Statue of Tzu in Yurihama, Tottori, un Tzu wrote 2,500 years ago during an agricultural age but S has remained relevant through both the industrial and information ages. When we think about security, Japan’s greatest strategic concern is , and we cannot discuss Chinese without first discussing . In this article, I demonstrate how contemporary Chinese apply the teachings of Sun Tzu and his seminal The Art of .1

Why Sun Tzu? Europe first discovered Sun Tzu during the late 18th century. Wilhelm II, the emperor of Germany, supposedly stated, “I wish I could have read Sun Tzu before I.” General Douglas MacArthur once stated that he always kept Sun Tzu’s and Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass on his desk. At the end of the , the United States borrowed from Sun Tzu when it created “competitive strategy,” which aimed to attack the Soviets’ weaknesses with American strengths.2 This is exactly Sun Tzu’s meaning when he said an “ avoids strength and strikes weak- ness.” I have also heard that this idea is referred to as a “net assessment” strat- egy in the Pentagon. When I was a student at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, I studied Caspar Weinberger’s “six tests.” When I first considered his tests I imme- diately thought, “This is the teaching of Sun Tzu.” Let us consider Weinberger’s six tests and the comparable ideas found in The Art of War (see table). Sun Tzu in General added a few tests of his own with the so-called Powell Doctrine, and his tests also have compa- Contemporary rable passages in Sun Tzu. For instance, Powell’s questions “Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entangle- ment?” and “Have risks and costs been Chinese Strategy fully and frankly analyzed?” are similarly mentioned in chapter 2 of The Art of War. By Fumio Ota Contemporary Chinese Strategy In 2001 I had some conversations with Dr. Fumio Ota, Vice Admiral (Ret.), Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, was the Director of the General Xiong Guankai, deputy chief Defense Intelligence Headquarters in the Japan Defense Agency. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and received his Ph.D. from the School of Advanced International of in Beijing. When I offered a Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. phrase from Sun Tzu in conversation,

76 Commentary / Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 the general recited the whole passage in Table. Sun Tzu. I also visited the People’s Lib- eration Army (PLA) National Defense Weinberger’s “Six Tests” Passages from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War University (PLANDU), the highest The United States should not commit forces “War is a matter of vital importance to the to combat overseas unless the particular State; the province of life or death; the road to educational institute for the Chinese engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our survival or ruin” (chapter 1). , and asked the vice president national interest or that of our allies. how PLANDU teaches Sun Tzu. He If we decide it is necessary to put combat “A victorious army wins its victories before answered that the ancient troops into a given situation, we should do so seeking ; an army destined to defeat is the centerpiece of the curriculum. wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of fights in the hope of winning” (chapter 4). winning. According to the Chinese Information Bureau in 2006, the PLA decided to If we do decide to commit forces to combat “Now to win and take your objectives, overseas, we should have clearly defined political but to fail to exploit these achievements is use The Art of War as the educational and military objectives. ominous and may be described as wasteful textbook not only for officers but also delay” (chapter 12). for all enlisted soldiers and sailors. The relationship between our objectives and When I was invited by the PLA the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually University of Science and Technology reassessed and adjusted if necessary. (PLAUST) to the Symposium for Before we commit combat forces abroad, there “The people [must] be in harmony with their Presidents of Military Institutions in must be some reasonable assurance we will have leaders, so that they will accompany them in October 2011, I spoke to the president the support of the American people and their life and unto death without fear of moral peril” of PLAUST during the symposium. elected representatives in Congress. (chapter 1). Whenever I mentioned a phrase from Sun The commitment of forces to combat should be a Tzu’s writing, he too responded with the last resort. entire passage. He had memorized the strategist’s work. him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally 35 South. On its maps, China portrays a I also had an opportunity to visit out when he does not expect you” (The three-line configuration that includes the the PLA Army Command Academy in Art of War, chapter 1). Hawaiian Islands as the third–island chain. Nanjing where the academy’s motto Since all Chinese In 2012 a Chinese delegation insisted from a passage in chapter 5 of The Art seem to memorize Sun Tzu, it is possible on Hawaiian sovereignty to Secretary of of War appears on the library wall: “Use that Chinese strategy is based on The Art State Hillary Clinton. Admiral Timothy the normal force to engage; use the ex- of War. All Central Military Commission Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific traordinary to win.” An American scholar members except Xi Jinping are generals Command, was approached in 2007 by pointed out that the Chinese concept and admirals who have memorized his a Chinese admiral who advocated divid- of cyber attack is based on that phrase.3 work completely. Even though PLA weap- ing the Pacific. Due to the declaration There were other framed phrases from ons and tactics are not as sophisticated as that “China will never seek hegemony,” Sun Tzu in the library: “All warfare is those of the major Western powers, this Chinese strategy is clearly deceptive. based on ,” and “There are comprehensive strategy—which includes We have to look at their real intentions. strategist’s keys to victory. It is not pos- nonmilitary means—is clever, and we must The latest China’s National Defense sible to discuss them beforehand.” understand how China has adopted Sun emphasizes “rapid assaults.”5 Military A phrase of Deng Xiaoping’s Tzu for its contemporary strategy. and Security Developments Involving 24-Character Plan (“Hide our capabili- What is Chinese contemporary the People’s Republic of China 2013 also ties and bide our time”), which was a strategy? It is not necessarily revealed states that the “PRC continues to pur- central tenant of Chinese strategy since in China’s National Defense, which is sue [the ability] to fight and win short the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, published every 2 years. In the preface we duration [conflicts].”6 This is contextu- is derived from ’s The Six read, “China will never seek hegemony.”4 ally similar to “while we have heard of Secret Teachings on the Way of Strategy, According to reports by the Center for blundering swiftness in war, we have one of China’s . Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and not yet seen a clever operation that was Some of ’s characteristics RAND, by 2020 China will be well on prolonged,” which is found in chapter 2 of strategic secrets, such as “When an its way to having the means to achieve of The Art of War. enemy advances, we will retreat,” “When its first–island chain policy. In May 2013 an enemy stays, we will disturb them,” Chinese newspapers discussed possession “” “When an enemy is tired, we will strike of Okinawa. In 2012 a PLA think tank, In 2003 the them,” and “When an enemy retreats, we the Academy, advocated Central Committee and the Central will chase them” are very similar to Sun a “strong ” that insists Military Commission endorsed the Tzu’s “When he concentrates, prepare that the PLA Navy must protect national “three warfares” concept, reflecting against him; where he is strong, avoid interests west of 165 East and north of China’s recognition that as a global

JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Ota 77 Moreover, Beijing has legislated many internal maritime laws to justify its mari- time activities including: •• Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) •• Proclamation of Territorial Base Line (1996) •• Public Relation Marine Science Research Administrative Regulation (1996) •• Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (1998) •• Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (1999) •• Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Use of Sea Areas (2001) •• Desert Island Protection Usage Administrative Regulation (2003) •• Law of the People’s Republic of Chinese bamboo copy of The Art of War with cover inscription suggesting it was either commissioned China on Island Protection (2009) or transcribed by (UC Riverside) •• National Mobilization Law (2010) Maritime Observation Forecast actor it would benefit from learning to Chinese leaders typically mention •• Administrative Regulations (2012). use the tools of public opinion, particu- ideas such as “Chinese Military Buildup larly during the early stages of a crisis, No Threat to the World” (Defense Disintegration Warfare as these tools have a tendency to bolster Minister Liang Guanglie’s statement The PLA one another.7 The PLA issued 100 in November 2012), or “Peaceful Academy in Nanjing studied disintegra- examples each for psychological, media, Development” (China’s National tion warfare from 2003 to 2009. Then and legal warfare. Defense), or “Harmonious Ocean” (the in 2010 a PLA publisher issued Disinte- examples cited Sun Tzu 30 times, media theme of the PLA Navy’s multinational gration Warfare. A passage from chapter warfare examples cited him 6 times, naval event in 2009). All of these are 3 of The Art of War, “To subdue the and legal warfare examples cited him examples of media warfare or, in other enemy without fighting is the acme of 3 times. The most cited phrase (from words, . On March 8, 2013, skill,” appears on the cover of Disinte- chapter 3) is “To subdue the enemy the People’s Daily reported that the gration Warfare. The idea of disintegra- without fighting is the acme of skill,” sovereignty of the is his- tion warfare includes politics, economy, which appears 10 times. The next most torically pending and not yet determined. culture, psychology, military threats, repeated phrase (from chapter 1) is “All This is still another example of media conspiracy, media propaganda, law, warfare is based on deception,” appear- warfare. To Beijing, the Ryukyu Islands information, and intelligence. All these ing half a dozen times. must represent “key ground, ground concepts are clearly building on Sun The PLA Daily reported that when equally advantageous for the enemy or Tzu’s ideas of deception, disruption, and 10 warships, including 2 Kilo-class me to occupy” (chapter 11, The Art of subduing the enemy without fighting. submarines, passed through the Miyako War) because the North and East Sea In 2012, for the first time since its Strait, they were to conduct exercises in Fleets can pass through the area into the establishment, the Minister of Foreign the spirit of the three warfares concept. Pacific with impunity. However, as Sun Affairs Conference of the Association of As it is not possible to conduct media Tzu stated, “Do not attack an enemy Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was and legal warfare as part of a naval ex- who occupies key ground.” China has not able to announce a joint communi- ercise, we should understand that they instead supported Okinawa’s indepen- qué because China had given tremendous conducted psychological warfare with dence activities, which were developed economic aid to Cambodia, the chair the goals of the deterrence, shock, and by pro-Chinese Okinawans and probably country of the conference. The tighter demoralization of Japan. Chinese secret agents as well.

78 Commentary / Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 coordination of ASEAN over the issue of the South China Sea does not favor China. Therefore, China resorted to dis- integration warfare to try to disrupt the ASEAN alliance by using economic ma- nipulation. China has implemented many methods, including historic issues during World War II, in attempts to divide the United States and Japan as well.

Unrestricted Warfare In 1999 two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published the book Unrestricted Warfare, which changed the definition of unrestricted warfare from “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will” to “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Kurama under way with Arleigh Burke–class guided- non-military, and lethal and non-lethal missile destroyer USS Gridley during passing exercise (U.S. Navy/James R. Evans) means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”8 Power of the People’s Republic of China states, “Of old, the rise of Yin was due Non-armed force includes trade war, (2009), stated that China’s leaders stress to I Chih, who formerly served the Hsia; financial war, a new terror war, and asymmetric to leverage their the Chou came to power through Lu Yu, ecological war.9 As for trade war, China advantages while exploiting the perceived a servant of the Yin.” Paul D. Moore, banned rare-earth mineral exports to vulnerabilities of potential opponents the former FBI chief Chinese intelligence Japan after a Chinese fishing boat skipper using so-called “assassin’s mace” pro- analyst, writes, “Some Americans of was arrested near Senkaku in September grams (for example, counterspace and Chinese ancestry in sensitive research or 2010. In October 2010, when Chinese cyber warfare programs).10 defense-related positions now feel them- dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the selves to be under increased scrutiny as Nobel Prize, Beijing reduced its Intelligence Warfare security risks.”13 imports of salmon from Norway. China There are strategic documents other The third secret agent is the double also reduced banana imports from the than Sun Tzu’s that include the topic of agent. Katrina Leung provides a good Philippines when the two countries intelligence. ’s On example. A former high-value FBI and clashed over Scarborough Shoal in 2012. War has only a few pages mentioning PRC Ministry of State security agent, In part two of the book A Discussion intelligence. He writes, “In short, most Leung allegedly contaminated 20 years of of New Methods of Operation, Qiao intelligence is false.”11 B.H. Liddell intelligence relating to the PRC as well as and Wang cite Sun Tzu: “As water has Hart’s Strategy perhaps intentionally has critically compromising the FBI’s Chinese no constant form, there are in war no no discussion of intelligence at all. Sun counterintelligence program. In March constant conditions. Thus, one able to Tzu spends the entire last chapter of 2013 Bryan Underwood, a former civil- gain victory by modifying his tactics in The Art of War discussing intelligence. ian guard at a U.S. consulate compound accordance with the enemy situation may Sun Tzu identifies five types of secret under construction in China, sold classi- be said to be divine” (The Art of War, agents. The first is the native of the en- fied photographs, information, and access chapter 6). Before this passage, there emy’s country. There is no doubt that to the U.S. consulate to the Ministry of is the famous phrase: “An army avoids countering the native agent is important State Security.14 strength and strikes weakness.” This is for antiterrorism warfare. David W. The fourth secret agent is the the substance of unrestricted warfare. Szady, a former assistant director for the expendable type. Sun Tzu states that Western rely on information Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), expendable agents are friendly spies who systems such as computer networks and stated, “the Chinese . . . mastered the are deliberately given fabricated informa- space surveillance. Beijing wants to attack use of multiple redundant collection plat- tion () that is related to those weaknesses using cyber strikes as forms by looking for students, delegates the media warfare aspect of the three soft means and antisatellite weaponry as to conferences, relatives and researchers warfares concept. In September 2012 hard means. to gather information.”12 the Global Times reported the result of The U.S. Secretary of Defense’s The second secret agent is the one the March 2006 referendum of Ryukyu annual report to Congress, Military inside the organization. The Art of War citizens. Seventy-five percent of them

JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Ota 79 supported independence from Japan and obeyed” (chapter 8), and “If the situation Notes reinstating free trade with China, and is one of victory but the sovereign has 25 percent supported remaining part of issued orders not to engage, the general 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Japan.15 There was in fact no referendum may decide to fight” (chapter 10). We Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). by Ryukyu citizens, and the vast majority have seen many indications of this includ- 2 United States Military Posture for FY1989 of Okinawans want to be a part of Japan. ing the -class nuclear submarine’s (Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office, 1989), 5–6, 93–94. This is a typical example of Chinese intrusion into Japanese territorial waters 3 J.P. London, “Made in China,” U.S. disinformation. in November 2004, the antisatellite Naval Institute Proceedings 137, no. 4 (April The last type of secret agent is the test in January 2007, and the 2011), 59. living agent, who collects informa- revelation of the J-20 stealth fighter when 4 China’s National Defense 2012 (Beijing: tion and returns with it. Most living Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Ministry of Defense, 2013), preface. 5 Ibid., chapter 2. agents today engage in cyber espio- China in January 2011. 6 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), nage. The U.S. Office of the National Second, the main theme of the first Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Counterintelligence Executive published half of chapter 6 of The Art of War is Developments Involving the People’s Republic of the Counterintelligence Report (2011), “initiative.” China has made preemptive China 2013 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2013), i. 7 which states, “Chinese actors are the strikes since its establishment, such as OSD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s world’s most active and persistent per- in the in 1950; the Strait Republic of China 2011 (Washington, DC: 16 petrators of economic .” crises in 1954, 1958, and 1995–1996; OSD, 2011), 26. The U.S.-China Economic and Security against India in 1962; against the Soviet 8 Colonel Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Review Commission reported in 2009 Union in 1969; and against in Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA that “U.S. industry and a range of 1974 (Paracel Islands), 1979, and 1988 and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), preface. government and military targets face re- (Spratly Islands). The first principle of 9 Ibid., chapter 2. peated exploitation attempts by Chinese the Chinese Air Force is securing initia- 10 OSD, Annual Report to Congress: hackers as do international organizations tive through operations.20 The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China and nongovernmental groups including Military Power of the People’s Republic 2009 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2009), 20. 11 Chinese dissident groups, activists, reli- of China (2007) contained a side col- Victor M. Rosello, “Clausewitz’s Con- tempt for Intelligence,” Parameters 21 (Spring gious organizations, groups, and umn that asked, “Is China Developing 1991), 103–114. 17 21 media institutions.” Despite the fact a Preemptive Strategy?” But China’s 12 Neil A. Lewis, “Spy Cases Raise Concern that Military and Security Developments National Defense (2008) stated, “China ’s Intentions,” The New York Times, Involving the People’s Republic of China pursues a national defense policy which July 10, 2008. 13 (2013) listed six specific names of spies,18 is purely [deleted since the 2010 version] Paul D. Moore, “How China Plays the Ethnic Card,” Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1999. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokes- defensive in .” 14 Narayan Lakshman, “U.S. jails China- man denied China’s involvement with What should we do for countering based double agent,” The Hindu, March 6, cyber espionage. During the U.S.-China Chinese strategy? We have to know and 2013. Defense Summit in August 2013, use Sun Tzu against China. The general 15 See . 16 Office of the National Counterintel- Wanquan denied (unpersuasively) that factors is moral influence which causes ligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. China was a major source of pervasive the people to be in harmony with their Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to global computer hacking. It has long leaders” (chapter 1). In order to disinte- Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and been acknowledged that China is the grate Chinese moral influence, we must Industrial Espionage, 2009–2011 (Washington, greatest source of cyber attacks against reveal its leaders’ true activities as the DC: Office of the National Counterintelligence 19 Executive, October 2011), i. the West. That is exactly what Sun Tzu New York Times did in October 2012 17 U.S.-China Economic and Security meant when he wrote, “When active, when it reported that Wen Jiabao’s rela- Review Commission, 2012 Report to Congress feign inactivity.” tives had tremendous financial assets in (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing the United States. This news damaged Office, November 2012), 7. 18 Conclusion the legitimacy of the Communist Party. OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, Contemporary Chinese strategy is As a result, the PLA cyber force wanted 51–52. heavily influenced by Sun Tzu, empha- to discredit the article by all means. 19 Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China’s ‘New sizing everything from deception, which Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is a double- Relationship’ Trap,” Washington Times, August we find in chapter 1, to espionage, edged sword. It is effective for opponents 26, 2013, B4. 20 which we read about in chapter 8. but may boomerang on its users. “He who Zhang Yanbing, “Air Force Campaign Principles,” Chinese Air Force Encyclopedia There are two final concerns. First, is not sage and wise, humane and just, (n.c.: Aviation Industry Press, 2005), 95–96. Sun Tzu ignores so-called civilian control. cannot use secret agents” (chapter 8). JFQ 21 OSD, Annual Report to Congress: He writes, “There are occasions when the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China commands of the sovereign need not be 2007 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2007), 12.

80 Commentary / Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014