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SITUATION REPORT: Tribal Protests Against Kurdish Governance in Deir-Ez-Zor Governorate

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SITUATION REPORT: Tribal Protests Against Kurdish Governance in Deir-Ez-Zor Governorate HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TEAM (HAT) SITUATION REPORT: Tribal Protests against Kurdish Governance in Deir-ez-Zor Governorate JUNE 17, 2019 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Protests against the Kurdish Self Administration (KSA) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) erupted across Deir-ez-Zor Governorate during the weekend of April 5, 2019 in Kishkiyeh and Abu Hamam towns in Hajin subdistrict; as well as Sawa village, Elhisan, and Shaqra village in Deir-ez-Zor subdistrict. Since then, similar protests have been held on a regular basis including in Shiheil and Basira towns, Basira subdistrict; Mhemideh and Lower Safira in Kisreh subdistrict; Mweileh and Hseein in Sur subdistrict; Elhisan again in Deir-ez-Zor subdistrict; Dahleh in Khasham subdistrict; and Shinan in Thiban subdistrict. Collectively, these mark the largest wave of public resistance to Kurdish governance in Deir-ez-Zor since the SDF wrested control of these areas from the Islamic State (ISIS) in the fall of 2017. The demonstrators continue to express similar demands, which can ultimately be summarized as: inadequate service provision by the KSA in the face of deteriorating living conditions, the SDF’s ongoing arrest and conscription campaigns, and the fuel shortages in northeast Syria and alleged smuggling of oil into Government of Syria-held territories. These demands were reiterated during a tribal conference sponsored by the political and military leadership of the KSA in Ein Issa on May 3. The meeting was attended by as many as 5,000 tribesmen, and it was explicitly organized in response to the protests. However, it is important to note that criticisms of the KSA outlined by protesters in Deir-ez-Zor are not unique to the governorate, as similar underlying tensions are present in Arab communities across the northeast. As such, the wave of recent protests is not a new phenomenon, but rather an intensification of an established pattern of opposition to KSA rule that has been ongoing for months. The recent fuel shortage has acted as a trigger for these underlying tensions and is the primary factor behind the eruption of protests in Deir-ez-Zor Governorate since April. The protests are likely to persist and expand to other areas in the northeast so long as oil transfers to Government-held areas continue and Arab grievances remain unaddressed. BACKGROUND 1. Inadequate Service provision Local sources indicate that service provision in the northeast, including Deir-ez-Zor governorate, fails to meet the needs of local residents. Most communities in the Kurdish-held northern half of Deir-ez-Zor have centrally provided electricity four to eight hours per day, while water quality is extremely poor due to pollution, destruction of infrastructure, runoff, and other factors. Moreover, healthcare facilities are clustered along the Euphrates River, creating a major barrier to access for remote and underserved communities. Finally, access to secondary schools is highly limited, and residents cite the poor condition of school buildings as one of the top three barriers for accessing education.1 Case Study Protests against Local Council Corruption and Water Shortages in Kishkiyeh and Abu Hamam, Hajin subdistrict, Deir-ez-Zor governorate During the earliest demonstrations against the KSA, which took place on April 5 in the towns of Kishkiyeh and Abu Hamam in Hajin Subdistrict, protesters specifically decried the poor living conditions and called on the U.S.-led International Coalition to dismiss Local Council officials appointed by the Syrian Democractic Council (the political arm of the SDF), accusing them of corruption. They also demanded the officials resume supplying water within the towns, which had been suffering from a severe water shortage most likely as a result of the reported shutdown of a water pumping station in the nearby town of Abu Hamam on March 26. 2. Arrests and Conscription In the aftermath of ISIS’ territorial defeat the SDF has shifted to identifying and eliminating ISIS sleeper cells across the northeast, yet the raids and arrests that constitute this campaign are increasingly seen by locals as invasive and unjustly targeting predominantly Arab communities. Local sources indicate that especially in Deir-ez-Zor communities which have witnessed protests, residents view the raids as collective punishment and retribution for previous support for ISIS. Case Study Protests against SDF Arrest Operations in Shiheil, Basira Subdistrict, Deir-ez-Zor Governorate On May 9 at least five people were killed and two were arrested during a raid on a suspected ISIS sleeper cell conducted in Al-Katf neighborhood of Shiheil by the SDF and supported by International Coalition aircrafts. While one of the arrested was prominent ISIS member and weapons-dealer Abu Bara’ Al-Deiri, a demonstration erupted in Shiheil later that day because residents maintained that the five people killed were civilians with no connections to ISIS. During the protest an SDF soldier shot a civilian demonstrator, and the SDF was forced to withdraw from the area when residents set fire to SDF military positions in response. 1.According to REACH’s Northeast Syria: Area-Based Assessment of Deir-ez-Zor Governorate (February 2019). MERCY CORPS Situation Report: Tribal Protests against Kurdish Governance in Deir- ez-Zor Governorate A 2 On May 14 the SDF expanded a military conscription campaign implemented through arrests, which has further challenged community acceptance. Arrests of men aged 19 to 33 who fail to fulfill their mandatory service have occurred in and around Ar-Raqqa city for months, and on May 14 the SDF announced it would widen the campaign to Al-Hasakeh Governorate. Local media reported that between May 24 and 26 more than 200 men were forcefully conscripted by the Asayish (the KSA’s internal security forces) and SDF-affiliated military police in five subdistricts in Al-Hasakeh Governorate. Conscription policies have had a profound social and economic impact. Local sources indicate that in large numbers, young men have begun to avoid public spaces for fear of being pressed into military service, impacting university attendance and cafes, restaurants, shops, and manual labor, which depend upon a labor force of predominantly military-age men. 3. Fuel Since March Syria’s nationwide fuel shortage has reached crisis proportions. Tightening U.S. sanctions on Iran, specifically its oil exports including those to Syria, have ratcheted up the pressure exerted through U.S. and EU sanctions on dealings with the Government of Syria, which holds key oil infrastructure including ports, pipelines, and refineries. However, the majority of Syria’s domestic oil and gas fields are located on Arab tribal lands now under Kurdish control, especially in central and southern Deir-ez-Zor Governorate. The fuel shortages have taxed communities nationwide, leading to strict fuel rationing and long queues at fuel stations. Direct impacts have been felt in transportation costs, household heating, and electricity generators. The high demand created by reduced fuel imports has given rise to increased cross-line oil trading and smuggling from the northeast to Government areas. Not only have tribes been denied a satisfactory share in mineral rights and revenue sharing within their own ancestral lands, but the export of the northeast’s oil in light of a shortage affecting daily life has exacerbated a profound sense of economic dispossession, continuing a pattern that has repeated itself under the Government, ISIS, and now Kurdish officials. Case Study Fuel Protests in Omar Oil Field, Deir-ez-Zor governorate On May 8 local media reported that demonstrators blocked trucks allegedly transporting oil from Omar oil field, the largest in Syria, to Government of Syria-held areas, and burned tires along Highway 7 which links al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor governorates, in protest of cross-line oil trading and smuggling. In response to the growing number of protests in Deir-ez-Zor, the KSA and SDF with support from the International Coalition, have begun to take steps to mitigate the growing tensions. In addition to the tribal conference held on May 3, on May 14 the SDF released approximately 43 prisoners in Deir-ez-Zor who had been charged as ISIS affiliates. The prisoners’ release occurred one day after leaders of the ‘Ageidat tribe convened a meeting in Shiheil during which they specifically demanded an end to the SDF’s ongoing arrest campaigns and denounced their operations as “murderous” after an SDF soldier shot a civilian protester during demonstrations that erupted in the town on May 9. Local sources reported that on May 18 the SDF and the International Coalition convened a meeting in Omar oil field near Shiheil with the family members of those killed during the May 9 raid on Shiheil as well as an April 25 raid on Daman village in Basira subdistrict. When the meeting proved unsuccessful in reducing tensions, the KSA’s Deir-ez-Zor Governorate Civil Council met with tribal sheikhs in Shiheil on May 20 to discuss residents’ demands for better service provision, and announced plans for the release of additional prisoners. On May 25, approximately 89 prisoners were released from an SDF prison in Kasra town in Kisreh subdistrict after having been arrested from various areas in Deir-ez-Zor for ISIS affiliations. The conciliatory measures taken by the KSA have had limited success in tempering the stiff resistance to Kurdish authority among Arab tribes. For example, the May 3 tribal conference was boycotted by the leadership of some MERCY CORPS Situation Report: Tribal Protests against Kurdish Governance in Deir- ez-Zor Governorate A 3 of northeast Syria’s most prominent Sunni Arab tribes, including the predominantly Government-aligned Beggara and Tayy, while members of Arab tribes which maintain ostensibly positive relations with the KSA were also rumored to have refused meaningful participation in the event.2 ANALYSIS Many of the criticisms outlined by protesters in Deir-ez-Zor are not unique to the governorate.
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