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The Character of the Greek Crisis DÉLKELET EURÓPA – SOUTH -EAST EUROPE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS QUARTERLY , Vol. 4. No.1. (Spring 2013/1 Tavasz) THE CHARACTER OF THE GREEK CRISIS ΧΑΡΊΚΛΕΙΑ ΚΟΚΚΊΝΟΥ ΜΑΝ∆ΑΜΑ∆ΙΏΤΟΥ ∗ (Abstract) The year of 2012 was a turbulent one for Greece. The country had to deal with a series of problems on the political, economic and social front. The economic crisis in the country, as a consequence of erroneous politics that were pursued primarily in domestic policies and afterwards in the foreign politics in 2009 is stills in progress. In this article, we are going to present Greece's internal politics, the parliamentary elections which were held twice in the same year, the difficulties of forming a new government, the economy, specifically the financial affairs of the country and the euro, and last but not least foreign affairs. This paper aims to present the crucial events of 2012 in Greece and preceding happenings leading to the issues that we face from the perspective of Greek and foreign newspapers and articles. Key words : political, economic and social turmoil, recession, erroneous policies, imbalances of public finances, debt crisis, parliamentary elections, forming a new government, euro, foreign relations. OUTLINE OF ARTICLE Introduction: 1) How Greece became a burning issue for Europe. 2) The most important events in Greek politics in 2012. 3) Strikes and societal resistance in Greece, their goals and achievements 4) Greece and the euro. 5) Greek foreign policy Conclusion. * Introduction There is a confusion of terminology when referring to the Greek problem in everyday "journalistic" use of language. The Greek problem is often referred as "economic crisis" with rising unemployment, declining real incomes and a general decline in demand. By "economic crisis", however, is also meant the Greek debt crisis. These two terminologies are different and the preferred term for the first one is "recession". Having made this distinction, we can proceed to describe the causes of the debt crisis in Greece and we will be able to understand how and why Greece became a burning issue for Europe and the Euro zone. 1) How Greece became a burning issue for Europe. The period after 1974 was a period of high borrowing for Greece resulting in the rapid expansion of debt. Between 1980 and 1993, the debt soared from 28.6% to 111.6% of GDP. 1 2 The deficit for the same period was also high. After 1993, the economy went into a smoother path in order to meet the convergence criteria ∗ The author: Xarikleia Kokkinou Mandamadiotou is a sophomore undergraduate student of the International and European Studies Department at the University of Piraeus, member of the SAFIA organization, researcher of the South- East Europe Research Institution and an active participant on MUNs (Model United Nations). 1 The chronilcle of swelling public debt (Tο χρονικό διόγκωσης του δηµόσιου χρέους) 1980-2005, by J. D. Kamaras. Kathimerini , December 15, 2005. 2 The chronicle of a Foretold detrailment (Το χρονικό ενός προαναγγελθέντος εκτροχιασµού), by Ch. Karanikas. Ta Nea , July 31, 2010. 2 Xarikleia Kokkinou Mandamadiotou Spring 2012 of the Maastricht Treaty. Thanks to the achievement of higher growth and privatization, the debt began to decrease slightly as a percentage of GDP and the deficit fell by 1999 to below 3%, resulting in allowing Greece to join the EMU. It was later revealed that the relatively high level of performance presented during this period was due to hidden defects and loans, a practice called creative accounting, the implementation of which helped the investment bank Goldman Sachs. In autumn 2004, the finance minister George Alogoskoufis conducted economic census under pressure by Eurostat. The census revealed the country’s previously concealed government spending leading to upward revision of the public budget deficits in the previous years. This led to the country’s loss of credibility and to a three year surveillance period by the EU. In the same year, the Eurostat revised the Greek public budget for the preceding years, which showed that Greece had never met the Maastricht convergence criteria and even after the critical year of 1999 it still had a deficit of over 3%. 3 4 The Greek economy, however, was one of the fastest growing in the Eurozone from 2000 to 2007. During this period, it grew at an annual rate of 4.2%, as foreign capital was flowing into the country. 5 Despite this, the country continued to record high budget deficits each year. Financial statistics reveal solid budget surpluses existed from 1960 to 1973 for the Greek general government, but since then only budget deficits were recorded. In 1974-80 the general government had an era with moderate and acceptable budget deficits (below 3% of GDP). According to an editorial published by the Greek conservative newspaper Kathimerini, large public deficits were indeed one of the features that have marked the Greek social model since the restoration of Democracy in 1974. After the removal of the right-wing military junta, the government wanted to bring disenfranchised left-leaning portions of the population into the economic mainstream. In order to do so, successive Greek governments have, among other things, customarily run large deficits to finance public sector jobs, pensions, and other social benefits. 6 The long period with high yearly budget deficits caused a situation where, from 1993, the debt-to-GDP ratio was continuously found to be in the unhealthy territory of above 94%. In the turmoil of the global financial crisis, the situation became unsustainable (causing the capital markets to freeze in April 2010) 7, as the downturn had caused the debt level rapidly to grow above the maximum sustainable level for Greece (defined by IMF economists to be 120%). According to “The Economic Adjustment Programm for Greece” published by the EU Commission in October 2011, the debt level was even expected further to worsen into a highly unsustainable level of 198% in 2012, if the proposed debt restructure agreement was not implemented. 8 Initially, currency devaluation helped the Greek government to finance borrowing. After the introduction of the euro in January 2001, the devaluation tool disappeared. Throughout the next 8 years, Greece was however able to continue its high level of borrowing, due to the lower interest rates government bonds in euro could command, in combination with a long series of strong GDP growth rates. Another consistent problem Greece has suffered from in recent decades, is the government's tax income. Each year it is far below the expected level. In 2010, the estimated tax evasion costs for the Greek government amounted to well over $20 billion per year. Problems however started to surface when the global financial crisis peaked, with negative repercussions hitting all national economies in September 2008. Greece was not the exception. The global financial crisis had a particularly significant negative impact on GDP growth rates in Greece. In conclusion, the global economic crisis combined with budget deficits of the country (a consistent problem is the huge shortfall in revenue each year far below the expected level. In 2010, the estimated tax evasion costs for the Greek government amounted to well over $20 billion per year. 9) and the constant borrowing, resulted in the collapse of the Greek economy. In addition, two of the country's largest earners, which are tourism and shipping, both were seriously affected by the downturn, with revenues falling 15% in 2009. 10 Under those unfavorable circumstances for the Greek economy, the Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, who ruled with a small majority of 152 MPs, announced snap elections for October 4, 2009. He was accused 3 With a deficit over the Maastricht Treaty we entered into EMU in 1999 (Με έλλειµα άνω του Μάαστριχτ µπήκαµε το 1999 στην ΟΝΕ), by Kostas Moshonas. Eleftherotipia , November 15, 2004. 4 Economic miracle with pathologies (Οικονοµικό θαύµα µε παθογένειες). Kathimerini , June 26, 2011. 5 "Greece: Foreign Capital Inflows Up". Embassy of Greece in Poland (Greeceinfo.wordpress.com). September 17, 2009. 6 Back down to earth with a bang (English edition). Kathimerini , March 3, 2010. 7 Financial crisis: Timeline, by Patrick Kingsley. The Guardian , August 7, 2012. 8 “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece: Fifth Review – October 2011 (Draft)”. European Commission . 9 Greeks and the state: An uncomfortable couple, by Christopher Torchia. Bloomberg Businessweek , May 3, 2010. 10 Greece sovereign debt-crisis, by Andrew Michael Teo. wordpress.com, September 14, 2011. (12/2/13) DÉLKELET -EURÓPA – SOUTH -EAST EUROPE International Relations Quarterly 3 by his opponents for his decision, saying that his purpose of announcing these elections was to escape from the difficult situation that he and his government have created. 11 In February 2010, the new government of George Papandreou (elected in October 2009), revised the 2009 deficit from a previously estimated 5% to an alarming 12.7% of GDP. 12 In April 2010, the reported 2009 deficit was further increased to 13.6% 13 and at the time of the final revised calculation by ECOFIN it ended at 15.6% of GDP, which proved to be the highest deficit for any EU country in 2009. This led the rating institute Fitch to downgrade Greece from A to A-.14 Nevertheless, the government declined to proceed directly to measures of fiscal consolidation in order to reassure the markets. In the next few months, the government proceeded to implement the election promises, such as the payment of subsidies to the social groups with low-income. 15 Consistent up to a point in pre- election promises of the government, it was the budget for 2010, filed in Parliament on 20 November 2009, which included increases in the rate of inflation, low wages and pensions. The budget also contained measures to reduce costs by cutting government spending and cuts in operating costs and estimated revenue growth, mainly through tackling tax evasion.
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