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1 David M. deRubertis, State Bar No. 208709 The deRubertis Law Firm, APC 2 4219 Coldwater Canyon Avenue Studio City, California 91604 3 Telephone:(818) 761-2322 Facsimile: (818) 761-2323 4 E-mail: [email protected]

5 Lee R. Feldman, State Bar No. 171628 Alicia Olivares, State Bar No. 181412 6 FELDMAN BROWNE OLIVARES A Professional Corporation 7 12400 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1100 Los Angeles, California 90025 8 Telephone:(310) 207-8500 Facsimile: (310) 207-8515 9 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] 10 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 11 Danessa Valentine & Jalisa Moore

12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

13 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE

14 DANESSA VALENTINE, an individual; Case No.: BC602184 15 JALISA MOORE, an individual; and all [Assigned for all purposes to the Hon. Carolyn B. others similarly situated, Kuhl, Department 12] 16 Plaintiffs, DECLARATION OF DAVID M. deRUBERTIS 17 IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINAL v. APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 18 SETTLEMENT AND MOTION FOR COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 19 entity; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, COSTS

20 Defendants. Date: February 13, 2020 Time: 10:00 a.m. 21 Dept.: 12

22 Complaint filed: November 24, 2015 Trial: NONE 23 24

27 28 1 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 DECLARATION OF DAVID M. deRUBERTIS, ESQ.:

2 I, David M. deRubertis, Esq., hereby declare as follows: 3 1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before all Courts of the State of 4 California and am the principal in the deRubertis Law Firm, APC and was one of the co-lead 5 attorneys for the Plaintiffs in this action. If called upon to testify, I could and would competently 6 attest to the following, which is submitted of my own personal knowledge. 7 8 2. This Declaration is submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of

9 the proposed class action settlement and/or motion for approval of attorney’s fees and costs.

10 3. I am the principal in the deRubertis Law Firm, APC, an employment and trial 11 boutique firm, where I concentrate on handling and trying employment matters on behalf of 12 employees throughout California. 13

14 15 I. BACKGROUND, TRAINING, QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE: 16 4. While I have been a member of the Bar since the year 2000, my experience in this

17 field is much deeper and broader than my admission date reflects. When I was sixteen (16) years

18 old, I began working in the office of McCulloch & deMontesquiou, a plaintiff’s consumer attorney 19 firm then-based in Encino, California. I worked continuously at McCulloch & deMontesquiou 20 from approximately July of 1990 through June of 1997, when the firm dissolved. During that time 21 period, I became intricately involved in all aspects of the firm’s practice, ranging from drafting 22 23 appellate briefs to “second-chairing” all trials with one of the firm’s partners, Paul A. 24 deMontesquiou. The trial work consisted of attending court and assisting Mr. deMontesquiou

25 while sitting at counsel’s table, helping prepare witnesses and conducting mock witness 26 examinations of them, participating in strategy sessions relating to theory or themes of the case, 27 briefing evidentiary issues and in limine motions and all other aspects of trial work. I participated 28 2 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 in my first full-length trial (i.e., attending every day of trial with Mr. deMontesquiou and assisting

2 him at counsel table) of approximately six (6) to eight (8) weeks long in the summer of 1993, when 3 I was nineteen (19) years old during my college first year summer. Over the next four (4) years, I 4 participated in approximately ten (10) completed jury trials with Mr. deMontesquiou, which 5 included verdicts of $5,300,000.00 in a wrongful death case and $800,000.00 in a medical 6 malpractice case. In these cases, I essentially sat “second-chair” with Mr. deMontesquiou at 7 8 counsel table, performing all functions that a “second-chair” would perform other than making

9 formal arguments to the Court or handling witnesses inside of the courtroom.

10 5. While I received offers of admission to many of the country’s finest law schools 11 (e.g., Columbia, Boalt Hall/U.C. Berkley, N.Y.U, U.C.L.A., U.S.C., etc.), I chose to attend Loyola 12 Law School in Los Angeles because of its practical focus on training trial lawyers and because I 13 received a full scholarship upon admission. I graduated summa cum laude and Order of the Coif 14 15 from Loyola Law School in 2000 with a cumulative grade point average of 92.05 (class rank of 2 16 of 297). I was the recipient of the Dean’s Scholarship and received awards for the highest grade in

17 twelve (12) different classes. I was a member of Loyola’s prestigious Byrne Trial Advocacy

18 Team, which is consistently considered one of the nation’s top law school mock trial advocacy 19 teams by the U.S News & World Report’s Annual Ranking, and on the Byrne Team I won a 20 national mock trial competition (Georgetown University Law Center 2nd Annual National White 21 Collar Crime Mock Trial Invitational, November 1998). I also received the highest ranking in the 22 23 1998 Loyola Law School Intramural Trial Advocacy Competition, the award for winning the 24 annual Byrne Trial Advocacy Competition, and the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA)

25 award for Excellence in the Preparation for Trial Law Award. Following graduation from law 26 school, I also served as an assistant coach for the Byrne Trial Advocacy Team, where I instructed 27 students on trial skills. In terms of appellate advocacy, I was a finalist in Scott Moot Court 28 3 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 Competition, which is a mock appellate argument tournament. Also while in law school, I had a

2 year-long externship as a Certified Law Clerk at the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, where 3 I personally conducted approximately eighty (80) criminal preliminary hearings and approximately 4 twenty (20) juvenile criminal bench trials (juvenile adjudications) also as a certified law student. 5 6. Immediately after passing the bar, I opened my own law practice in November of 6 2000 handling a variety of plaintiff’s contingency matters. Since then I have conducted 7 8 approximately twenty-seven (27) trials in both state and federal courts (approximately twenty-one

9 [21] jury and six [6] bench trials), as well as two [2] binding arbitrations. I have a statewide

10 practice, having tried cases from as far South as San Diego County to as far North as Sacramento 11 and Yolo Counties, as well as multiple counties in between. 12 7. I have obtained multiple multi-million dollar employment jury verdicts – including 13 obtaining as lead counsel record-setting employment verdicts. For example, in 2014, as lead trial 14 15 counsel in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, I obtained a 16 $6,000,000 Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation jury verdict plus a finding of malice, fraud or oppression (at

17 which point the matter resolved confidentially before the jury determined the amount of punitive

18 damages). Even before punitive damages, this was at the time the largest Sarbanes-Oxley 19 retaliation verdict in history in the entire country and it remains today the largest compensatory 20 damage jury verdict in the history of the Sarbanes-Oxley law. In 2017, I obtained as lead trial 21 counsel what is believed to be the largest associational disability discrimination jury verdict in 22 23 California to date under the FEHA in a trial in San Diego. Back in 2004, as co-counsel I helped 24 obtain $19,000,000 in a single plaintiff disability discrimination case. This was the largest

25 employment verdict in the nation in 2004 and was at the time believed to be the largest single 26 plaintiff disability discrimination/California Family Rights Act verdict in California history at the 27 time. I have also been lead trial counsel in numerous employment-related jury trials that have 28 4 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 resulted in numerous seven- and six-figure jury verdicts, and have settled many multi-million

2 dollar employment cases confidentially (i.e., $8,500,000; $6,250,000 on a termination case with 3 only five hundred thousand dollars [$500,000] in economic damage; $5,25,000; $4,500,000 in a 4 termination case with zero economic damages; $4,200,000; $3,850,000; $3,425,000; etc.). I have 5 also settled an employment discrimination class action for fifteen million dollars ($15,000,000), as 6 well as many multi-million-dollar wage and hour class action matters. 7 8 8. A substantial portion of my practice consists of being asked to step in to try

9 employment cases for or with other attorneys, often after discovery is done and on the “eve of

10 trial.” In the last five (5) years, somewhere between fifty to seventy-five percent (50-75%) of my 11 practice has consisted of stepping into employment cases for other attorneys to either try the case 12 or complete the work-up and try it. Often, these are last minute “eve of trial” requests and often I 13 am asked to step in as lead trial counsel by attorneys who themselves are very experienced 14 15 employment or trial attorneys. 16 9. A smaller portion of my practice includes handling complex or cutting-edge

17 employment law appeals, usually at the California Supreme Court level (either on behalf of the

18 employee or amicus curiae on behalf of the employee or consumer). My experience in handling 19 employment cases before the California Supreme Court is set forth in paragraph 13 below. In 20 addition to my California Supreme Court practice, I have also handled approximately seventeen 21 (17) or more appeals as lead counsel (most of which were employment-related cases) in both the 22 23 California appellate courts and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 24 10. I have received numerous professional recognitions and honors, including:

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1 ● Charles B. O’Reilly Memorial “Trial Lawyer of the Year” for Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles (CAALA) (2014): In October 2014, I was voted “Trial 2 Lawyer of the Year” by the Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles (CAALA), which was formally awarded in January 2015. Every year, only one of 3 CAALA’s nearly three thousand members receives this award. I have been one of only four (4) employment lawyers out of the forty-seven (47) individuals who have 4 received this honor since 1972. In addition to receiving the Trial Lawyer of the Year honor in 2014, in 2009, I was a CAALA Trial Lawyer of the Year nominee for 5 my trial-work on employment cases.

6 ● “California Lawyer Attorney of the Year” (“CLAY Award”): In March 2014, I was honored as a California Lawyer magazine “Attorney of the Year” – i.e., a “CLAY 7 Award” recipient – for my work in the employment law field and particularly the case of Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203. 8 ● Best Lawyers in America - “Lawyer of the Year Employment Law - Individuals” 9 (2014 & 2018): In both 2014 and 2018, I was honored as Best Lawyers’ “Lawyer of the Year - Employment Law - Individuals” for the Los Angeles area. Only one 10 attorney from each practice area in each region receives this honor annually.

11 ● “Joe Posner Award” from the California Employment Lawyers Association (CELA): In 2011, I was the recipient of the California Employment Lawyers’ 12 Association’s (CELA) “Joe Posner Award.” CELA is a statewide organization of over one thousand employee rights lawyers – the largest statewide organization of 13 employee rights attorneys in the Country. The “Posner Award” is CELA’s highest recognition and it is given to an individual for a career of work dedicated to 14 advancing employee rights. To date, I remain the youngest-ever recipient of this honor (37 years-old). 15 ● Daily Journal’s Top 10 Plaintiff-Side Employment Lawyer & Top Labor and 16 Employment Lawyer (2009-2019): In both 2009 and 2010, I was honored as one of the Top 10 Plaintiff-Side Employment Lawyers in California by Los Angeles & San 17 Francisco Daily Journals. In 2011, the Daily Journal re-styled this honor as “Top Labor & Employment Lawyers.” In 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 18 2018 and 2019, I was given this recognition. I am the only plaintiff-side employment lawyer in California to have been recognized by the Daily Journal in its 19 top employment lawyers lists every year since the inception of this recognition in 2009. 20 ● Daily Journal’s “Top Plaintiffs’ Verdicts by Impact”: In both 2014 and 2016, the 21 Los Angeles & San Francisco Daily Journals recognized jury verdicts I obtained as lead counsel as being among the “Top Plaintiffs’ Verdicts by Impact” for those 22 years. In 2014, I received this honor for my successful federal jury trial in the case of Zulfer v. Playboy Enterprises. In 2016, I received this honor for my successful 23 state court jury trial in the case of Hernandez v. Pacific Bell/AT&T.

24 ● Top 100 Southern California Super Lawyer: From 2011-2020, I have been honored as a “Top 100 Southern California Super Lawyer” by Los Angeles Magazine and 25 Law & Politics, through the vote of my peers. In addition being recognized as a “Top 100 Southern California Super Lawyer” from 2011-2020, in 2010, I was 26 recognized as a Super Lawyer in Employment Litigation. And, from 2005 through 2009, I was recognized as a Rising Star Super Lawyer by Los Angeles Magazine 27 and Law & Politics – a distinction given to 2.5% of Southern California lawyers who are either under forty (40) years of age or have been in practice for less than ten 28 (10) years. 6 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 ● American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA) Member: In 2012, at thirty-eight (38) years-old, I was inducted into the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA) at 2 the rank of Associate.

4 ● Best Lawyers in America - Employment Law - Individuals: In addition to my “Lawyer of the Year” recognition discussed above in 2014 and 2016, from 2012 5 through 2020, I have been recognized in Best Lawyers in America under the practice area of Employment Law - Individuals. 6 ● Best Law Firms in America - Employment Law- Individuals (“Tier 1”): From 2013 7 through 2019, my law firm (The deRubertis Law Firm, APC) has been recognized in Best Lawyers in America under the practice area of “Employment Law – 8 Individuals” and “Litigation - Labor & Employment.” My firm has received a Tier 1 listing. 9 ● “Street Fighter of Year” Finalist for Consumer Attorneys Association of California 10 (CAOC): In both 2014 and 2015, I was Finalist for CAOC’s “Street Fighter of the Year” award. This award is for smaller firm practitioners (five attorneys or less) 11 that achieved a significant result in a case that exemplifies the everyday struggles of the small firm practitioner. In 2014, I was a Finalist for my work in the Zulfer v. 12 Playboy Enterprises matter discussed above. In 2015, I was a Finalist for my pro bono representation of former firefighter Wynn Williams in the Supreme Court case 13 of Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97 discussed below. 14 ● “Top 100 California Trial Lawyer”: From 2008 to the present, I have been 15 recognized as a “Top 100 Trial Lawyer” in California by The National Trial Lawyers (formerly, The ATLA), an organization that offers membership to those it 16 deems the Top 100 trial lawyers in each state. (www.thenationaltriallawvers.org.).

17 ● “Top 40 Under 40 Trial Lawyer”: In 2012 and 2013, I was honored by The National Trial Lawyers (formerly, The ATLA) as one of the Top 40 Trial Lawyers 18 Under 40.

19 ● “Fellow - Litigation Counsel of America”: In 2014, I was invited to join the “Litigation Counsel of America” (LCA) as a “Fellow.” The LCA is an invitation- 20 only trial lawyer honorary society whose membership is limited to 3,500 Fellows nationwide and includes members from both sides of the bar (plaintiff and defense). 21 ● AV Preeminent Rating by Martindale Hubbell: I have achieved a preeminent AV 22 rating by Martindale Hubbell. This AV rating reflects lawyers who have achieved the highest possible peer review rating in both legal abilities and professional ethics. 23 ● Corporate International Global Award for Attorney’s Fees Law Firm of the Year - 24 California: In 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 Corporate International Magazine recognized my firm as its “Attorney’s Fees Law Firm of the Year in 25 California.”

26 11. Attorney Organization Leadership Positions: I am also an active member of various

27 professional organizations. For example, for approximately five (5) years, I was a member of the 28 Board of Governors of the Consumer Attorneys of 7California (CAOC), which is the largest DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 statewide trial attorney organization in the nation. For the last approximately six (6) years, I have

2 been a member of the Board of Governors of the Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles 3 (CAALA), which is the largest local trial lawyer organization in the nation. As part of my role on 4 CAALA’s Board, I served as a Co-Chair for CAALA’s Annual Convention in Las Vegas in both 5 2016 and 2017. From 2007 to the end of 2019, I served as a member of the Executive Board of the 6 California Employment Lawyers Association (CELA), which is the largest statewide organization 7 8 of employee rights advocates. As part of my involvement in CELA, for many years, I was the

9 Chair of CELA’s committee that periodically reviews and makes recommendations to the Judicial

10 Council concerning the CACI instructions. In that capacity, twice a year I personally drafted 11 CELA’s comments to the Judicial Council concerning possible changes to the standard, CACI jury 12 instructions. I have also been a frequent participant in CELA’s Amicus activities to the California 13 Supreme Court, including drafting Amicus briefs and letters seeking publication, de-publication or 14 15 supporting review, to the Supreme Court. I have also been a member of CAOC’s Amicus 16 Committee, and regularly drafted amicus briefs on CAOC’s behalf – particularly in cases pending

17 before the California Supreme Court. I was also a founding Director and currently an Emeritus

18 Board of Directors member of the Los Angeles Trial Lawyers Charities, a non-profit corporation 19 with a mission of making a positive difference in the lives of people in the greater Los Angeles 20 community through fund raising, donations, and financial support to those in need. I am also one 21 of the four members of the Executive Committee of the National Trial Lawyers’ Business Tort 22 23 Trial Lawyers Association. Finally, from 2005 through 2008, I served as a Member of the 24 Executive Committee of the Labor and Employment Law Section of the California State Bar.

25 12. Editorial or Authorship Positions: Demonstrating my expertise in substantive 26 employment law in general, and disability discrimination cases in particular, I served for many 27 years as a Contributing Editor to the chapter on “Disability Discrimination” found within the Rutter 28 8 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 Group’s California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation. This is probably the most frequently

2 used employment law treatise regarding California’s employment law. I was also a member of the 3 Editorial Advisory Board of the “California Sexual Harassment” treatise (authored by Nancy 4 Bornn, Esq. and published through James Publishing) and the Editorial Board of The Forum, the 5 monthly publication for the Consumer Attorneys of California. 6 13. Extensive Supreme Court Employment Law Experience and Other Published 7 8 Employment Law Decisions: Some of my cases have or will lead to important developments in the

9 law. In fact, given my recognition by my peers as a leader in employee rights law in California, I

10 am frequently asked to serve as lead appellate counsel in the California Supreme Court on 11 important employment law matters pending before the Court. Since 2008, I have been involved on 12 the merits in five (5) separate cases pending before the California Supreme Court – four of which I 13 have served as lead appellate counsel including presenting oral argument to the Court: 14 15 ● First, I was retained to serve as sole appellate attorney and lead counsel at the Supreme 16 Court level in the case of Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central (2008) 43 Cal.4th 201, which was the

17 first case to reach the Court under California’s family and medical leave law (the California Family

18 Rights Act, which is California’s version of the Family Medical Leave Act [FMLA]). I personally 19 briefed and argued the Lonicki case at the Supreme Court. This decision, which reversed the grant 20 of summary judgment against Ms. Lonicki (previously affirmed on appeal by the Third District), 21 established that an employee can be eligible for statutory medical leave from one job despite an 22 23 ability to work at another similar job. 24 ● Second, I was also the lead attorney at the Supreme Court level in the case of Roby v.

25 McKesson HBOC (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, a landmark employment disability discrimination and 26 harassment, as well as punitive damages case. I personally drafted all briefs in the Roby case (with 27 assistance from co-counsel) and I personally argued the Roby case at oral argument to the Supreme 28 9 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 Court.

2 ● Third, I was also asked to step in at the Supreme Court stage to serve as lead appellate 3 counsel in the case of Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, which addressed the 4 causal nexus standard required in FEHA cases, the availability of a “mixed-motive” defense to 5 FEHA claims and the impact of such a defense if proven. I was lead counsel in Harris at the 6 California Supreme Court from the petition to review until the conclusion of the case at the 7 8 Supreme Court, and I personally drafted all briefs in the case (with assistance from co-counsel) and

9 I personally conducted oral argument to the Court on behalf of Ms. Harris.

10 ● Fourth, I was part of a team of attorneys involved at the Supreme Court level in the case 11 of Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 48 Cal.4th 665, which addressed the 12 scope of judicial review of a contractual arbitration award arising out of an underlying employment 13 case. 14 15 ● Fifth, I was lead counsel at the Supreme Court on a pro bono basis in the case of Williams 16 v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, which held that a prevailing

17 defendant in a FEHA case must prove that the action was frivolous in order to recover ordinary

18 costs against a FEHA plaintiff. 19 Finally, I also served as one of the lead authors on an Amicus brief to the California Supreme Court 20 filed on behalf of the California Employment Lawyers Association (CELA) in the case of Johnson 21 v. Ford (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191, a seminal punitive damages decision. I was also the lead author of 22 23 amicus briefs that were filed in the California Supreme Court on behalf of Consumer Attorneys of 24 California (CAOC) in the cases of Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474 and

25 Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909. 26 14. Apart from my Supreme Court employment law practice, I have had other important 27 published appellate decisions. For example, in this case – that is, Soria v. Univision Radio Los 28 10 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.4th 570 – I obtained a favorable published decision interpreting the

2 FEHA’s disability provisions quite expansively in favor of broad coverage and employee 3 protection. Among other things, Soria established, inter alia, that: (a) abnormal cell growth can 4 constitute a disability under the FEHA even in the context of a benign or non-cancerous growth 5 and (b) needing to attend doctor’s appointments for preventative or diagnostic care relating to a 6 potential disability can itself constitute a limitation on the ability to work thereby establishing a 7 8 disability under the FEHA. I also obtained a favorable published decision as lead counsel from the

9 Ninth Circuit in Leyva v. Medline Industries, Inc. (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510. Leyva was the first

10 published, substantive federal appellate court decision interpreting the United States Supreme 11 Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1426. The employment and class 12 action defense bar had tried to trumpet Comcast as precluding class certification in cases where 13 individual damage inquiries may be needed. Leyva dispelled that interpretation and re-affirmed 14 15 that the need to calculate individual class member damages does not preclude certification where 16 liability can be established by common proof. Another appellate case of mine, Butler v. The Vons

17 Companies, Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 943, led to a published decision clarifying the law

18 concerning a unionized employee’s purported waiver of rights under the Fair Employment & 19 Housing Act by signing a union grievance settlement agreement. 20 15. Recognized Expertise in Employment Law: My expertise in employment law issues 21 – including specifically disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation matters – is also 22 23 reflected by the fact that I was asked to serve (and did serve) on an Advisory Working Group to the 24 California Fair Employment and Housing Commission as that body endeavored to draft new

25 Regulations for the California Code of Regulations interpreting the Fair Employment and Housing 26 Act’s disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation provisions. I have also appeared 27 before the California Law Review Commission representing CELA to offer insight and expert 28 11 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 guidance on issues affecting employment-related contractual arbitration. Finally, I have testified to

2 both the California Assembly Judicial Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee regarding 3 pending employment-related legislation. 4 16. Continuing Education Speeches: I am a very active member of the continuing legal 5 education community and have been asked on a regular basis to speak or make presentations on 6 continuing legal education panels. In more recent years, I have been primarily asked to speak on 7 8 regarding trial techniques including particularly trying employment cases. I have also historically

9 been frequently asked to speak on the topics of disability discrimination/reasonable

10 accommodation as well as medical leave cases. In addition to my personally speaking at CLE 11 presentations, I am regularly involved in planning continuing legal education seminars for legal 12 organizations, including, for example, serving as a Co-Chair of CAALA’s annual Las Vegas 13 Convention in both 2016 and 2017 and playing a significant planning role for CELA’s Trial 14 15 College and CELA seminars relating to trying employment cases and handling disability 16 discrimination cases. In terms of my personal participation in CLE presentations, since I began

17 giving CLE speeches back in 2002, I have consistently done so on an average of almost once every

18 other month at both nationwide and statewide conferences, including the following: 19  “Whistleblower Retaliation,” Rutter Group Spring Program (March 2020 – committed); 20  “AB 5, Dynamex and the Misclassification of Independent Contractors,” Consumer Attorneys 21 Association of Los Angeles 2020 New Laws Seminar (January 2020 - committed); 22  “Maximizing Value of Employment Cases,” Westside Bar Association (August 2019); 23  “Ask the Experts Panel,” Employment Law Forum by Los Angeles & San Francisco Daily 24 Journal Professional Education (July 2019);

25  “Trial, Technology & the Law: Showcasing Electronic Evidence at Trial & Trial Technology 26 Presentations,” Los Angeles County Bar Association Labor & Employment Law Section Saturday Morning Seminar Series (June 2019); 27  “Harassment and Retaliation in the #MeToo Era,” California Judges Association/The Rutter 28 Group Employment Litigation 2019 (February12 2019); DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1  “Arguing and Proving Emotional Harm or Distress in Harassment Cases,” Consumer Attorneys 2 Association of Los Angeles Annual Convention (September 2018); 3

4  “Masters in Trial: Character Evidence in Today’s #MeToo World,” American Board of Trial 5 Advocates (ABOTA, Los Angeles Chapter) (June 2018);

6  “Plaintiff’s Trial Academy - Pre-Trial Practice,” [multi-night lecture] Consumer Attorneys 7 Association of Los Angeles’ Annual Plaintiff’s Trial Academy (May 2018);

8  “Employment Law Panel,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annual Convention (September 2017) [panel moderator]; 9  “Evidence Panel,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annual Convention 10 (September 2017) [panel moderator]; 11  “Professional Negligence Panel,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annual 12 Convention (September 2017) [panel moderator];

13  “Employee Mobility,” Employment Law Forum by Los Angeles & San Francisco Daily 14 Journal Professional Education (July 2017);

15  “Masters in Trial: A Trial Demonstration from Opening Statement through Closing Arguments,” American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA, Los Angeles Chapter) (June 2017) 16 (delivered mock opening statement and closing argument);

17  “Plaintiff’s Trial Academy - Pre-Trial Practice,” [multi-night lecture] Consumer Attorneys 18 Association of Los Angeles’ Annual Plaintiff’s Trial Academy (April-May 2017);

19  “Trial Skills in Employment Cases,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annual Convention (September 2016) [panel moderator]; 20  “Voir Dire,” [panel moderator] Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annual 21 Convention (September 2016) [panel moderator]; 22  “Third Party Cases,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annual Convention 23 (September 2016) [panel moderator];

24  “Delivering Dynamic Opening & Closing Statements,” [mock opening statement] National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) Annual Conference (June 2016); 25  “CELA Trial College - Proving Punitive Damages,” California Employment Lawyers 26 Association First Annual Trial College (June 2016); 27  “Plaintiff’s Trial Academy - Opening Statements,” [mock opening statement and multi-night 28 lecture] Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles’ Annual Plaintiff’s Trial Academy 13 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 (May 2016);

2  “The Art of Trying an Employment Case,” California Judges Association/The Rutter Group Employment Litigation 2016 (February 2016); 3

5  “Masters in Trial: A Trial Demonstration from Opening Statements through Jury Deliberations,” American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA, Central Coast Chapter) (October 6 2015) (delivered mock witness examination);

7  “Deposition Skills Workshop - Deposition Taking Trainer,” California Employment Lawyers Association Skills Seminar (October 2015); 8

9  “Advanced Trial Skills: Opening – The Art of Storytelling,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annuel Convention (September 2015); 10  “CELA Annual Trial College - Mock Closing Argument Presentation,” California Employment 11 Lawyers Association 2nd Annual Trial College (June 2015);

12  “CELA Annual Trial College - Trainer,” California Employment Lawyers Association 2nd 13 Annual Trial College (June 2015);

14  “The 411 on 998s,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Webinar (May 2015);

15  “Plaintiff’s Trial Academy - Pre-Trial Practice,” [multi-night lecture] Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles’ Annual Plaintiff’s Trial Academy (April 2015); 16  “Trial Skills for the New Attorney - Written Discovery,” Consumer Attorneys Association of 17 Los Angeles 17th Annual Trial Lawyer Skills for the New Attorney (March 2015); 18  “The Wonder Years: Keys to Success as new Lawyer,” Iranian American Lawyers Association 19 (January 2015);

20  “Federal Court Practice: Has Your State Law Complaint Been Removed to Federal Court? Now What?,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Webinar (November 2014); 21

22  “Reviewing the California Supreme Court’s Most Active Year Yet for Wage and Hour Decisions,” Consumer Attorneys Association of California Annual Conference (November 23 2014);

24  “A Primer for Bigger Verdicts – Mock Closing Argument Demonstration,” California Employment Lawyers Association Annual Conference (October 2014); 25 “Establishing Discrimination Through Circumstantial Proof,” Consumer Attorneys Association 26  of Los Angeles Annual Convention (September 2014); 27  “CELA Annual Trial College - Mock Opening Statement Presentation,” California 28 Employment Lawyers Association 1st Annual Trial College (June 2014); 14 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1  “CELA Annual Trial College - Trainer,” California Employment Lawyers Association 1st 2 Annual Trial College (June 2014);

3  “Voir Dire in an Employment Case,” [mock voir dire] Los Angeles County Bar Association 4 Labor & Employment Law Section Saturday Morning Seminar Series (April 2014);

5  “Damages Seminar: Punitive Damages,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Damages Seminar (April 2014); 6  “Harris v. City of Santa Monica,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annual 7 Convention (September 2013);

8  “Putting it All Together: Trying the Employment Case,” Orange County Bar Association Labor 9 & Employment Law Annual Seminar (May 2013);

10  “Harris v. City of Santa Monica,” Los Angeles County Bar Association Labor & Employment Law Section Dinner Program (March 2013); 11  “Harris v. City of Santa Monica,” California Employment Lawyers Association Webinar 12 (March 2013); 13  “Employment Law Watch List: Harris v. City of Santa Monica,” State Bar of California Labor 14 & Employment Law Section (March 2013);

15  “Conducting Focus Groups and Mock Trials,” [conducted live focus group/mock trial presentation] California Employment Lawyers Association Full Day Seminar (October 2012); 16 17  “Employment Law Roundtable: Plaintiff, Defense and Judicial Perspectives,” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles Annual Convention (September 2012); 18  “Beyond Brinker: Give Me a Break!!! Meal Breaks, Rest Breaks, The Rolling Five and the 19 Future of Wage and Hour Class Action Litigation,” Beverly Hills Bar Association Labor & Employment Law Section (May 2012); 20  “Visualizing Your Evidence,” National Employment Lawyers Association Annual Conference 21 (June 2012); 22  “Co-Counseling Roundtable,” California Employment Lawyers Association Practice 23 Management Committee Seminar (January 2012);

24  “California Employment Law Update 2011: Update on Key Wage and Hour Developments Update,” Practicing Law Institute California Employment Law Update (November 2011); 25 26  “Discrimination/Harassment Track: Trying Discrimination and Harassment Cases,” California Employment Lawyers Association Annual Conference (October 2011); 27  “Using Personal Injury Themes in Employment Cases,” California Employment Lawyers 28 Association Annual Conference (October 2011); 15 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1  “Employment Law Roundtable: Plaintiff, Defense and Judicial Perspectives,” Consumer 2 Attorneys of Los Angeles Annual Convention (September 2011);

3  “Recent Developments in Disability Discrimination Law in California,” State Bar of California 4 Labor & Employment Law Section (June 2011);

5  “Trial Lawyers in Action: A Practical Workshop” [delivered mock closing argument], Consumer Attorneys of Los Angeles, (May 2011); 6  “Visualizing Your Evidence,” National Employment Lawyers Association Spring Trial 7 Advocacy Conference, (March 2011);

8  “Trial Advocacy for the Plaintiff’s Employment Lawyer, Practical Skills Group Leader,” 9 National Employment Lawyers Association Spring Trial Advocacy Conference, (March 2011);

10  “Employee Accommodations: Are Social Changes Redefining the Workplace,” Los Angeles County Bar Association Labor & Employment Law Section Annual Symposium (March 2011); 11  “Disability, Work Comp and Leave Cross Over Issues,” Beverly Hills Bar Association Labor & 12 Employment Law Section, February 2010; 13  “Trial Practice Seminar: Mock Trial of Employment Case,” [conducted live mock trial 14 demonstration] California Employment Lawyers Association, October 2009;

15  “Disability, Medical Condition and Family Leave Cases,” Consumer Attorneys of Los Angeles Annual Convention, September 2009; 16  “Mock Trial of Employment Case,” [conducted live mock trial demonstration] Los Angeles 17 County Bar Association Labor & Employment Law Section, June 2009; 18  “California Employment Law Update,” June 2009, National Employment Lawyers Association. 19  “Using Worker’s Compensation to Help Get the Case Settled?,” Southern California Mediation 20 Association, Annual Employment Mediation Conference, May 2009;

21  “Trial in a Disability Discrimination Case,” Disability Discrimination Series, State Bar of 22 California Labor & Employment Law Section, December 2008;“Disability Discrimination: How is Green Shaking out in Practice?,” State Bar of California Labor & Employment Law 23 Section Annual Conference, October 2008;

24  “Trial Case Study: Ismen v. Beverly Hospital,” Orange County Employment Lawyers Dinner Program, September, 2008; 25  “Discovery in a Disability Discrimination Case,” Disability Discrimination Series, State Bar of 26 California Labor & Employment Law Section, June 2008; 27  “Employment Law for the Personal Injury Practitioner: How to Spot Employment Cases in 28 Your PI Intakes: Disability Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodations,” 4th Annual 16 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 California Regional Trial Lawyers Conference, June 2008;

2  “Can Worker’s Compensation Help Get the Case Settled?,” Southern California Mediation Association, Annual Employment Mediation Conference, May 2008; 3

4  “Dysfunctional Employee Behavior: When Is It a Medical Condition that Needs to be Accommodated and at What Time Is It a Threat to Others,” Orange County Bar Association 5 Labor and Employment Section, March 2008;

6  “The Trial Cometh,” Disability Discrimination Practical Seminar, California Employment Lawyers Association September 2007; 7  “Discovery Gold,” Disability Discrimination Practical Seminar, California Employment 8 Lawyers Association September 2007; 9  “Framing the Case,” Disability Discrimination Practical Seminar, California Employment 10 Lawyers Association September 2007;

11  “Employment Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation Law Regarding Industrially- Injured Workers: Cross-Over Issues Between Reasonable accommodation and Worker’s 12 Compensation,” Consumer Attorneys of Los Angeles Annual Convention, September 2007; 13  “Successful Trial Techniques and Strategies in Employment Law Trials: A Mock Trial 14 Demonstration of a Disability Discrimination Trial,” Los Angeles County Bar Association Labor & Employment Law Section, June 2007; 15  “Mastering the Courtroom: Strategies and Practical Advice for Employment Law Trials,” State 16 Bar of California Labor & Employment Law Section Annual Public Sector Conference, April 17 2007;

18  “Nuts and Bolts of Litigating an Employment Case from Intake to Settlement: Opposing Motions for Summary Judgment.” Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles, February 19 2007;

20  “Verdict for Plaintiff: Trials and Tribulations of Employment Litigation: How to Win the Unwinnable Case,” Consumer Attorneys of California College of Trial Arts, November 2006; 21

22  “Trial Victories: Tips from the Trenches,” California Employment Lawyers Association Annual Convention, September 2006; 23  “A Comparison of the California and Federal Disability Discrimination Law,” National 24 Employment Lawyers’ Association Annual Convention, June 2006;

25  “Handling Disability Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation Cases,” Los Angeles 26 County Bar Association, November of 2005;

27  “Employment Law for the General Practitioner: Representing the Injured Worker,” State Bar of California Labor & Employment Law Section, November of 2005; 28 17 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1  “Navigating the Leave of Absence Quagmire: Advanced Topics in Leaves of Absence,” State Bar of California Labor & Employment Law Section Annual Conference, October 2005; 2  “Trial Technology in the 21st Century,” California Employment Lawyers Association, 3 September 2005; 4  “Maximizing Value of Your Disability Discrimination/Reasonable Accommodation Case,” 5 Reg. Trial Lawyers Association Annual Conference, June 2005;

6  “Employment Law 101: Discovery,” California Employment Lawyers Association, April 2005;

7  “Annual Update on Employment Law,” State Bar Labor & Employment Law Section Annual 8 Public Employee Conference, April 2005;

9  “How Not to Disable Your Disability Discrimination/Reasonable Accommodations Case,” Consumer Attorneys Association of California Trial College of Arts Annual Tahoe Convention, 10 March 2005; 11  “The California Labor Code and Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004,” the 12 Southern California Employment Roundtable, November 2004;

13  “Trial Victories,” California Employment Lawyers Association 17th Annual Convention, October 2004; 14  “Unique Elements of Public Sector Cases,” California Employment Lawyers Association 15 Public Sector Conference, October 2004; 16  “Punitive Damages in California: Maximizing Success or Minimizing Exposure,” Continuing 17 Education of the Bar, July 2004;

18  “The California Labor Code and Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004,” Los Angeles County Bar Association Labor & Employment Law Section, June 2004; 19

20  “Annual Update on Employment Law,” Los Angeles County Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Section, February 2004; 21  “Crossover Issues in Employment Law and Worker’s Compensation,” California Applicant’s 22 Association Annual Convention, January 2004;

23  “Navigating the Disability Case Quagmire: Handling Disability and Family/Medical Leave Cases,” California Employment Lawyers Association’s 16th Annual Convention, October 24 2003; 25  “Representing Public Employees in Employment Lawsuits,” Consumer Attorney’s Association 26 of Los Angeles’ 21st Annual Convention, September 2003;

27  “Innovative Tools for the Use in Employment Litigation: Business & Professions Code Section 17200, et seq. and the Investigative Consumer Credit Reporting Act,” Presented to the Beverly 28 Hills Bar Association Labor & Employment Section18 in March of 2003; DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1  “Litigating Employment Cases Where and How You Want: Responding to Employment 2 Defense Tactics on Arbitration, Removal and Preemption,” Consumer Attorney’s Association of Los Angeles’ 20th Annual Convention, August 2002. 3

4 17. Publications: In addition to these continuing legal education speeches, I frequently 5 publish articles in legal periodicals regarding employment law, evidence and trial strategies. I also

6 have published multiple articles on disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation

7 matters particularly. My eighteen (18) publications to date include: 8  “Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District: Employee’s Perspective,” by Norm Pine 9 & David M. deRubertis, California Labor & Employment Law Review (Official Publication fo the State Bar of California Labor and Employment Law Section), Vol. 29, No. 4 (July 2015); 10  “Protecting Whistleblowers: Sarbanes-Oxley’s ‘Protected Activity’ Requirement,” The 11 Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Association for Southern California) (June 2014);

12  “Harris v. City of Santa Monica: A New Standard in California,” The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Association for Southern California) (April 2013); 13  “Common Pitfalls or Mistakes Made in the Working-Up Employment Cases for Trial,” The 14 Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (April 2012);

15  “Telling Your Employment Story with Thematic Visual Images,” The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (April 2011); 16  “Admissibility of Statements Reflecting Unlawful Animus: Overcoming ‘Stray Remarks’ and 17 Hearsay Objections,” The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (October 2010); 18  “Employment Disability And the Interactive Process: Is Proof an Effective Accommodation 19 Required to Establish a Prima Facie Interactive Process Violation,” The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (April 2010); 20  “Protecting Your Sexual Harassment Plaintiff from the Jury’s Sometimes Harsh Judgment,” 21 The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (May 2009); 22  “Reasonable Accommodation and Disability Discrimination Cases: CACI Instructions Fall 23 Short,” by David M. deRubertis, The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (May 2008); 24  “Mitigation of Wage Loss Damages: Know the Rules and Hold the Defendant to Them,” by 25 David M. deRubertis, The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (November 2007); 26  “Securing Punitive Damages in Employment Cases: The Requirement of Malicious Conduct by 27 an Officer, Director or Managing Agent,” by David M. deRubertis and Norman H. Pine The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (May 2007); 28  “Demonstrative Evidence in the Employment Trial:19 Keeping Your Story Simple,” by David M. DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 deRubertis, The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (March 2007); 2  “Reasonable Accommodation and Disability Discrimination Claims Arising Out of Industrial 3 Injuries,” David M. deRubertis, The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern California) (September 2006); 4  “Juror Bias in Employment Cases: Turning the Tort Reform-Minded Juror Into Your Ally in 5 Employment Trials,” David M. deRubertis, The Forum (June 2006);

6  “Miller & Yanowitz: The California Supreme Court strengthens California’s anti-retaliation protections,” The Advocate (Journal of Consumer Attorneys Associations for Southern 7 California) (November 2005);

8  “The ABCs of Disability Discrimination Claims,” Jill P. Telfer and David M. deRubertis, The Forum Vol. 34, No. 6, p. 27 (July/August 2004); 9  “The Limits of an Employer’s Prerogative to Invade the Privacy of Its Employees: The 10 Creation of the Employer/Employee Relationship Does Not Abrogate the Constitutionally Guaranteed Right to Privacy: Parts I & II.” The Advocate. Vol. 24, No. 9, p. 14 (Oct. 1997) and 11 Vol. 24, No. 10, p. 8 (Nov. 1997); and

12  “House Rules: The Admissibility Standards in Landlord Harassment Cases,” by Mark Steven Avila and David M. deRubertis, The Practitioner: Los Angeles Daily Journal. (Sept. 8, 1997). 13

14 II. INFORMATION REGARDING HOURLY RATES: 15 18. I have extensive knowledge of the prevailing hourly rates in the community for 16 17 work of similar nature and complexity to the work in this case. This knowledge includes 18 knowledge of the Southern California market generally and the Los Angeles market specifically.

19 My experience and knowledge in this regard comes from a variety of sources, including: (a) my 20 own work in fee applications in other matters; (b) my assistance to other attorneys in their fee 21 applications, including offering expert testimony regarding prevailing market rates (which expert 22 testimony has been relied on in numerous trial courts throughout California in setting appropriate 23 rates); (c) my familiarity with fee application orders in other cases; (d) my independent research 24 25 and knowledge of the prevailing market rates based on fee requests of other counsel and my 26 familiarity with rates charged in other law firms; and (e) my independent reading and research

27 regarding law firm billing rates. 28 20 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 19. While the overwhelming majority of my practice is contingency-based

2 representation, my current hourly rate – the rate I will charge if retained or consulted on an hourly 3 basis on an employment law matter – is nine hundred and fifty dollars ($950.00) per hour. Based 4 on my familiarity with prevailing market rates for work of similar complexity in the Southern 5 California market including specifically the Los Angeles market, I can attest that this hourly rate is 6 within the prevailing market rate for work of similar complexity performed by attorneys of similar 7 8 skill and experience in both the Southern California market generally and the Los Angeles market

9 specifically.

10 20. Even though I have received most of the professional honors and external 11 recognition (peer and otherwise) for an employment law trial attorney in California, my current 12 hourly rate of nine hundred and fifty dollars ($950.00) per hour is below the highest end of the 13 market rate for work of this nature in the Los Angeles market. Indeed, I am aware of fee orders in 14 15 single-plaintiff FEHA cases like this one from Los Angeles Superior Court judges that have

16 reached as high as one thousand and one hundred dollars ($1,100.00) per hour.1 For example, in 17 December 2017, the Honorable Victor E. Chavez of the Los Angeles Superior Court awarded 18 attorney Carney Shegerian fees at an hourly rate of one thousand and one hundred dollars 19 ($1,100.00) per hour for his work in the single-plaintiff FEHA matter of Moland v. McWane, Inc., 20 Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 559796. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “B” is a 21 22 true and correct copy of this fee order (having reviewed the briefing on this motion, I can confirm

23 that the fees described in this order as to Mr. Shegerian’s time were at the rate of one thousand and

24 one hundred dollars [$1,100.00] per hour). Likewise, in August 2018, attorney Carney Shegerian 25 26 1 Indeed, back in January 2014, the National Law Journal did an article entitled “NLJ Billing 27 Survey: $1,000 Per Hour Isn’t Rare Anymore,” the point of which was that “four-figure hourly rates for in-demand partners at the most prestigious firms don’t raise eyebrows – a few tope earners 28 are closing in on $2,000 an hour.” Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “A” is a true and correct copy of this article. 21 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 was again awarded an hourly rate of one thousand one hundred dollars ($1,100.00) per hour for his

2 representation of another single plaintiff in a FEHA action in the case of Pinter-Brown, M.D. v. 3 Regents of the University of California, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 624838, by the 4 Honorable Michael P. Linfield. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “C” is a true and correct 5 copy of this order. 6 21. Moreover, the reasonableness of my current rate is further confirmed by other fee 7 8 orders approving the same rate but years earlier (when rates were lower than they currently are).

9 For example, back in 2016, attorney C. Michael Alder was awarded fees in a FEHA action at the

10 hourly rate of nine hundred and fifty dollars ($950.00) per hour by the Honorable Ronald S.W. 11 Lew of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, in the case of Godinez 12 v. Alta-Dena Certified Dairy, LLC, United States District Court Central District of California Case 13 No. CV-15-01652 RSWL (SSx), another single-plaintiff FEHA action. Attached hereto and 14 15 marked as Exhibit “D” is a true and correct copy of this order. Likewise, also back in 2016, 16 attorney Victor George was awarded fees in a single-plaintiff FEHA action at the rate of nine

17 hundred and fifty dollars ($950.00) per hour in the case of Doreen Olson Mackey v. Helinet

18 Aviation, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 528671 by the Honorable Michael 19 Johnson. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “E” is a true and correct copy of this order. 20 22. I am also aware of the fact that partners of well-respected law firms that regularly 21 defend employment cases like this case charge hourly rates above the rates sought here. For 22 23 example, the Paul Hastings, LLP firm regularly defends individual and class action employment 24 matters like this case. In fact, I personally have litigated five (5) separate individual employment

25 matters defended by the Paul Hastings firm in the last few years. Through review of court records, 26 I located a Declaration filed by Paul Hastings attorney Elena R. Baca in support of a fee application 27 in the case of Charney v. Danziger, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 585664. Ms. Baca is 28 22 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 one of the leading partners in the Los Angeles Paul Hastings Office’s Employment Department and

2 she defended some of the above-mentioned cases I recently handled against the Paul Hastings firm 3 in recent years. In her Declaration, Ms. Baca declares that her “2019 standard hourly billable rate 4 is $1,200.00.” Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “F” is a true and correct copy of this 5 Declaration. Likewise, I located a Declaration filed by Paul Hastings the Los Angeles Office in 6 2018 by the Paul Hastings firm for its work in the defense of an employment-related lawsuit. The 7 8 supporting declaration in this fee application confirms that the following rates were charged as

9 “standard billing rates” in 2015 by Paul Hastings attorneys for defense of this employment-related

10 lawsuit: (1) Partner Dennis Ellis: one thousand fifty dollars ($1,050.00) per hour; (2) Partner Elena 11 Baca: nine hundred and seventy-five dollars ($975.00); (3) “Senior Associate” Nicholas Begakis 12 [2007 admission]: seven hundred and ninety-dollars ($790.00) per hour; and (4) “Junior Associate” 13 Scott Klausner [2013 admission]: five hundred and fifty dollars ($550.00) per hour. Attached 14 15 hereto and marked as Exhibit “G” is a true and correct copy of this Declaration of Dennis Ellis with 16 supporting exhibits from the case of Charney v. American Apparel, Inc., L.A.S.C. Case No. BC

17 581602. This Declaration confirms that the rates above “reflect Paul Hastings’ standard billing

18 rates, and are routinely accepted by the Firm’s clients.” 19 23. Likewise, I have personally reviewed records – including a declaration under oath 20 from attorney Eugene Scalia, a member of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher’s Labor & Employment 21 Practice Group – which confirms that, as of 2012 – that is, seven (7) years ago – Mr. Scalia 22 23 charged nine hundred and eighty dollars ($980.00) per hour as his “normal hourly rate.” Again, 24 this rate is dated – the declaration was from seven (7) years ago. The Gibson firm, including Mr.

25 Scalia specifically, defend individual employment litigation matters, including in Southern 26 California. I can state this based on firsthand knowledge because I recently handled two separate 27 individual employment cases being defended by the Gibson firm in California, and Mr. Scalia was 28 23 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 counsel in both of those cases.

2 24. I have also reviewed the National Law Journal Billing Survey for 2017, 2016 and 3 2014.2 The Survey is an annual survey of law firm billing rates. The data contained in this survey 4 on attorney fee rates confirms that first chair level partners at quality law firms which defend 5 6 employment cases regularly charge rates above and consistent with those sought here. The 7 following chart illustrates data found from the Survey for firms that regularly defend employment

8 cases such as this case. I am personally aware that each of the firms listed below defends

9 employment matters in California. Indeed, I have handled employment matters against many of 10 the firms listed below. In cases where the firm’s information is contained in the 2017 Survey, that 11 information is provided in the chart below. If the firm’s information was contained in the 2017 12 survey, then I use the data from either the 2016 survey (if included) and, if not, then the 2014 13 14 survey. If I used data from the 2016 survey, it is denoted with two ** after the “Firm Name.” If I 15 used information in the 2014 survey, it is denoted with one * after the firm’s name in the “Firm

16 Name” column). All of these surveys understate the actual rates because they are dated date at 17 least being two years-old and at most being five-years old given the consistent rise in rates from 18 2014 through 2017. 19 20 Firm Name Partner High Partner Associate Rate Average (If High Rate (If 21 Listed) Listed) Akin Gump, et al.** $1,325 $1,175 $690 22 23 Baker & McKenzie * $1,130 $755 $925 24 Bingham McCutchen * $1,080 $795 $605 25

26 27 2 I did not rely on the 2015 survey because, unlike the 2014, 2016 and 2017 surveys, the 2015 28 survey did not list specific billing rates associated with specific law firms as was done in 2014, 2016 and 2017. 24 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 Cooley not disclosed $1,100 $836 2 Dechert** $995 $930 $755 3 4 DLA Piper $1,120 $985 $850

5 Gibson Dunn & Crutcher $1,195 $1,150 $875 6 Greenberg Traurig $1,080 $790 $475 7 8 Hogan Lovells * $1,000 $835 not disclosed 9 Hughes Hubbard & Reed * $995 $890 $675 10 Irell & Manella not disclosed $1,135 not disclosed 11 12 Jones Day $1,050 $950 $800 13 King & Spalding, LLP $1,435 $1,000 $790 14 Morrison & Foerster * $1,195 $865 $725 15 16 O’Melveny & Myers * $950 $715 not disclosed 17 Pillsbury Winthrop, et al. $1,235 $830 not disclosed 18 Proskauer Rose, LLP not disclosed $1,200 not disclosed 19 20 Sidley Austin $1,180 $1,135 not disclosed 21 Venable * $1,075 $660 $575 22 23 Winston & Strawn * not disclosed $930 $750 24

25 26 27 28 25 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 25. I set my firm’s hourly rates consistent with the rates charged by higher-end law

2 firms handling work of similar complexity given my firm’s skill and reputation in the areas in 3 which we practice. In other words, I set my firm’s rates consistent with those firms whom I believe 4 provide comparable quality legal services such as the firms noted above, simply on the opposite 5 side of the fence. As set forth above, my personal qualifications command a higher-end of the 6 spectrum billing rate for the type of cases we handle and, indeed, we are often litigating and trying 7 8 cases to successful conclusion against firms such as those stated in the paragraph above. Likewise,

9 I typically hire attorneys at my firm who also have a demonstrated record of success and possess a

10 high level of skill, experience and ability. Based on my familiarity with the prevailing market rates 11 for work of similar complexity to the work performed in this case, including within the Los 12 Angeles market, it is my opinion that the nine hundred and fifty ($950.00) hourly rate is reasonable 13 and in line with the prevailing market rate for similar services in the Los Angeles market. 14 15 III. HOURS SPENT PROSECUTING THIS CASE: 16 26. I personally performed the overwhelming majority of the work on this case

17 performed by my office. For preliminary approval purposes, I am only recounting my time and not

18 the minimal time spent by a couple of other timekeepers in my office. 19 27. Based on my records maintained relating to this matter, I provide the following 20 estimate of the amount of time that I have reasonably and necessarily spent in handling this case to 21 this point: 22 23  Pre-filing investigations and research: approximately 25 hours;

24  Written discovery (drafting, review of, etc.): approximately 50 hours; 25  Meet and confers regarding discovery disputes: approximately 20 hours; 26

28 26 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1  Review of voluminous documents (over 20,000 pages of documents produced by County,

2 including many technical scientific studies, etc.: page-by-page personal review): approximately 3 105 hours; 4  Preparation for and taking of PMK depositions (personally prepared for three PMK depositions 5 and personally took two; assisted in preparation of three other PMK deponents): approximately 6 7 60 hours

8  Review and analysis of depositions I did not personally take: Approximately 50 hours

9  Legal research re: underlying substantive disability law and privacy violation issues: 55 hours 10  Drafting class certification moving papers, including additional research (including as to survey 11 and sampling issues, Duran issues, substantive law issues, etc.), drafting MPAs, drafting trial 12 plan, drafting declarations, etc.: Approximately 125 hours 13 14  Consulting and working with expert witness re: class cert and trial plan theories and

15 approaches, including approaches to sampling and survey issues: Approximately 15 hours

16  Review and analysis of Defendant’s class cert opposition and drafting of majority of class cert 17 reply papers: Approximately 65 hours 18  Analysis and beginning to brief Court’s requested issues post-class cert hearing: 35 hours 19  Attending Court Hearings: Approximately 12 hours 20 21  Preparation for and attending mediation session: approximately 25 hours;

22  Miscellaneous correspondence, emails (over 1,500 emails regarding this case), meetings and

23 telephone calls: approximately 50 hours; 24 Total Time spent by Declarant: Approximately 692 hours 25

27 28 27 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

1 28. Based on my hourly rate of nine hundred and fifty dollars ($950.00) per hour, my

2 estimated lodestar is approximately six hundred fifty-seven thousand four hundred dollars 3 ($657,400.00). This estimated lodestar is only for my personal time spent on this matter and does 4 not account for time spent by others in my office, including compensable paralegal and support 5 services. 6 29. Additionally, my firm has incurred costs in litigation this matter in the total sum of 7 8 thirty-seven thousand two dollars and twenty-six cents ($37,002.26). Attached hereto and marked

9 as Exhibit “H” is a true and correct itemization of the charges that represent the costs my firm has

10 incurred in this matter. I have personally reviewed the itemization and can attest to the fact that 11 these costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred in prosecuting this action. 12 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 13 foregoing is true and correct based on my personal knowledge under the laws of the State of 14 15 California, and if called upon to do so, could and would testify competently to the matters stated 16 herein.

17 Executed this 16th day of January 2020, at Studio City, California.

18 19 ______20 David M. deRubertis, Esq. Declarant 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 28 DECL OF DAVID M. DERUBERTIS ISO MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT & MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS

EXHIBIT A to DAVID DERUBERTIS DECL $1,000 Per Hour Isn't Rare Anymore; Nominal billing levels rise, but discounts ease blow. The National Law Journal January 13, 2014 Monday

January 13, 2014 Monday

SECTION: NU'S BILLING SURVEY; Pg. 1 Vol. 36 No. 20

LENGTH: 1860 words

HEADLINE: $1,000 Per Hour Isn't Rare Anymore; Nominal billing levels rise, but discounts ease blow.

BYLINE: KAREN SLOAN

BODY:

As recently as five years ago, law partners charging $1,000 an hour were outliers. Today, four figure hourly rates for indemand partners at the most prestigious firms don't raise eyebrows-and a few top earners are closing in on $2,000 an hour.

These rate increases come despite hand-wringing over price pressures from clients amid a tough economy. But everrising standard billing rates also obscure the growing practice of discounts, falling collection rates, and slow march toward_alternative fee arrangements.

Nearly 20 percent of the firms included in The National Law Journal's annual survey of large law firm billing rates this year had at least one partner charging more than $1,000 an hour. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher partner Theodore Olson had the highest rate recorded in our survey, billing $1,800 per hour while representing mobile satellite service provider UghtSquared Inc. in Chapter 11 proceedings.

Of course, few law firm partners claim Olson's star power. His rate in that case is nearly the twice the $980 per hour average charged by Gibson Dunn partners and three times the average $604 hourly rate among partners at NU 350 firms. Gibson Dunn chairman and managing partner Ken Doran said Olson's rate is "substantially" above that of other partners at the firm, and that the firm's standard rates are in line with its peers.

"While the majority of Ted Olson's work is done under alternative billing arrangements, his hourly r.\:."' rate reflects his stature in the legal community, the high demand for his services and the unique :,~ value that he offers to clients given his extraordinary experience as a former solicitor general of ;~ the United States who has argued more than 60 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and has -~ counseled several presidents," Doran said. l.,~) :::.~::. l-.... ,,. :;:;c:i

p. 057 I

In reviewing billing data this year, we took a new approach, asking each firm on the NLJ 350-our survey of the nation's 350 largest firms by attorney headcount-to provide their highest, lowest and average billing rates for associates and partners. We supplemented those data through public records. All together, this year's survey includes information for 159 of the country's largest law firms and reflects billing rates as of October.

The figures show that, even in a down economy, hiring a large law firm remains a pricey prospect. The median among the highest partner billing rates reported at each firm is $775 an hour, while the median low partner rate is $405. For associates, the median high stands at $510 and the low at $235. The average associate rate is $370.

Multiple industry studies show that law firm billing rates continued to climb during 2013 despite efforts by corpo'rate counsel to rein them in. TyMetrix's 2013 Real Rate Report Snapshot found that the average law firm billing rate increased by 4.8 percent compared with 2012. Similarly, the Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at the Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Peer Monitor found that law firms increased their rates by an average 3.5 percent during 2013.

Of course, rates charged by firms on paper don't necessarily reflect what clients actually pay. Billing realization rates-which reflect the percentage of work billed at firms' standard rates- have fallen from 89 percent in 2010 to nearly 87 percent in 2013 on average, according to the Georgetown study. When accounting for billed hours actually collected by firms, the realization rate falls to 83.5 percent.

"What this means, of course, is that- on average-law firms are collecting only 83.5 cents for every $1.00 of standard time they record," the Georgetown report reads. 'To understand the full impact, one need only consider that at the end of 2007, the collected realization rate was at the 92 percent level."

In other words, law firms set rates with the understanding that they aren't likely to collect the full amount, said Mark Medice, who oversees the Peer Monitor Index. That index gauges the strength of the legal market according to economic indicators including demand for legal services, productivity, rates and expenses. "Firms start out with the idea of, 'I want to achieve a certain rate, but it's likely that my client will ask for discounts whether or not I increase my rate,"' Medice said.

Indeed, firms bill nearly all hourly work at discounts ranging from 5 percent to 20 percent off standard rates, said Peter Zeughauser, a consultant with the Zeughauser Group. Discounts can run as high as SO percent for matters billed under a hybrid system, wherein a law firm can earn a premium for keeping costs under a set level or for obtaining a certain outcome, he added. "Most firms have gone to a two-tier system, with. what is essentially an aspirational rate that they occasionally get and a lower rate that they actually budget for," he said.

Most of the discounting happens at the front end, when firms and clients negotiate rates, Medice said. But additional discounting happens at the billing and collections stages. Handling alternative fee arrangements and discounts has become so complex that more than half of the law firms on the Am Law 100-NLJ affiliate The American Lawyer's ranking of firms by gross revenue-have created new positions for pricing directors, Zeughauser said.

THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHY

~f"l "'·· Unsurprisingly, rates vary by location. Firms with their largest office in New York had the highest \.,,..) *~~ average partner and associate billing rates, at $882 and $520, respectively. Similarly, TyMetrix .~:::, has reported that more than 25 percent of partners at large New York firms charge $1,000 per ::.o

p. 058 . e hour or more for contracts and commercial work.

Washington was the next priciest city on our survey, with partners charging an avera asso~iat~s. $~2_9. Part_ne.t? charne. an .. ~v.era,ge $§9.1 in Chica o and associates 427 ~~r~~l¥l~~·'f!Fffi~ii~ifazyff1'?~~'tf~fv~*'~\ii$66sttYitffrg4'e ~rb>;;;:.~~t·;nM~i.:~b.'(:o.B~~'.1"•\'J'i::;:":':><':•;~·~.C,:l~;,:-:>ji.~~9..~~!..k':"~o;;;."-~:~.,;k,:.*"".0!r:S':g.r-~:'1;j,•w.1J!>!"'~•'*'~'·"0:

Pricing also depends heavily on practice area, Zeughauser and Medice said. Bet-the-company patent litigation and white-collar litigation largely remain at premium prices, while practices including labor and employment have come under huge pressure to reduce prices.

"If there was a way for law firms to hold rates, they would do it. They recognize how sensitive clients are to price increases," Zeughauser said. But declining profit margins-due in part to higher technology costs and the expensive lateral hiring market-mean that firms simply lack the option to keep rates flat, he said.

BILLING SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The National Law Journal's survey of billing rates of the largest U.S. law firms provides the high, low and average rates for partners and associates.

The NU asked respondents to its annual survey of the nation's largest law firms (the NU 350) to provide a range of hourly billing rates for partners and associates as of October 2013.

For firms that did not supply data to .us, in many cases we were able to supplement billing- rate data derived from public records.

In total, we have rates for 159 of the nation's 350 largest firms.

Rates data include averages, highs and low rates for partners and associates. Information also includes the average full-time equivalent (FTE) attorneys at the firm and the city of the firm's principal or largest office.

We used these data to calculate averages for the nation as a whole and for selected cities.

Billing Rates at the Country's Priciest Law Firms

Here are the 50 firms that charge the highest average hourly rates for partners.

Billing Rates at the Country's Priciest Law Firms FIRM NAME LARGEST AVERAGE PARTNER ASSOCIATE U.S. FULL-TIME HOURLY HOURLY OFFICE* EQUIVALENT RATES RATES ATTORNEYS* AVERAGE HIGH LOW AVERAGE HIGH LOW * Full-time equivalent attorney numbers and the largest U.S. office are from the NU 350 published in April 2013. For complete numbers, please see NU.com. ** Firm did not exist in this form for the entire year. ::?;:) ~,, Debevoise & New York 615 $1,055 $1,075 $955 $490 $760 $120 ;.~~ Plimpton ~:.:::o- Paul, Weiss, New York 803 $1,040 $1,120 $760 $600 $760 $250 ~,:_,

p. 059 . Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison Skadden; New York 1,735 $1,035 $1,150 $845 $620 $845 $340 Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom Fried, Frank, New York 476 $1,000 $1,100 $930 $595 $760 $375 Harris, Shriver & Jacobson Latham & New York 2,033 $990 $1,110 $895 $605 $725 $465 Watkins Gibson, Dunn New York 1,086 $980 $1,800 $765 $590 $930 $175 & Crutcher Davis Polk & New York 787 $975 $985 $850 $615 $975 $130 Wardwell Willkie Farr & New York 540 $950 $1,090 $790 $580 $790 $350 Gallagher Cadwalader, New York 435 $930 $1,050 $800 $605 $750 $395 Wickersham & Taft Weil, Gotshal New York 1,201 $930 $1,075 $625 $600 $790 $300 & Manges Quinn New York 697 $915 $1,075 $810 $410 $675 $320 Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan Wilmer Cutler Washington 961 $905 $1,250 $735 $290 $695 $75 Pickering Hale and Dorr Dechert New York 803 $900 $1,095 $670 $530 $735 $395 Andrews Houston 348 $890 $1,090 $745 $528 $785 $265 Kurth Hughes New York 344 $890 $995 $725 $555 $675 $365 Hubbard & Reed Irell & Manella Los 164 $890 $975 $800 $535 $750 $395 Angeles Proskauer New York 746 $880 $950 $725 $465 $675 $295 Rose White & Case New York 1,900 $875 $1,050 $700 $525 $1,050 $220 Morrison & San 1,010 $865 $1,195 $595 $525 $725 $230 Foerster Francisco Pillsbury Washington 609 $865 $1,070 $615 $520 $860 $375 Winthrop Shaw Pittman Kaye Scholer New York 414 $860 $1,080 $715 $510 $680 $320 Kramer Levin New York 320 $845 $1,025 $740 $590 $750 $400 :::o ?,..n Naftalis & .. Frankel \.,. .) )f;:i;;>. Hogan Lovells Washington 2,280 ~,~. $835 $1,000 $705 - \.,_:, :::~:;. L-.-• .1)'- :;')q

p. 060 • e e Kasowitz, New York 365 $835 $1, 195 $600 $340 $625 $200 Benson, Torres & Friedman

Kirkland & Ellis Chicago 1,517 $825 $995 $590 $540 $715 $235 Cooley Palo Alto 632 $820 $990 $660 $525 $630 $160 Arnold & Washington 748 $815 $950 $670 $500 $610 $345 Porter Paul Hastings New York 899 $815 $900 $750 $540 $755 $335 Curtis, Mallet- New York 322 $800 $860 $730 $480 $785 $345 Prevost, Colt & Mosle Winston & Chicago 842 $800 $995 $650 $520 $590 $425 Strawn Bingham Boston 900 $795 $1,080 $220 $450 $605 $185 Mccutchen Akin Gump Washington 806 $785 $1,220 $615 $525 $660 $365 Strauss Hauer & Feld Covington & Washington 738 $780 $890 $605 $415 $565 $320 Burling King & Atlanta 838 $775 $995 $545 $460 $735 $125 Spalding Norton Rose N/A** N/A** $775 $900 $525 $400 $515 $300 Fulbright DLA Piper New York 4,036 $765 $1,025 $450 $510 $750 $250 Bracewell & Houston 432 $760 $1,125 $575 $440 $700 $275 Giuliani Baker & Chicago 4,004 $755 $1,130 $260 $395 $925 $100 McKenzie Dickstein Washington 308 $750 $1,250 $590 $475 $585 $310 Shapiro Jen·ner & Chicago 432 $745 $925 $565 $465 $550 $380 Block Jones Day New York 2,363 $745 $975 $445 $435 $775 $205 Manatt, Los 325 $740 $795 $640 - Phelps & Angeles Phillips Seward & New York 152 $735 $850 $625 $400 $600 $290 Kissel O'Melveny & Los 738 $715 $950 $615 - Myers Angeles McDermott Chicago 1,024 $710 $835 $525 - Will & Emery Reed Smith Pittsburgh 1,468 $710 $945 $545 $420 $530 $295 Dentons N/A** N/A** $700 $1,050 $345 $425 $685 $210

~p Jeffer Mangels Los 126 $690 $875 $560 - ~,, -,.. Butler & Angeles ~ .. _) Mitchell *;:;"" ..... Sheppard, Los 521 $685 h~.) $875 $490 $415 $535 $275 r.~) l,..~ ~~

p. 061 Mullin, Richter Angeles & Hampton Alston & Bird Atlanta 805 $675 $875 $495 $425 $575 $280

THE FOUR- FIGURE CLUB

These 10 firms posted the highest partner billing rates.

THE FOUR-FIGURE CLUB Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher $1,800 Dickstein Shapiro $1,250 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr $1,250 Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld $1,220 Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman $1,195 Morrison & Foerster $1,195 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom $1,150 Baker & McKenzie $1,130 Bracewell & Giuliani $1, 125 Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison $1,120

Contact Karen Sloan at [email protected]

LOAD-DATE: January 13, 2014

p. 062 EXHIBIT B to DAVID DERUBERTIS DECL SUPER~OR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 12/08/17 DEPT. 96

HONORABLE VICTOR E. CHAVEZ JUDGE D. GONZALEZ DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR

SANDRA RAMEY, C.A. Deputy Sheriff NONE Reporter

8:45 am BC559796 Plaintiff Counsel RICKEY MOLAND NO APPEARANCES vs Defendant MCWANE INC ET AL Counsel

DETERMINED LONG CAUSE ON 4/20/1 *AWAITING ASSIGNMENT*

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

COURT'S RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER:

Against Defendant McWane, Inc., Plaintiff Moland moved for a total attorney fees award of $2,314,730, based on a foundational sum of $1,551,605 in attorney fees, times a 1.5 multiplier.

The court took this matter under submission after having considered all the parties' papers in this matter, as well as the parties' oral arguments presented at the November 30, 2017 hearing. The court now finds and rules as follows.

"In civil actions brought under [Government Code section 12965(b)], the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party ... reasonable attorney's fees and costs, including expert witness fees." The California Supreme Court has explained that in FEHA actions, 'a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily receive his or her costs and attorney fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 ~al.4th 97, 115.) Also, "[a]s the prevailing party [in a FEHA action], plaintiff [is] entitled only to 'reasonable attorney fees' (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (b)), not

,,, reasonable fees plus a windfall." ·(Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 647.) Moreover, "[i]n emphasizing that a trial court ;,., retains the discretion to award attorney fees in an

MINUTES ENTERED Page 1 of 4 DEPT. 96 12/08/17 COUNTY CLERK

p. 063 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 12/08/17 DEPI'. 96

HONORABLE VICTOR E. CHAVEZ JUDGE D. GONZALEZ DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR

SANDRA RJl..MEY, C.A. Deputy Sheriff NONE Reporter

8:45 am BC559796 Plaintiff Counsel RICKEY MOLAND NO APPEARANCES vs Defendant MCWANE INC ET AL Counsel

DETERMINED LONG CAUSE ON 4/20/1 *AWAITING ASSIGNMENT*

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

amount that is less than the lodestar amount, '[t]o the extent a trial court is concerned that a particular award is excessive, it has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether. 1 [Citation] ... , '"A fee request that appears unreasonably inf lated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether."'" (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 - 1322.)

In light of this discretion, the court hereby awards Plaintiff only his baseline attorney fees of $1,551,605, given the size of Plaintiff's global recovery, the extent and ordinary nature of the litigation, and the lawyering skills displayed in this case. Clerk to give notice.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, the below-named Executive Officer/Clerk of the above-entitled court, do hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause herein, and that on this date I served the lr •• Los Angeles, CA. upon each party or counsel named below by placing the document for collection and mailing so as to

MINUTES ENTERED Page 2 of 4 DEPT. 96 12/08/17 COUNTY CLERK

p. 064 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 12/08/17 DEPT. 96

HONORABLE VICTOR E. CHAVEZ JUDGE D. GONZALEZ DEPUTY CLERK

HONOMBLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR

SANDRA RP.MEY, C.A. Deputy Sheriff NONE Reporter

8:45 am BC559796 Plaintiff Counsel RICKEY MOLAND NO APPEARANCES vs · Defendant MCWANE INC ET AL Counsel DETERMINED LONG CAUSE ON 4/20/1 *AWAITING ASSIGNMENT*

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

cause it to be deposited in the United States mail at the courthouse in Los Angeles, California, one copy of the original filed/entered herein i~ a separate sealed envelope to each address as shown below with the postage thereon fully prepaid, in accordance with standard court practices.

Dated: December 8, 2017 Sherri Officer/Clerk

By:

Reza Mirroknian THE MIRROKNIAN LAW FIRM P.C. 15260 VeLtura Boulevard, Suite 1740 Sherman Oaks, CA 91403

Carney R. Shergerian SHERGERIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC. 225 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 ;.,, Santa Monica, CA 90401

MINUTES ENTERED Page 3 of 4 DEPT. 96 '12/08/17 COUNTY CLERK

p. 065 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 12/08/17 DE.PT. 96

HONORABLE VICTOR E. CHAVEZ JUDGE D . GONZALEZ DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR

SANDRA R.Po..MEY, C.A. Deputy Sheriff NONE Reporter

8:45 am BC559796 Plaintiff Counsel RICKEY MOLAND NO APPEARANCES vs Defendant MCWANE INC ET AL Counsel

DETERMINED LONG CAUSE ON 4/20/1 *AWAITING ASSIGNMENT*

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Peter A. Javanmardi JAVANMARDI LAW P.C. 1875 Century Park East, Suite 1770 Los Ange:es, CA 90067

James A. Bowles Elissa L .. Gysi HILL, FAKRER, & BURRILL, LLP One California Plaza 300 South Grand Avenue, 37th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071

;,,

!:_,

MINUTES ENTERED Page 4 of 4 DEPT. 96 12/08/17 COUNTY CLERK

p. 066 EXHIBIT C to DAVID DERUBERTIS DECL SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION OF DEFENDANTS, THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TAX COSTS; MOTION OF PLAINTIFF, DR. LAUREN PINTER-BROWN, FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES OF $1,814,152.81;

The Court's tentative ruling is provided to all sides via the Court's website. The matters are called for hearing. The Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore is signed and filed this date. After oral argument, the Court's tentative ruling is adopted as the Order of the Court as follows:

Case Number: BC624838 Hearing Date: August 03, 2018 Dept: 34 SUBJECT: Motion for attorney's fees; Motion to tax costs

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES MINUTES ENTERED Page 1 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 067 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 123 83 Reporter

8: 3 0 am BC624 83 8 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Moving Party: Plaintiff Dr. Lauren Pinter-Brown

Resp. Party: Defendant The Regents of the University of California

The motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the amount of $1,814,152.81, as indicated in the spreadsheet below:

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff commenced this action on 06/22/16 against defendant for: (1) gender discrimination; (2) gender harassment; (3) retaliation for complaints of discrimination and harassment based on gender; (4) age discrimination; (5) age harassment; (6) violation of Labor Code § 1102.5; (7) violation of the Equal Pay Act; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (9) defamation.

MINUTES ENTERED Page 2 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 068 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

On 02/15/18, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor on her gender discrimination and retaliation claims. The jury awarded plaintiff $13,011,671.00.

ANALYSIS:

As the prevailing party on her FEHA claims, plaintiff moves for an award of attorney fees in the amount of $1,814,152.81. (See Notice of Motion, p. 2:2-7.) This sum includes a lodestar figure of $1,036,658.75 and a 1.75 multiplier. (Ibid.)

A.Relevant Law

"[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement." (People ex re.l. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.)

Attorney's fees may be recovered by a prevailing plaintiff in a FEHA action. (See Gov. Code, § 12965(b); Chavez v. City of Los Angeles MINUTES ENTERED Page 3 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK·

p. 069 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/ 03 /18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 984.) Under the FEHA, a prevailing defendant may only recover fees upon a showing that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. (See Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 103; Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 985; Cummings v. Benco Building Services (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1387-1388; Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421.)

The trial court has broad authority to determine'the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.) In determining the reasonable value of the attorney services, "the court does not need separate evidence to establish the reasonable value of whatever should be justly awarded, the theory being that the trial judge is competent from his own knowledge of legal practice to fix the amount of the fees. [Citations.]" (Spencer v. Harmon Enterprises (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 614, 621 [internal citations omitted].)

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to "reasonableness" of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c) (5) .) This burden requires competent MINUTES ENTERED Page 4 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 070 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) "Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records." (Id. at p. 559.)

In determining whether the requested attorney's fees are "reasonable," the Court's

"first step involves the lodestar figure - a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer's hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided." (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 [internal citations omitted].)

In determining whether to adjust the lodestar figure, the Court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or MINUTES ENTERED Page 5 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 071 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084 I 1095 •)

"'The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. [Citations.] This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel. [Citations.]' " (Center For Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 619.)

"The trial courts, of course, should be allowed the discretion to exclude from a fee award the fees incurred by a prevailing party in ·making frivolous procedural maneuvers, the primary concern in setting rules for attorney fee awards must be the encouragement of efficient litigation." (Presley of Southern California v. Whelan (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 959, 963.)

A.Discussion MINUTES ENTERED Page 6 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 072 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08 I 03 /18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney fees in the total amount of $1,814,152.81. This sum includes a lodestar figure of $1,036,658.75 representing 1,571.2 hours spent by her counsel in litigating this matter over the past two years. (See Notice of Motion, p. 2:2-7.) Plaintiff also seeks a 1.75 lodestar multiplier on the ground that such an enhancement "is necessary to fully compensate Pinter-Brown's counsel in accordance with the market value of their work." (Motion, p. 1:24-25.) Plaintiff has submitted detailed time records for each of the nine attorneys who worked on this matter. (See Appx. of Evid., Exhs. 1-9; See also, Motion, p. 12:8-19.)

Plaintiff argues that the relatively high amount of attorney fees is due, in large part, to defendant's aggressive tactics throughout the litigation and refusal to engage in any meaningful settlement negotiation:

" ... this was an exceptionally difficult case, which necessitated extensive discovery, opposing an exhaustive but futile motion for summary judgment, and a multi-week hard-fought trial. Not once has defendant made a reasonable settlement offer, even MINUTES ENTERED Page 7 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 073 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) · DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: after the jury delivered a $13 million verdict." (Motion, p. 1:4-6.)

By way of example, plaintiff explains that:

"this case involved voluminous discovery and extensive law and motion practice, evidenced by: 25 total depositions, over 7,600 pages of documents produced in discovery, approximately twenty sets of written discovery involving multiple defendants, defendant's futile but complex summary judgment motion, and a procedurally fatal and factually meritless motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (which Pinter-Brown was forced to oppose before the Court disposed of it)." (Id. at p. 2:17-21.)

Additionally, plaintiff argues that the case was particularly hard because counsel:

"faced an arduous task of proving that Dr. Pinter-Brown was subject to working conditions that were so intolerable that she had no reasonable alternative except to resign .... a 'constructive discharge' claim is difficult to prove because it MINUTES ENTERED Page 8 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 074 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: requires a level of showing that deal with both subjective and objective standards which are subject to great contention. (Id. at p. 3:5-8.) ·

In Opposition, defendant argues that the Court should exercise its discretion to deny f~es entirely because the requested fees are excessive and "designed to test the limits of what the Court will approve by seeking compensation for excessive hours and proposing excessive hourly rates." (Opposition, p. 1:2-6.) In the event that the Court decides to award fees to plaintiff, defendant asserts that, after all mandatory deductions, plaintiff is entitled to only $39,311.25 for the two years of work that resulted in a $13 million jury verdict. (See Id. at p. 10:14-15.)

i.The hours expended were reasonable

As outlined above, plaintiff argues that her attorneys reasonably spent 1,571.2 hours working on this case over the last two years. According to plaintiff, this amount of work was necessitated by the complexity of the issues, the vast quantity of discovery and motion practice, and defendant's aggressive tactics. (See generally, Motion, p. 1-3.) MINUTES ENTERED Page 9 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 075 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Defendant argues that plaintiff has completely failed to show the reasonableness of the time expended by her counsel. (See Opposition, p. 2:23-6:11.) It argues that "the declarations and time records submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel in support of the Motion are neither trustworthy nor credible and fail to support or justify the hours listed and fees sought." (Id. at p. 3:8-10.) The Opposition cites to a number of specific time entries that defendant deems objectionable, and defendant has submitted a separate exhibit containing objections to more than half of the time entries submitted by plaintiff. (See McGuigan Deel. Exh. A.)

First, defendant argues that there are several time entries that are "demonstrably inaccurate." (Opposition, p. 3:18.) These entries include:

1.5 hours billed by Mark Lim on August 19, 2019 (i.e., one year from now), for 'preparation of motion in limine 6 and internal discussion regarding facts regarding same."

MINUTES ENTERED Page 10 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 076 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS ~~~m Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 2.75 hours billed by Taylor French on January 2, 2018, to review 'nt Deposition; review of Hunt's r.'

0.25 hours billed by Taylor Prainito on June 1, 2027 (i.e., nine years from now) for a discussion with Plaintiff regarding deposition transcripts and Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

3.8 hours billed by Ms. Prainito on February 15, 2018, for purportedly reviewing (unspecified) discovery responses on the last day of trial.

0.1 hours billed by Ms. Prainito on April 17, 2018, for review of an unidentified deposition notice (2 months after trial ended.)

Defendant argues that these time entries must be excluded and that their existence "call[s] into question the evidentiary value of Plaintiff's counsel's time records as a whole." (Opposition, p. 4:4-5.)

Defendant has done little more than identify typos in plaintiff's billing records. Defendant apparently has the good sense not to explicitly MINUTES ENTERED Page 11 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 077 · SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPI'. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: claim that plaintiff is improperly billing for fictional services provided nearly a decade in the future and merely implies it instead. In reply, plaintiff argues that "even when a trial court is faced with a 'plethora of flawed attorney time entries,' it is still impermissible 'to engage in an across-the-board reduction of hours." (Reply, p. 2:12-14 [quoting Mountjoy v. Bank of Am., N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 280] .) With respect to the disputed entry on 01/02/18, plaintiff explains that it should read "Discussion regarding Hunt Deposition; Review of Hurit's report in preparation for deposition." (Reply, p. 2:20-21.) Furthermore, defendant provides no explanation or authority which would support the implicit claim that it would be improper for plaintiff's counsel to continue reviewing discovery at the trial or even to perform such work after the trial. It is curious that defendant objects to the 0.1 hours billed by Ms. Prainito on 04/17/18 as this was only one day before defendant filed its untimely motion for a new trial. Plaintiff accurately summarizes defendant's objections: "The typos identified by defendant are negligible, and defendant provides no authority that suggests it should receive a windfall due to five clerical errors in the time records." (Reply, p. 2:22-23.)

Next, defendant argues that hundreds of MINUTES ENTERED Page 12 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 078 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS ~~~m Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: plaintiff's time entries contain improper block billing and must be stricken. (See Opposition, p. 4: 8-5: 15; McGuigan Deel., Exh. A [containing "at least 272 time entries with improper block-billing and/or vague descriptions"].) Defendant cites three specific examples in its opposition:

13.1 hours billed by Anthony Nguyen on 2/7/2018 for 'Preparation for Trial and Trial Attendance; further edits to De Vos Outline; review of deposition transcript; review of Pinter-Brown trial testimony.'

4.9 hours billed by Ms. Prainito on 7/19/17 for "Review of deposition summaries; drafting of separate statement."

6.5 and 6.8 hours billed by Mr. Nguyen and Mr. Lim, respectively, on 2/15/18 for "Travel to Court and Trial Attendance; discussion with jurors; internal discussion regarding verdict and post-trial concerns."

(Opposition, p. 4:25-5:4.) Defendant finds each of these entries objectionable because they "combine[] multiple tasks without providing a break-down of the time spent on each task, which is particularly MINUTES ENTERED Page 13 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 079 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

. DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: problematic because they correspond (individually and in the aggregate) substantial amounts of attorney time and list tasks that are only vaguely described." (Id. at p. 5:5-8.)

Defendant's argument is not well taken. Block billing is only problematic "when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not." (Heritage Pac. Fin. LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.) Defendant does not allege that any of the three entries cited above contain any non-compensable work. Furthermore, defendant has not cited any authority that suggests that plaintiff is required to provide any more detail than has already been provided. The billing entries identified by defendant are sufficiently descriptive and do not contain any problematic block billing.

"[C]onsistent precedent in California cases provide[s] trial courts with the discretion about whether [or not] to penalize block billing." (Heritage Pacific Financial v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010, fn. 6. [italics in original; brackets added].)

Finally, defendant argues that the time MINUTES ENTERED Page 14 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 080 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) . UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: spent by plaintiff's counsel was excessive, inefficient, or duplicative and that hundreds of hours should be stricken as a result. (See Opposition, p. 5: 18-6:11.) Here, defendant cites to the following examples:

Up to 129.05 hours were billed by four different attorneys to prepare closing arguments . . . between February 6, 2018 and February 14, 2018.

Between January 29, 2018 and February 14, 2108, Messrs. Nguyen, Shegerian, and Lim billed a total of 321.65 hours for trial preparation (up to 15.9 hours in a single day) . Some entries give only the description of 'preparation for trial and trial attendance' for several hours of work ... while the remainder are block-billed entries that do not permit scrutiny into the work performed or the amount of time spend on each (listed and unlisted) task.

172 hours billed for various 'internal discussions' with multiple attorneys billing for discussions about simple issues such as "internal discussion regarding stipulation."

MINUTES ENTERED Page 15 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 081 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN · VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: (Opposition, 5:18-6:7)

Defendant is correct that the Ketchum court noted that "padding in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation." (See Opposition, p. 6:9-11 [quoting Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139.) Here, however, defendant has done nothing more than identify the fact that plaintiff's counsel spent substantial time on various tasks. Defendant does not even claim that it would be unreasonable to spend 321 hours on trial preparation or 129.05 hours preparing closing arguments. The Court agrees that this is a large amount of time to spend preparing for closing; nonetheless, the Court remembers plaintiff's closing as concise, well-planned and to-the-point. And it was clearly effective; the jury returned the next day with a $13 million verdict. With little planning, any attorney can present a rambling closing; it takes a lot of planning to be concise. As the 17th-century French philosopher and mathematician said, "Forgive me for writing such a long letter; I did not have the time to make it shorter.~ (Blase Pascal, Lettres Provinciales, 1657.)

Defendant fails to cite any authority to suggest that it is improper for two or more attorneys to MINUTES ENTERED Page 16 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 082 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: bill for a discussion about issues related to the case. In short, defendant has failed to identify any "padding in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts." In reply, plaintiff presents further persuasive explanation that shows that defendant has misrepresented the nature of the work performed by plaintiff's counsel. (See Reply, p. 5:3-6:3.)

As detailed above, defendant has failed to cite any meaningful example of a billing entry that was improper, impermissible vague, suggested problematic block billing, or evidenced any form of padding.

"A party cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response." (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 638.)

Or, as stated by the Court of Appeal eight years later, "[p]arties who litigate with no holds barred in cases such as this, in which the prevailing party is entitled to a fee award, assume the risk they will have to reimburse the excessive expenses they force upon their adversaries." (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 653-654.)

MINUTES ENTERED Page 17 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

'.''•,

p. 083 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

The Court finds that plaintiff's counsel reasonably expended 1,571.2 hours litigating this case.

i. Hourly rates

Defendant also objects to the hourly rates requested by plaintiff's counsel. (See Opposition, p. 6:14-7:11.) Most significantly, defendant objects to Mr. Shegerian's request for an hourly rate of $1,100. Defendant claims that this represents a 40% raise from the $700 that he is usually awarded and that 11 [t]he apparent genesis for this appears to be an off-handed compliment paid by the court three years ago in an unrelated matter." (Id. at p. 6:15-17.) As recently as December 2017, defendant claims that courts have routinely declined to increase his hourly rate from $700 per hour. (Id. at p. 6:20-22; McGuigan Deel., ~ 3, Exs. B-E.)

Plaintiff declares that Mr. Shegerian's hourly rate of $1,100 has been court approved by Judge Chavez in Moland v. McWane, Inc. as recently as December 2017. (See Shegerian Deel., ~ 7; McGuigan Deel. Exh. E [the Court's order does not specify the hourly rate awarded to Mr. Shegerian, MINUTES ENTERED Page 18 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 084 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEYf. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 123 83 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: but the "court hereby awards Plaintiff only his baseline attorney fees of $1,551,605" without any apparent deduction].) Plaintiff also declares that Mr. Nguyen and Mr. Lim's hourly rates "have been court-approved at $600 and $375 per hour, respectively." (Reply, p. 6:8-9; Nguyen Deel., ~ 8, Lim Deel. , . ii 3.)

In early 2013·, this Court approved an hourly rate for defense counsel of $920/hour on a successful anti-SLAPP motion. At that time, this Court stated in its decision, "There are many who would argue that an hourly billing rate approaching $1000 per hour is per se outrageous; this court would be hard-pressed to logically argue against that proposition. On the other hand, reality sometimes has a way of trumping common-sense. Whether outrageous or not, in the Los Angeles legal community, attorney billing rates of $1000 per hour and above are no longer unheard of." What was true about an extremely high - albeit "reasonable" - attorney's fees rate of $920/hour in 2013 holds true today.

Just one year later, in Chodos v. Borman (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 76 the Court of Appeal upheld a jury's finding that $1,000/hour was, in the circumstances of that case, a reasonable hourly rate. MINUTES ENTERED Page 19 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 085 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 0 8 I 0 3 I 18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

The Court has seen Mr. Shegerian's ability throughout this trial. He is considered by his peers to be one of the finest plaintiff-side trial attorneys in the State, and this Court agrees with that conclusion. The Court finds that the hourly rates requested for plaintiff's counsel are reasonable.

i.Deductions based on limited success

Based on all of the alleged defects in plaintiff's billing records cited above, defendant asserts that plaintiff's recovery should be limited only to "judicially noticed" hours spent litigating this matter. (See Opposition, p. 7:13-8:13.) This would include only "the time Plaintiff's counsel spent in hearings or at trial before this Court" and would amount to a total of 102 hours or $119,125 in fees. (See Ibid.) Defendant has failed to identify any meaningful defect in the billing records or show that there is any improper pattern of padding, block billing, or duplicative work. The Court rejects this argument as frivolous.

MINUTES ENTERED Page 20 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 086 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Separately, defendant argues that the lodestar figure must be reduced by an additional 67% to account for the fact that plaintiff was only partially successful in this action because she prevailed on only 2 or her original 9 causes of action. (See Opposition, p. 8:15-10:15.) Defendant notes that "prior to trial Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the equal pay act, and her request for punitive damages." (Id. at p. 9:9-11.) Additionally, "[f]ollowing the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court dismissed Plaintiff's claims for gender harassment, gender retaliation, age harassment, violation of Labor Code§ 1102.5." (Id. at p. 9:12-14.) Because plaintiff was unsuccessful on a majority of her causes of action, the fees must be reduced to "reflect the overall level of success achieved." (See Id. at p. 9: 26-28.)

In reply, plaintiff argues that reducing the lodestar due to "limited success" is discouraged in FEHA actions. (See Reply, p. 7:11-18.) Courts have held that "[i]t is only when a plaintiff has achieved a limited success, or has failed with respect to distinct and unrelated claims, that a reduction from the lodestar is appropriate." (Hogar v. Cmty. Dev. Comm'n of the City of Escondido (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1369.) Plaintiff argues that MINUTES ENTERED Page 21 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 087 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: her successful and unsuccessful claims were inextricably intertwined with her constructive discharge theory such that apportionment is not necessary. Notably, "[e]mployment discrimination cases, by their very nature, involve several causes of action arising from the same set of facts." (Reply, p. 8:27-28 [Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 413, 431.) .) The Court finds that it would be nearly impossible to separate out the time spent on plaintiff's gender and age claims. Both arose out of the same working conditions that the jury found to be intolerable and it was reasonable to proceed on the belief that defendants' behavior towards plaintiff could have been based on either or both her age and her gender. Plaintiff further explains that "the intertwined nature of employment cases is heightened because Pinter-Brown was constructively discharged. Stated otherwise, all the facts and claims pled in the Complaint are ultimately intertwined with the constructive discharge, and at least from Pinter-Brown's perspective, gave rise to her intolerable work conditions." (Reply, p. 8:5-8.)

While plaintiff may have prevailed on only two of her original causes of action, given that plaintiff received an award of over $13,000,000, the Court finds it hard to believe that defendant is seriously claiming that plaintiff achieved only a MINUTES ENTERED Page 22 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 088 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: limited success. In fact, as indicated below, plaintiff's degree of success warrants a multiplier.

Defendant accuses plaintiff's counsel of asking for unconscionably inflated fees, yet defense counsel falls victim to the opposite vice - of suggesting a lodestar that is unconscionably deflated. Defense counsel concludes that, even if they were to "concede that Plaintiff's counsel's proposed hourly rates are proper," (which defendant contests) "the total lodestar available is $119, 125. 11 (Opposition, p. 8: 13, 28.) Defense later argues that this lodestar should be reduced by 67% (for plaintiff's supposed limited success), so that the Court would award a final lodestar of $39,311.25. (Opposition, p. 10:14-15.)

The Court notes that defense counsel - although suggesting a lodestar of under $40,000, nowhere indicates the amount that defendant paid its attorneys on this matter. Defense counsel does not provide the court with any evidence of their hourly rates, or of the number of hours defense counsel incurred in defending this action.

It is not uncommon for courts to compare opposing counsel's fees to help determine whether MINUTES ENTERED Page 23 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 089 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8:30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: the moving party's fees are reasonable. That is because a "comparative analysis of each side's . respective litigation costs may be a useful check on the reasonableness of any fee request." (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 273, 281, quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272. See, also, Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272; Deane Gardenhome Ass'n v. Denktas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1399 (comparing losing party's total incurred fees with prevailing party's claim for fees); West Coast Dev. v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693, 707; In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570, 584 (court expressly recognized that an opponent's time and amounts charged were probative to the determination of whether the fee claimant's time is reasonable); Mountjoy v Bank of America, NA (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 273 (comparison of the parties' respective fees at the end of the case was probative to the ultimate question of reasonableness) ; accord, Democratic Party of Washington v. Reed (9th Cir. 2004) 388 F.3d 1281, 1287 (prevailing parties' hours were not excessive because number of hours claimed of the same "magnitude" as their opponent's hours); Cairns v Franklin Mint Co. (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3d 1139 (declining to reduce defendant's lodestar fee calculations, in part, because opponent had incurred even greater fees). Had defense counsel felt that this comparison would have been useful to buttress their argument, the Court would have expected MINUTES ENTERED Page 24 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 090 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: counsel to have provided such evidence.

Taking into consideration the above analysis, the Court awards a lodestar of $1,036,658.75, as indicated in the spreadsheet below: ***SEE CHART NO. 1*** Multiplier

"The award of a multiplier is in the end a discretionary matter largely left to· the trial court." (Hogar v. Community Development Com'n of City of Escondido (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1371. See also Rey v. Madera Unif. Sch. Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1242.) A court may enhance the lodestar figure in appropriate cases. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.) The court in Ketchum provided an explanation of the rationale behind contingent fee enhancements: "'A contingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed. The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is higher because the risk of default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of conventional MINUTES ENTERED Page 25 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 091 ------,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 0 8 I 0 3 I 18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: loans.'" (Id. at pp. 1132-1133. [quoting Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (4th ed. 1992) pp. 534, 567] .) "A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases." (Id. at p. 1133 [internal citations and quotations omitted].) The following factors may be considered in deciding whether to apply a multiplier: "(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which' the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award." (Id. at p. 1032.)

"[D]espite th[e Supreme Court's] emphasis on the need to apply the lodestar method in order to reach a rational and objective determination of a reasonable attorney fee, the court has never required that trial courts engage in any explicit analysis on the record. [Citation.] Indeed, in Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th 1122, the court held that the trial court was 'not required to issue a statement of decision with regard to the fee award.' (Id. at p. 1140.)" (SOURCE v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1189.) MINUTES ENTERED Page 26 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 092 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8:30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Nonetheless, the Court will outline below its reasons for awarding a multiplier.

Plaintiff requests a 1.75 lodestar multiplier as compensation for the contingent risk of this case and on the grounds that this case presented difficult questions, precluded her counsel from taking on other work, and that her counsel displayed extraordinary skill in obtaining the verdict. (See Motion, p. 12: 20-15: 3.) She explains that her counsel took this case on an entirely contingent basis and that "[h]ere, the contingent-risk factor is catastrophic in terms of both time and money. Pinter-Brown's attorneys spent more than 1,550 hours and advanced hard cots in presenting a case that faced substantial (and potentially insurmountable) obstacles." (Id. at p. 13: 19-21.) Even after the verdict, "there remains no resolution in sight after more than two years of litigation, and zero dollars recovered to date." (Id.at p. 13: 27-28.)

Plaintiff also argues that a multiplier is warranted based on the "quality factor" because "[s]ecuring such a sizable jury verdict is impressive to say the least and is even more MINUTES ENTERED Page 27 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 093 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

8:30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: extraordinary when considering the social context underlying the case." (See Id. at p. 9:9-24.) Not only did plaintiff's counsel secure an excellent result for this individual plaintiff, it appears that their efforts have resulted in meaningful change at UCLA·. Plaintiff argues that:

"UCLA has made substantial changes in the wake of the jury's February verdict, such as clearly identifying UCLA's Title IX Officer, the reporting process, and the rights of employees and students under Title IX. Further, as noted by this Court, 'less than a month after the Pinter-Brown verdict, a UCLA student who had alleged sexual harassment stated how she felt vindicated when a Title IX investigation determined that she indeed had been harassed as a graduate student at UCLA 10 years earlier,' and the harasser was subsequently dismissed from UCLA. " (Motion at p. 2: 4-11.)

The Court finds that plaintiff's counsel displayed remarkable skill in obtaining a substantial recovery for plaintiff and in effecting meaningful change. This, of course, is the purpose of FEHA. (See, e.g., Govt. Code § 12920 [The Legislature's intent in enacting FEHA is to "provide effective remedies that will eliminate ... discriminatory practices."]; Lopez v. Routt (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1010 [ MINUTES ENTERED Page 28 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 094 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

"The [U.S. Supreme Court] recognized that Congress had chosen Title VII plaintiffs as instruments to vindicate federal policy against job discrimination, and further recognized that when a trial court awards attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff, 'it is awarding them against a violator of federal law.' (Christiansburg [Garment Co. v. E. E. 0. C. (1978)] 434U.S. [412], 418.)")

Plaintiff's counsel also declares that this case has required the firm to turn away other work, "resulting in the preclusion of work in at least three other cases." (Reply, p. 14:3-7; Shegerian Deel., ~ 21.)

Defendant argues that the hourly rates sought by plaintiff's counsel "already incorporate compensation" to account for the risk associated with the contingency agreement and notes that "plaintiff's counsel does not claim or offer proof that the proposed hourly rates have ever been charged to clients in hourly-fee cases." (Opposition, p. 13:1-3.) This Court disagrees.

"[A] contingent fee in a case with a 50 percent chance of success should be twice the amount of a MINUTES ENTERED Page 29 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 095 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: non-contingent fee for the same case . . " (Cezares v. Saenz (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 279, 288.)

It is this Court's experience that, in FEHA cases, plaintiffs prevail approximately half the time. Although there is no California case on-point, other courts have similarly concluded that, at least in labor and employment cases, it is reasonable to assume that plaintiffs' counsel will win approximately half the time. (See, e.g., Fujiwara v. Sushi Yasuda,· Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 58 F. Supp. 3d 424, 329.) If the Court were to accept Defendant's argument that plaintiff's lead counsel should be awarded a lodestar based upon an hourly rate of $750/hour, this would mean that Mr. Shegerian's non-contingent rate would be $375/hour. This is barely above the rate charge for a first-year association at a major law firm. Clearly, Mr. Shegerian's experience and expertise command a substantially higher hourly rate.

Further, Defendant fails to present any evidence of its implicit assertion that plaintiff's counsel's contingent-fee rates are higher than what they charge in hourly-fee cases. Further, the Court notes that if a plaintiff's attorney exclusively takes contingent-fee cases, there would be no way for that MINUTES ENTERED Page 30 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 096 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 123 83 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: attorney to show rates "charged to clients in hourly-fee cases." Clearly, that would not preclude a successful plaintiff's attorney in a FEHA case from being awarded attorney's fees.

Defendant asserts that plaintiff's counsel was not precluded from taking on other work because it "has filed 212 cases while this case was pending." (Opposition, p. 12: 15-17; McGuigan Deel., ~ 4, Exh. F.)

The Court agrees with defendant that this third Ketchum factor - "the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys" - is not present here. The Court will not consider this factor in determining a multiplier.

However, Defendant cites no authority - and it is not the law -that a multiplier is warranted only when a case precludes counsel from doing any other work. The Court finds that the other three Ketchum factors - 11 (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, [and] (4) the contingent natur~ of the fee award" - all warrant a multiplier in this case. (See Ketchum, supra, at p. 1032.)

MINUTES ENTERED Page 31 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 097 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 0 8 I 0 3 I 18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

The Court is also aware that this case was filed two years ago, and that while defense counsel's invoices have (presumably) been paid by its client on a monthly basis, plaintiff's counsel has not only fronted all costs to-date, but has not yet received any remuneration whatsoever on this case. Had plaintiff's counsel been paid monthly, those payments could have been invested. In June 2016 - when this case was filed - the Dow Jones Industrial average was approximately 17,800. As of the writing of this tentative decision, the Dow Jones Average is about 25,500. (See, e.g., https://www.macrotrends.net/1358/ dow-jones-industrial-average-last- 10-years.) This is an increase of approximately 43%. This in itself might warrant a 1.1 multiplier. (The rea$on it would not warrant a 1.43 multiplier is that all of the attorney's fees would not have accrued at the beginning of the case, but would rather have been spread out over the past two years. In fact, a majority of the attorney's fees were incurred in the last year and when preparing for trial. Hence a multiplier of approximately 1.1 would be appropriate simply to account for delay in payment.)

However, this Court need not - and perhaps should not - be so mathematical in its application of a MINUTES ENTERED Page 32 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 098 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: multiplier. Having considered all of the Ketchum factors, the Court agrees with plaintiff that a multiplier of 1.75 is the minimum that would be appropriate in this case.

Conclusion

The motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the amount of 1,814,152.81, as indicated in the spreadsheet below: ***SEE CHART NO. 2*** MOTION TO TAX COSTS

Moving Party: Defendant The Regents of the University of California

Resp. Party: Plaintiff Dr. Lauren Pinter-Brown

The motion is GRANTED in part. The Court taxes a total of $23,339.56 from plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs. The Court awards plaintiff her costs in the amount of $58,399.78.

MINUTES ENTERED Page 33 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 099 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:

The Court has noted various arithmetical errors in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and pleadings. Plaintiff lists the totai costs as $81,736.34. (See Memorandum of Costs, p. 1.) However, the costs listed actually total $81,739.34, a difference of $3.00. This was not pointed out by defendant; since defense counsel have always conducted themselves in a professional manner as officers of the Court (see, e.g., Rules Prof. Conduct, rules 5-220, 5-200 (A), (B)) the Court will simply assume that neither party caught this error.

Since it is not worth arguing over the $3.00 that plaintiff is shorting herself; the Court will use the lower figure supplied by plaintiff.

The Court also notes that plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs requests $31,353.55 for witness fees. (Memorandum of Costs, ~ 8.) However, the Worksheet accompanying the Memorandum of Costs lists the total witness fees as $30,678.55. This discrepancy is not mentioned by either party in either their opposition or reply. The Court will use MINUTES ENTERED Page 34 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

1~;·.)t

p. 100 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

8:30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: the lower, documented amount, as indicated in the discussion of witness fees, below.

Lastly, the Court notes that plaintiff has miscalculated the amounts requested under "other" expenses. Her Memorandum of Costs requests $10,848.23 in "other" expenses; yet in her opposition, she states that she is withdrawing $321.89 of this amount, and therefore "should recover such costs in the amount of $10,848.23." (Memorandum of Costs, ~ 13; Opposition, p. 10:16.) Further, the amounts listed in her MPA under "other" - $8,776.00 for Trial Equipment and $1,785.47 for Parking and Travel - total $10,561.47, not the $10,848.23 listed. Once again, neither party has brought this discrepancy to the Court's attention.

ANALYSIS:

On 04/17/18, plaintiff filed a verified memorandum of costs seeking to recover a total of $81,736.34 in expenses incurred in connection with this action. (See "Preliminary Comments, " above. ) On 04/23/18; defendant timely filed its motion to tax MINUTES ENTERED Page 35 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 101 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: costs.

A.Relevant Law

"Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032 (b) . )

After judgment is entered, the prevailing party "who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a) .) "The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in this case." (Ibid.)

In turn, the losing party may file a motion to strike or tax costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b) .) Procedurally, "[a]ny notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum." (Ibid.) MINUTES ENTERED Page 36 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 102 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 123 83 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Even where parties are unsuccessful as to certain matters, prevailing parties as defined by statute (Code of Civil Procedure §1032) are entitled to recover all costs reasonably incurred, and proof that parties were unsuccessful on particular items is not tantamount to a demonstration that such costs were unreasonably incurred. (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200.)

During the hearing, "the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary." (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.) "This procedure provides an orderly and efficient way of placing disputed costs at issue on a line item basis." (612 South LLC v. Laconic Ltd. Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1285.)

11 [T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a "proper objection" to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation.] However, 11 [i] f the items appear to be proper charges the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were MINUTES ENTERED Page 37 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 103 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations] , and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party]." [Citations.]

"The court's first determination, therefore, is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item, and whether it appears proper on its face. [Citation.] If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show them to be unnecessary or unreasonable. [Citation.]" (Nelson, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 131.)

A.Discussion

Defendant argues that the Memorandum should be stricken in its entirety because" [p]laintiff did not ·provide any documentation, invoices or otherwise, to justify these costs, preventing the Court or The Regents from determining the reasonableness of any costs Plaintiff claims." (Motion, p. 1:5-9.) The Court rejects this claim: "the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary." (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) MINUTES ENTERED Page 38 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 104 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.) No additional documentation is necessary; it is defendant's burden to present evidence that the costs were unnecessary or unreasonable.

Separately, defendant moves to strike the following items from the Memorandum:

'' ... the total amount of $68,575.55 which includes $380.00 in filing and motion fees, $4,304.05 in unnecessary deposition costs; $1,124.45 in service of process fees for witnesses not called or relied upon at trial, $31,678.55 in witness fees, $15,497.27 for unsubstantiated models, blowups, and photocopies of exhibits, $4,743.00 in unrecoverable court reporter fees, and $10,848.23 in vague 'other' expenses." (Motion, p. 1: 11-16.)

In Opposition, plaintiff withdraws her request for a total of $353.27, including "(1) witness fees - $21.05, (2) models, blowups, and photocopies of exhibits - $10.33, [and] (3) other - $321.89." (Opposition, p. 1:3-7.) She argues that all of the other requested costs are recoverable and requests that the Court award her costs in the amount of $80,711.57. (See Id. at p. 1:8-13.)

MINUTES ENTERED Page 39 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

"': •• ;11.

p. 105 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/ 03 /18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

i.Filing and Motion Fees

Plaintiff seeks $755.00 in "filing and motion fees." (Memorandum, ~ 1.) Defendant argues that "the only cognizable fees is the filing fee for $435.00." (Motion, p. 3:12-13.) The "vague descriptions'' include "three non-descript [sic] ex parte applications but provides the date for only one entry." (Id. atp. 3: 16-18.)

In opposition, plaintiff argues that all of the filing and motion fees were necessary, reasonable, and recoverable:

"Plaintiff reserved three motion hearing dates in this litigation - two motions to compel further discovery responses and one motion for attorney fees. While the motions to compel further discovery responses ultimately were not heard by this Court and Plaintiff eventually obtained the requested relief via further meet and confer efforts Plaintiff nonetheless needed to pay the filing fees and reserve these motion dates to ensure compliance with her discovery requests." (Opposition, p. 4:10-15; Nguyen Deel., ~~ 2-3, Exh. 1 [containing payment MINUTES ENTERED Page 40 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 106 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: receipts and CRS receipts].)

Additionally, "plaintiff's two ex parte applications are similarly recoverable as Plaintiff's counsel applied to extend the page length of her opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment .. [and the] second ex parte application . . . was likewise reasonably necessary as Plaintiff Pinter-Brown was hospitalized for a medical condition approximately one week before the scheduled trial date" necessitating a short continuance. (Opposition, p. 4:20-28; Nguyen Deel., , 4.)

In reply, defendant argues that the fees connected with the three motion hearings and the two ex parte applications should be stricken. (See Reply, p. 2:3-17.)

According to defendant, the two motions to compel further discovery responses were unnecessary because "counsel admits that further meet and confer efforts were appropriate and necessary to resolve the motions." (Reply, p. 2:7-9.) The Court disagrees. Defendant was under an obligation to timely produce discovery responses. Plaintiff believed that the discovery responses were MINUTES ENTERED Page 41 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 107 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8: 30· am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: inadequate and eventually persuaded defendant that she was correct. Filing a motion to compel .is often the impetus that is required to get an opposing party to engage in the meet and confer process in good faith. Plaintiff may recover the filing fees for both motions to compel.

Defendant presents no argument why the filing fees for plaintiff's attorney fees motion is not recoverable.

Defendant argues that the ex parte applications are not recoverable because "[p]laintiff tacitly concedes that a page-length extension was ultimately not required or appropriate" and because the ex parte to continue the trial was "due to Plaintiff's own health issue was not reasonably required, but rather, an expense to accommodate Plaintiff's personal needs." (Reply, p. 2: 12-16.) Defendant cites no authority for either claim. Any indication that the request for a page-length extension was unnecessary is only visible in hindsight. Plaintiff's counsel has declared that they believed the extension was necessary at the time. The standard is what a reasonable attorney would do at the time, not what ultimately turns out to be necessary. Similarly, defendant fails to explain how it is not reasonably MINUTES ENTERED Page 42 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 108 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) 'DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: necessary to make sure that plaintiff could attend the trial. It was not unreasonable to seek a continuance to ensure that she could attend.

Plaintiff may recover $755.00 in f~ling and motion fees.

i.Deposition Costs

Defendant moves to strike $4,304.05 in costs for the depositions of Robert DuWors, Patricia Ganz, Allister-Benjamin Chase, Alan Marcus Fogelman, Terra Hughes, Robert Elshoff, and Judith Currier on the ground that their testimony was not used at trial. (See Motion, p. 4: 9-17.) The fact that they were deposed but did not testify "suggests that their testimony was merely relevant but not necessary to the proceedings." (Id. at p. 4: 13-14.)

In opposition, plaintiff acknowledges that these witnesses' deposition testimony was not used at trial but explains that their testimony was "reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation" because their testimony was "heavily relied upon by Plaintiff in her opposition to MINUTES ENTERED Page 43 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 109 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 0 8 I 0 3 I 18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 123 83 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Defendant's voluminous and difficult motion for summary judgment. A significant portion of emails and other exhibits relied upon at trial included reference to Drs. Fogelman, Ganz, and Currier, and it was necessary for Plaintiff's successful litigation of this case to depose these individuals." (Opposition, p 5:17-22.)

Plaintiff has submitted invoices documenting the expenses incurred in connection with deposing witnesses in this case. (See Nguyen Deel., Exh. 3.) She notes that these expenses include fees for preparation of deposition transcripts, which are recoverable in the Court's discretion because they are not specifically enumerated. (Opposition, p. 5: 23-25 [citing Hsu v. Semiconductor Systems, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342] .) Additionally, she seeks to recover costs for expedited deposition transcripts of several witnesses and argues that she "had no choice but to expedite the transcripts, because her opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment was due on August 3, 2017." (Id. at p. 6: 12-16.)

In reply, defendant argues that the Court should disallow $8,331.91 in deposition costs because plaintiff's documentary evidence shows that many of the charges are not recoverable. (See Reply, MINUTES ENTERED Page 44 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 110 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: p. 3: 1-17.) Defendant argues that "[t]he remaining sums for expedited fees ($1,475.82), optional eiectronic copies ($376), delivery fees ($250), and other improper expenses such as parking ($194.50) are not recoverable." (Reply, p. 3: 19-21.) Additionally, "[d]efendant should not bear the costs for Plaintiff's failure to plan or take depositions late" by being compelled to pay for the expedited fees. (Id. at p. 3: 23-24.)

Defendant fails to cite any authority to support its conclusions that electronic copies, delivery fees, and parking are not encompassed within the allowable expenses for "taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions including an original and one copy of those taken by the claimant . . . and travel expenses to attend depositions." Defendant also fails to show that plaintiff is at fault for conducting depositions so close to the deadline for opposing the motion for summary judgment.

Further, the Court gave each side 16 hours for their presentation of evidence. Plaintiff used 16.0 hours; defendant used 15.9 hours. These limitations were reasonable, and were consistent with the Court's order at the Case Management Conference that this would be a 7-10 day jury trial. MINUTES ENTERED Page 45 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 111 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEYf. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8:30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS ~~~m Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: However, given these limitations, neither party could call all of the witnesses that they might have originally anticipated calling.

Plaintiff may recover $14,888.09 in deposition costs.

i.Service of Process

Defendant moves to strike $1,124.25 in service of process costs from the Memorandum on the ground that these costs related to service on witnesses who were not "deposed in the course of litigation or appeared at trial" and for serving witnesses who "were deposed but did not testify at trial and were, therefore, not necessary to the litigation." (Motion, p. 4: 22-28.)

In opposition, plaintiff acknowledges that it served several individuals who were not deposed and who did not testify at trial. "Plaintiff made a strategic call at trial to not call these witnesses at trial.,Still, Plaintiff had a duty to ensure that it served subpoenas on all of the witnesses who would offer probative evidence at trial. Plaintiff MINUTES ENTERED Page 46 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 112 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 0 8 I 0 3 I 18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

8:30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: should not have to bear costs that were reasonably necessary to conduct of the litigation." (Opposition, p. 6:27-7:3.) Additionally, plaintiff incurred actual expenses to serve some individuals twice because the first attempt was unsuccessful.

Once again, defendant's argument is based entirely on hindsight. Plaintiff chose not to call certain witnesses and so it appears that those witnesses must have been unnecessary. That is not the standard. Plaintiff persuasively argues that, at the time these individuals were served, her counsel reasonably believed that their testimony would be necessary. Counsel made a strategic decision not to call these witnesses. Given the resulting verdict, it appears that counsel's strategy worked.

As the Court indicated above, the Court gave each side 16 hours for their presentation of evidence. Given these restrictions, it is not surprising that subpoenas might have been served on potential witnesses who were never called to testify at trial. This is no different than most trials; for instance, today's newspapers report that the prosecution in the Paul Manafort trial has "said they might call three dozen witnesses." (See New York Times, 7/31/18, "Manafort Trial Gets Off to Quick Start, available at MINUTES ENTERED Page 47 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 113 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/ us/politics/paul-manafort-trial.html? hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage &clickSource=story-heading&module =f irst-column-region®ion=top-news &WT.nav=top-news.) It is unlikely that all of these witnesses will be called by the prosecution in the estimated three-week trial.

The Court declines to strike any amount incurred for service.

i.Witness Fees

Defendant moves to strike $61.05 in ordinary witness fees paid to Ben Chase on the ground that he never testified at trial. (Motion, p. 5: 10-12.)

Plaintiff withdraws $21.05 in expenses related to Mr. Chase's deposition "which includes $10.00 for parking expense reimbursement and $0.535/mile rather than the statutorily allowable $0.20/mile" in travel expenses. (See Opposition, p. 7: 14-17.) Nevertheless, he actually appeared at

MINUTES ENTERED Page 48 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 114 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: trial and would have been called but Plaintiff had a limited amount of time to present her case and made a strategic call to expend more trial time examining other witnesses." (Id. at p. 7: 21-23.) As defendant's motion concedes, witness fees are available for "each day's actual attendance at trial," not just for testifying at trial. (Motion, p. 5:8-9.)

Defendant also moves to strike expert witness fees on the ground that the Court has not ordered that the fees would be recoverable and plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show that the costs were reasonable or necessary. (Motion, p. 5: 13-22.)

Although the Court did not explicitly order that expert witness fees would be recoverable, they are provided for by statute. Government Code section 12965 provides that 11 [i]n actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and costs, including expert witness fees." (Gov. Code§ 12965(b) .) Additionally, Courts "have relied upon federal cases interpreting Title VII in determining the standards governing FEHA fee recoveries. Under Title VII a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to expert witness fees." (Opposition, p. 8: 9-14.) MINUTES ENTERED Page 49 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 115 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Here, plaintiff argues that she incurred expert witness fees in the amount of $30,678.55 for the retention of experts "who were necessary to assess plaintiff's emotional distress" and damages and to depose defendant's expert witness. (See Opposition, p. 8:15-20.)

In reply, defendant challenges plaintiff's documentation on the ground that the invoices do not reflect the fact that plaintiff actually paid all of the expenses. (See Reply, p. 6:10-28.) Defendant cites no authority for the claim that a cost must have been actually paid in order to be recoverable. The documentary evidence establishes that plaintiff has actually incurred an obligation to pay the requested amounts to each expert witness. That is sufficient.

As indicated above in its "Preliminary Comments," Plaintiff's Summary to its Memorandum of Costs lists witness fees as $31,353.55, while the worksheet only itemizes $30,678.55 in costs. The Court will use the lower amount.

The Court awards expert witness fees to MINUTES ENTERED Page 50 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 116 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 0 8 I 0 3 I 18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NA VARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 123 83 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: plaintiff, in the amount of $30,678.55, plus ordinary witness fees in the amount of $40.00 for a total of $30,718.55.

i.Models, Blowups and Photocopies of Exhibits

Section 1033. 5 (a) ( 13) provides that "[m]odels and blowups of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact." Because this section only allows costs that were helpful to aid the trier of fact, "[i]t follows that fees are not authorized for exhibits not used at trial." (Ladas v. California State Auto Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 775 [such costs not allowable because the case was dismissed before trial].)

Defendant moves to strike $15,497.27 in fees allegedly incurred for models, blowups, and photocopies of exhibits on the ground that "plaintiff provides no further description of 'copies' that would in any way justify the claimed exorbitant cost." (Motion, p. 6: 4-7.)

MINUTES ENTERED Page 51 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 117 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: The Court finds that the copying charge per page that plaintiff is requesting - 1.5¢/page - is eminently reasonable.

Plaintiff withdraws $10.33 from her claimed costs but maintains that the vast majority of the costs are recoverable. (See Opposition, p. 9: 9-10.) Plaintiff cites the following expenses:

"Shegerian & Associates incurred $12,836.25 in: (1) printing/copying five sets of Plaintiff's trial exhibits . (2) printing/copying three sets of Defendant's trial exhibits ... (3) printing/copying six sets of deposition transcripts ' ( 4 O binders . . . and ( 5) exhibit tabs . 11

(Opposition, p. 9:24-10:3.) At the Final Status Conference, the Court required counsel to prepare five full sets of their trial exhibits - the original for the Judicial Assistant, plus one copy each for the Court, for the witness, for counsel and for opposing counsel. These are reimbursable. Plaintiff lists $6,849.90 for copying six sets of these exhibits, at $0.015/page. The Court will award 5/6 of this amount, or $5,708.25, and taxes the remaining amount.

MINUTES ENTERED Page 52 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 118 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

The remaining expenses appear to have been for counsel's benefit and use during the trial. There is no evidence that these costs relate to exhibits that were "reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact." (Code of Civil Procedure§ 1033. 5 (a) (13).)

Accordingly, the Court taxes $7,128.00 from plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs, plus the $10.33 withdrawn by plaintiff.

i.Court Reporter Fees

A prevailing party may recover "court reporter fees as established by statute." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033. 5 (a)· (11).)

Defendant moves to strike $4,743.00 in Court Reporter fees on the ground that they are not ordered by the Court and are not allowable under section 1033.5(b). (See Motion, p. 6:20-28.) In . opposition, plaintiff maintains that "Court reporter fees are expressly allowed by section 1033.5." (Opposition, p. 10:10.) Plaintiff is incorrect. MINUTES ENTERED Page 53 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 119 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R . NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

8: 30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim. (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Section 1033.5(a) (11) allows for recovery of court reporter fees if they are "established by statute." (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a) (11) .) Plaintiff fails to cite any statute that allows for the recovery of court reporter fees.

Accordingly, the Court strikes $4,743.00 from plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs.

i.Other

Plaintiff seeks to recover $10,848.23 for "other" expenses including "trial equipment, medical records, attorney reimb." (Memorandum, ~ 13, p. 3.) Defendant moves to strike these costs on the ground that "plaintiff fails to itemize each category of alleged costs." (See Motion, p. 7: 2-12.)

Plaintiff withdraws $321.89 from her request and argues that she should receive $10,848.23 in "other" costs. (See Opposition, p. 10: 15-16.)

First, plaintiff explains that she incurred $8,776.00 in expenses for trial equipment. MINUTES ENTERED Page 54 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 120 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO DeputySheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8:30 am BC624838 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: (Opposition, p. 10: 18-25.) She submits invoices totaling $8,776.00 which reflects "equipment rental fees to assist in the electronic presentation of evidence at trial." (Nguyen Deel., ~ 18, Exh. 9.)

Defendant objects to these expenses on the ground that the trial support services were provided by Trial Electronics Direct, "a fictitious business name which uses the same Post Off ice box number as Plaintiff's counsel's firm and registered as a fictitious business name by Plaintiff's counsel as the registrant. By way of these costs, Mr. Shegerian is charging his firm to rent equipment that, in all likelihood, his firm already owns. This cost is disingenuous and expressly disallowed by case law."

The Fictitious Business Name Statement is signed by Mr. Shegerian on behalf of the owner, Secretariat Enterprises, LLC. (See McGuigan Deel, Exh. B.) Even if Mr. Shegerian is the sole owner of Secretariat Enterprises LLC, that LLC is a separate business entity from the law firm, which is a registered corporation under the name Shegerian & Associates, Inc. (See Id. at Exh. A.)

Although these corporations may be distinct legal entities, the issue raised by defense is MINUTES ENTERED Page 55 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 121 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 08/03/18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12383 Reporter

8: 3 0 am BC624 83 8 Plaintiff Anthony Nguyen (X) Counsel Mark Lim (X) DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS Defendant Kathryn T. McGuigan (X) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS Counsel Barbara A. Fitzgerald (X) ANGELES ET AL

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: troubling to this Court. Anytime there are closely-held interlocking corporations, the possibility of self-dealing is always present. There is no way for this Court to know whether the amounts billed represent fair-market value for the services rendered. Having no evidence of the reasonableness of these costs, the Court exercises its discretion to tax the $8,776.00 in rentals for trial equipment.

Next, plaintiff claims that she incurred $1,785~47 in parking and travel expenses related to depositions, which are specifically allowable under section 1033.5(a) (3). (Opposition, p. 10:27-28.) Plaintiff acknowledges that attorney parking at trial and hearings are discretionary but requests that the Court award these expenses. (See Id. at p. 11.) Plaintiff has submitted invoices documenting these expenses. (See Nguyen Deel., Exh. 10.)

While the Court would normally allow for travel expenses related to depositions, the Court normally does not allow for reimbursement for parking at trial and court hearings. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 does not readily allow the Court to determine how much money was incurred for parking and/or travel related to trial and court hearings.

MINUTES ENTERED Page 56 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 122 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 0 8 I 0 3 I 18 DEPT. 34

HONORABLE MICHAEL P. LINFIELD JUDGE R. NAVARRO DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #7 V. GALINDO Deputy Sheriff Rosie Samples, CSR# 12 3 8 3 Reporter

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Defendant objects to all but $25 of the parking expenses. (Reply, p. 10:12.) The Court will therefore tax all but $25.00 of these expenses.

(As indicated above in the "Preliminary Comments," Plaintiff has miscalculated the amounts under her "other" expenses. (See Memorandum of Costs, Summary and Worksheet, ~~ 13.) Using the figure listed on the summary, the Court taxes $10,823.23, and awards $25.00.

i.Conclusion

The motion is GRANTED in part as indicated in the spreadsheet below. The Court taxes a total of $23,339.56 from plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs. The Court awards plaintiff her costs in the amount of $58,399.78.

****SEE CHART NO. 3*** Defendant is to give notice.

MINUTES ENTERED Page 57 of 57 DEPT. 34 08/03/18 COUNTY CLERK

p. 123 CHART NO. 1- BC624838- DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

ATTORNEYS FEES

Rate Hours Total Rate Hours Attorney's Name Requested Requested Requested Granted Granted Total Granted

Carney Shegerian $1,100.00 381.70 $419,870.00 $1,100.00 381.70 $419,870.00

Anthony Nguyen $675.00 395.60 $267,030.00 $675.00 395.60 $267,030.00

Taylor Prainito $500.00 398.90 $199,450.00 $500.00 398.90 $199,450.00

Mark Lim $400.00 327.30 $130,920.00 $400.00 327.30 $130,920.00

Gloria Tumanyan $350.00 4.25 $1,487.50 $350.00 4.25 $1,487.50

Kristina Unanyan $350.00 7.30 $2,555.00 $350.00 7.30 $2,555.00

Monique Eginli $325.00 .17.25 $5,606.25 $325.00 17.25 $5,606.25

Cecilia Son $325.00 20.00 $6,500.00 $325.00 20.00 $6,500.00

Taylor French $300.00 10.80 $3,240.00 $300.00 10.80 $3,240.00

Total Total Fees Requested $1,036,658.75 Granted $1,036,658.75

p. 124 -- I

CHART NO. 2- BC624838- DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

ATIORNEVS FEES

Rate Hours Total Rate Hours Attorney's Name Requested Requested Requested Granted Granted Total Granted

Carney Shegerian $1,100.00 381.70 $419,870.00 $1,100.00 381.70 $419,870.00

Anthony Nguyen $675.00 395.60 $267,030.00 $675.00 395.60 $267,030.00

Taylor Prainito $500.00 398.90 $199,450.00 $500.00 398.90 $199,450.00

Mark Lim $400.00 327.30 $130,920.00 $400.00 327.30 $130,920.00

Gloria Tumanyan $350.00 4.25 $1,487.50 $350.00 4.25 $1,487.50

Kristina Unanyan $350.00 7.30 $2,555.00 $350.00 7.30 $2,555.00

Monique Eginli $325.00 17.25 $5,606.25 $325.00 17.25 $5,606.25

Cecilia Son $325.00 20.00 $6,500.00 $325.00 20.00 $6,500.00

Taylor French $300.00 10.80 $3,240.00 $300.00 10.80 $3,240.00

Total Total Fees Requested $1,036,658.75 Granted $1,036,658. 75

Multiplier 1.75 $1,814,152.81

p. 125 CHART NO. 3- BC624838- DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

Motion to Tax Costs

Item No. Item Amount Requested Amount Taxed Amount Granted

1 Filing and motion fees $755.00 $0.00 $755.00

2 Jury fees $1,748.20 $0.00 $1,748.20

3 Jury food and lodging $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

4 Deposition costs $14,888.09 $0.00 $14,888.09

5 Service of process $1,906.00 $0.00 $1,906.00

6 Attachment expenses $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

7 Surety bond premiums $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

8 Witness fees $31,353.55 $635.00 $30,718.55

9 Court-ordered transcripts $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

10 Attorneys fees $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

11 Models, blowups, photocopies $15,497.27 $7,138.33 $8,358.94

12 Court reporter fees $4,743.00 $4,743.00 $0.00

13 Other $10,848.23 $10,823.23 $25.00

TOTAL $81,739.34 $23,339.56 $58,399.78

p. 126 EXHIBIT D to DAVID DERUBERTIS DECL Case 2:15-cv-01652-RSWL-SS Document 119 Filed 08/15/16 Page 1 of 22 Page ID #:2105

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 ROSI GODINEZ, an ) CV 15-01652 RSWL (SSx) individual, ) 13 ) ORDER Re: PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, ) MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ 14 ) FEES AND COSTS [107]. v. ) 15 ) ALTA-DENA CERTIFIED DAIRY, ) 16 LLC, a limited liability ) company; MARIA FLORES, an ) 17 individual and DOES 1 to ) 20, inclusive, ) 18 ) ) 19 Defendants. ) 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Rosi 22 Godinez’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and 23 Costs [107] (“Motion”). Plaintiff’s Motion arises out 24 of her action against Defendant Alta-Dena Certified 25 Dairy, LLC (“Defendant”) for disability discrimination, 26 retaliation, wrongful termination, disability 27 harassment, and failure to prevent disability 28 harassment in violation of the California Fair 1

p. 127 Case 2:15-cv-01652-RSWL-SS Document 119 Filed 08/15/16 Page 2 of 22 Page ID #:2106

1 Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), in addition to a 2 violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”), 3 ECF No. 1. On March 30, 2016, upon conclusion of a 4 five day jury trial, Judgment was entered in favor of 5 Plaintiff and against Defendant. See J., ECF No. 106. 6 Plaintiff was awarded a total recovery of $544,505.00, 7 as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. Plaintiff 8 now seeks an order awarding her attorneys’ fees in the 9 amount of $891,420.00 and expert witness fees in the 10 amount of $19,456.75. 11 II. BACKGROUND 12 A. Factual Background 13 Plaintiff was employed by Alta-Dena for 14 approximately 35 years, from 1978 until October 13, 15 2013. Compl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff began her employment at 16 Alta-Dena as a quality assurance laboratory technician 17 at the ice cream plant in City of Industry North. Id.; 18 Declaration of Sayaka Karitani, Ex. A (hereinafter 19 “Godinez Depo.”) 14:11-15:21. When Alta-Dena closed 20 its ice cream plant at the end of 2011, Plaintiff began 21 work in the milk processing plant (“Milk Plant”). Id. 22 at 15:22-24. In 2012, the Milk Plant became a party to 23 the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) with the 24 unit of Teamsters Local 630 (the “Union”). Id. at 25 58:19-59:6; Flores Decl. §§ 4, 6. In or about 2013, 26 and during her employment with Alta-Dena, Plaintiff 27 suffered from disabilities for which she requested 28 accommodation from Alta-Dena, including, but not 2

p. 128 Case 2:15-cv-01652-RSWL-SS Document 119 Filed 08/15/16 Page 3 of 22 Page ID #:2107

1 limited to, accommodations to her working environment, 2 her schedule, job duties, and leave, including leave 3 under the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”). Id. 4 at ¶ 9. Alta-Dena, via its managers, employees, and 5 agents, including Defendant Flores, knew of Plaintiff’s 6 disabilities and her desire for accommodation from 7 early 2013 until her employment was terminated on 8 October 31, 2013. Id. at ¶ 10. 9 Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant for 10 disability discrimination, retaliation, wrongful 11 termination, disability harassment, and failure to 12 prevent disability harassment in violation of FEHA, in 13 addition to a violation of the CFRA. Upon conclusion 14 of a five day jury trial, Judgment was entered in favor 15 of Plaintiff, whom was awarded a recovery of 16 $544,505.00, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. See 17 J., ECF No. 106. Plaintiff now seeks an order awarding 18 her attorneys’ fees in the amount of $445,710.00, with 19 a multiplier of 2.0, for a total fee award of 20 $891,420.00. Plaintiff further seeks $19,456.75 in 21 expert fees. 22 B. Procedural Background 23 On March 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in 24 the Superior Court of California, County of Los 25 Angeles. On March 6, 2015, Alta-Dena removed the 26 action to this Court [1]. On October 27, 2015, Alta- 27 Dena filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the 28 Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment [19]. On 3

p. 129 Case 2:15-cv-01652-RSWL-SS Document 119 Filed 08/15/16 Page 4 of 22 Page ID #:2108

1 January 29, 2016, this Court granted in part and denied 2 in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [54]. 3 A jury-trial commenced on March 8, 2016, and concluded 4 on March 14, 2016. Judgment was entered in favor of 5 Plaintiff, who was awarded a recovery of $544,505.00, 6 and attorneys’ fees and costs [106]. Plaintiff now 7 files the present Motion [107], seeking attorneys’ fees 8 and costs. 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 A. Legal Standard 11 Under the “American Rule,” each party to a lawsuit 12 is generally responsible for its own attorneys' fees. 13 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). The 14 Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) permits courts 15 to award attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert 16 witness fees, to the “prevailing party.” Cal. Gov. 17 Code § 12965(b). The party seeking fees bears the 18 burden of proving his entitlement to fees, the 19 reasonableness of the fees sought, and a fee 20 enhancement if sought. See Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 21 4th 1122, 1138 (2001). 22 The calculation of attorneys’ fees in a removed 23 diversity action, such as the present case, is governed 24 by California law. Crommie v. State of Cal., Public 25 Utilities Comm’n, 840 F. Supp. 719, 724 (N.D. Cal. 26 1994) (citing Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1237 (9th 27 Cir. 1991)). Under California law, the general rule is 28 that the amount of an attorneys’ fee award is within 4

p. 130 Case 2:15-cv-01652-RSWL-SS Document 119 Filed 08/15/16 Page 5 of 22 Page ID #:2109

1 the sound discretion of the trial court. Hancock Lab., 2 Inc. v. Admiral Ins., 777 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 3 1985). Under California law, “the primary method for 4 establishing the amount of ‘reasonable’ attorney fees 5 is the lodestar method. The lodestar (or touchstone) 6 is produced by multiplying the number of hours 7 reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly 8 rate. The goal of the lodestar method is to “fully 9 compensate counsel for the prevailing party services 10 reasonably provided.” Horsford v. Board of Trustees of 11 California State University, 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395 12 (2005). 13 Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may 14 increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive 15 or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into account a variety 16 of other factors, including the quality of the 17 representation, the novelty and complexity of the 18 issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk 19 presented. Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122 (2001). 20 B. Analysis 21 In the present Motion, Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ 22 fees in the amount of $445,710, with a 2.0 lodestar 23 enhancement, for a total fee award of $891,420. See 24 generally Mot. 1:11-12, ECF No. 107. Plaintiff also 25 seeks $19,456.75 in expert witness fees. Id. 26 Additionally, Plaintiff states in her Motion that she 27 reserves the right to seek additional fees, that may be 28 incurred addressing any post-trial motions. Upon 5

p. 131 Case 2:15-cv-01652-RSWL-SS Document 119 Filed 08/15/16 Page 6 of 22 Page ID #:2110

1 review of Plaintiff’s Motion and all relevant papers, 2 this Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s Motion for 3 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [107]. 4 1. The Hours Spent by Plaintiff’s Counsel are 5 Sufficiently Documented and Reasonable 6 The first issue the Court must consider is whether 7 the number of hours spent by Plaintiff’s counsel are 8 reasonable. To decide this, the “basis for the trial 9 court’s calculation must be the actual hours counsel 10 has devoted to the case, less those that result from 11 inefficient or duplicative use of time.” Horsford, 132 12 Cal.App.4th at 399-400. Counsel’s time records are 13 “the starting point for [the court’s] lodestar 14 determination.” Id. In fact, “the verified time 15 statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, 16 are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear 17 indication the records are erroneous.” Id. 18 Plaintiff claims that Potter, whom exclusively 19 handled the case from filing the original Complaint in 20 March 2014 until trial, expended a total of 440.20 1 21 hours to date on Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Plaintiff 22 further alleges counsel from Alder Law, associated 23 counsel whom litigated the case, expended the following 24 25 1Potter clarifies that he personally spent about 435.20 26 hours on Plaintiff’s lawsuit. An attorney and former colleague Gary Och spent 5 hours on the lawsuit. Och’s 5 hours were spent 27 preparing for, traveling to, and engaging in a motion to remand the case when Potter was unable to attend due to unforeseen 28 circumstances. Potter Decl. ¶¶ 12, 13, ECF No. 107-8. 6

p. 132 Case 2:15-cv-01652-RSWL-SS Document 119 Filed 08/15/16 Page 7 of 22 Page ID #:2111

1 hours in litigating this matter: Mike Alder, 96.4 2 hours; Marni Folinsky, 185.4 hours; Allison Stone, 2.6 3 hours. Mot. 2:3-12. 4 Upon review of the proffered time records, the 5 Court finds the hours sought for reimbursement by 6 Plaintiff are sufficiently detailed. See Decl. of 7 Michael Alder (“Alder Decl.”) Ex. A, ECF No. 107-7; 8 Decl. of Donald Potter (“Potter Decl.”) Ex. A, ECF No. 9 107-9. In the time records, Potter and Alder break 10 down the hours spent by each attorney on this case, 11 detailing the date, task, and hourly rate of the 12 attorney whom completed those hours. Id. The records 13 detail the proportion of time spent on written 14 discovery, law and motion, percipient and expert 15 depositions, settlement negotiations, trial 16 preparation, and trial. Id. 17 The Court further finds that the records show that 18 all hours were reasonably spent in pursuit of 19 Plaintiff’s case, as viewed at the time the work was 20 performed. See Moore v. Jas. H Matthews & Co., 682 21 F,2d 830, 839 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding compensation is 22 appropriate for “every item of service which, at the 23 time rendered, would have been undertaken by a 24 reasonable and prudent lawyer to advance or protect his 25 client’s interest.”). There is no indication that 26 Donald Potter or counsel from Alder Law expended 27 duplicative, inefficient, or excessive hours in any 28 area. Significantly, Defendant does not proffer any 7

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1 evidence of such. Further, there is no indication that 2 any hours detailed in any of the attorneys’ time 3 records are erroneous, so as to overcome the 4 “presumption of validity” these time records are due. 5 Horsford, 132 Cal.App.4th at 396. 6 Defendant notes that Potter seeks to be compensated 7 for ninety hours of work on this matter since January 8 21, 2016, which is when Alder and Folinsky began to 9 handle the case. Opp’n 5:13-27. Defendant argues that 10 “[s]uch entries were unnecessary and should not be 11 awarded to [Plaintiff],” id., however, Defendant does 12 not provide the Court with any argument, case law, or 13 reasoning in support of this position. 14 Upon review of Potter’s time records during this 15 period, the Court finds that these hours were 2 16 reasonably spent in furtherance of Plaintiff’s lawsuit, 17 and thus Plaintiff should be compensated for this time. 18 Discounting the time Potter spent on the case during 19 trial would be improper as Potter was actively involved 20 in the litigation, and associated AlderLaw into the 21 case solely as trial counsel. Plaintiff has proffered 22 argument and evidence to show Potter’s “participation 23 in the month before trial and at trial was critical to 24 25 2Potter details his time spent completing tasks, such as: 26 discussing settlement offers with defense counsel, communicating with Folinsky regarding the trial, communicating with defense 27 counsel regarding the motions in limine, preparing charts for use as display for trial, reviewing Defendant’s proposed jury 28 instructions, etc. Potter Decl., Ex A. 8

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1 the success of the trial,” for example, “his presence 2 was of key importance to observe the trial testimony of 3 the witnesses whose depositions he solely handled and 4 to strategize throughout the trial.” Reply 6:1-21. 5 Defendant then argues that Plaintiff should not be 6 awarded costs for getting Alder and Folinsky “up to 7 speed” about the case in the month-and-a-half before 8 trial. Opp’n 6:1-8. Defendant argues that those fees 9 “would have been unnecessary had Potter handled the 10 case through trial,” and thus those fees are not 11 reasonable and should not be compensated. Id. at 6:1-8. 12 Again, Defendant provides no support for its 13 argument. Nonetheless, the Court finds this argument 14 wholly unconvincing, as Alder and Folinsky couldn’t 15 have possibly litigated the case without getting “up to 16 speed” on the matter. Defendant concedes that Alder 17 spent 13.8 hours and Folinsky spent 33.2 hours 18 preparing for trial. Opp’n 6:14-17. The Court finds 19 these hours not only reasonable, but a demonstration of 20 efficiency in reviewing the matter’s two year history 21 and numerous disputed issues. Alder and Folinsky must 22 be compensated for this time reasonably spent in 23 pursuit of Plaintiff’s case. 24 Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not 25 be awarded fees for two “needless” motions that were 26 filed - (1) a motion to remand the case to state court, 27 and (2) a motion to compel the production of employee 28 work schedules. Defendant contends that “those tasks 9

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1 were not reasonable and, as a result, [Plaintiff] 2 should receive no compensation for them.” Opp’n 7:3-7. 3 Upon review of the parties’ papers, the Court finds 4 these motions were reasonably filed and, in fact, 5 resulted from the parties’ failure to cooperate during 6 the meet-and-confer process. In so finding, the Court 7 notes: “‘Attorneys generally must pursue all available 8 legal avenues and theories in pursuit of their clients' 9 objectives; it is impossible, as a practical matter, 10 for an attorney to know in advance whether or not his 11 or her work on a potentially meritorious legal theory 12 will ultimately prevail.’” Greene v. Dillingham 13 Construction, N.A., Inc., 101 Cal.App.4th 418, 424 14 (2002) (citing Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, 213 15 Cal.App.3d 231, 250 (1989)). Accordingly, Plaintiff 16 should be compensated for time spent on these motions. 17 In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff has met her 18 burden in proving the reasonableness of all hours 19 sought for reimbursement. The Court further finds 20 Defendant has failed to show the claimed hours are 21 unreasonable. 22 2. The Hourly Rates Sought by Plaintiff’s Counsel 23 are Reasonable 24 Plaintiff’s attorneys are seeking compensation for 25 fees at the following hourly rates: $950/hour (Michael 26 Alder); $600/hour (Marni Folinsky); and $550/hour 27 (Donald Potter). Alder Decl. ¶ 17. 28 Defendant argues that these rates are 10

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1 “unjustifiably high.” Opp’n 3:3. Defendant claims 2 that Plaintiff’s attorneys offer no evidence of an 3 hourly rate that they actually charge to paying 4 clients, rather than contingency clients. Id. at 4:1- 5 10. Defendant then suggests that this Court should cap 6 Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates at $300 per hour, because, 7 as Defendant argues, that is “the proper rate to be 8 charged by contingency attorneys for single plaintiff 9 employment discrimination cases.” Id. at 3:15-24. 10 The Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates are 11 reasonable. As noted above, the lodestar method 12 considers the “basic fee for comparable legal services 13 in the community.” Horsford, 132 Cal.App.4th at 397 14 (citing Ketchum, 14 Cal.4th at 1132). Defendant is 15 incorrect in asserting that Plaintiff proffers no 16 evidence of counsel’s rates for paying clients. 17 Plaintiff’s attorneys attest to their current billing 18 rates in Potter and Alder’s supporting declarations. 19 See Potter Decl. ¶ 16 (“My current billing rate is five 20 hundred and fifty dollars per hour ($550.00)”); Alder 21 Decl. ¶ 17 (“My regular hourly rate is $950 per hour, 22 Ms. Folinsky’s hourly rate is $600 per hour and Ms. 3 23 Stone’s hourly rate is $300 per hour.”). Nowhere in 24 25 3Alder notes in his Declaration: “AlderLaw is divided into 26 teams consisting of a Senior Attorney, Associate, Paralegal, and Legal Assistant. The team assigned to [Plaintiff’s] case 27 practices in the area of employment law. . . [and] consisted of Marni Folinsky, Senior Attoney, and Allison Stone, Associate.” 28 Alder Decl. ¶ 13. 11

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1 these declarations do Potter or Alder indicate these 2 rates are only applied to contingency cases. Further, 3 there is no indication these rates are falsified or 4 exaggerated, and as discussed above, counsel’s records, 5 “as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in 6 the absence of a clear indication [they] are 7 erroneous.” Holsford, 132 Cal.App.4th at 396. 8 Plaintiff bolsters her argument that the rates 9 sought are reasonable with five supporting 10 declarations. See Decl. of Carney R. Shegerian 11 (“Sherigan Decl.”), ECF No. 107-5; Decl. of Arash 12 Homampour (“Homampour Decl.”), ECF No. 107-4; Decl. of 13 Lee Feldman (“Feldman Decl.”), ECF No. 107-3; Decl. of 14 Joseph R. Becerra (“Becerra Decl.”), ECF No. 107-2; 15 Decl. of Frank Alfonso (“Alfonso Decl.”), ECF No. 10-2. 16 In these declarations, five similarly experienced labor 17 and employment attorneys from the Los Angeles area 18 attest that: “[b]ased on [their] knowledge and 19 experience of billing rates for work of similar 20 complexity in the community, and [their] knowledge of 21 the skill, experience, reputations and expertise of 22 Plaintiff’s counsel in this case, it is [their] 23 professional opinion that the hourly rates sought in 24 this case are well within the range of reasonableness 25 for attorneys of similar skill, expertise, experience 26 and reputation performing work of similar complexity.” 27 Shegerian Decl. ¶ 9; see also Becerra Decl. ¶ 8; 28 Alfonso Decl. ¶ 9; Feldman Decl. ¶ 7; Homampour Decl. ¶ 12

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1 16. Furthermore, these supporting declarations 2 exemplify that Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees are 3 reasonable, as the attesting labor and employment 4 attorneys, with similarly extensive experience, charge 5 the following rates themselves: Arash Homampour: 6 $975/hour, Frank Alfonso: $600/hour, Joseph R. Becerra: 7 $550/hour, Carney R. Shegerian: $700/hour. Finally, 8 the Court finds Defendant’s argument that courts in 9 this district generally limit attorneys’ fee rates in 10 single-plaintiff employment cases to $300 per hour is 11 unsupported and without merit. The Court finds the 12 rates sought by Plaintiff are reasonable and accurately 13 reflect their stature in the field of labor and 14 employment contingency litigation. 15 3. The Court Will Apply a Lodestar Multiplier 16 Plaintiff requests that the Court apply a 2.0 17 lodestar multiplier, awarding Plaintiff a sum total of 18 $891,420 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff argues such a 19 multiplier is warranted because of (1) the risk 20 presented by taking on the matter on contingency, (2) 21 Plaintiff’s counsel’s preclusion from other work, and 22 (3) the exceptional results obtained at trial. Mot. 23 12:6-17:7. 24 “In FEHA cases, the trial court has the discretion 25 to apply a multiplier or fee enhancement to the 26 lodestar figure.” Greene, 101 Cal.App.4th at 426-427 27 (citing Flannery v. California Highway Patrol, 61 28 Cal.App.4th 629, 646 (1998); Serrano v. Priest, 20 13

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4 1 Cal.3d 25, 48–49 (1977)). “The purpose of such 2 adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for 3 the particular action. In effect, the court 4 determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation 5 involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary 6 legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned 7 lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate 8 for such services.” In re Vitamin Cases, 110 Cal. App. 9 4th 1041, 1052 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 10 Public policy supports an adjustment in contingent fee 11 matters, and specifically in FEHA matters, because: “‘A 12 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and 13 provides legal services is not receiving the fair 14 market value of his work if he is paid only for the 15 second of these functions. If he is paid no more, 16 competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award 17 cases.’” Id. (quoting Ketchum 24 Cal.4th at p. 18 1132–1133). “The contingency adjustment may be made at 19 the lodestar phase of the court's calculation or by 20 applying a multiplier to the noncontingency lodestar 21 calculation (but not both).” Id. 22 “In determining the exact quantum of the 23 multiplier, California courts evaluate several factors, 24 4 25 California courts have consistently noted that attorneys’ fees awarded to “prevailing parties” in FEHA cases are intended 26 to provide “fair compensation to the attorneys involved in the litigation at hand and encourage [ ] litigation of claims that in 27 the public interest merit litigation.” Flannery v. Prentice, 26 Cal.4th 572, 583 (2001) (citing Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 63 28 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1172 (1998)). 14

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1 including: ‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the 2 questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in 3 presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of 4 the litigation precluded other employment by the 5 attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee 6 award.’” National Federation of the Blind v. Target 7 Corp., 2009 WL 2390261, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009) 8 (citing Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132). “The total fee 9 amount is then compared against lodestar multipliers in 10 comparable cases.” Id. 11 Here, Plaintiff’s counsel argue they are entitled 12 to an increased lodestar because “the contingent-risk 13 factor was enormous.” Mot. 14:19-21. “Plaintiff’s 14 counsel spent more than 700 hours in attorney time over 15 the course of several years and advanced nearly $50,000 5 16 in costs” on the matter. Id. To date, Plaintiff’s 17 counsel maintain they have not received any payment for 18 the hours expended, nor any reimbursement for the 19 fronted litigation expenses. Potter Decl. ¶ 11. 20 Further, Plaintiff contends “[t]his was an extremely 21 risky case. Given the complexity of Defendant’s 22 business and Plaintiff’s job, Plaintiff had an uphill 23 battle getting the jury to understand the essential 24 functions of Plaintiff’s job as lab tech in a milk 25 processing plant.” Id. 26 5Alder notes he advanced approximately $28,000 in costs. 27 Alder Decl. ¶ 11. Potter Notes he advanced “approximately $20,000.00 of [his] own money for litigation costs to prosecute 28 this lawsuit.” Potter Decl. ¶ 12. 15

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1 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are not 2 limited to recovering their hourly rate on the time 3 spent on the case, but rather are entitled to an 4 increased lodestar amount, reflecting the value of the 5 contingency factor, as well as the difficulty of the 6 issues at hand, the skill exemplified by counsel, and 7 the exceptional results obtained. See Cazares v. 8 Saenz, 208 Cal.App.3d 279, 289 (1989). 9 The Court notes, specifically in the case of 10 Potter, that the length of this case itself presented 11 an economic difficulty to the solo practitioner. An 12 award of fees based solely on the lodestar, without a 13 significant lodestar multiplier, would fail to 14 compensate Potter for the great risk he took in 15 pursuing Plaintiff’s claim. See In re Vitamin Cases, 16 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1054. The Court further notes 17 that Alder Law took great risk in working hundreds of 18 hours and advancing tens of thousands of dollars in 19 costs, in spite of the very real risk that counsel 20 would never be entirely compensated, or compensated at 21 all. See Horsford, 132 Cal.App.4th at 394. 22 Additionally, the present matter involved numerous 23 complicated issues, increasing the risk presented by 6 24 its contingent nature. 25 6 26 In order to properly present Plaintiff’s case to the jury, Plaintiff’s counsel had to break-down many nuanced tasks and job 27 requirements to argue that Plaintiff was capable of working despite her physical disabilities. Whether Plaintiff could 28 complete these tasks was a central issue in this case - and thus 16

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1 Next, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently 2 shown the Court that the demands of the present matter 3 precluded counsel from accepting other work – 4 specifically, Potter was precluded from other work 7 5 during the years of pre-trial litigation , and counsel 6 from Alder Law were precluded from other work during 8 7 trial and post-trial motion practice. 8 Further, the Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel 9 demonstrated great skill in litigating the case, and 10

11 Plaintiff’s job requirements required close and intense analysis including, inter alia, scheduling and staffing of co-workers, 12 physical requirements of each task, the time and frequency of 13 each task (as completed by Plaintiff and her coworkers), the tools and equipment available to employees, and the layout of the 14 facility. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel delved into Plaintiff’s disability history, and treatment of her disability, as well as 15 analysis of Plaintiff and Defendant’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. Potter Decl. ¶¶ 18-21. 16 7In his declaration, Potter notes that he “operate[s] a 17 small office with finite resources, “ and that “[p]rior to February 2016, [he] did not employ any attorney.” Potter Decl. ¶ 18 10. Potter notes that he has “prosecuted her case . . . since 19 [he] filed the lawsuit in the Los Angeles Superior Court in March 2014.” Id. at ¶ 11. Potter maintains that his firm has incurred 20 440.20 hours to date on Plaintiff’s case, and he personally has spent 435.30 hours on the litigation. Id. at ¶ 12. Potter 21 explains that “[a]s a true sole practitioner, my firm has a finite amount of time [and] resources to expend on cases we 22 prosecute. The substantial time and cost I invested in [Plaintiff’s] lawsuit necessarily precluded my office from 23 accepting other employment and I had to decline a number of potential cases that I could have otherwise pursued.” Id. at ¶ 24 43. 25 8In his declaration, Alder states “[w]ithout disclosing 26 privileged and proprietary information, I can represent to the Court that by taking on this representation and agreeing to try 27 [Plaintiff’s] case, it meant that I had to decline other matters so that I could dedicate[] my time to this matter.” Alder Decl. 28 ¶ 12. 17

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1 ultimately obtained exceptional results at trial. In 2 the present case, the jury awarded Plaintiff more than 3 five times the amount of Defendant’s Offer of Judgment 9 4 prior to trial. Plaintiff proceeded to trial in spite 5 of this Offer because, as Plaintiff states, “[t]his was 6 nowhere close to the amount of Plaintiff’s claimed 7 damages . . .,” and Defendant “never made a reasonable 8 settlement offer.” Mot. 10:8-12. Defendant contends 9 that it disposed of three of Plaintiff’s claims at the 10 summary judgment stage, and thus Plaintiff did not 11 obtain exceptional results worthy of the fees 12 requested. On the contrary, this Court notes that it 13 is not significant that three of Plaintiff’s claims 14 were disposed of at the summary judgment stage. It is 15 not unusual in employment discrimination cases for 10 16 counsel to plead alternative theories at the outset. 17 Rather, it is significant that the jury found in favor 18 of Plaintiff on all five surviving claims, and awarded 19 Plaintiff more than five times Defendant’s Offer of 20 Judgment, over half a million dollars. Accordingly, 21 the Court awards Plaintiff’s counsel an upward lodestar 22 9Plaintiff notes that just prior to trial, “[o]n February 23 11, 2016, [Defendant] made an Offer of Judgment pursuant to Rule 24 68 for $100,001 exclusive of attorneys’ fees costs.” Mot. 4:2-3. 10 25 “Employment discrimination cases, by their very nature, involve several causes of action arising from the same set of 26 facts. A responsible attorney handling an employment discrimination case must plead a variety of statutory, tort, and 27 contract causes of action in order to fully protect the interests of his or her client.” Brown v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 477, 28 486 (1984). 18

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1 adjustment on the additional bases of exceptional skill 2 and success at trial. See Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. 3 v. Blythe, 32 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1674, fn8 (1995) (“In 4 some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award may 5 be justified.”). 6 The Court finds that while an upward adjusted 7 lodestar is appropriate, a 2.0 multiplier is not. 8 California courts have only upheld such high 9 multipliers on limited occasions. Two factors that 10 have frequently weighed in favor of awarding such high 11 multipliers include when a plaintiff obtains (1) 12 exceptional results in the absence of supporting 13 precedent, and (2) when pursuit of an action has in 14 some way expanded a public right. See National 15 Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp., 2009 WL 16 2390261, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009) (“Exceptional 17 results in the face of vigorous opposition and in the 18 absence of supporting precedent militate in favor of 19 higher multiplier values.”); Vizcaino v. Microsoft 20 Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) 21 (“exceptional results” warranting a high fee multiplier 22 exist when “counsel pursued th[e] case in the absence 23 of supporting precedents.”). The Ninth Circuit has 24 consistently held that a 2.0 multiplier is appropriate 25 when an action not only enforces a private right, but 26 in doing so “provide[s] a significant public benefit” 27 by, for example, expanding statutory protections by 28 extending the applicability of discrimination laws. 19

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1 National Federation of the Blind, 2009 WL 2390261, at 2 *6 (2009); but see Flannery v. California Highway 3 Patrol, 61 Cal.App.4th 629 (1998) (finding that a 4 successful action, even when it sent a message that 5 sexual discrimination and harassment would not be 6 tolerated, failed to register as a significant public 7 benefit, and thus a larger lodestar multiplier was not 8 warranted.). 9 Where an action does not achieve such success in 10 the absence of precedent, however warrants some upward 11 adjustment of the lodestar due to factors such as 12 contingent risk, great skill, or exceptional results at 13 trial, courts have applied a more modest multiplier. 14 “It has been observed that ‘contingency enhancements in 15 fee-shifting cases ordinarily should range between five 16 and fifty-percent of the lodestar fee, with the 17 enhancement in typically contingency cases ranging 18 between twenty and thirty-five percent of the 19 lodestar.’” Schefke v. Reliabile Collection Agency, 20 Ltd., 96 Hawai’i 408, 455 (Haw. 2001) (citing Rendine 21 v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 343 (N.J. 1995)). 22 Accordingly, and in consideration of all the 23 factors discussed above, the Court finds that an 24 enhancement of the lodestar by 25% of the original fee 25 amount of $445,720 is appropriate. The Court does not 26 hesitate to award these fees simply because it would 27 amount to a fees award higher than the jury’s damages 28 award to Plaintiff. In fact, the Court notes that 20

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1 discrimination claims “undoubtedly require substantial 2 effort from counsel.” Simmons v. PCR Technology, 209 3 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In fact, 4 California courts often award attorneys’ fees in excess 5 of the jury award, when appropriate: “The court notes 6 that in its twenty-plus years’ experience, attorneys’ 7 fees in individual discrimination cases often exceed 8 the damages.” Simmons, 209 F.Supp.2d at 1035; see also 9 Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist., 79 10 Cal.App.4th 440, 445 (2002) (affirming a fee award of 11 more than ten times the compensatory damages award 12 based on trial court finding that defendant failed to 13 offer any amount in settlement while knowing of the 14 defendants’ discriminatory conduct, forcing the matter 15 to be intensely litigated at trial). In consideration 16 of all of the above, the Court awards Plaintiff’s 17 counsel a 25% upward lodestar adjustment, for a total 18 fee award of $557,150. 19 4. Plaintiff Should be Awarded the Expert Fees 20 Sought in their Entirety 21 Plaintiff additionally seeks expert witness fees in 22 the amount of $19,456.75. Mot. 16-17. Alder attests 23 in his declaration that $8,393.75 was paid to Formuzis 24 Pickersgill & Hunt to prepare an economic analysis of 25 Plaintiff’s loss of earnings. Alder Decl. ¶ 11; see 26 Reply Exs. A, B ECF Nos. 111-1, 111-2. Plaintiff notes 27 that “[a]n economist was needed in this case to 28 calculate [Plaintiff’s] past loss of earnings and 21

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1 benefits and the present value of her future loss of 2 earnings.” Alder Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff additionally 3 paid $11,063 to Dr. Anthony Reading who testified about 4 the emotional distress Plaintiff suffered as a result 5 of Defendant’s conduct. Id.; see Reply Ex. B, ECF No. 6 111-3. 7 As discussed above, FEHA specifically permits the 8 Court to award costs to the “prevailing party,” 9 including expert fees. See Cal. Gov. Code § 12965(b). 10 Upon review of the invoices from Plaintiff’s experts, 11 the Court should find the fees sought are reasonable 12 and sufficiently detailed. Accordingly, pursuant to 13 FEHA, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for 14 $19,456.75 in expert fees. 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS 17 Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [107], 18 however applies a 25% upward lodestar adjustment, for a 19 total of $557,150.00 in attorneys’ fees. Further, the 20 Court awards Plaintiff its requested expert fees, a 21 total of $19,456.75. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 DATED: August 15, 2016 s/ RONALD S.W. LEW 24 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW 25 Senior U.S. District Judge 26 27 28 22

p. 148 EXHIBIT E to DAVID DERUBERTIS DECL SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ! .

DATE: 04/19 /16 DEPT; 56

HONORABLE MICHAEL JOHNSON JUDGE P. SOLIS DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #4 JACKIE SIENSKI, 12390, G. RODRIGUEZ, C.A. Deputy Sheriff PRO TEMPORE Reporter

8:30 am BC528671 Plaintiff Victor George {x) Counsel Wayne Smith {x) DOREEN OLSON MACKEY Elvi s Tran (x) vs Defendant Tracey Kennedy (x) HELINET AVIATION ET AL Counsel Ryan Krueger (x)

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION OF PLAINTIFF FOR ATTORNEY FEES;

Matter is called for hearing. The Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore is signed and filed this date, and the case proceeds with the reporter of r ecord as reflected on the minute order. The mo tion is argued and ordered to stand submitted. Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs, previously set for hearing on May 12, 2016, is advanced to this date and continued to May 18, 2016 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 56.

Later 1 the Court rules as follows on the ·. motion: Motion is granted in part. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered on 2/8/16 in favor of Plaintiff Doreen Mackey in the amount of $2,766,725 against Defendants He l inet Aviati on, Helinet Aviation Servi ces LLC and Helinet Technologies. Plaintiff now moves for recovery of attorney fees. Evidence - Defendants have objected to the declarations by George, Smith, Tran, Aguiar, Panish, Quigley,

MINUTES ENTERED Page 1 of 7 DEPT. 56 04/19/16 COUNTY CLERK

p. p.083 149 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 04/19/16 DEPT. 56

HONORABLE MICHAEL JOHNSON JUDGE P. SOLIS DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #4-A JACKIE SIENSKI, 12390, G. RODRIGUEZ, C.A. Deputy Sheriff PRO TEMPORE Reporter

8:30 am BC528671 Plaintiff Victor George (x) Counsel Wayne Smith (x) DOREEN OLSON MACKEY Elvis Tran (x) vs . Defendant Tracey Kennedy (x) HELINET AVIATION ET AL Counsel Ryan Krueger (x)

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: deRubertis and Pine. Objections 47, 68 and 69 are sustained, and the rest are overruled. Plaintiff has objected to the Kennedy declaration. All objections are overruled. Lodestar - Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of reasonable attorney fees under the FEHA, Gov't Code §12965(b). The determination of a reasonable fee begins with the "lodestar" - the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community. E.g. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095; Vo v .. Las Virgenes Water Dist . . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 445. Plaintiff requests a lodestar of $939,335, based upon 1,355.45· attorney hours. The specific calculation is as follows: George, 437.75 hours at $950 = $415,862.50; Smith, 577.9 hours at $675 = $390,082.50; Tran 276 . 8 hours at $425 = $117,640; and Aguiar, 63 hours at $250 = $15,750'. ' Defendants contend that Plaintiff's lodestar is unreasonably inf lated, because the hourly rates are too high, George and Smith did not appropriately delegate work to attorneys or paralegals at a lower rate, the attorneys engaged in excessive duplication, some of the billings reflect services that should have been absorbed as firm overhead, the fees are not supported by adequate documentation,

MINUTES ENTERED 10 Page 2 of 7 DEPT. 56 04/19/16 ~ COUNTY CLERK ~ A, N I'>,.> f'-..,?""' @,.....,. f;i')

p.084p. 150 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 04/19/16 DEPT. 56

HONORABLE MICHAEL JOHNSON JUDGE P. SOLIS DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #4""' .8 JACKIE SIENSKI, 12390, G. RODRIGUEZ, C.A. Deputy Sheriff PRO TEMPORE Reporter

8:30 am BC528671 Plaintiff Victor George (x) Counsel Wayne Smith (x) DOREEN OLSON MACKEY Elvis Tran (x) vs De fendant Tracey Kennedy (x)' HELINET AVI ATION ET AL Counsel Ryan Krueger (x)

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: and about $50,000 of the lodestar accounts for George's work on an unrelated criminal matter. Defendants• arguments are hot persuasive. The attorneys• hourly rates are very high for an employment case of this kind, and the court finds them to be above the rang.e for comparable work in Los Angeles; nevertheless, they do not require reduction in light of the other factors discussed below regarding Plaintiff's request for an enhancement. The attorneys' s.ervices and hours of work were reasonable and appropriate; the number of hours were appropriate, duplication was insignificant, and delegation was reasonable for a small law f i rm . .The attorney billing records were reasonable; each billing was described . appropriately, there were no unreasonable charges for overhead, and there was no "block billing" that prevents evaluation of th.e attorneys' services. George's work on the criminal matter was appropriate; Plaintiff was called to testify before a criminal grand jury on issues related to her civil claims, and it was appropriate for George to counsel and guide her on matters that could have fundamentally affected this case. The court will therefore accept Plaintiff's lodestar in the amount of $939,335. Multiplier ,.. Plaint iff has requested a multiplier of 2.0, for a

MINUTES ENTERED Page 3 of 7 DEPT. 56 04/19/16 COUNTY CLERK

p.085p. 151 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 04/19 /16' DEPI'. 56

HONORABLE MICHAEL JOHNSON JUDGE P. SOLIS DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #4-& JACKIE SIENSKI, 12390, G. RODRIGUEZ, C.A. Deputy Sheriff PRO TEMPORE Reporter

8:30 am BCS28671 Plaintiff Victor George (x) Counsel Wayne Smith (x) DOREEN OLSON MACKEY Elvis Tran (x) vs Defendant Tracey Kennedy ( x) HELINET AVIATION ET .AL Counsel Ryan Krueger (x)

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

total fee award of $1,878,6~0. A multiplier is a tool that can be used to modify the lodestar in order to reach an appropriate attorney fee award. The court can apply a multiplier to adjust the lodestar up or down to account for the unique circumstances of the particular case. See Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 ("The touchstone figure may be increased or decreased by the trial court depending on other factors involved in the lawsuit."); Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1172 (Gov't Code §12965(b) "authorizes an award of reasonable attorney fees, not an award of reasonable fees plus an enhancement"). In Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49, the Supreme Court suggested a number of factors which can be considered for a multiplier. The factors which apply here are "(l) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award". 20 Cal.3d at 49. The Court has considered these factors, as well as Plaintiff's other arguments. It has concluded that

MINUTES ENTERED Page 4 of 7 DEPT. 56 04/19/16 COUNTY CLERK

p.086p. 152 e· e SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 04/19 /16 DEPT. 56

HONORABLE MICHAEL JOHNSON JUDGE P. SOLIS DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #4-9 JACKIE SIENSKI, 12390, G. RODRIGUEZ, C.A. Deputy Sheriff PRO TEMPORE Reporter

8:30 am BC528671 Plaintiff Victor George · (x) Counsel · Wayne Smith (x) DOREEN OLSON MACKEY Elvis Tran (x) vs Defendant Tracey Kennedy (x) HELINET AVIATION ET AL Counsel Ryan Krueger (x)

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Plaintiff's request for a 2.0 multiplier is not warranted in this case, and a multiplier of 1.2 is appropriate. This results in a fee award of $1,127,202. The Court believes that Plaintiff's high hourly rates largely compensate for the factors which would otherwise militate in favor of a positive multiplier, such as the skill displayed by the attorneys, preclusion of other work, contingent nature of a fee award, and delay in payment . In Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, tpe Supreme Court mad~ favorable comments about the role of a positive multiplier when cases are taken on a contingency basis. But the Supreme Court also directed trial courts to "consider the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors under Serrano III. We emphasize that when determining the appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar." 24 Cal.4th at 1138. That is what the Court has done here. The Court believes that Plaintiff ' s high hourly rates largely compensate for the enhancement factors which are to be considered for a multiplier. Having considered all of the evidence and argument presented by the parties, the Court believes that a 1.2 multiplier and a fee award of $1,127,202 are reasonable and appropriate.

MINUTES ENTERED .Page 5 of 7 DEPT. 56 04/19/16 COUNTY CLERK

p.087p. 153 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 04/19 /16 DEPT. 56

HONORABLE MICHAEL JOHNSON JUDGE P. SOLIS DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #4-E.- JACKIE SIENSKI, 12390, G. RODRIGUEZ, C.A. Deputy Sheriff PRO TEMPORE Reporter

8:30 am BC528671 Plaintiff Victor George (x) Counsel Wayne Smith (x) DOREEN OLSON MACKEY Elvis Tran {x) vs Defendant Tracey Kennedy (x) HELINET AVIATION ET AL Counsel Ryan Krueger (x)

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Ruling - As the Supreme Court stated in Chavez v. City of Los Angeles ( 2010) 47 Cal. 4th 970, 985, "the .trial court's ultimate goal is •to determine a reasonable attorney fee'"· Having considered all the rel evant factors, the court believes that $1,127,202 is a reasonable and appropriate attorney fee in this case. Fees are therefore awarded to Plaintiff in that amount. CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, the. below-named Executive Officer/Clerk of the above-entit led court, do hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause herein, and that on this date I served the April 19, 2016 minute order upon each party or counsel named below by placing the document for collection and mailing so as to cause it to be deposited in the United States mail at the courthouse in Los Angeles, California, one copy of the original filed/entered herein in a separate sealed envelope to each address as shown below with the postage thereon fully prepaid, in accordance with standard court practices.

Dated: 4-19-16 Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk

"MINUTES ENTERED Page 6 of 7 DEPT. 56 04/19/16 COUNTY CLERK

p.088p. 154 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE: 04/19/16 DEPT. 56

HONORABLE MICHAEL JOHNSON JUDGE P. SOLIS DEPUTY CLERK

HONORABLE JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR #4-f JACKIE SIENSKI, 12390, G. RODRIGUEZ, C.A. Deputy Sheriff PRO TEMPORE Reporter

8:30 am BC528671 Plaintiff Victor George (x) Counsel Wayne Smith (x) DOREEN OLSON MACKEY Elvis Tran {x) vs Defendant Tracey Kennedy (x) HELINET AVIATION ET AL Counsel Ryan Krueger (x)

NATURE OF10CEEDINGS: By:~ P. Solis, Deputy

Victor L. George Law Offices of Victor L. George 20355 Hawthorne Blvd 1st Floor Torrance CA 90503

Tracey A.. Kennedy Sheppard Mullin Richter Hampton 333 S Hope St 43rd Floor Los Angeles CA 90071-1422

MINUTES ENTERED Page 7 of 7 DEPT. · 56 04/19/16 COUNTY CLERK

p.089p. 155 EXHIBIT F to DAVID DERUBERTIS DECL Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 05/28/2019 02:07 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by S. Bolden,Deputy Clerk

1 PAUL HASTINGS LLP ELENA R. BACA (SB# 160564) 2 [email protected] JENNIFER L. MILAZZO (SB# 318356) 3 [email protected] 515 South Flower Street 4 Twenty-Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 5 Telephone: (213) 683-6000 Facsimile: (213) 627-0705 6 Attorneys for Defendant 7 David Danziger

8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 11 12 DOV CHARNEY, an individual, CASE NO. BC585664 13 Plaintiff, SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF ELENA R. BACA IN SUPPORT OF DAVID 14 v. DANZIGER’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 15 DAVID DANZIGER, an individual; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, 16 Date: June 4, 2019 Defendants. Time: 8:45 a.m. 17 Dept.: 14 Judge: Hon. Terry A. Green 18 RESERVATION ID: 181026360333 19

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

SUPPLEMENTAL DECL. OF ELENA BACA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES LEGAL_US_E # 141940854.2

1 DECLARATION OF ELENA R. BACA

2 I, Elena R. Baca, hereby declare and state as follows: 3 1. I am an attorney duly admitted to practice law before all the Courts of the State of 4 California and this Court. I am a partner at the law firm of Paul Hastings LLP, and counsel of 5 record for Defendant David Danziger (“Danziger”). I make this supplemental declaration in 6 support of Danziger’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (“Fees Motion”). I have personal knowledge 7 of the facts set forth below, and if called as a witness, I would and could competently testify 8 thereto. 9 2. On October 29, 2018, Danziger filed his Fees Motion. Plaintiff Dov Charney 10 (“Plaintiff”) opposed the Fees Motion on May 21, 2019, which was not served on Danziger until 11 May 23, 2019, at approximately 1:25 p.m. Plaintiff was required to serve his Opposition no later 12 than the close of business on May 22, 2019. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1005. 13 3. Danziger’s requested fee award seeks additional recovery for the approximately 14 37.2 hours that attorneys from Paul Hastings billed on work related to Danziger’s Motion for 15 Attorneys’ Fees (the “Fees Motion”). I billed 3.1 hours on such work, including drafting and 16 revising the Fees Motion and supporting declarations. Scott Klausner, a mid-level associate at 17 Paul Hastings at the time, billed 6 hours to the Fees Motion, including drafting and revising the 18 Fees Motion. Paul Kind, a mid-level associate at Paul Hastings at the time, billed 5.5 hours on 19 work related to the Fees Motion, including revising the Fees Motion and preparing the supporting 20 declarations and related filings. Jennifer L. Milazzo, a junior associate, spent 14.9 hours on work 21 related to the Fees Motion, including revising the Fees Motion, reviewing the supporting 22 invoices, performing legal research, and finalizing the Fees Motion and relating filings. Daniel 23 Rojas, a junior associate, spent 7.7 hours on work related to the Fees Motion, including revising 24 the Fees Motion and performing legal research in support of the Fees Motion. Attached hereto as 25 “Exhibit A” is a true and correct copy of redacted invoices prepared by Paul Hastings that reflect 26 time spent and billed from October 1, 2018 through December 31, 2018, in connection with Paul 27 Hastings’ preparation of the Fees Motion. Exhibit A has been redacted to preserve attorney-client 28 -2- SUPPLEMENTAL DECL. OF ELENA R. BACA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES LEGAL_US_E # 141940854.2

1 and attorney work product information, while providing sufficient support for the fees sought to 2 be recovered by the Fees Motion. 3 4. I have reviewed the billing statements submitted to Danziger by Paul Hastings in 4 connection with the preparation of the Fees Motion and found them to be accurate. Paul 5 Hastings’ monthly billing statements are maintained in the ordinary course of business and 6 establish that Paul Hastings attorneys spent 37.2 hours preparing the Fees Motion. Any time that 7 was determined to be excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, was “written off” and not 8 billed. Paul Hastings’ customary standard billing rates are commensurate with the rates of 9 attorneys of similar skill, experience, and expertise in the same area. The hourly billing rates 10 submitted herewith are the standard and customary hourly rates charged by Paul Hastings to other 11 clients for attorneys’ work. Applying the standard hourly rates charged annually to the hours 12 worked since October 1, 2018 results in the aggregated value for 37.2 hours worked. 13 5. Danziger’s requested fee award also seeks additional recovery for the 14 approximately 15.66 hours that attorneys from Paul Hastings billed on work related to Danziger’s 15 Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Fees Motion (the “Reply”). Paul Hastings has not yet 16 finalized bills for its services related to the preparation of the Reply in support of the Fees 17 Motion. Nevertheless, I have diligently tracked the time I have billed in connection with the 18 Reply. To date, I have billed 0.6 hours on such work. This time was spent reviewing and 19 analyzing Plaintiff’s Opposition, reviewing and revising the Reply, and drafting and revising the 20 supporting declarations and related filings. I have also reviewed the time records of Ms. Milazzo, 21 which she has recorded using Paul Hastings’ attorney time-tracker software. Ms. Milazzo has 22 billed 15.6 hours in connection with the Reply. This work has consisted of reviewing and 23 analyzing Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Fees Motion, conducting legal research regarding the 24 arguments raised in the Opposition and authorities cited in support thereof, drafting and revising 25 the Reply, and drafting and revising the supporting declarations and related filings. 26 6. Attached hereto as “Exhibit B” is a summary of the time and aggregate value of 27 time based on the standard hourly rates, organized by billing attorney, contained in the redacted 28 invoices attached as Exhibit A and the time entered into Paul Hastings’ time-tracker software. -3- SUPPLEMENTAL DECL. OF ELENA R. BACA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES LEGAL_US_E # 141940854.2

1 Exhibit B was prepared by Paul Hastings in the regular course of business at my direction after

2 my review of Paul Hastings' invoices in this matter. Exhibit B reflects a true and accurate

3 summary of the time spent and billed from October 1, 2018 through December 31, 2018, in

4 connection with Paul Hastings' preparation of the Fees Motion and a true and accurate summary

5 of the time spent on the Reply from May 23, 2019 to May 28, 2019.

6 7. Paul Kind received his J.D. from Loyola Law School, where he graduated Order of

7 the Coif While in law school, Mr. Kind served as a Note & Comment Editor of the Loyola of

8 Los Angeles Law Review, and he won the award for the best published comment. Mr. Kind also

9 served· as a judicial extern to the Honorable Stephen R. Reinhardt of the United States Court of

10 Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and to R. Gary Klausner of the United States District Court for the

11 Central District of California.

12 8. Daniel Rojas graduated from the University of Chicago Law School. While in law

13 school, Mr. Rojas was an in-.house legal intern at Microsoft. In 2018, Mr. Rojas' hourly billable

14 rate was $560.00.

15 9. The rates for Daniel Rojas and Paul Kind are commensurate with rates of other top

16 law firms in the Los Angeles area and are therefore reasonable.

17 10. My 2019 standard hourly billable rate is $1,200.00.

18 11. Ms. Milazzo's 2019 standard hourly billable rate is $735.00.

20 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of

21 California that the foregoing is true and correct. 22

23 Executed this 28th day of May 2019, at Los Angeles, California.

25 26 By: 27

-4- SUPPLEMENTAL DECL. OF ELENA R. BACA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES LEGAL_ US_E # 141940854.2

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 5 PAUL HASTINGS LLP 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 t: +1.213.683.6000 | f: +1.213.627.0705 | www.paulhastings.com

November 26, 2018

SUMMARY SHEET

Charney Litigation (Danzinger)

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending October 31, 2018 Costs incurred and advanced Current Fees and Costs Due Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due - Due Upon Receipt

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 6 PAUL HASTINGS LLP 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 t: +1.213.683.6000 | f: +1.213.627.0705 | www.paulhastings.com

November 26, 2018

REMITTANCE COPY

Charney Litigation (Danzinger)

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending October 31, 2018 Costs incurred and advanced Current Fees and Costs Due Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due - Due Upon Receipt

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 7 Page 2

REMITTANCE COPY (cont.)

Summary of Prior Balance Due Invoice Payments/ Invoice Date Number Amount Trust Appl. Credits Balance Due 07/31/2017 09/25/2017 10/25/2017 11/21/2017 12/20/2017 01/15/2018 03/26/2018 04/23/2018 05/30/2018 06/21/2018 07/27/2018 08/21/2018 09/26/2018 10/19/2018

Total Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 8 PAUL HASTINGS LLP 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 t: +1.213.683.6000 | f: +1.213.627.0705 | www.paulhastings.com

November 26, 2018

FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED for the period ending October 31, 2018

Charney Litigation (Danzinger)

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description Hours

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description Hours 10/09/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo A104 Manage the preparation of invoices for motion 0.40 for attorney fees 10/10/2018 Daniel Rojas A102 Legal research regarding motion for attorneys 1.00 fees 10/11/2018 Daniel Rojas A102 Legal research regarding motion for attorneys 1.00 fees 10/12/2018 Daniel Rojas A102 Legal research regarding motion for attorneys 1.00 fees

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 9 Page 2

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description Hours 10/26/2018 Elena R. Baca A103 Review transcript for motion for attorney fees 0.50

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description Hours

10/22/2018 Scott M. Klausner A103 Prepare motion for attorneys' fees and 3.00 supporting documents 10/23/2018 Scott M. Klausner A103 Prepare motion for attorneys' fees and 3.00 supporting documents 10/25/2018 Elena R. Baca A103 Prepare motion for attorneys fee 0.20 10/26/2018 Elena R. Baca A103 Prepare motion for fees 0.20 10/26/2018 Elena R. Baca A103 Revise motion for attorneys' fees 0.80 10/26/2018 Elena R. Baca A103 Prepare attorneys' fee motion 0.40 10/26/2018 Paul D. Kind A103 Prepare notice of motion and motion for fees 2.00 10/26/2018 Paul D. Kind A103 Prepare E. Baca declaration in support of 3.50 motion for fees 10/28/2018 Elena R. Baca A103 Prepare motion for attorneys' fees 0.50 10/29/2018 Elena R. Baca A103 Prepare fees motion 0.40

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description Hours

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 10 Page 3

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description Hours 10/15/2018 Daniel Rojas A103 Draft and revise motion for attorney's fees 3.50 10/25/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo A103 Prepare notice of motion and motion for 0.30 attorneys' fees 10/26/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo A104 Prepare notice of motion and motion for 5.00 attorneys' fees 10/27/2018 Daniel Rojas A102 Legal research relating to motion for attorney's 1.20 fees 10/27/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo A104 Prepare and revise motion for attorneys' fees 1.30 and supporting declaration 10/28/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo A104 Prepare and revise motion for attorneys' fees 2.90 and supporting declaration 10/29/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo A104 Manage filing of motion for attorneys fees 2.40

10/29/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo A104 Revise and finalize motion for attorneys' fees 2.40

10/30/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo A101 Attend to management of upcoming deadlines 0.20 pertaining to attorneys' fee motion

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description Hours

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 11 Page 4

Timekeeper Summary Elena R. Baca 3.10 hours at Scott M. Klausner 6.00 hours at Paul D. Kind 7.00 hours at Daniel Rojas 7.70 hours at Jennifer L. Milazzo 14.90 hours at

Costs incurred and advanced Date Description Quantity Rate Amount

Total Costs incurred and advanced

Current Fees and Costs Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due - Due Upon Receipt

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 12 PAUL HASTINGS LLP 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 t: +1.213.683.6000 | f: +1.213.627.0705 | www.paulhastings.com

January 16, 2019

SUMMARY SHEET

Charney Litigation (Danzinger)

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending December 31, 2018 Current Fees and Costs Due Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due - Due Upon Receipt

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 13 PAUL HASTINGS LLP 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 t: +1.213.683.6000 | f: +1.213.627.0705 | www.paulhastings.com

January 16, 2019

REMITTANCE COPY

Charney Litigation (Danzinger)

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending December 31, 2018 Current Fees and Costs Due Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due - Due Upon Receipt

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 14 Page 2

REMITTANCE COPY (cont.)

Total Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 15 PAUL HASTINGS LLP 515 South Flower Street, 25th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 t: +1.213.683.6000 | f: +1.213.627.0705 | www.paulhastings.com

January 16, 2019

FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED for the period ending December 31, 2018

Charney Litigation (Danzinger)

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description Hours 12/11/2018 Elena R. Baca A104 Review status of clerk's award of attorneys fees 0.10 and costs as prevailing party

Timekeeper Summary Elena R. Baca 0.10 hours at

Current Fees and Costs Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due - Due Upon Receipt

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 16

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B, PAGE 17 Date Timekeeper Description Hours Legal research regarding motion for attorneys 10/10/2018 Daniel Rojas 1.00 fees Legal research regarding motion for attorneys 10/11/2018 Daniel Rojas 1.00 fees Legal research regarding motion for attorneys 10/12/2018 Daniel Rojas 1.00 fees 10/15/2018 Daniel Rojas Draft and revise motion for attorney's fees 3.50 Legal research relating to motion for attorney's 10/27/2018 Daniel Rojas 1.20 fees 10/25/2018 Elena R. Baca Prepare motion for attorneys fee 0.20 10/26/2018 Elena R. Baca Prepare attorneys' fee motion 0.40 10/26/2018 Elena R. Baca Revise motion for attorneys' fees 0.80 10/26/2018 Elena R. Baca Prepare motion for fees 0.20 10/26/2018 Elena R. Baca Review transcript for motion for attorney fees 0.50 10/28/2018 Elena R. Baca Prepare motion for attorneys' fees 0.50 10/29/2018 Elena R. Baca Prepare fees motion 0.40 Review status of clerk's award of attorneys fees 12/11/2018 Elena R. Baca 0.10 and costs as prevailing party Manage the preparation of invoices for motion 10/9/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo 0.40 for attorney fees Prepare notice of motion and motion for 10/25/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo 0.30 attorneys' fees Prepare notice of motion and motion for 10/26/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo 5.00 attorneys' fees Prepare and revise motion for attorneys' fees and 10/27/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo 1.30 supporting declaration Prepare and revise motion for attorneys' fees and 10/28/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo 2.90 supporting declaration 10/29/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo Revise and finalize motion for attorneys' fees 2.40 10/29/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo Manage filing of motion for attorneys fees 2.40 Attend to management of upcoming deadlines 10/30/2018 Jennifer L. Milazzo 0.20 pertaining to attorneys' fee motion Prepare E. Baca declaration in support of motion 10/26/2018 Paul D. Kind 3.50 for fees 10/26/2018 Paul D. Kind Prepare notice of motion and motion for fees 2.00 Prepare motion for attorneys' fees and supporting 10/22/2018 Scott M. Klausner 3.00 documents Prepare motion for attorneys' fees and supporting 10/23/2018 Scott M. Klausner 3.00 documents

Total Additional Timekeeper Billing Rate Grand Total Hours for 2018 Daniel Rojas 7.70 $560.00 $4,312.00 Elena R. Baca 3.10 $1,110.00 $3,441.00 Jennifer L. Milazzo 14.90 $635.00 $9,461.50 Paul D. Kind 5.50 $765.00 $4,207.50 Scott M. Klausner 6.00 $875.00 $5,250.00

Total Additional Timekeeper Hours for 2019 (Reply Billing Rate Grand Total Brief) Elena R. Baca 0.06 $1,200.00 $72.00

LEGAL_US_E # 141963905.2 EXHIBIT B, PAGE 18 Jennifer L. Milazzo 15.60 $735.00 $11,466.00

LEGAL_US_E # 141963905.2 EXHIBIT B, PAGE 19 EXHIBIT G to DAVID DERUBERTIS DECL 1 PAUL HASTINGS LLP ELENA R. BACA (SB# 160564) 2 [email protected] DENNIS S. ELLIS (SB# 178196) FILED 3 [email protected] Superior Court of California SCOTT KLAUSNER (SB# 292070) Cou"ty of Los Angeles 4 [email protected] 515 South Flower Street DEC 3 0 Z015 5 Twenty-Fifth Floor . Los Angeles, CA 90071-2228 Sherd R.®~1,.,·/Clerk 6 Telephone: (213) 683-6000 B ~,Deputy Facsimile: (213) 627-0705 Y.s lshayla Chambers ' 7 Attorneys for Defendants 8 American Apparel, Inc. and Colleen Brown i 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 11

12 DOV CHARNEY, an individual, CASE NO. BC581602 13 Plaintiff, 14 DECLARATION OF DENNIS S. ELLIS IN v. SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT COLLEEN 15 BROWN'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' AMERICAN APPAREL, INC., a Delaware FEES 16 corporation; COLLEEN BROWN, an individual; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, 17 Date: February 26, 2016 Defendants. Time: 1:30 p.m. 18 Dept.: 14 Judge:· Hon. Terry A. Green 19 [Notice of Motion and Motion; Memorandum of 20 Points and Authorities and [Proposed] Order filed and served concurrently herewith] 21

22 r-·.:·r-,:, 23 [-.. _;,... _, 24

(_._i:~·~i c:1c:1 25 26 t··._! t..... = c:! c:i 27 r.:·r..:· 28 ORIGINAL ; "- ·: i._ "i

DECLARATION OF DENNIS S. ELLIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES LEGAL_US_E # 119397032.2 p. 186 DECLARATION OF DENNIS S. ELLIS

2 I, Dennis S. Ellis, hereby declare and state as follows:

3 1. I am an attorney duly admitted to practice law before all the Courts of the State of

4 California and this Court. I am a partner at the law firm of Paul Hastings LLP, Global Chair of

5 Paul Hastings' Complex Litigation and Arbitration Practice Group, and counsel ofrecord for

6 Defendants Colleen Brown ("Brown") and American Apparel, Inc. ("American Apparel")

7 (collectively, "Defendants"). I make this declaration in support of Brown's Motion for

8 Attorneys' Fees. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth below, and if called as a

9 witness, I would and could competently testify thereto.

IO 2. Plaintiff Dov Charney ("Plaintiff') filed his Complaint in this action on May 12,

11 2015. On June 19, 2015, Defendants filed their Special Motion to Strike pursuant to California

12 Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 (the "Anti-SLAPP Motion"). A hearing was held on

13 Defendants' Anti-SLAPP Motion on September 30, 2015, during which this Court granted

14 Defendants' Anti-SLAPP Motion and struck in its entirety Plaintiffs Complaint. A true and

15 correct copy of the September 30, 2015 hearing transcript is attached hereto as "Exhibit A." The

16 Court's October 20, 2015 Statement of Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."

17 3. Attorneys from Paul Hastings billed more than 225 hours of time on work related

18 to Defendants' Anti-SLAPP Motion. This work consisted of developing an efficient, cost

19 effective litigation strategy, analyzing Plaintiffs papers, investigating Plaintiffs allegations,

20 researching legal issues, drafting and r,evising the Anti-SLAPP Motion and Reply, drafting and

21 revising the supporting declarations and related filings, and preparing for and arguing at the

22 hearing on the Anti-SLAPP Motion. Attached hereto as "Exhibit C" is a true and correct copy of j- ~~. 23 redacted invoices prepared by Defendants' counsel that reflect time spent and billed through i... (_;

·.. 24 September 30, 2015, in connection with Paul Hastings' preparation of the Anti-SLAPP Motion. (_.( .. 25 Exhibit C has been redacted to presen/e attorney-client and attorney work product information, c:~:! ··. 26 while providing sufficient support for the fees sought to be recovered by the Fee Motion. i... (_; 27 4. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a summary of the time entries contained in the c::~:! I-~ . . i-·~· 28 redacted invoices attached as Exhibit C. Exhibit D was prepared by Paul Hastings in the regular i,~ i.~ .. l -1- DECLARATION OF DENNIS S. ELLIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES LEGAL_US_E # 119397032.2 p. 187 course of business at my direction after my review of Paul Hastings invoices in this matter.

2 Exhibit D reflects a true and accurate summary of the time spent and billed through September

3 30, 2015 in connection with Paul Hastings' preparation of the Anti-SLAPP Motion.

4 5. I am familiar with Paul Hastings' billing rates and practices. My hourly billing

5 rate is $1,050.00. The hourly billing rate for Nicholas J. Begakis, a senior associate, is $790.00.

6 The hourly billing rate for Scott Klausner, a junior associate, is $550.00. These rates reflect Paul

7 Hastings' standard billing rates, and are routinely accepted by the Firm's clients. These are the

8 rates charged by Paul Hastings in this matter for all work performed during September 2015

9 through to the present. All work performed in this matter during May and June 2015 was billed at

10 reduced rates as a result of a negotiated 15% discount. My hourly billing rate for work done in

11 this matter during May and June 2015 ,was $892.50. The hourly rates of Mr. Begakis and Mr.

12 Klausner during this time were $671.50 and $467.00, respectively. These discounted rates are

13 reflected in the redacted invoices attached as Exhibit C.

14 6. Paul Hastings has not yet finalized bills for its services relating to the instant Fee

15 motion, but based on my evaluation of Paul Hastings' attorney time-tracker software, I estimate

16 that Paul Hastings attorneys have bille'cl approximately 19 hours on work related to this Fee

17 Motion. I further anticipate that Paul Hastings attorneys will bill approximately 18 hours

18 preparing the Reply in support of the Fee Motion and preparing for and attending the hearing on

19 this Motion. Prior to the hearing, Paul Hastings will file and serve a supplemental declaration

20 describing all fees incurred in connection with this Fee Motion.

21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of

22 California that the foregoing is true and correct.

!-+~..:. 23 Executed this 30th day of December 2015, at Los Angeles, California.

1:.,:H·.1; ... 24 ·.::: '• i:.(1 .• : 25 \ cc:1 .·.; ... 26 Dennis S. Ellis 1 1 ht .. 27 ((1:1 r+ .•.. 28 1._cri -2- DECLARATION OF DENNIS S. ELLIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES LEGAL_US_E # 119397032.2 p. 188 • •

j~·

EXHIBIT A p. 189 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT 14 HONORABLE TERRY A. GREEN

DOV CHARNEY, an individual, ) ) CASE NO. BC581602 Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) AMERICAN APPAREL, INC., a ) Delaware corporation; COLLEEN ) BROWN, an individual; and ) DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, ) ) Defendants. ) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-> ) DOV CHARNEY, an individual, ) ) CASE NO. BC581130 Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) STANDARD GENERAL, L.P., a ) Delaware limited partnership; ) STANDARD GENERAL MASTER FUND, ) L.P., a New York limited ) partnership; P STANDARD GENERAL ) LTD., a British Virgin Islands ) limited company; and DOES 1 to ) 50, inclusive, ) ) Defendants. ) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-> REPORTER'S' TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2015 9:26 A.M.

111 NORTH HILL STREET, DEPARTMENT 14 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

1~{.! .. !

-..:· .. KIMBERLY WILDISH, CSR #8078 OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE 1

~r·.:. i l KIMBERLY COURT REPORTERS - 818.789.8960 j. p. 190 1 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL: 2 3 4 FOR THE PLAINTIFF DOV CHARNEY: 5 FINK & STEINBERG BY: OLAF J. MULLER, ESQ.

:·;. 6 11500 WEST OLYMPIC BOULEVARD ' SUITE 316 7 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90064 310.268.0780 8 9 10 11 FOR THE DEFENDANTS AMERICAN APPAREL, INC. 12 AND COLLEEN BROWN: -: .. ) 13 PAUL HASTINGS BY: DENNIS S. ELLIS, ESQ. 14 -AND- NICHOLAS BEGAKIS, ESQ. 15 515 SOUTH FLOWER STREET TWENTY-FIFTH FLOOR 16 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90071 213.683.6112 17 18 19 i· 20 FOR THE DEFENDANTS STANDARD GENERAL,· L. P. ; STANDARD 21 GENERAL MASTER FUND, L.P.; P STANDARD GENERAL LTD.: ' 22 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON, LLP BY: MARK B. HELM, ESQ. 23 -AND- NATHAN .REHN, ESQ.

1.) ~· 24 355 SOUTH GRAND AVENUE THIRTY-FIFTH FLOOR !h,J' 25 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90071. ~:.,.:.. 213.683.9187 iLJi 26 -fl:'.i' !~)I ~~·· 27 ":... , 28 !l::....!1 c::: 2

1-·~· KIMBERLY COURT REPORTERS - 818.789.8960 ;.····:· t1

p. 191 e e

1 public figure. Where is the malice?

2 Okay. You're arguing it's a hostile 3 takeover, basically. But you know, I don't see any 4 evidence of malice. I don't see any evidence of ... 5 They certainly had a good faith belief. <) 6 There's certainly no evidence of reckless disregard of 7 the truth. Anything but.

8 So, I don't know. This is just a... You

~.~.~) 9 know, I don't know what to say. When I look upon this 10 and say: Is there any reasonable likelihood of 11 plaintiff succeeding in this lawsuit?

/''··1 t,;/ .1.4' You know, I think there's a greater 13 likelihood that I'll be the first American astronaut ,,. 14 stranded 'on Mars before Plaintiff wins this lawsuit. I

J. !:> ( ' mean, I just'· cannot see it happening. I mean, it 16 just... This would be certainly an entertaining trial. 17 It certainly beats your usual breach of contract case.

18 I jus~ don't see it. 19 Now, I want to hear from you. You know,

20 your papers here were fun to read. They were just... I 21 really enjoy litigation as an art form. I really do. 22 And I love it when we get great lawyers and great facts 23 and great law and we, fight about it and all this. This 24 is really fun for me. But I want to hear from you. i .. j f-;, I"·-' 25 Now, American Apparel... A slightly ..• 26 different case. I think the next time Ms. Brown wants 1,,,,1 27 to send a letter to all the people in the company, she "'-·-''"1 '• 28 might want to run it. by counsel first. But, okay. We (',. I 10 0 ~~·- I KIMBERLY COURT REPORTERS - 818.789.8960 I :·>· v~ I h p. 192 1 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 3 DEPARTMENT 14 HONORABLE TERRY A. GREEN !• 4 DOV CHARNEY, an individual, ) ) CASE NO. BC581602 l 5 Plaintiff, ) I ) 6 vs. ) ) 7 AMERICAN APPAREL, IN~. , a ) Delaware corporation; COLLEEN ) 8 BROWN, an individual; and ) DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, ) 9 ) Defendants. ) 10 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> ) 11 DOV CHARNEY, an individual, ) ) CASE NO. BC581130 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 vs. ) ) 14 STANDARD GENERAL, L. P. , a ) Delaware limited partnership; ) 15 STANDARD GENERAL MASTER FUND, ) L.P., a New York limited ) 16 partnership; P STANDARD GENERAL ) LTD., a British Virgin Islands ) 17 limited company; and DOES 1 to ) 50, inclusive, ) 18 ) Defendants. ) 19 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 20 I, KIMBERLY.WILDISH, CSR NO. 8078, OFFICIAL 21 REPORTER PRO TEMPORE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE 22 OF CALIFORNIA, FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, DO HEREBY 1-•· 23 CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING PAGES COMPRISE A FULL, TRUE t-.,.1 24 AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN IN THE '., 25 ABOVE~TITLED GAUSE O~SEPTEMBER 30, 2015. ( .... t: 26 ,. ,,.,··

I ~ p. 193 EXHIBIT e· p. 194 e(

2 ORIGINAL FILED 3 OCT 2 0 2015 4 Rece1veo ~1- (' {~ A " )o l."'1 Nf"'l'---r E' LE' •s 5 OCT 0 5 Z015 SU'PERIOR COURT 6 ROOM 102 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 10 11 DOV CHARNEY, an individual, CASE NO. BC581602

12 Plaintiff, RELATED TO CASE NOS. BC581130 AND BC585664 13 v.

14 AMERICAN APP AREL, INC., a Delaware [41R8F88iiR) STATEMENT OF corporation; COLLEEN BROWN, an DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL 15 individual; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 425.16 ET 16 Defendants. SEQ. 17 Date: September 30, 2015 18 Time: 8:45 a.m. Dept.: 14 19 Judge: Hon. Terry A. Green 20 21 22 r. .:. 23 t·... ' 24

(..., •• ! 25 Ci "•, 26 t·· I '• 27 C' f-;. 28 \."I LEGAL US E # 117222132.3 [Fli OPOW:iil3 STATEMENT OF DECISION

p. 195 1 [PROPOSED] STATEMENT OF DECISION 2 On September 30, 2015 at 8:45 a.m., the Special Motion to Strike of Defendants Colleen 3 Brown and American Apparel, Inc. ("American Apparel" or the "Company") (collectively, 4 "Defendants") came on for hearing.before the above entitled Court. Dennis S. Ellis and Nicholas 5 J. Begakis appeared on behalf of Defendants. Olaf Muller appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Dov 6 Charney ("Plaintiff'). For the reasons set forth below, and set forth in greater detail on the 7 record, Defendants' Special Motion to Strike pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 8 Section 425.16 is hereby GRANTED and Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED. 9 With regard to the evidence submitted by the parties in support of, and in opposition to, 10 Defendants' Anti-SLAPP Motion, the Court reviewed and considered the Declarations of Plaintiff 11 and Defendant Brown and the objections thereto. The Court's rulings on the objections to

12 evidence are set forth in the Court's Orders thereon. The Court SUSTAINED Defendants'

13 objections to Plaintiffs Declaration. The Court found Plaintiffs Declaration to be argumentative 14 and to inappropriately characterize purported evidence. With limited exception as set forth in the 15 Order thereon, the Court OVERRULED Plaintiffs objections to Defendant Brown's Declaration. 16 The Court found that Defendant Brown set forth an adequate basis to establish the applicability of 17 the business records exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to California Evidence Code Section 18 1271. Further, the Court found that even if the evidence referenced in Defe.ndant Brown's 19 Declaration did not fall within the business records exception, it was admissible for the non 20 hearsay purpose of establishing Defendant Brown's state of mind with regard to the allegations of 21 the Complaint. Defendants Request for Judicial Notice was GRANTED. 22 Upon considering the papers in support of, and in and in opposition to, Defendants' Anti fd' 23 SLAPP Motion, the evidence submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the Anti-SLAPP r'·., i ::;= 24 Motion, and the arguments of the Parties, the Court hereby finds as follows: \,,,I

;;:;i, 25 1. Defendant Brown's letter, attached as Exhibit E to Plaintiffs Complaint, which i;_,,,p I ;b 26 sets forth the basis for Plaintiffs termination by American Apparel (the "Brown f·... ,l {'; 27 Letter") comes within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute pursuant to California e::: ~.2: 28 Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16(e)(4) as it was conduct in furtherance of -1- Vi LEGAL US E#ll722213=2·::....3 ______---1 [~P82Mi] STATEMENT OF DECISION

p. 196 { .... " . i.. ..

1 Brown 's exercise of her constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 2 public issue and an issue of public interest. The Brown Letter sets forth the basis ..• 3 for the termination of the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of a publicly traded 4 comp any with thousands of employees and approximately 180 million shares 5 outst anding. Further, the Brown Letter was sent at or around the time the 6 Securit ies and Exchange Commission ("SEC") initiated an investigation related to

7 Plain ti ffs conduct and Defendant Brown was aware that the basis for Plaintiffs 8 termin ation would be disclosed to the SEC. The grounds for the termination of the 9 CEOcould affect a company's stock price. Moreover, the Brown Letter was sent 10 to Am erican Apparel employees in an effort to quell the labor unrest alleged by

11 Plainti ff in paragraph 49 of the Complaint. Defendants have, therefore, carried 12 their burden on the first prong of the Anti-SLAPP statute by establishing that the 13 Brown Letter is subject to the protections of California Code of Civil Procedure 14 Sectio n 425.16. Plaintiff was therefore required to make a prima facie showing

15 that he was reasonably likely to succeed in his claims against Defendants.

16 2. TheCourt further finds that the Brown Letter is a privileged communication

17 pursu ant to California Civil Code Section 47(c) because the Brown Letter was 18 directe d to American Apparel employees regarding a matter of mutual interest, the

19 basis fior Plaintiffs termination. 20 3. TheCourt finds that Plaintiff is a public figure, a fact that was not contested by

21 Plain ti ff. 22 4. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff was required to establish that the Brown Letter ~;. 23 was se nt with actual malice. That is, motivated by hatred or ill-will, or made with .·~_; ... i

~··.,. 24 knowl edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. (~ .} .,., 25 5. Plainti ff failed to carry his burden of establishing he would be reasonably likely to

."· ·• 26 succee d on his cause of action for defamation and each of the additional causes of

"·l... ! 27 action alleged in the Complaint are inextricably intertwined with the defamation ctT"1 .. I •· LlS cause of action. As set forth in greater detail on the record, the Court finds that the ! .. i i.•. r·.;.: LEGAL US E # 117222132.3 [ii OPGQ[ji'~ ST ATEMENT OF DECISION

p. 197 ------z---~------

1 Brown Letter is entirely composed of statements that are either not defamatory as a

2 matter of law, or statements of opinion. Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence at all 3 that the Brown Letter was sent with any ill-will or hatred. Plaintiff was thus --tii--~------.... 4 re quired to establish knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. He 5 did not do so. Defendant Brown's Declaration sets forth ample basis for the

6 statements made in the Brown Letter. The Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that 7 the allegations set forth in the Brown Letter were not sufficiently proven. Brown 8 was entitled to reasonably rely on these third party allegations in connection with 9 issuing the Brown Letter. Plaintiffs counsel pointed to two statements during

10 argument he claimed were "knowingly false," whether the Board vote terminating 11 him was unanimous ai;id whether the Board members that voted for his termination 12 were appointed by Plaintiff. The Court finds that these statements were not 13 defamatory. Thus, ef the statements in the Brown letter identified by Plaintiff in 14 paragraph 50 of the Complaint, and relied upon in opposition to Defendants' Anti 15 SLAPP motion, each of those statements was either objectively true, made by 16 Brown without ill-will, hatred, knowledge of falsity or with a reckless disregard 17 for the truth, and/or non-defamatory. Indeed, given the extensive allegations of 18 misconduct that Plaintiff failed to dispute with any competent evidence, the Court 19 hereby finds that Defendant Brown had, at a minimum, a reasonable belief of the 20 truth of the matters set forth in the Brown Letter. 21 II 22 II

~fi,-;. 23 II f\µ!"I

..;. ·~ 24 II

(~~:...! 25 II (1~:1 N·.;:.,, 26 II

[··.~!.' 27 II c~:i ~f";. 28 l. __ lJ .. i LEGAL US E # 117222132.3 [II HOBlilli] STATEMENT OF DECISION

p. 198 1 Defendants Anti-SLAPP Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaint, and each and 2 every cause of action therein, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants shall comply with 3 the California Code of Civil Procedure in connection with any request for attorneys' fees in 4 connection with their motion. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

7 DATED: to - L.o - I~ 8 By: 9 The Honorable Terry A. Green, Judge, Los Angeles County Superior Court 10

12 13 14 15

16 17 18

19 20

21 22 ~· 23 th~'

~.·;_,_ 24 ii ! i •.. ;.+ ... (fi1 25 ·..;- ...

"•":..... 26 i*·J! 27 1f'71·.;... n--..:.:· 28 !tli LEGAL US E # 117222132.3 [jii)BQRflij: STATEMENT OF DECISION

p. 199 .; ·:.'

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 3 . CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND COUNTY OF ~ ss: LOS ANGELES 4

7 On October 5, 2015, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: 8 [PROPOSED] STATEMENT OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 425.16 ET 9 SEQ. . . 10 on the interested parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: 11 Keith A. Fink, Esq. 12 Olaf J. Muller, Esq. Fink & Steinberg 13 11500 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 316 14 Los Angeles, CA 90064 Telephone: (310) 268-0780 15 Facsimile: (310) 268-0790

16 VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL: VIA UPS: By delivering such document(s) to an overnight mail service or an authorized 17 courier in a sealed envelope or package designated by the express service courier addressed to the person(s) on whom it is to be served. 18 D VIA U.S. MAIL: 19 I am readily familiar with the film's practice of collection and processing of correspondence for mailing. Under that practice such sealed envelope(s) would be 20 deposited with the U.S. postal service on June 19, 2015 with postage thereon fully prepaid, at Los Angeles, California. 21

I 22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California rr,;. that the above is true and correct. 23 f't\.!i Executed on October 5, 2015, at Los Angeles, California.

"[,~;~-M 24

!~~·~I 25 (r:r1

·~;. 26 tt\.!I 27 i:[J1 f!-:.0:· 28

1,1,0"'1! LEGAL_US_E# 117239601.1 PROOF OF SERVICE

p. 200 ·-:-

. I I EXHIBIT C I p. 201 I REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS LLP HASTINGS 71 S. Wacker Drive, Forty-Filth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 If: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. July 16, 201.5 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

SUMMARY SHEET

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending May 31, 2015 Less 15% Discount

Costs incurred and advanced Current Fees and Costs Due Total Balance Due

...... ·.... r·r .. , '!<- .. --

~, ... ·.... 1... J._i

p. 202 REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS LLP HASTINGS 71 S. Wacker Drive, Forty-Fifth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 I f: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. July 16, 2015 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

REMITTANCE COPY

Charney Litigation - (Brown)

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending May 31, 2015 Less 15% Discount

Costs incurred and advanced Current Fees and Costs Due Total Balance Due

·.. -.. _

"• .,... ~. ·-

p. 203 REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS llP HASTINGS 71 5. Wacker Drive, Forty-Filth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 If: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. July 16, 2015 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED for the period ending May 31, 2015

Charney Litigation - (Brown) Less 15% Discount

I- ~f-;. t··.,} .. I ,\ .. 05/13/2015 Elena R. Baca A106 Conference with client 0.60 ·--.

(_ ·-'(_ ·- i

1 c: r"'1·-... 05/14/2015 Elena R. Baca J\106 Telephone conference with client 0.90

05/14/2015 Elena R. Baca J\105 Conference with D. Ellis 0.90 c:=c:i t- ~·f--~·

p. 204 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 2

05/26/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A106 Telephone conference with C. Grayson 0.50 regarding strategy of SLAPP . 05/27 /2015 Elena R. Baca A 106 ' Correspond with client 0.20

It-.:. t-..e .. ~

I...... ! ("1·-· '·· t·.} {";.,.._

... ~. l "1

I. I p. 205 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 3

Timekeeper Name Activity Description 05/13/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Correspond regarding standards under the anti 0.20 SLAPP statute for special motion to strike

05/13/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research regarding standards under the 2.40 an\i-SLAPP statute for brining a special motion to strike 05/13/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Strategize 0.30

05/14/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research relating to 0.90 anti-SLAPP motion

p. 206 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 4

p. 207 L __ REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 5

05/21 /2015 Elena R. Baca A106 Strategize with client 0.50

05/26/2015 Elena R. Baca A105 Conference with D. Ellis 0.30

uc.;. rr

05/26/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft anti-SLAPP motion 1.20 05/26/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A105 Conferences with D. Ellis and S. Klausner 0.60 regarding anti-SLAPP motion 05/26/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research relating to key issues in anti- 1.80

l.J.JI

p. 208 REDACTED

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SLAPP motion

05/26/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Draft outline 1.70 regarding anti-SLAPP motion 05/27/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft anti-SLAPP motion 2.10

05/27/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A105 C~rrespond regarding anti- 0.30 SLAPP motion 05/27/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Draft anti-SLAPP motion 6.00 05/27/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research relating to key issues in anti- 2.60 SLAPP motion,

05/27/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Draft outline 1.50 regarding anti-SLAPP motion 05/28/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A103 Review and revise outline of anti-SLAPP 0.50 argument 05/28/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft memorandum of points and authorities in 2.60 support of anti-SLAPP motion 05/28/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft declaration in support of 1.40 anti-SLAPP motion 05/28/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research relating to key issues in anti- 2.00 SLAPP motion

05/28/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Draft anti-SLAPP motion 6.80 05/28/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze record for purposes of 0.70 developing factual allegations in anti-SLAPP motion 05/29/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A103 Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion outline 0.80 05/29/2015 Dennis S. Ellis i\106 Telephone conference with C. Grayson 0.80 regarding anti-SLAPP motion f-+.~· j·.. !i. I ~ ' .. 05/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis J\103 Draft memorandum of points and authorities in 2.80 ...... support of anti-SLAPP motion

( .....( .. = 05/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A105 Conferences with D. Ellis and S. Klausner 0.50 c:ir:: regarding anti-SLAPP motion 05/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft declaration 1.30 f-..} .... i regarding anti-SLAPP motion c:iC:= l-·+~·

1.... lL "!

p. 209 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 7

05/29/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise declaration in 0.80 support of anti-SLAPP motion 05/29/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion 0.40 05/29/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze record for purposes of 1.00 revising and developing factual allegations in declaration in support of anti- SLAPP motion 05/30/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft and revise memorandum of points and 1.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 05/30/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Di.:aft declaration in support of 4.50 anti-SLAPP motion

05/31/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A103 Review and revise declaration 1.00

05/31/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 1.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 05/31/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Review and revise declaration in 1.30 support of anti-SLAPP motion 05/31/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze record for purposes of 1.00 revising and developing factual allegations in declaration in support of anti- SLAPP motion

p. 210 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 8

Timekeeper Summary Elena R. Baca $975.00 Dennis S. Ellis $1,050.00 $825.00 Nicholas]. Begakis $790.00 $485.00 Scott M. Klausner $550.00

Costs incurred and advanced Westlaw 1,527.75 Photocopy Charges 13.00 Total Costs incurred and advanced $1,540.75

-·.:· ...

H.:..:.

p. 211 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 9

r...• .,:.

p. 212 REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS LLP HASTINGS 71 5. Wacker Drive, Forty-Fifth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 If: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. July 30, 2015 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

SUMMARY SHEET

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending June 30, 2015 Less 15% Discount

Costs incurred and advanced Current Fees and Costs Due Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due

,t'·"' '"{7:1

·~

p. 213 REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS LLP HASTINGS 71 S. Wacker Drive, Forty-Fifth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 I f: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. July 30, 2015 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

REMITTANCE COPY

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending June 30, 2015 Less 15% Discount

Costs incurred and advanced Current Fees and Costs Due Prior Balance Due Total Balance Due

p. 214 REDACTED

American App2rel, Inc. Page 2

t\.'

p. 215 REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS llP HASTINGS 71 S. Wacker Drive, Forty-Fifth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 I f: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. July 30, 2015 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED for the period endingJune 30, 2015

~·

..,. .... !J,,..,_11

p. 216 REDACTED

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06/02/2015 Elena R. Baca A105 Correspond with D. Ellis and client 0.30 '

06/01 /2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion and 1.00 supporting declaration (!:I .....;,:. ... _.,,,: .. 06/01 /2015 Dennis S. Ellis A106 Telephone conference with client regarding 0.30 Cl! .. 1 anti-SLAPP motion

'\ ••&· ·~

I,., .. ! i..~ '·i. l

p. 217 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 3

Date Timekeeper Name Activity Description 06/01 /2015 Nicholas]. Begakis A 103 Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion and 4.00 supporting declaration

06/01/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 3.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/01/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise declaration in 0.70 support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/01/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Draft notice of motion and motion to strike 0.30 06/01/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze local rules governing 0.10 filing anti-SLAPP motion 06/01/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research relating to anti-SLAPP motion 1.00 06/01/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Conference with N. Begakis regarding revisions 0.20 to anti-SLAPP motion 06/02/2015 Andrea M. Mariano A103 Review and revise citations and quotations in 2.70 American Apparel's motion to strike 06/02/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A106 Correspond with client regarding anti-SLAPP 0.50 motion 06/02/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion 2.00 06/02/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 1.70 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/02/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Reyiew and revise memorandum of points and 2.60 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/02/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise notice of motion and motion 0.30 to strike j-b.:· 06/03/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 1.00 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion r-.. ti ... ' .. ·. ... .,,. 06/03/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Review and analyze factual record for 0.40 ! ~J .} ~~ anti-SLAPP motion and declaration ·-f"1 !,,... ~l-

~ .....~. ·~ 06/03/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and 2.00 t··. t•-' revise declaration (~~:! t-1!-: ~-

!._ t4 ·1

p. 218 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 4

06/04/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 1.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/04/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze factual record for the 1.00 purpose of revising memorandum of points and authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/04/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and revise memorandum of points and 2.00 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/05/2015 Kicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 1.00 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/05/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise declaration in 0.20 support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/05/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and revise memorandum of points and 0.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion

06/08/2015 Andrea M. Mariano A101 Dr'aft memorandum of points and authorities ill 0.60 support of anti-SLAPP motion for filing 06/08/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 1.20 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/08/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Conference with N. Begakis regarding 0.20

anti-SLAPP motion and declaration

06/08/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Review and revise memorandum of points and 5.00 authorities and declaration in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/09/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A106 Correspond with client regarding revised 0.20 motion and declaration 06/09/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Review and revise motion and declaration 2.30 06/09/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum 0.80 and declaration 06/09/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A107 Correspond with T. Rehn regarding anti-SLAPP 0.30 14-.;;. motion ti").j 06/09/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A105 Correspond with D. Ellis and S. Klausner 0.30 ~."'·,.... regarding anti-SLAPP motion (~... ·ii 06/09/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise declaration in 0.90 !~~~;! support of anti-SLAPP motion

~ .. ·... ·~ 06/10/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 C~rrespond with client regarding anti-SLAPP 0.20 rt:-...! 1 action i~)' h;,..,;;.

11.rt!.;..- :i

p. 219 REDACTED

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06/10/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Review and revise anti-SLAPP action 0.80 06/10/2015 Nicholas]. Begakis A103 Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum 0.70

06/10/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research 0.40

06/10/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 1.80 authorities and declaration in support of anti-SLAPP Motion 06/10/2015 Scott M. Klausner AlOS Review revlSlons 0.30 to anti-SLAPP motion and declaration

06/11 /2015 Dennis S. Ellis A 105 Conference with team regarding anti-SLAPP a.so motion 06/11/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion 2.00

06/11/2015 Nicholas]. Begakis A103 Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum 0.80 and deciaration

06/11/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Conferences with D. Ellis and N. Begakis 0.50 regarding anti-SLAPP motion and declaration

~·

06/11/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 0.90 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP Motion 06/11/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and revise declaration in 1.80 support of anti-SLAPP motion

p. 220 REDACTED

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06/12/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion 1.00

06/12/2015 Elena R. Baca A105 Correspond with D. Ellis regarding anti-SLAPP 0.10 motion 06/12/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A105 Conference with S. Klausner regarding 0.30 anti-SLAPP memorandum 06/12/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A107 Conference with D. Ellis and counsel for 0.70 Standard General regarding anti-SLAPP briefing 06/12/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Research regarding anti- 0.20 SLAPP motion 06/12/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Conference with N. Begakis regarding 0.30 anti-SLAPP motion and declaration

06/12/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Review and analyze anti-SLAPP motion 0.50

06/12/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Legal research regarding 1.20 anti-SLAPP motion

06/12/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Telephone conferences with D. Ellis regarding 0.20 anti- SLAPP motion 06/12/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze 0.50

for the purposes of preparing anti-SLAPP motion and declaration

I•'' r,~1-· 06/15/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Telephone conferences with clients regarding 0.50 anti-SLAPP motion 06/15/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Draft anti-SLAPP motion 1.00 06/15/2015 Elena R. Baca A106 Correspond with client regarding motion 0.20 06/15/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A104 Review and analysis of· anti- 0.50 ·...... _ SLAPP motion 06/15/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum 2.00

1-+~·

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and declaration 06/15/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Conference with D. Ellis regarding 0.10 anti-SLAPP motion 06/15/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Review and revise memorandum of points and 3.00 au~horities and declaration m support of anti-SLAPP motion

06/16/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A102 Draft anti-SLAPP motion and research 2.00

06/16/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise memorandum in support of 5.00 anti-SLAPP motion and declaration in support of same 06/16/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise declaration in 1.20 support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/16/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise memorandum of points and 1.40 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion

06/16/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Review and analyze rules and local 0.20 requirements to ensure compliance of anti- SLAPP motion 06/16/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Conference with N. Begakis regarding revisions 0.20 to anti-SLAPP motion and declaration

06/17/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A107 Telephone conferences with Munger and 1.00 Debevoise regarding anti-SLAPP motion r+.:. 06/17/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A106 Telephone conferences with client regarding 1.00 anti-SLAPP motion f\::-1~ .. '!"'i 06/17/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A103 Draft anti-SLAPP motion 3.00

'• ·. 06/17/2015 Elena R. Baca A104 Review pleading regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.20 (~)..... ! 06/17/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Re;v:iew and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum 3.00 c::c:i and declaration ~~ ·. ·~ ·• 06/17 /2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise notice of motion and anti- 0.40 ['..)\_, SLAPP motion r-r ... 1 ·.-.- ·,.. .. 1-..:t- .:.

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American Apparel, Inc. Page 8

06/17 /2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Conferences with D. Ellis and N. Begakis 0.40 regarding anti-SLAPP motion and declaration

06/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Draft request for judicial notice in support of 0.60 anti-SLAPP motion 06/17 /2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research regarding anti- 0.30 SLAPP motion

06/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Review and revise memorandum of points and 2.90 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise declaration in 2.30 support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/18/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A107 Telephone conference with Munger regarding 0.50 anti-SLAPP motion 06/18/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Finalize anti-SLAPP motion 3.00 06/18/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A104 Review and analysis of Standard General anti- 0.60 SLAPP motion 06/18/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A107 Correspo_nd with M. Helm regarding anti- 0.60 SLAPP motion 06/18/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum 1.50 and supporting declaration 06/18/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and revise notice of motion and anti- 2.70 SLAPP Motion and memorandum of points and authorities, declaration and request for judicial notice in support of anti- SLAPP motion 06/19/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A106 Telephone conference with C. Grayson 0.30 regarding brief 06/19/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A108 Telephone conferences with stakeholders 0.80 regarding brief 06/19/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Final review and revisions to anti-SLAPP 1.50 motion 1.,.:::. 06/19/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and_ revise anti-SLAPP motion, 0.80 rr<' declaration , and request for judicial notice for filing

(~~:;,: '~ i 06/22/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Review press from anti-SLAPP filing 1.00 C:~-~! 06/22/2015 Nicholas]. Begakis A102 Research regarding 1.60 anti-SLAPP arguments l't·-.j .. ! 06/22/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A105 Conference with D. Ellis and S. Klausner 0.60 CQ:! f-ji.:~. l... i] .. !

p. 223 • REDACTED American Apparel, Inc. Page 9

regarding anti-SLAPP 06/25/2015 Scott M. Klausner A106 Draft and revise memorandum of points and 1.60 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/26/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Draft and revise memorandum of po.ints and 2.60 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 06/26/2015 Scott M. Klausner A105 Legal research 2.10 for memorandum of points and authorities in support of anti-SLAPP mntinn

06/19/2015 Nicholas]. Begakis A103 Finalize anti-SLAPP motion 2.60

Timekeeper Summarv Elena R. Baca $975.00 Dennis S. Ellis $1,050.00 Nicholas J. Begakis $790.00 $485.00 Scott M. Klausner $550.00 Andrea M. Mariano $305.00

Costs incurred and advanced Date Description Amount 06/19/2015 Nationwide Legal, LLC (USD) (US); Invoice# 135765 dated 2015-06-19; 1,038.05

p. 224 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 10

LASC Central LosAngelesCA90012; TKT# 761936 dated 06/19/2015 06/19/2015 UPS (USD)QPMPCARD); Invoice# 00000930543265; 06/19/2015; Keith 10.61 Fink; Fink & Steinberg; 11500 West Olympic Boulevard; Los Angeles, CA 90064; 1Z9305430190837076 (MAN) Westlaw 732.15 Photocopy Charges 70.80

p. 225 REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS LLP HASTI ~~GS 71 S. Wacker Drive, Forty-Fifth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 I f: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. September 30, 2015 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

SUMMARY SHEET

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending September 30, 2015 Cos ts incurred and advanced Current Fees and Costs Due Less Retainer Applied Total Balance Due

r·,,.. I

p. 226 REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS llP . HAST 11'-J GS 71 5. Wacker Drive, Forty-Fifth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 If: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. September 30, 2015 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

'REMITTANCE COPY

Legal fees for professional services for the period ending September 30, 2015 Costs incurred and advanced Current Fees and Costs Due Less Retainer Applied Total Balance Due

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p. 227 REDACTED PAUL PAUL HASTINGS LLP HASTINGS 71 S. Wacker Drive, Forty-Fifth Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 t: +1.312.499.6000 I f: +1.312.499.6100 I www.paulhastings.com

American Apparel, Inc. September 30, 2015 747 Warehouse Street Los Angeles, CA 90021

FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED for the period ending September 30, 2015

09/30/2015 Elena R. Baca A106 Conference with D. Ellis 0.40

09/30/2015 Elena R. Baca A106 Telephone conference with client 0.70

09/22/2015 Elena R. Baca A103 Review reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 0.30 !-~·"· "'-t·:... ·•·. i'·-t ! .. :

09/29/2015 Elena R. Baca A106 Communication with client 0.20 r.. i ;· .. , ..... ! c.:t:' j-:--. ..:t-_.:.

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p. 228 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 2

09/18/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze plaintiffs opposition brief 1.20 and declaration, and legal research

09/19/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research regarding reply brief in support 1.50 of anti-SLAPP motion,

' 09/19/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze plaintiffs declaration 2.00

09/20/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Draft evidentiary objections to plaintiffs 2.70 deposition, including legal research relating to the same 09/20/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Prepare 2.00

reply brief in support of anti-SLAPP motion 09/20/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research for the purpose of preparing 1.50 reply brief in support of anti-SLAPP motion,

09/21/2015 Scott M. Klausner A102 Legal research for the purpose of preparing 0.80 reply brief in support of anti-SLAPP motion

09/23/2015 Andrea M. Mariano A101 Check citations and quotations in reply in 1.40 support of special motion to strike 09/23/2015 Elena R. Baca A103. Review reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 0.30 09/23/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise reply brief in support of anti- 2.00 SLAPP motion 09/23/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Review and revise evidentiary objections to 1.10 plaintiffs declaration 09/25/2015 Scott M. Klausner A104 Review and analyze plaintiffs objections to 0.20 declaration of C. Brown

~·.:~.:. I

p. 229 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 3

09/28/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A104 Review materials for SLAPP motion 1.00 09/29/2015 ·Dennis S. Ellis A101 Prepare for SLAPP motion hearing: 3.00

09/30/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A106 Conference with client regarding anti-SLAPP 0.50 motion· 09/30/2015 Dennis S. Ellis A109 Prepare for and attend anti-SLAPP motion 3.00

09/09/2015 Nicholas}. Begakis A103 Draft opposition to ex parte application to 4.40 continue hearing on anti-SLAPP motion

.. ~ .. ~ F .-·

09/21/2015 Scott M. Klausner A108 Review and "revise reply brief in support of anti 0.90 SLAPP motion 09 /22/2015 Scott M. Klausner A103 Legal research regarding_reply brief in support 0.30 of anti-SLAPP motion ·

p. 230 REDACTED

American Apparel, Inc. Page 4

09/28/2015 Scott M. Klausner A108 Legal research regarding anti-SLAPP standards 0.60

09/18/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A104 Review and analysis of plaintiff's opposition to 1.00 anti-SLAPP motion 09/19/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A108 Correspond with T. Rehn, counsel for Standard 0.50 General, regarding reply briefs in support of anti-SLAPP motions 09/20/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 1.60 09/21/2015 Kicholas J. Begakis A103 Prepare reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 3.60 09/22/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Review and revise objections to evidence in 0.60 support of opposition to anti-SLAPP motion 09/22/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 6.70 09/23/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Finalize reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 1.00 09/25/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis J\104 Review and analyze objections to testimony of 0.40 C. Brown 09/28/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A104 Pr~pare for hearing on anti-SLAPP motion 0.80 09/28/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A108 Conference with T. Rehn regarding Standard 0.40 General anti-SLAPP motion 09/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A108 Conferences and correspond with T. Rehn 0.50 regarding Standard General anti-SLAPP motion 09/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A104 Prepare for oral argument on anti-SLAPP 2.30 motion 09/30/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A103 Draft statement of decision 0.60 09/30/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis A109 Prepare for and attend hearing on anti-SLAPP H..;.:. 4.00 motion f't·:..:!

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p. 231 • REDACTED American Apparel, Inc. Page 5

Elena R. Baca $975.00 Dennis S. Ellis $1,050.00 Nicholas]. Begakis $790.00 Scott M. Klausner $550.00 Andrea M. Mariano $305.00

Costs incurred and advanced Photocopy Charges 60.20 Westlaw 692.10 Total Costs incurred and advanced $752.30

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p. 232 I•'• ~·

EXHIBIT D p. 233 Date Timekeeper Description Hours 5/13/2015 Elena R. Baca Conference with client 0.60 5/14/2015 Elena R. Baca Telephone conference with client 0.90 5/14/2015 Elena R. Baca Conference with D. Ellis 0.90 Telephone conference with C. Grayson regarding 5/26/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 0.50 strategy of SLAPP 5/27/3015 Elena R. Baca Correspond with client 0.20 Correspond regarding standards under the anti-SLAPP 5/13/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.20 statute for special motion to strike

Legal research regarding standards under the anti- 5/13/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.40 SLAPP statute for brining a special motion to strike

5/13/2015 Scott M. Klausner Strategize 0.30 5/14/2015 Scott M. Klausner Legal research relating to anti-SLAPP motion 0.90 5/21/2015 Elena R. Baca Strategize with client a.so 5/26/2015 Elena R. Baca Conference with D. Ellis 0.30 5/26/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Draft anti-SLAPP motion 1.20 Conferences with D. Ellis and S. Klausner regarding anti- 5/26/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.60 SLAPP motion Legal research relating to key issues in anti-SLAPP 5/26/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.80 motion 5/26/2015 Scott M. Klausner Draft outline regarding anti-SLAPP motion 1.70 5/27/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Draft anti-SLAPP motion 2.10 5/27/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Correspond regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.30 5/27/2015 Scott M. Klausner Draft anti-SLAPP motion 6.00 Legal research relating to key issues in anti-SLAPP 5/27/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.60 motion 5/27/2015 Scott M. Klausner Draft outline regarding anti-SLAPP motion 1.50

5/28/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Review and revise outline of anti-SLAPP argument 0.50

Draft memorandum of points and authorities in 5/28/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 2.60 support of anti-SLAPP motion

5/28/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Draft declaration in support of anti-SLAPP motion 1.40

Legal research relating to key issues in anti-SLAPP 5/28/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.00 motion 5/28/2015 Scott M. Klausner Draft anti-SLAPP motion 6.80

Review and a~alyze record for purpose of developing 5/28/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.70 factual allegations in anti-SLAPP motion

'•, 5/29/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion outline 0.80 Telephone conference with C. Grayson regarding anti- 5/29/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 0.80 SLAPP motion ... Draft memorandum of points and authorities in 5/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 2.80 support of anti-SLAPP motion Conferences with D. Ellis and S. Klausner regarding anti- 5/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.50 SLAPP motion

p. 234 5/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Draft declaration regarding anti-SLAPP motion 1.30 Review and revise declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 5/29/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.80 motion 5/29/2015 Scott M. Klausner Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion 0.40 Review and analyze record for the purpose of revising 5/29/2015 Scott M. Klausner and developing factual allegations in declaration in 1.00 support of anti-SLAPP motion Draft and revise memorandum of points and 5/30/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.30 authorities in .support of anti-SLAPP motion

5/30/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Draft declaration in support of anti-SLAPP motion 4.50

5/31/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Review and revise declaration supporting documents 1.00

Review and revise memorandum of points and 5/31/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and revise declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 5/31/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.30 motion Review and analyze record for the purpose of revising 5/31/2015 Scott M. Klausner and developing factual allegations in declaration in 1.00 support of anti-SLAPP motion 5/27/2015 Elena R. Baca Correspond with client 0.20 6/2/2015 Elena R. Baca Correspond with D. Ellis and client 0.30 Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion and supporting 6/1/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 1.00 declaration Telephone conference with client regarding anti-SLAPP 6/1/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 0.30 motion Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion and supporting 6/1/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 4.00 declaration Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/1/2015 Scott M. Klausner 3.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and revise declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 6/1/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.70. motion 6/1/2015 Scott M. Klausner Draft notice of motion and motion to strike 0.30 Review and analyze local rules governing filing anti- 6/1/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.10 SLAPP motion 6/1/2015 Scott M. Klausner Legal research relating to anti-SLAPP motion 1.00 Conference with N. Begakis regarding revisions to anti- 6/1/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.20 1f.-;. SLAPP motion Review and revise citations and quotations in American 6/2/2015 Andrea M. Mariano 2.70 Apparel's motion to strike

6/2/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Correspond with client regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.50

6/2/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion 2.00 ·...... Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/2/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.70 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/2/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.60 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion

p. 235 Review and revise notice of motion and motion to 6/2/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.30 strike Review and r~vise memorandum of points and 6/3/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.00 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and analyze factual record for anti-SLAPP 6/3/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.40 motion and declaration 6/3/2015 Scott M. Klausner Review and revise declaration 2.00 Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/4/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and anayzle factual record for the purpose of 6/4/2015 Scott M. Klausner revising memprandum of points and authorities in 1.00 support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/4/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.00 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/5/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.00 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and revise declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 6/5/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.20 motion Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/5/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.30 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Draft memorandum of points and authorities in 6/8/2015 Andrea M. Mariano 0.60 support of anti-SLAPP motion for filing Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/8/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.20 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Conference with N. Begakis regarding anti-SLAPP 6/8/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.20 motion and declaration Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/8/2015 Scott M. Klausner authorities and declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 5.00 motion Correspond with client regarding revised motion and 6/9/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 0.20 declaration 6/9/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Review and revise motion and declaration 2.30 Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum and 6/9/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.80 declaration ' 6/9/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Correspond with T. Rehn regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.30

Correspond with D. Ellis and S. Klausner regarding anti- 6/9/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.30 SLAPP motion Review and revise declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 6/9/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.90 motion

!'.I Dennis S. Ellis Correspond with client regarding anti-SLAPP action 'r"' i 6/10/2015 0.20 '"'! ·~ 6/10/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Review and revise anti-SLAPP action 0.80 6/10/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum 0.70 6/10/2015 Scott M. Klausner Legal research 0.40

p. 236 Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/10/201S Scott M. Klausner authorities and declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 1.80 motion

6/10/201S Scott M. Klausner Review revisions to anti-SLAPP motion and declaration 0.30

6/11/201S Dennis S. Ellis Conference with team regarding anti-SLAPP motion a.so

6/11/201S Dennis S. Ellis Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion 2.00 Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum and 6/11/201S Nicholas J. Begakis 0.80 declaration Conferences with D. Ellis and N. Begakis regarding anti- 6/11/201S Scott M. Klausner a.so SLAPP motion and declaration Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/11/201S Scott M. Klausner 0.90 authorities in .support of anti-SLAPP Motion Review and revise declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 6/11/201S Scott M. Klausner 1.80 motion 6/12/201S Dennis S. Ellis Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion 1.00

6/12/201S Elena R. Baca Correspond with D. Ellis regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.10

Conference with S. Klausner regarding anti-SLAPP 6/12/201S Nicholas J. Begakis 0.30 memorandum Conference with D. Ellis and counsel for Standard 6/12/201S Nicholas J. Begakis 0.70 General regarding anti-SLAPP briefing 6/12/201S Scott M. Klausner Research regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.20 Conference with N. Begakis regarding anti-SLAPP 6/12/201S Scott M. Klausner 0.30 motion and declaration 6/12/201S Scott M. Klausner Review and analyze anti-SLAPP motion a.so 6/12/201S Scott M. Klausner Legal research regarding anti-SLAPP motion 1.20 Telephone conferences with D. Ellis regarding anti- 6/12/201S Scott M. Klausner 0.20 SLAPP motion Review and analyze for the purposes of preparing anti- 6/12/201S Scott M. Klausner a.so SLAPP motion and declaration Telephone conferences with clients regarding anti- 6/1S/201S Dennis S. Ellis a.so SLAPP motion 6/1S/201S Dennis S. Ellis Draft anti-SLAPP motion 1.00 6/1S/201S Elena R. Baca Correspond with client regarding motion 0.20 6/1S/201S Nicholas J. Begakis Review and analysis of anti-SLAPP motion a.so Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum and 6/1S/201S Nicholas J. Begakis 2.00 declaration

6/1S/201S Scott M. Klausner Conference with D. Ellis regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.10 ,··... .,t ' : ·... ·- Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/1S/201S Scott M. Klausner authorities and declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 3.00 motion f'..+._, 6/16/201S Dennis S. Ellis Draft anti-SLAPP motion and research 2.00 1-·""1.-.- ·... -1._ ... 1 f-C·f-C· i._, .. ,!,_ -1

p. 237 Review and revise memorandum in support of anti- 6/16/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 5.00 SLAPP motion and declartion in support of same

Review and· revise declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 6/16/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.20 motion Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/16/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.40 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion

Review and analyze rules and local requirements to 6/16/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.20 ensure compliance of anti-SLAPP motion

Conference with N. Begakis regarding revisions to anti- 6/16/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.20 SLAPP motion and declaration Telephone conferences with Munger and Debevoise 6/17/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 1.00 regarding anti-SLAPP motion Telephone co.nferences with client regarding anti-SLAPP 6/17/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 1.00 motion 6/17/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Draft anti-SLAPP motion 3.00 6/17/2015 Elena R. Baca Review pleading regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.20 Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum and 6/17/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 3.00 declaration Review and revise notice of motion and anti-SLAPP 6/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.40 motion Conferences with D. Ellis and N. Begakis regarding anti- 6/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.40 SLAPP motion and declaration Draft request for judicial notice in support of anti- 6/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.60 SLAPP motion 6/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner Legal research regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.30 Review and revise memorandum of points and 6/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.90 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Review and revise declaration in support of anti-SLAPP 6/17/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.30 motion Telephone conference with Munger regarding anti- 6/18/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 0.50 SLAPP motion 6/18/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Finalize anti-SLAPP motion 3.00 Review and analysis of Standard General anti-SLAPP 6/18/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.60 motion

6/18/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Correspond with M. Helm regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.60 1-~-i-~· Review and revise anti-SLAPP memorandum and r·+_1 6/18/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.50 supporting declaration Review and revise notice of motion and anti-SLAPP motion and memorandum of points and authorities, 6/18/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.70 declaration, and request for judicial notice in support of ..... , anti-SLAPP motion

6/19/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Telephone conference with C. Grayson regarding brief 0.30 (:1 ('"1 \-•

p. 238 Telephone co~ferences with stakeholders regarding 6/19/2015 Dennis S. Ellis 0.80 brief 6/19/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Final review and revisions to anti-SLAPP motion 1.50

Review and revise anti-SLAPP motion, declaration, and 6/19/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.80 request for judicial notice for filing

6/22/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Review press from anti-SLAPP filing 1.00 6/22/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Research regarding anti-SLAPP arguments 1.60 Conference w_ith D. Ellis and S. Klausner regarding anti- 6/22/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.60 SLAPP Draft and revise memorandum of points and 6/25/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.60 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Draft and revise memorandum of points and 6/26/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.60 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion Legal research for memorandum of points and 6/26/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.10 authorities in support of anti-SLAPP motion 6/19/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Finalize anti-SLAPP motion 2.60 9/30/2015 Elena R. Baca Conference with D. Ellis 0.40 9/30/2015 Elena R. Baca Telephone conference with client 0.70 9/22/2015 Elena R. Baca Review reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 0.30 9/29/2015 Elena R. Baca Communication with client 0.20 Review and analyze plaintiff's opposition brief and 9/18/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.20 declaration, and legal research Legal research regarding reply brief in support of anti- 9/19/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.50 SLAPP motion 9/19/2015 Scott M. Klausner Review and analyze plaintiff's declaration 2.00

Draft evidentiary objections to plaintiff's deposition, 9/20/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.70 including legal research relating to the same

9/20/2015 Scott M. Klausner Prepare reply brief in support of anti-SLAPP motion 2.00

Legal research for the purpose of preparing reply brief 9/20/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.50 in support of anti-SLAPP motion Legal research for the purpose of preparing reply brief 9/21/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.80 in support of anti-SLAPP motion Check citation and quotations in reply in support of 9/23/2015 Andrea M. Mariano 1.40 special motion to strike r+...:· 9/23/2015 Elena R. Baca Review reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 0.30 Review and revise reply brief in support of anti-SLAPP 9/23/2015 Scott M. Klausner 2.00 N::.'-' motion Review and revise evidentiary objections to plaintiff's 9/23/2015 Scott M. Klausner 1.10 declaration Review and analyze plaintiff's objections to declaration 9/25/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.20 ~, .:· ·• of C. Brown r.. r·.i: :·;,..· .. 9/28/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Review materials for SLAPP motion 1.00

•.,..o:" ... I I!! 9/29/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Prepare for SLAPP motion hearing 3.00 ·-~ .....

1-+~·

p. 239 9/30/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Conference with client regarding anti-SLAPP motion 0.50

9/30/2015 Dennis S. Ellis Prepare for and attend anti-SLAPP motion 3.00 Draft opposition to ex parte application to continue 9/9/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 4.40 hearing on anti-SLAPP motion Review and revise reply brief in support of anti-SLAPP 9/21/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.90 motion Legal research regarding reply brief in support of anti- 9/22/2015 Scott M. Klausner 0.30 SLAPP motion 9/28/2015 Scott M. Klausner Legal research regarding anti-SLAPP standards 0.60 Review and analysis of plaintiff's opposition to anti- 9/18/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 1.00 SLAPP motion

Correspond with T. Rehn, counsel for Standard General, 9/19/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.50. regarding reply briefs in support of anti-SLAPP motions

9/20/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Draft reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 1.60 9/21/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Prepare reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 3.60 Review and revise objections to evidence in support of 9/22/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.60 opposition to anti-SLAPP motion 9/22/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Draft reply in 'support of anti-SLAPP motion 6.70 9/23/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Finalize reply in support of anti-SLAPP motion 1.00 Review and analyze objections to testimony of C. 9/25/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.40 Brown 9/28/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Prepare for hearing on anti-SLAPP motion 0.80 Conference with T. Rehn regarding Standard General 9/28/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.40 anti-SLAPP motion Conferences and correspond with T. Rehn regarding 9/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis 0.50 Standard Gen'eral anti-SLAPP motion 9/29/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Prepare for oral argument on anti-SLAPP motion 2.30 9/30/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Draft statement of decision 0.60

9/30/2015 Nicholas J. Begakis Prepare for and attend hearing on anti-SLAPP motion 4.00

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p. 240 • • 1 PROOF OF SERVICE

2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) ss: 3 CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ~ 4

5 I am employed in the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18, and not a party to the within action. My business 6 address is 515 South Flower Street, Twenty-Fifth Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071- 2228. 7 On December 30, 2015, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: 8 DECLARATION OF DENNIS S. ELLIS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT 9 COLLEEN BROWN'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

10 on the interested parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: 11 Keith A. Fink, Esq. 12 Olaf J. Muller, Esq. Fink & Steinberg 13 11500 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 316 14 Los Angeles, CA 90064 Telephone: (310) 268-0780 15 Facsimile: (310) 268-0790 16 D VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL: VIA UPS: By delivering such document(s) to an overnight mail service or an authorized 17 courier in a sealed envelope or package designated by the express service courier addressed to the person(s) on whom it is to be served. 18 VIA U.S. MAIL: 19 I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing of correspondence for mailing. Under that practice such sealed envelope(s) would be 20 deposited with the U.S. postal service on December 30, 2015with postage thereon fully prepaid, at Los Angeles, California. 21

22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. rr~· 23 N·~~' Executed on December 30, 2015, at Los Angeles, California.

~.::: ... 24

(_('::.!·.! 25 (1:1:1 ··.::· ... 26 ~~ielcart

•l".t·.'' !"'' .. 27 c~:: r·~.:. 28 i._ ti'"! PROOF OF SERVICE

p. 241 EXHIBIT H to DAVID DERUBERTIS DECL VALENTINE COST SUMMARY

DATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 06/28/16 PIP Printing Inv. 69135 (printing D Docs prod)$ 701.50 07/24/16 Case Anywhere Inv. 79116 (billing period 04/22/16-06/30/16)$ 92.40 08/23/16 PIP Printing Inv. 70289 (printing add'l D Docs prod)$ 551.50 09/15/16 Superior Court LA (4 page document-unk)$ 4.00 10/04/16 Unlimited Conferencing (total 147 minutes)$ 147.00 10/19/16 Case Anywhere (86227) billing period 07/1/16-09/30/16)$ 120.00 12/05/16 Superior Court LA (34 page document-unk)$ 19.00 12/09/16 PIP Printing Inv. 72473 (copies of D Docs produced)$ 1,402.30 12/09/16 PIP Printing (72473)Print Docs County 11780-21411$ 1,402.30 01/04/17 CCROLA Inv. 140416 (12/19/16 CCW Transcript Order)$ 72.75 01/06/17 PCR (84615) Goldberg, M.D. DEPO taken 12/20/16$ 1,627.15 01/11/17 PCR (84907) Goldberg, M.D.VIDEO taken 12/20/16$ 1,490.25 01/16/17 Case Anywhere (93390) billing period 10/1/16-12/31/16)$ 120.00 04/07/17 PCR (90483) Goldberg, M.D. DEPO Vol. 2 taken 4/3/17$ 2,155.23 04/16/17 Case Anywhere (100490) billing period 1/1/17-3/31/17)$ 120.00 04/17/17 PCR (91087) Goldberg, M.D.VIDEO Vol. 2 taken 4/3/17$ 1,344.25 07/05/17 Case Anywhere (107626) billing period 4/1/17-6/30/17)$ 120.00 08/31/17 Legislative Intent (online research)$ 300.00 09/20/17 GSO (3449037) Feldman Browne Olivares$ 15.69 09/20/17 GSO (3449037) Liberty Cassidy Whitmore$ 15.69 09/20/17 ACE (199792) Stip to cont for Class Cert to LASC$ 114.94 10/04/17 GSO (3466708) Liberty Cassidy Whitmore$ 15.69 10/04/17 GSO (3466708) Feldman Browne Olivares$ 15.69 10/04/17 Case Anywhere (115029) billing period 7/1/17-9/30/17$ 120.00 10/04/17 ACE (200535) SAC/Summons to LASC$ 91.52 10/11/17 ACE (200535) Corrected SAC/Summons to LASC$ 67.02 10/27/17 GSO (34721111) Liberty Cassidy Whitmore$ 23.00 10/27/17 GSO (34721111) Feldman Browne Olivares$ 15.69 11/02/17 Kusar Court Reporters Inv. 236701 (DEPO of PMQ Pineado) $ 478.00 11/16/17 PCR (105337) Goldberg, M.D. DEPO taken 11/10/17 expedited$ 3,350.65 11/21/17 PCR (105313) Goldberg, M.D. VIDEO taken 11/10/17 $ 1,569.00 11/28/17 ACE (203165) MTN for Xcertif to LASC$ 205.70 11/29/17 ACE (203165) Not of Errata to LASC$ 10.75 11/30/17 EconOne Inv. 14268 (NOV HOURS)$ 12,375.00 11/13/17 ACE (202197) Notice/POS to Liberty, Cassidy, Whitmore$ 116.74 01/15/18 Case Anywhere (121645) billing period 10/1/17-12/31/17$ 160.00 03/19/18 Kusar Court Reproters (242422) Erika Sweet-Video$ 189.00 04/12/18 Case Anywhere (129722) billing period 1/1/18-3/31/18$ 135.00 07/10/18 Case Anywhere Inv. 137163 (access fee: 04/01/18-06/30/18)$ 120.00 07/11/18 LASC Case Doc Images #1180710J6056$ 54.20 07/20/18 LASC MSA Filing Fee$ 500.00 07/20/18 GSO (3694427) Liberty, Cassidy, Whitmore$ 22.06 07/31/18 CCROLA (156282) Original and Cert Transcript fee for Motion$ 333.60 07/31/18 LASC - DMD Parking (Mtn for Class Cert hearing)$ 20.00 07/31/18 ProLegal Inv. 165751 (LASC Filing on 07/20/18)$ 123.32 09/14/18 Thomas Reuters- Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation$ 218.30 09/25/18 JAMS, INC. Inv. 0004532520-220 (Ps' 01/10/19 Mediation Fees)$ 2,725.00 10/15/18 Case Anywhere Inv. 144177 (07/01/18-09/30/18)$ 135.00 12/05/18 GSO (3800872) JAMS$ 16.33 01/10/19 DMD Parking - Mediation$ 20.00 01/10/19 Case Anywhere Inv. 151128 (10/01/18-12/31/18)$ 120.00 02/19/19 In-House Copies/Prints as of 02/19/19 (3,427 x .10)$ 342.70 04/14/19 Case Anywhere Inv. 158018 (01/01/19-03/31/19)$ 120.00 07/11/19 Case Anywhere Inv. 164976 (04/01/19-06/30/19)$ 120.00 08/22/19 LASC Parking - DMD (Mtn for Preliminary Approval hearing)$ 18.00 08/22/19 CCROLA (166786) 08/22/19 Motion Transcript$ 202.50 10/03/19 Case Anywhere Inv. 172118 (07/01/19-09/30/19)$ 120.00 10/29/19 CCROLA (168481) 10/10/19 Reporter Fee & Transcript$ 623.15 01/08/20 In-House Copies/Prints from 02/20/19-01/08/20 (537 x .10)$ 53.70 01/08/20 Case Anywhere Inv. 179356 (10/01/19-12/31/19)$ 120.00

TOTAL VALENTINE (COLA) COSTS:$ 37,002.26