the floor of the problems, given national differences and the Convention). A consensus outcome, in the reluctance to pool sovereignty in these areas. context of a wider public debate around the It is too early to predict success or failure - or Convention, will make it very difficult for member the direction of the final outcomes - of the states to ignore or reject the principal conclusions Convention. But it is possible to distinguish a in the subsequent 2004 IGC. It may be unlikely number of models or scenarios (developed that a strong consensus can be gained on all further in the conclusion) that may finally major issues, but the aim will be to limit the result from the twin processes of the Convention number of cases where alternate points of view and IGC: are present in the text (and to avoid any separate ¥ Emergent global political power; minority reports), although some are in favour of ¥ Struggling global power; presenting options for selection by the IGC in ¥ Efficient but weak EU some areas. However, even within the presidium ¥ Efficient but unstable EU it appears to be unclear for now what sort of final ¥ Technocratic, stalled and inefficient EU. text will be produced Ð whether in the form of a new Treaty or a political document. This paper first assesses the political In general, member states would prefer to see dynamics so far of the Convention and then more options in the conclusions rather than analyses the key issues posed by the challenges of consensus, to increase their room for manoeuvre enlargement, of democracy and of becoming a in the IGC - but a number appointed senior genuine global actor (the paper does not look in political figures as government representatives on detail at specific policy areas such as economic the Convention, implicitly recognizing the cooperation or justice and home affairs). potential power of the ConventionÕs output. The UK initially talked emphatically about the need for 2. Politics of the Convention a ÔfirebreakÕ between the Convention and the At the time of writing (May 2002), the internal IGC, but then, in recognition of the potential political dynamics of the Convention are still power of the Convention appointed their Europe developing. It is too early to identify definitively minister as government representative Ð as did where the main power center(s) will lie, or what France. Portugal too has also emphasized the the main divisions of opinion will be but some need for the Convention to provide options.
63 Kirsty Hughes
Germany, in contrast, appears to be more ready representatives are meeting as a group, as are the for the Convention to play a significant role, even candidate members; the MEPs meet as a group if also nervous of the potential loss of political but also organize meetings of the three main initiative by the governments. political groupings, open to other members of For the candidate countries, there appears to the Convention; and some members are meeting be less innate suspicion of the Convention vis-ˆ- in national groupings. Beyond this other vis the IGC - not least, perhaps, because of the alignments of member statesÕ government political opportunities it offers them. Of representatives, and of Convention members considerable political importance for the according to positions on key issues, can be candidates is their participation in the expected - the UK, for example, has already Convention on an equal basis; and, while Laeken announced its intention for its representative to stated that the candidates could not prevent a co-operate with the Italian representative (an consensus among the current 15 at the unlikely pairing of Hain with Fini). National MPs Convention, any final conclusion that divided the are also developing as a group with some shared current members from the candidates would interests, not least in their relative lack of contact represent a failure of the process. The candidatesÕ with EU institutions. representatives have already demonstrated both How these different political dynamics political determination and effectiveness by develop will be fundamental in determining the successfully arguing for a candidate nature of the final output of the Convention. representative on the presidium (referred to by Some are concerned that Giscard intends to Giscard dÕEstaing as a Ôguest to the presidiumÕ) dictate the key elements of the final document, and for the possibility of using their own working closely with the secretariat led by John languages to address the convention (both points Kerr (former head of the British foreign and on which Giscard was reluctant to concede). The Commonwealth office - proposed for the post by three candidates not in the group of 10 currently Pierre de Boissieu, deputy secretary-general of expected to accede in 2004, notably Turkey, are the Council), and in close consultation with key also treating the Convention as an important member states (not least to ensure that the heart political opportunity to demonstrate their of his proposals are then adopted by the member political seriousness about, and involvement in, states, ensuring that the Convention - and Giscard the European integration process. - are seen as the designers of the future EU) . Others expect the presidium to play the key role, Political Alignments developing and putting forward proposals to the Many different actual and potential groupings Convention as a whole. But so far there is little and alignments exist in the Convention. The evidence that the presidium is developing into a relative role and power of the chairman, the cohesive political grouping, with some tensions secretariat, the presidium, and the ordinary between Giscard and the presidium. No minutes Convention members represent one key aspect of are published of the presidium discussions but it the political dynamics that are developing. But appears that in the first 3 months they have been other groupings have also emerged: government more organizational than substantive, with
64 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? attempts now being made to move the meetings cooperation). These groups should make short onto more substantive issues and to try to make reports between September and November, with the presidium more politically operational. further groups to be created in the future So far, the wider Convention also (including on foreign affairs). Working groups will demonstrates a reluctance to give a clear be composed of members of the Convention leadership role to the presidium. Over 300 selected according to their expertise but also amendments were received from members of the reflecting in each group the overall balance and Convention to the rules of procedure on the composition of the Convention. Given their more working methods of the Convention put forward detailed mandates, the working groups will by Giscard. Some members of the Convention, become one more crucial political player in the such as the British MEP Andrew Duff (vice process (it as yet unclear if the groups will meet president of the MEPs grouping on the in public). Complaints have also been made by Convention), are determined that power will Convention members to Giscard at his intention remain with members of the Convention - Duff to use presidium members to chair all six first the himself already having drafted some proposed working groups (by a group of Finnish, Austrian, new Treaty articles. Such political manoeuvring Danish and Luxembourg members) Ð a further will continue, but success of the Convention will example of the ongoing manoeuvring for political require the construction of a certain degree of advantage. As the ConventionÕs work and political trust between the wider Convention, the dynamics unfold and clarify, greater coherence is presidium and the secretariat. The Convention is likely to develop in its debates, operating clearly a highly political body and any simple top- procedures and also in the main lines of division down approach will not be effective. and difference. But in these early stages, all In order to try to dissipate some of the fears players are trying to understand the complex of a top-down approach, the secretariat and political dynamics and their key implications. presidium initially planned to have a Ôlistening phaseÕ of the Convention through its first few Substantive Views months of operation to the summer of 2002, In terms of balance of views within the before moving to detailed issue papers and Convention on the substance of institutional and working groups in the autumn. But while such a policy change and development, it is relatively listening phase is under way, a growing early for an in-depth assessment. In terms of appreciation within the Convention both of the general aims and issues, some broad areas of magnitude of the task and of the limitations of agreement are emerging in initial Convention debate within the Convention as a whole, as a tool debates - notably on issues such as the need to for going into detail on subjects, led by the start strengthen common foreign and security policy, of May to the announcement of the establishment to strengthen policies in the justice and home of six working groups (on subsidiarity, the charter affairs area, to enhance economic policy of fundamental rights, the legal personality of the coordination, to tackle issues around democratic EU, EU competences, role of national legitimacy, and to promote clearer processes for parliaments, and economic and financial the application of subsidiarity. Initial debates have
65 Kirsty Hughes shown very little support for any repatriation of Sweden, Denmark and probably France. competences or for drawing up a precise list of Some of the UKÕs ideas were reflected in the competences. Clearer differences of view emerge paper from the Council secretariat to the in areas such as social policy and building a Barcelona summit on Council reform. A further stronger social Europe. Although Giscard in his more detailed secretariat paper will go to the comments at the meeting on the 15th April Seville Council. This underlines the existence of suggested no-one was arguing to increase yet another political dynamic around the competences in the social domain, this seems to Convention - member states, and the Council be contradicted by speeches calling for a stronger secretariat, moving to see what Council reform social Europe. But detailed debates on can go ahead without Treaty reform, driven in part institutional changes, and on key issues such as by the implicit threat that if they do not make the relative powers and role of the Council and decisions now the Convention may put forward Commission, have yet to take place. alternative proposals. Although more substantive Of course, the broad, and sometimes proposals and changes, such as reform of the detailed, positions of the existing member states presidency, require Treaty change, any agreement are mostly rather well-known. But particularly by the European Council on the desired direction among the largest 4 member states, European and details of such reform could impact strongly policies are currently in a state of some flux and on, and effectively pre-empt, the Convention. The confusion. In Italy, the Berlusconi government European Council having given a mandate to the has broken with the long Italian positions of Convention, would effectively be trying to reclaim strong integrationist support for the EU, but the part of it. outlines of what will be key new positions are unclear. In France, the elections, and the Civil Society Relations preceding period of cohabitation Ð together with In one other area of its work, relations with FranceÕs weakening position in a wider EU, civil society through the so-called Forum, the combine to give much less clarity than normal to picture also looks mixed. Convention its approach. Elections in Germany are similarly, if vice-chairman, Jean-Luc Dehaene has been given not to the same degree, blurring some of its overall responsibility for relations with civil policy lines, while in the UK the potential euro society. The Convention has set up a Forum web referendum in 2003 is colouring all its policies site for debate and for written contributions, and statements. which at various points the secretariat will aim The UK (as discussed further below) did summarise and synthesise. Various dialogues are move rather early in advance of the Convention in also developing between Dehaene and other February to put forward new proposals members of the presidium and different civil suggesting the creation of an executive council society groups and networks including networks within the Council. The UK is clearly hoping that of NGOs and networks of think tanks. Civil society it will have more support among member states hearings, and a youth Convention mirroring the for its more intergovernmentalist approach than actual Convention are planned for the June and in recent IGCs - in particular from Italy, Spain, July. Ecosoc - an observer at the Convention - has
66 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? also been charged with a role in facilitating these by an elite it may have an entirely contrary impact dialogues. Meanwhile Convention members are on legitimacy, and the development of the encouraged to support and develop national European political space, to that intended. debates in their respective countries and to Avoiding this outcome means reaching beyond report back on developments. The Convention organised civil society to the wider public. session at the end of June will focus on civil society and allow civil society representatives to Politics of the Convention Ð Summary address the convention and to organise meetings of Key Issues and discussions around the Convention meeting ¥ Nature of the final document Ð within the European Parliament. constitutional treaty or political text. Consensus The big questions here are three-fold: the or division Ð and extent of options presented extent of the debate, and the range of groups (member states prefer options); involved, across the member states and candidate ¥ New political dynamics of the enlarged countries; the extent to which this debate can be EU emerging Ð and political opportunity for sufficiently structured so that clear messages and Bulgaria, Romania and especially Turkey; points of view come through, and, crucially, the candidate countries push successfully for extent to which the Convention is seen to be representative on presidium and for use of own genuinely open to the wider civil debate that will languages; surround its activities at least to some degree. ¥ Complexity of developing political The jury is still out on these questions but there alignments and groupings Ð relative positions and are rumblings of discontent from some NGOs and roles of the chair (Giscard), secretariat, it is questionable whether the Convention has presidium, Convention; range of groups meeting either the political will or the resources, not least Ð governmentsÕ representatives, national MPs, in its secretariat, to listen to and take on board MEPs, political parties, national groups, candidate this debate. Nonetheless, the June hearings and countries etc; Convention meeting are an important step ¥ Presidium not yet developing identity as a forward. The lack of representativeness of the political team; Convention most notably in its pitiful proportion ¥ Top-down or bottom up approach Ð of women members is one further reason why an wider Convention has many suspicions of effective public debate is so important. presidium and chair, some tensions evident; As discussed further below, the process of the ¥ First working groups established Ð Convention especially in its relation with the important political players; wider political and public debates is of ¥ General support for strengthening considerable importance. If the process of public common foreign and security policy and justice consultation and debate is seen as inadequate, and home affairs, for enhancing economic policy just a process of tokenism, this may impact coordination, and for strengthening democratic strongly and negatively on the wider reception of legitimacy Ð more differences on social Europe; the final output of the Convention. If the output little support for repatriation of competences or is seen to be a European constitution produced for lists of competences;
67 Kirsty Hughes
¥ Civil society relations Ð importance of enlargement Ð this might be most likely to come wide-ranging debate around the Convention, with to the fore, if major problems arise such as failure genuine access and input into the Convention Ð to ratify Nice. some criticisms and doubts from NGOs. Even if all the above hurdles are safely cleared, it is also not guaranteed that all the 3. The Impact of Enlargement candidates will then get approval of their publics The current timetable for enlargement, in referenda for accession. Nonetheless, despite according to the EU road map, is for negotiations these uncertainties, the most likely scenario at with the front runners to conclude by the end of present is for an enlargement by up to ten 2002, with entry by early 2004 before the countries by 2004 (with further candidates European parliamentary elections. At present, a queuing up behind). This would also mean that Ôbig bangÕ enlargement of 10 new members is the 2004 IGC would be held at 25 not at 15 (if the anticipated. But there are various hurdles still to IGC started before all accession treaties were clear. The detailed negotiations on the budgetary, ratified, then candidates might initially participate agricultural and structural funds chapters will as observers but becoming full members of the only take place in autumn 2002 - and could easily IGC before it concluded). run beyond the end of year deadline. Cyprus is another potential stumbling block where if Coalitions and Large and Small current negotiations for a political settlement on Countries the island fail, the EU will have to take the final The fundamental problem for the enlarged decision to admit Cyprus without such a EU is how to manage the increased numbers and settlement. Meanwhile, there is no firm indication diversity that the Union will contain. Problems of yet whether and when Ireland will hold another efficiency and political interaction already exist at referendum on the Nice Treaty, though it is 15. But the new enlargement of the EU presages a anticipated for autumn 2002, and with no major change in political dynamics, which may guarantee that the Irish will, on a second vote, impact on all aspects of EU policy-making, policy deliver a positive answer. instruments and institutional organization and If the Nice Treaty is not ratified, then there are behaviour. The political balances - and bargains - essentially two routes forward: firstly to include across different policy and institutional areas will the key elements of Nice for enlargement in each change. The range and variety of alliance and accession treaty, or secondly to postpone coalition formation will increase considerably. enlargement until the work of the Convention Uncertainty and guesswork already characterize and 2004 IGC is completed. The latter solution the political interaction at 15, but the uncertainty would cause major political difficulties in relations at 25 will increase further, impacting negatively on between the EU and candidates, and impact effective and coherent decision-making. There strongly on political attitudes and debates within will be a rapid increase in knowledge of the new each candidate country. Some are concerned that membersÕ main policy positions, key interests and the current rightward shift in EU politics in recent bargaining behaviour after enlargement (and national elections might encourage a delay in before, not least through the dynamics of the
68 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? convention as well as through analysis of their Revisiting Nice and Majority Voting policy positions and structural interests). But this The small country-large country dilemma is increased knowledge will not fully compensate one reason, though not the only one, why for the range of alliances and coalitions that will revisiting the voting weights agreed at Nice would be feasible across all EU decision-making Ð not be desirable. Nice had various adverse effects on least when cross-bargains and deals in the current the voting system: it increased the weight of the EU already make tracing the full details of larger countries and increased the threshold for a coalitions and positions on any political or policy qualified majority vote. This reduces the influence decision very difficult. of smaller countries without making it easier for One of the key characteristics of the enlarged the ÔbigsÕ to get agreement Ð what it facilitates in EU will be that it is essentially a small country EU various ways is blocking decision-making. With its - the number of ÔbigsÕ will increase only from five 3 criteria for achieving a majority (reaching the to six (as Poland joins France, Germany, Italy, qualified majority vote bar at 74% of the total, a Spain, and the UK) while the number of ÔsmallsÕ majority of member states and at least 62% of the will increase from 10 to 19. At the same time, the population) it also reduces transparency and proportion of the EUÕs population represented by simplicity, while increasing the ease and range of the ÔbigsÕ will remain roughly stable at about two- means of getting a blocking minority. Larger thirds of the total. With the increase in number of countries will find it easier to block, no-one will the smaller countries, the importance of ensuring find it easier to reach decisions. that the EU continues to respect the sovereignty This counter-productive agreement needs to and voice of all Ð and not simply of the large be scrutinized by the Convention and alternative countries Ð is highly pertinent. ideas put forward (without underestimating the The enlarged EU is a small country EU: it strength of the political power play and needs to function in such a way that the smaller bargaining that got to the Nice agreement in the countries continue to have a genuine voice and first place). The most obvious and simple input and continue to benefit from the pooling of alternative that the Convention could consider is sovereignty. But the risk is that the enlarged EU the proposal for a simple double majority voting may become a big country EU. Certainly, there system. Based on a dual majority of population will be pressures, explicit and implicit, from some and of countries, the simple double majority of the larger countries for more centralisation of system not only neatly balances the issues of size EU leadership around them, and in some cases versus sovereignty but also has the considerable for an implicit directoire (at present the strongest advantage of transparency and simplicity. tendencies in this direction are coming from the Furthermore, since enlargement also raises the UK, not least with its proposals to strengthen the need to consider further extension of qualified Council at the expense of the Commission - given majority voting, a voting system that is simple, the UKÕs normal ultra-sensitivity over EU balanced and easily understandable becomes ever centralisation, it is a little ironic to see its more important. Without an extension of QMV, policies tending towards the aim of centralisation the EU risks blockage through national vetoes, around the ÔbigsÕ). but extension of QMV can impact on existing
69 Kirsty Hughes problems of democratic inadequacy and distance potential utility of so-called open coordination of EU institutions. This also argues, therefore, for processes, particularly in areas that are important an extension of co-decision with the EP. or sensitive for national sovereignty such as Consequently efficiency solutions and democratic aspects of social policy. While the effectiveness solutions have to be considered in the light of and value of these open coordination processes is their impact on each other and not separately. anyway open to doubt - with their mixture of exchange of best practice, peer pressure and in Competences some cases common guidelines and This is also the case for other aspects of recommendations Ð the increase in numbers that institutional change under discussion. Finding will come with enlargement may considerably clearer and simpler processes for the application complicate their functioning. Trying to agree ÔsoftÕ of subsidiarity and for the sharing of competences frameworks that will fit 25 countries will be more between the EU and the member states is needed difficult, and the effectiveness of peer pressure on in the current EU, but becomes yet more urgent those ÔlaggardsÕ furthest from meeting the in a system where each individual country will guidelines may fall as the number and variety of have a smaller voice in a larger total of voices and laggards increases. votes. Yet, as the Convention has already debated, the prospects for defining a clear list of Changing Economic and Political competences are low, in particular since most Geography competences are shared but also because Enlargement also brings with it a new political competences evolve. So clarity and simplicity has and economic geography of the EU as well as a to come through the procedures and definitions new configuration and diversity of economic and rather than through any lists. This is one area in social development levels. These changes raise a particular, where new potential roles for national variety of questions for policy development. parliaments are being closely examined. The The geographical expansion of the EU shifts European Commission (Com (2002) 247) both borders and the center of gravity of the EU proposes an approach focusing on the intensity sharply eastwards. From extended borders with of application of the competence Ð whether, for Russia, through new borders with Ukraine down example, an area of competence requires to the Balkans, plus the southern expansion to harmonisation or simply coordination Ð together Cyprus and Malta, the EU has to contend in with a rationalisation of the range of tools and economic, political, diplomatic and security terms approaches that can be used. with a range of new neighbours. Even after a Ôbig Since most competences are shared, but in a bangÕ enlargement it also still has 3 remaining wide variety of different ways, the question of the current candidates Ð Bulgaria, Romania and nature or type of policy instruments available also Turkey, with others, such as Croatia, likely to join becomes important in encouraging subsidiarity the list soon. The new member states already and proportionality. Enlargement can impact here have a range of links and interactions and political too. Thus, for example, through the Lisbon and policy views on relations with the new process more emphasis has been put on the neighbours. These policy views of the new
70 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? member states are not identical with those of proposals on policy competences and existing EU member states - just as those current instruments in this area will be particularly EU member states that border the candidate important. But the Convention is not working in countries have tended to have both stronger a static environment Ð this is an area of major political and economic interests in enlargement, current political activity for the EU and so the as well as in some cases stronger concerns over goalposts are shifting. issues such as labour migration. The enlarged EU will also have a much wider This new shape of the enlarged EU will impact diversity in levels of economic development. This on policy debate and development in a range of not only points towards the need for a areas from foreign policy, to immigration policies, redefinition and development of structural and internal security, and trade and investment links. cohesion policy, together with a new balance of Whatever role the EU succeeds in developing in interests around the structural funds, and the global foreign policy, after enlargement the EU CAP, it also indicates a new pattern of views on will directly face considerable responsibilities and economic and social policy development. The policy questions in its role as a regional economic candidate countries cannot be treated in any and political power. Current debates within sense as a group here: just as with the existing Europe over internal security and terrorism on member states, there are a range of views on the one hand and over immigration, and the economic policy, liberalisation, and the role of focus of the extreme right on immigration, on the European social policy. From their experiences of other hand raise the possibility of the EU moving transition, many have moved quite far in terms of towards a more defensive, Ôfortress EuropeÕ liberalisation. But there are a range of interests - approach. But political and economic needs and business, union, NGO etc - in each country, pressures point in the other direction towards a together with a range of public and popular views, well-managed set of economic, political and which will impact on the positions taken by the security relations across the new EU borders - in a new member states once they join and which will way that should be, though may not be, relate, in part, to the level of economic complementary to the enlargement and development and the speed and extent of development of NATOÕs relations with countries convergence. While Estonia, for example, may be beyond the EU. positioned fairly closely to member states like the Developing EU policy positions and UK in terms of attitudes to liberalisation and free approaches to manage these relations market approaches, other candidates will have successfully will require, especially in justice and views and policy approaches that may take them home affairs, stronger and more coherent EU closer to a position similar to Germany, others to policies and competences (such as in the France, to Portugal etc. And these positions will proposal for a common EU border guard). The vary by policy area - many expect Poland to share Convention so far has not addressed these issues interests with Spain after accession, particularly in any detail but has recognised in its debates the with respect to the structural funds and importance of moving forward in the justice and agriculture, but in other areas of economic policy home affairs area as well as in CFSP. Further and liberalisation, it may end up positioned
71 Kirsty Hughes somewhere between the UK and Germany. across the board from the candidates either in the With the current enlargement timetable, the Convention or subsequently as a new member EU will also have to face up to this range of views states, there is also likely to be a number of policy as it agrees its post-2006 budget. In terms of areas, such as the budget and the structural budget debates, the EU will face a new North- funds, where considerable commonality may be South-East triangle which will expand the found, particularly amongst the candidate traditional dynamics of the budget debates, from countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is too the fundamental split between net contributors early in the Convention debates to identify the and net recipients, particularly the current extent of commonality but there are a number of cohesion four, to the new net recipients of Central broad issues and areas where potential and Eastern Europe - who may or not find ways to similarities of view can be identified a priori. make common cause with the current net In terms of the original motivations for the recipients. In 2006, a full-scale review of the CAP candidate countries to join the EU, political is also due, where a range of new alliances may be motivations have been central. There is a strong anticipated, not least between France and Poland. understanding of the EU, and of membership of The Convention does not have the future the EU, as having fundamental political drivers budget as part of its tasks. But its debates around and implications. In this sense, the candidates are economic and social policy competences and the very similar to Spain, Portugal and Greece, who need, or otherwise, for greater economic policy while standing to gain economically from joining coordination in the EU will highlight and provide the EU, also saw the political importance of being more information on the economic policy full members of the EU not least in underpinning positions and potential alliances in the enlarged their own democratic development. This is then a EU. More importantly perhaps, while it is not the very different enlargement to the more job of the Convention to design a new structural economically driven motivations behind the and regional policy, it is open to the Convention accession of countries such as the UK, Denmark to make some clear statements about the need for and Sweden. The candidates have an interest in a solidarity and cohesion in the enlarged EU and strong political Europe, and not simply in an the key values as well as competences needed at economic association. EU level to encourage and underpin such Given the experiences in the candidate solidarity. While it may be relatively easy to get countries of central and eastern Europe of broad support for the general principle of political transition and the establishment of solidarity, unpacking the concept into general democracy - and to reinforce those structures - policies and competences could prove they also have an interest in a clear articulation of controversial. democratic processes and decision-making in the EU, and not in the establishment of a directoire CandidatesÕ common interests in the approach (not least since most are smaller Convention countries). This does not mean all the candidates As the above discussion makes clear, while will support a strongly integrationist or federalist there is no reason to expect common positions approach - and a range of views can be seen to be
72 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? emerging here, with Hungary perhaps as one of states - support a strong role for the Commission the more integrationist minded, and Estonia at as being in their interests; nonetheless, their the other end of the spectrum. But it does mean determination to avoid anything that looks like a general interest in effective political integration second-class status, may imply a reluctance to see in areas where pooling sovereignty is a positive- a smaller Commission even though a Commission sum game - and a relative absence of the deep of 25 or more members will be weaker. They will suspicion of integration in some existing EU have to face up at some point to this fundamental member states notably Denmark, Sweden and the contradiction. Equally, they may be suspicious of UK. Their experience of the Cold War and of any Council reforms, particularly to the superpower politics may also cut in different Presidency, that may weaken their participation. directions Ð leading, on the one hand, to an The candidatesÕ experiences of democratic appreciation of the importance of having a strong transition, and the relative newness to them of EU political voice at European level but, on the other structures, may also make them more open to - hand, to an emphasis on the importance of and more likely to come forward with - more effective democratic processes for controlling radical proposals and solutions for democratising and opening up the EU including in terms of that political voice and maintaining the role of transparency, simplicity, participation and national sovereignty. Candidate country members legitimacy. Their fresh experience of redesigning of the Convention have spoken out clearly in and re-establishing political systems should also favour of a stronger foreign policy. mean that the idea of building a European Given the political motivations for accession constitution or constitutional text is seen as a and the experiences of political transition since positive and necessary approach rather than in 1989, together with the evidence of the ongoing any way threatening. Finally, while a range of negotiations, it is also clear that the candidates attitudes to economic and social policy are clearly will avoid and oppose any institutional and policy visible in the candidatesÕ current national policies, developments that will involve placing them in considerable consensus can be expected on any Ôsecond-class memberÕ status - whether as positive solidarity and cohesion policies. new members or as smaller countries. This will In summary, areas of likely common interest impact on a range of positions (although in or consensus among the candidates include the exactly what form has yet to be seen) such as on following: the role of the Council and the Commission, or ¥ A strong political Europe and not just an on economic policy coordination in the context economic Europe of the euro. On the latter, the Commission has ¥ Making the EU a strong regional actor and proposed the formalisation of the role of the a stronger global actor eurogroup Ð a development which could have ¥ Clearer articulation of democratic many further implications for differential policy processes and decision-making, strong measures formulation within and outside of the eurogroup, to improve transparency, participation and and which the candidates will view with concern. legitimacy As mostly smaller countries, the candidates ¥ Support for establishing a European may - like most of the current smaller EU member constitutional text
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¥ Positive approach to the potential 4. The Democratic Problem benefits in key areas from pooling sovereignty The EU faces a number of serious and further integration inadequacies in its democratic functioning - these ¥ Opposition to a directoire approach inadequacies exist both in its structures and in its ¥ Opposition to a two-speed Europe operations. As the Laeken declaration said Òthe ¥ Support for solidarity and cohesion Union needs to become more democratic, more policies transparent and more efficientÓ; it went on to ¥ Support for the Commission but support emphasize the need to bring its citizens Òcloser to for a large Commission. the European design and institutionsÓ. Many of the democratic inadequacies are difficult to Enlargement Ð Summary of Key Issues resolve in their entirety, precisely because of the ¥ Increased numbers and diversity Ð unique nature of the EU construction and the fact democratic and efficiency challenges; greater that the EU is not a state and it has no range and variety of potential alliances and government. Relatedly, there is no pan-European coalitions increasing uncertainty; public or demos and no European political space ¥ Enlarged EU is a small country EU (19 comparable to national political arenas and smalls to 6 bigs at 25) but risks being run as a big debates. country EU; Consequently, even the European Parliament ¥ Revisit Nice voting weights Ð double- - in structural terms, the most democratic of the majority voting as the solution; EU institutions - faces legitimacy problems, not ¥ Extend QMV and co-decision for only related to issues around levels of turnout in improved efficiency and democracy; parliamentary elections, but particularly related ¥ Clarify allocation of competences and to lack of visibility, knowledge and awareness application of subsidiarity Ð new processes not among EU citizens. For the Council and lists; Commission the difficulties are greater. The ¥ Effectiveness of some instruments may Council is democratic in the sense that any change with greater numbers Ð open intergovernmental body (of democracies) is coordination processes may become weaker; democratic - it is composed of ministerial ¥ Changing economic and political representatives of currently elected governments. geography Ð implications for many policies; EU But the Council as a whole is not elected as a pan- needs to be a regional power; new emphasis on European body and it does not begin to resemble solidarity and cohesion needed; a representative EU government. Furthermore, ¥ Candidates have some common interests while it shares many legislative powers with the in the Convention Ð including support for a European Parliament, it is not fully accountable to politically strong EU, EU as a regional power, that body and currently exercises those powers in opposition to a directoire approach and to a two- private together with its executive powers, while speed EU. national parliaments can only hold individual national members of Council to account and not the whole Council.
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The Commission with its own executive The Convention has as yet only debated these powers and right of initiative faces particular issues in the broadest terms, although with much problems in that its members are all appointed support as would be expected for the general goal not elected (even if many were previously of bringing the EU closer to the citizens. This national politicians); but, unlike the Council, it is notwithstanding a curious intervention from in a position to take a pan-European view, at least Giscard in the ConventionÕs April meeting where in theory independent of national interests. The he emphasized the contradiction involved in EP exercises some important scrutiny and trying to bring the EU closer to the citizens as it accountability powers over the Commission but, is, he said, by definition the most distant level of overall, issues remain both of the political government. The emphasis, he considers, should accountability and representativeness of be on comprehensibility Ð closeness to the Commissioners and, relatedly, of their political citizen can be satisfied by other levels of control over the bureaucracy. government, local and national and only very These democratic inadequacies exist little by the European level. This seems a rather independently of the enlargement of the EU. But inadequate response to the Laeken challenge as through the increase in number of member set by the member states. Action is needed not states, enlargement risks increasing the public only to make the EU more comprehensible but perception of distance from, and loss of control also more transparent, more representative and of, EU institutions: pooling sovereignty at 6 is more participative - with the last two of these clearly not the same as pooling sovereignty at 25 characteristics in many ways the most or more. There is also an important link between challenging. Some would also include increasing the health and vitality of democratic processes in efficiency as in part a further element of the member states and those at EU level. Thus, improving democracy - although the argument the current democratic malaise in many of the EU that citizens are only interested in efficiency, in member states, linked to, and reflected in, falling ÔdeliveryÕ, is an argument that at best abandons voter turnout, falling trust in politicians, a variety the attempt, at the start, to improve democracy of corruption scandals and, more recently, the and at worst is fundamentally antidemocratic. rise of the extreme right, impacts on the EU, in Several of the issues under discussion, or on particular through the Council, since EU citizens the agenda of the Convention, impact on these are unlikely to place more trust in the Council different aspects of democratic functioning. A than they do in the national politicians that clear and simple constitution together with clear, represent them there. This problem is then effective procedures for allocation of aggravated when national politicians turn round competences and the implementation of and blame Brussels or the Commission for policy subsidiarity, could impact strongly on both decisions or communication failures (as done comprehensibility and transparency. Proposals most recently by Schroeder, linked clearly to the already under discussion within the Council to German election campaign) rather than hold legislative sessions in public would also acknowledging, explaining and defending the represent a leap forward on the transparency decisions and systems to which they are party. side. But the representative and participative
75 Kirsty Hughes dimensions are more difficult and relate strongly the Commission. Many observers do see the to how the roles and structures of the Council balance of power as already shifting from and Commission are developed, as well as to the Commission to Council, partly reflecting weak role of national parliaments. leadership in the former (leaders chosen by the Council) but also representing more fundamental Council versus Commission trends in EU development, including increased Both the Council and Commission need focus on areas sensitive to national sovereignty. reform in their own right, in both efficiency and democratic terms, but one of the key questions Council Reform for the Convention and subsequent IGC is that of Several of the proposals for Council reform the relative balance between the executive may impact on this balance. The European powers of the Council versus those of the Council at Barcelona discussed a paper from the Commission. It is the ongoing fight over whether Council secretariat focusing in particular on the EU develops in an intergovernmental or reform of the European Council, of the General supranational direction and decisions taken in Affairs Council, and of the presidency, together this key area will impact on many other aspects of with the issue of legislating in public. A number of EU development. Some of those arguing in favour decisions on Council reform may be taken at the of a stronger Council, notably the UK who took a Seville Council - those that require Treaty change lead in making early proposals here, emphasize may be forwarded to the Convention as a that in their view the Council is not only more contribution of the European Council, a democratic than the Commission but, according contribution that will be difficult to ignore. to the UKÕs foreign secretary Jack Straw, that it is where democratic accountability lies Ôfirst An EU President and Executive Council? and foremostÕ. Despite some lip service to the The UK first started to float a number of ideas role of the Commission, it is clear that the on Council reform behind the scenes at the start UK would like to see the EU move in a much of the year, bringing some of them into the light more intergovernmental direction with of day in a speech by the British Foreign Secretary the Commission increasingly fulfilling the role (the Hague, 21st February 2002) just before the of a secretariat. start of the Convention. It is interesting to note Apart from the democratic deficiencies of the that some of the British ideas that have been Council discussed above, the main difficulty with floated, but were not spelt out in detail by Jack this approach lies with the fact that the Straw, have also been picked up in the Council Commission, as a supranational body, is designed secretariat contribution to Barcelona Ð the extent to take a pan-European view, while the Council of collaboration between the UK and the Council consists of the individual national views secretariat is unclear, but looks to be rather close. aggregated through intergovernmental debate. Ideas on an EU President were subsequently also Larger member states also dominate in the followed by Jacques Chirac and Jose Maria Aznar. Council, which is why the smaller member states One part of the UK proposal is the idea of have tended to be strong defenders of the role of creating, in effect, an executive council of the
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Council to replace the current presidency. Under identical to the situation of the current this proposal, the number of Council formations Commission President i.e. former head of state, would be reduced to under 10. Each Council appointed by the Council and for a period of 5 would appoint a chairperson for 2 1/2 years years. Yet, as many accept, there are problems of instead of six months and that group of chair inadequate democratic legitimacy of the people would form an executive council or Commission President (due to his appointment steering group. not election Ð as discussed further below). But The Council secretariat also make explicit in those supporting the new President idea would their Barcelona note the idea only gently raised in be unlikely to support any reforms of the Jack StrawÕs speech (but floated informally by UK Commission President, which would demonstrate sources): to ÔelectÕ Ð actually to appoint Ð the the democratic inadequacy of their new European president of the European Council by its Council leader. Furthermore, although the members for a period substantially longer than proposal overcomes the problem of the rotating the current presidency length of six months, presidency, the latter has the democratic possibly 2 1/2 years they suggest. Chirac advantage that it has at its head an elected proposed at the start of March appointing the premier, not an appointed, former politician. President of the Council for 5 years, an idea given Moreover, confusion may be the outcome if the further publicity by Peter Hain, the UKÕs Europe EU has 2 Presidents both appointed in an minister (in an interview with the FT, 6/02/02). identical manner. Spain has also come out in support of this idea, On the international side, the new President while the idea of an executive council has would effectively replace the role of the current attracted less attention. Meanwhile, the smaller High Representative though this has not been countries are concerned at the proposal, with explicitly spelt out. But SolanaÕs representativity Finland criticizing anything that would weaken as the international voice of the EU depends the Commission. The German government has crucially on the member states political not commented but MEP Elmar Brok at the May willingness to allow him that voice Ð the same Convention meeting lambasted the idea of a question, and problem, would exist for a new EU super-president, saying the choice was between President. Finally, there may be coordination and ÒMonnet and MetternichÓ. liaison problems between EU President and The proposal for an EU President neatly Commission, since the latter holds many of the encapsulates the divisions over the relative relevant executive tools and powers. The powers of the Council and Commission and of outcome could well be a very weak President not the intergovernmental versus supranational the new strong leader intended by the larger approach. Its supporters claim such a President countries supporting the idea. Nonetheless, there would be more legitimate, overcome the is a strong risk that the UK, France and Spain - and problems of the changing 6-month presidency possibly Italy - may bargain for this against, and act as the central interlocutor for possibly, agreeing with the smaller countries international dialogues. But there are many continued appointment by each member state of problems with the proposal. Firstly, it is in fact a Commissioner Ð resulting in a weak
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Commission with weak Presidents of both the Commission (Com (2002)247) does not Commission and Council. engage directly with these arguments at all, Various unanswered questions also face the leaving the question of the presidency to one side idea of an executive Council chaired by the new while generally arguing for a stronger President. How would equality across member Commission in a variety of key areas. states be assured? What happens to the position While some of the smaller countries may of the long-standing (2 1/2 year or more) chairs of continue to defend the 6-month presidency, most Councils when there are elections and changes of accept the need for change in an enlarged EU. But government in member states? What would be if they are opposed to the new President idea, the role, if any, of the Commission in the alternatives are needed. Other proposals for executive council/steering group? But what is reform of the presidency have focused more on perhaps most striking about this proposal is its the idea of a team presidency shared among a parallelism to the Commission, particularly once small number of member states. The team taking into account proposals for its reform. A presidency approach would provide more strong Commission, as many have argued, should continuity and consistency, and would also work have fewer members, perhaps as few as 12, rather as some form of steering group, but without the than a number equal to the number of member strong executive council characteristics of the states. Taken together, the two reform proposals UKÕs proposal. But a team presidency also implies would produce two remarkably similar looking a head of the European Council in place for more cross-portfolio executive bodies. than 6 months. The difference to the UK Two parallel executive structures may proposals would be that such a head of the reinforce interinstitutional conflict not European Council would be an acting head of cooperation. In such a situation, the Commission state, and so not a full time President, and a team may also find itself very much the weaker body. presidency is unlikely to last for 5 years. This Furthermore, if such an executive council of the would conflict less with the position of Council did become a dominant structure in the Commission President but it does also indicate EU, there is a serious risk that it would be that a higher profile Ð through longer length Ð EU relatively inefficient (since it would not be a full- President in some form is a probable outcome. time executive), dominated by the larger The relations of that President with the countries, and tending towards some similarities Commission President and with the High with the UN. These weaknesses might be Representative will need considerable further removed if such an executive council were definition. permanent and full-time i.e. if its members stood down from their national political duties - but this The General Affairs Council would be full circle back reinventing the Ð time for change Commission (although at that point the The choices over the presidency are strongly reinvented ÔCommissionÕ would be at the heart of interrelated to other aspects of Council reform Ð the Council Ð certainly not the outcome intended as well as to the role and reform of the by the intergovernmentalists). It is notable that Commission. The inadequate functioning of the
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General Affairs Council is another key area of Reforming the European Council debate here. In different contributions to and A further area of consideration for reform is comments on the debates so far, there is a general the role of the European Council itself and how to recognition that the GAC is overloaded and bring it more fully within the institutional malfunctioning in its efforts to combine its structures of the Union. The Council secretariat general coordination roles with the foreign affairs suggest various procedural and organizational role. One relatively straightforward part of a changes to improve the efficiency and focus of solution here is to create a separate Foreign European Council meetings, and re-establishing Affairs Council - although less straightforward is and re-emphasizing its role in setting a strategic who chairs it - the (reformed) presidency or framework for EU policy development. The Solana? But there are a variety of views of what proposed changes range from substantially then happens with the general coordination side reducing the size of delegations, to shorter more of the GAC. Does it continue in its current form focused conclusions, and better preparation of or is a new formation of the Council established? meetings both through reform of the GAC and Some have proposed a coordination Council also through reduction in the number of Council composed possibly of deputy prime ministers or formations. Ideas have also been floated to try to European ministers. But the politics of these limit the use of European Council as a decision different positions of deputy prime minister and maker of last resort when individual Councils fail European minister vary considerably across to reach agreement, including the idea of using member states, especially where there are QMV in the European Council for areas where coalitions, and so a more acceptable solution is QMV is used in the individual councils. The likely to be one where each prime minister relationship between the European Council and nominates their own choice of minister to such a the proposed executive council also needs coordination Council. Such a Council might meet further consideration - the European Council on a frequent basis in Brussels. While some have might find its risk being upstaged by the raised fears about how this could relate to the executive council particularly if it was chaired by a meetings of officials in Coreper, a more new, longer term European Council president. substantial question is how such coordination Many but not all of these Council reforms Council would relate to an executive council or have implications for the balance of power steering group if that was the direction of reform between Council and Commission. Whichever of the presidency. It is possible that these way this balance shifts, it is unlikely to be decisions may be taken sequentially, since reform permanently settled since the EU is not at a stage of the General Affairs Council does not require where it will confer all its executive powers on Treaty amendment whereas the substantive one institution. With the exception of the changes to the presidency proposed would proposal for the Council to legislate in public Ð a require Treaty change. vital step forward for transparency and accountability Ð the proposed Council changes, including that of the new President, do not make any changes or improvements to representativity.
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They also raise many questions that would have on merit is open to considerable doubt. But while to be resolved about inter-institutional relations success of these internal administrative reforms is and roles. In particular, the possibility of both one vital component of ensuring the effectiveness European Council and Commission having and accountability of a politically reformed Presidents appointed in the same way for the Commission, they themselves do not impact same time period, both potentially former directly on the lack of political coordination and premiers, raises more difficulties than it resolves. strategy, nor will they lead either to a substantial But how the balance of power shifts will also restructuring of internal structures and depend on how the Commission is reformed. The resources. Commission itself is of course pursuing a number Restricting the future size of the Commission of internal reforms but the wider debate around is a key reform (ducked at Nice) to ensure its role and structure has not yet been pursued effective political direction and coordination. A within the Convention itself. smaller Commission, probably around 12 commissioners, would contribute to ensuring: ¥ effective strategic policy leadership by the Commission Reform Much of the debate about Commission President and by the Commission as a whole; reform has focused on the two issues of the size ¥ genuine joined-up policy management of the Commission and the potential election of and development (i.e. real collegiality); its President. The future size of the Commission is ¥ pan-European policy-making not fundamental not simply to the efficiency with undermined by national influences; which it functions but to the question of how it ¥ improved political accountability of the fulfils its role of taking a coherent, pan-European administration to the commissioners; and approach to initiating policy and upholding all ¥ greater effectiveness of the Commission existing rules and agreements (defending the in interinstitutional discussions with the Council Treaties). The Commission at present looks and the Parliament. increasingly weak, with an absence of strategic leadership or strategic framework underpinning To achieve these results also requires radical the tendency of the current Commission to structural changes within the Commission, fragment into separate, relatively uncoordinated reducing resources in less relevant areas (which policy domains, with varying degrees of political returns to the issue of competences) and control by individual commissioners over those reorganizing resources and structures to ensure policy domains and with a serious absence of genuine strategic policy planning and genuine collegiality. development. This could also contribute to Furthermore, the effectiveness of the current greater communication and coordination of internal reforms of the administration - the strategic planning across the three institutions. In bureaucracy - of the Commission have yet to be terms of strategic policy development, the tested. Whether it will really prove possible to CommissionÕs sole right of initiative is in fact replace a system dominated by insider networks already shared. A better recognition of that by and national preference with one of promotion improved joint coordination is not per se an attack on the CommissionÕs remit.
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Smaller countries Ð both member states and not to party affiliation. This proposal could and candidate countries Ð mostly support a strong should be taken further: it could be applied to the role for the Commission and so should support selection of all commissioners. And if the latter is reform. But their reluctance to give up what they a step too far, then the Parliament should at least see as their national commissioner may condemn have the right to endorse or reject individual the Commission to weakness and a failure to commissioners and not simply the whole fulfill its pan-European policy function, with Commission. Without such a step forward, the infighting driven by national interests. Commission will remain insufficiently These reforms on their own, substantial and accountable. In such a new framework not only controversial though they are, are not sufficient would its role be clear and more transparent and and will have to be complemented by reforms on accountable, but such a new system should also the side of democratic accountability. Attention strengthen the political control of the has focused here on the question of electing the commissioners over the administration itself, Commission President - either by a genuine EU another fundamental requirement of reform. wide popular election or via election by the In the absence of such changes, it is almost European Parliament. The former proposal - an inevitable that the political balance will shift EU wide election - is problematic due to the lack towards the Council, as it will become of a genuine or even emergent pan-European increasingly difficult to justify a major political political space reflected in the weakness of role for an unreformed Commission. But if the transnational parties and the absence of a Council agrees to appoint a new European European demos or, relatedly, a European media. Council President, then it will be highly unlikely The alternative which is a more intermediate step to accept any of these democratic reforms, as of election by the EP is a preferable proposal in they will underline the democratic illegitimacy of that it balances the need for more democratic the new President. Council and Commission accountability with the difficulties raised by reform are consequently intertwined, highly the inadequate development of the European political, and strongly dependent on the outcome public space. of bargaining between the larger and smaller Some are concerned that such an election countries Ð with Germany potentially in a process might unnecessarily politicize the position to play a pivotal role promoting effective Commission and would undermine its collegiality. and democratic reforms and preventing the worst But there are various possible routes around this outcome of a weak new European Council problem. The President might be elected from a President interacting poorly with a weak list provided by the European Council, and there Commission. is no reason why this list should necessarily provide a choice of candidates across the political Communication and Participation parties. Moreover, the European Parliament could Increasing democracy in the EU is not only a commit to making this a free vote and to question of institutional and structural changes. It identifying criteria for preference among is a question of communication and participation. candidates relating to key European priorities and It is the challenge of building a real European
81 Kirsty Hughes political space and debate. These issues are often take on board communication as part of their misunderstood and poorly focused on within the role. Both institutions also have to face up to the EU institutions, with emphasis being put on fact that what is needed is open, two-way provision of information to overcome lack of communication and debate - debate that will understanding. But a dynamic, participative include criticism and disagreement: democratic system is not and cannot be simply or communication strategy is not the PR strategy of mainly about one-way information flows. What is a political spin-doctor. needed is a step change in political and public Serious political commitment to promoting discussion of European political and policy pan-European debate should also result in structures and initiatives. But this would require innovative new ideas and experiments. For new initiatives and actions and change in example, in terms of openness and accountability, behaviour of national and European politicians the Commission could start each week with a and officials. The media has an important role to one-hour weekly online question time with one play here too but politicians and officials cannot member of the Commission (with a different simply ask or expect the media to write more commissioner each week) - this would represent about the EU. a leap ahead of most member states. The EP National politicians, not least faced with the could have much more frequent question time current democratic malaise in many of the EU sessions with both Commission and Council member states, need to acknowledge more presidents and could find a mechanism to involve directly and openly their role and responsibilities national MPs in those sessions. Imaginative new in EU decision-making. It is only national mechanisms to involve national MPs and engage politicians who can explain and defend decisions them directly with MEPs and the EP Ð and taken in the Council back in their respective not simply a new mechanism to involve MPs in national political arenas. If they shy away from this subsidiarity and competences decisions Ð task and instead suggest or imply that could help to provoke a much more rapid responsibility for decisions taken lies elsewhere politicizing of European debates in the individual (Brussels, the Commission, the bureaucracy) member states. then this contributes in an important way to While there has been some progress in confusion, mistrust and distance of the wider relations with so-called ÔorganizedÕ civil society, public. This will be particularly the case if the particularly NGOs and interest groups, more Convention and subsequent IGC agree a needs to be done here too, to ensure coherence, constitution for the EU: unless a political lead reliability and openness in consultation and is given in promoting debate and understanding dialogue processes Ð and to build on, and move of such a constitution, it will fail in one of its beyond, the CommissionÕs 2001 white paper on main purposes. governance. Overall, precisely because the EU is Both Commission and Parliament also need not a state with directly equivalent political to devote much more political time and resources structures to those of individual member states, to developing effective communication strategies. which results in problems of legitimacy and Particularly in the Commission, officials need to comprehensibility, there is a need for all those
82 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? involved in EU political developments and Treaty change, during its work and not simply at institutions to ensure that the structures that do its conclusion. If the Convention cannot engage exist are as open, accessible and engaged with the and provoke a wider debate, then the chances of wider public as possible. meeting the Laeken challenge of bringing the EU This is where the Convention itself could play closer to its citizens are slight, whatever the a major role, and also faces a major challenge. The institutional changes it proposes. way in which the Convention conducts itself, its actual process of work and debate, will be vital for The Democratic Problem Ð Summary engaging the wider public, for engaging real of Key Issues national political attention and encouraging the development of a genuine dynamic of political ¥ Democratic legitimacy problems of EU debate. The risk for the Convention is twofold. institutions Ð need for EU to be more The first risk is that, while it may engage in a transparent, comprehensible, representative and range of dialogues with NGOs, unions, business, participative; think tanks and so on, it could fail to demonstrate ¥ Relative powers and reforms of Council that there is a real two-way communication under and Commission are fundamental to the nature of way Ð to show the debates and ideas from the the new EU Ð radical reforms of both are needed; outside are being fed into, and impacting on, the greater intergovernmentalism risks weakening Convention. the EU; ¥ Rotating Presidency needs reform; The second risk is that its work and debates ¥ Proposals for new European Council appear removed from current important political President will lead to confusion Ð with EU having challenges and issues. The Convention is not a 2 Presidents (Council and Commission) government and will not have a consensus appointed in the same manner, for same time position until it produces its final document. period. Both Presidents will lack democratic Nonetheless, through effective communication legitimacy. Council-Commission coordination strategies it should be showing the direct may also suffer with increased conflicts, resulting relevance of its developing debates to key in weak European Council President and weak contemporary issues. For example, the wide Commission; support in the Convention already for ¥ Reform of General Affairs Council Ð split strengthening CFSP and for moving forward in into two formations, foreign affairs and general the justice and home affairs area allows the work affairs; of the Convention to be presented to the media ¥ Commission reform Ð need for a small and the wider public in the context of current Commission, with structures significantly issues of debate, from the Middle East, to refocused on the pan-European policy antidiscrimination, globalization and terrorism. It dimension, for effective and coherent strategic need not be a thing apart. Moreover, it could take policy leadership, and to avoid national a leaf out of the approach of the Council, and put influences; forward ideas for change that do not require ¥ Greater accountability of Commission
83 Kirsty Hughes and bureaucracy to EP Ð election of President by globalization, sustainability and development, the EP, and of Commissioners, or at least individual inadequacies of the EU as a global actor have right of veto; been painfully apparent and the need to ¥ Step change in communication and strengthen its international role is very clear. At promotion of democratic participation by all EU the same time, developments post September institutions and political actors, including national 11th have also underlined the pre-eminence of politicians; new genuine communication national sovereignty in foreign policy, not least in strategies; innovations such as weekly on-line the larger member states. question time, involvement of national MPs in EP Another key factor for the EU in the current questioning of Commission president and EU international environment, is the sharp presidency; more coherent and reliable civil deterioration in US-European relations. From the dialogue; fight against terrorism and weapons of mass ¥ Convention has a key role to play here in destruction in rogue states, to trade, Kyoto and demonstrating through its processes of the international criminal court, the US and EU consultation and dialogue a new approach to are facing recurring strategic differences. participation and communication. Growing US unilateralism also serves to emphasize the EUÕs weakness. Yet at the same 5. The EUÕs Voice in the World time, the sharpness of some of the differences of The Laeken declaration set out high view help to highlight what is distinctive about ambitions for a new EU role in the world, stating: the EUÕs approach and also acts as a further Òdoes Europe not, now that it is finally unified, catalyst in the growing pressures for the EU to have a leading role to play in a new world order, move forward in this area. The EU argues for a that of a power able both to play a stabilizing role more multilateral approach but its power to push worldwide and to point the way ahead for many international relations in this direction will in fact countries and peoples?Ó. Whether or not the depend on its ability to forge its own internal Convention will be able to set out a path for the multilateralism into a much stronger common EU to achieve this new and highly ambitious role voice. Enlargement will complicate this due to the (both model and stabilizing power) is open to increase both in numbers and in the variety of doubt. But what is vital is that the Convention interests. But at the same time, the increase in does put forward serious and credible proposals number of member states also increases the for the EU to have a much stronger political voice potential political weight of the EU and adds to in the world. The next enlargement will underline the pressure to become at least a stronger once more the disparity between the EUÕs regional power. economic weight in the world and its political The challenge for the Convention is not influence - the economic giant/political dwarf simply to look at EU foreign policy and syndrome. In the current global context, with the institutional structures but to look across the global agenda crowded with major issues from range of EU international policies, and at their post September 11th and combating international interconnection with various aspects of internal terrorism, to the ongoing Middle East crisis, policy. One of the main difficulties that must be
84 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? faced up to is the diverse legal base in the Treaty such arguments gain weight together with the of different policies, not least the spread of related need for unified EU representation - or at relevant international policies across the three least euro-zone representation - in international pillars. Given the different Treaty bases for EU bodies including the IMF, G8 and World Bank. If action, the Commission and the Council have such goals are to be reached, the need to varying roles and powers both across and within strengthen internal policies in the enlarged EU, policy areas which impact negatively on coherent, not least structural and cohesion policy, is a vital integrated and effective policy-making. The element, if diversity of interests and sectional Commission, in particular, has a stronger role in interests are not to weaken and impede trade and in aid and development, all areas which development of coherent and effective offer a range of policy instruments that can be international policy positions and strategies. A used to support and implement wider foreign clearer more coherent EU approach to policy aims. But while many of the relevant management of globalization could also impact instruments lie with the Commission, the Council on other areas of concern to the Convention, determines the CFSP policy framework. not least if it helps to open up a genuine One of the key challenges, therefore, is to pan-European debate with civil society and with situate international policies including trade, aid younger people. and development, justice and home affairs, However, if the EU puts its principal focus on environment and sustainability, human rights and globalization without at the same time looking to foreign policy in a common framework with take major steps forward in the foreign and much closer coordination and mutual security policy dimension, it will be failing to reinforcement across the policy areas. This has address some of the most pressing key led to arguments for a merger of the three pillars, contemporary challenges. At the same time, while retaining a range of instruments and despite the importance of moving to greater decision-making procedures. A number of coordination and integration, many of the most Convention members have argued for such a important challenges in CFSP come down to the merger (in the May 23/24 meeting) as has the fundamental issue of the political will and Commission (Com (2002)247) although Giscard interests of the member states in agreeing to, and dÕEstaing in summing up the May meeting acting on the basis of, a genuine common policy expressed strong doubts about the idea. rather than pursuing their own individual and Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, has argued independent policies. Structural changes on their that the EU should focus as its first priority on the own cannot achieve this crucial element of governance of globalization and the promotion of political will and commitment. sustainable development. So he proposes that the The difficulties of the EU becoming a strong Commission should have competence, as with political global actor are clear - and without a step trade, to negotiate on all aspects of the change, they will almost inevitably get worse in management of globalization from environment enlarging from 15 to 25 member states, with the to transport to energy. With the launch of the risk of very weak Ôlowest common denominatorÕ euro, and the development of the euro-zone, positions emerging. In the post-September 11th
85 Kirsty Hughes period, with the crisis in the Middle East, with the Council, with the creation of separate Foreign growing unilateralism of the US, and with the Affairs Council would be one step forward. This threat of a US campaign against Iraq, the lack of could be chaired by Solana, creating continuity coordination and the lack of strong commonly and consistency - but if the presidency is defined interests and policy positions among the successfully reformed, and the six-month EU member states has been highlighted. While presidency abolished, then chairing by the new many fear the possible role of an informal reformed presidency would also result in more directoire of France, Germany and the UK in a continuity and consistency than at present. A strengthened CFSP, events such the Middle East more focused, separate and consistent Council crisis and US threats against Iraq, in fact highlight could contribute to moving forward in terms of the lack of coordination and focused agreement much greater attention to priority setting and among the three ÔbigsÕ. The UKÕs so-called establishment of clear strategic frameworks in Ôspecial relationshipÕ with the US appears more foreign policy, reinforced by the work of the often to emphasize differences between the UK Political and Security Committee (COPS). and other EU member states, rather than to Furthermore, while up to now, despite the provide a route to explain and promote common provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, QMV has European positions or to ameliorate fractious not been used in CFSP, in the medium run transatlantic relations. QMV should be used and extended. The A step change in CFSP would require a major difficulties in this are, of course, considerable but improvement in coordination and in political will outside the security and defence area, it is the to define stronger common positions as a direction of progress. genuine framework for member statesÕ foreign In terms of greater coordination between policies. This would require France, Germany and Council and Commission, much discussion has the UK to lead here in demonstrating genuine focused in the last two years on the proposal of political interests in progress. At the same time, it merging the post of High Representative with that is also clear that at 15, and even more at 25, an of the Commissioner for external relations (an effective CFSP cannot simply be built around an idea supported already in 1999 by Chris Patten, informal directoire of three. The infamous and proposed in a speech in 2000 by Prodi). Downing Street dinner of autumn 2001 - where Certainly, the split between policy formation and the initial three-some of France, Germany and policy instruments represented by the two posts the UK was expanded to include Italy, Spain, then is not ideal. But some consider this idea the High Representative, then the Belgian premature, not least since SolanaÕs position is presidency and finally at the last minute the Prime relatively new. Moreover, such a merging of Minister of the Netherlands - demonstrated rather Council and Commission posts, with the new publicly the need for a more inclusive and Representative taking part in meetings in both coherent approach. institutions, has very wide institutional Some of the institutional changes discussed implications and ramifications Ð it is not a above would contribute to improving the stand-alone proposal. The Commission functioning of CFSP. Reform of the General Affairs (Com (2002)247) has proposed merger with the
86 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? post being located in the Commission, and having international policies problematic; need for a the sole right of initiative (though no details common framework for trade, aid and are given of how the Council would then development, environment, justice and security, function) Ð Paris and London have been quick to human rights and foreign policy; merge 3 pillars reject these ideas. ¥ Major increase in coordination of However, Germany (who pushed hard in member statesÕ foreign policies within common Laeken for a strong emphasis on the external framework needed; dimension and is generally pushing for stronger ¥ Institutional changes include and more rapid action on CFSP) supports fusion establishment of a separate Foreign Affairs of the two posts, while France talks of increasing Council; move towards greater QMV in foreign synergy. If synergy is a code word for the policy (not security and defense); greater synergy, status quo, then it is obviously inadequate. But and in the medium run merger, of the High serious proposals to improve coordination Representative and Commissioner for External and interaction could provide the basis to Relations posts move forward, and ultimately to bring the two positions together. 6. Conclusions Making progress will not be easy, yet more has The challenges for the Convention and IGC been done in recent years on CFSP, and especially are clear and daunting. But the Convention has on ESDP, than would have been predicted in the the chance, and the political challenge, of mid-1990s. Even so, much faster and more demonstrating that where intergovernmental substantial progress will be needed if the decision-making behind closed doors has proved difficulties the EU faces in having a strong voice at inadequate in the past, the open and more this critical current global conjuncture are to be inclusive approach of the Convention can overcome, and overcome with sufficient rapidity. succeed. The Convention cannot substitute for political The Convention is still only at the early stages will among the member states but it can show the of its work. But many if not most of the choices institutional and organizational route forward as open to it are already known Ð it is the selection well as putting the political challenge clearly to across those choices that will determine the the member states. shape of the future EU. On the basis of these different choices, together with the different Voice in the World Ð Summary of Key political groupings and interests within the Issues Convention and across the member states and ¥ Enlargement underlines EU position as candidates, it is possible to identify a number of economic giant and political dwarf; scenarios that help to illustrate the potential ¥ Global instability and uncertainty, and implications of the choices made. Five scenarios deteriorating EU-US relationship, add to pressure are briefly identified below: for urgent step change in EUÕs international role Ð political will of member states still key hurdle; ¥ Diverse legal bases of different
87 Kirsty Hughes
(1) Emergent Global Political Power Nice voting weights and QMV conditions and The EU takes major steps forward in replace with simple double majority voting; democracy, efficiency and in international policy- extend QMV; clarify processes for competences making. Consequently, it begins to have a and subsidiarity and include national parliaments stronger, effective global voice, understood by the in the new processes. European public and legitimated by effective democratic processes. International Policies: Create an effective common framework for all international policies Democracy: Clear, basic constitutional Treaty; Ð trade, development, aid, justice and home stronger accountability of Commission affairs (in their international dimensions), human bureaucracy to the Commission, and of rights and foreign policy, with closer coordination Commission to the EP: and integration of these policy areas. Integrate Commission President elected by the the 3 pillars, while maintaining different decision- European Parliament, Commissioners either making and policy developments approaches for elected or at least endorsed separately by the EP; different policy areas; create a new Foreign Affairs open up Council Ð legislative sessions to be held Council, chaired by the High Representative; in in public; extend EPÕs rights of co-decision; step the medium run, extend QMV in foreign policy change in communication strategy and civil (but not in defence and security); in the medium dialogue, including national politicians taking on run, merge the posts of High Representative and their responsibilities for explaining and Commissioner for external relations, in the short acknowledging their role in EU decisions; run, develop new procedures for substantially innovations in communication (e.g. weekly improved and visible synergy. online question time of commissioners); new and innovative involvement of national parliaments; (2) Struggling Global Power no moves to formal, separate decision-making for The EU takes weak steps forward on avant-garde (no exclusive 2-speed EU) democratic changes, makes more effective changes on the efficiency side but moves towards Efficiency: reduce size of Commission to 12; an intergovernmental model for the EU. The EU restructure Commission resources, increasing makes significant changes in international policy focus on strategic policy development, and formulation. But over time democratic reducing resources in areas of strongly national inadequacies, the lack of an effective pan- competence; reform Council of Ministers and European strategic policy leadership function and European Council Ð split General Affairs Council, conflict in the Council, not least over the creating a Foreign Affairs Council and a new decisions of the executive Council, leads to permanent Coordination Council (with ministers national differences coming to the fore and the designated by their heads of state); bring EU struggles to have its voice heard in the world. European Council within EU institutional framework; abolish six-month presidency Ð Democracy: Basic constitutional Treaty Ð but introduce new, longer team presidency; abolish clarity marred by complex formulations
88 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? representing strong national differences; no (3) Efficient but Weak EU changes to Commission accountability; Council The EU takes major steps forward in legislative sessions to be held in public; no new democracy and efficiency but not in international and innovative communication strategy; policy-making. Consequently, the enlarged EU formalisation of eurogroup leads to emergence of function relatively well, but does not manage to two-speed EU through de facto barriers impeding act effectively as a regional power and so faces candidatesÕ joining the euro. more difficulties in relations with neighbours and with the stability of its regional environment. Efficiency: Commission stays large Ð with number of Commissioners to match number of Democracy: Clear, basic constitutional Treaty; member states; Council of Ministers and stronger accountability of Commission European Council reformed Ð abolish 6 month bureaucracy to the Commission, and of presidency and creation of new 5 year European Commission to the EP: Commission President Council President, appointed by European elected by the European Parliament, Council members; creation of new executive Commissioners either elected or at least Council, chaired by president and made up of endorsed separately by the EP; open up Council Ð chairs of the (reduced to) 8 Council formations; legislative sessions to be held in public; extend General Affairs Council, creating a Foreign Affairs EPÕs rights of co-decision; step change in Council and a new permanent Coordination communication strategy and civil dialogue, Council (with ministers designated by their heads including national politicians taking on their of state); bring European Council within EU responsibilities for explaining and acknowledging institutional framework; maintain Nice voting their role in EU decisions; innovations in weights and QMV conditions; extend QMV; clarify communication (e.g. weekly online question time processes for competences and subsidiarity and of commissioners); new and innovative include national parliaments in the new involvement of national parliaments; no moves to processes. formal, separate decision-making for avant-garde (no exclusive 2-speed EU). International Policies: Create processes for more effective coordination for all international Efficiency: reduce size of Commission to 12; policies Ð trade, development, aid, justice and restructure Commission resources, increasing home affairs (in their international dimensions), focus on strategic policy development, and human rights and foreign policy. Create a new reducing resources in areas of strongly national Foreign Affairs Council, chaired by the European competence; reform Council of Ministers and Council President; develop new procedures for European Council Ð split General Affairs Council, substantially improved and visible synergies creating a Foreign Affairs Council and a new between the High Representative and the permanent Coordination Council (with ministers Commissioner for External Relations. designated by their heads of state); bring European Council within EU institutional framework; abolish six-month presidency Ð
89 Kirsty Hughes introduce new, longer team presidency; abolish European Council reformed Ð abolish 6 month Nice voting weights and QMV conditions and presidency and creation of new 5 year European replace with simple double majority voting; Council President, appointed by European extend QMV; clarify processes for competences Council members; creation of new executive and subsidiarity and include national parliaments Council, chaired by president and made up of in the new processes. chairs of the (reduced to) 8 Council formations; reform of General Affairs Council, creating a International Policies: New Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Council and a new permanent Council created, chaired by presidency. No action Coordination Council (with ministers designated to improve synergy or coherence across different by their heads of state); bring European Council areas of international policy. No change in within EU institutional framework; maintain Nice positions of High Representative and voting weights and QMV conditions; extend QMV; Commissioner for External Relations. clarify processes for competences and subsidiarity and include national parliaments in (4) Efficient but Unstable EU the new processes. The EU makes some improvements in efficiency, following a much stronger International Policies: New Foreign Affairs intergovernmental approach but does less in Council created, chaired by European Council terms of democratic changes and little on the president. No action to improve synergy international side. The intergovernmental or coherence across different areas of approach combined with absence of sufficient international policy. No change in positions of democratic changes results in inadequate popular High Representative and Commissioner for support for the EU together with national External Relations. frictions between member states. The EUÕs development is unstable and problematic. (5) Technocratic, Stalled and Inefficient EU Democracy: Basic constitutional Treaty Ð but The Convention and IGC fail to agree major clarity marred by complex formulations changes and only some tinkering is achieved not representing strong national differences; no moving much beyond the Nice Treaty. Decision- changes to Commission accountability; Council making in the enlarged EU is extremely difficult legislative sessions to be held in public; no new with many blockages. Public dissatisfaction with and innovative communication strategy; the EU grows and national differences of view formalisation of eurogroup leads to emergence of become sharper. Attempts to move forward two-speed EU through de facto barriers impeding within the eurogroup fail due to public discontent candidatesÕ joining the euro. and different national reactions to a deteriorating global environment. Efficiency: Commission stays large Ð with number of Commissioners to match number of Democracy: No constitutional Treaty; no member states; Council of Ministers and changes to Commission accountability; Council
90 THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION: TRAVELING HOPEFULLY? legislative sessions to be held in public; no new ensure coherence and achieve common views. and innovative communication strategy; But a renewed dynamic combination of the formalisation of eurogroup leads to emergence of supranational and intergovernmental will also not two-speed EU through de facto barriers impeding succeed without substantial changes in candidatesÕ joining the euro. democratic involvement and participation. The scenarios also underline the importance of the Efficiency: Commission stays large Ð with international dimension. The enlarged EU cannot number of Commissioners to match number of isolate itself or cut itself off from the wider world. member states; six-month presidency abolished Unless major steps forward are taken to and replaced by team presidency of 3 countries strengthen the EUÕs international voice, then for 18 months; no reform of General Affairs even a more democratic and efficient EU will find Council; maintain Nice voting weights and QMV itself buffeted by global forces over which it has conditions; no extension of QMV; no new role for little control. national parliaments; complex new procedures The challenges facing the EU are pressing. In for allocation of competences and subsidiarity. a calmer and more stable global environment, the triple challenge of tackling the democratic deficit, International Policies: no changes to managing the politics and organization of the international policy coordination or to CFSP.. enlarged EU, and building a genuine global voice, These scenarios are only indicative of how would be hard and comprehensive enough. In different decisions may come together to create the current global context, it is both much more the overall structures and dynamics of the new difficult and more urgent to rise to these EU. But they underline the importance of not challenges. Much lies on the shoulders of the looking at individual changes in isolation. The future of Europe Convention Ð an important most positive scenario is the first one, of the innovation in the preparation of these emergent global power. This requires the EU to fundamental decisions, not least in its openness move forward in democratic and efficiency terms and composition. But events may move rapidly while managing to renew and maintain its balance ahead and past the steady timetable of the between intergovernmental and supranational Convention and IGC. The challenge for the approaches. Success of this scenario requires Convention, and for all the political groupings substantial Commission reform together with within it, is to demonstrate not only that it can many changes in the Council, and an come up with focused substantive solutions that understanding of the requirements of will revitalize and restructure the EU to meet the participative democracy. needs and demands of European and global In an enlarged EU, reforms that do not politics, but also that it can engage with the wider provide adequate scope and room within EU world Ð with the public, with unfolding events Ð structures for genuine pan-European policy- in the process of its work. If it does not, it risks development and that move too far in an being seen as a fundamental political distraction, intergovernmental direction risk creating a on the sidelines as global events move rapidly situation where it is increasingly difficult to forward.
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