The Case of Marine Environmental Management in Somalia
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The Stability/Sustainability Dynamics: The Case of Marine Environmental Management in Somalia QASIM HERSI FARAH A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillments for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Environmental Studies York University Toronto, Ontario October 2016 QASIM HERSI FARAH, 2016 Abstract Since January 1991, Somalia has been a war-torn society without law and order machinery. After a decade of chaos, in January 2001, an interim government formed in Djibouti was brought to Mogadishu, albeit it failed to function. Two similar others followed; one in 2004 and the other in 2007. In 2012, a federal government was elected by 275 members of parliament, but it is yet to govern most of the country’s regions. Consequently, over 25 years, there has been sociopolitical and economic instability which jeopardised Somalia’s environment and security (land and marine). Now, who are the actors of socio-political and economic instability, and can marine sustainability be achieved in the absence of stability? This doctoral study identifies, defines, examines and analyzes each of the state and non- state actors/networks operating in Somalia, at the international, regional, national, provincial, and local levels. I investigated who are they and what are their backgrounds/origins? What are their objectives and strategies? What are their capacities and economic status? What are their motives and manoeuvres? and what are their internal and external relationships? I categorised each one of them based on these scales: instability, potential stability or stability. I adopted a multi-dimensional approach which aims at tackling both marine environmental degradation and insecurity in the Somali basin, while establishing a community-based policy as a milestone for the formulation of a national/provincial policy. The study finds out that the competing multifaceted and multipurpose (economic, political or social gains) networks deliberately or inadvertently destroy the country’s environment and contribute to instability. Yet, in the country’s post-conflict situation, environmental traditional- based policy and socio-legal systems can be practiced at the grassroots level. I then proposed the roles to be played by individuals, local communities, provincials, and national, as well as regional, and international communities in the implementation of this bottom-up approach policy. While showing the relationship between environmental sustainability and sociopolitical stability, I argue that marine problems are borderless and as such, need global attention. I shed light on how war- torn states and post-conflict countries can establish vital means of environmental sustainability by applying community-based policy, implemented through self-help programs. ii Identification Terms: Marine, Seawaters, Environment, Networks of Stability/Potential Stability/Instability, Political, Social, Sociopolitical, Economic, Exclusive Economic Zone, Illegal Fishing, Foreign Trawlers, Jurisdiction, Judiciary, Executive, Legislative, Warlords, Faith-Lords, Money-Lords, Al-Shabaab, Backgrounds, Manoeuvers, Motives, Relationships, Minor-Groups, Typology, Negotiation, Management, Puntland, Somaliland, Jubbaland, Galmudug, Southwest Somalia, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya. iii Dedicated to: My Mother Salada Adam and, My Children: Abdulfatah, Abdulhalim, Hanaan, and Hasiina iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My first gratitude and a special debt are due to my Supervisor, Professor Mark Winfield who helped me both morally and academically in the accomplishment of this dissertation. Then, I should extend my gratitude to the rest of my Committee: Professor Anna Zalik and Professor Don Dippo as well as to the Deans of the Faculty of Environmental Studies and the Faculty of Graduate Studies. Outside York University, I am indebted to Madam Ubah Hassan Ugaas, the mother of my two daughters; Hanaan and Hasiina, who endeavoured to give me space and time to concentrate on completing this huge work. A deep and high appreciation is also due to my two sons; Abdulfatah and Abdulhalim who successfully managed themselves without my presence and parenthood, despite living in a hardship situation. They are really self-raised and self-trained children. v Table of Contents Title: Page No. Abstract ii Dedication iv Acknowledgement v Chapter One General Introduction to Somalia…………………………………………… 1 Introduction 1.1: Somalia: from Central Authoritative System to Unstable Fiefdoms……… 2 1.2: Clan system in Somalia…………………………………………………… 6 1. 3: Maritime Geography and Climate in Somalia…….. 11 1. 4: Somalia’s Economy in the Context of Socio-political Instability… . 14 1. 5: Measuring the Economic Impacts on the Civil War in the Context of Instability. 18 1. 6: The Marine Ecological Situation in Somalia………. 22 1. 7: Conclusion ………….. 27 Chapter Two: Theoretical Approach 2.1: Introduction…………….. 29 2.2: Research Question………….. 30 2.3: Contemporary Literature on Resource Management and the Case of Somalia 30 2.4: Stability/Instability Dynamics in Marine Environmental Degradation in Somalia. 36 2. 5: The importance of locally based approaches….. 39 Policy Network Analysis: A Brief Introduction…. 41 2.6: Application of Policy Network Analysis at three levels in the case of Somalia. 46 2. 8: Research Methods….. 50 2.9: Conclusion 52 Chapter Three: International/Regional Scale Analysis on Foreign Networks of Stability, Potential Stability, and Instability in Somalia: Who are they? What are their Objectives and Strategies? What are their Capacities? 3.1. Introduction 54 vi 3.2AMISOM 55 3.2.1: Background and Geographical Scope 3.2.2: Capacity and Economy……. 56 3.2.3: Motives…. 57 3.2. 4: Manoeuvres…… 59 3.2. 5: Relationships…… 59 3.2.6: Typology ….. 61 3.3: Ethiopia 3. 3.1: Background and Geographical Scope…… 62 3. 3.2: Capacity and Economy…. 64 3. 3.3: Manoeuvres …. 66 3. 3. 4: Motives…. 67 3. 3. 5: Relationships…. 68 3.3. 6: Typology … 70 3.4: Kenya 3.4.1. Background and Geographical Scope…. 71 3.4.2: Capacity and Economy… 72 3.4.3: Manoeuvres … 73 3.4. 4: Motives…. 76 3.4. 5: Relationships… 79 3.4.6: Typology … 80 3.5: Western Intelligence Forces: CIA, FBI, MI5, MI6 81 3.5.1: Background and Origin 3.5. 2: Capacity and Economy 82 3.5.3: Manoeuvres 83 3.5. 4: Motives 84 3.5. 5: Relationships 86 3.5.6: Typology 87 3.6: Turkey 3.6.1. Background and Origin 88 vii 3.6.2. Capacity and Economic Status (Legal, Administrative/executive and Revenue) 89 3.6.3: Manoeuvres 89 3.6. 4: Motives 90 3.6. 5: Relationships 91 3.6.6: Typology 92 3.7: NATO 92 3. 7.1: Background and Origin 3.7. 2: Administrative and Economic Capacity 93 3.7.3: Motives 94 3.7. 4: Relationships 95 3.7.5: Typology 95 3.8: Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) 97 3.8. 1: Background 97 3.8. 2: Manoeuvres 98 3.8. 3: Relationships 98 3.8. 4: Typology 99 3.9: Clandestine Regional State Networks 99 3.9. 1: General Background 99 3.9. 2: Regional Networks’ Manoeuvres and Motives 101 3.9. 3: International Networks’ Manoeuvres and Motives 102 3.9. 4: Relationships 103 3.9. 5: Typology 103 3.10: IIUUUO Fishing 105 3.11: Oil Exploiters 107 3.12: The Role of the Somali Diaspora 110 3.13. Conclusion 112 Table/Diagram 113 4: Chapter Four: Status and Role of the National Institutional and Non-Institutional Networks of Stability, Potential Stability and Instability 4.1. Introduction 114 viii 4.2.: Legislative Branch/Parliament 114 4.2. 1: Background and Origin 4. 2. 2: Administrative Capacity 115 4.2. 3: Economic Base 116 4.2. 4 : Manoeuvres/Activities 118 4.2. 5 : Motives…. 120 4. 2. 6: Relationships….. 122 4.27: Typology …. 123 4.3 Executive Branch 4.3.1.: Background and Origin…. 124 4.3. 2: Executing Administrative Capacity….. 124 4. 3. 3: Economic Base…. 128 4.3. 4: Manoeuvres/Activities…. 129 4.3. 5: Motives…. 132 4.3. 6: Relationships…. 134 4. 3. 7: Typology…. 136 4. 4: Judiciary Branch 4. 4. 1: Background and Origin 4. 4. 2: Administrative Capacity ….. 137 4. 4. 3: Economic Base…… 139 4. 4. 4: Manoeuvres/Activities…… 139 4. 4. 5: Motives……………… 141 4. 4. 6: Relationships…. 142 4. 4. 7: Typology……………. 144 4. 5: Money-lords………… 145 4. 5. 1: Background 145 4. 5. 2: Manoeuvres/Activities …….. 146 4. 5. 3: Motives……………… 147 4. 5. 4: Exceptions……. 148 4. 5. 5: Relationships……….. 148 ix 4. 5. 6: Typology………. 148 4. 6: Faith-lords 4.6. 1: Introduction 149 4.6.2: Faith-lord Warmongers 149 4.6.2.1: Background 4.6.2. 2: Manoeuvres 150 4.6.3. Ala-Sheikh………….. 150 4.6.3.1: Background 4. 6. 4. Al-Ittahad…………. 150 4.6.4.1: Background 4.6.4.2: Manoeuvres 151 4.6.4.3: Consequence………….. 152 4.6.4: Typology….. 152 4.6.5. Al-Shabab………… 154 4.6.5.1: Background 4.6.5.2: Manoeuvres……………. 154 4.6.5. 3: Economic Base……. 155 4.6.5.4: Motives 155 4.6.5.5: Strategies……… 156 4.6.5.6: Typology… 156 4.6.7. Ahlu-Sunnah wal-Jama’…………. 157 4.6. 7. 1: Background………….. 157 4.6.7. 2: Manoeuvres………… 157 4. 6. 7. 3: Motives……………… 158 4.6.7.4.: Typology…………… 158 4. 6. 8. Al-Islah as the Key Faith Peacemakers 159 4.6.8.1: Background 159 4.6.8.2: Manoeuvres………….. 159 4.6.8.3: Relationships….. 160 4.6.8.4: Typology 161 x 4. 7: Warlords 4.7. 1: Background………….. 161 4.7.2: Economic Base………….. 161 4.7.3: Typology……… 162 4.8. Parasite Networks………… 163 4.8.1: Relationship among the Insecurity Networks of Instability …. 163 4.8.2: Typology…………………….. 165 4. 9: The Key Network Actors of Fishing Companies and Coast-Guards……. 166 4. 9.1. Somali National Fishing Company (SNFCO)… 166 4.9. 2: Somali Marine Resource Development and Conservation Centre (SMRDCC) 167 4.10.