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Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2Nd Quarter 2014 the General Recited the Whole Passage in Table

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Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2Nd Quarter 2014 the General Recited the Whole Passage in Table Statue of Sun Tzu in Yurihama, Tottori, Japan un Tzu wrote 2,500 years ago during an agricultural age but S has remained relevant through both the industrial and information ages. When we think about security, Japan’s greatest strategic concern is China, and we cannot discuss Chinese strategy without first discussing Sun Tzu. In this article, I demonstrate how contemporary Chinese strategists apply the teachings of Sun Tzu and his seminal The Art of War.1 Why Sun Tzu? Europe first discovered Sun Tzu during the late 18th century. Wilhelm II, the emperor of Germany, supposedly stated, “I wish I could have read Sun Tzu before World War I.” General Douglas MacArthur once stated that he always kept Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass on his desk. At the end of the Cold War, the United States borrowed from Sun Tzu when it created “competitive strategy,” which aimed to attack the Soviets’ weaknesses with American strengths.2 This is exactly Sun Tzu’s meaning when he said an “Army avoids strength and strikes weak- ness.” I have also heard that this idea is referred to as a “net assessment” strat- egy in the Pentagon. When I was a student at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, I studied Caspar Weinberger’s “six tests.” When I first considered his tests I imme- diately thought, “This is the teaching of Sun Tzu.” Let us consider Weinberger’s six tests and the comparable ideas found in The Art of War (see table). Sun Tzu in General Colin Powell added a few tests of his own with the so-called Powell Doctrine, and his tests also have compa- Contemporary rable passages in Sun Tzu. For instance, Powell’s questions “Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entangle- ment?” and “Have risks and costs been Chinese Strategy fully and frankly analyzed?” are similarly mentioned in chapter 2 of The Art of War. By Fumio Ota Contemporary Chinese Strategy In 2001 I had some conversations with Dr. Fumio Ota, Vice Admiral (Ret.), Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, was the Director of the General Xiong Guankai, deputy chief Defense Intelligence Headquarters in the Japan Defense Agency. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and received his Ph.D. from the School of Advanced International of staff in Beijing. When I offered a Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. phrase from Sun Tzu in conversation, 76 Commentary / Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 the general recited the whole passage in Table. Sun Tzu. I also visited the People’s Lib- eration Army (PLA) National Defense Weinberger’s “Six Tests” Passages from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War University (PLANDU), the highest The United States should not commit forces “War is a matter of vital importance to the to combat overseas unless the particular State; the province of life or death; the road to educational institute for the Chinese engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our survival or ruin” (chapter 1). military, and asked the vice president national interest or that of our allies. how PLANDU teaches Sun Tzu. He If we decide it is necessary to put combat “A victorious army wins its victories before answered that the ancient strategist troops into a given situation, we should do so seeking battle; an army destined to defeat is the centerpiece of the curriculum. wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of fights in the hope of winning” (chapter 4). winning. According to the Chinese Information Bureau in 2006, the PLA decided to If we do decide to commit forces to combat “Now to win battles and take your objectives, overseas, we should have clearly defined political but to fail to exploit these achievements is use The Art of War as the educational and military objectives. ominous and may be described as wasteful textbook not only for officers but also delay” (chapter 12). for all enlisted soldiers and sailors. The relationship between our objectives and When I was invited by the PLA the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually University of Science and Technology reassessed and adjusted if necessary. (PLAUST) to the Symposium for Before we commit combat forces abroad, there “The people [must] be in harmony with their Presidents of Military Institutions in must be some reasonable assurance we will have leaders, so that they will accompany them in October 2011, I spoke to the president the support of the American people and their life and unto death without fear of moral peril” of PLAUST during the symposium. elected representatives in Congress. (chapter 1). Whenever I mentioned a phrase from Sun The commitment of forces to combat should be a Tzu’s writing, he too responded with the last resort. entire passage. He had memorized the strategist’s work. him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally 35 South. On its maps, China portrays a I also had an opportunity to visit out when he does not expect you” (The three-line configuration that includes the the PLA Army Command Academy in Art of War, chapter 1). Hawaiian Islands as the third–island chain. Nanjing where the academy’s motto Since all Chinese military personnel In 2012 a Chinese delegation insisted from a passage in chapter 5 of The Art seem to memorize Sun Tzu, it is possible on Hawaiian sovereignty to Secretary of of War appears on the library wall: “Use that Chinese strategy is based on The Art State Hillary Clinton. Admiral Timothy the normal force to engage; use the ex- of War. All Central Military Commission Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific traordinary to win.” An American scholar members except Xi Jinping are generals Command, was approached in 2007 by pointed out that the Chinese concept and admirals who have memorized his a Chinese admiral who advocated divid- of cyber attack is based on that phrase.3 work completely. Even though PLA weap- ing the Pacific. Due to the declaration There were other framed phrases from ons and tactics are not as sophisticated as that “China will never seek hegemony,” Sun Tzu in the library: “All warfare is those of the major Western powers, this Chinese strategy is clearly deceptive. based on deception,” and “There are comprehensive strategy—which includes We have to look at their real intentions. strategist’s keys to victory. It is not pos- nonmilitary means—is clever, and we must The latest China’s National Defense sible to discuss them beforehand.” understand how China has adopted Sun emphasizes “rapid assaults.”5 Military A phrase of Deng Xiaoping’s Tzu for its contemporary strategy. and Security Developments Involving 24-Character Plan (“Hide our capabili- What is Chinese contemporary the People’s Republic of China 2013 also ties and bide our time”), which was a strategy? It is not necessarily revealed states that the “PRC continues to pur- central tenant of Chinese strategy since in China’s National Defense, which is sue [the ability] to fight and win short the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, published every 2 years. In the preface we duration [conflicts].”6 This is contextu- is derived from Jiang Ziya’s The Six read, “China will never seek hegemony.”4 ally similar to “while we have heard of Secret Teachings on the Way of Strategy, According to reports by the Center for blundering swiftness in war, we have one of China’s seven military classics. Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and not yet seen a clever operation that was Some of Mao Zedong’s characteristics RAND, by 2020 China will be well on prolonged,” which is found in chapter 2 of strategic secrets, such as “When an its way to having the means to achieve of The Art of War. enemy advances, we will retreat,” “When its first–island chain policy. In May 2013 an enemy stays, we will disturb them,” Chinese newspapers discussed possession “Three Warfares” “When an enemy is tired, we will strike of Okinawa. In 2012 a PLA think tank, In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party them,” and “When an enemy retreats, we the Military Science Academy, advocated Central Committee and the Central will chase them” are very similar to Sun a “strong military strategy” that insists Military Commission endorsed the Tzu’s “When he concentrates, prepare that the PLA Navy must protect national “three warfares” concept, reflecting against him; where he is strong, avoid interests west of 165 East and north of China’s recognition that as a global JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Ota 77 Moreover, Beijing has legislated many internal maritime laws to justify its mari- time activities including: • Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) • Proclamation of Territorial Base Line (1996) • Public Relation Marine Science Research Administrative Regulation (1996) • Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (1998) • Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (1999) • Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Use of Sea Areas (2001) • Desert Island Protection Usage Administrative Regulation (2003) • Law of the People’s Republic of Chinese bamboo copy of The Art of War with cover inscription suggesting it was either commissioned China on Island Protection (2009) or transcribed by Qianlong Emperor (UC Riverside) • National Mobilization Law (2010) Maritime Observation Forecast actor it would benefit from learning to Chinese leaders typically mention • Administrative Regulations (2012). use the tools of public opinion, particu- ideas such as “Chinese Military Buildup larly during the early stages of a crisis, No Threat to the World” (Defense Disintegration Warfare as these tools have a tendency to bolster Minister Liang Guanglie’s statement The PLA International Relations one another.7 The PLA issued 100 in November 2012), or “Peaceful Academy in Nanjing studied disintegra- examples each for psychological, media, Development” (China’s National tion warfare from 2003 to 2009.
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